Tag Archives: IAM user

An easier way to control access to AWS resources by using the AWS organization of IAM principals

2018-05-17 Sulay Shah

Post Syndicated from Sulay Shah original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/control-access-to-aws-resources-by-using-the-aws-organization-of-iam-principals/

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) now makes it easier for you to control access to your AWS resources by using the AWS organization of IAM principals (users and roles). For some services, you grant permissions using resource-based policies to specify the accounts and principals that can access the resource and what actions they can perform on it. Now, you can use a new condition key, aws:PrincipalOrgID, in these policies to require all principals accessing the resource to be from an account in the organization. For example, let’s say you have an Amazon S3 bucket policy and you want to restrict access to only principals from AWS accounts inside of your organization. To accomplish this, you can define the aws:PrincipalOrgID condition and set the value to your organization ID in the bucket policy. Your organization ID is what sets the access control on the S3 bucket. Additionally, when you use this condition, policy permissions apply when you add new accounts to this organization without requiring an update to the policy.

In this post, I walk through the details of the new condition and show you how to restrict access to only principals in your organization using S3.

Condition concepts

Before I introduce the new condition, let’s review the condition element of an IAM policy. A condition is an optional IAM policy element you can use to specify special circumstances under which the policy grants or denies permission. A condition includes a condition key, operator, and value for the condition. There are two types of conditions: service-specific conditions and global conditions. Service-specific conditions are specific to certain actions in an AWS service. For example, the condition key ec2:InstanceType supports specific EC2 actions. Global conditions support all actions across all AWS services.

Now that I’ve reviewed the condition element in an IAM policy, let me introduce the new condition.

AWS:PrincipalOrgID Condition Key

You can use this condition key to apply a filter to the Principal element of a resource-based policy. You can use any string operator, such as StringLike, with this condition and specify the AWS organization ID for as its value.

Condition key	Description	Operator(s)	Value
aws:PrincipalOrgID	Validates if the principal accessing the resource belongs to an account in your organization.	All String operators	Any AWS organization ID

Example: Restrict access to only principals from my organization

Let’s consider an example where I want to give specific IAM principals in my organization direct access to my S3 bucket, 2018-Financial-Data, that contains sensitive financial information. I have two accounts in my AWS organization with multiple account IDs, and only some IAM users from these accounts need access to this financial report.

To grant this access, I author a resource-based policy for my S3 bucket as shown below. In this policy, I list the individuals who I want to grant access. For the sake of this example, let’s say that while doing so, I accidentally specify an incorrect account ID. This means a user named Steve, who is not in an account in my organization, can now access my financial report. To require the principal account to be in my organization, I add a condition to my policy using the global condition key aws:PrincipalOrgID. This condition requires that only principals from accounts in my organization can access the S3 bucket. This means that although Steve is one of the principals in the policy, he can’t access the financial report because the account that he is a member of doesn’t belong to my organization.




{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "AllowPutObject",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": ["arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Casey",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/David",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Tom",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Michael",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Brenda",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Lisa",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565664:user/Norman",
				"arn:aws:iam::094697565646:user/Steve",
				"arn:aws:iam::087695765465:user/Douglas",
				"arn:aws:iam::087695765465:user/Michelle"],
            "Action": "s3:GetObject",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::2018-Financial-Data/*",
            "Condition": {"ForAnyValue:StringLike": 
                             {"aws:PrincipalOrgID": [ "o-xxxxxxxxxx" ]}
                         }
        }
    ]
}

In the policy above, I specify the principals that I grant access to using the principal element of the statement. Next, I add s3:GetObject as the action and 2018-Financial-Data/* as the resource to grant read access to my S3 bucket. Finally, I add the new condition key aws:PrincipalOrgID and specify my organization ID in the condition element of the statement to make sure only the principals from the accounts in my organization can access this bucket.

Summary

You can now use the aws:PrincipalOrgID condition key in your resource-based policies to more easily restrict access to IAM principals from accounts in your AWS organization. For more information about this global condition key and policy examples using aws:PrincipalOrgID, read the IAM documentation.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the Comments section below. If you have questions about or suggestions for this solution, start a new thread on the IAM forum or contact AWS Support.

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Refining Access to Branches in AWS CodeCommit

2018-05-16 Chris Barclay

Post Syndicated from Chris Barclay original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/refining-access-to-branches-in-aws-codecommit/

Thanks to Susan Ferrell, Senior Technical Writer, for a great blog post on how to use CodeCommit branch-level permissions.
—-

AWS CodeCommit users have been asking for a way to restrict commits to some repository branches to just a few people. In this blog post, we’re going to show you how to do that by creating and applying a conditional policy, an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policy that contains a context key.

Why would I do this?

When you create a branch in an AWS CodeCommit repository, the branch is available, by default, to all repository users. Here are some scenarios in which refining access might help you:

You maintain a branch in a repository for production-ready code, and you don’t want to allow changes to this branch except from a select group of people.
You want to limit the number of people who can make changes to the default branch in a repository.
You want to ensure that pull requests cannot be merged to a branch except by an approved group of developers.

We’ll show you how to create a policy in IAM that prevents users from pushing commits to and merging pull requests to a branch named master. You’ll attach that policy to one group or role in IAM, and then test how users in that group are affected when that policy is applied. We’ll explain how it works, so you can create custom policies for your repositories.

What you need to get started

You’ll need to sign in to AWS with sufficient permissions to:
- - Create and apply policies in IAM.
  - Create groups in IAM.
  - Add users to those groups.
  - Apply policies to those groups.
You can use existing IAM groups, but because you’re going to be changing permissions, you might want to first test this out on groups and users you’ve created specifically for this purpose.
You’ll need a repository in AWS CodeCommit with at least two branches: master and test-branch. For information about how to create repositories, see Create a Repository. For information about how to create branches, see Create a Branch. In this blog post, we’ve named the repository MyDemoRepo. You can use an existing repository with branches of another name, if you prefer.

Let’s get started!

Create two groups in IAM

We’re going to set up two groups in IAM: Developers and Senior_Developers. To start, both groups will have the same managed policy, AWSCodeCommitPowerUsers, applied. Users in each group will have exactly the same permissions to perform actions in IAM.

Figure 1: Two example groups in IAM, with distinct users but the same managed policy applied to each group

First, create the Developers group.

Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the IAM console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/.
In the navigation pane, choose Groups, and then choose Create New Group.
In the Group Name box, type Developers, and then choose Next Step.
In the list of policies, select the check box for AWSCodeCommitPowerUsers, then choose Next Step.
Choose Create Group.

Now, follow these steps to create the Senior_Developers group and attach the AWSCodeCommitPowerUsers managed policy. You now have two empty groups with the same policy attached.

Create users in IAM

Next, add at least one unique user to each group. You can use existing IAM users, but because you’ll be affecting their access to AWS CodeCommit, you might want to create two users just for testing purposes. Let’s go ahead and create Arnav and Mary.

In the navigation pane, choose Users, and then choose Add user.
For the new user, type Arnav_Desai.
Choose Add another user, and then type Mary_Major.
Select the type of access (programmatic access, access to the AWS Management Console, or both). In this blog post, we’ll be testing everything from the console, but if you want to test AWS CodeCommit using the AWS CLI, make sure you include programmatic access and console access.
For Console password type, choose Custom password. Each user is assigned the password that you type in the box. Write these down so you don’t forget them. You’ll need to sign in to the console using each of these accounts.
Choose Next: Permissions.
On the Set permissions page, choose Add user to group. Add Arnav to the Developers group. Add Mary to the Senior_Developers group.
Choose Next: Review to see all of the choices you made up to this point. When you are ready to proceed, choose Create user.

Sign in as Arnav, and then follow these steps to go to the master branch and add a file. Then sign in as Mary and follow the same steps.

Open the AWS CodeCommit console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/codecommit.
On the Dashboard page, from the list of repositories, choose MyDemoRepo.
In the Code view, choose the branch named master.
Choose Add file, and then choose Create file. Type some text or code in the editor.
Provide information to other users about who added this file to the repository and why.
1. In Author name, type the name of the user (Arnav or Mary).
2. In Email address, type an email address so that other repository users can contact you about this change.
3. In Commit message, type a brief description to help you remember why you added this file or any other details you might find helpful.
4. Type a name for the file.
Choose Commit file.

Now follow the same steps to add a file in a different branch. (In our example repository, that’s the branch named test-branch.) You should be able to add a file to both branches regardless of whether you’re signed in as Arnav or Mary.

Let’s change that.

Create a conditional policy in IAM

You’re going to create a policy in IAM that will deny API actions if certain conditions are met. We want to prevent users with this policy applied from updating a branch named master, but we don’t want to prevent them from viewing the branch, cloning the repository, or creating pull requests that will merge to that branch. For this reason, we want to pick and choose our APIs carefully. Looking at the Permissions Reference, the logical permissions for this are:

GitPush
PutFile
MergePullRequestByFastForward

Now’s the time to think about what else you might want this policy to do. For example, because we don’t want users with this policy to make changes to this branch, we probably don’t want them to be able to delete it either, right? So let’s add one more permission:

DeleteBranch

The branch in which we want to deny these actions is master. The repository in which the branch resides is MyDemoRepo. We’re going to need more than just the repository name, though. We need the repository ARN. Fortunately, that’s easy to find. Just go to the AWS CodeCommit console, choose the repository, and choose Settings. The repository ARN is displayed on the General tab.

Now we’re ready to create a policy.
1. Open the IAM console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/. Make sure you’re signed in with the account that has sufficient permissions to create policies, and not as Arnav or Mary.
2. In the navigation pane, choose Policies, and then choose Create policy.
3. Choose JSON, and then paste in the following:

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": [
                "codecommit:GitPush",
                "codecommit:DeleteBranch",
                "codecommit:PutFile",
                "codecommit:MergePullRequestByFastForward"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:codecommit:us-east-2:80398EXAMPLE:MyDemoRepo",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEqualsIfExists": {
                    "codecommit:References": [
                        "refs/heads/master"   
                    ]
                },
                "Null": {
                    "codecommit:References": false
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

You’ll notice a few things here. First, change the repository ARN to the ARN for your repository and include the repository name. Second, if you want to restrict access to a branch with a name different from our example, master, change that reference too.

Now let’s talk about this policy and what it does. You might be wondering why we’re using a Git reference (refs/heads) value instead of just the branch name. The answer lies in how Git references things, and how AWS CodeCommit, as a Git-based repository service, implements its APIs. A branch in Git is a simple pointer (reference) to the SHA-1 value of the head commit for that branch.

You might also be wondering about the second part of the condition, the nullification language. This is necessary because of the way git push and git-receive-pack work. Without going into too many technical details, when you attempt to push a change from a local repo to AWS CodeCommit, an initial reference call is made to AWS CodeCommit without any branch information. AWS CodeCommit evaluates that initial call to ensure that:

a) You’re authorized to make calls.

b) A repository exists with the name specified in the initial call. If you left that null out of the policy, users with that policy would be unable to complete any pushes from their local repos to the AWS CodeCommit remote repository at all, regardless of which branch they were trying to push their commits to.

Could you write a policy in such a way that the null is not required? Of course. IAM policy language is flexible. There’s an example of how to do this in the AWS CodeCommit User Guide, if you’re curious. But for the purposes of this blog post, let’s continue with this policy as written.

So what have we essentially said in this policy? We’ve asked IAM to deny the relevant CodeCommit permissions if the request is made to the resource MyDemoRepo and it meets the following condition: the reference is to refs/heads/master. Otherwise, the deny does not apply.

I’m sure you’re wondering if this policy has to be constrained to a specific repository resource like MyDemoRepo. After all, it would be awfully convenient if a single policy could apply to all branches in any repository in an AWS account, particularly since the default branch in any repository is initially the master branch. Good news! Simply replace the ARN with an *, and your policy will affect ALL branches named master in every AWS CodeCommit repository in your AWS account. Make sure that this is really what you want, though. We suggest you start by limiting the scope to just one repository, and then changing things when you’ve tested it and are happy with how it works.

When you’re sure you’ve modified the policy for your environment, choose Review policy to validate it. Give this policy a name, such as DenyChangesToMaster, provide a description of its purpose, and then choose Create policy.

Now that you have a policy, it’s time to apply and test it.

Apply the policy to a group

In theory, you could apply the policy you just created directly to any IAM user, but that really doesn’t scale well. You should apply this policy to a group, if you use IAM groups to manage users, or to a role, if your users assume a role when interacting with AWS resources.

In the IAM console, choose Groups, and then choose Developers.
On the Permissions tab, choose Attach Policy.
Choose DenyChangesToMaster, and then choose Attach policy.

Your groups now have a critical difference: users in the Developers group have an additional policy applied that restricts their actions in the master branch. In other words, Mary can continue to add files, push commits, and merge pull requests in the master branch, but Arnav cannot.

Figure 2: Two example groups in IAM, one with an additional policy applied that will prevent users in this group from making changes to the master branch

Test it out. Sign in as Arnav, and do the following:

Open the AWS CodeCommit console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/codecommit.
On the Dashboard page, from the list of repositories, choose MyDemoRepo.
In the Code view, choose the branch named master.
Choose Add file, and then choose Create file, just as you did before. Provide some text, and then add the file name and your user information.
Choose Commit file.

This time you’ll see an error after choosing Commit file. It’s not a pretty message, but at the very end, you’ll see a telling phrase: “explicit deny”. That’s the policy in action. You, as Arnav, are explicitly denied PutFile, which prevents you from adding a file to the master branch. You’ll see similar results if you try other actions denied by that policy, such as deleting the master branch.

Stay signed in as Arnav, but this time add a file to test-branch. You should be able to add a file without seeing any errors. You can create a branch based on the master branch, add a file to it, and create a pull request that will merge to the master branch, all just as before. However, you cannot perform denied actions on that master branch.

Sign out as Arnav and sign in as Mary. You’ll see that as that IAM user, you can add and edit files in the master branch, merge pull requests to it, and even, although we don’t recommend this, delete it.

Conclusion

You can use conditional statements in policies in IAM to refine how users interact with your AWS CodeCommit repositories. This blog post showed how to use such a policy to prevent users from making changes to a branch named master. There are many other options. We hope this blog post will encourage you to experiment with AWS CodeCommit, IAM policies, and permissions. If you have any questions or suggestions, we’d love to hear from you.

Classify sensitive data in your environment using Amazon Macie

2018-04-04 Alexander Watson

Post Syndicated from Alexander Watson original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/classify-sensitive-data-in-your-environment-using-amazon-macie/

In this post, I’ll show you how to create a sample dataset for Amazon Macie, and how you can use Amazon Macie to implement data-centric compliance and security analytics in your Amazon S3 environment. I’ll also dive into the different kinds of credentials, document types, and PII detections supported by Macie. First, I’ll walk through creating a “getting started” sample set of artificial, generated data that you can use to test Macie capabilities and start building your own policies and alerts.

Create a realistic data sample set in S3

I’ll use amazon-macie-activity-generator, which we call “AMG” for short, a sample application developed by AWS that generates realistic content and accesses your test account to create the data. AMG uses AWS CloudFormation, AWS Lambda, and Python’s excellent Faker library to create a data set with artificial—but realistic—data classifications and access patterns to help test some of the features and capabilities of Macie. AMG is released under Amazon Software License 1.0, and we’ll accept pull requests on our GitHub repository and monitor any issues that are opened so we can try to fix bugs and consider new feature requests.

The following diagram shows a high level architecture overview of the components that will be created in your AWS account for AMG. For additional detail about these components and their relationships, review the CloudFormation setup script.

Depending on the data types specified in your JSON configuration template (details below), AMG will periodically generate artificial documents for the specified S3 target with a PutObject action. By default, the CloudFormation stack uses a configuration file that instructs AMG to create a new, private S3 bucket that can only be accessed by authorized AWS users/roles in the same account as the bucket. All the S3 objects with fake data in this bucket have a private ACL and inherit the bucket’s access control configuration. All generated objects feature the header in the example below, and AMG supports all fake data providers offered by https://faker.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html, as well as a few of AMG‘s own custom fake data providers requested by our customers: aws_creds, slack_creds, github_creds, facebook_creds, linux_shadow, rsa, linux_passwd, dsa, ec, pgp, cert, itin, swift_code, and cve.

# Sample Report - No identification of actual persons or places is # intended or should be inferred


74323 Julie Field
 Lake Joshuamouth, OR 30055-3905
 1-196-191-4438x974
 53001 Paul Union
 New John, HI 94740
 Mastercard
 Amanda Wells
 5135725008183484 09/26
 CVV: 550
354-70-6172
 242 George Plaza
 East Lawrencefurt, VA 37287-7620
 GB73WAUS0628038988364
 587 Silva Village
 Pearsonburgh, NM 11616-7231
 LDNM1948227117807
 American Express
 Brett Garza
 347965534580275 05/20
 CID: 4758

599.335.2742 JCB 15 digit Michael Arias 210069190253121 03/27 CVC: 861

Create your amazon-macie-activity-generator CloudFormation stack

You can deploy AMG in your AWS account by using either these methods:

Use the CloudFormation Template: https://s3.amazonaws.com/amazon-macie-activity-generator-us-east-1-fb58a9df3468/CloudFormationTemplate.yml
Or use this One-click CloudFormation launch stack.

Follow these steps:

Log in to the AWS Console in a region supported by Amazon Macie, which currently includes US East (N. Virginia), US West (Oregon).
Select the One-click CloudFormation launch stack, or launch CloudFormation using the template above.
Read our terms, select the Acknowledgement box, and then select Create.

Creating the data takes a few minutes, and you can periodically refresh CloudWatch to track progress.

Add the new sample data to Macie

Now, I’ll log into the Macie console and add the newly created sample data buckets for analysis by Macie.

Note: If you don’t explicitly specify a bucket for S3 targets in CloudFormation, AMG will use the S3 bucket that’s created by default for the stack, which will be printed out in the CloudFormation stack’s output.

To add buckets for data classification, follow these steps:

Log in to Amazon Macie.
Select Integrations, and then select Services.
Select your account, and then select Details from the Amazon S3 card.
Select your newly created buckets for Full classification, including existing data.

For additional details on configuring Macie, refer to our getting started documentation.

Macie classifies all historical and newly created data in the buckets created by AMG, and the data will be available in the Macie console as it’s classified. Typically, you can expect the data in the sample set to be classified within 60 minutes of the time it was selected for analysis.

Classifying objects with Macie

To see the objects in your test sample set, in Macie, open the Research tab, and then select the S3 Objects index. We’ll use the regular expression search capability in Macie to find any objects written to buckets that start with “amazon-macie-activity-generator-defaults3bucket”. To search for this, type the following text into the Macie search box and select the magnifying glass icon.

filesystem_metadata.bucket:/amazon-macie-activity-generator-defaults3bucket.*/

From here, you can see a nice breakdown of the kinds of objects that have been classified by Macie, as well as the object-specific details. Create an advanced search using Lucene Query Syntax, and save it as an alert to be matched against any newly created data.

Analyzing accesses to your test data

In addition to classifying data, Macie tracks all control plane and data plane accesses to your content using CloudTrail. To see accesses to your generated environment (created periodically by AMG to mimic user activity), on the Macie navigation bar, select Research, select the CloudTrail data index, and then use the following search to identify our generated role activity:

sessionName.key:/amazon-macie-activity-generator-LambdaFunction-.*/

From this search, you can dive into the user activity (IAM users, assumed roles, federated users, and so on), which is summarized in 5-minute aggregations (user sessions). For example, in the screen shot you can see that one of our AMG-generated users listed objects one time (ListObjects) and wrote 56 objects to S3 (PutObject) during a 5-minute period.

Macie alerts

Macie features both predictive (machine learning-based) and basic (rule-based) alerts, including alerts on unencrypted credentials being uploaded to S3 (because this activity might not follow compliance best practices), risky activity such as data exfiltration, and user-defined alerts that are based on saved searches. To see alerts that have been generated based on AMG‘s activity, on the Macie navigation bar, select Alerts.

AMG will continue to run, periodically uploading content to the specified S3 buckets. To stop AMG, delete the AMG CloudFormation stack and associated resources here.

What are the costs?

Macie has a free tier enabling up to 1GB of content to be analyzed per month at no cost to you. By default, AMG will write approximately 10MB of objects to Amazon S3 per day, and you will incur charges for data classification after crossing the 1GB monthly free tier. Running continuously, AMG will generate about 310MB of content per month (10MB/day x 31 days), which will stay below the free tier. Any data use above 1GB will be billed at the Macie public price of $5/GB. For more detail, see the Macie pricing documentation.

If you have feedback about this blog post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this blog post, start a new thread on the Amazon Macie forum or contact AWS Support.

How to Use Service Control Policies in AWS Organizations

2018-04-02 Frank Phillis

Post Syndicated from Frank Phillis original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-service-control-policies-in-aws-organizations/

With AWS Organizations, you can centrally manage policies across multiple AWS accounts without having to use custom scripts and manual processes. For example, you can apply service control policies (SCPs) across multiple AWS accounts that are members of an organization. SCPs allow you to define which AWS service APIs can and cannot be executed by AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) entities (such as IAM users and roles) in your organization’s member AWS accounts. SCPs are created and applied from the master account, which is the AWS account that you used when you created your organization.

