Tag Archives: military

Fighting Leakers at Apple

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/06/fighting_leaker.html

Apple is fighting its own battle against leakers, using people and tactics from the NSA.

According to the hour-long presentation, Apple’s Global Security team employs an undisclosed number of investigators around the world to prevent information from reaching competitors, counterfeiters, and the press, as well as hunt down the source when leaks do occur. Some of these investigators have previously worked at U.S. intelligence agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA), law enforcement agencies like the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service, and in the U.S. military.

The information is from an internal briefing, which was leaked.

A kindly lesson for you non-techies about encryption

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/06/a-kindly-lesson-for-you-non-techies.html

The following tweets need to be debunked:

The answer to John Schindler’s question is:

every expert in cryptography doesn’t know this

Oh, sure, you can find fringe wacko who also knows crypto that agrees with you but all the sane members of the security community will not.

Telegram is not trustworthy because it’s partially closed-source. We can’t see how it works. We don’t know if they’ve made accidental mistakes that can be hacked. We don’t know if they’ve been bribed by the NSA or Russia to put backdoors in their program. In contrast, PGP and Signal are open-source. We can read exactly what the software does. Indeed, thousands of people have been reviewing their software looking for mistakes and backdoors. Being open-source doesn’t automatically make software better, but it does make hiding secret backdoors much harder.

Telegram is not trustworthy because we aren’t certain the crypto is done properly. Signal, and especially PGP, are done properly.

The thing about encryption is that when done properly, it works. Neither the NSA nor the Russians can break properly encrypted content. There’s no such thing as “military grade” encryption that is better than consumer grade. There’s only encryption that nobody can hack vs. encryption that your neighbor’s teenage kid can easily hack. Those scenes in TV/movies about breaking encryption is as realistic as sound in space: good for dramatic presentation, but not how things work in the real world.

In particular, end-to-end encryption works. Sure, in the past, such apps only encrypted as far as the server, so whoever ran the server could read your messages. Modern chat apps, though, are end-to-end: the servers have absolutely no ability to decrypt what’s on them, unless they can get the decryption keys from the phones. But some tasks, like encrypted messages to a group of people, can be hard to do properly.

Thus, in contrast to what John Schindler says, while we techies have doubts about Telegram, we don’t have doubts about Russia authorities having access to Signal and PGP messages.

Snowden hatred has become the anti-vax of crypto. Sure, there’s no particular reason to trust Snowden — people should really stop treating him as some sort of privacy-Jesus. But there’s no particular reason to distrust him, either. His bland statements on crypto are indistinguishable from any other crypto-enthusiast statements. If he’s a Russian pawn, then so too is the bulk of the crypto community.

With all this said, using Signal doesn’t make you perfectly safe. The person you are chatting with could be a secret agent — especially in group chat. There could be cameras/microphones in the room where you are using the app. The Russians can also hack into your phone, and likewise eavesdrop on everything you do with the phone, regardless of which app you use. And they probably have hacked specific people’s phones. On the other hand, if the NSA or Russians were widely hacking phones, we’d detect that this was happening. We haven’t.

Signal is therefore not a guarantee of safety, because nothing is, and if your life depends on it, you can’t trust any simple advice like “use Signal”. But, for the bulk of us, it’s pretty damn secure, and I trust neither the Russians nor the NSA are reading my Signal or PGP messages.

At first blush, this @20committee tweet appears to be non-experts opining on things outside their expertise. But in reality, it’s just obtuse partisanship, where truth and expertise doesn’t matter. Nothing you or I say can change some people’s minds on this matter, no matter how much our expertise gives weight to our words. This post is instead for bystanders, who don’t know enough to judge whether these crazy statements have merit.


Bonus:

So let’s talk about “every crypto expert“. It’s, of course, impossible to speak for every crypto expert. It’s like saying how the consensus among climate scientists is that mankind is warming the globe, while at the same time, ignoring the wide spread disagreement on how much warming that is.

The same is true here. You’ll get a widespread different set of responses from experts about the above tweet. Some, for example, will stress my point at the bottom that hacking the endpoint (the phone) breaks all the apps, and thus justify the above tweet from that point of view. Others will point out that all software has bugs, and it’s quite possible that Signal has some unknown bug that the Russians are exploiting.

So I’m not attempting to speak for what all experts might say here in the general case and what long lecture they can opine about. I am, though, pointing out the basics that virtually everyone agrees on, the consensus of open-source and working crypto.

NSA Document Outlining Russian Attempts to Hack Voter Rolls

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/06/nsa_document_ou.html

This week brought new public evidence about Russian interference in the 2016 election. On Monday, the Intercept published a top-secret National Security Agency document describing Russian hacking attempts against the US election system. While the attacks seem more exploratory than operational ­– and there’s no evidence that they had any actual effect ­– they further illustrate the real threats and vulnerabilities facing our elections, and they point to solutions.

The document describes how the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, attacked a company called VR Systems that, according to its website, provides software to manage voter rolls in eight states. The August 2016 attack was successful, and the attackers used the information they stole from the company’s network to launch targeted attacks against 122 local election officials on October 27, 12 days before the election.

