Tag Archives: exploitation

Some quick thoughts on the public discussion regarding facial recognition and Amazon Rekognition this past week

Post Syndicated from Dr. Matt Wood original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/some-quick-thoughts-on-the-public-discussion-regarding-facial-recognition-and-amazon-rekognition-this-past-week/

We have seen a lot of discussion this past week about the role of Amazon Rekognition in facial recognition, surveillance, and civil liberties, and we wanted to share some thoughts.

Amazon Rekognition is a service we announced in 2016. It makes use of new technologies – such as deep learning – and puts them in the hands of developers in an easy-to-use, low-cost way. Since then, we have seen customers use the image and video analysis capabilities of Amazon Rekognition in ways that materially benefit both society (e.g. preventing human trafficking, inhibiting child exploitation, reuniting missing children with their families, and building educational apps for children), and organizations (enhancing security through multi-factor authentication, finding images more easily, or preventing package theft). Amazon Web Services (AWS) is not the only provider of services like these, and we remain excited about how image and video analysis can be a driver for good in the world, including in the public sector and law enforcement.

There have always been and will always be risks with new technology capabilities. Each organization choosing to employ technology must act responsibly or risk legal penalties and public condemnation. AWS takes its responsibilities seriously. But we believe it is the wrong approach to impose a ban on promising new technologies because they might be used by bad actors for nefarious purposes in the future. The world would be a very different place if we had restricted people from buying computers because it was possible to use that computer to do harm. The same can be said of thousands of technologies upon which we all rely each day. Through responsible use, the benefits have far outweighed the risks.

Customers are off to a great start with Amazon Rekognition; the evidence of the positive impact this new technology can provide is strong (and growing by the week), and we’re excited to continue to support our customers in its responsible use.

-Dr. Matt Wood, general manager of artificial intelligence at AWS

The FBI tells everybody to reboot their router

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/755741/rss

This CERT
advisory
warns of over 500,000 home routers that have been compromised
by the VPNFilter malware and is advising everybody to reboot their routers
to (partially) remove it. This Talos
Intelligence page
has a lot more information about VPNFilter, though a
lot apparently remains unknown. “At the time of this publication, we
do not have definitive proof on how the threat actor is exploiting the
affected devices. However, all of the affected makes/models that we have
uncovered had well-known, public vulnerabilities. Since advanced threat
actors tend to only use the minimum resources necessary to accomplish their
goals, we assess with high confidence that VPNFilter required no zero-day
exploitation techniques.

BPI Wants Piracy Dealt With Under New UK Internet ‘Clean-Up’ Laws

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/bpi-wants-music-piracy-dealt-with-under-uk-internet-clean-up-laws-180523/

For the past several years, the UK Government has expressed a strong desire to “clean up” the Internet.

Strong emphasis has been placed on making the Internet safer for children but that’s just the tip of a much larger iceberg.

This week, the Government published its response to the Internet Safety Strategy green paper, stating unequivocally that more needs to be done to tackle “online harm”.

Noting that six out of ten people report seeing inappropriate or harmful content online, the Government said that work already underway with social media companies to protect users had borne fruit but overall industry response has been less satisfactory.

As a result, the Government will now carry through with its threat to introduce new legislation, albeit with the assistance of technology companies, children’s charities and other stakeholders.

“Digital technology is overwhelmingly a force for good across the world and we must always champion innovation and change for the better,” said Matt Hancock, Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.

“At the same time I have been clear that we have to address the Wild West elements of the Internet through legislation, in a way that supports innovation. We strongly support technology companies to start up and grow, and we want to work with them to keep our citizens safe.”

While emphasis is being placed on hot-button topics such as cyberbullying and online child exploitation, the Government is clear that it wishes to tackle “the full range” of online harms. That has been greeted by UK music group BPI with a request that the Government introduces new measures to tackle Internet piracy.

In a statement issued this week, BPI chief executive Geoff Taylor welcomed the move towards legislative change and urged the Government to encompass the music industry and beyond.

