Tag Archives: mail

A Peek Behind the Mail Curtain

Post Syndicated from marcelatoath original https://yahooeng.tumblr.com/post/174023151641

USE IMAP TO ACCESS SOME UNIQUE FEATURES

By Libby Lin, Principal Product Manager

Well, we actually won’t show you how we create the magic in our big OATH consumer mail factory. But nevertheless we wanted to share how interested developers could leverage some of our unique features we offer for our Yahoo and AOL Mail customers.

To drive experiences like our travel and shopping smart views or message threading, we tag qualified mails with something we call DECOS and THREADID. While we will not indulge in explaining how exactly we use them internally, we wanted to share how they can be used and accessed through IMAP.

So let’s just look at a sample IMAP command chain. We’ll just assume that you are familiar with the IMAP protocol at this point and you know how to properly talk to an IMAP server.

So here’s how you would retrieve DECO and THREADIDs for specific messages:

1. CONNECT

   openssl s_client -crlf -connect imap.mail.yahoo.com:993

2. LOGIN

   a login username password

   a OK LOGIN completed

3. LIST FOLDERS

   a list “” “*”

   * LIST (\Junk \HasNoChildren) “/” “Bulk Mail”

   * LIST (\Archive \HasNoChildren) “/” “Archive”

   * LIST (\Drafts \HasNoChildren) “/” “Draft”

   * LIST (\HasNoChildren) “/” “Inbox”

   * LIST (\HasNoChildren) “/” “Notes”

   * LIST (\Sent \HasNoChildren) “/” “Sent”

   * LIST (\Trash \HasChildren) “/” “Trash”

   * LIST (\HasNoChildren) “/” “Trash/l2”

   * LIST (\HasChildren) “/” “test level 1”

   * LIST (\HasNoChildren) “/” “test level 1/nestedfolder”

   * LIST (\HasNoChildren) “/” “test level 1/test level 2”

   * LIST (\HasNoChildren) “/” “&T2BZfXso-”

   * LIST (\HasNoChildren) “/” “&gQKAqk7WWr12hA-”

   a OK LIST completed

4.SELECT FOLDER

   a select inbox

   * 94 EXISTS

   * 0 RECENT

   * OK [UIDVALIDITY 1453335194] UIDs valid

   * OK [UIDNEXT 40213] Predicted next UID

   * FLAGS (\Answered \Deleted \Draft \Flagged \Seen $Forwarded $Junk $NotJunk)

   * OK [PERMANENTFLAGS (\Answered \Deleted \Draft \Flagged \Seen $Forwarded $Junk $NotJunk)] Permanent flags

   * OK [HIGHESTMODSEQ 205]

   a OK [READ-WRITE] SELECT completed; now in selected state

5. SEARCH FOR UID

   a uid search 1:*

   * SEARCH 1 2 3 4 11 12 14 23 24 75 76 77 78 114 120 121 124 128 129 130 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 40139 40140 40141 40142 40143 40144 40145 40146 40147 40148     40149 40150 40151 40152 40153 40154 40155 40156 40157 40158 40159 40160 40161 40162 40163 40164 40165 40166 40167 40168 40172 40173 40174 40175 40176     40177 40178 40179 40182 40183 40184 40185 40186 40187 40188 40190 40191 40192 40193 40194 40195 40196 40197 40198 40199 40200 40201 40202 40203 40204     40205 40206 40207 40208 40209 40211 40212

   a OK UID SEARCH completed

6. FETCH DECOS BASED ON UID

   a uid fetch 40212 (X-MSG-DECOS X-MSG-ID X-MSG-THREADID)

   * 94 FETCH (UID 40212 X-MSG-THREADID “108” X-MSG-ID “ACfIowseFt7xWtj0og0L2G0T1wM” X-MSG-DECOS (“FTI” “F1” “EML”))

   a OK UID FETCH completed

Maliciously Changing Someone’s Address

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/maliciously_cha.html

Someone changed the address of UPS corporate headquarters to his own apartment in Chicago. The company discovered it three months later.

The problem, of course, is that there isn’t any authentication of change-of-address submissions:

According to the Postal Service, nearly 37 million change-of-address requests ­ known as PS Form 3575 ­ were submitted in 2017. The form, which can be filled out in person or online, includes a warning below the signature line that “anyone submitting false or inaccurate information” could be subject to fines and imprisonment.

To cut down on possible fraud, post offices send a validation letter to both an old and new address when a change is filed. The letter includes a toll-free number to call to report anything suspicious.

Each year, only a tiny fraction of the requests are ever referred to postal inspectors for investigation. A spokeswoman for the U.S. Postal Inspection Service could not provide a specific number to the Tribune, but officials have previously said that the number of change-of-address investigations in a given year totals 1,000 or fewer typically.