That is where the NSA’s analysis ends. We don’t know whether those 122 targeted attacks were successful, or what their effects were if so. We don’t know whether other election software companies besides VR Systems were targeted, or what the GRU’s overall plan was — if it had one. Certainly, there are ways to disrupt voting by interfering with the voter registration process or voter rolls. But there was no indication on Election Day that people found their names removed from the system, or their address changed, or anything else that would have had an effect — anywhere in the country, let alone in the eight states where VR Systems is deployed. (There were Election Day problems with the voting rolls in Durham, NC ­– one of the states that VR Systems supports ­– but they seem like conventional errors and not malicious action.)

And 12 days before the election (with early voting already well underway in many jurisdictions) seems far too late to start an operation like that. That is why these attacks feel exploratory to me, rather than part of an operational attack. The Russians were seeing how far they could get, and keeping those accesses in their pocket for potential future use.

Presumably, this document was intended for the Justice Department, including the FBI, which would be the proper agency to continue looking into these hacks. We don’t know what happened next, if anything. VR Systems isn’t commenting, and the names of the local election officials targeted did not appear in the NSA document.

So while this document isn’t much of a smoking gun, it’s yet more evidence of widespread Russian attempts to interfere last year.

The document was, allegedly, sent to the Intercept anonymously. An NSA contractor, Reality Leigh Winner, was arrested Saturday and charged with mishandling classified information. The speed with which the government identified her serves as a caution to anyone wanting to leak official US secrets.

The Intercept sent a scan of the document to another source during its reporting. That scan showed a crease in the original document, which implied that someone had printed the document and then carried it out of some secure location. The second source, according to the FBI’s affidavit against Winner, passed it on to the NSA. From there, NSA investigators were able to look at their records and determine that only six people had printed out the document. (The government may also have been able to track the printout through secret dots that identified the printer.) Winner was the only one of those six who had been in e-mail contact with the Intercept. It is unclear whether the e-mail evidence was from Winner’s NSA account or her personal account, but in either case, it’s incredibly sloppy tradecraft.

With President Trump’s election, the issue of Russian interference in last year’s campaign has become highly politicized. Reports like the one from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in January have been criticized by partisan supporters of the White House. It’s interesting that this document was reported by the Intercept, which has been historically skeptical about claims of Russian interference. (I was quoted in their story, and they showed me a copy of the NSA document before it was published.) The leaker was even praised by WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who up until now has been traditionally critical of allegations of Russian election interference.

This demonstrates the power of source documents. It’s easy to discount a Justice Department official or a summary report. A detailed NSA document is much more convincing. Right now, there’s a federal suit to force the ODNI to release the entire January report, not just the unclassified summary. These efforts are vital.

This hack will certainly come up at the Senate hearing where former FBI director James B. Comey is scheduled to testify Thursday. Last year, there were several stories about voter databases being targeted by Russia. Last August, the FBI confirmed that the Russians successfully hacked voter databases in Illinois and Arizona. And a month later, an unnamed Department of Homeland Security official said that the Russians targeted voter databases in 20 states. Again, we don’t know of anything that came of these hacks, but expect Comey to be asked about them. Unfortunately, any details he does know are almost certainly classified, and won’t be revealed in open testimony.

But more important than any of this, we need to better secure our election systems going forward. We have significant vulnerabilities in our voting machines, our voter rolls and registration process, and the vote tabulation systems after the polls close. In January, DHS designated our voting systems as critical national infrastructure, but so far that has been entirely for show. In the United States, we don’t have a single integrated election. We have 50-plus individual elections, each with its own rules and its own regulatory authorities. Federal standards that mandate voter-verified paper ballots and post-election auditing would go a long way to secure our voting system. These attacks demonstrate that we need to secure the voter rolls, as well.

Democratic elections serve two purposes. The first is to elect the winner. But the second is to convince the loser. After the votes are all counted, everyone needs to trust that the election was fair and the results accurate. Attacks against our election system, even if they are ultimately ineffective, undermine that trust and ­– by extension ­– our democracy. Yes, fixing this will be expensive. Yes, it will require federal action in what’s historically been state-run systems. But as a country, we have no other option.

This essay previously appeared in the Washington Post.

The Quick vs. the Strong: Commentary on Cory Doctorow’s Walkaway

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/05/the_quick_vs_th.html

Technological advances change the world. That’s partly because of what they are, but even more because of the social changes they enable. New technologies upend power balances. They give groups new capabilities, increased effectiveness, and new defenses. The Internet decades have been a never-ending series of these upendings. We’ve seen existing industries fall and new industries rise. We’ve seen governments become more powerful in some areas and less in others. We’ve seen the rise of a new form of governance: a multi-stakeholder model where skilled individuals can have more power than multinational corporations or major governments.

Among the many power struggles, there is one type I want to particularly highlight: the battles between the nimble individuals who start using a new technology first, and the slower organizations that come along later.

In general, the unempowered are the first to benefit from new technologies: hackers, dissidents, marginalized groups, criminals, and so on. When they first encountered the Internet, it was transformative. Suddenly, they had access to technologies for dissemination, coordination, organization, and action — things that were impossibly hard before. This can be incredibly empowering. In the early decades of the Internet, we saw it in the rise of Usenet discussion forums and special-interest mailing lists, in how the Internet routed around censorship, and how Internet governance bypassed traditional government and corporate models. More recently, we saw it in the SOPA/PIPA debate of 2011-12, the Gezi protests in Turkey and the various “color” revolutions, and the rising use of crowdfunding. These technologies can invert power dynamics, even in the presence of government surveillance and censorship.