“This is a vital opportunity to protect consumers and boost the UK’s music and creative industries. The BPI has long pressed for internet intermediaries and online platforms to take responsibility for the content that they promote to users,” Taylor said.

“Government should now take the power in legislation to require online giants to take effective, proactive measures to clean illegal content from their sites and services. This will keep fans away from dodgy sites full of harmful content and prevent criminals from undermining creative businesses that create UK jobs.”

The BPI has published four initial requests, each of which provides food for thought.

The demand to “establish a new fast-track process for blocking illegal sites” is not entirely unexpected, particularly given the expense of launching applications for blocking injunctions at the High Court.

“The BPI has taken a large number of actions against individual websites – 63 injunctions are in place against sites that are wholly or mainly infringing and whose business is simply to profit from criminal activity,” the BPI says.

Those injunctions can be expanded fairly easily to include new sites operating under similar banners or facilitating access to those already covered, but it’s clear the BPI would like something more streamlined. Voluntary schemes, such as the one in place in Portugal, could be an option but it’s unclear how troublesome that could be for ISPs. New legislation could solve that dilemma, however.

Another big thorn in the side for groups like the BPI are people and entities that post infringing content. The BPI is very good at taking these listings down from sites and search engines in particular (more than 600 million requests to date) but it’s a game of whac-a-mole the group would rather not engage in.

With that in mind, the BPI would like the Government to impose new rules that would compel online platforms to stop content from being re-posted after it’s been taken down while removing the accounts of repeat infringers.

Thirdly, the BPI would like the Government to introduce penalties for “online operators” who do not provide “transparent contact and ownership information.” The music group isn’t any more specific than that, but the suggestion is that operators of some sites have a tendency to hide in the shadows, something which frustrates enforcement activity.

Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the BPI is calling on the Government to legislate for a new “duty of care” for online intermediaries and platforms. Specifically, the BPI wants “effective action” taken against businesses that use the Internet to “encourage” consumers to access content illegally.

While this could easily encompass pirate sites and services themselves, this proposal has the breadth to include a wide range of offenders, from people posting piracy-focused tutorials on monetized YouTube channels to those selling fully-loaded Kodi devices on eBay or social media.

Overall, the BPI clearly wants to place pressure on intermediaries to take action against piracy when they’re in a position to do so, and particularly those who may not have shown much enthusiasm towards industry collaboration in the past.

“Legislation in this Bill, to take powers to intervene with respect to operators that do not co-operate, would bring focus to the roundtable process and ensure that intermediaries take their responsibilities seriously,” the BPI says.

The Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and the Home Office will now work on a White Paper, to be published later this year, to set out legislation to tackle “online harms”. The BPI and similar entities will hope that the Government takes their concerns on board.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

XXEinjector – Automatic XXE Injection Tool For Exploitation

Post Syndicated from Darknet original https://www.darknet.org.uk/2018/05/xxeinjector-automatic-xxe-injection-tool-for-exploitation/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=darknetfeed

XXEinjector – Automatic XXE Injection Tool For Exploitation

XXEinjector is a Ruby-based XXE Injection Tool that automates retrieving files using direct and out of band methods. Directory listing only works in Java applications and the brute forcing method needs to be used for other applications.

Usage of XXEinjector XXE Injection Tool

XXEinjector actually has a LOT of options, so do have a look through to see how you can best leverage this type of attack. Obviously Ruby is a prequisite to run the tool.

Read the rest of XXEinjector – Automatic XXE Injection Tool For Exploitation now! Only available at Darknet.

OMG The Stupid It Burns

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/04/omg-stupid-it-burns.html

This article, pointed out by @TheGrugq, is stupid enough that it’s worth rebutting.