While fraud involving change-of-address forms has long been linked to identity thieves, the targets are usually unsuspecting individuals, not massive corporations.

AWS IoT 1-Click – Use Simple Devices to Trigger Lambda Functions

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-iot-1-click-use-simple-devices-to-trigger-lambda-functions/

We announced a preview of AWS IoT 1-Click at AWS re:Invent 2017 and have been refining it ever since, focusing on simplicity and a clean out-of-box experience. Designed to make IoT available and accessible to a broad audience, AWS IoT 1-Click is now generally available, along with new IoT buttons from AWS and AT&T.

I sat down with the dev team a month or two ago to learn about the service so that I could start thinking about my blog post. During the meeting they gave me a pair of IoT buttons and I started to think about some creative ways to put them to use. Here are a few that I came up with:

Help Request – Earlier this month I spent a very pleasant weekend at the HackTillDawn hackathon in Los Angeles. As the participants were hacking away, they occasionally had questions about AWS, machine learning, Amazon SageMaker, and AWS DeepLens. While we had plenty of AWS Solution Architects on hand (decked out in fashionable & distinctive AWS shirts for easy identification), I imagined an IoT button for each team. Pressing the button would alert the SA crew via SMS and direct them to the proper table.

Camera ControlTim Bray and I were in the AWS video studio, prepping for the first episode of Tim’s series on AWS Messaging. Minutes before we opened the Twitch stream I realized that we did not have a clean, unobtrusive way to ask the camera operator to switch to a closeup view. Again, I imagined that a couple of IoT buttons would allow us to make the request.

Remote Dog Treat Dispenser – My dog barks every time a stranger opens the gate in front of our house. While it is great to have confirmation that my Ring doorbell is working, I would like to be able to press a button and dispense a treat so that Luna stops barking!

Homes, offices, factories, schools, vehicles, and health care facilities can all benefit from IoT buttons and other simple IoT devices, all managed using AWS IoT 1-Click.

All About AWS IoT 1-Click
As I said earlier, we have been focusing on simplicity and a clean out-of-box experience. Here’s what that means:

Architects can dream up applications for inexpensive, low-powered devices.

Developers don’t need to write any device-level code. They can make use of pre-built actions, which send email or SMS messages, or write their own custom actions using AWS Lambda functions.

Installers don’t have to install certificates or configure cloud endpoints on newly acquired devices, and don’t have to worry about firmware updates.

Administrators can monitor the overall status and health of each device, and can arrange to receive alerts when a device nears the end of its useful life and needs to be replaced, using a single interface that spans device types and manufacturers.

I’ll show you how easy this is in just a moment. But first, let’s talk about the current set of devices that are supported by AWS IoT 1-Click.

Who’s Got the Button?
We’re launching with support for two types of buttons (both pictured above). Both types of buttons are pre-configured with X.509 certificates, communicate to the cloud over secure connections, and are ready to use.

The AWS IoT Enterprise Button communicates via Wi-Fi. It has a 2000-click lifetime, encrypts outbound data using TLS, and can be configured using BLE and our mobile app. It retails for $19.99 (shipping and handling not included) and can be used in the United States, Europe, and Japan.

The AT&T LTE-M Button communicates via the LTE-M cellular network. It has a 1500-click lifetime, and also encrypts outbound data using TLS. The device and the bundled data plan is available an an introductory price of $29.99 (shipping and handling not included), and can be used in the United States.

We are very interested in working with device manufacturers in order to make even more shapes, sizes, and types of devices (badge readers, asset trackers, motion detectors, and industrial sensors, to name a few) available to our customers. Our team will be happy to tell you about our provisioning tools and our facility for pushing OTA (over the air) updates to large fleets of devices; you can contact them at [email protected].

AWS IoT 1-Click Concepts
I’m eager to show you how to use AWS IoT 1-Click and the buttons, but need to introduce a few concepts first.

Device – A button or other item that can send messages. Each device is uniquely identified by a serial number.

Placement Template – Describes a like-minded collection of devices to be deployed. Specifies the action to be performed and lists the names of custom attributes for each device.

Placement – A device that has been deployed. Referring to placements instead of devices gives you the freedom to replace and upgrade devices with minimal disruption. Each placement can include values for custom attributes such as a location (“Building 8, 3rd Floor, Room 1337”) or a purpose (“Coffee Request Button”).

Action – The AWS Lambda function to invoke when the button is pressed. You can write a function from scratch, or you can make use of a pair of predefined functions that send an email or an SMS message. The actions have access to the attributes; you can, for example, send an SMS message with the text “Urgent need for coffee in Building 8, 3rd Floor, Room 1337.”