But that’s just half the story. Technology magnifies power in general, but the rates of adoption are different. Criminals, dissidents, the unorganized — all outliers — are more agile. They can make use of new technologies faster, and can magnify their collective power because of it. But when the already-powerful big institutions finally figured out how to use the Internet, they had more raw power to magnify.

This is true for both governments and corporations. We now know that governments all over the world are militarizing the Internet, using it for surveillance, censorship, and propaganda. Large corporations are using it to control what we can do and see, and the rise of winner-take-all distribution systems only exacerbates this.

This is the fundamental tension at the heart of the Internet, and information-based technology in general. The unempowered are more efficient at leveraging new technology, while the powerful have more raw power to leverage. These two trends lead to a battle between the quick and the strong: the quick who can make use of new power faster, and the strong who can make use of that same power more effectively.

This battle is playing out today in many different areas of information technology. You can see it in the security vs. surveillance battles between criminals and the FBI, or dissidents and the Chinese government. You can see it in the battles between content pirates and various media organizations. You can see it where social-media giants and Internet-commerce giants battle against new upstarts. You can see it in politics, where the newer Internet-aware organizations fight with the older, more established, political organizations. You can even see it in warfare, where a small cadre of military can keep a country under perpetual bombardment — using drones — with no risk to the attackers.

This battle is fundamental to Cory Doctorow’s new novel Walkaway. Our heroes represent the quick: those who have checked out of traditional society, and thrive because easy access to 3D printers enables them to eschew traditional notions of property. Their enemy is the strong: the traditional government institutions that exert their power mostly because they can. This battle rages through most of the book, as the quick embrace ever-new technologies and the strong struggle to catch up.

It’s easy to root for the quick, both in Doctorow’s book and in the real world. And while I’m not going to give away Doctorow’s ending — and I don’t know enough to predict how it will play out in the real world — right now, trends favor the strong.

Centralized infrastructure favors traditional power, and the Internet is becoming more centralized. This is true both at the endpoints, where companies like Facebook, Apple, Google, and Amazon control much of how we interact with information. It’s also true in the middle, where companies like Comcast increasingly control how information gets to us. It’s true in countries like Russia and China that increasingly legislate their own national agenda onto their pieces of the Internet. And it’s even true in countries like the US and the UK, that increasingly legislate more government surveillance capabilities.

At the 1996 World Economic Forum, cyber-libertarian John Perry Barlow issued his “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” telling the assembled world leaders and titans of Industry: “You have no moral right to rule us, nor do you possess any methods of enforcement that we have true reason to fear.” Many of us believed him a scant 20 years ago, but today those words ring hollow.

But if history is any guide, these things are cyclic. In another 20 years, even newer technologies — both the ones Doctorow focuses on and the ones no one can predict — could easily tip the balance back in favor of the quick. Whether that will result in more of a utopia or a dystopia depends partly on these technologies, but even more on the social changes resulting from these technologies. I’m short-term pessimistic but long-term optimistic.

This essay previously appeared on Crooked Timber.

Attack vs. Defense in Nation-State Cyber Operations

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/04/attack_vs_defen.html

I regularly say that, on the Internet, attack is easier than defense. There are a bunch of reasons for this, but primarily it’s 1) the complexity of modern networked computer systems and 2) the attacker’s ability to choose the time and method of the attack versus the defender’s necessity to secure against every type of attack. This is true, but how this translates to military cyber-operations is less straightforward. Contrary to popular belief, government cyberattacks are not bolts out of the blue, and the attack/defense balance is more…well…balanced.

Rebecca Slayton has a good article in International Security that tries to make sense of this: “What is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment.” In it, she points out that launching a cyberattack is more than finding and exploiting a vulnerability, and it is those other things that help balance the offensive advantage.

Security Orchestration and Incident Response

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/03/security_orches.html

Last month at the RSA Conference, I saw a lot of companies selling security incident response automation. Their promise was to replace people with computers ­– sometimes with the addition of machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques ­– and to respond to attacks at computer speeds.

While this is a laudable goal, there’s a fundamental problem with doing this in the short term. You can only automate what you’re certain about, and there is still an enormous amount of uncertainty in cybersecurity. Automation has its place in incident response, but the focus needs to be on making the people effective, not on replacing them ­ security orchestration, not automation.

This isn’t just a choice of words ­– it’s a difference in philosophy. The US military went through this in the 1990s. What was called the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was supposed to change how warfare was fought. Satellites, drones and battlefield sensors were supposed to give commanders unprecedented information about what was going on, while networked soldiers and weaponry would enable troops to coordinate to a degree never before possible. In short, the traditional fog of war would be replaced by perfect information, providing certainty instead of uncertainty. They, too, believed certainty would fuel automation and, in many circumstances, allow technology to replace people.

Of course, it didn’t work out that way. The US learned in Afghanistan and Iraq that there are a lot of holes in both its collection and coordination systems. Drones have their place, but they can’t replace ground troops. The advances from the RMA brought with them some enormous advantages, especially against militaries that didn’t have access to the same technologies, but never resulted in certainty. Uncertainty still rules the battlefield, and soldiers on the ground are still the only effective way to control a region of territory.

But along the way, we learned a lot about how the feeling of certainty affects military thinking. Last month, I attended a lecture on the topic by H.R. McMaster. This was before he became President Trump’s national security advisor-designate. Then, he was the director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center. His lecture touched on many topics, but at one point he talked about the failure of the RMA. He confirmed that military strategists mistakenly believed that data would give them certainty. But he took this change in thinking further, outlining the ways this belief in certainty had repercussions in how military strategists thought about modern conflict.