In a previous post, How to Use Service Control Policies in AWS Organizations to Enforce Healthcare Compliance in Your AWS Account, we reviewed how to create and manage SCPs and Organizational Units (OU) within an organization. In this post, I show how to use SCPs for access control in Organizations, with a specific focus on evaluating SCPs when an IAM entity calls an API in a member AWS account. I first cover some key Organizations concepts, and then I show how an SCP attached to an organization impacts which AWS service APIs are available to member accounts. Finally, I demonstrate these concepts with an example.

Organizational structure in Organizations

OUs give you a way to logically group and structure member AWS accounts in your organization. The screenshot shows the tree view of an example organizational structure in my organization with several OUs. Currently, I have selected OrgUnit01, and this is the current view I see in my main window. You can see here that within the OrgUnit01 OU, I have nested two additional OUs (OrgUnit01ChildA and OrgUnit01ChildB) and an AWS account is also contained within OrgUnit01, named “Developer Sandbox Account”.

The parts of the example organizational structure in the screenshot are:

Tree view — The hierarchy of your organization’s root and any OUs you have created
Tree view toggle — Enable and disable tree view
Organizational Units — Any child OUs of the selected root or OU in tree view
Accounts — Any AWS accounts (members or master) in the current OU

In the next section, I explain why at least one SCP must be attached to your root and OUs and introduce SCP evaluation.

How Service Control Policy evaluation logic works

To allow an AWS service API at the member account level, you must allow the API at every level between the member account and the root of your organization. This means you must attach an SCP at every level between your organization’s root and the member account that allows the given AWS service API (such as ec2:RunInstances). For more information, see About Service Control Policies.

Let’s say you want to allow the ec2:RunInstances API in the Developer Sandbox Account in the example structure in the preceding screenshot. To allow this AWS service API, you must allow the API in at least one SCP attached at each of these levels:

The organization’s root
The OU named OrgUnit01

If you don’t allow the AWS service in an SCP attached at each of these two levels, neither IAM entities nor the root user in the Developer Sandbox Account will be able to call ec2:RunInstances, even if an administrator has given them permission to do so (for IAM entities). In terms of policy evaluation, SCPs follow exactly the same policy evaluation logic as IAM does: by default, all requests are denied, an explicit allow overrides this default, and an explicit deny overrides any explicit allows.

What does this look like in practice? In the next section, I share a practical example to demonstrate how this works in Organizations.

An example structure with nested OUs and SCPs

In the previous section, I introduced design aspects of AWS Organizations that help prevent administrators from breaking structures in their Organizations. But because AWS Organizations is flexible enough to address multiple use cases, administrators can make changes that have unintended consequences, such as breaking organizational structures when moving an AWS account from one OU to another. In this section, I show an example with broken OU and SCP structures and explain how you can fix them.

I’ll take a blacklisting approach. That is, I’ll use the FullAWSAccess SCP, which doesn’t filter out any AWS service APIs. Then, I will filter out specific APIs by blacklisting them in subsequent SCPs attached to OUs at various points in my organization’s structure. For further reading on blacklisting and whitelisting with AWS Organizations, review AWS Organizations Terminology and Concepts.

Let’s say I have developed the OU and SCP structure shown in the diagram below. Before taking a close look at that diagram, I’ll briefly outline the goals I’m trying to achieve. Broadly speaking, there’s a small subset of APIs that I want to filter out using SCPs. This means that IAM entities in some AWS accounts in my organization will not have access to particular AWS service APIs, such as those related to Amazon EC2, while other accounts will not have access to APIs associated with Amazon CloudWatch, Amazon S3, and so on. Apart from these special cases, I do want the accounts in my organization to have access to all other APIs. More specifically, my goals are as follows:

Any AWS accounts in the Root should not have any API filtered out.
Any AWS accounts in OU 001 should have APIs for CloudWatch filtered out, but all other APIs will be accessible.
Any AWS accounts in OU 002 should have APIs for both CloudWatch and EC2 filtered out, but all other APIs will be accessible.
Any AWS accounts in OU 003 should have APIs for S3 filtered out, but all other APIs will be accessible.

To that end, let’s now look at my initial SCP and OU configuration in the image below that shows the example OU and SCP structure. The arrow shows the direction of inheritance: the root and the OUs below it (children) inherit SCPs from the OUs above them (parents). This example structure contains the following SCPs:

FullAWSAccess — Allows all AWS service APIs
Deny_CW — Denies all CloudWatch APIs
Deny_EC2 — Denies all Amazon EC2 APIs
Deny_S3 — Denies all Amazon S3 APIs

Now that I’ve outlined my intent, and shown you the OU / SCP structure that I’ve created to meet that set of goals, you can probably already see that the structure provided in the image above will not work correctly for my stated goals. In fact, AWS accounts in the Root container and OU 001 will have the intended access, as per my goals (1) and (2). I will not, however, meet my goals (3) and (4) with the above structure: entities in member accounts directly under OU 002 cannot perform any actions, even if they’re granted permissions by IAM access policies. This is because the FullAWSAccess SCP isn’t attached directly to this OU (it’s only inherited).

Why is this important? For an AWS service API to be available to IAM entities in a member account, the API must be specified in an SCP attached at every level all the way down the hierarchy to the relevant member account. Similarly, even though OU 003 does have the FullAWSAccess SCP attached directly to it, the fact that it’s not attached to the parent OU (OU 002) means that IAM entities in member accounts under OU 003 also aren’t able to access any service APIs. This doesn’t happen by default—I have deliberately taken this action to organize my structure in this way, to show both the flexibility and the kind of problems you can encounter when working with OUs and SCPs.

So I now need to fix the problems that I’ve inadvertently created. To start with, I’m going to make one change to OU 002 by attaching the FullAWSAccess SCP directly to that OU. After I do that, OU 002 has the attached and inherited policies that are shown in the following image.

With the FullAWSAccess policy attached to OU 002, member accounts in both OU 002 and OU 003 can access the other non-restricted AWS service APIs (keeping in mind that the FullAWSAccess policy was already applied to OU 003).

I have one final issue to address in this example: OU 003 has an SCP attached that blocks access to the Amazon S3 APIs. However, in this OU, the intent is to allow IAM entities in member accounts to access the EC2 APIs. EC2 API access is blocked because in the parent OU (OU 002), an SCP is attached that denies access to that API (the Deny_EC2 SCP), which means that any actions listed in Deny_EC2 have already been filtered out. An explicit deny always trumps an allow, so to meet goal (4) and have an OU in which EC2 APIs are allowed but access to CloudWatch APIs and S3 APIs is filtered out, I will move OU 003 up one level, placing it directly under OU 001. This change gives me a working OU and policy structure, as shown in the following image.

I recommend that at each level of your organization’s hierarchy, you directly apply the relevant SCPs. By doing this, you’re less likely to forget to apply an SCP to a particular OU, which can break your permission structure. By directly applying SCPs, you also make your policy structure easier to read.

If you have a group of accounts in your organization that are for testing purposes, I recommend that you experiment with OUs and SCPs. Applying SCPs to OUs and then moving an AWS account around within that structure can show you how SCPs affect IAM entities. For example, if you have an IAM user with the AdministratorAccess policy attached, you should see how SCPs can filter out certain AWS service APIs from specified member accounts.

Conclusion

I showed you how you can effectively apply SCPs to OUs in your organization and avoid some of the common issues that you might experience. I demonstrated an approach to designing a working organizational structure that I hope will help smooth your deployment of your organization and enables you to better centrally secure and manage your AWS accounts.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the Comments section below. If you have questions about anything in this post, start a new thread on the Organizations forum.

How we reduce complexity and rapidly iterate on Amazon GuardDuty: twelve new detections added

2018-03-14 Michael Fuller

Post Syndicated from Michael Fuller original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/why-we-reduce-complexity-and-rapidly-iterate-on-amazon-guardduty-twelve-new-detections-added/

We’re relentlessly innovating on your behalf at AWS, especially when it comes to security. Last November, we launched Amazon GuardDuty, a continuous security monitoring and threat detection service that incorporates threat intelligence, anomaly detection, and machine learning to help protect your AWS resources, including your AWS accounts. Many large customers, including General Electric, Autodesk, and MapBox, discovered these benefits and have quickly adopted the service for its ease of use and improved threat detection. In this post, I want to show you how easy it is for everyone to get started—large and small—and discuss our rapid iteration on the service.

After more than seven years at AWS, I still find myself staying up at night obsessing about unnecessary complexity. Sounds fun, right? Well, I don’t have to tell you that there’s a lot of unnecessary complexity and undifferentiated heavy lifting in security. Most security tooling requires significant care and feeding by humans. It’s often difficult to configure and manage, it’s hard to know if it’s working properly, and it’s costly to procure and run. As a result, it’s not accessible to all customers, and for those that do get their hands on it, they spend a lot of highly-skilled resources trying to keep it operating at its potential.

Even for the most skilled security teams, it can be a struggle to ensure that all resources are covered, especially in the age of virtualization, where new accounts, new resources, and new users can come and go across your organization at a rapid pace. Furthermore, attackers have come up with ingenious ways of giving you the impression your security solution is working when, in fact, it has been completely disabled.

I’ve spent a lot of time obsessing about these problems. How can we use the Cloud to not just innovate in security, but also make it easier, more affordable, and more accessible to all? Our ultimate goal is to help you better protect your AWS resources, while also freeing you up to focus on the next big project.

With GuardDuty, we really turned the screws on unnecessary complexity, distilling continuous security monitoring and threat detection down to a binary decision—it’s either on or off. That’s it. There’s no software, virtual appliances, or agents to deploy, no data sources to enable, and no complex permissions to create. You don’t have to write custom rules or become an expert at machine learning. All we ask of you is to simply turn the service on with a single-click or API call.

GuardDuty operates completely on our infrastructure, so there’s no risk of disrupting your workloads. By providing a hard hypervisor boundary between the code running in your AWS accounts and the code running in GuardDuty, we can help ensure full coverage while making it harder for a misconfiguration or an ingenious attacker to change that. When we detect something interesting, we generate a security finding and deliver it to you through the GuardDuty console and AWS CloudWatch Events. This makes it possible to simply view findings in GuardDuty or push them to an existing SIEM or workflow system. We’ve already seen customers take it a step further using AWS Lambda to automate actions such as changing security groups, isolating instances, or rotating credentials.

Now… are you ready to get started? It’s this simple:

So, you’ve got it enabled, now what can GuardDuty detect?

As soon as you enable the service, it immediately starts consuming multiple metadata streams at scale, including AWS CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, and DNS logs. It compares what it finds to fully managed threat intelligence feeds containing the latest malicious IPs and domains. In parallel, GuardDuty profiles all activity in your account, which allows it to learn the behavior of your resources so it can identify highly suspicious activity that suggests a threat.

The threat-intelligence-based detections can identify activity such as an EC2 instance being probed or brute-forced by an attacker. If an instance is compromised, it can detect attempts at lateral movement, communication with a known malware or command-and-control server, crypto-currency mining, or an attempt to exfiltrate data through DNS.

Where it gets more interesting is the ability to detect AWS account-focused threats. For example, if an attacker gets a hold of your AWS account credentials—say, one of your developers exposes credentials on GitHub—GuardDuty will identify unusual account behavior. For example, an unusual instance type being deployed in a region that has never been used, suspicious attempts to inventory your resources by calling unusual patterns of list APIs or describe APIs, or an effort to obscure user activity by disabling CloudTrail logging.

Our obsession with removing complexity meant making these detections fully-managed. We take on all the heavy lifting of building, maintaining, measuring, and improving the detections so that you can focus on what to do when an event does occur.

What’s new?

When we launched at the end of November, we had thirty-four distinct detections in GuardDuty, but we weren’t stopping there. Many of these detections are already on their second or third continuous improvement iteration. In less than three months, we’ve also added twelve more, including nine CloudTrail-based anomaly detections that identify highly suspicious activity in your accounts. These new detections intelligently catch changes to, or reconnaissance of, network, resource, user permissions, and anomalous activity in EC2, CloudTrail, and AWS console log-ins. These are detections we’ve built based on what we’ve learned from observed attack patterns across the scale of AWS.

The intelligence in these detections is built around the identification of highly sensitive AWS API calls that are invoked under one or more highly suspicious circumstances. The combination of “highly sensitive” and “highly suspicious” is important. Highly sensitive APIs are those that either change the security posture of an account by adding or elevating users, user policies, roles, or account-key IDs (AKIDs). Highly suspicious circumstances are determined from underlying models profiled at the API level by GuardDuty. The result is the ability to catch real threats, while decreasing false positives, limiting false negatives, and reducing alert-noise.

It’s still day one

As we like to say in Amazon, it’s still day one. I’m excited about what we’ve built with GuardDuty, but we’re not going to stop improving, even if you’re already happy with what we’ve built. Check out the list of new detections below and all of the GuardDuty detections in our online documentation. Keep the feedback coming as it’s what powers us at AWS.

Now, I have to stop writing because my wife tells me I have some unnecessary complexity to remove from our closet.

New GuardDuty CloudTrail-based anomaly detections

Recon:IAMUser/NetworkPermissions
Situation: An IAM user invoked an API commonly used to discover the network access permissions of existing security groups, ACLs, and routes in your AWS account.
Description: This finding is triggered when network configuration settings in your AWS environment are probed under suspicious circumstances. For example, if an IAM user in your AWS environment invoked the DescribeSecurityGroups API with no prior history of doing so. An attacker might use stolen credentials to perform this reconnaissance of network configuration settings before executing the next stage of their attack, which might include changing network permissions or making use of existing openings in the network configuration.
Recon:IAMUser/ResourcePermissions
Situation: An IAM user invoked an API commonly used to discover the permissions associated with various resources in your AWS account.
Description: This finding is triggered when resource access permissions in your AWS account are probed under suspicious circumstances. For example, if an IAM user with no prior history of doing so, invoked the DescribeInstances API. An attacker might use stolen credentials to perform this reconnaissance of your AWS resources in order to find valuable information or determine the capabilities of the credentials they already have.
Recon:IAMUser/UserPermissions
Situation: An IAM user invoked an API commonly used to discover the users, groups, policies, and permissions in your AWS account.
Description: This finding is triggered when user permissions in your AWS environment are probed under suspicious circumstances. For example, if an IAM user invoked the ListInstanceProfilesForRole API with no prior history of doing so. An attacker might use stolen credentials to perform this reconnaissance of your IAM users and roles to determine the capabilities of the credentials they already have or to find more permissive credentials that are vulnerable to lateral movement.
Persistence:IAMUser/NetworkPermissions
Situation: An IAM user invoked an API commonly used to change the network access permissions for security groups, routes, and ACLs in your AWS account.
Description: This finding is triggered when network configuration settings are changed under suspicious circumstances. For example, if an IAM user in your AWS environment invoked the CreateSecurityGroup API with no prior history of doing so. Attackers often attempt to change security groups, allowing certain inbound traffic on various ports to improve their ability to access the bot they might have planted on your EC2 instance.
Persistence:IAMUser/ResourcePermissions
Situation: An IAM user invoked an API commonly used to change the security access policies of various resources in your AWS account.
Description: This finding is triggered when a change is detected to policies or permissions attached to AWS resources. For example, if an IAM user in your AWS environment invoked the PutBucketPolicy API with no prior history of doing so. Some services, such as Amazon S3, support resource-attached permissions that grant one or more IAM principals access to the resource. With stolen credentials, attackers can change the policies attached to a resource, granting themselves future access to that resource.
Persistence:IAMUser/UserPermissions
Situation: An IAM user invoked an API commonly used to add, modify, or delete IAM users, groups, or policies in your AWS account.
Description: This finding is triggered by suspicious changes to the user-related permissions in your AWS environment. For example, if an IAM user in your AWS environment invoked the AttachUserPolicy API with no prior history of doing so. In an effort to maximize their ability to access the account even after they’ve been discovered, attackers can use stolen credentials to create new users, add access policies to existing users, create access keys, and so on. The owner of the account might notice that a particular IAM user or password was stolen and delete it from the account, but might not delete other users that were created by the fraudulently created admin IAM user, leaving their AWS account still accessible to the attacker.
ResourceConsumption:IAMUser/ComputeResources
Situation: An IAM user invoked an API commonly used to launch compute resources like EC2 Instances.
Description: This finding is triggered when EC2 instances in your AWS environment are launched under suspicious circumstances. For example, if an IAM user invoked the RunInstances API with no prior history of doing so. This might be an indication of an attacker using stolen credentials to access compute time (possibly for cryptocurrency mining or password cracking). It can also be an indication of an attacker using an EC2 instance in your AWS environment and its credentials to maintain access to your account.
Stealth:IAMUser/LoggingConfigurationModified
Situation: An IAM user invoked an API commonly used to stop CloudTrail logging, delete existing logs, and otherwise eliminate traces of activity in your AWS account.
Description: This finding is triggered when the logging configuration in your AWS account is modified under suspicious circumstances. For example, if an IAM user invoked the StopLogging API with no prior history of doing so. This can be an indication of an attacker trying to cover their tracks by eliminating any trace of their activity.
UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLogin
Situation: An unusual console login by an IAM user in your AWS account was observed.
Description: This finding is triggered when a console login is detected under suspicious circumstances. For example, if an IAM user invoked the ConsoleLogin API from a never-before- used client or an unusual location. This could be an indication of stolen credentials being used to gain access to your AWS account, or a valid user accessing the account in an invalid or less secure manner (for example, not over an approved VPN).

New GuardDuty threat intelligence based detections

Trojan:EC2/PhishingDomainRequest!DNS
This detection occurs when an EC2 instance queries domains involved in phishing attacks.
Trojan:EC2/BlackholeTraffic!DNS
This detection occurs when an EC2 instance connects to a black hole domain. Black holes refer to places in the network where incoming or outgoing traffic is silently discarded without informing the source that the data didn’t reach its intended recipient.
Trojan:EC2/DGADomainRequest.C!DNS
This detection occurs when an EC2 instance queries algorithmically generated domains. Such domains are commonly used by malware and could be an indication of a compromised EC2 instance.

If you have feedback about this blog post, submit comments in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about this blog post, start a new thread on the Amazon GuardDuty forum or contact AWS Support.

How to Use Bucket Policies and Apply Defense-in-Depth to Help Secure Your Amazon S3 Data

2018-03-07 Rajat Ravinder Varuni

Post Syndicated from Rajat Ravinder Varuni original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-bucket-policies-and-apply-defense-in-depth-to-help-secure-your-amazon-s3-data/

Amazon S3 provides comprehensive security and compliance capabilities that meet even the most stringent regulatory requirements. It gives you flexibility in the way you manage data for cost optimization, access control, and compliance. However, because the service is flexible, a user could accidentally configure buckets in a manner that is not secure. For example, let’s say you uploaded files to an Amazon S3 bucket with public read permissions, even though you intended only to share this file with a colleague or a partner. Although this might have accomplished your task to share the file internally, the file is now available to anyone on the internet, even without authentication.

In this blog post, we show you how to prevent your Amazon S3 buckets and objects from allowing public access. We discuss how to secure data in Amazon S3 with a defense-in-depth approach, where multiple security controls are put in place to help prevent data leakage. This approach helps prevent you from allowing public access to confidential information, such as personally identifiable information (PII) or protected health information (PHI).

Preventing your Amazon S3 buckets and objects from allowing public access

Every call to an Amazon S3 service becomes a REST API request. When your request is transformed via a REST call, the permissions are converted into parameters included in the HTTP header or as URL parameters. The Amazon S3 bucket policy allows or denies access to the Amazon S3 bucket or Amazon S3 objects based on policy statements, and then evaluates conditions based on those parameters. To learn more, see Using Bucket Policies and User Policies.

With this in mind, let’s say multiple AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) users at Example Corp. have access to an Amazon S3 bucket and the objects in the bucket. Example Corp. wants to share the objects among its IAM users, while at the same time preventing the objects from being made available publicly.

To demonstrate how to do this, we start by creating an Amazon S3 bucket named examplebucket. After creating this bucket, we must apply the following bucket policy. This policy denies any uploaded object (PutObject) with the attribute x-amz-acl having the values public-read, public-read-write, or authenticated-read. This means authenticated users cannot upload objects to the bucket if the objects have public permissions.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "DenyPublicReadACL",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "*"
            },
            "Action": [
                "s3:PutObject",
                "s3:PutObjectAcl"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "s3:x-amz-acl": [
                        "public-read",
                        "public-read-write",
                        "authenticated-read"
                    ]
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DenyPublicReadGrant",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "*"
            },
            "Action": [
                "s3:PutObject",
                "s3:PutObjectAcl"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringLike": {
                    "s3:x-amz-grant-read": [
                        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers*",
                        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers*"
                    ]
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DenyPublicListACL",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "*"
            },
            "Action": "s3:PutBucketAcl",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "s3:x-amz-acl": [
                        "public-read",
                        "public-read-write",
                        "authenticated-read"
                    ]
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DenyPublicListGrant",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "*"
            },
            "Action": "s3:PutBucketAcl",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket",
            "Condition": {
                "StringLike": {
                    "s3:x-amz-grant-read": [
                        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers*",
                        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers*"
                    ]
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

To better understand what is happening in this bucket policy, we’ll explain each statement. Let’s start with the first statement.


