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	<title>computer security &#8211; Noise</title>
	<atom:link href="https://noise.getoto.net/tag/computer-security/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://noise.getoto.net</link>
	<description>The collective thoughts of the interwebz</description>
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		<title>Digital Threat Modeling Under Authoritarianism</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2025/09/26/digital-threat-modeling-under-authoritarianism/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2025 11:04:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[threat models]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=70871</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Today’s world requires us to make complex and nuanced decisions about our digital security. Evaluating when to use a secure messaging app like Signal or WhatsApp, which passwords to store on your smartphone, or what to share on social media requires us to assess risks and make judgments accordingly. Arriving at any conclusion is an exercise in threat modeling.</p>
<p>In security, <a href="https://shostack.org/resources/threat-modeling">threat modeling</a> is the process of determining what security measures make sense in your particular situation. It’s a way to think about potential risks, possible defenses, and the costs of both. It’s how experts avoid being distracted by irrelevant risks or overburdened by undue costs...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Why Take9 Won’t Improve Cybersecurity</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2025/05/30/why-take9-wont-improve-cybersecurity/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 May 2025 11:05:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phishing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[psychology of security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security awareness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=70302</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>There’s a new cybersecurity awareness campaign: Take9. The idea is that people—you, me, everyone—should just pause for nine seconds and think more about the link they are planning to click on, the file they are planning to download, or whatever it is they are planning to share.</p>
<p>There’s a <a href="https://pausetake9.org/">website</a>—of course—and a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GlmplblxsGM">video</a>, well-produced and scary. But the campaign won’t do much to improve cybersecurity. The advice isn’t reasonable, it won’t make either individuals or nations appreciably safer, and it deflects blame from the real causes of our cyberspace insecurities...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>On Generative AI Security</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2025/02/05/on-generative-ai-security/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Feb 2025 12:03:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LLM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[microsoft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=69867</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Microsoft’s AI Red Team just published “<a href="https://airedteamwhitepapers.blob.core.windows.net/lessonswhitepaper/MS_AIRT_Lessons_eBook.pdf">Lessons from Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products</a>.” Their <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/01/13/3-takeaways-from-red-teaming-100-generative-ai-products/">blog post</a> lists “three takeaways,” but the eight lessons in the report itself are more useful:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>Understand what the system can do and where it is applied.</li>
<li>You don’t have to compute gradients to break an AI system.</li>
<li>AI red teaming is not safety benchmarking.</li>
<li>Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape.</li>
<li>The human element of AI red teaming is crucial.</li>
<li>Responsible AI harms are pervasive but difficult to measure.</li>
<li>LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones...</li></ol></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Biden Signs New Cybersecurity Order</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2025/01/20/biden-signs-new-cybersecurity-order/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jan 2025 12:06:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=69821</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>President Biden has signed a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2025/01/16/executive-order-on-strengthening-and-promoting-innovation-in-the-nations-cybersecurity/">new cybersecurity order</a>. It has a bunch of provisions, most notably using the US governments procurement power to improve cybersecurity practices industry-wide.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/biden-executive-order-cybersecurity-ai-and-more/">details</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>The core of the executive order is an array of mandates for protecting government networks based on lessons learned from recent major incidents­—namely, the security failures of federal contractors.</p>
<p>The order requires software vendors to submit proof that they follow secure development practices, building on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/M-22-18.pdf">a mandate that debuted</a> in 2022 in response to ...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>On the Cyber Safety Review Board</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/08/06/a-better-investigatory-board-for-cyber-incidents/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Aug 2024 11:01:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=69222</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When an airplane crashes, impartial investigatory bodies leap into action, empowered by law to unearth what happened and why. But there is no such empowered and impartial body to investigate CrowdStrike’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/19/business/microsoft-outage-cause-azure-crowdstrike.html">faulty update</a> that recently unfolded, ensnarling banks, airlines, and emergency services to the tune of billions of dollars. We need one. To be sure, there is the White House’s <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/cyber-safety-review-board-csrb">Cyber Safety Review Board</a>. On March 20, the CSRB <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/CSRB_Review_of_the_Summer_2023_MEO_Intrusion_Final_508c.pdf">released</a> a report into last summer’s intrusion by a Chinese hacking group into Microsoft’s cloud environment, where it compromised the U.S. Department of Commerce, State Department, congressional offices, and several associated companies. But the board’s report—well-researched and containing some good and actionable recommendations—shows how it suffers from its lack of subpoena power and its political unwillingness to generalize from specific incidents to the broader industry...