McMaster’s observations are directly relevant to Internet security incident response. We too have been led to believe that data will give us certainty, and we are making the same mistakes that the military did in the 1990s. In a world of uncertainty, there’s a premium on understanding, because commanders need to figure out what’s going on. In a world of certainty, knowing what’s going on becomes a simple matter of data collection.

I see this same fallacy in Internet security. Many companies exhibiting at the RSA Conference promised to collect and display more data and that the data will reveal everything. This simply isn’t true. Data does not equal information, and information does not equal understanding. We need data, but we also must prioritize understanding the data we have over collecting ever more data. Much like the problems with bulk surveillance, the “collect it all” approach provides minimal value over collecting the specific data that’s useful.

In a world of uncertainty, the focus is on execution. In a world of certainty, the focus is on planning. I see this manifesting in Internet security as well. My own Resilient Systems ­– now part of IBM Security –­ allows incident response teams to manage security incidents and intrusions. While the tool is useful for planning and testing, its real focus is always on execution.

Uncertainty demands initiative, while certainty demands synchronization. Here, again, we are heading too far down the wrong path. The purpose of all incident response tools should be to make the human responders more effective. They need both the ability and the capability to exercise it effectively.

When things are uncertain, you want your systems to be decentralized. When things are certain, centralization is more important. Good incident response teams know that decentralization goes hand in hand with initiative. And finally, a world of uncertainty prioritizes command, while a world of certainty prioritizes control. Again, effective incident response teams know this, and effective managers aren’t scared to release and delegate control.

Like the US military, we in the incident response field have shifted too much into the world of certainty. We have prioritized data collection, preplanning, synchronization, centralization and control. You can see it in the way people talk about the future of Internet security, and you can see it in the products and services offered on the show floor of the RSA Conference.

Automation, too, is fixed. Incident response needs to be dynamic and agile, because you are never certain and there is an adaptive, malicious adversary on the other end. You need a response system that has human controls and can modify itself on the fly. Automation just doesn’t allow a system to do that to the extent that’s needed in today’s environment. Just as the military shifted from trying to replace the soldier to making the best soldier possible, we need to do the same.

For some time, I have been talking about incident response in terms of OODA loops. This is a way of thinking about real-time adversarial relationships, originally developed for airplane dogfights, but much more broadly applicable. OODA stands for observe-orient-decide-act, and it’s what people responding to a cybersecurity incident do constantly, over and over again. We need tools that augment each of those four steps. These tools need to operate in a world of uncertainty, where there is never enough data to know everything that is going on. We need to prioritize understanding, execution, initiative, decentralization and command.

At the same time, we’re going to have to make all of this scale. If anything, the most seductive promise of a world of certainty and automation is that it allows defense to scale. The problem is that we’re not there yet. We can automate and scale parts of IT security, such as antivirus, automatic patching and firewall management, but we can’t yet scale incident response. We still need people. And we need to understand what can be automated and what can’t be.

The word I prefer is orchestration. Security orchestration represents the union of people, process and technology. It’s computer automation where it works, and human coordination where that’s necessary. It’s networked systems giving people understanding and capabilities for execution. It’s making those on the front lines of incident response the most effective they can be, instead of trying to replace them. It’s the best approach we have for cyberdefense.

Automation has its place. If you think about the product categories where it has worked, they’re all areas where we have pretty strong certainty. Automation works in antivirus, firewalls, patch management and authentication systems. None of them is perfect, but all those systems are right almost all the time, and we’ve developed ancillary systems to deal with it when they’re wrong.

Automation fails in incident response because there’s too much uncertainty. Actions can be automated once the people understand what’s going on, but people are still required. For example, IBM’s Watson for Cyber Security provides insights for incident response teams based on its ability to ingest and find patterns in an enormous amount of freeform data. It does not attempt a level of understanding necessary to take people out of the equation.

From within an orchestration model, automation can be incredibly powerful. But it’s the human-centric orchestration model –­ the dashboards, the reports, the collaboration –­ that makes automation work. Otherwise, you’re blindly trusting the machine. And when an uncertain process is automated, the results can be dangerous.

Technology continues to advance, and this is all a changing target. Eventually, computers will become intelligent enough to replace people at real-time incident response. My guess, though, is that computers are not going to get there by collecting enough data to be certain. More likely, they’ll develop the ability to exhibit understanding and operate in a world of uncertainty. That’s a much harder goal.

Yes, today, this is all science fiction. But it’s not stupid science fiction, and it might become reality during the lifetimes of our children. Until then, we need people in the loop. Orchestration is a way to achieve that.

This essay previously appeared on the Security Intelligence blog.

Some notes on the RAND 0day report

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/03/some-notes-on-rand-0day-report.html

The RAND Corporation has a research report on the 0day market [ * ]. It’s pretty good. They talked to all the right people. It should be considered the seminal work on the issue. They’ve got the pricing about right ($1 million for full chain iPhone exploit, but closer to $100k for others). They’ve got the stats about right (5% chance somebody else will discover an exploit).

Yet, they’ve got some problems, namely phrasing the debate as activists want, rather than a neutral view of the debate.

The report frequently uses the word “stockpile”. This is a biased term used by activists. According to the dictionary, it means:

a large accumulated stock of goods or materials, especially one held in reserve for use at a time of shortage or other emergency.