{
    "Sid": "DenyPublicReadACL",
    "Effect": "Deny",
    "Principal": {
        "AWS": "*"
    },
    "Action": [
        "s3:PutObject",
        "s3:PutObjectAcl"
    ],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*",
    "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
            "s3:x-amz-acl": [
                "public-read",
                "public-read-write",
                "authenticated-read"
            ]
        }
    }
}

This statement accomplishes the following:

“Deny any Amazon S3 request to PutObject or PutObjectAcl in the bucket examplebucket when the request includes one of the following access control lists (ACLs): public-read, public-read-write, or authenticated-read.”

Remember that IAM policies are evaluated not in a first-match-and-exit model. Instead, IAM evaluates first if there is an explicit Deny. If there is not, IAM continues to evaluate if you have an explicit Allow and then you have an implicit Deny.

The above policy creates an explicit Deny. Even when any authenticated user tries to upload (PutObject) an object with public read or write permissions, such as public-read or public-read-write or authenticated-read, the action will be denied. To understand how S3 Access Permissions work, you must understand what Access Control Lists (ACL) and Grants are. You can find the documentation here.

Now let’s continue our bucket policy explanation by examining the next statement.

{
    "Sid": "DenyPublicReadGrant",
    "Effect": "Deny",
    "Principal": {
        "AWS": "*"
    },
    "Action": [
        "s3:PutObject",
        "s3:PutObjectAcl"
    ],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*",
    "Condition": {
        "StringLike": {
            "s3:x-amz-grant-read": [
                "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers*",
                "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers*"
            ]
        }
    }
}

This statement is very similar to the first statement, except that instead of checking the ACLs, we are checking specific user groups’ grants that represent the following groups:

AuthenticatedUsers group. Represented by http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers, this group represents all AWS accounts. Access permissions to this group allow any AWS account to access the resource. However, all requests must be signed (authenticated).
AllUsers group. Represented by http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers, access permissions to this group allow anyone on the internet access to the resource. The requests can be signed (authenticated) or unsigned (anonymous). Unsigned requests omit the Authentication header in the request.

For more information about which parameters you can use to create bucket policies, see Using Bucket Policies and User Policies.

Now that you know how to deny object uploads with permissions that would make the object public, you just have two statement policies that prevent users from changing the bucket permissions (Denying s3:PutBucketACL from ACL and Denying s3:PutBucketACL from Grants).

Below is how we’re preventing users from changing the bucket permisssions.

{
  "Sid": "DenyPublicListACL",
  "Effect": "Deny",
  "Principal": {
    "AWS": "*"
  },
  "Action": "s3:PutBucketAcl",
  "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket",
  "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
      "s3:x-amz-acl": [
        "public-read",
        "public-read-write",
        "authenticated-read"
      ]
    }
  }
},
{
  "Sid": "DenyPublicListGrant",
  "Effect": "Deny",
  "Principal": {
    "AWS": "*"
  },
  "Action": "s3:PutBucketAcl",
  "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket",
  "Condition": {
    "StringLike": {
      "s3:x-amz-grant-read": [
        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers*",
        "*http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers*"
      ]
    }
  }
}

As you can see above, the statement is very similar to the Object statements, except that now we use s3:PutBucketAcl instead of s3:PutObjectAcl, the Resource is just the bucket ARN, and the objects have the “/*” in the end of the ARN.

In this section, we showed how to prevent IAM users from accidently uploading Amazon S3 objects with public permissions to buckets. In the next section, we show you how to enforce multiple layers of security controls, such as encryption of data at rest and in transit while serving traffic from Amazon S3.

Securing data on Amazon S3 with defense-in-depth

Let’s say that Example Corp. wants to serve files securely from Amazon S3 to its users with the following requirements:

The data must be encrypted at rest and during transit.
The data must be accessible only by a limited set of public IP addresses.
All requests for data should be handled only by Amazon CloudFront (which is a content delivery network) instead of being directly available from an Amazon S3 URL. If you’re using an Amazon S3 bucket as the origin for a CloudFront distribution, you can grant public permission to read the objects in your bucket. This allows anyone to access your objects either through CloudFront or the Amazon S3 URL. CloudFront doesn’t expose Amazon S3 URLs, but your users still might have access to those URLs if your application serves any objects directly from Amazon S3, or if anyone gives out direct links to specific objects in Amazon S3.
A domain name is required to consume the content. Custom SSL certificate support lets you deliver content over HTTPS by using your own domain name and your own SSL certificate. This gives visitors to your website the security benefits of CloudFront over an SSL connection that uses your own domain name, in addition to lower latency and higher reliability.

To represent defense-in-depth visually, the following diagram contains several Amazon S3 objects (A) in a single Amazon S3 bucket (B). You can encrypt these objects on the server side or the client side. You also can configure the bucket policy such that objects are accessible only through CloudFront, which you can accomplish through an origin access identity (C). You then can configure CloudFront to deliver content only over HTTPS in addition to using your own domain name (D).

Defense-in-depth requirement 1: Data must be encrypted at rest and during transit

Let’s start with the objects themselves. Amazon S3 objects—files in this case—can range from zero bytes to multiple terabytes in size (see service limits for the latest information). Each Amazon S3 bucket includes a collection of objects, and the objects can be uploaded via the Amazon S3 console, AWS CLI, or AWS API.

You can encrypt Amazon S3 objects at rest and during transit. At rest, objects in a bucket are encrypted with server-side encryption by using Amazon S3 managed keys or AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) managed keys or customer-provided keys through AWS KMS. You also can encrypt objects on the client side by using AWS KMS managed keys or a customer-supplied client-side master key.

If you choose to use server-side encryption, Amazon S3 encrypts your objects before saving them on disks in AWS data centers. To encrypt an object at the time of upload, you need to add the x-amz-server-side-encryption header to the request to tell Amazon S3 to encrypt the object using Amazon S3 managed keys (SSE-S3), AWS KMS managed keys (SSE-KMS), or customer-provided keys (SSE-C). There are two possible values for the x-amz-server-side-encryption header: AES256, which tells Amazon S3 to use Amazon S3 managed keys, and aws:kms, which tells Amazon S3 to use AWS KMS managed keys.

The following code example shows a Put request using SSE-S3.

PUT /example-object HTTP/1.1
Host: myBucket.s3.amazonaws.com
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2016 17:50:00 GMT
Authorization: authorization string
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Length: 11434
x-amz-meta-author: Janet
Expect: 100-continue
x-amz-server-side-encryption: AES256
[11434 bytes of object data]

If you choose to use client-side encryption, you can encrypt data on the client side and upload the encrypted data to Amazon S3. In this case, you manage the encryption process, the encryption keys, and related tools. You encrypt data on the client side by using AWS KMS managed keys or a customer-supplied, client-side master key.

Defense-in-depth requirement 2: Data must be accessible only by a limited set of public IP addresses

At the Amazon S3 bucket level, you can configure permissions through a bucket policy. For example, you can limit access to the objects in a bucket by IP address range or specific IP addresses. Alternatively, you can make the objects accessible only through HTTPS.

The following bucket policy allows access to Amazon S3 objects only through HTTPS (the policy was generated with the AWS Policy Generator). Here the bucket policy explicitly denies ("Effect": "Deny") all read access ("Action": "s3:GetObject") from anybody who browses ("Principal": "*") to Amazon S3 objects within an Amazon S3 bucket if they are not accessed through HTTPS ("aws:SecureTransport": "false").

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Id": "Policy1504640911349",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "Stmt1504640908907",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": "*",
            "Action": "s3:GetObject",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::/*",
            "Condition": {
                "Bool": {
                    "aws:SecureTransport": "false"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

Defense-in-depth requirement 3: Data must not be publicly accessible directly from an Amazon S3 URL

Next, configure Amazon CloudFront to serve traffic from within the bucket. The use of CloudFront serves several purposes:

CloudFront is a content delivery network that acts as a cache to serve static files quickly to clients.
Depending on the number of requests, the cost of delivery is less than if objects were served directly via Amazon S3.
Objects served through CloudFront can be limited to specific countries.

Access to these Amazon S3 objects is available only through CloudFront. We do this by creating an origin access identity (OAI) for CloudFront and granting access to objects in the respective Amazon S3 bucket only to that OAI. As a result, access to Amazon S3 objects from the internet is possible only through CloudFront; all other means of accessing the objects—such as through an Amazon S3 URL—are denied. CloudFront acts not only as a content distribution network, but also as a host that denies access based on geographic restrictions. You apply these restrictions by updating your CloudFront web distribution and adding a whitelist that contains only a specific country’s name (let’s say Liechtenstein). Alternatively, you could add a blacklist that contains every country except that country. Learn more about how to use CloudFront geographic restriction to whitelist or blacklist a country to restrict or allow users in specific locations from accessing web content in the AWS Support Knowledge Center.

Defense-in-depth requirement 4: A domain name is required to consume the content

To serve content from CloudFront, you must use a domain name in the URLs for objects on your webpages or in your web application. The domain name can be either of the following:

The domain name that CloudFront automatically assigns when you create a distribution, such as d111111abcdef8.cloudfront.net
Your own domain name, such as example.com

For example, you might use one of the following URLs to return the file image.jpg:

http://d111111abcdef8.cloudfront.net/images/image.jpg
http://example.com/images/image.jpg

You use the same URL format whether you store the content in Amazon S3 buckets or at a custom origin, like one of your own web servers.

Instead of using the default domain name that CloudFront assigns for you when you create a distribution, you can add an alternate domain name that’s easier to work with, like example.com. By setting up your own domain name with CloudFront, you can use a URL like this for objects in your distribution: http://example.com/images/image.jpg.

Let’s say that you already have a domain name hosted on Amazon Route 53. You would like to serve traffic from the domain name, request an SSL certificate, and add this to your CloudFront web distribution. The SSL offloading occurs in CloudFront by serving traffic securely from each CloudFront location. You also can configure CloudFront to deliver your content over HTTPS by using your custom domain name and your own SSL certificate. Serving web content through CloudFront reduces response from the origin as requests are redirected to the nearest edge location. This results in faster download times than if the visitor had requested the content from a data center that is located farther away.

Summary

In this post, we demonstrated how you can apply policies to Amazon S3 buckets so that only users with appropriate permissions are allowed to access the buckets. Anonymous users (with public-read/public-read-write permissions) and authenticated users without the appropriate permissions are prevented from accessing the buckets.

We also examined how to secure access to objects in Amazon S3 buckets. The objects in Amazon S3 buckets can be encrypted at rest and during transit. Doing so helps provide end-to-end security from the source (in this case, Amazon S3) to your users.

If you have feedback about this blog post, submit comments in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about this blog post, start a new thread on the Amazon S3 forum or contact AWS Support.

How to Patch Linux Workloads on AWS

2018-02-15 Koen van Blijderveen

Post Syndicated from Koen van Blijderveen original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-patch-linux-workloads-on-aws/

Most malware tries to compromise your systems by using a known vulnerability that the operating system maker has already patched. As best practices to help prevent malware from affecting your systems, you should apply all operating system patches and actively monitor your systems for missing patches.

In this blog post, I show you how to patch Linux workloads using AWS Systems Manager. To accomplish this, I will show you how to use the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) to:

Launch an Amazon EC2 instance for use with Systems Manager.
Configure Systems Manager to patch your Amazon EC2 Linux instances.

In two previous blog posts (Part 1 and Part 2), I showed how to use the AWS Management Console to perform the necessary steps to patch, inspect, and protect Microsoft Windows workloads. You can implement those same processes for your Linux instances running in AWS by changing the instance tags and types shown in the previous blog posts.

Because most Linux system administrators are more familiar with using a command line, I show how to patch Linux workloads by using the AWS CLI in this blog post. The steps to use the Amazon EBS Snapshot Scheduler and Amazon Inspector are identical for both Microsoft Windows and Linux.

What you should know first

To follow along with the solution in this post, you need one or more Amazon EC2 instances. You may use existing instances or create new instances. For this post, I assume this is an Amazon EC2 for Amazon Linux instance installed from Amazon Machine Images (AMIs).

Systems Manager is a collection of capabilities that helps you automate management tasks for AWS-hosted instances on Amazon EC2 and your on-premises servers. In this post, I use Systems Manager for two purposes: to run remote commands and apply operating system patches. To learn about the full capabilities of Systems Manager, see What Is AWS Systems Manager?

As of Amazon Linux 2017.09, the AMI comes preinstalled with the Systems Manager agent. Systems Manager Patch Manager also supports Red Hat and Ubuntu. To install the agent on these Linux distributions or an older version of Amazon Linux, see Installing and Configuring SSM Agent on Linux Instances.

If you are not familiar with how to launch an Amazon EC2 instance, see Launching an Instance. I also assume you launched or will launch your instance in a private subnet. You must make sure that the Amazon EC2 instance can connect to the internet using a network address translation (NAT) instance or NAT gateway to communicate with Systems Manager. The following diagram shows how you should structure your VPC.

Later in this post, you will assign tasks to a maintenance window to patch your instances with Systems Manager. To do this, the IAM user you are using for this post must have the iam:PassRole permission. This permission allows the IAM user assigning tasks to pass his own IAM permissions to the AWS service. In this example, when you assign a task to a maintenance window, IAM passes your credentials to Systems Manager. You also should authorize your IAM user to use Amazon EC2 and Systems Manager. As mentioned before, you will be using the AWS CLI for most of the steps in this blog post. Our documentation shows you how to get started with the AWS CLI. Make sure you have the AWS CLI installed and configured with an AWS access key and secret access key that belong to an IAM user that have the following AWS managed policies attached to the IAM user you are using for this example: AmazonEC2FullAccess and AmazonSSMFullAccess.

Step 1: Launch an Amazon EC2 Linux instance

In this section, I show you how to launch an Amazon EC2 instance so that you can use Systems Manager with the instance. This step requires you to do three things:

Create an IAM role for Systems Manager before launching your Amazon EC2 instance.
Launch your Amazon EC2 instance with Amazon EBS and the IAM role for Systems Manager.
Add tags to the instances so that you can add your instances to a Systems Manager maintenance window based on tags.

A. Create an IAM role for Systems Manager

Before launching an Amazon EC2 instance, I recommend that you first create an IAM role for Systems Manager, which you will use to update the Amazon EC2 instance. AWS already provides a preconfigured policy that you can use for the new role and it is called AmazonEC2RoleforSSM.

Create a JSON file named trustpolicy-ec2ssm.json that contains the following trust policy. This policy describes which principal (an entity that can take action on an AWS resource) is allowed to assume the role we are going to create. In this example, the principal is the Amazon EC2 service.
```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": {"Service": "ec2.amazonaws.com"},
    "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
  }
}
```

Use the following command to create a role named EC2SSM that has the AWS managed policy AmazonEC2RoleforSSM attached to it. This generates JSON-based output that describes the role and its parameters, if the command is successful.
```
$ aws iam create-role --role-name EC2SSM --assume-role-policy-document file://trustpolicy-ec2ssm.json
```

Use the following command to attach the AWS managed IAM policy (AmazonEC2RoleforSSM) to your newly created role.

$ aws iam attach-role-policy --role-name EC2SSM --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AmazonEC2RoleforSSM

Use the following commands to create the IAM instance profile and add the role to the instance profile. The instance profile is needed to attach the role we created earlier to your Amazon EC2 instance.
```
$ aws iam create-instance-profile --instance-profile-name EC2SSM-IP
$ aws iam add-role-to-instance-profile --instance-profile-name EC2SSM-IP --role-name EC2SSM
```

B. Launch your Amazon EC2 instance

To follow along, you need an Amazon EC2 instance that is running Amazon Linux. You can use any existing instance you may have or create a new instance.

When launching a new Amazon EC2 instance, be sure that:

The operating system is Amazon Linux.
You attach the newly created IAM role (EC2SSM).
The Amazon EC2 instance can connect to Systems Manager through a network address translation (NAT) gateway or a NAT instance.

Use the following command to launch a new Amazon EC2 instance using an Amazon Linux AMI available in the US East (N. Virginia) Region (also known as us-east-1). Replace YourKeyPair and YourSubnetId with your information. For more information about creating a key pair, see the create-key-pair documentation. Write down the InstanceId that is in the output because you will need it later in this post.
```
$ aws ec2 run-instances --image-id ami-cb9ec1b1 --instance-type t2.micro --key-name YourKeyPair --subnet-id YourSubnetId --iam-instance-profile Name=EC2SSM-IP
```

If you are using an existing Amazon EC2 instance, you can use the following command to attach the instance profile you created earlier to your instance.
```
$ aws ec2 associate-iam-instance-profile --instance-id YourInstanceId --iam-instance-profile Name=EC2SSM-IP
```

C. Add tags

The final step of configuring your Amazon EC2 instances is to add tags. You will use these tags to configure Systems Manager in Step 2 of this post. For this example, I add a tag named Patch Group and set the value to Linux Servers. I could have other groups of Amazon EC2 instances that I treat differently by having the same tag name but a different tag value. For example, I might have a collection of other servers with the tag name Patch Group with a value of Web Servers.

Use the following command to add the Patch Group tag to your Amazon EC2 instance.

$ aws ec2 create-tags --resources YourInstanceId --tags --tags Key="Patch Group",Value="Linux Servers"

Note: You must wait a few minutes until the Amazon EC2 instance is available before you can proceed to the next section. To make sure your Amazon EC2 instance is online and ready, you can use the following AWS CLI command:

$ aws ec2 describe-instance-status --instance-ids YourInstanceId

At this point, you now have at least one Amazon EC2 instance you can use to configure Systems Manager.

Step 2: Configure Systems Manager

In this section, I show you how to configure and use Systems Manager to apply operating system patches to your Amazon EC2 instances, and how to manage patch compliance.

To start, I provide some background information about Systems Manager. Then, I cover how to:

Create the Systems Manager IAM role so that Systems Manager is able to perform patch operations.
Create a Systems Manager patch baseline and associate it with your instance to define which patches Systems Manager should apply.
Define a maintenance window to make sure Systems Manager patches your instance when you tell it to.
Monitor patch compliance to verify the patch state of your instances.

You must meet two prerequisites to use Systems Manager to apply operating system patches. First, you must attach the IAM role you created in the previous section, EC2SSM, to your Amazon EC2 instance. Second, you must install the Systems Manager agent on your Amazon EC2 instance. If you have used a recent Amazon Linux AMI, Amazon has already installed the Systems Manager agent on your Amazon EC2 instance. You can confirm this by logging in to an Amazon EC2 instance and checking the Systems Manager agent log files that are located at /var/log/amazon/ssm/.

To install the Systems Manager agent on an instance that does not have the agent preinstalled or if you want to use the Systems Manager agent on your on-premises servers, see Installing and Configuring the Systems Manager Agent on Linux Instances. If you forgot to attach the newly created role when launching your Amazon EC2 instance or if you want to attach the role to already running Amazon EC2 instances, see Attach an AWS IAM Role to an Existing Amazon EC2 Instance by Using the AWS CLI or use the AWS Management Console.

A. Create the Systems Manager IAM role

For a maintenance window to be able to run any tasks, you must create a new role for Systems Manager. This role is a different kind of role than the one you created earlier: this role will be used by Systems Manager instead of Amazon EC2. Earlier, you created the role, EC2SSM, with the policy, AmazonEC2RoleforSSM, which allowed the Systems Manager agent on your instance to communicate with Systems Manager. In this section, you need a new role with the policy, AmazonSSMMaintenanceWindowRole, so that the Systems Manager service can execute commands on your instance.

To create the new IAM role for Systems Manager:

Create a JSON file named trustpolicy-maintenancewindowrole.json that contains the following trust policy. This policy describes which principal is allowed to assume the role you are going to create. This trust policy allows not only Amazon EC2 to assume this role, but also Systems Manager.

{
   "Version":"2012-10-17",
   "Statement":[
      {
         "Sid":"",
         "Effect":"Allow",
         "Principal":{
            "Service":[
               "ec2.amazonaws.com",
               "ssm.amazonaws.com"
           ]
         },
         "Action":"sts:AssumeRole"
      }
   ]
}

Use the following command to create a role named MaintenanceWindowRole that has the AWS managed policy, AmazonSSMMaintenanceWindowRole, attached to it. This command generates JSON-based output that describes the role and its parameters, if the command is successful.
```
$ aws iam create-role --role-name MaintenanceWindowRole --assume-role-policy-document file://trustpolicy-maintenancewindowrole.json
```

Use the following command to attach the AWS managed IAM policy (AmazonEC2RoleforSSM) to your newly created role.

