Tag Archives: businessofsecurity

Reforming CDA 230

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/12/reforming_cda_2.html

There’s a serious debate on reforming Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. I am in the process of figuring out what I believe, and this is more a place to put resources and listen to people’s comments.

The EFF has written extensively on why it is so important and dismantling it will be catastrophic for the Internet. Danielle Citron disagrees. (There’s also this law journal article by Citron and Ben Wittes.) Sarah Jeong’s op-ed. Another op-ed. Another paper.

Here are good news articles.

Reading all of this, I am reminded of this decade-old quote by Dan Geer. He’s addressing Internet service providers:

Hello, Uncle Sam here.

You can charge whatever you like based on the contents of what you are carrying, but you are responsible for that content if it is illegal; inspecting brings with it a responsibility for what you learn.


You can enjoy common carrier protections at all times, but you can neither inspect nor act on the contents of what you are carrying and can only charge for carriage itself. Bits are bits.

Choose wisely. No refunds or exchanges at this window.

We can revise this choice for the social-media age:

Hi Facebook/Twitter/YouTube/everyone else:

You can build a communications based on inspecting user content and presenting it as you want, but that business model also conveys responsibility for that content.


You can be a communications service and enjoy the protections of CDA 230, in which case you cannot inspect or control the content you deliver.

Facebook would be an example of the former. WhatsApp would be an example of the latter.

I am honestly undecided about all of this. I want CDA230 to protect things like the commenting section of this blog. But I don’t think it should protect dating apps when they are used as a conduit for abuse. And I really don’t want society to pay the cost for all the externalities inherent in Facebook’s business model.

Prices for Zero-Day Exploits Are Rising

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/01/prices_for_zero.html

Companies are willing to pay ever-increasing amounts for good zero-day exploits against hard-to-break computers and applications:

On Monday, market-leading exploit broker Zerodium said it would pay up to $2 million for zero-click jailbreaks of Apple’s iOS, $1.5 million for one-click iOS jailbreaks, and $1 million for exploits that take over secure messaging apps WhatsApp and iMessage. Previously, Zerodium was offering $1.5 million, $1 million, and $500,000 for the same types of exploits respectively. The steeper prices indicate not only that the demand for these exploits continues to grow, but also that reliably compromising these targets is becoming increasingly hard.

Note that these prices are for offensive uses of the exploit. Zerodium — and others — sell exploits to companies who make surveillance tools and cyber-weapons for governments. Many companies have bug bounty programs for those who want the exploit used for defensive purposes — i.e., fixed — but they pay orders of magnitude less. This is a problem.

Back in 2014, Dan Geer said that that the US should corner the market on software vulnerabilities:

“There is no doubt that the U.S. Government could openly corner the world vulnerability market,” said Geer, “that is, we buy them all and we make them all public. Simply announce ‘Show us a competing bid, and we’ll give you [10 times more].’ Sure, there are some who will say ‘I hate Americans; I sell only to Ukrainians,’ but because vulnerability finding is increasingly automation-assisted, the seller who won’t sell to the Americans knows that his vulns can be rediscovered in due course by someone who will sell to the Americans who will tell everybody, thus his need to sell his product before it outdates is irresistible.”

I don’t know about the 10x, but in theory he’s right. There’s no other way to solve this.