Activists paint the picture that the government (NSA, CIA, DoD, FBI) buys 0day to hold in reserve in case they later need them. If that’s the case, then it seems reasonable that it’s better to disclose/patch the vuln then let it grow moldy in a cyberwarehouse somewhere.

But that’s not how things work. The government buys vulns it has immediate use for (primarily). Almost all vulns it buys are used within 6 months. Most vulns in its “stockpile” have been used in the previous year. These cyberweapons are not in a warehouse, but in active use on the front lines.

This is top secret, of course, so people assume it’s not happening. They hear about no cyber operations (except Stuxnet), so they assume such operations aren’t occurring. Thus, they build up the stockpiling assumption rather than the active use assumption.

If the RAND wanted to create an even more useful survey, they should figure out how many thousands of times per day our government (NSA, CIA, DoD, FBI) exploits 0days. They should characterize who they target (e.g. terrorists, child pornographers), success rate, and how many people they’ve killed based on 0days. It’s this data, not patching, that is at the root of the policy debate.

That 0days are actively used determines pricing. If the government doesn’t have immediate need for a vuln, it won’t pay much for it, if anything at all. Conversely, if the government has urgent need for a vuln, it’ll pay a lot.

Let’s say you have a remote vuln for Samsung TVs. You go to the NSA and offer it to them. They tell you they aren’t interested, because they see no near term need for it. Then a year later, spies reveal ISIS has stolen a truckload of Samsung TVs, put them in all the meeting rooms, and hooked them to Internet for video conferencing. The NSA then comes back to you and offers $500k for the vuln.

Likewise, the number of sellers affects the price. If you know they desperately need the Samsung TV 0day, but they are only offering $100k, then it likely means that there’s another seller also offering such a vuln.

That’s why iPhone vulns are worth $1 million for a full chain exploit, from browser to persistence. They use it a lot, it’s a major part of ongoing cyber operations. Each time Apple upgrades iOS, the change breaks part of the existing chain, and the government is keen on getting a new exploit to fix it. They’ll pay a lot to the first vuln seller who can give them a new exploit.

Thus, there are three prices the government is willing to pay for an 0day (the value it provides to the government):

  • the price for an 0day they will actively use right now (high)
  • the price for an 0day they’ll stockpile for possible use in the future (low)
  • the price for an 0day they’ll disclose to the vendor to patch (very low)

That these are different prices is important to the policy debate. When activists claim the government should disclose the 0day they acquire, they are ignoring the price the 0day was acquired for. Since the government actively uses the 0day, they are acquired for a high-price, with their “use” value far higher than their “patch” value. It’s an absurd argument to make that they government should then immediately discard that money, to pay “use value” prices for “patch” results.

If the policy becomes that the NSA/CIA should disclose/patch the 0day they buy, it doesn’t mean business as usual acquiring vulns. It instead means they’ll stop buying 0day.

In other words, “patching 0day” is not an outcome on either side of the debate. Either the government buys 0day to use, or it stops buying 0day. In neither case does patching happen.

The real argument is whether the government (NSA, CIA, DoD, FBI) should be acquiring, weaponizing, and using 0day in the first place. It demands that we unilaterally disarm our military, intelligence, and law enforcement, preventing them from using 0days against our adversaries while our adversaries continue to use 0days against us.

That’s the gaping hole in both the RAND paper and most news reporting of this controversy. They characterize the debate the way activists want, as if the only question is the value of patching. They avoid talking about unilateral cyberdisarmament, even though that’s the consequence of the policy they are advocating. They avoid comparing the value of 0days to our country for active use (high) compared to the value to to our country for patching (very low).

Conclusion

It’s nice that the RAND paper studied the value of patching and confirmed it’s low, that only around 5% of our cyber-arsenal is likely to be found by others. But it’d be nice if they also looked at the point of view of those actively using 0days on a daily basis, rather than phrasing the debate the way activists want.

Some comments on the Wikileaks CIA/#vault7 leak

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/03/some-comments-on-wikileaks-ciavault7.html

I thought I’d write up some notes about the Wikileaks CIA “#vault7” leak. This post will be updated frequently over the next 24 hours.

The CIA didn’t remotely hack a TV. The docs are clear that they can update the software running on the TV using a USB drive. There’s no evidence of them doing so remotely over the Internet. If you aren’t afraid of the CIA breaking in an installing a listening device, then you should’t be afraid of the CIA installing listening software.

The CIA didn’t defeat Signal/WhatsApp encryption. The CIA has some exploits for Android/iPhone. If they can get on your phone, then of course they can record audio and screenshots. Technically, this bypasses/defeats encryption — but such phrases used by Wikileaks are highly misleading, since nothing related to Signal/WhatsApp is happening. What’s happening is the CIA is bypassing/defeating the phone. Sometimes. If they’ve got an exploit for it, or can trick you into installing their software.

There’s no overlap or turf war with the NSA. The NSA does “signals intelligence”, so they hack radios and remotely across the Internet. The CIA does “humans intelligence”, so they hack locally, with a human. The sort of thing they do is bribe, blackmail, or bedazzle some human “asset” (like a technician in a nuclear plant) to stick a USB drive into a slot. All the various military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies have hacking groups to help them do their own missions.