$ aws iam attach-role-policy --role-name MaintenanceWindowRole --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AmazonSSMMaintenanceWindowRole

B. Create a Systems Manager patch baseline and associate it with your instance

Next, you will create a Systems Manager patch baseline and associate it with your Amazon EC2 instance. A patch baseline defines which patches Systems Manager should apply to your instance. Before you can associate the patch baseline with your instance, though, you must determine if Systems Manager recognizes your Amazon EC2 instance. Use the following command to list all instances managed by Systems Manager. The --filters option ensures you look only for your newly created Amazon EC2 instance.

$ aws ssm describe-instance-information --filters Key=InstanceIds,Values= YourInstanceId

{
    "InstanceInformationList": [
        {
            "IsLatestVersion": true,
            "ComputerName": "ip-10-50-2-245",
            "PingStatus": "Online",
            "InstanceId": "YourInstanceId",
            "IPAddress": "10.50.2.245",
            "ResourceType": "EC2Instance",
            "AgentVersion": "2.2.120.0",
            "PlatformVersion": "2017.09",
            "PlatformName": "Amazon Linux AMI",
            "PlatformType": "Linux",
            "LastPingDateTime": 1515759143.826
        }
    ]
}

If your instance is missing from the list, verify that:

Your instance is running.
You attached the Systems Manager IAM role, EC2SSM.
You deployed a NAT gateway in your public subnet to ensure your VPC reflects the diagram shown earlier in this post so that the Systems Manager agent can connect to the Systems Manager internet endpoint.
The Systems Manager agent logs don’t include any unaddressed errors.

Now that you have checked that Systems Manager can manage your Amazon EC2 instance, it is time to create a patch baseline. With a patch baseline, you define which patches are approved to be installed on all Amazon EC2 instances associated with the patch baseline. The Patch Group resource tag you defined earlier will determine to which patch group an instance belongs. If you do not specifically define a patch baseline, the default AWS-managed patch baseline is used.

To create a patch baseline:

Use the following command to create a patch baseline named AmazonLinuxServers. With approval rules, you can determine the approved patches that will be included in your patch baseline. In this example, you add all Critical severity patches to the patch baseline as soon as they are released, by setting the Auto approval delay to 0 days. By setting the Auto approval delay to 2 days, you add to this patch baseline the Important, Medium, and Low severity patches two days after they are released.
```
$ aws ssm create-patch-baseline --name "AmazonLinuxServers" --description "Baseline containing all updates for Amazon Linux" --operating-system AMAZON_LINUX --approval-rules "PatchRules=[{PatchFilterGroup={PatchFilters=[{Values=[Critical],Key=SEVERITY}]},ApproveAfterDays=0,ComplianceLevel=CRITICAL},{PatchFilterGroup={PatchFilters=[{Values=[Important,Medium,Low],Key=SEVERITY}]},ApproveAfterDays=2,ComplianceLevel=HIGH}]"

{
    "BaselineId": "YourBaselineId"
}
```

Use the following command to register the patch baseline you created with your instance. To do so, you use the Patch Group tag that you added to your Amazon EC2 instance.

$ aws ssm register-patch-baseline-for-patch-group --baseline-id YourPatchBaselineId --patch-group "Linux Servers"

{
    "PatchGroup": "Linux Servers",
    "BaselineId": "YourBaselineId"
}

C. Define a maintenance window

Now that you have successfully set up a role, created a patch baseline, and registered your Amazon EC2 instance with your patch baseline, you will define a maintenance window so that you can control when your Amazon EC2 instances will receive patches. By creating multiple maintenance windows and assigning them to different patch groups, you can make sure your Amazon EC2 instances do not all reboot at the same time.

To define a maintenance window:

Use the following command to define a maintenance window. In this example command, the maintenance window will start every Saturday at 10:00 P.M. UTC. It will have a duration of 4 hours and will not start any new tasks 1 hour before the end of the maintenance window.
```
$ aws ssm create-maintenance-window --name SaturdayNight --schedule "cron(0 0 22 ? * SAT *)" --duration 4 --cutoff 1 --allow-unassociated-targets

{
    "WindowId": "YourMaintenanceWindowId"
}
```

For more information about defining a cron-based schedule for maintenance windows, see Cron and Rate Expressions for Maintenance Windows.

After defining the maintenance window, you must register the Amazon EC2 instance with the maintenance window so that Systems Manager knows which Amazon EC2 instance it should patch in this maintenance window. You can register the instance by using the same Patch Group tag you used to associate the Amazon EC2 instance with the AWS-provided patch baseline, as shown in the following command.
```
$ aws ssm register-target-with-maintenance-window --window-id YourMaintenanceWindowId --resource-type INSTANCE --targets "Key=tag:Patch Group,Values=Linux Servers"

{
    "WindowTargetId": "YourWindowTargetId"
}
```

Assign a task to the maintenance window that will install the operating system patches on your Amazon EC2 instance. The following command includes the following options.
1. name is the name of your task and is optional. I named mine Patching.
2. task-arn is the name of the task document you want to run.
3. max-concurrency allows you to specify how many of your Amazon EC2 instances Systems Manager should patch at the same time. max-errors determines when Systems Manager should abort the task. For patching, this number should not be too low, because you do not want your entire patch task to stop on all instances if one instance fails. You can set this, for example, to 20%.
4. service-role-arn is the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the AmazonSSMMaintenanceWindowRole role you created earlier in this blog post.
5. task-invocation-parameters defines the parameters that are specific to the AWS-RunPatchBaseline task document and tells Systems Manager that you want to install patches with a timeout of 600 seconds (10 minutes).
```
$ aws ssm register-task-with-maintenance-window --name "Patching" --window-id "YourMaintenanceWindowId" --targets "Key=WindowTargetIds,Values=YourWindowTargetId" --task-arn AWS-RunPatchBaseline --service-role-arn "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/MaintenanceWindowRole" --task-type "RUN_COMMAND" --task-invocation-parameters "RunCommand={Comment=,TimeoutSeconds=600,Parameters={SnapshotId=[''],Operation=[Install]}}" --max-concurrency "500" --max-errors "20%"

{
    "WindowTaskId": "YourWindowTaskId"
}
```

Now, you must wait for the maintenance window to run at least once according to the schedule you defined earlier. If your maintenance window has expired, you can check the status of any maintenance tasks Systems Manager has performed by using the following command.

$ aws ssm describe-maintenance-window-executions --window-id "YourMaintenanceWindowId"

{
    "WindowExecutions": [
        {
            "Status": "SUCCESS",
            "WindowId": "YourMaintenanceWindowId",
            "WindowExecutionId": "b594984b-430e-4ffa-a44c-a2e171de9dd3",
            "EndTime": 1515766467.487,
            "StartTime": 1515766457.691
        }
    ]
}

D. Monitor patch compliance

You also can see the overall patch compliance of all Amazon EC2 instances using the following command in the AWS CLI.

$ aws ssm list-compliance-summaries

This command shows you the number of instances that are compliant with each category and the number of instances that are not in JSON format.

You also can see overall patch compliance by choosing Compliance under Insights in the navigation pane of the Systems Manager console. You will see a visual representation of how many Amazon EC2 instances are up to date, how many Amazon EC2 instances are noncompliant, and how many Amazon EC2 instances are compliant in relation to the earlier defined patch baseline.

In this section, you have set everything up for patch management on your instance. Now you know how to patch your Amazon EC2 instance in a controlled manner and how to check if your Amazon EC2 instance is compliant with the patch baseline you have defined. Of course, I recommend that you apply these steps to all Amazon EC2 instances you manage.

Summary

In this blog post, I showed how to use Systems Manager to create a patch baseline and maintenance window to keep your Amazon EC2 Linux instances up to date with the latest security patches. Remember that by creating multiple maintenance windows and assigning them to different patch groups, you can make sure your Amazon EC2 instances do not all reboot at the same time.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about or issues implementing any part of this solution, start a new thread on the Amazon EC2 forum or contact AWS Support.

– Koen

Sharing Secrets with AWS Lambda Using AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store

2018-02-09 Chris Munns

Post Syndicated from Chris Munns original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/sharing-secrets-with-aws-lambda-using-aws-systems-manager-parameter-store/

This post courtesy of Roberto Iturralde, Sr. Application Developer- AWS Professional Services

Application architects are faced with key decisions throughout the process of designing and implementing their systems. One decision common to nearly all solutions is how to manage the storage and access rights of application configuration. Shared configuration should be stored centrally and securely with each system component having access only to the properties that it needs for functioning.

With AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store, developers have access to central, secure, durable, and highly available storage for application configuration and secrets. Parameter Store also integrates with AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM), allowing fine-grained access control to individual parameters or branches of a hierarchical tree.

This post demonstrates how to create and access shared configurations in Parameter Store from AWS Lambda. Both encrypted and plaintext parameter values are stored with only the Lambda function having permissions to decrypt the secrets. You also use AWS X-Ray to profile the function.

Solution overview

This example is made up of the following components:

An AWS SAM template that defines:
- A Lambda function and its permissions
- An unencrypted Parameter Store parameter that the Lambda function loads
- A KMS key that only the Lambda function can access. You use this key to create an encrypted parameter later.
Lambda function code in Python 3.6 that demonstrates how to load values from Parameter Store at function initialization for reuse across invocations.

Launch the AWS SAM template

To create the resources shown in this post, you can download the SAM template or choose the button to launch the stack. The template requires one parameter, an IAM user name, which is the name of the IAM user to be the admin of the KMS key that you create. In order to perform the steps listed in this post, this IAM user will need permissions to execute Lambda functions, create Parameter Store parameters, administer keys in KMS, and view the X-Ray console. If you have these privileges in your IAM user account you can use your own account to complete the walkthrough. You can not use the root user to administer the KMS keys.

SAM template resources

The following sections show the code for the resources defined in the template.
Lambda function

ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev:
    Type: 'AWS::Serverless::Function'
    Properties:
      FunctionName: 'ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev'
      Description: 'Integrating lambda with Parameter Store'
      Handler: 'lambda_function.lambda_handler'
      Role: !GetAtt ParameterStoreBlogFunctionRoleDev.Arn
      CodeUri: './code'
      Environment:
        Variables:
          ENV: 'dev'
          APP_CONFIG_PATH: 'parameterStoreBlog'
          AWS_XRAY_TRACING_NAME: 'ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev'
      Runtime: 'python3.6'
      Timeout: 5
      Tracing: 'Active'

  ParameterStoreBlogFunctionRoleDev:
    Type: AWS::IAM::Role
    Properties:
      AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
        Version: '2012-10-17'
        Statement:
          -
            Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              Service:
                - 'lambda.amazonaws.com'
            Action:
              - 'sts:AssumeRole'
      ManagedPolicyArns:
        - 'arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole'
      Policies:
        -
          PolicyName: 'ParameterStoreBlogDevParameterAccess'
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: '2012-10-17'
            Statement:
              -
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - 'ssm:GetParameter*'
                Resource: !Sub 'arn:aws:ssm:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/dev/parameterStoreBlog*'
        -
          PolicyName: 'ParameterStoreBlogDevXRayAccess'
          PolicyDocument:
            Version: '2012-10-17'
            Statement:
              -
                Effect: Allow
                Action:
                  - 'xray:PutTraceSegments'
                  - 'xray:PutTelemetryRecords'
                Resource: '*'

In this YAML code, you define a Lambda function named ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev using the SAM AWS::Serverless::Function type. The environment variables for this function include the ENV (dev) and the APP_CONFIG_PATH where you find the configuration for this app in Parameter Store. X-Ray tracing is also enabled for profiling later.

The IAM role for this function extends the AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole by adding IAM policies that grant the function permissions to write to X-Ray and get parameters from Parameter Store, limited to paths under /dev/parameterStoreBlog*.
Parameter Store parameter

SimpleParameter:
    Type: AWS::SSM::Parameter
    Properties:
      Name: '/dev/parameterStoreBlog/appConfig'
      Description: 'Sample dev config values for my app'
      Type: String
      Value: '{"key1": "value1","key2": "value2","key3": "value3"}'

This YAML code creates a plaintext string parameter in Parameter Store in a path that your Lambda function can access.
KMS encryption key

ParameterStoreBlogDevEncryptionKeyAlias:
    Type: AWS::KMS::Alias
    Properties:
      AliasName: 'alias/ParameterStoreBlogKeyDev'
      TargetKeyId: !Ref ParameterStoreBlogDevEncryptionKey

  ParameterStoreBlogDevEncryptionKey:
    Type: AWS::KMS::Key
    Properties:
      Description: 'Encryption key for secret config values for the Parameter Store blog post'
      Enabled: True
      EnableKeyRotation: False
      KeyPolicy:
        Version: '2012-10-17'
        Id: 'key-default-1'
        Statement:
          -
            Sid: 'Allow administration of the key & encryption of new values'
            Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              AWS:
                - !Sub 'arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:user/${IAMUsername}'
            Action:
              - 'kms:Create*'
              - 'kms:Encrypt'
              - 'kms:Describe*'
              - 'kms:Enable*'
              - 'kms:List*'
              - 'kms:Put*'
              - 'kms:Update*'
              - 'kms:Revoke*'
              - 'kms:Disable*'
              - 'kms:Get*'
              - 'kms:Delete*'
              - 'kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion'
              - 'kms:CancelKeyDeletion'
            Resource: '*'
          -
            Sid: 'Allow use of the key'
            Effect: Allow
            Principal:
              AWS: !GetAtt ParameterStoreBlogFunctionRoleDev.Arn
            Action:
              - 'kms:Encrypt'
              - 'kms:Decrypt'
              - 'kms:ReEncrypt*'
              - 'kms:GenerateDataKey*'
              - 'kms:DescribeKey'
            Resource: '*'

This YAML code creates an encryption key with a key policy with two statements.

The first statement allows a given user (${IAMUsername}) to administer the key. Importantly, this includes the ability to encrypt values using this key and disable or delete this key, but does not allow the administrator to decrypt values that were encrypted with this key.

The second statement grants your Lambda function permission to encrypt and decrypt values using this key. The alias for this key in KMS is ParameterStoreBlogKeyDev, which is how you reference it later.

Lambda function

Here I walk you through the Lambda function code.

import os, traceback, json, configparser, boto3
from aws_xray_sdk.core import patch_all
patch_all()

# Initialize boto3 client at global scope for connection reuse
client = boto3.client('ssm')
env = os.environ['ENV']
app_config_path = os.environ['APP_CONFIG_PATH']
full_config_path = '/' + env + '/' + app_config_path
# Initialize app at global scope for reuse across invocations
app = None

class MyApp:
    def __init__(self, config):
        """
        Construct new MyApp with configuration
        :param config: application configuration
        """
        self.config = config

    def get_config(self):
        return self.config

def load_config(ssm_parameter_path):
    """
    Load configparser from config stored in SSM Parameter Store
    :param ssm_parameter_path: Path to app config in SSM Parameter Store
    :return: ConfigParser holding loaded config
    """
    configuration = configparser.ConfigParser()
    try:
        # Get all parameters for this app
        param_details = client.get_parameters_by_path(
            Path=ssm_parameter_path,
            Recursive=False,
            WithDecryption=True
        )

        # Loop through the returned parameters and populate the ConfigParser
        if 'Parameters' in param_details and len(param_details.get('Parameters')) > 0:
            for param in param_details.get('Parameters'):
                param_path_array = param.get('Name').split("/")
                section_position = len(param_path_array) - 1
                section_name = param_path_array[section_position]
                config_values = json.loads(param.get('Value'))
                config_dict = {section_name: config_values}
                print("Found configuration: " + str(config_dict))
                configuration.read_dict(config_dict)

    except:
        print("Encountered an error loading config from SSM.")
        traceback.print_exc()
    finally:
        return configuration

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    global app
    # Initialize app if it doesn't yet exist
    if app is None:
        print("Loading config and creating new MyApp...")
        config = load_config(full_config_path)
        app = MyApp(config)

    return "MyApp config is " + str(app.get_config()._sections)

Beneath the import statements, you import the patch_all function from the AWS X-Ray library, which you use to patch boto3 to create X-Ray segments for all your boto3 operations.

Next, you create a boto3 SSM client at the global scope for reuse across function invocations, following Lambda best practices. Using the function environment variables, you assemble the path where you expect to find your configuration in Parameter Store. The class MyApp is meant to serve as an example of an application that would need its configuration injected at construction. In this example, you create an instance of ConfigParser, a class in Python’s standard library for handling basic configurations, to give to MyApp.

The load_config function loads the all the parameters from Parameter Store at the level immediately beneath the path provided in the Lambda function environment variables. Each parameter found is put into a new section in ConfigParser. The name of the section is the name of the parameter, less the base path. In this example, the full parameter name is /dev/parameterStoreBlog/appConfig, which is put in a section named appConfig.

Finally, the lambda_handler function initializes an instance of MyApp if it doesn’t already exist, constructing it with the loaded configuration from Parameter Store. Then it simply returns the currently loaded configuration in MyApp. The impact of this design is that the configuration is only loaded from Parameter Store the first time that the Lambda function execution environment is initialized. Subsequent invocations reuse the existing instance of MyApp, resulting in improved performance. You see this in the X-Ray traces later in this post. For more advanced use cases where configuration changes need to be received immediately, you could implement an expiry policy for your configuration entries or push notifications to your function.

To confirm that everything was created successfully, test the function in the Lambda console.

Open the Lambda console.
In the navigation pane, choose Functions.
In the Functions pane, filter to ParameterStoreBlogFunctionDev to find the function created by the SAM template earlier. Open the function name to view its details.
On the top right of the function detail page, choose Test. You may need to create a new test event. The input JSON doesn’t matter as this function ignores the input.

After running the test, you should see output similar to the following. This demonstrates that the function successfully fetched the unencrypted configuration from Parameter Store.

Create an encrypted parameter

You currently have a simple, unencrypted parameter and a Lambda function that can access it.

Next, you create an encrypted parameter that only your Lambda function has permission to use for decryption. This limits read access for this parameter to only this Lambda function.

To follow along with this section, deploy the SAM template for this post in your account and make your IAM user name the KMS key admin mentioned earlier.

In the Systems Manager console, under Shared Resources, choose Parameter Store.
Choose Create Parameter.
- For Name, enter /dev/parameterStoreBlog/appSecrets.
- For Type, select Secure String.
- For KMS Key ID, choose alias/ParameterStoreBlogKeyDev, which is the key that your SAM template created.
- For Value, enter {"secretKey": "secretValue"}.
- Choose Create Parameter.
If you now try to view the value of this parameter by choosing the name of the parameter in the parameters list and then choosing Show next to the Value field, you won’t see the value appear. This is because, even though you have permission to encrypt values using this KMS key, you do not have permissions to decrypt values.
In the Lambda console, run another test of your function. You now also see the secret parameter that you created and its decrypted value.

If you do not see the new parameter in the Lambda output, this may be because the Lambda execution environment is still warm from the previous test. Because the parameters are loaded at Lambda startup, you need a fresh execution environment to refresh the values.

Adjust the function timeout to a different value in the Advanced Settings at the bottom of the Lambda Configuration tab. Choose Save and test to trigger the creation of a new Lambda execution environment.

Profiling the impact of querying Parameter Store using AWS X-Ray

By using the AWS X-Ray SDK to patch boto3 in your Lambda function code, each invocation of the function creates traces in X-Ray. In this example, you can use these traces to validate the performance impact of your design decision to only load configuration from Parameter Store on the first invocation of the function in a new execution environment.

From the Lambda function details page where you tested the function earlier, under the function name, choose Monitoring. Choose View traces in X-Ray.

This opens the X-Ray console in a new window filtered to your function. Be aware of the time range field next to the search bar if you don’t see any search results.
In this screenshot, I’ve invoked the Lambda function twice, one time 10.3 minutes ago with a response time of 1.1 seconds and again 9.8 minutes ago with a response time of 8 milliseconds.

Looking at the details of the longer running trace by clicking the trace ID, you can see that the Lambda function spent the first ~350 ms of the full 1.1 sec routing the request through Lambda and creating a new execution environment for this function, as this was the first invocation with this code. This is the portion of time before the initialization subsegment.

Next, it took 725 ms to initialize the function, which includes executing the code at the global scope (including creating the boto3 client). This is also a one-time cost for a fresh execution environment.

Finally, the function executed for 65 ms, of which 63.5 ms was the GetParametersByPath call to Parameter Store.

Looking at the trace for the second, much faster function invocation, you see that the majority of the 8 ms execution time was Lambda routing the request to the function and returning the response. Only 1 ms of the overall execution time was attributed to the execution of the function, which makes sense given that after the first invocation you’re simply returning the config stored in MyApp.

While the Traces screen allows you to view the details of individual traces, the X-Ray Service Map screen allows you to view aggregate performance data for all traced services over a period of time.

In the X-Ray console navigation pane, choose Service map. Selecting a service node shows the metrics for node-specific requests. Selecting an edge between two nodes shows the metrics for requests that traveled that connection. Again, be aware of the time range field next to the search bar if you don’t see any search results.