The article starts with the question “Why did the lessons of Stuxnet, Wannacry, Heartbleed and Shamoon go unheeded?“. It then proceeds to ignore the lessons of those things.
Some of the actual lessons should be things like how Stuxnet crossed air gaps, how Wannacry spread through flat Windows networking, how Heartbleed comes from technical debt, and how Shamoon furthers state aims by causing damage.
But this article doesn’t cover the technical lessons. Instead, it thinks the lesson should be the moral lesson, that we should take these things more seriously. But that’s stupid. It’s the sort of lesson people teach you that know nothing about the topic. When you have nothing of value to contribute to a topic you can always take the moral high road and criticize everyone for being morally weak for not taking it more seriously. Obviously, since doctors haven’t cured cancer yet, it’s because they don’t take the problem seriously.
The article continues to ignore the lesson of these cyber attacks and instead regales us with a list of military lessons from WW I and WW II. This makes the same flaw that many in the military make, trying to understand cyber through analogies with the real world. It’s not that such lessons could have no value, it’s that this article contains a poor list of them. It seems to consist of a random list of events that appeal to the author rather than events that have bearing on cybersecurity.
Then, in case we don’t get the point, the article bullies us with hyperbole, cliches, buzzwords, bombastic language, famous quotes, and citations. It’s hard to see how most of them actually apply to the text. Rather, it seems like they are included simply because he really really likes them.
The article invests much effort in discussing the buzzword “OODA loop”. Most attacks in cyberspace don’t have one. Instead, attackers flail around, trying lots of random things, overcoming defense with brute-force rather than an understanding of what’s going on. That’s obviously the case with Wannacry: it was an accident, with the perpetrator experimenting with what would happen if they added the ETERNALBLUE exploit to their existing ransomware code. The consequence was beyond anybody’s ability to predict.
You might claim that this is just the first stage, that they’ll loop around, observe Wannacry’s effects, orient themselves, decide, then act upon what they learned. Nope. Wannacry burned the exploit. It’s essentially removed any vulnerable systems from the public Internet, thereby making it impossible to use what they learned. It’s still active a year later, with infected systems behind firewalls busily scanning the Internet so that if you put a new system online that’s vulnerable, it’ll be taken offline within a few hours, before any other evildoer can take advantage of it.
See what I’m doing here? Learning the actual lessons of things like Wannacry? The thing the above article fails to do??
The article has a humorous paragraph on “defense in depth”, misunderstanding the term. To be fair, it’s the cybersecurity industry’s fault: they adopted then redefined the term. That’s why there’s two separate articles on Wikipedia: one for the old military term (as used in this article) and one for the new cybersecurity term.
As used in the cybersecurity industry, “defense in depth” means having multiple layers of security. Many organizations put all their defensive efforts on the perimeter, and none inside a network. The idea of “defense in depth” is to put more defenses inside the network. For example, instead of just one firewall at the edge of the network, put firewalls inside the network to segment different subnetworks from each other, so that a ransomware infection in the customer support computers doesn’t spread to sales and marketing computers.
The article talks about exploiting WiFi chips to bypass the defense in depth measures like browser sandboxes. This is conflating different types of attacks. A WiFi attack is usually considered a local attack, from somebody next to you in bar, rather than a remote attack from a server in Russia. Moreover, far from disproving “defense in depth” such WiFi attacks highlight the need for it. Namely, phones need to be designed so that successful exploitation of other microprocessors (namely, the WiFi, Bluetooth, and cellular baseband chips) can’t directly compromise the host system. In other words, once exploited with “Broadpwn”, a hacker would need to extend the exploit chain with another vulnerability in the hosts Broadcom WiFi driver rather than immediately exploiting a DMA attack across PCIe. This suggests that if PCIe is used to interface to peripherals in the phone that an IOMMU be used, for “defense in depth”.
Cybersecurity is a young field. There are lots of useful things that outsider non-techies can teach us. Lessons from military history would be well-received.
But that’s not this story. Instead, this story is by an outsider telling us we don’t know what we are doing, that they do, and then proceeds to prove they don’t know what they are doing. Their argument is based on a moral suasion and bullying us with what appears on the surface to be intellectual rigor, but which is in fact devoid of anything smart.
My fear, here, is that I’m going to be in a meeting where somebody has read this pretentious garbage, explaining to me why “defense in depth” is wrong and how we need to OODA faster. I’d rather nip this in the bud, pointing out if you found anything interesting from that article, you are wrong.