The CIA isn’t more advanced than the NSA. Most of this dump is child’s play, simply malware/trojans cobbled together from bits found on the Internet. Sometimes they buy more advanced stuff from contractors, or get stuff shared from the NSA. Technologically, they are far behind the NSA in sophistication and technical expertise.

The CIA isn’t hoarding 0days. For one thing, few 0days were mentioned at all. The CIA’s techniques rely upon straightforward hacking, not super secret 0day hacking Second of all, they aren’t keeping 0days back in a vault somewhere — if they have 0days, they are using them.

The VEP process is nonsense. Activists keep mentioning the “vulnerability equities process”, in which all those interested in 0days within the government has a say in what happens to them, with the eventual goal that they be disclosed to vendors. The VEP is nonsense. The activist argument is nonsense. As far as I can tell, the VEP is designed as busy work to keep people away from those who really use 0days, such as the NSA and the CIA. If they spend millions of dollars buying 0days because it has that value in intelligence operations, they aren’t going to destroy that value by disclosing to a vendor. If VEP forces disclosure, disclosure still won’t happen, the NSA will simply stop buying vulns.

But they’ll have to disclose the 0days. Any 0days that were leaked to Wikileaks are, of course, no longer secret. Thus, while this leak isn’t an argument for unilateral disarmament in cyberspace, the CIA will have to disclose to vendor the vulns that are now in Russian hands, so that they can be fixed.

There’s no false flags. In several places, the CIA talks about making sure that what they do isn’t so unique, so it can’t be attributed to them. However, Wikileaks’s press release hints that the “UMBRAGE” program is deliberately stealing techniques from Russia to use as a false-flag operation. This is nonsense. For example, the DNC hack attribution was live command-and-control servers simultaneously used against different Russian targets — not a few snippets of code. [More here]

This hurts the CIA a lot. Already, one AV researcher has told me that a virus they once suspected came from the Russians or Chinese can now be attributed to the CIA, as it matches the description perfectly to something in the leak. We can develop anti-virus and intrusion-detection signatures based on this information that will defeat much of what we read in these documents. This would put a multi-year delay in the CIA’s development efforts. Plus, it’ll now go on a witch-hunt looking for the leaker, which will erode morale. Update: Three extremely smart and knowledgeable people who I respect disagree, claiming it won’t hurt the CIA a lot. I suppose I’m focusing on “hurting the cyber abilities” of the CIA, not the CIA as a whole, which mostly is non-cyber in function.

The CIA is not cutting edge. A few days ago, Hak5 started selling “BashBunny”, a USB hacking tool more advanced than the USB tools in the leak. The CIA seems to get most of their USB techniques from open-source projects, such Travis Goodpseeds “GoodFET” project.

The CIA isn’t spying on us. Snowden revealed how the NSA was surveilling all Americans. Nothing like that appears in the CIA dump. It’s all legitimate spy stuff (assuming you think spying on foreign adversaries is legitimate).

Update #2: How is hacking cars and phones not SIGINT (which is the NSA’s turf)?[*The answer is via physical access. For example, they might have a device that plugs into the ODBII port on the car that quickly updates the firmware of the brakes. Think of it as normal spy activity (e.g. cutting a victim’s brakes), but now with cyber.

Update #3: Apple iPhone. My vague sense is that CIA is more concerned about decrypting iPhones they get physical access to, rather than remotely hacking them and installing malware. CIA is HUMINT and covert ops, meaning they’ll punch somebody in the face, grab their iPhone, and run, then take it back to their lab and decrypt it.


NSA Using Cyberattack for Defense

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/nsa_using_cyber.html

These days, it’s rare that we learn something new from the Snowden documents. But Ben Buchanan found something interesting. The NSA penetrates enemy networks in order to enhance our defensive capabilities.

The data the NSA collected by penetrating BYZANTINE CANDOR’s networks had concrete forward-looking defensive value. It included information on the adversary’s “future targets,” including “bios of senior White House officials, [cleared defense contractor] employees, [United States government] employees” and more. It also included access to the “source code and [the] new tools” the Chinese used to conduct operations. The computers penetrated by the NSA also revealed information about the exploits in use. In effect, the intelligence gained from the operation, once given to network defenders and fed into automated systems, was enough to guide and enhance the United States’ defensive efforts.

This case alludes to important themes in network defense. It shows the persistence of talented adversaries, the creativity of clever defenders, the challenge of getting actionable intelligence on the threat, and the need for network architecture and defenders capable of acting on that information. But it also highlights an important point that is too often overlooked: not every intrusion is in service of offensive aims. There are genuinely defensive reasons for a nation to launch intrusions against another nation’s networks.

[…]

Other Snowden files show what the NSA can do when it gathers this data, describing an interrelated and complex set of United States programs to collect intelligence and use it to better protect its networks. The NSA’s internal documents call this “foreign intelligence in support of dynamic defense.” The gathered information can “tip” malicious code the NSA has placed on servers and computers around the world. Based on this tip, one of the NSA’s nodes can act on the information, “inject[ing a] response onto the Internet towards [the] target.” There are a variety of responses that the NSA can inject, including resetting connections, delivering malicious code, and redirecting internet traffic.