After invoking your Lambda function several more times by testing it from the Lambda console, you can view some aggregate performance metrics. Look at the following:

From the client perspective, requests to the Lambda service for the function are taking an average of 50 ms to respond. The function is generating ~1 trace per minute.
The function itself is responding in an average of 3 ms. In the following screenshot, I’ve clicked on this node, which reveals a latency histogram of the traced requests showing that over 95% of requests return in under 5 ms.
Parameter Store is responding to requests in an average of 64 ms, but note the much lower trace rate in the node. This is because you only fetch data from Parameter Store on the initialization of the Lambda execution environment.

Conclusion

Deduplication, encryption, and restricted access to shared configuration and secrets is a key component to any mature architecture. Serverless architectures designed using event-driven, on-demand, compute services like Lambda are no different.

In this post, I walked you through a sample application accessing unencrypted and encrypted values in Parameter Store. These values were created in a hierarchy by application environment and component name, with the permissions to decrypt secret values restricted to only the function needing access. The techniques used here can become the foundation of secure, robust configuration management in your enterprise serverless applications.

Give Your WordPress Blog a Voice With Our New Amazon Polly Plugin

2018-02-08 Jeff Barr

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/give-your-wordpress-blog-a-voice-with-our-new-amazon-polly-plugin/

I first told you about Polly in late 2016 in my post Amazon Polly – Text to Speech in 47 Voices and 24 Languages. After that AWS re:Invent launch, we added support for Korean, five new voices, and made Polly available in all Regions in the aws partition. We also added whispering, speech marks, a timbre effect, and dynamic range compression.

New WordPress Plugin
Today we are launching a WordPress plugin that uses Polly to create high-quality audio versions of your blog posts. You can access the audio from within the post or in podcast form using a feature that we call Amazon Pollycast! Both options make your content more accessible and can help you to reach a wider audience. This plugin was a joint effort between the AWS team our friends at AWS Advanced Technology Partner WP Engine.

As you will see, the plugin is easy to install and configure. You can use it with installations of WordPress that you run on your own infrastructure or on AWS. Either way, you have access to all of Polly’s voices along with a wide variety of configuration options. The generated audio (an MP3 file for each post) can be stored alongside your WordPress content, or in Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3), with optional support for content distribution via Amazon CloudFront.

Installing the Plugin
I did not have an existing WordPress-powered blog, so I begin by launching a Lightsail instance using the WordPress 4.8.1 blueprint:

Then I follow these directions to access my login credentials:

Credentials in hand, I log in to the WordPress Dashboard:

The plugin makes calls to AWS, and needs to have credentials in order to do so. I hop over to the IAM Console and created a new policy. The policy allows the plugin to access a carefully selected set of S3 and Polly functions (find the full policy in the README):

Then I create an IAM user (wp-polly-user). I enter the name and indicate that it will be used for Programmatic Access:

Then I attach the policy that I just created, and click on Review:

I review my settings (not shown) and then click on Create User. Then I copy the two values (Access Key ID and Secret Access Key) into a secure location. Possession of these keys allows the bearer to make calls to AWS so I take care not to leave them lying around.

Now I am ready to install the plugin! I go back to the WordPress Dashboard and click on Add New in the Plugins menu:

Then I click on Upload Plugin and locate the ZIP file that I downloaded from the WordPress Plugins site. After I find it I click on Install Now to proceed:

WordPress uploads and installs the plugin. Now I click on Activate Plugin to move ahead:

With the plugin installed, I click on Settings to set it up:

I enter my keys and click on Save Changes:

The General settings let me control the sample rate, voice, player position, the default setting for new posts, and the autoplay option. I can leave all of the settings as-is to get started:

The Cloud Storage settings let me store audio in S3 and to use CloudFront to distribute the audio:

The Amazon Pollycast settings give me control over the iTunes parameters that are included in the generated RSS feed:

Finally, the Bulk Update button lets me regenerate all of the audio files after I change any of the other settings:

With the plugin installed and configured, I can create a new post. As you can see, the plugin can be enabled and customized for each post:

I can see how much it will cost to convert to audio with a click:

When I click on Publish, the plugin breaks the text into multiple blocks on sentence boundaries, calls the Polly SynthesizeSpeech API for each block, and accumulates the resulting audio in a single MP3 file. The published blog post references the file using the <audio> tag. Here’s the post:

I can’t seem to use an <audio> tag in this post, but you can download and play the MP3 file yourself if you’d like.

The Pollycast feature generates an RSS file with links to an MP3 file for each post:

Pricing
The plugin will make calls to Amazon Polly each time the post is saved or updated. Pricing is based on the number of characters in the speech requests, as described on the Polly Pricing page. Also, the AWS Free Tier lets you process up to 5 million characters per month at no charge, for a period of one year that starts when you make your first call to Polly.

Going Further
The plugin is available on GitHub in source code form and we are looking forward to your pull requests! Here are a couple of ideas to get you started:

Voice Per Author – Allow selection of a distinct Polly voice for each author.

Quoted Text – For blogs that make frequent use of embedded quotes, use a distinct voice for the quotes.

Translation – Use Amazon Translate to translate the texts into another language, and then use Polly to generate audio in that language.

Other Blogging Engines – Build a similar plugin for your favorite blogging engine.

SSML Support – Figure out an interesting way to use Polly’s SSML tags to add additional character to the audio.

Let me know what you come up with!

— Jeff;

How to Connect Directly to AWS Key Management Service from Amazon VPC by Using an AWS PrivateLink Endpoint

2018-01-22 Joe Wright

Post Syndicated from Joe Wright original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-connect-directly-to-aws-key-management-service-from-amazon-vpc-by-using-an-aws-privatelink-endpoint/

AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) now supports Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) endpoints powered by AWS PrivateLink. This means you now can connect directly to AWS KMS through a private endpoint in your VPC, keeping all traffic within your VPC and the AWS network.

Previously, applications running inside a VPC required internet access to connect to AWS KMS. This meant managing internet connectivity through internet gateways, Network Address Translation (NAT) devices, or firewall proxies. With support for Amazon VPC endpoints, you can now keep all traffic between your VPC and AWS KMS within the AWS network and avoid management of internet connectivity. In this blog post, I show you how to create and use an Amazon VPC endpoint for AWS KMS, audit the use of AWS KMS keys through the Amazon VPC endpoint, and build stricter access controls using key policies.

Create and use an Amazon VPC endpoint with AWS KMS

To get started, I will show you how to use the Amazon VPC console to create an endpoint in the US East (N. Virginia) Region, also known as us-east-1.

To create an endpoint in the US East (N. Virginia) Region:

Navigate to the Amazon VPC console. In the navigation pane, choose Endpoints, and then choose Create Endpoint.
Choose AWS services for Service category.
Choose the AWS KMS endpoint service, com.amazonaws.us-east-1.kms, from the Service Name list, as shown in the following screenshot.
Your VPC endpoint can span multiple Availability Zones, providing isolation and fault tolerance. Choose a subnet from each Availability Zone from which you want to connect. An elastic network interface for the VPC endpoint is created in each subnet that you choose, each with its own DNS hostname and private IP address.
If your VPC has DNS hostnames and DNS support enabled, choose Enable for this endpoint under Enable Private DNS Name to have applications use the VPC endpoint by default.
You use security groups to control access to your endpoint. Choose a security group from the list, or create a new one.
To finish creating the endpoint, choose Create endpoint. The console returns a VPC Endpoint ID. In our example, the VPC Endpoint ID is vpce-0c0052e3fbffdb450.
To connect to this endpoint, you need a DNS hostname that is generated for this endpoint. You can view these DNS hostnames by choosing the VPC Endpoint ID and then choosing the Details tab of the endpoint in the Amazon VPC console. One of the DNS hostnames for the endpoint that I created in the previous step is vpce-0c0052e3fbffdb450-afmosqu8.kms.us-east-1.vpce.amazonaws.com.

You can connect to AWS KMS through the VPC endpoint by using the AWS CLI or an AWS SDK. In this example, I use the following AWS CLI command to list all AWS KMS keys in the account in us-east-1.

aws kms list-keys --endpoint-url https://vpce-0c0052e3fbffdb450-afmosqu8.kms.us-east-1.vpce.amazonaws.com

If your VPC has DNS hostnames and DNS support enabled and you enabled private DNS names in the preceding steps, you can connect to your VPC endpoint by using the standard AWS KMS DNS hostname (https://kms.<region>.amazonaws.com), instead of manually configuring the endpoints in the AWS CLI or AWS SDKs. The AWS CLI and SDKs use this hostname by default to connect to KMS, so there’s nothing to change in your application to begin using the VPC endpoint.

You can monitor and audit AWS KMS usage through your VPC endpoint. Every request made to AWS KMS is logged by AWS CloudTrail. Now, when you use a VPC endpoint to make requests to AWS KMS, the endpoint ID appears in the CloudTrail log entries.

Restrict access using key policies

A good security practice to follow is least privilege: granting the fewest permissions required to complete a task. You can control access to your AWS KMS keys from a specific VPC endpoint by using AWS KMS key policies and AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies. The aws:sourceVpce condition key lets you grant or restrict access to AWS KMS keys based on the VPC endpoint used. For example, the following example key policy allows a user to perform encryption operations with a key only when the request comes through the specified VPC endpoint (replace the placeholder AWS account ID with your own account ID, and the placeholder VPC endpoint ID with your own endpoint ID).

{
    "Id": "example-key-1",
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "Enable IAM user permissions",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {"AWS":["123456789012"]},
            "Action": ["kms:*"],
            "Resource": "*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "Restrict usage to my VPC endpoint",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Principal": "*",
            "Action": [
                "kms:Encrypt",
                "kms:Decrypt",
                "kms:ReEncrypt*",
                "kms:GenerateDataKey*"
            ],
            "Resource": "*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringNotEquals": {
                    "aws:sourceVpce": "vpce-1a2b3c4d5e6f7g8h"
                }
            }
        }

    ]
}

This policy works by including a Deny statement with a StringNotEquals condition. When a user makes a request to AWS KMS through a VPC endpoint, the endpoint’s ID is compared to the aws:sourceVpce value specified in the policy. If the two values are not the same, the request is denied. You can modify AWS KMS key policies in the AWS KMS console. For more information, see Modifying a Key Policy.

You also can control access to your AWS KMS keys from any endpoint running in one or more VPCs by using the aws:sourceVpc policy condition key. Suppose you have an application that is running in one VPC, but uses a second VPC for resource management functions. In the following example policy, AWS KMS key administrative actions can only be made from VPC vpc-12345678, and the key can only be used for cryptographic operations from VPC vpc-2b2b2b2b.

{
    "Id": "example-key-2",
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "Allow administrative actions from vpc-12345678",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {"AWS": "123456789012"},
            "Action": [
                "kms:Create*","kms:Enable*","kms:Put*","kms:Update*",
                "kms:Revoke*","kms:Disable*","kms:Delete*",
                "kms:TagResource", "kms:UntagResource"
            ],
            "Resource": "*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "aws:sourceVpc": "vpc-12345678"
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Sid": "Allow key usage from vpc-2b2b2b2b",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {"AWS": "123456789012"},
            "Action": [
                "kms:Encrypt","kms:Decrypt","kms:GenerateDataKey*"
            ],
            "Resource": "*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "aws:sourceVpc": "vpc-2b2b2b2b"
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Sid": "Allow read actions from everywhere",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {"AWS": "123456789012"},
            "Action": [
                "kms:Describe*","kms:List*","kms:Get*"
            ],
            "Resource": "*",
        }
    ]
}

The previous examples show how you can limit access to AWS KMS API actions that are attached to a key policy. If you want to limit access to AWS KMS API actions that are not attached to a specific key, you have to use these VPC-related conditions in an IAM policy that refers to the desired AWS KMS API actions.

Summary

In this post, I have demonstrated how to create and use a VPC endpoint for AWS KMS, and how to use the aws:sourceVpc and aws:sourceVpce policy conditions to scope permissions to call various AWS KMS APIs. AWS KMS VPC endpoints provide you with more control over how your applications connect to AWS KMS and can save you from managing internet connectivity from your VPC.

To learn more about connecting to AWS KMS through a VPC endpoint, see the AWS KMS Developer Guide. For helpful guidance about your overall VPC network structure, see Practical VPC Design.

If you have questions about this feature or anything else related to AWS KMS, start a new thread in the AWS KMS forum.

– Joe

Recent EC2 Goodies – Launch Templates and Spread Placement

2018-01-20 Jeff Barr

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/recent-ec2-goodies-launch-templates-and-spread-placement/

We launched some important new EC2 instance types and features at AWS re:Invent. I’ve already told you about the M5, H1, T2 Unlimited and Bare Metal instances, and about Spot features such as Hibernation and the New Pricing Model. Randall told you about the Amazon Time Sync Service. Today I would like to tell you about two of the features that we launched: Spread placement groups and Launch Templates. Both features are available in the EC2 Console and from the EC2 APIs, and can be used in all of the AWS Regions in the “aws” partition:

Launch Templates
You can use launch templates to store the instance, network, security, storage, and advanced parameters that you use to launch EC2 instances, and can also include any desired tags. Each template can include any desired subset of the full collection of parameters. You can, for example, define common configuration parameters such as tags or network configurations in a template, and allow the other parameters to be specified as part of the actual launch.

Templates give you the power to set up a consistent launch environment that spans instances launched in On-Demand and Spot form, as well as through EC2 Auto Scaling and as part of a Spot Fleet. You can use them to implement organization-wide standards and to enforce best practices, and you can give your IAM users the ability to launch instances via templates while withholding the ability to do so via the underlying APIs.

Templates are versioned and you can use any desired version when you launch an instance. You can create templates from scratch, base them on the previous version, or copy the parameters from a running instance.

Here’s how you create a launch template in the Console:

Here’s how to include network interfaces, storage volumes, tags, and security groups:

And here’s how to specify advanced and specialized parameters:

You don’t have to specify values for all of these parameters in your templates; enter the values that are common to multiple instances or launches and specify the rest at launch time.

When you click Create launch template, the template is created and can be used to launch On-Demand instances, create Auto Scaling Groups, and create Spot Fleets:

The Launch Instance button now gives you the option to launch from a template:

Simply choose the template and the version, and finalize all of the launch parameters:

You can also manage your templates and template versions from the Console:

To learn more about this feature, read Launching an Instance from a Launch Template.

Spread Placement Groups
Spread placement groups indicate that you do not want the instances in the group to share the same underlying hardware. Applications that rely on a small number of critical instances can launch them in a spread placement group to reduce the odds that one hardware failure will impact more than one instance. Here are a couple of things to keep in mind when you use spread placement groups:

Availability Zones – A single spread placement group can span multiple Availability Zones. You can have a maximum of seven running instances per Availability Zone per group.
Unique Hardware – Launch requests can fail if there is insufficient unique hardware available. The situation changes over time as overall usage changes and as we add additional hardware; you can retry failed requests at a later time.
Instance Types – You can launch a wide variety of M4, M5, C3, R3, R4, X1, X1e, D2, H1, I2, I3, HS1, F1, G2, G3, P2, and P3 instances types in spread placement groups.
Reserved Instances – Instances launched into a spread placement group can make use of reserved capacity. However, you cannot currently reserve capacity for a placement group and could receive an ICE (Insufficient Capacity Error) even if you have some RI’s available.
Applicability – You cannot use spread placement groups in conjunction with Dedicated Instances or Dedicated Hosts.

You can create and use spread placement groups from the AWS Management Console, the AWS Command Line Interface (CLI), the AWS Tools for Windows PowerShell, and the AWS SDKs. The console has a new feature that will help you to learn how to use the command line:

You can specify an existing placement group or create a new one when you launch an EC2 instance:

To learn more, read about Placement Groups.

— Jeff;

How To to Migrate Multi Multi-Tier Environments Using The AWS Server Migration Service

2018-01-16 Chris Munns

Post Syndicated from Chris Munns original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/how-to-to-migrate-multi-multi-tier-environments-using-the-aws-server-migration-service/

This post courtesy of Shane Baldacchino, Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services.

Many customers ask for guidance on migrating end-to-end solutions running on virtual machines over to AWS. This post provides an overview of moving a common WordPress blog running on a virtualized platform to AWS, including re-pointing the DNS records associated to with the website.

AWS Server Migration Service (AWS SMS) is an agentless service that makes it easier and faster for you to migrate thousands of on-premises workloads to AWS. AWS SMS allows you to automate, schedule, and track incremental replications of live server volumes, making it easier for you to coordinate large-scale server migrations.

Walkthrough

The key elements of this migration process include the following steps:

Establish your AWS environment.
Replicate your database.
Download the SMS Connector from the AWS Management Console.
Configure AWS SMS and Hypervisor permissions.
Install and configure the SMS Connector appliance.
Import your virtual machine inventory and create a replication job.
Launch your Amazon EC2 instance.
Change your DNS records to resolve the WordPress blog to your EC2 instance.

Before you start, ensure that your source systems OS and vCenter version are supported by AWS. For more information, see the Server Migration Service FAQ.

Establish your AWS environment

For this walkthrough, your WordPress blog is currently running as a two-tier LAMP stack in a corporate data center. You have a frontend running Apache and PHP, plus a backend database running on MySQL. All systems are hosted on a virtualized platform.

First, establish your AWS environment. If your organization is new to AWS, this may include account or subaccount creation, a new virtual private cloud (VPC), and associated subnets, route tables, internet gateways, and so on. Think of this phase as setting up your software-defined data center. For more information, see Getting Started with Amazon EC2.

The blog is a two-tier stack, so go with two private subnets. Because you want it to be highly available, use multiple Availability Zones. A zone resides within an AWS Region. Each zone is isolated, but the zones within a region are connected through low-latency links. This allows architects and solution designers to build highly available solutions.

Replicate your database

WordPress uses a MySQL relational database. You could continue to manage MySQL and the associated EC2 instances associated with maintaining and scaling a database. For this walkthrough, use this opportunity to migrate to an RDS instance of Amazon Aurora, as it is a MySQL compliant database. Not only is Amazon Aurora a high-performant database engine but it frees you up to focus on application development by managing time-consuming database administration tasks, including backups, software patching, monitoring, scaling, and replication.

Use AWS Database Migration Service to migrate your MySQL database to Amazon Aurora easily and securely. After a database migration instance has been instantiated, configure the source and destination endpoints and create a replication task.

By attaching to the MySQL binlog, you can seed in the current data in the database and also capture all future state changes in near real time. For more information, see Migrating a MySQL-Compatible Database to Amazon Aurora.

Finally, the task shows that you are replicating current data in your WordPress blog database and future changes from MySQL into Amazon Aurora.

Download the SMS Connector from the AWS Management Console

Now, use AWS SMS to migrate your Apache PHP frontend to EC2. AWS SMS is delivered as an appliance for your hypervisor.

To download the SMS Connector, log in to the console and choose Server Migration Service, Connectors, SMS Connector setup guide.

Configure AWS SMS

Your hypervisor and AWS SMS will need an appropriate user with sufficient privileges to perform migrations.

AWS SMS – Use the AWS CLI or the IAM console to create an IAM user with the ServerMigrationConnector policy attached.
Hypervisor – Follow the specific instructions for your hypervisor in the Getting Started with AWS Server Migration Service.

Install and configure the SMS Connector appliance

Launch a new VM based on the SMS Connector that you downloaded. To configure the connector, connect to it via HTTPS. You can obtain the SMS Connector IP address from your hypervisor.

Connect to the SMS Connector via HTTPS. In the example above, the connector IP address is 10.0.0.31. In your browser, enter https://10.0.0.31.

Configure the connector with the IAM and hypervisor credentials that you created earlier.

After it’s configured, and the associated connectivity and authentication checks have passed, return to the console and view your connector in AWS SMS.

Import your virtual machine inventory and create a replication job
After validating that the SMS Connector is in a “HEALTHY” state, import your server catalog to AWS SMS. This process can take up to a minute.

Select the server to migrate and choose Create replication job. The console guides you through the process. The time that the initial replication task takes to complete is dependent on the available bandwidth and the size of your VM. After the initial seed replication, network bandwidth is minimized as AWS SMS replicates only incremental changes occurring on the VM.

Launch your EC2 instance

When your replication task is complete, the artifact created by AWS SMS is a custom AMI that you can use to deploy an EC2 instance. Follow the usual process to launch your EC2 instance, noting that you may need to replace any host-based firewalls with security groups and NACLs.

When you create an EC2 instance, ensure that you pick the most suitable EC2 instance type and size to match your performance requirements while optimizing for cost.

While your new EC2 instance is a replica of your on-premises VM, you should always validate that applications are functioning. How you do this differs on an application-by-application basis. You can use a combination of approaches, such as editing a local host file and testing your application, SSH, or Telnet.

From the RDS console, get your connection string details and update your WordPress configuration file to point to the Amazon Aurora database. As WordPress is expecting a MySQL database and Amazon Aurora is MySQL-compliant, this change of database engine is transparent to WordPress.

Change your DNS records to resolve the WordPress blog to your EC2 instance

You have validated that your WordPress application is running correctly, as you are still receiving changes from your on-premises data center via AWS DMS into your Amazon Aurora database.

You can now update your DNS zone file using Amazon Route 53. Route 53 can be driven by multiple methods: console, SDK, or AWS CLI.