The Digital Security Exchange Is Live

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/04/the_digital_sec.html

Last year I wrote about the Digital Security Exchange. The project is live:

The DSX works to strengthen the digital resilience of U.S. civil society groups by improving their understanding and mitigation of online threats.

We do this by pairing civil society and social sector organizations with credible and trustworthy digital security experts and trainers who can help them keep their data and networks safe from exposure, exploitation, and attack. We are committed to working with community-based organizations, legal and journalistic organizations, civil rights advocates, local and national organizers, and public and high-profile figures who are working to advance social, racial, political, and economic justice in our communities and our world.

If you are either an organization who needs help, or an expert who can provide help, visit their website.

Note: I am on their advisory committee.

XSStrike – Advanced XSS Fuzzer & Exploitation Suite

Post Syndicated from Darknet original https://www.darknet.org.uk/2018/03/xsstrike-advanced-xss-fuzzer-exploitation-suite/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=darknetfeed

XSStrike – Advanced XSS Fuzzer & Exploitation Suite

XSStrike is an advanced XSS detection suite, which contains a powerful XSS fuzzer and provides zero false positive results using fuzzy matching. XSStrike is the first XSS scanner to generate its own payloads.

It is also built in an intelligent enough manner to detect and break out of various contexts.

Features of XSStrike XSS Fuzzer & Hacking Tool

XSStrike has:

  • Powerful fuzzing engine
  • Context breaking technology
  • Intelligent payload generation
  • GET & POST method support
  • Cookie Support
  • WAF Fingerprinting
  • Handcrafted payloads for filter and WAF evasion
  • Hidden parameter discovery
  • Accurate results via levenshtein distance algorithm

There are various other XSS security related tools you can check out like:

– XSSYA v2.0 Released – XSS Vulnerability Confirmation Tool
– xssless – An Automated XSS Payload Generator Written In Python
– XSSer v1.0 – Cross Site Scripter Framework

You can download XSStrike here:

XSStrike-master.zip

Or read more here.

Read the rest of XSStrike – Advanced XSS Fuzzer & Exploitation Suite now! Only available at Darknet.

OWASP ZSC – Obfuscated Code Generator Tool

Post Syndicated from Darknet original https://www.darknet.org.uk/2018/01/owasp-zsc-obfuscated-code-generator-tool/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=darknetfeed

OWASP ZSC – Obfuscated Code Generator Tool

OWASP ZSC is an open source obfuscated code generator tool in Python which lets you generate customized shellcodes and convert scripts to an obfuscated script.

Shellcodes are small codes in Assembly language which could be used as the payload in software exploitation. Other usages are in malware, bypassing antivirus software, obfuscating code for protection and so on.

This software can be run on Windows/Linux/OSX under Python.

Why use OWASP ZSC Obfuscated Code Generator Tool

Another good reason for obfuscating files or generating shellcode with ZSC is that it can be used for pen-testing assignments.

Read the rest of OWASP ZSC – Obfuscated Code Generator Tool now! Only available at Darknet.

Why Linus is right (as usual)

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/11/why-linus-is-right-as-usual.html

People are debating this email from Linus Torvalds (maintainer of the Linux kernel). It has strong language, like:

Some security people have scoffed at me when I say that security
problems are primarily “just bugs”.
Those security people are f*cking morons.
Because honestly, the kind of security person who doesn’t accept that
security problems are primarily just bugs, I don’t want to work with.