Similarly, if the NSA can learn about the adversary’s “tools and tradecraft” early enough, it can develop and deploy “tailored countermeasures” to blunt the intended effect. The NSA can then try to discern the intent of the adversary and use its countermeasure to mitigate the attempted intrusion. The signals intelligence agency feeds information about the incoming threat to an automated system deployed on networks that the NSA protects. This system has a number of capabilities, including blocking the incoming traffic outright, sending unexpected responses back to the adversary, slowing the traffic down, and “permitting the activity to appear [to the adversary] to complete without disclosing that it did not reach [or] affect the intended target.”

These defensive capabilities appear to be actively in use by the United States against a wide range of threats. NSA documents indicate that the agency uses the system to block twenty-eight major categories of threats as of 2011. This includes action against significant adversaries, such as China, as well as against non-state actors. Documents provide a number of success stories. These include the thwarting of a BYZANTINE HADES intrusion attempt that targeted four high-ranking American military leaders, including the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the NSA’s network defenders saw the attempt coming and successfully prevented any negative effects. The files also include examples of successful defense against Anonymous and against several other code-named entities.

I recommend Buchanan’s book: The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations.

Research into the Root Causes of Terrorism

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/research_into_t_1.html

Interesting article in Science discussing field research on how people are radicalized to become terrorists.

The potential for research that can overcome existing constraints can be seen in recent advances in understanding violent extremism and, partly, in interdiction and prevention. Most notable is waning interest in simplistic root-cause explanations of why individuals become violent extremists (e.g., poverty, lack of education, marginalization, foreign occupation, and religious fervor), which cannot accommodate the richness and diversity of situations that breed terrorism or support meaningful interventions. A more tractable line of inquiry is how people actually become involved in terror networks (e.g., how they radicalize and are recruited, move to action, or come to abandon cause and comrades).

Reports from the The Soufan Group, International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (King’s College London), and the Combating Terrorism Center (U.S. Military Academy) indicate that approximately three-fourths of those who join the Islamic State or al-Qaeda do so in groups. These groups often involve preexisting social networks and typically cluster in particular towns and neighborhoods.. This suggests that much recruitment does not need direct personal appeals by organization agents or individual exposure to social media (which would entail a more dispersed recruitment pattern). Fieldwork is needed to identify the specific conditions under which these processes play out. Natural growth models of terrorist networks then might be based on an epidemiology of radical ideas in host social networks rather than built in the abstract then fitted to data and would allow for a public health, rather than strictly criminal, approach to violent extremism.

Such considerations have implications for countering terrorist recruitment. The present USG focus is on “counternarratives,” intended as alternative to the “ideologies” held to motivate terrorists. This strategy treats ideas as disembodied from the human conditions in which they are embedded and given life as animators of social groups. In their stead, research and policy might better focus on personalized “counterengagement,” addressing and harnessing the fellowship, passion, and purpose of people within specific social contexts, as ISIS and al-Qaeda often do. This focus stands in sharp contrast to reliance on negative mass messaging and sting operations to dissuade young people in doubt through entrapment and punishment (the most common practice used in U.S. law enforcement) rather than through positive persuasion and channeling into productive life paths. At the very least, we need field research in communities that is capable of capturing evidence to reveal which strategies are working, failing, or backfiring.

AWS re:Start – Training and Job Placement in the UK

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-restart-training-and-job-placement-in-the-uk/

As a follow-on to the recent launch of the AWS Region in London, I am happy to be able to tell you about a new UK-centric training and job placement program that we call AWS re:Start. This program is designed to educate young adults, military veterans, members of the military reserve, those leaving the Armed Forces, and service spouses on the latest software development and cloud computing technologies.

We’re working closely with QA Consulting (an APN Training Partner), The Prince’s Trust, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). In conjunction with members of AWS Partner Network (APN) and customers, work placements will be offered to 1,000 people as part of this program.

AWS re:Start is designed to accommodate participants at all levels of experience – even those with no previous technical knowledge can sign up. Participants who join AWS re:Start will complete technical training classes, led by AWS certified instructors, and will gain experience through on-the-job training. They will also learn about about multi-tier architectures, application programming interfaces (APIs), and microservices, giving them the knowledge and skills needed to help businesses to build secure, elastically scalable, and highly-reliable applications in the cloud. Training content for the AWS re:Start program will be curated by AWS in collaboration with QA Consulting, who will also deliver the training courses.

Organizations that have pledged job placements to AWS re:Start include Annalect, ARM, Claranet, Cloudreach, Direct Line Group, EDF Energy, Funding Circle, KCOM, Sage, Tesco Bank, and Zopa. Participants completing the program can expect to be eligible for many different technical positions within these companies, including highly sought-after entry level positions such as such as first line help desk support, IT support analyst, software developer, IT support technician, network engineer, IT recruitment consultant, and IT sales roles. They will also have the fundamental knowledge needed to immediately start working with AWS and building their own technology start-up business. To learn more about this aspect of the program, read AWS re:Start for Employers.

AWS re:Start for the Military
AWS re:Start training and work placements for the Armed Forces, including reservists, veterans, service leavers, and service spouses will be delivered through the Ministry of Defence and the  Career Transition Partnership (CTP).  AWS is also proud to be signing the Armed Forces Covenant, which establishes how businesses support members of the UK Armed Forces community and guards against discrimination returning service men and women may face when entering the civilian workforce.

AWS re:Start for Young Adults
The AWS re:Start program will be delivered to young adults through The Prince’s Trust Get into Technology program. The Prince’s Trust is a youth charity that helps young people aged 13 to 30 find jobs, education, and training to help them succeed. In addition to technical training, the ‘Get into Technology’ program will support students with mentoring, soft work skills, and help in applying for jobs including resume writing and interview skills.