Getting Started with AWS IoT 1-Click
Let’s set up an IoT button using the AWS IoT 1-Click Console:

If I didn’t have any buttons I could click Buy devices to get some. But, I do have some, so I click Claim devices to move ahead. I enter the device ID or claim code for my AT&T button and click Claim (I can enter multiple claim codes or device IDs if I want):

The AWS buttons can be claimed using the console or the mobile app; the first step is to use the mobile app to configure the button to use my Wi-Fi:

Then I scan the barcode on the box and click the button to complete the process of claiming the device. Both of my buttons are now visible in the console:

I am now ready to put them to use. I click on Projects, and then Create a project:

I name and describe my project, and click Next to proceed:

Now I define a device template, along with names and default values for the placement attributes. Here’s how I set up a device template (projects can contain several, but I just need one):

The action has two mandatory parameters (phone number and SMS message) built in; I add three more (Building, Room, and Floor) and click Create project:

I’m almost ready to ask for some coffee! The next step is to associate my buttons with this project by creating a placement for each one. I click Create placements to proceed. I name each placement, select the device to associate with it, and then enter values for the attributes that I established for the project. I can also add additional attributes that are peculiar to this placement:

I can inspect my project and see that everything looks good:

I click on the buttons and the SMS messages appear:

I can monitor device activity in the AWS IoT 1-Click Console:

And also in the Lambda Console:

The Lambda function itself is also accessible, and can be used as-is or customized:

As you can see, this is the code that lets me use {{*}}include all of the placement attributes in the message and {{Building}} (for example) to include a specific placement attribute.

Now Available
I’ve barely scratched the surface of this cool new service and I encourage you to give it a try (or a click) yourself. Buy a button or two, build something cool, and let me know all about it!

Pricing is based on the number of enabled devices in your account, measured monthly and pro-rated for partial months. Devices can be enabled or disabled at any time. See the AWS IoT 1-Click Pricing page for more info.

To learn more, visit the AWS IoT 1-Click home page or read the AWS IoT 1-Click documentation.

Jeff;

 

Details on a New PGP Vulnerability

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/details_on_a_ne.html

A new PGP vulnerability was announced today. Basically, the vulnerability makes use of the fact that modern e-mail programs allow for embedded HTML objects. Essentially, if an attacker can intercept and modify a message in transit, he can insert code that sends the plaintext in a URL to a remote website. Very clever.

The EFAIL attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards to reveal the plaintext of encrypted emails. In a nutshell, EFAIL abuses active content of HTML emails, for example externally loaded images or styles, to exfiltrate plaintext through requested URLs. To create these exfiltration channels, the attacker first needs access to the encrypted emails, for example, by eavesdropping on network traffic, compromising email accounts, email servers, backup systems or client computers. The emails could even have been collected years ago.

The attacker changes an encrypted email in a particular way and sends this changed encrypted email to the victim. The victim’s email client decrypts the email and loads any external content, thus exfiltrating the plaintext to the attacker.

A few initial comments:

1. Being able to intercept and modify e-mails in transit is the sort of thing the NSA can do, but is hard for the average hacker. That being said, there are circumstances where someone can modify e-mails. I don’t mean to minimize the seriousness of this attack, but that is a consideration.

2. The vulnerability isn’t with PGP or S/MIME itself, but in the way they interact with modern e-mail programs. You can see this in the two suggested short-term mitigations: “No decryption in the e-mail client,” and “disable HTML rendering.”

3. I’ve been getting some weird press calls from reporters wanting to know if this demonstrates that e-mail encryption is impossible. No, this just demonstrates that programmers are human and vulnerabilities are inevitable. PGP almost certainly has fewer bugs than your average piece of software, but it’s not bug free.

3. Why is anyone using encrypted e-mail anymore, anyway? Reliably and easily encrypting e-mail is an insurmountably hard problem for reasons having nothing to do with today’s announcement. If you need to communicate securely, use Signal. If having Signal on your phone will arouse suspicion, use WhatsApp.

I’ll post other commentaries and analyses as I find them.

EDITED TO ADD (5/14): News articles.

Slashdot thread.

Critical PGP Vulnerability

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/critical_pgp_vu.html

EFF is reporting that a critical vulnerability has been discovered in PGP and S/MIME. No details have been published yet, but one of the researchers wrote:

We’ll publish critical vulnerabilities in PGP/GPG and S/MIME email encryption on 2018-05-15 07:00 UTC. They might reveal the plaintext of encrypted emails, including encrypted emails sent in the past. There are currently no reliable fixes for the vulnerability. If you use PGP/GPG or S/MIME for very sensitive communication, you should disable it in your email client for now.

This sounds like a protocol vulnerability, but we’ll learn more tomorrow.

News articles.