I thought I’d explain why Linus is right.
Linus has an unwritten manifesto of how the Linux kernel should be maintained. It’s not written down in one place, instead we are supposed to reverse engineer it from his scathing emails, where he calls people morons for not understanding it. This is one such scathing email. The rules he’s expressing here are:
  • Large changes to the kernel should happen in small iterative steps, each one thoroughly debugged.
  • Minor security concerns aren’t major emergencies; they don’t allow bypassing the rules more than any other bug/feature.
Last year, some security “hardening” code was added to the kernel to prevent a class of buffer-overflow/out-of-bounds issues. This code didn’t address any particular 0day vulnerability, but was designed to prevent a class of future potential exploits from being exploited. This is reasonable.
This code had bugs, but that’s no sin. All code has bugs.
The sin, from Linus’s point of view, is that when an overflow/out-of-bounds access was detected, the code would kill the user-mode process or kernel. Linus thinks it should have only generated warnings, and let the offending code continue to run.
Of course, that would in theory make the change of little benefit, because it would no longer prevent 0days from being exploited.
But warnings would only be temporary, the first step. There’s likely to be be bugs in the large code change, and it would probably uncover bugs in other code. While bounds-checking is a security issue, its first implementation will always find existing code having latent bounds bugs. Or, it’ll have “false-positives” triggering on things that aren’t actually the flaws its looking for. Killing things made these bugs worse, causing catastrophic failures in the latest kernel that didn’t exist before. Warnings, however, would have equally highlighted the bugs, but without causing catastrophic failures. My car runs multiple copies of Linux — such catastrophic failures would risk my life.
Only after a year, when the bugs have been fixed, would the default behavior of the code be changed to kill buggy code, thus preventing exploitation.
In other words, large changes to the kernel should happen in small, manageable steps. This hardening hasn’t existed for 25 years of the Linux kernel, so there’s no emergency requiring it be added immediately rather than conservatively, no reason to bypass Linus’s development processes. There’s no reason it couldn’t have been warnings for a year while working out problems, followed by killing buggy code later.
Linus was correct here. No vuln has appeared in the last year that this code would’ve stopped, so the fact that it killed processes/kernels rather than generated warnings was unnecessary. Conversely, because it killed things, bugs in the kernel code were costly, and required emergency patches.
Despite his unreasonable tone, Linus is a hugely reasonable person. He’s not trying to stop changes to the kernel. He’s not trying to stop security improvements. He’s not even trying to stop processes from getting killed That’s not why people are moronic. Instead, they are moronic for not understanding that large changes need to made conservatively, and security issues are no more important than any other feature/bug.

Update: Also, since most security people aren’t developers, they are also a bit clueless how things actually work. Bounds-checking, which they define as purely a security feature to stop buffer-overflows is actually overwhelmingly a debugging feature. When you turn on bounds-checking for the first time, it’ll trigger on a lot of latent bugs in the code — things that never caused a problem in the past (like reading past ends of buffers) but cause trouble now. Developers know this, security “experts” tend not to. These kernel changes were made by security people who failed to understand this, who failed to realize that their changes would uncover lots of bugs in existing code, and that killing buggy code was hugely inappropriate.

Update: Another flaw developers are intimately familiar with is how “hardening” code can cause false-positives, triggering on non-buggy code. A good example is where the BIND9 code crashed on an improper assert(). This hardening code designed to prevent exploitation made things worse by triggering on valid input/code.

Update: No, it’s probably not okay to call people “morons” as Linus does. They may be wrong, but they usually are reasonable people. On the other hand, security people tend to be sanctimonious bastards with rigid thinking, so after he has dealt with that minority, I can see why Linus treats all security people that way.

Register for and Attend this September 28 Tech Talk: “How to Use AWS WAF to Mitigate OWASP Top 10 Attacks”

Post Syndicated from Craig Liebendorfer original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/register-for-and-attend-this-september-28-tech-talk-how-to-use-aws-waf-to-mitigate-owasp-top-10-attacks/

AWS Online Tech Talks banner

As part of the AWS Online Tech Talks series, AWS will present How to Use AWS WAF to Mitigate OWASP Top 10 Attacks on Thursday, September 28. This tech talk will start at 9:00 A.M. Pacific Time and end at 9:40 A.M. Pacific Time.