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>LLMs’ Data-Control Path Insecurity</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/05/13/llms-data-control-path-insecurity/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[B. Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2024 11:04:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LLM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[noncomputer hacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[phones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulnerabilities]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68882</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Back in the 1960s, if you played a 2,600Hz tone into an AT&#38;T pay phone, you could make calls without paying. A phone hacker named <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Draper">John Draper</a> noticed that the <a href="https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/capn-crunch-whistle">plastic whistle</a> that came free in a box of Captain Crunch cereal worked to make the right sound. That became his hacker name, and everyone who knew the trick made free pay-phone calls.</p>
<p>There were all sorts of related hacks, such as faking the tones that signaled coins dropping into a pay phone and faking tones used by repair equipment. AT&#38;T could sometimes change the signaling tones, make them more complicated, or try to keep them secret. But the general class of exploit was impossible to fix because the problem was general: Data and control used the same channel. That is, the commands that told the phone switch what to do were sent along the same path as voices...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>A Cyber Insurance Backstop</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/02/28/a-cyber-insurance-backstop/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Feb 2024 12:02:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[insurance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68543</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the first week of January, the pharmaceutical giant Merck quietly <a href="https://therecord.media/merck-insurance-settlement-notpetya">settled its years-long lawsuit</a> over whether or not its property and casualty insurers would cover a $700 million claim filed after the devastating <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/">NotPetya cyberattack</a> in 2017. The malware ultimately infected more than 40,000 of Merck’s computers, which significantly disrupted the company’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1AD1AO/">drug and vaccine production</a>. After Merck filed its $700 million claim, the pharmaceutical giant’s insurers argued that they were not required to cover the malware’s damage because the cyberattack was widely attributed to the Russian government and therefore was excluded from standard property and casualty insurance coverage as a “hostile or warlike act.”...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>New iPhone Security Features to Protect Stolen Devices</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/12/27/new-iphone-security-features-to-protect-stolen-devices/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Dec 2023 12:01:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Apple]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[iPhone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[theft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68236</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Apple is <a href="https://www.macrumors.com/2023/12/12/ios-17-3-stolen-device-protection-feature/">rolling out</a> a new “Stolen Device Protection” feature that seems well thought out:</p>
<blockquote><p>When Stolen Device Protection is turned on, Face ID or Touch ID authentication is required for additional actions, including viewing passwords or passkeys stored in iCloud Keychain, applying for a new Apple Card, turning off Lost Mode, erasing all content and settings, using payment methods saved in Safari, and more. No passcode fallback is available in the event that the user is unable to complete Face ID or Touch ID authentication.</p>
<p>For especially sensitive actions, including changing the password of the Apple ID account associated with the iPhone, the feature adds a security delay on top of biometric authentication. In these cases, the user must authenticate with Face ID or Touch ID, wait one hour, and authenticate with Face ID or Touch ID again. However, Apple said there will be no delay when the iPhone is in familiar locations, such as at home or work...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Friday Squid Blogging: Unpatched Vulnerabilities in the Squid Caching Proxy</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/11/18/friday-squid-blogging-unpatched-vulnerabilities-in-the-squid-caching-proxy/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Nov 2023 22:01:40 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[patching]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[proxies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[squid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulnerabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[web]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67997</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In a rare squid/security post, here&#8217;s an article about unpatched vulnerabilities in the Squid caching proxy.