Serious vulnerabilities with OpenPGP and S/MIME

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/754370/rss

The efail.de site describes a set of
vulnerabilities in the implementation of PGP and MIME that can cause the
disclosure of encrypted communications, including old messages. “In a
nutshell, EFAIL abuses active content of HTML emails, for example
externally loaded images or styles, to exfiltrate plaintext through
requested URLs.

The EFF recommends
uninstalling email-encryption tools that automatically
decrypt email entirely. “Until the flaws
described in the paper are more widely understood and fixed, users should
arrange for the use of alternative end-to-end secure channels, such as
Signal, and temporarily stop sending and especially reading PGP-encrypted
email.

Some notes on eFail

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/05/some-notes-on-efail.html

I’ve been busy trying to replicate the “eFail” PGP/SMIME bug. I thought I’d write up some notes.

PGP and S/MIME encrypt emails, so that eavesdroppers can’t read them. The bugs potentially allow eavesdroppers to take the encrypted emails they’ve captured and resend them to you, reformatted in a way that allows them to decrypt the messages.

Disable remote/external content in email

The most important defense is to disable “external” or “remote” content from being automatically loaded. This is when HTML-formatted emails attempt to load images from remote websites. This happens legitimately when they want to display images, but not fill up the email with them. But most of the time this is illegitimate, they hide images on the webpage in order to track you with unique IDs and cookies. For example, this is the code at the end of an email from politician Bernie Sanders to his supporters. Notice the long random number assigned to track me, and the width/height of this image is set to one pixel, so you don’t even see it:

Such trackers are so pernicious they are disabled by default in most email clients. This is an example of the settings in Thunderbird:

The problem is that as you read email messages, you often get frustrated by the fact the error messages and missing content, so you keep adding exceptions:

The correct defense against this eFail bug is to make sure such remote content is disabled and that you have no exceptions, or at least, no HTTP exceptions. HTTPS exceptions (those using SSL) are okay as long as they aren’t to a website the attacker controls. Unencrypted exceptions, though, the hacker can eavesdrop on, so it doesn’t matter if they control the website the requests go to. If the attacker can eavesdrop on your emails, they can probably eavesdrop on your HTTP sessions as well.

Some have recommended disabling PGP and S/MIME completely. That’s probably overkill. As long as the attacker can’t use the “remote content” in emails, you are fine. Likewise, some have recommend disabling HTML completely. That’s not even an option in any email client I’ve used — you can disable sending HTML emails, but not receiving them. It’s sufficient to just disable grabbing remote content, not the rest of HTML email rendering.

I couldn’t replicate the direct exfiltration

There rare two related bugs. One allows direct exfiltration, which appends the decrypted PGP email onto the end of an IMG tag (like one of those tracking tags), allowing the entire message to be decrypted.

An example of this is the following email. This is a standard HTML email message consisting of multiple parts. The trick is that the IMG tag in the first part starts the URL (blog.robertgraham.com/…) but doesn’t end it. It has the starting quotes in front of the URL but no ending quotes. The ending will in the next chunk.

The next chunk isn’t HTML, though, it’s PGP. The PGP extension (in my case, Enignmail) will detect this and automatically decrypt it. In this case, it’s some previous email message I’ve received the attacker captured by eavesdropping, who then pastes the contents into this email message in order to get it decrypted.

What should happen at this point is that Thunderbird will generate a request (if “remote content” is enabled) to the blog.robertgraham.com server with the decrypted contents of the PGP email appended to it. But that’s not what happens. Instead, I get this:

I am indeed getting weird stuff in the URL (the bit after the GET /), but it’s not the PGP decrypted message. Instead what’s going on is that when Thunderbird puts together a “multipart/mixed” message, it adds it’s own HTML tags consisting of lines between each part. In the email client it looks like this:

The HTML code it adds looks like:

That’s what you see in the above URL, all this code up to the first quotes. Those quotes terminate the quotes in the URL from the first multipart section, causing the rest of the content to be ignored (as far as being sent as part of the URL).

So at least for the latest version of Thunderbird, you are accidentally safe, even if you have “remote content” enabled. Though, this is only according to my tests, there may be a work around to this that hackers could exploit.

STARTTLS

In the old days, email was sent plaintext over the wire so that it could be passively eavesdropped on. Nowadays, most providers send it via “STARTTLS”, which sorta encrypts it. Attackers can still intercept such email, but they have to do so actively, using man-in-the-middle. Such active techniques can be detected if you are careful and look for them.
Some organizations don’t care. Apparently, some nation states are just blocking all STARTTLS and forcing email to be sent unencrypted. Others do care. The NSA will passively sniff all the email they can in nations like Iraq, but they won’t actively intercept STARTTLS messages, for fear of getting caught.
The consequence is that it’s much less likely that somebody has been eavesdropping on you, passively grabbing all your PGP/SMIME emails. If you fear they have been, you should look (e.g. send emails from GMail and see if they are intercepted by sniffing the wire).