For this walkthrough, update your DNS zone file via the AWS CLI. The JSON example shows upserting the A record in your zone to resolve to your EC2 instance.

Use the AWS CLI to execute the request and update the record in your zone file. The cut-over period between the original off-cloud location and AWS is defined by the TTL in the SOA (statement of authority) in your DNS zone. During this period, any requests resolving to your off-cloud server that result in database writes are automatically replicated to your Amazon Aurora instance via AWS DMS.

You have now successfully migrated your WordPress blog to AWS. Based on the TTL of your DNS zone file, end users slowly resolve the WordPress blog to AWS.

After you have validated your successful migration, be sure to delete your AWS DMS task and your AWS SMS replication job.

Summary

In this post, you moved a WordPress blog to AWS, using AWS SMS and AWS DMS to re-point the associated DNS records.

Many architectures can be extended to use many of the inherent benefits of AWS, with little effort. For example, by using Amazon CloudWatch metrics to drive Auto Scaling policies, you can use an Application Load Balancer as your frontend. This removes the single point of failure for a single Amazon EC2 instance and ensures that your deployed capacity closely follows customer demand. Think big and get building!

The Top 20 Most Viewed AWS IAM Documentation Pages in 2017

2018-01-05 Stephenie Swope

Post Syndicated from Stephenie Swope original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/the-top-20-most-viewed-aws-iam-documentation-pages-in-2017/

The following 20 pages were the most viewed AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) documentation pages in 2017. I have included a brief description with each link to explain what each page covers. Use this list to see what other AWS customers have been viewing and perhaps to pique your own interest in a topic you’ve been meaning to learn about.

What Is IAM?
Learn more about IAM, a web service that helps you securely control access to AWS resources for your users. You use IAM to control who can use your AWS resources (authentication) and how they can use resources (authorization).
Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account
You can create one or more IAM users in your AWS account. You might create an IAM user when someone joins your organization, or when you have a new application that needs to make API calls to AWS.
Managing Access Keys for IAM Users
Users need their own access keys to make programmatic calls to AWS from the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI), Tools for Windows PowerShell, the AWS SDKs, or direct HTTP calls using the APIs for individual AWS services. To fill this need, you can create, modify, view, or rotate access keys (access key IDs and secret access keys) for IAM users.
IAM JSON Policy Elements Reference
Learn more about the elements that you can use when you create a JSON policy. View additional JSON policy examples and learn about conditions, supported data types, and how they are used in various services.
IAM Best Practices
To help secure your AWS resources, follow these best practices for IAM.
Tutorial: Delegate Access to the Billing Console
Learn how to delegate access to specific IAM users who need to view or manage AWS Billing and Cost Management data for an AWS account.
Using Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) in AWS
For an additional layer of security when signing in to your AWS account, AWS recommends that you configure MFA to help protect your AWS resources. MFA adds extra security because it requires users to enter a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services.
The IAM Console and the Sign-in Page
Learn about the IAM-enabled AWS Management Console sign-in page and how to sign in as an AWS account root user or as an IAM user. To help your users sign in easily, create a unique sign-in URL for your account.
Enabling a Virtual MFA Device
Learn how to enable and manage virtual MFA devices from the AWS Management Console.
How Users Sign In to Your Account
After you create IAM users and passwords for each, your users can sign in to the AWS Management Console using your account ID or alias, or from a special URL that includes your account ID.
Working with Server Certificates
Some AWS services can use server certificates that you manage with IAM or AWS Certificate Manager (ACM). ACM is the preferred tool to provision, manage, and deploy your server certificates. Use IAM as a certificate manager only when you must support HTTPS connections in a region that is not supported by ACM.
Your AWS Account ID and Its Alias
Learn how to find your AWS account ID and its alias.
IAM Roles
A role is an AWS identity with permission policies that determine what the identity can and cannot do in AWS using temporary security credentials that are created dynamically and provided to the user. A role is intended to be assumable by anyone who needs it using these temporary security credentials.
IAM Policies
Read an overview of policies, which are entities in AWS that, when attached to an identity or resource, define their permissions. Policies are stored in AWS as JSON documents attached to principals as identity-based policies or to resources as resource-based policies.
Example Policies
This collection of policies can help you define permissions for your IAM identities, such as granting access to a specific Amazon DynamoDB table or launching Amazon EC2 instances in a specific subnet.
Tutorial: Delegate Access Across AWS Accounts Using IAM Roles
Learn how to use an IAM role to delegate access to resources that are in different AWS accounts that you own.
Using an IAM Role to Grant Permissions to Applications Running on Amazon EC2 Instances
Use an IAM role to manage temporary credentials for applications that run on an EC2 instance. When you use a role, you do not have to distribute long-term credentials to an EC2 instance. Instead, the role supplies temporary permissions that applications can use when they make calls to other AWS resources.
Creating Your First IAM Admin User and Group
As a best practice, do not use the AWS account root user for any task where it’s not required. Instead, learn how to create an IAM administrator user and group for yourself.
Temporary Security Credentials
You can use the AWS Security Token Service (AWS STS) to create and provide trusted users with temporary security credentials that can control access to your AWS resources. Temporary security credentials work almost identically to the long-term access key credentials that your IAM users can use.
The AWS Account Root User
When you first create an AWS account, you begin with a single sign-in identity that has complete access to all AWS services and resources in the account. This identity is called the AWS account root user and is accessed by signing in with the email address and password that you used to create the account. To manage your root user, follow the steps on this page.

In the “Comments” section below, let us know if you would like to see anything on these or other IAM documentation pages expanded or updated to make them more useful to you.

– Stephenie

AWS Organizations Now Supports Self-Service Removal of Accounts from an Organization

2017-12-20 Raymond Ma

Post Syndicated from Raymond Ma original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-organizations-now-supports-self-service-removal-of-accounts-from-an-organization/

Today, AWS Organizations made it easier for you to remove AWS accounts from an organization. You can remove accounts from an organization without requiring assistance from AWS Support, and the accounts you remove can operate as standalone accounts or be invited to join another organization. For example, you could remove graduating students’ AWS accounts from your organization to become standalone accounts or move accounts into another organization after an acquisition.

In this blog post, I explain the information and permissions required to remove accounts from an organization, and then I demonstrate how to remove an account from an organization.

Information and permissions required to remove accounts from an organization

In order to remove an AWS account from an organization, you must have permission to do so. To verify that your AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user or role has the required permissions to remove an account from an organization, navigate to the IAM console. Though you also can remove an account from your organization after signing in as the root user, AWS recommends you follow IAM best practices and use an IAM user or role instead.

To remove an AWS account from an organization, your IAM user or role must have the following permissions:

organizations:DescribeOrganization (console only)
organizations:LeaveOrganization

In order for an AWS account in an organization to be removed and become a standalone account, the account must have the following:

Contact information
An accepted AWS Customer Agreement
A valid payment method, such as a credit card
A verified phone number
A selected support plan option

In certain situations, you may need to update some of this required information for the AWS account you want to remove and the Organizations console walks you through the steps to update it. If you need to update the payment method for the AWS account, the IAM user or role performing the action must have the following permissions:

aws-portal:ModifyBilling
aws-portal:ModifyPaymentMethods

For a complete list of required permissions, steps to remove an account from an organization, and important information applicable to programmatically created accounts in Organizations, see Removing a Member Account from Your Organization.

How to remove an AWS account from an organization

Let’s say that I need to remove some students’ AWS accounts from one of my university’s organizations because the students are graduating and want to continue using their AWS accounts independently of the organization.

To remove these student accounts from the organization:

I navigate to the Organizations console, choose the accounts that I want to remove, and choose Remove accounts.
I confirm that I want to remove these accounts by choosing Remove.
The accounts for Mary Major and Richard Roe already had all of the information required to become standalone accounts and are removed from the organization. The accounts that require additional information to become standalone accounts show a status of Remove failed. In this example, I must complete the information for the Jane Doe and Carlos Salazar accounts before I can remove them.

I will work on the Jane Doe and Carlos Salazar accounts one at a time. To see the sign-in options for the Jane Doe account, I choose Sign-in options.

I want the students to provide their additional required information so that their accounts can become standalone accounts. To allow Jane, the student who owns the Jane Doe account, to sign in to her account and provide the missing information, I choose Copy link and email the link to Jane.

To complete this process for the Carlos Salazar account, I return to the account list on the previous page and choose Sign-in options for the Carlos Salazar account. I email Carlos, the owner of the Carlos Salazar account, a self-service account removal link. Both account owners follow the same process to remove their accounts from the organization.

After receiving the email from me with the sign-in link, Jane clicks the link to sign in to her Jane Doe account. After signing in, Jane provides and submits the information that is required to make her account a standalone account. Jane then is taken to the Organizations console where she chooses Leave organization to remove her account from the organization.
After Jane chooses Leave organization, she is redirected to the Organizations console, and a notification confirms that the Jane Doe account has been removed from the organization.
As the administrator in the master account of the organization, I can verify the successful removal by checking that the Jane Doe account no longer shows up in the list of accounts. Alternatively, if CloudWatch Events has been set up for Organizations, notifications can be provided through additional channels. For information about how to set up CloudWatch Events for Organizations, see Tutorial: Monitor Important Changes to Your Organization with CloudWatch Events.

Summary

Today, AWS Organizations made it easier for you to remove AWS accounts from your organization so that they can operate independently of your organization. To remove an AWS account from your organization, sign in to the Organizations console.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about or issues implementing this solution, start a new thread on the Organizations forum.

– Raymond

New – Amazon CloudWatch Agent with AWS Systems Manager Integration – Unified Metrics & Log Collection for Linux & Windows

2017-12-14 Jeff Barr

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-amazon-cloudwatch-agent-with-aws-systems-manager-integration-unified-metrics-log-collection-for-linux-windows/

In the past I’ve talked about several agents, deaemons, and scripts that you could use to collect system metrics and log files for your Windows and Linux instances and on-premise services and publish them to Amazon CloudWatch. The data collected by this somewhat disparate collection of tools gave you visibility into the status and behavior of your compute resources, along with the power to take action when a value goes out of range and indicates a potential issue. You can graph any desired metrics on CloudWatch Dashboards, initiate actions via CloudWatch Alarms, and search CloudWatch Logs to find error messages, while taking advantage of our support for custom high-resolution metrics.

New Unified Agent
Today we are taking a nice step forward and launching a new, unified CloudWatch Agent. It runs in the cloud and on-premises, on Linux and Windows instances and servers, and handles metrics and log files. You can deploy it using AWS Systems Manager (SSM) Run Command, SSM State Manager, or from the CLI. Here are some of the most important features:

Single Agent – A single agent now collects both metrics and logs. This simplifies the setup process and reduces complexity.

Cross-Platform / Cross-Environment – The new agent runs in the cloud and on-premises, on 64-bit Linux and 64-bit Windows, and includes HTTP proxy server support.

Configurable – The new agent captures the most useful system metrics automatically. It can be configured to collect hundreds of others, including fine-grained metrics on sub-resources such as CPU threads, mounted filesystems, and network interfaces.

CloudWatch-Friendly – The new agent supports standard 1-minute metrics and the newer 1-second high-resolution metrics. It automatically includes EC2 dimensions such as Instance Id, Image Id, and Auto Scaling Group Name, and also supports the use of custom dimensions. All of the dimensions can be used for custom aggregation across Auto Scaling Groups, applications, and so forth.

Migration – You can easily migrate existing AWS SSM and EC2Config configurations for use with the new agent.

Installing the Agent
The CloudWatch Agent uses an IAM role when running on an EC2 instance, and an IAM user when running on an on-premises server. The role or the user must include the AmazonSSMFullAccess and AmazonEC2ReadOnlyAccess policies. Here’s my role:

I can easily add it to a running instance (this is a relatively new and very handy EC2 feature):

The SSM Agent is already running on my instance. If it wasn’t, I would follow the steps in Installing and Configuring SSM Agent to set it up.

Next, I install the CloudWatch Agent using the AWS Systems Manager:

This takes just a few seconds. Now I can use a simple wizard to set up the configuration file for the agent:

The wizard also lets me set up the log files to be monitored:

The wizard generates a JSON-format config file and stores it on the instance. It also offers me the option to upload the file to my Parameter Store so that I can deploy it to my other instances (I can also do fine-grained customization of the metrics and log collection configuration by editing the file):

Now I can start the CloudWatch Agent using Run Command, supplying the name of my configuration in the Parameter Store:

This runs in a few seconds and the agent begins to publish metrics right away. As I mentioned earlier, the agent can publish fine-grained metrics on the resources inside of or attached to an instance. For example, here are the metrics for each filesystem:

There’s a separate log stream for each monitored log file on each instance:

I can view and search it, just like I can do for any other log stream:

Now Available
The new CloudWatch Agent is available now and you can start using it today in all public AWS Regions, with AWS GovCloud (US) and the Regions in China to follow.

There’s no charge for the agent; you pay the usual CloudWatch prices for logs and custom metrics.

— Jeff;

AWS Cloud9 – Cloud Developer Environments

2017-11-30 Randall Hunt

Post Syndicated from Randall Hunt original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-cloud9-cloud-developer-environments/

One of the first things you learn when you start programming is that, just like any craftsperson, your tools matter. Notepad.exe isn’t going to cut it. A powerful editor and testing pipeline supercharge your productivity. I still remember learning to use Vim for the first time and being able to zip around systems and complex programs. Do you remember how hard it was to setup all your compilers and dependencies on a new machine? How many cycles have you wasted matching versions, tinkering with configs, and then writing documentation to onboard a new developer to a project?

Today we’re launching AWS Cloud9, an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) for writing, running, and debugging code, all from your web browser. Cloud9 comes prepackaged with essential tools for many popular programming languages (Javascript, Python, PHP, etc.) so you don’t have to tinker with installing various compilers and toolchains. Cloud9 also provides a seamless experience for working with serverless applications allowing you to quickly switch between local and remote testing or debugging. Based on the popular open source Ace Editor and c9.io IDE (which we acquired last year), AWS Cloud9 is designed to make collaborative cloud development easy with extremely powerful pair programming features. There are more features than I could ever cover in this post but to give a quick breakdown I’ll break the IDE into 3 components: The editor, the AWS integrations, and the collaboration.

Editing

The Ace Editor at the core of Cloud9 is what lets you write code quickly, easily, and beautifully. It follows a UNIX philosophy of doing one thing and doing it well: writing code.

It has all the typical IDE features you would expect: live syntax checking, auto-indent, auto-completion, code folding, split panes, version control integration, multiple cursors and selections, and it also has a few unique features I want to highlight. First of all, it’s fast, even for large (100000+ line) files. There’s no lag or other issues while typing. It has over two dozen themes built-in (solarized!) and you can bring all of your favorite themes from Sublime Text or TextMate as well. It has built-in support for 40+ language modes and customizable run configurations for your projects. Most importantly though, it has Vim mode (or emacs if your fingers work that way). It also has a keybinding editor that allows you to bend the editor to your will.

The editor supports powerful keyboard navigation and commands (similar to Sublime Text or vim plugins like ctrlp). On a Mac, with ⌘+P you can open any file in your environment with fuzzy search. With ⌘+. you can open up the command pane which allows you to do invoke any of the editor commands by typing the name. It also helpfully displays the keybindings for a command in the pane, for instance to open to a terminal you can press ⌥+T. Oh, did I mention there’s a terminal? It ships with the AWS CLI preconfigured for access to your resources.

The environment also comes with pre-installed debugging tools for many popular languages – but you’re not limited to what’s already installed. It’s easy to add in new programs and define new run configurations.

The editor is just one, admittedly important, component in an IDE though. I want to show you some other compelling features.

AWS Integrations

The AWS Cloud9 IDE is the first IDE I’ve used that is truly “cloud native”. The service is provided at no additional charge, and you only charged for the underlying compute and storage resources. When you create an environment you’re prompted for either: an instance type and an auto-hibernate time, or SSH access to a machine of your choice.

If you’re running in AWS the auto-hibernate feature will stop your instance shortly after you stop using your IDE. This can be a huge cost savings over running a more permanent developer desktop. You can also launch it within a VPC to give it secure access to your development resources. If you want to run Cloud9 outside of AWS, or on an existing instance, you can provide SSH access to the service which it will use to create an environment on the external machine. Your environment is provisioned with automatic and secure access to your AWS account so you don’t have to worry about copying credentials around. Let me say that again: you can run this anywhere.

Serverless Development with AWS Cloud9

I spend a lot of time on Twitch developing serverless applications. I have hundreds of lambda functions and APIs deployed. Cloud9 makes working with every single one of these functions delightful. Let me show you how it works.

If you look in the top right side of the editor you’ll see an AWS Resources tab. Opening this you can see all of the lambda functions in your region (you can see functions in other regions by adjusting your region preferences in the AWS preference pane).

You can import these remote functions to your local workspace just by double-clicking them. This allows you to edit, test, and debug your serverless applications all locally. You can create new applications and functions easily as well. If you click the Lambda icon in the top right of the pane you’ll be prompted to create a new lambda function and Cloud9 will automatically create a Serverless Application Model template for you as well. The IDE ships with support for the popular SAM local tool pre-installed. This is what I use in most of my local testing and serverless development. Since you have a terminal, it’s easy to install additional tools and use other serverless frameworks.

Launching an Environment from AWS CodeStar

With AWS CodeStar you can easily provision an end-to-end continuous delivery toolchain for development on AWS. Codestar provides a unified experience for building, testing, deploying, and managing applications using AWS CodeCommit, CodeBuild, CodePipeline, and CodeDeploy suite of services. Now, with a few simple clicks you can provision a Cloud9 environment to develop your application. Your environment will be pre-configured with the code for your CodeStar application already checked out and git credentials already configured.

You can easily share this environment with your coworkers which leads me to another extremely useful set of features.

Collaboration

One of the many things that sets AWS Cloud9 apart from other editors are the rich collaboration tools. You can invite an IAM user to your environment with a few clicks.

You can see what files they’re working on, where their cursors are, and even share a terminal. The chat features is useful as well.

Things to Know

There are no additional charges for this service beyond the underlying compute and storage.
c9.io continues to run for existing users. You can continue to use all the features of c9.io and add new team members if you have a team account. In the future, we will provide tools for easy migration of your c9.io workspaces to AWS Cloud9.
AWS Cloud9 is available in the US West (Oregon), US East (Ohio), US East (N.Virginia), EU (Ireland), and Asia Pacific (Singapore) regions.

I can’t wait to see what you build with AWS Cloud9!

– Randall

Serverless Automated Cost Controls, Part1

2017-11-22 Shankar Ramachandran

Post Syndicated from Shankar Ramachandran original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/serverless-automated-cost-controls-part1/

This post courtesy of Shankar Ramachandran, Pubali Sen, and George Mao

In line with AWS’s continual efforts to reduce costs for customers, this series focuses on how customers can build serverless automated cost controls. This post provides an architecture blueprint and a sample implementation to prevent budget overruns.

This solution uses the following AWS products:

AWS Budgets – An AWS Cost Management tool that helps customers define and track budgets for AWS costs, and forecast for up to three months.
Amazon SNS – An AWS service that makes it easy to set up, operate, and send notifications from the cloud.
AWS Lambda – An AWS service that lets you run code without provisioning or managing servers.

You can fine-tune a budget for various parameters, for example filtering by service or tag. The Budgets tool lets you post notifications on an SNS topic. A Lambda function that subscribes to the SNS topic can act on the notification. Any programmatically implementable action can be taken.

The diagram below describes the architecture blueprint.

In this post, we describe how to use this blueprint with AWS Step Functions and IAM to effectively revoke the ability of a user to start new Amazon EC2 instances, after a budget amount is exceeded.

Freedom with guardrails

AWS lets you quickly spin up resources as you need them, deploying hundreds or even thousands of servers in minutes. This means you can quickly develop and roll out new applications. Teams can experiment and innovate more quickly and frequently. If an experiment fails, you can always de-provision those servers without risk.

This improved agility also brings in the need for effective cost controls. Your Finance and Accounting department must budget, monitor, and control the AWS spend. For example, this could be a budget per project. Further, Finance and Accounting must take appropriate actions if the budget for the project has been exceeded, for example. Call it “freedom with guardrails” – where Finance wants to give developers freedom, but with financial constraints.

Architecture

This section describes how to use the blueprint introduced earlier to implement a “freedom with guardrails” solution.

The budget for “Project Beta” is set up in Budgets. In this example, we focus on EC2 usage and identify the instances that belong to this project by filtering on the tag Project with the value Beta. For more information, see Creating a Budget.
The budget configuration also includes settings to send a notification on an SNS topic when the usage exceeds 100% of the budgeted amount. For more information, see Creating an Amazon SNS Topic for Budget Notifications.
The master Lambda function receives the SNS notification.
It triggers execution of a Step Functions state machine with the parameters for completing the configured action.
The action Lambda function is triggered as a task in the state machine. The function interacts with IAM to effectively remove the user’s permissions to create an EC2 instance.

This decoupled modular design allows for extensibility. New actions (serially or in parallel) can be added by simply adding new steps.

Implementing the solution

All the instructions and code needed to implement the architecture have been posted on the Serverless Automated Cost Controls GitHub repo. We recommend that you try this first in a Dev/Test environment.