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.
Read my blog posting gu...]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Decoupling for Security</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/11/08/decoupling-for-security/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[B. Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Nov 2023 12:08:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[cloud computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68058</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><em>This is an excerpt from a longer paper. You can read the whole thing (complete with sidebars and illustrations) <a href="https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2023/11/decoupling-for-security.html">here</a>.</em></p>
<p>Our message is simple: it is possible to get the best of both worlds. We can and should get the benefits of the cloud while taking security back into our own hands. Here we outline a strategy for doing that.</p>
<h3>What Is Decoupling?</h3>
<p>In the last few years, a slew of ideas old and new have converged to reveal a path out of this morass, but they haven’t been widely recognized, combined, or used. These ideas, which we’ll refer to in the aggregate as “decoupling,” allow us to rethink both security and privacy...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Spaf on the Morris Worm</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/11/07/spaf-on-the-morris-worm/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[B. Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Nov 2023 12:08:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[history of computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[history of security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68046</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Gene Spafford wrote an essay reflecting on the Morris Worm of 1988&#8212;thirty-five years ago. His lessons from then are still applicable today.
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		<title>New York Increases Cybersecurity Rules for Financial Companies</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/11/03/new-york-increases-cybersecurity-rules-for-financial-companies/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Nov 2023 11:01:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68036</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Another example of a large and influential state <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-adds-stiffer-requirements-to-cybersecurity-rules-68d49fd1?mod=djemCybersecruityPro&#38;tpl=cy">doing things</a> the federal government won’t:</p>
<blockquote><p>Boards of directors, or other senior committees, are charged with overseeing cybersecurity risk management, and must retain an appropriate level of expertise to understand cyber issues, the rules say. Directors must sign off on cybersecurity programs, and ensure that any security program has “sufficient resources” to function.</p>
<p>In a new addition, companies now face significant requirements related to ransom payments. Regulated firms must now report any payment made to hackers within 24 hours of that payment...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Microsoft is Soft-Launching Security Copilot</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/10/25/microsoft-is-soft-launching-security-copilot/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Oct 2023 11:07:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[incident response]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LLM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[microsoft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67992</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Microsoft has announced an early access program for its LLM-based security chatbot assistant: Security Copilot.
I am curious whether this thing is actually useful.
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		<title>Ethical Problems in Computer Security</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/06/21/ethical-problems-in-computer-security/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2023 17:54:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[academic papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67471</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Tadayoshi Kohno, Yasemin Acar, and Wulf Loh wrote excellent paper on ethical thinking within the computer security community: “<a href="https://securityethics.cs.washington.edu/ComputerSecurityTrolleyProblems.pdf">Ethical Frameworks and Computer Security Trolley Problems: Foundations for Conversation</a>“:</p>
<blockquote><p><b>Abstract:</b> The computer security research community regularly tackles ethical questions. The field of ethics / moral philosophy has for centuries considered what it means to be “morally good” or at least “morally allowed / acceptable.” Among philosophy’s contributions are (1) frameworks for evaluating the morality of actions—including the well-established consequentialist and deontological frameworks—and (2) scenarios (like trolley problems) featuring moral dilemmas that can facilitate discussion about and intellectual inquiry into different perspectives on moral reasoning and decision-making. In a classic trolley problem, consequentialist and deontological analyses may render different opinions. In this research, we explicitly make and explore connections between moral questions in computer security research and ethics / moral philosophy through the creation and analysis of trolley problem-like computer security-themed moral dilemmas and, in doing so, we seek to contribute to conversations among security researchers about the morality of security research-related decisions. We explicitly do not seek to define what is morally right or wrong, nor do we argue for one framework over another. Indeed, the consequentialist and deontological frameworks that we center, in addition to coming to different conclusions for our scenarios, have significant limitations. Instead, by offering our scenarios and by comparing two different approaches to ethics, we strive to contribute to how the computer security research field considers and converses about ethical questions, especially when there are different perspectives on what is morally right or acceptable. Our vision is for this work to be broadly useful to the computer security community, including to researchers as they embark on (or choose not to embark on), conduct, and write about their research, to program committees as they evaluate submissions, and to educators as they teach about computer security and ethics...