You’ll know if you are getting hacked

If somebody attacks you using eFail, you’ll know. You’ll get an email message formatted this way, with multipart/mixed components, some with corrupt HTML, some encrypted via PGP. This means that for the most part, your risk is that you’ll be attacked only once — the hacker will only be able to get one message through and decrypt it before you notice that something is amiss. Though to be fair, they can probably include all the emails they want decrypted as attachments to the single email they sent you, so the risk isn’t necessarily that you’ll only get one decrypted.
As mentioned above, a lot of attackers (e.g. the NSA) won’t attack you if its so easy to get caught. Other attackers, though, like anonymous hackers, don’t care.
Somebody ought to write a plugin to Thunderbird to detect this.

Summary

It only works if attackers have already captured your emails (though, that’s why you use PGP/SMIME in the first place, to guard against that).
It only works if you’ve enabled your email client to automatically grab external/remote content.
It seems to not be easily reproducible in all cases.
Instead of disabling PGP/SMIME, you should make sure your email client hast remote/external content disabled — that’s a huge privacy violation even without this bug.

Notes: The default email client on the Mac enables remote content by default, which is bad:

Mayank Sinha’s home security project

Post Syndicated from Helen Lynn original https://www.raspberrypi.org/blog/home-security/

Yesterday, I received an email from someone called Mayank Sinha, showing us the Raspberry Pi home security project he’s been working on. He got in touch particularly because, he writes, the Raspberry Pi community has given him “immense support” with his build, and he wanted to dedicate it to the commmunity as thanks.

Mayank’s project is named Asfaleia, a Greek word that means safety, certainty, or security against threats. It’s part of an honourable tradition dating all the way back to 2012: it’s a prototype housed in a polystyrene box, using breadboards and jumper leads and sticky tape. And it’s working! Take a look.

Asfaleia DIY Home Security System

An IOT based home security system. The link to the code: https://github.com/mayanksinha11/Asfaleia

Home security with Asfaleida

Asfaleia has a PIR (passive infrared) motion sensor, an IR break beam sensor, and a gas sensor. All are connected to a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, the latter two via a NodeMCU board. Mayank currently has them set up in a box that’s divided into compartments to model different rooms in a house.

A shallow box divided into four labelled "rooms", all containing electronic components

All the best prototypes have sticky tape or rubber bands

If the IR sensors detect motion or a broken beam, the webcam takes a photo and emails it to the build’s owner, and the build also calls their phone (I like your ringtone, Mayank). If the gas sensor detects a leak, the system activates an exhaust fan via a small relay board, and again the owner receives a phone call. The build can also authenticate users via face and fingerprint recognition. The software that runs it all is written in Python, and you can see Mayank’s code on GitHub.

Of prototypes and works-in-progess

Reading Mayank’s email made me very happy yesterday. We know that thousands of people in our community give a great deal of time and effort to help others learn and make things, and it is always wonderful to see an example of how that support is helping someone turn their ideas into reality. It’s great, too, to see people sharing works-in-progress, as well as polished projects! After all, the average build is more likely to feature rubber bands and Tupperware boxes than meticulously designed laser-cut parts or expert joinery. Mayank’s YouTube channel shows earlier work on this and another Pi project, and I hope he’ll continue to document his builds.

So here’s to Raspberry Pi projects big, small, beginner, professional, endlessly prototyped, unashamedly bodged, unfinished or fully working, shonky or shiny. Please keep sharing them all!

The post Mayank Sinha’s home security project appeared first on Raspberry Pi.

timeShift(GrafanaBuzz, 1w) Issue 44

Post Syndicated from Blogs on Grafana Labs Blog original https://grafana.com/blog/2018/05/11/timeshiftgrafanabuzz-1w-issue-44/

Welcome to TimeShift Grafana v5.1.2 is available and includes an important bug fix for MySQL, plus an update for GDPR compliance. See below for more details and the full release notes.
Also, KubeCon + CloudNativeCon Europe 2018 videos are now available including talks from members of the Grafana Labs team! Check out these talks below.
If you would like your article highlighted in our weekly roundup, feel free to send me an email at [email protected]

Hello World Issue 5: Engineering

Post Syndicated from Russell Barnes original https://www.raspberrypi.org/blog/hello-world-issue-5/

Join us as we celebrate the Year of Engineering in the newest issue of Hello World, our magazine for computing and digital making educators.

 

Inspiring future engineers

We’ve brought together a wide range of experts to share their ideas and advice on how to bring engineering to your classroom — read issue 5 to find out the best ways to inspire the next generation.