The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 identifies the most critical vulnerabilities that web developers must address in their applications. AWS WAF, a web application firewall, helps you address the vulnerabilities identified in the OWASP Top 10. In this webinar, you will learn how to use AWS WAF to write rules to match common patterns of exploitation and block malicious requests from reaching your web servers.

You also will learn how to:

  • Secure your web applications.
  • Configure AWS Shield and AWS WAF.
  • Defend against the most common Layer 7 attacks.

This tech talk is free. Register today.

– Craig

People can’t read (Equifax edition)

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/09/people-cant-read-equifax-edition.html

One of these days I’m going to write a guide for journalists reporting on the cyber. One of the items I’d stress is that they often fail to read the text of what is being said, but instead read some sort of subtext that wasn’t explicitly said. This is valid sometimes — as the subtext is what the writer intended all along, even if they didn’t explicitly write it. Other times, though the imagined subtext is not what the writer intended at all.

A good example is the recent Equifax breach. The original statement says:

Equifax Inc. (NYSE: EFX) today announced a cybersecurity incident potentially impacting approximately 143 million U.S. consumers.

The word consumers was widely translated to customers, as in this Bloomberg story:

Equifax Inc. said its systems were struck by a cyberattack that may have affected about 143 million U.S. customers of the credit reporting agency

But these aren’t the same thing. Equifax is a credit rating agency, keeping data on people who are not its own customers. It’s an important difference.

Another good example is yesterday’s quote “confirming” that the “Apache Struts” vulnerability was to blame:

Equifax has been intensely investigating the scope of the intrusion with the assistance of a leading, independent cybersecurity firm to determine what information was accessed and who has been impacted. We know that criminals exploited a U.S. website application vulnerability. The vulnerability was Apache Struts CVE-2017-5638.

But it doesn’t confirm Struts was responsible. Blaming Struts is certainly the subtext of this paragraph, but it’s not the text. It mentions that criminals had exploited the Struts vulnerability, but don’t actually connect the dots to the breach we are all talking about.

There’s probably reasons for this. While it’s easy for forensics to find evidence of Struts exploitation in logfiles, it’s much harder to connect this to the breach. While they suspect Struts, they may not actually be able to confirm it. Or, maybe they are trying to cover things up, where they feel failing to patch is a lesser crime than what they really did.

It’s at this point journalists should earn their pay. Instead rewriting what they read on the Internet, they could do legwork and call up Equifax PR and ask.

The purpose of this post isn’t to discuss Equifax, but the tendency of people to “read between the lines”, to read some subtext that wasn’t actually expressed in the text. Sometimes the subtext is legitimately there, such as how Equifax clearly intends people to blame Struts thought they don’t say it outright. Sometimes the subtext isn’t there, such as how Equifax doesn’t mean it’s own customers, only “U.S. consumers”. Journalists need to be careful about making assumptions about the subtext.


Update: The Equifax CSO has a degree in music. Some people have criticized this. Most people have defended this, pointing out that almost nobody has an “infosec” degree in our industry, and many of the top people have no degree at all. Among others, @thegrugq has pointed out that infosec degrees are only a few years old — they weren’t around 20 years ago when today’s corporate officers were getting their degrees.

Again, we have the text/subtext problem, where people interpret infosec degrees as being the same as computer-science degrees, the later of which have existed for decades. Some, as in this case, consider them to be wildly different. Others consider them to be nearly the same.