This implementation description can be broken down into two parts:

Create a solution stack for serverless automated cost controls.
Verify the solution by testing the EC2 fleet.

To tie this back to the “freedom with guardrails” scenario, the Finance department performs a one-time implementation of the solution stack. To simulate resources for Project Beta, the developers spin up the test EC2 fleet.

Prerequisites

There are two prerequisites:

Make sure that you have the necessary IAM permissions. For more information, see the section titled “Required IAM permissions” in the README.
Define and activate a cost allocation tag with the key Project. For more information, see Using Cost Allocation Tags. It can take up to 12 hours for the tags to propagate to Budgets.

Create resources

The solution stack includes creating the following resources:

Three Lambda functions
One Step Functions state machine
One SNS topic
One IAM group
One IAM user
IAM policies as needed
One budget

Two of the Lambda functions were described in the previous section, to a) receive the SNS notification and b) trigger the Step Functions state machine. Another Lambda function is used to create the budget, as a custom AWS CloudFormation resource. The SNS topic connects Budgets with Lambda function A. Lambda function B is configured as a task in Step Functions. A budget for $2 is created which is filtered by Service: EC2 and Tag: Project, Beta. A test IAM group and user is created to enable you to validate this Cost Control Solution.

To create the serverless automated cost control solution stack, choose the button below. It takes few minutes to spin up the stack. You can monitor the progress in the CloudFormation console.

When you see the CREATE_COMPLETE status for the stack you had created, choose Outputs. Copy the following four values that you need later:

TemplateURL
UserName
SignInURL
Password

Verify the stack

The next step is to verify the serverless automated cost controls solution stack that you just created. To do this, spin up an EC2 fleet of t2.micro instances, representative of the resources needed for Project Beta, and tag them with Project, Beta.

Browse to the SignInURL, and log in using the UserName and Password values copied on from the stack output.
In the CloudFormation console, choose Create Stack.
For Choose a template, select Choose an Amazon S3 template URL and paste the TemplateURL value from the preceding section. Choose Next.
Give this stack a name, such as “testEc2FleetForProjectBeta”. Choose Next.
On the Specify Details page, enter parameters such as the UserName and Password copied in the previous section. Choose Next.
Ignore any errors related to listing IAM roles. The test user has a minimal set of permissions that is just sufficient to spin up this test stack (in line with security best practices).
On the Options page, choose Next.
On the Review page, choose Create. It takes a few minutes to spin up the stack, and you can monitor the progress in the CloudFormation console.
When you see the status “CREATE_COMPLETE”, open the EC2 console to verify that four t2.micro instances have been spun up, with the tag of Project, Beta.

The hourly cost for these instances depends on the region in which they are running. On the average (irrespective of the region), you can expect the aggregate cost for this EC2 fleet to exceed the set $2 budget in 48 hours.

Verify the solution

The first step is to identify the test IAM group that was created in the previous section. The group should have “projectBeta” in the name, prepended with the CloudFormation stack name and appended with an alphanumeric string. Verify that the managed policy associated is: “EC2FullAccess”, which indicates that the users in this group have unrestricted access to EC2.

There are two stages of verification for this serverless automated cost controls solution: simulating a notification and waiting for a breach.

Simulated notification

Because it takes at least a few hours for the aggregate cost of the EC2 fleet to breach the set budget, you can verify the solution by simulating the notification from Budgets.

Log in to the SNS console (using your regular AWS credentials).
Publish a message on the SNS topic that has “budgetNotificationTopic” in the name. The complete name is appended by the CloudFormation stack identifier.
Copy the following text as the body of the notification: “This is a mock notification”.
Choose Publish.
Open the IAM console to verify that the policy for the test group has been switched to “EC2ReadOnly”. This prevents users in this group from creating new instances.
Verify that the test user created in the previous section cannot spin up new EC2 instances. You can log in as the test user and try creating a new EC2 instance (via the same CloudFormation stack or the EC2 console). You should get an error message indicating that you do not have the necessary permissions.
If you are proceeding to stage 2 of the verification, then you must switch the permissions back to “EC2FullAccess” for the test group, which can be done in the IAM console.

Automatic notification

Within 48 hours, the aggregate cost of the EC2 fleet spun up in the earlier section breaches the budget rule and triggers an automatic notification. This results in the permissions getting switched out, just as in the simulated notification.

Clean up

Use the following steps to delete your resources and stop incurring costs.

Open the CloudFormation console.
Delete the EC2 fleet by deleting the appropriate stack (for example, delete the stack named “testEc2FleetForProjectBeta”).
Next, delete the “costControlStack” stack.

Conclusion

Using Lambda in tandem with Budgets, you can build Serverless automated cost controls on AWS. Find all the resources (instructions, code) for implementing the solution discussed in this post on the Serverless Automated Cost Controls GitHub repo.

Stay tuned to this series for more tips about building serverless automated cost controls. In the next post, we discuss using smart lighting to influence developer behavior and describe a solution to encourage cost-aware development practices.

If you have questions or suggestions, please comment below.

The 10 Most Viewed Security-Related AWS Knowledge Center Articles and Videos for November 2017

2017-11-22 Maggie Burke

Post Syndicated from Maggie Burke original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/the-10-most-viewed-security-related-aws-knowledge-center-articles-and-videos-for-november-2017/

AWS Knowledge Center image

The AWS Knowledge Center helps answer the questions most frequently asked by AWS Support customers. The following 10 Knowledge Center security articles and videos have been the most viewed this month. It’s likely you’ve wondered about a few of these topics yourself, so here’s a chance to learn the answers!

How do I create an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policy to restrict access for an IAM user, group, or role to a particular Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC)?
Learn how to apply a custom IAM policy to restrict IAM user, group, or role permissions for creating and managing Amazon EC2 instances in a specified VPC.
How do I use an MFA token to authenticate access to my AWS resources through the AWS CLI?
One IAM best practice is to protect your account and its resources by using a multi-factor authentication (MFA) device. If you plan use the AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) while using an MFA device, you must create a temporary session token.
Can I restrict an IAM user’s EC2 access to specific resources?
This article demonstrates how to link multiple AWS accounts through AWS Organizations and isolate IAM user groups in their own accounts.
I didn’t receive a validation email for the SSL certificate I requested through AWS Certificate Manager (ACM)—where is it?
Can’t find your ACM validation emails? Be sure to check the email address to which you requested that ACM send validation emails.
How do I create an IAM policy that has a source IP restriction but still allows users to switch roles in the AWS Management Console?
Learn how to write an IAM policy that not only includes a source IP restriction but also lets your users switch roles in the console.
How do I allow users from another account to access resources in my account through IAM?
If you have the 12-digit account number and permissions to create and edit IAM roles and users for both accounts, you can permit specific IAM users to access resources in your account.
What are the differences between a service control policy (SCP) and an IAM policy?
Learn how to distinguish an SCP from an IAM policy.
How do I share my customer master keys (CMKs) across multiple AWS accounts?
To grant another account access to your CMKs, create an IAM policy on the secondary account that grants access to use your CMKs.
How do I set up AWS Trusted Advisor notifications?
Learn how to receive free weekly email notifications from Trusted Advisor.
How do I use AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) encryption context to protect the integrity of encrypted data?
Encryption context name-value pairs used with AWS KMS encryption and decryption operations provide a method for checking ciphertext authenticity. Learn how to use encryption context to help protect your encrypted data.

The AWS Security Blog will publish an updated version of this list regularly going forward. You also can subscribe to the AWS Knowledge Center Videos playlist on YouTube.

– Maggie

How to Patch, Inspect, and Protect Microsoft Windows Workloads on AWS—Part 1

2017-11-21 Koen van Blijderveen

Post Syndicated from Koen van Blijderveen original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-patch-inspect-and-protect-microsoft-windows-workloads-on-aws-part-1/

Most malware tries to compromise your systems by using a known vulnerability that the maker of the operating system has already patched. To help prevent malware from affecting your systems, two security best practices are to apply all operating system patches to your systems and actively monitor your systems for missing patches. In case you do need to recover from a malware attack, you should make regular backups of your data.

In today’s blog post (Part 1 of a two-part post), I show how to keep your Amazon EC2 instances that run Microsoft Windows up to date with the latest security patches by using Amazon EC2 Systems Manager. Tomorrow in Part 2, I show how to take regular snapshots of your data by using Amazon EBS Snapshot Scheduler and how to use Amazon Inspector to check if your EC2 instances running Microsoft Windows contain any common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs).

What you should know first

To follow along with the solution in this post, you need one or more EC2 instances. You may use existing instances or create new instances. For the blog post, I assume this is an EC2 for Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 instance installed from the Amazon Machine Images (AMIs). If you are not familiar with how to launch an EC2 instance, see Launching an Instance. I also assume you launched or will launch your instance in a private subnet. A private subnet is not directly accessible via the internet, and access to it requires either a VPN connection to your on-premises network or a jump host in a public subnet (a subnet with access to the internet). You must make sure that the EC2 instance can connect to the internet using a network address translation (NAT) instance or NAT gateway to communicate with Systems Manager and Amazon Inspector. The following diagram shows how you should structure your Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). You should also be familiar with Restoring an Amazon EBS Volume from a Snapshot and Attaching an Amazon EBS Volume to an Instance.

Later on, you will assign tasks to a maintenance window to patch your instances with Systems Manager. To do this, the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user you are using for this post must have the iam:PassRole permission. This permission allows this IAM user to assign tasks to pass their own IAM permissions to the AWS service. In this example, when you assign a task to a maintenance window, IAM passes your credentials to Systems Manager. This safeguard ensures that the user cannot use the creation of tasks to elevate their IAM privileges because their own IAM privileges limit which tasks they can run against an EC2 instance. You should also authorize your IAM user to use EC2, Amazon Inspector, Amazon CloudWatch, and Systems Manager. You can achieve this by attaching the following AWS managed policies to the IAM user you are using for this example: AmazonInspectorFullAccess, AmazonEC2FullAccess, and AmazonSSMFullAccess.

Architectural overview

The following diagram illustrates the components of this solution’s architecture.

For this blog post, Microsoft Windows EC2 is Amazon EC2 for Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 instances with attached Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) volumes, which are running in your VPC. These instances may be standalone Windows instances running your Windows workloads, or you may have joined them to an Active Directory domain controller. For instances joined to a domain, you can be using Active Directory running on an EC2 for Windows instance, or you can use AWS Directory Service for Microsoft Active Directory.

Amazon EC2 Systems Manager is a scalable tool for remote management of your EC2 instances. You will use the Systems Manager Run Command to install the Amazon Inspector agent. The agent enables EC2 instances to communicate with the Amazon Inspector service and run assessments, which I explain in detail later in this blog post. You also will create a Systems Manager association to keep your EC2 instances up to date with the latest security patches.

You can use the EBS Snapshot Scheduler to schedule automated snapshots at regular intervals. You will use it to set up regular snapshots of your Amazon EBS volumes. EBS Snapshot Scheduler is a prebuilt solution by AWS that you will deploy in your AWS account. With Amazon EBS snapshots, you pay only for the actual data you store. Snapshots save only the data that has changed since the previous snapshot, which minimizes your cost.

You will use Amazon Inspector to run security assessments on your EC2 for Windows Server instance. In this post, I show how to assess if your EC2 for Windows Server instance is vulnerable to any of the more than 50,000 CVEs registered with Amazon Inspector.

In today’s and tomorrow’s posts, I show you how to:

Launch an EC2 instance with an IAM role, Amazon EBS volume, and tags that Systems Manager and Amazon Inspector will use.
Configure Systems Manager to install the Amazon Inspector agent and patch your EC2 instances.
Take EBS snapshots by using EBS Snapshot Scheduler to automate snapshots based on instance tags.
Use Amazon Inspector to check if your EC2 instances running Microsoft Windows contain any common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs).

Step 1: Launch an EC2 instance

In this section, I show you how to launch your EC2 instances so that you can use Systems Manager with the instances and use instance tags with EBS Snapshot Scheduler to automate snapshots. This requires three things:

Create an IAM role for Systems Manager before launching your EC2 instance.
Launch your EC2 instance with Amazon EBS and the IAM role for Systems Manager.
Add tags to instances so that you can automate policies for which instances you take snapshots of and when.

Create an IAM role for Systems Manager

Before launching your EC2 instance, I recommend that you first create an IAM role for Systems Manager, which you will use to update the EC2 instance you will launch. AWS already provides a preconfigured policy that you can use for your new role, and it is called AmazonEC2RoleforSSM.

Sign in to the IAM console and choose Roles in the navigation pane. Choose Create new role.
In the role-creation workflow, choose AWS service > EC2 > EC2 to create a role for an EC2 instance.
Choose the AmazonEC2RoleforSSM policy to attach it to the new role you are creating.
Give the role a meaningful name (I chose EC2SSM) and description, and choose Create role.

Launch your EC2 instance

To follow along, you need an EC2 instance that is running Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 and that has an Amazon EBS volume attached. You can use any existing instance you may have or create a new instance.

When launching your new EC2 instance, be sure that:

The operating system is Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2.
You attach at least one Amazon EBS volume to the EC2 instance.
You attach the newly created IAM role (EC2SSM).
The EC2 instance can connect to the internet through a network address translation (NAT) gateway or a NAT instance.
You create the tags shown in the following screenshot (you will use them later).

If you are using an already launched EC2 instance, you can attach the newly created role as described in Easily Replace or Attach an IAM Role to an Existing EC2 Instance by Using the EC2 Console.

Add tags

The final step of configuring your EC2 instances is to add tags. You will use these tags to configure Systems Manager in Step 2 of this blog post and to configure Amazon Inspector in Part 2. For this example, I add a tag key, Patch Group, and set the value to Windows Servers. I could have other groups of EC2 instances that I treat differently by having the same tag key but a different tag value. For example, I might have a collection of other servers with the Patch Group tag key with a value of IAS Servers.

Note: You must wait a few minutes until the EC2 instance becomes available before you can proceed to the next section.

At this point, you now have at least one EC2 instance you can use to configure Systems Manager, use EBS Snapshot Scheduler, and use Amazon Inspector.

Note: If you have a large number of EC2 instances to tag, you may want to use the EC2 CreateTags API rather than manually apply tags to each instance.

Step 2: Configure Systems Manager

In this section, I show you how to use Systems Manager to apply operating system patches to your EC2 instances, and how to manage patch compliance.

To start, I will provide some background information about Systems Manager. Then, I will cover how to:

Create the Systems Manager IAM role so that Systems Manager is able to perform patch operations.
Associate a Systems Manager patch baseline with your instance to define which patches Systems Manager should apply.
Define a maintenance window to make sure Systems Manager patches your instance when you tell it to.
Monitor patch compliance to verify the patch state of your instances.

Systems Manager is a collection of capabilities that helps you automate management tasks for AWS-hosted instances on EC2 and your on-premises servers. In this post, I use Systems Manager for two purposes: to run remote commands and apply operating system patches. To learn about the full capabilities of Systems Manager, see What Is Amazon EC2 Systems Manager?

Patch management is an important measure to prevent malware from infecting your systems. Most malware attacks look for vulnerabilities that are publicly known and in most cases are already patched by the maker of the operating system. These publicly known vulnerabilities are well documented and therefore easier for an attacker to exploit than having to discover a new vulnerability.

Patches for these new vulnerabilities are available through Systems Manager within hours after Microsoft releases them. There are two prerequisites to use Systems Manager to apply operating system patches. First, you must attach the IAM role you created in the previous section, EC2SSM, to your EC2 instance. Second, you must install the Systems Manager agent on your EC2 instance. If you have used a recent Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 AMI published by AWS, Amazon has already installed the Systems Manager agent on your EC2 instance. You can confirm this by logging in to an EC2 instance and looking for Amazon SSM Agent under Programs and Features in Windows. To install the Systems Manager agent on an instance that does not have the agent preinstalled or if you want to use the Systems Manager agent on your on-premises servers, see the documentation about installing the Systems Manager agent. If you forgot to attach the newly created role when launching your EC2 instance or if you want to attach the role to already running EC2 instances, see Attach an AWS IAM Role to an Existing Amazon EC2 Instance by Using the AWS CLI or use the AWS Management Console.

To make sure your EC2 instance receives operating system patches from Systems Manager, you will use the default patch baseline provided and maintained by AWS, and you will define a maintenance window so that you control when your EC2 instances should receive patches. For the maintenance window to be able to run any tasks, you also must create a new role for Systems Manager. This role is a different kind of role than the one you created earlier: Systems Manager will use this role instead of EC2. Earlier we created the EC2SSM role with the AmazonEC2RoleforSSM policy, which allowed the Systems Manager agent on our instance to communicate with the Systems Manager service. Here we need a new role with the policy AmazonSSMMaintenanceWindowRole to make sure the Systems Manager service is able to execute commands on our instance.

Create the Systems Manager IAM role

To create the new IAM role for Systems Manager, follow the same procedure as in the previous section, but in Step 3, choose the AmazonSSMMaintenanceWindowRole policy instead of the previously selected AmazonEC2RoleforSSM policy.

Finish the wizard and give your new role a recognizable name. For example, I named my role MaintenanceWindowRole.

By default, only EC2 instances can assume this new role. You must update the trust policy to enable Systems Manager to assume this role.

To update the trust policy associated with this new role:

Navigate to the IAM console and choose Roles in the navigation pane.
Choose MaintenanceWindowRole and choose the Trust relationships tab. Then choose Edit trust relationship.

Update the policy document by copying the following policy and pasting it in the Policy Document box. As you can see, I have added the ssm.amazonaws.com service to the list of allowed Principals that can assume this role. Choose Update Trust Policy.

{
   "Version":"2012-10-17",
   "Statement":[
      {
         "Sid":"",
         "Effect":"Allow",
         "Principal":{
            "Service":[
               "ec2.amazonaws.com",
               "ssm.amazonaws.com"
           ]
         },
         "Action":"sts:AssumeRole"
      }
   ]
}

Associate a Systems Manager patch baseline with your instance

Next, you are going to associate a Systems Manager patch baseline with your EC2 instance. A patch baseline defines which patches Systems Manager should apply. You will use the default patch baseline that AWS manages and maintains. Before you can associate the patch baseline with your instance, though, you must determine if Systems Manager recognizes your EC2 instance.

Navigate to the EC2 console, scroll down to Systems Manager Shared Resources in the navigation pane, and choose Managed Instances. Your new EC2 instance should be available there. If your instance is missing from the list, verify the following:

Go to the EC2 console and verify your instance is running.
Select your instance and confirm you attached the Systems Manager IAM role, EC2SSM.
Make sure that you deployed a NAT gateway in your public subnet to ensure your VPC reflects the diagram at the start of this post so that the Systems Manager agent can connect to the Systems Manager internet endpoint.
Check the Systems Manager Agent logs for any errors.

Now that you have confirmed that Systems Manager can manage your EC2 instance, it is time to associate the AWS maintained patch baseline with your EC2 instance:

Choose Patch Baselines under Systems Manager Services in the navigation pane of the EC2 console.
Choose the default patch baseline as highlighted in the following screenshot, and choose Modify Patch Groups in the Actions drop-down.
In the Patch group box, enter the same value you entered under the Patch Group tag of your EC2 instance in “Step 1: Configure your EC2 instance.” In this example, the value I enter is Windows Servers. Choose the check mark icon next to the patch group and choose Close.

Define a maintenance window

Now that you have successfully set up a role and have associated a patch baseline with your EC2 instance, you will define a maintenance window so that you can control when your EC2 instances should receive patches. By creating multiple maintenance windows and assigning them to different patch groups, you can make sure your EC2 instances do not all reboot at the same time. The Patch Group resource tag you defined earlier will determine to which patch group an instance belongs.

To define a maintenance window:

Navigate to the EC2 console, scroll down to Systems Manager Shared Resources in the navigation pane, and choose Maintenance Windows. Choose Create a Maintenance Window.
Select the Cron schedule builder to define the schedule for the maintenance window. In the example in the following screenshot, the maintenance window will start every Saturday at 10:00 P.M. UTC.
To specify when your maintenance window will end, specify the duration. In this example, the four-hour maintenance window will end on the following Sunday morning at 2:00 A.M. UTC (in other words, four hours after it started).
Systems manager completes all tasks that are in process, even if the maintenance window ends. In my example, I am choosing to prevent new tasks from starting within one hour of the end of my maintenance window because I estimated my patch operations might take longer than one hour to complete. Confirm the creation of the maintenance window by choosing Create maintenance window.
After creating the maintenance window, you must register the EC2 instance to the maintenance window so that Systems Manager knows which EC2 instance it should patch in this maintenance window. To do so, choose Register new targets on the Targets tab of your newly created maintenance window. You can register your targets by using the same Patch Group tag you used before to associate the EC2 instance with the AWS-provided patch baseline.
Assign a task to the maintenance window that will install the operating system patches on your EC2 instance:
1. Open Maintenance Windows in the EC2 console, select your previously created maintenance window, choose the Tasks tab, and choose Register run command task from the Register new task drop-down.
2. Choose the AWS-RunPatchBaseline document from the list of available documents.
3. For Parameters:
  1. For Role, choose the role you created previously (called MaintenanceWindowRole).
  2. For Execute on, specify how many EC2 instances Systems Manager should patch at the same time. If you have a large number of EC2 instances and want to patch all EC2 instances within the defined time, make sure this number is not too low. For example, if you have 1,000 EC2 instances, a maintenance window of 4 hours, and 2 hours’ time for patching, make this number at least 500.
  3. For Stop after, specify after how many errors Systems Manager should stop.
  4. For Operation, choose Install to make sure to install the patches.