Plus we’ve got plenty on GP and Scratch, we answer your latest questions, and we bring you our usual collection of useful features, guides, and lesson plans.

Highlights of issue 5 include:

  • The bluffers’ guide to putting together a tech-themed school trip
  • Inclusion, and coding for the visually impaired
  • Getting students interested in databases
  • Why copying may not always be a bad thing

How to get Hello World #5

Hello World is available as a free download under a Creative Commons license for everyone in world who is interested in computer science and digital making education. Get the latest issue as a PDF file straight from the Hello World website.

We’re currently offering free print copies of the magazine to serving educators in the UK. This offer is open to teachers, Code Club and CoderDojo volunteers, teaching assistants, teacher trainers, and others who help children and young people learn about computing and digital making. Subscribe to have your free print magazine posted directly to your home, or subscribe digitally — 20000 educators have already signed up to receive theirs!

Get in touch!

You could write for us about your experiences as an educator, and share your advice with the community. Wherever you are in the world, get in touch by emailing our editorial team about your article idea — we would love to hear from you!

Hello World magazine is a collaboration between the Raspberry Pi Foundation and Computing At School, which is part of the British Computing Society.

The post Hello World Issue 5: Engineering appeared first on Raspberry Pi.

The US Is Unprepared for Election-Related Hacking in 2018

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/the_us_is_unpre.html

This survey and report is not surprising:

The survey of nearly forty Republican and Democratic campaign operatives, administered through November and December 2017, revealed that American political campaign staff — primarily working at the state and congressional levels — are not only unprepared for possible cyber attacks, but remain generally unconcerned about the threat. The survey sample was relatively small, but nevertheless the survey provides a first look at how campaign managers and staff are responding to the threat.

The overwhelming majority of those surveyed do not want to devote campaign resources to cybersecurity or to hire personnel to address cybersecurity issues. Even though campaign managers recognize there is a high probability that campaign and personal emails are at risk of being hacked, they are more concerned about fundraising and press coverage than they are about cybersecurity. Less than half of those surveyed said they had taken steps to make their data secure and most were unsure if they wanted to spend any money on this protection.

Security is never something we actually want. Security is something we need in order to avoid what we don’t want. It’s also more abstract, concerned with hypothetical future possibilities. Of course it’s lower on the priorities list than fundraising and press coverage. They’re more tangible, and they’re more immediate.

This is all to the attackers’ advantage.

The intersection of Customer Engagement and Data Science

Post Syndicated from Brent Meyer original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/messaging-and-targeting/the-intersection-of-customer-engagement-and-data-science/

On the Messaging and Targeting team, we’re constantly inspired by the new and novel ways that customers use our services. For example, last year we took an in-depth look at a customer who built a fully featured email marketing platform based on Amazon SES and other AWS Services.

This week, our friends on the AWS Machine Learning team published a blog post that brings together the worlds of data science and customer engagement. Their solution uses Amazon SageMaker (a platform for building and deploying machine learning models) to create a system that makes purchasing predictions based on customers’ past behaviors. It then uses Amazon Pinpoint to send campaigns to customers based on these predictions.

The blog post is an interesting read that includes a primer on the process of creating a useful Machine Learning solution. It then goes in-depth, discussing the real-world considerations that are involved in implementing the solution.

Take a look at their post, Amazon Pinpoint campaigns driven by machine learning on Amazon SageMaker, on the AWS Machine Learning Blog.

No, Ray Ozzie hasn’t solved crypto backdoors

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/04/no-ray-ozzie-hasnt-solved-crypto.html

According to this Wired article, Ray Ozzie may have a solution to the crypto backdoor problem. No, he hasn’t. He’s only solving the part we already know how to solve. He’s deliberately ignoring the stuff we don’t know how to solve. We know how to make backdoors, we just don’t know how to secure them.

The vault doesn’t scale

Yes, Apple has a vault where they’ve successfully protected important keys. No, it doesn’t mean this vault scales. The more people and the more often you have to touch the vault, the less secure it becomes. We are talking thousands of requests per day from 100,000 different law enforcement agencies around the world. We are unlikely to protect this against incompetence and mistakes. We are definitely unable to secure this against deliberate attack.

A good analogy to Ozzie’s solution is LetsEncrypt for getting SSL certificates for your website, which is fairly scalable, using a private key locked in a vault for signing hundreds of thousands of certificates. That this scales seems to validate Ozzie’s proposal.

But at the same time, LetsEncrypt is easily subverted. LetsEncrypt uses DNS to verify your identity. But spoofing DNS is easy, as was recently shown in the recent BGP attack against a cryptocurrency. Attackers can create fraudulent SSL certificates with enough effort. We’ve got other protections against this, such as discovering and revoking the SSL bad certificate, so while damaging, it’s not catastrophic.