Hardening the Kernel in Android Oreo (Android Developers Blog)

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/732475/rss

The Android Developers Blog has an
overview of the security features
added to the kernel in the Android
“Oreo” release. “Usercopy functions are used by the kernel to
transfer data from user space to kernel space memory and back again. Since
2014, missing or invalid bounds checking has caused about 45% of Android’s
kernel vulnerabilities. Hardened usercopy adds bounds checking to usercopy
functions, which helps developers spot misuse and fix bugs in their
code. Also, if obscure driver bugs slip through, hardening these functions
prevents the exploitation of such bugs.

NoSQLMap – Automated NoSQL Exploitation Tool

Post Syndicated from Darknet original http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/darknethackers/~3/Y4RGC1J9G-U/

NoSQLMap is an open source Python-based automated NoSQL exploitation tool designed to audit for as well as automate injection attacks and exploit default configuration weaknesses in NoSQL databases. It is also intended to attack web applications using NoSQL in order to disclose data from the database. Presently the tool’s exploits are focused…

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CrackMapExec – Active Directory Post-Exploitation Tool

Post Syndicated from Darknet original http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/darknethackers/~3/r7Om66Zbxck/

CrackMapExec (a.k.a CME) is a post-exploitation tool that helps automate assessing the security of large Active Directory networks. Built with stealth in mind, CME follows the concept of “Living off the Land”: abusing built-in Active Directory features/protocols to achieve its functionality and allowing it to evade most endpoint protection/IDS/IPS…

Read the full post at darknet.org.uk

New Security Whitepaper Now Available: Use AWS WAF to Mitigate OWASP’s Top 10 Web Application Vulnerabilities

Post Syndicated from Vlad Vlasceanu original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/new-security-whitepaper-now-available-use-aws-waf-to-mitigate-owasps-top-10-web-application-vulnerabilities/

Whitepaper image

Today, we released a new security whitepaper: Use AWS WAF to Mitigate OWASP’s Top 10 Web Application Vulnerabilities. This whitepaper describes how you can use AWS WAF, a web application firewall, to address the top application security flaws as named by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). Using AWS WAF, you can write rules to match patterns of exploitation attempts in HTTP requests and block requests from reaching your web servers. This whitepaper discusses manifestations of these security vulnerabilities, AWS WAF–based mitigation strategies, and other AWS services or solutions that can help address these threats.

– Vlad

A Man-in-the-Middle Attack against a Password Reset System

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/07/a_man-in-the-mi.html

This is nice work: “The Password Reset MitM Attack,” by Nethanel Gelerntor, Senia Kalma, Bar Magnezi, and Hen Porcilan:

Abstract: We present the password reset MitM (PRMitM) attack and show how it can be used to take over user accounts. The PRMitM attack exploits the similarity of the registration and password reset processes to launch a man in the middle (MitM) attack at the application level. The attacker initiates a password reset process with a website and forwards every challenge to the victim who either wishes to register in the attacking site or to access a particular resource on it.

The attack has several variants, including exploitation of a password reset process that relies on the victim’s mobile phone, using either SMS or phone call. We evaluated the PRMitM attacks on Google and Facebook users in several experiments, and found that their password reset process is vulnerable to the PRMitM attack. Other websites and some popular mobile applications are vulnerable as well.

Although solutions seem trivial in some cases, our experiments show that the straightforward solutions are not as effective as expected. We designed and evaluated two secure password reset processes and evaluated them on users of Google and Facebook. Our results indicate a significant improvement in the security. Since millions of accounts are currently vulnerable to the PRMitM attack, we also present a list of recommendations for implementing and auditing the password reset process.

Password resets have long been a weak security link.

BoingBoing Post.

TheFatRat – Massive Exploitation Tool

Post Syndicated from Darknet original http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/darknethackers/~3/A3ozOmH4BDE/

TheFatRat is an easy-to-use Exploitation Tool that can help you to generate backdoors and post exploitation attacks like browser attack DLL files. This tool compiles malware with popular payloads and then the compiled malware can be executed on Windows, Linux, Mac OS X and Android. The malware that is created with this tool also has […]

The…

Read the full post at darknet.org.uk