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Computer Repair Technicians Are Stealing Your Data</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2022/11/28/computer-repair-technicians-are-stealing-your-data/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2022 15:44:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=66278</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Laptop technicians <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/11/half-of-computer-repairs-result-in-snooping-of-sensitive-data-study-finds/">routinely violate the privacy</a> of the people whose computers they repair:</p>
<blockquote><p>Researchers at University of Guelph in Ontario, Canada, recovered logs from laptops after receiving overnight repairs from 12 commercial shops. The logs showed that technicians from six of the locations had accessed personal data and that two of those shops also copied data onto a personal device. Devices belonging to females were more likely to be snooped on, and that snooping tended to seek more sensitive data, including both sexually revealing and non-sexual pictures, documents, and financial information...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Recovering Passwords by Measuring Residual Heat</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2022/10/12/recovering-passwords-by-measuring-residual-heat/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 12 Oct 2022 11:30:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[cameras]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[machine learning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=65951</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Researchers have used thermal cameras and ML guessing techniques to <a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3563693">recover passwords</a> from measuring the residual heat left by fingers on keyboards. From the abstract:</p>
<blockquote><p>We detail the implementation of ThermoSecure and make a dataset of 1,500 thermal images of keyboards with heat traces resulting from input publicly available. Our first study shows that ThermoSecure successfully attacks 6-symbol, 8-symbol, 12-symbol, and 16-symbol passwords with an average accuracy of 92%, 80%, 71%, and 55% respectively, and even higher accuracy when thermal images are taken within 30 seconds. We found that typing behavior significantly impacts vulnerability to thermal attacks, where hunt-and-peck typists are more vulnerable than fast typists (92% vs 83% thermal attack success if performed within 30 seconds). The second study showed that the keycaps material has a statistically significant effect on the effectiveness of thermal attacks: ABS keycaps retain the thermal trace of users presses for a longer period of time, making them more vulnerable to thermal attacks, with a 52% average attack accuracy compared to 14% for keyboards with PBT keycaps...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Bypassing Two-Factor Authentication</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2022/04/01/bypassing-two-factor-authentication/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2022 11:12:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[two-factor authentication]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=65282</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>These techniques are not new, but they’re <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/03/lapsus-and-solar-winds-hackers-both-use-the-same-old-trick-to-bypass-mfa/">increasingly popular</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>…some forms of MFA are stronger than others, and recent events show that these weaker forms aren’t much of a hurdle for some hackers to clear. In the past few months, suspected script kiddies like the Lapsus$ data extortion gang and elite Russian-state threat actors (like Cozy Bear, the group behind the SolarWinds hack) have both successfully defeated the protection.</p>
<p>[…]</p>
<p>Methods include:</p>
<ul>
<li>Sending a bunch of MFA requests and hoping the target finally accepts one to make the noise stop.
...</li></ul></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Mysterious Macintosh Malware</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2021/03/02/mysterious-macintosh-malware/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Mar 2021 12:05:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Apple]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=61995</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This is <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/02/new-malware-found-on-30000-macs-has-security-pros-stumped/">weird</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>Once an hour, infected Macs check a control server to see if there are any new commands the malware should run or binaries to execute. So far, however, researchers have yet to observe delivery of any payload on any of the infected 30,000 machines, leaving the malware’s ultimate goal unknown. The lack of a final payload suggests that the malware may spring into action once an unknown condition is met.</p>
<p>Also curious, the malware comes with a mechanism to completely remove itself, a capability that’s typically reserved for high-stealth operations. So far, though, there are no signs the self-destruct feature has been used, raising the question of why the mechanism exists...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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