But with Ozzie’s scheme, equivalent attacks would be catastrophic, as it would lead to unlocking the phone and stealing all of somebody’s secrets.

In particular, consider what would happen if LetsEncrypt’s certificate was stolen (as Matthew Green points out). The consequence is that this would be detected and mass revocations would occur. If Ozzie’s master key were stolen, nothing would happen. Nobody would know, and evildoers would be able to freely decrypt phones. Ozzie claims his scheme can work because SSL works — but then his scheme includes none of the many protections necessary to make SSL work.

What I’m trying to show here is that in a lab, it all looks nice and pretty, but when attacked at scale, things break down — quickly. We have so much experience with failure at scale that we can judge Ozzie’s scheme as woefully incomplete. It’s not even up to the standard of SSL, and we have a long list of SSL problems.

Cryptography is about people more than math

We have a mathematically pure encryption algorithm called the “One Time Pad”. It can’t ever be broken, provably so with mathematics.

It’s also perfectly useless, as it’s not something humans can use. That’s why we use AES, which is vastly less secure (anything you encrypt today can probably be decrypted in 100 years). AES can be used by humans whereas One Time Pads cannot be. (I learned the fallacy of One Time Pad’s on my grandfather’s knee — he was a WW II codebreaker who broke German messages trying to futz with One Time Pads).

The same is true with Ozzie’s scheme. It focuses on the mathematical model but ignores the human element. We already know how to solve the mathematical problem in a hundred different ways. The part we don’t know how to secure is the human element.

How do we know the law enforcement person is who they say they are? How do we know the “trusted Apple employee” can’t be bribed? How can the law enforcement agent communicate securely with the Apple employee?

You think these things are theoretical, but they aren’t. Consider financial transactions. It used to be common that you could just email your bank/broker to wire funds into an account for such things as buying a house. Hackers have subverted that, intercepting messages, changing account numbers, and stealing millions. Most banks/brokers require additional verification before doing such transfers.

Let me repeat: Ozzie has only solved the part we already know how to solve. He hasn’t addressed these issues that confound us.

We still can’t secure security, much less secure backdoors

We already know how to decrypt iPhones: just wait a year or two for somebody to discover a vulnerability. FBI claims it’s “going dark”, but that’s only for timely decryption of phones. If they are willing to wait a year or two a vulnerability will eventually be found that allows decryption.

That’s what’s happened with the “GrayKey” device that’s been all over the news lately. Apple is fixing it so that it won’t work on new phones, but it works on old phones.

Ozzie’s solution is based on the assumption that iPhones are already secure against things like GrayKey. Like his assumption “if Apple already has a vault for private keys, then we have such vaults for backdoor keys”, Ozzie is saying “if Apple already had secure hardware/software to secure the phone, then we can use the same stuff to secure the backdoors”. But we don’t really have secure vaults and we don’t really have secure hardware/software to secure the phone.

Again, to stress this point, Ozzie is solving the part we already know how to solve, but ignoring the stuff we don’t know how to solve. His solution is insecure for the same reason phones are already insecure.

Locked phones aren’t the problem

Phones are general purpose computers. That means anybody can install an encryption app on the phone regardless of whatever other security the phone might provide. The police are powerless to stop this. Even if they make such encryption crime, then criminals will still use encryption.

That leads to a strange situation that the only data the FBI will be able to decrypt is that of people who believe they are innocent. Those who know they are guilty will install encryption apps like Signal that have no backdoors.

In the past this was rare, as people found learning new apps a barrier. These days, apps like Signal are so easy even drug dealers can figure out how to use them.

We know how to get Apple to give us a backdoor, just pass a law forcing them to. It may look like Ozzie’s scheme, it may be something more secure designed by Apple’s engineers. Sure, it will weaken security on the phone for everyone, but those who truly care will just install Signal. But again we are back to the problem that Ozzie’s solving the problem we know how to solve while ignoring the much larger problem, that of preventing people from installing their own encryption.

The FBI isn’t necessarily the problem

Ozzie phrases his solution in terms of U.S. law enforcement. Well, what about Europe? What about Russia? What about China? What about North Korea?

Technology is borderless. A solution in the United States that allows “legitimate” law enforcement requests will inevitably be used by repressive states for what we believe would be “illegitimate” law enforcement requests.

Ozzie sees himself as the hero helping law enforcement protect 300 million American citizens. He doesn’t see himself what he really is, the villain helping oppress 1.4 billion Chinese, 144 million Russians, and another couple billion living in oppressive governments around the world.