Now, you must wait for the maintenance window to run at least once according to the schedule you defined earlier. Note that if you don’t want to wait, you can adjust the schedule to run sooner by choosing Edit maintenance window on the Maintenance Windows page of Systems Manager. If your maintenance window has expired, you can check the status of any maintenance tasks Systems Manager has performed on the Maintenance Windows page of Systems Manager and select your maintenance window.

Monitor patch compliance

You also can see the overall patch compliance of all EC2 instances that are part of defined patch groups by choosing Patch Compliance under Systems Manager Services in the navigation pane of the EC2 console. You can filter by Patch Group to see how many EC2 instances within the selected patch group are up to date, how many EC2 instances are missing updates, and how many EC2 instances are in an error state.

In this section, you have set everything up for patch management on your instance. Now you know how to patch your EC2 instance in a controlled manner and how to check if your EC2 instance is compliant with the patch baseline you have defined. Of course, I recommend that you apply these steps to all EC2 instances you manage.

Summary

In Part 1 of this blog post, I have shown how to configure EC2 instances for use with Systems Manager, EBS Snapshot Scheduler, and Amazon Inspector. I also have shown how to use Systems Manager to keep your Microsoft Windows–based EC2 instances up to date. In Part 2 of this blog post tomorrow, I will show how to take regular snapshots of your data by using EBS Snapshot Scheduler and how to use Amazon Inspector to check if your EC2 instances running Microsoft Windows contain any CVEs.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about or issues implementing this solution, start a new thread on the EC2 forum or the Amazon Inspector forum, or contact AWS Support.

– Koen

Using AWS CodeCommit Pull Requests to request code reviews and discuss code

2017-11-20 Chris Barclay

Post Syndicated from Chris Barclay original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/using-aws-codecommit-pull-requests-to-request-code-reviews-and-discuss-code/

Thank you to Michael Edge, Senior Cloud Architect, for a great blog on CodeCommit pull requests.

~~~~~~~

AWS CodeCommit is a fully managed service for securely hosting private Git repositories. CodeCommit now supports pull requests, which allows repository users to review, comment upon, and interactively iterate on code changes. Used as a collaboration tool between team members, pull requests help you to review potential changes to a CodeCommit repository before merging those changes into the repository. Each pull request goes through a simple lifecycle, as follows:

The new features to be merged are added as one or more commits to a feature branch. The commits are not merged into the destination branch.
The pull request is created, usually from the difference between two branches.
Team members review and comment on the pull request. The pull request might be updated with additional commits that contain changes made in response to comments, or include changes made to the destination branch.
Once team members are happy with the pull request, it is merged into the destination branch. The commits are applied to the destination branch in the same order they were added to the pull request.

Commenting is an integral part of the pull request process, and is used to collaborate between the developers and the reviewer. Reviewers add comments and questions to a pull request during the review process, and developers respond to these with explanations. Pull request comments can be added to the overall pull request, a file within the pull request, or a line within a file.

To make the comments more useful, sign in to the AWS Management Console as an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user. The username will then be associated with the comment, indicating the owner of the comment. Pull request comments are a great quality improvement tool as they allow the entire development team visibility into what reviewers are looking for in the code. They also serve as a record of the discussion between team members at a point in time, and shouldn’t be deleted.

AWS CodeCommit is also introducing the ability to add comments to a commit, another useful collaboration feature that allows team members to discuss code changed as part of a commit. This helps you discuss changes made in a repository, including why the changes were made, whether further changes are necessary, or whether changes should be merged. As is the case with pull request comments, you can comment on an overall commit, on a file within a commit, or on a specific line or change within a file, and other repository users can respond to your comments. Comments are not restricted to commits, they can also be used to comment on the differences between two branches, or between two tags. Commit comments are separate from pull request comments, i.e. you will not see commit comments when reviewing a pull request – you will only see pull request comments.

A pull request example

Let’s get started by running through an example. We’ll take a typical pull request scenario and look at how we’d use CodeCommit and the AWS Management Console for each of the steps.

To try out this scenario, you’ll need:

An AWS CodeCommit repository with some sample code in the master branch. We’ve provided sample code below.
Two AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) users, both with the AWSCodeCommitPowerUser managed policy applied to them.
Git installed on your local computer, and access configured for AWS CodeCommit.
A clone of the AWS CodeCommit repository on your local computer.

In the course of this example, you’ll sign in to the AWS CodeCommit console as one IAM user to create the pull request, and as the other IAM user to review the pull request. To learn more about how to set up your IAM users and how to connect to AWS CodeCommit with Git, see the following topics:

Information on creating an IAM user with AWS Management Console access.
Instructions on how to access CodeCommit using Git.
If you’d like to use the same ‘hello world’ application as used in this article, here is the source code:

package com.amazon.helloworld;

public class Main {
	public static void main(String[] args) {

		System.out.println("Hello, world");
	}
}

The scenario below uses the us-east-2 region.

Creating the branches

Before we jump in and create a pull request, we’ll need at least two branches. In this example, we’ll follow a branching strategy similar to the one described in GitFlow. We’ll create a new branch for our feature from the main development branch (the default branch). We’ll develop the feature in the feature branch. Once we’ve written and tested the code for the new feature in that branch, we’ll create a pull request that contains the differences between the feature branch and the main development branch. Our team lead (the second IAM user) will review the changes in the pull request. Once the changes have been reviewed, the feature branch will be merged into the development branch.

Figure 1: Pull request link

Sign in to the AWS CodeCommit console with the IAM user you want to use as the developer. You can use an existing repository or you can go ahead and create a new one. We won’t be merging any changes to the master branch of your repository, so it’s safe to use an existing repository for this example. You’ll find the Pull requests link has been added just above the Commits link (see Figure 1), and below Commits you’ll find the Branches link. Click Branches and create a new branch called ‘develop’, branched from the ‘master’ branch. Then create a new branch called ‘feature1’, branched from the ‘develop’ branch. You’ll end up with three branches, as you can see in Figure 2. (Your repository might contain other branches in addition to the three shown in the figure).

Figure 2: Create a feature branch

If you haven’t cloned your repo yet, go to the Code link in the CodeCommit console and click the Connect button. Follow the instructions to clone your repo (detailed instructions are here). Open a terminal or command line and paste the git clone command supplied in the Connect instructions for your repository. The example below shows cloning a repository named codecommit-demo:

git clone https://git-codecommit.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/v1/repos/codecommit-demo

If you’ve previously cloned the repo you’ll need to update your local repo with the branches you created. Open a terminal or command line and make sure you’re in the root directory of your repo, then run the following command:

git remote update origin

You’ll see your new branches pulled down to your local repository.

$ git remote update origin
Fetching origin
From https://git-codecommit.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/v1/repos/codecommit-demo
 * [new branch]      develop    -> origin/develop
 * [new branch]      feature1   -> origin/feature1

You can also see your new branches by typing:

git branch --all

$ git branch --all
* master
  remotes/origin/develop
  remotes/origin/feature1
  remotes/origin/master

Now we’ll make a change to the ‘feature1’ branch. Open a terminal or command line and check out the feature1 branch by running the following command:

git checkout feature1

$ git checkout feature1
Branch feature1 set up to track remote branch feature1 from origin.
Switched to a new branch 'feature1'

Make code changes

Edit a file in the repo using your favorite editor and save the changes. Commit your changes to the local repository, and push your changes to CodeCommit. For example:

git commit -am 'added new feature'
git push origin feature1

$ git commit -am 'added new feature'
[feature1 8f6cb28] added new feature
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

$ git push origin feature1
Counting objects: 9, done.
Delta compression using up to 4 threads.
Compressing objects: 100% (4/4), done.
Writing objects: 100% (9/9), 617 bytes | 617.00 KiB/s, done.
Total 9 (delta 2), reused 0 (delta 0)
To https://git-codecommit.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/v1/repos/codecommit-demo
   2774a53..8f6cb28  feature1 -> feature1

Creating the pull request

Now we have a ‘feature1’ branch that differs from the ‘develop’ branch. At this point we want to merge our changes into the ‘develop’ branch. We’ll create a pull request to notify our team members to review our changes and check whether they are ready for a merge.

In the AWS CodeCommit console, click Pull requests. Click Create pull request. On the next page select ‘develop’ as the destination branch and ‘feature1’ as the source branch. Click Compare. CodeCommit will check for merge conflicts and highlight whether the branches can be automatically merged using the fast-forward option, or whether a manual merge is necessary. A pull request can be created in both situations.

Figure 3: Create a pull request

After comparing the two branches, the CodeCommit console displays the information you’ll need in order to create the pull request. In the ‘Details’ section, the ‘Title’ for the pull request is mandatory, and you may optionally provide comments to your reviewers to explain the code change you have made and what you’d like them to review. In the ‘Notifications’ section, there is an option to set up notifications to notify subscribers of changes to your pull request. Notifications will be sent on creation of the pull request as well as for any pull request updates or comments. And finally, you can review the changes that make up this pull request. This includes both the individual commits (a pull request can contain one or more commits, available in the Commits tab) as well as the changes made to each file, i.e. the diff between the two branches referenced by the pull request, available in the Changes tab. After you have reviewed this information and added a title for your pull request, click the Create button. You will see a confirmation screen, as shown in Figure 4, indicating that your pull request has been successfully created, and can be merged without conflicts into the ‘develop’ branch.

Figure 4: Pull request confirmation page

Reviewing the pull request

Now let’s view the pull request from the perspective of the team lead. If you set up notifications for this CodeCommit repository, creating the pull request would have sent an email notification to the team lead, and he/she can use the links in the email to navigate directly to the pull request. In this example, sign in to the AWS CodeCommit console as the IAM user you’re using as the team lead, and click Pull requests. You will see the same information you did during creation of the pull request, plus a record of activity related to the pull request, as you can see in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Team lead reviewing the pull request

Commenting on the pull request

You now perform a thorough review of the changes and make a number of comments using the new pull request comment feature. To gain an overall perspective on the pull request, you might first go to the Commits tab and review how many commits are included in this pull request. Next, you might visit the Changes tab to review the changes, which displays the differences between the feature branch code and the develop branch code. At this point, you can add comments to the pull request as you work through each of the changes. Let’s go ahead and review the pull request. During the review, you can add review comments at three levels:

The overall pull request
A file within the pull request
An individual line within a file

The overall pull request
In the Changes tab near the bottom of the page you’ll see a ‘Comments on changes’ box. We’ll add comments here related to the overall pull request. Add your comments as shown in Figure 6 and click the Save button.

Figure 6: Pull request comment

A specific file in the pull request
Hovering your mouse over a filename in the Changes tab will cause a blue ‘comments’ icon to appear to the left of the filename. Clicking the icon will allow you to enter comments specific to this file, as in the example in Figure 7. Go ahead and add comments for one of the files changed by the developer. Click the Save button to save your comment.

Figure 7: File comment

A specific line in a file in the pull request
A blue ‘comments’ icon will appear as you hover over individual lines within each file in the pull request, allowing you to create comments against lines that have been added, removed or are unchanged. In Figure 8, you add comments against a line that has been added to the source code, encouraging the developer to review the naming standards. Go ahead and add line comments for one of the files changed by the developer. Click the Save button to save your comment.

Figure 8: Line comment

A pull request that has been commented at all three levels will look similar to Figure 9. The pull request comment is shown expanded in the ‘Comments on changes’ section, while the comments at file and line level are shown collapsed. A ‘comment’ icon indicates that comments exist at file and line level. Clicking the icon will expand and show the comment. Since you are expecting the developer to make further changes based on your comments, you won’t merge the pull request at this stage, but will leave it open awaiting feedback. Each comment you made results in a notification being sent to the developer, who can respond to the comments. This is great for remote working, where developers and team lead may be in different time zones.

Figure 9: Fully commented pull request

Adding a little complexity

A typical development team is going to be creating pull requests on a regular basis. It’s highly likely that the team lead will merge other pull requests into the ‘develop’ branch while pull requests on feature branches are in the review stage. This may result in a change to the ‘Mergable’ status of a pull request. Let’s add this scenario into the mix and check out how a developer will handle this.

To test this scenario, we could create a new pull request and ask the team lead to merge this to the ‘develop’ branch. But for the sake of simplicity we’ll take a shortcut. Clone your CodeCommit repo to a new folder, switch to the ‘develop’ branch, and make a change to one of the same files that were changed in your pull request. Make sure you change a line of code that was also changed in the pull request. Commit and push this back to CodeCommit. Since you’ve just changed a line of code in the ‘develop’ branch that has also been changed in the ‘feature1’ branch, the ‘feature1’ branch cannot be cleanly merged into the ‘develop’ branch. Your developer will need to resolve this merge conflict.

A developer reviewing the pull request would see the pull request now looks similar to Figure 10, with a ‘Resolve conflicts’ status rather than the ‘Mergable’ status it had previously (see Figure 5).

Figure 10: Pull request with merge conflicts

Reviewing the review comments

Once the team lead has completed his review, the developer will review the comments and make the suggested changes. As a developer, you’ll see the list of review comments made by the team lead in the pull request Activity tab, as shown in Figure 11. The Activity tab shows the history of the pull request, including commits and comments. You can reply to the review comments directly from the Activity tab, by clicking the Reply button, or you can do this from the Changes tab. The Changes tab shows the comments for the latest commit, as comments on previous commits may be associated with lines that have changed or been removed in the current commit. Comments for previous commits are available to view and reply to in the Activity tab.

In the Activity tab, use the shortcut link (which looks like this </>) to move quickly to the source code associated with the comment. In this example, you will make further changes to the source code to address the pull request review comments, so let’s go ahead and do this now. But first, you will need to resolve the ‘Resolve conflicts’ status.

Figure 11: Pull request activity

Resolving the ‘Resolve conflicts’ status

The ‘Resolve conflicts’ status indicates there is a merge conflict between the ‘develop’ branch and the ‘feature1’ branch. This will require manual intervention to restore the pull request back to the ‘Mergable’ state. We will resolve this conflict next.

Open a terminal or command line and check out the develop branch by running the following command:

git checkout develop

$ git checkout develop
Switched to branch 'develop'
Your branch is up-to-date with 'origin/develop'.

To incorporate the changes the team lead made to the ‘develop’ branch, merge the remote ‘develop’ branch with your local copy:

git pull

$ git pull
remote: Counting objects: 9, done.
Unpacking objects: 100% (9/9), done.
From https://git-codecommit.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/v1/repos/codecommit-demo
   af13c82..7b36f52  develop    -> origin/develop
Updating af13c82..7b36f52
Fast-forward
 src/main/java/com/amazon/helloworld/Main.java | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Then checkout the ‘feature1’ branch:

git checkout feature1

$ git checkout feature1
Switched to branch 'feature1'
Your branch is up-to-date with 'origin/feature1'.

Now merge the changes from the ‘develop’ branch into your ‘feature1’ branch:

git merge develop

$ git merge develop
Auto-merging src/main/java/com/amazon/helloworld/Main.java
CONFLICT (content): Merge conflict in src/main/java/com/amazon/helloworld/Main.java
Automatic merge failed; fix conflicts and then commit the result.

Yes, this fails. The file Main.java has been changed in both branches, resulting in a merge conflict that can’t be resolved automatically. However, Main.java will now contain markers that indicate where the conflicting code is, and you can use these to resolve the issues manually. Edit Main.java using your favorite IDE, and you’ll see it looks something like this:

package com.amazon.helloworld;

import java.util.*;

/**
 * This class prints a hello world message
 */

public class Main {
   public static void main(String[] args) {

<<<<<<< HEAD
        Date todaysdate = Calendar.getInstance().getTime();

        System.out.println("Hello, earthling. Today's date is: " + todaysdate);
=======
      System.out.println("Hello, earth");
>>>>>>> develop
   }
}

The code between HEAD and ‘===’ is the code the developer added in the ‘feature1’ branch (HEAD represents ‘feature1’ because this is the current checked out branch). The code between ‘===’ and ‘>>> develop’ is the code added to the ‘develop’ branch by the team lead. We’ll resolve the conflict by manually merging both changes, resulting in an updated Main.java:

package com.amazon.helloworld;

import java.util.*;

/**
 * This class prints a hello world message
 */

public class Main {
   public static void main(String[] args) {

        Date todaysdate = Calendar.getInstance().getTime();

        System.out.println("Hello, earth. Today's date is: " + todaysdate);
   }
}

After saving the change you can add and commit it to your local repo:

git add src/
git commit -m 'fixed merge conflict by merging changes'

Fixing issues raised by the reviewer

Now you are ready to address the comments made by the team lead. If you are no longer pointing to the ‘feature1’ branch, check out the ‘feature1’ branch by running the following command:

git checkout feature1

$ git checkout feature1
Branch feature1 set up to track remote branch feature1 from origin.
Switched to a new branch 'feature1'

Edit the source code in your favorite IDE and make the changes to address the comments. In this example, the developer has updated the source code as follows:

package com.amazon.helloworld;

import java.util.*;

/**
 *  This class prints a hello world message
 *
 * @author Michael Edge
 * @see HelloEarth
 * @version 1.0
 */

public class Main {
   public static void main(String[] args) {

        Date todaysDate = Calendar.getInstance().getTime();

        System.out.println("Hello, earth. Today's date is: " + todaysDate);
   }
}

After saving the changes, commit and push to the CodeCommit ‘feature1’ branch as you did previously:

git commit -am 'updated based on review comments'
git push origin feature1

Responding to the reviewer

Now that you’ve fixed the code issues you will want to respond to the review comments. In the AWS CodeCommit console, check that your latest commit appears in the pull request Commits tab. You now have a pull request consisting of more than one commit. The pull request in Figure 12 has four commits, which originated from the following activities:

8th Nov: the original commit used to initiate this pull request
10th Nov, 3 hours ago: the commit by the team lead to the ‘develop’ branch, merged into our ‘feature1’ branch
10th Nov, 24 minutes ago: the commit by the developer that resolved the merge conflict
10th Nov, 4 minutes ago: the final commit by the developer addressing the review comments

Figure 12: Pull request with multiple commits

Let’s reply to the review comments provided by the team lead. In the Activity tab, reply to the pull request comment and save it, as shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Replying to a pull request comment

At this stage, your code has been committed and you’ve updated your pull request comments, so you are ready for a final review by the team lead.

Final review

The team lead reviews the code changes and comments made by the developer. As team lead, you own the ‘develop’ branch and it’s your decision on whether to merge the changes in the pull request into the ‘develop’ branch. You can close the pull request with or without merging using the Merge and Close buttons at the bottom of the pull request page (see Figure 13). Clicking Close will allow you to add comments on why you are closing the pull request without merging. Merging will perform a fast-forward merge, incorporating the commits referenced by the pull request. Let’s go ahead and click the Merge button to merge the pull request into the ‘develop’ branch.

Figure 14: Merging the pull request

After merging a pull request, development of that feature is complete and the feature branch is no longer needed. It’s common practice to delete the feature branch after merging. CodeCommit provides a check box during merge to automatically delete the associated feature branch, as seen in Figure 14. Clicking the Merge button will merge the pull request into the ‘develop’ branch, as shown in Figure 15. This will update the status of the pull request to ‘Merged’, and will close the pull request.

Conclusion

This blog has demonstrated how pull requests can be used to request a code review, and enable reviewers to get a comprehensive summary of what is changing, provide feedback to the author, and merge the code into production. For more information on pull requests, see the documentation.

Noise

Tag Archives: IAM user

An easier way to control access to AWS resources by using the AWS organization of IAM principals

Condition concepts

AWS:PrincipalOrgID Condition Key

Example: Restrict access to only principals from my organization

Summary

Refining Access to Branches in AWS CodeCommit

Why would I do this?

What you need to get started

Create two groups in IAM

Create users in IAM

Create a conditional policy in IAM

Apply the policy to a group

Conclusion

How to Patch Linux Workloads on AWS

What you should know first

Step 1: Launch an Amazon EC2 Linux instance

A. Create an IAM role for Systems Manager

B. Launch your Amazon EC2 instance

C. Add tags

Step 2: Configure Systems Manager

A. Create the Systems Manager IAM role

B. Create a Systems Manager patch baseline and associate it with your instance

C. Define a maintenance window

D. Monitor patch compliance

Summary

Sharing Secrets with AWS Lambda Using AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store

Solution overview

Launch the AWS SAM template

SAM template resources

Lambda function

Create an encrypted parameter

Profiling the impact of querying Parameter Store using AWS X-Ray

Conclusion

Recent EC2 Goodies – Launch Templates and Spread Placement

The collective thoughts of the interwebz