Conclusion

Ozzie pretends the problem is political, that he’s created a solution that appeases both sides. He hasn’t. He’s solved the problem we already know how to solve. He’s ignored all the problems we struggle with, the problems we claim make secure backdoors essentially impossible. I’ve listed some in this post, but there are many more. Any famous person can create a solution that convinces fawning editors at Wired Magazine, but if Ozzie wants to move forward he’s going to have to work harder to appease doubting cryptographers.

[$] Removing the kthread freezer?

Post Syndicated from jake original https://lwn.net/Articles/752588/rss

Using the kernel thread (kthread) freezer has been a longtime problem
for a variety of reasons. It is meant as a way to suspend kthreads on the
way toward system suspend, but in practice has proved problematic to the
point that it came up at both the 2015 and
2016 Kernel Summits (as well as on the
mailing lists over the years); the intent is to try
to remove the kthread freezer entirely. To that end, Luis Rodriguez led a
discussion in the filesystem track of the 2018 Linux Storage, Filesystem,
and Memory-Management Summit on the problems and possible solutions.

New .BOT gTLD from Amazon

Post Syndicated from Randall Hunt original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-bot-gtld-from-amazon/

Today, I’m excited to announce the launch of .BOT, a new generic top-level domain (gTLD) from Amazon. Customers can use .BOT domains to provide an identity and portal for their bots. Fitness bots, slack bots, e-commerce bots, and more can all benefit from an easy-to-access .BOT domain. The phrase “bot” was the 4th most registered domain keyword within the .COM TLD in 2016 with more than 6000 domains per month. A .BOT domain allows customers to provide a definitive internet identity for their bots as well as enhancing SEO performance.

At the time of this writing .BOT domains start at $75 each and must be verified and published with a supported tool like: Amazon Lex, Botkit Studio, Dialogflow, Gupshup, Microsoft Bot Framework, or Pandorabots. You can expect support for more tools over time and if your favorite bot framework isn’t supported feel free to contact us here: [email protected].

Below, I’ll walk through the experience of registering and provisioning a domain for my bot, whereml.bot. Then we’ll look at setting up the domain as a hosted zone in Amazon Route 53. Let’s get started.

Registering a .BOT domain

First, I’ll head over to https://amazonregistry.com/bot, type in a new domain, and click magnifying class to make sure my domain is available and get taken to the registration wizard.

Next, I have the opportunity to choose how I want to verify my bot. I build all of my bots with Amazon Lex so I’ll select that in the drop down and get prompted for instructions specific to AWS. If I had my bot hosted somewhere else I would need to follow the unique verification instructions for that particular framework.

To verify my Lex bot I need to give the Amazon Registry permissions to invoke the bot and verify it’s existence. I’ll do this by creating an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) cross account role and providing the AmazonLexReadOnly permissions to that role. This is easily accomplished in the AWS Console. Be sure to provide the account number and external ID shown on the registration page.

Now I’ll add read only permissions to our Amazon Lex bots.

I’ll give my role a fancy name like DotBotCrossAccountVerifyRole and a description so it’s easy to remember why I made this then I’ll click create to create the role and be transported to the role summary page.

Finally, I’ll copy the ARN from the created role and save it for my next step.

Here I’ll add all the details of my Amazon Lex bot. If you haven’t made a bot yet you can follow the tutorial to build a basic bot. I can refer to any alias I’ve deployed but if I just want to grab the latest published bot I can pass in $LATEST as the alias. Finally I’ll click Validate and proceed to registering my domain.

Amazon Registry works with a partner EnCirca to register our domains so we’ll select them and optionally grab Site Builder. I know how to sling some HTML and Javascript together so I’ll pass on the Site Builder side of things.

 

After I click continue we’re taken to EnCirca’s website to finalize the registration and with any luck within a few minutes of purchasing and completing the registration we should receive an email with some good news:

Alright, now that we have a domain name let’s find out how to host things on it.

Using Amazon Route53 with a .BOT domain

Amazon Route 53 is a highly available and scalable DNS with robust APIs, healthchecks, service discovery, and many other features. I definitely want to use this to host my new domain. The first thing I’ll do is navigate to the Route53 console and create a hosted zone with the same name as my domain.


Great! Now, I need to take the Name Server (NS) records that Route53 created for me and use EnCirca’s portal to add these as the authoritative nameservers on the domain.

Now I just add my records to my hosted zone and I should be able to serve traffic! Way cool, I’ve got my very own .bot domain for @WhereML.

Next Steps

  • I could and should add to the security of my site by creating TLS certificates for people who intend to access my domain over TLS. Luckily with AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) this is extremely straightforward and I’ve got my subdomains and root domain verified in just a few clicks.
  • I could create a cloudfront distrobution to front an S3 static single page application to host my entire chatbot and invoke Amazon Lex with a cognito identity right from the browser.

Randall