Learn More / Apply Now
The first intake of participants for AWS re:Start is scheduled for March 27, 2017. Those who complete the AWS re:Start program will be eligible to apply for further training courses offered by QA Consulting to prepare them to take the AWS Associate Level Certification exam and other certifications. Visit the AWS re:Start site to learn more.

Jeff;

Attributing the DNC Hacks to Russia

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/01/attributing_the_1.html

President Barack Obama’s public accusation of Russia as the source of the hacks in the US presidential election and the leaking of sensitive e-mails through WikiLeaks and other sources has opened up a debate on what constitutes sufficient evidence to attribute an attack in cyberspace. The answer is both complicated and inherently tied up in political considerations.

The administration is balancing political considerations and the inherent secrecy of electronic espionage with the need to justify its actions to the public. These issues will continue to plague us as more international conflict plays out in cyberspace.

It’s true that it’s easy for an attacker to hide who he is in cyberspace. We are unable to identify particular pieces of hardware and software around the world positively. We can’t verify the identity of someone sitting in front of a keyboard through computer data alone. Internet data packets don’t come with return addresses, and it’s easy for attackers to disguise their origins. For decades, hackers have used techniques such as jump hosts, VPNs, Tor and open relays to obscure their origin, and in many cases they work. I’m sure that many national intelligence agencies route their attacks through China, simply because everyone knows lots of attacks come from China.

On the other hand, there are techniques that can identify attackers with varying degrees of precision. It’s rarely just one thing, and you’ll often hear the term “constellation of evidence” to describe how a particular attacker is identified. It’s analogous to traditional detective work. Investigators collect clues and piece them together with known mode of operations. They look for elements that resemble other attacks and elements that are anomalies. The clues might involve ones and zeros, but the techniques go back to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.

The University of Toronto-based organization Citizen Lab routinely attributes attacks against the computers of activists and dissidents to particular Third World governments. It took months to identify China as the source of the 2012 attacks against the New York Times. While it was uncontroversial to say that Russia was the source of a cyberattack against Estonia in 2007, no one knew if those attacks were authorized by the Russian government — until the attackers explained themselves. And it was the Internet security company CrowdStrike, which first attributed the attacks against the Democratic National Committee to Russian intelligence agencies in June, based on multiple pieces of evidence gathered from its forensic investigation.

Attribution is easier if you are monitoring broad swaths of the Internet. This gives the National Security Agency a singular advantage in the attribution game. The problem, of course, is that the NSA doesn’t want to publish what it knows.

Regardless of what the government knows and how it knows it, the decision of whether to make attribution evidence public is another matter. When Sony was attacked, many security experts — myself included­ — were skeptical of both the government’s attribution claims and the flimsy evidence associated with it. I only became convinced when the New York Times ran a story about the government’s attribution, which talked about both secret evidence inside the NSA and human intelligence assets inside North Korea. In contrast, when the Office of Personnel Management was breached in 2015, the US government decided not to accuse China publicly, either because it didn’t want to escalate the political situation or because it didn’t want to reveal any secret evidence.

The Obama administration has been more public about its evidence in the DNC case, but it has not been entirely public.

It’s one thing for the government to know who attacked it. It’s quite another for it to convince the public who attacked it. As attribution increasingly relies on secret evidence­ — as it did with North Korea’s attack of Sony in 2014 and almost certainly does regarding Russia and the previous election — ­the government is going to have to face the choice of making previously secret evidence public and burning sources and methods, or keeping it secret and facing perfectly reasonable skepticism.

If the government is going to take public action against a cyberattack, it needs to make its evidence public. But releasing secret evidence might get people killed, and it would make any future confidentiality assurances we make to human sources completely non-credible. This problem isn’t going away; secrecy helps the intelligence community, but it wounds our democracy.

The constellation of evidence attributing the attacks against the DNC, and subsequent release of information, is comprehensive. It’s possible that there was more than one attack. It’s possible that someone not associated with Russia leaked the information to WikiLeaks, although we have no idea where that someone else would have obtained the information. We know that the Russian actors who hacked the DNC­ — both the FSB, Russia’s principal security agency, and the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence unit — ­are also attacking other political networks around the world.

In the end, though, attribution comes down to whom you believe. When Citizen Lab writes a report outlining how a United Arab Emirates human rights defender was targeted with a cyberattack, we have no trouble believing that it was the UAE government. When Google identifies China as the source of attacks against Gmail users, we believe it just as easily.

Obama decided not to make the accusation public before the election so as not to be seen as influencing the election. Now, afterward, there are political implications in accepting that Russia hacked the DNC in an attempt to influence the US presidential election. But no amount of evidence can convince the unconvinceable.

The most important thing we can do right now is deter any country from trying this sort of thing in the future, and the political nature of the issue makes that harder. Right now, we’ve told the world that others can get away with manipulating our election process as long as they can keep their efforts secret until after one side wins. Obama has promised both secret retaliations and public ones. We need to hope they’re enough.

This essay previously appeared on CNN.com.

EDITED TO ADD: The ODNI released a declassified report on the Russian attacks. Here’s a New York Times article on the report.

And last week there were Senate hearings on this issue.

EDITED TO ADD: A Washington Post article talks about some of the intelligence behind the assessment.

EDITED TO ADD (1/10): The UK connection.

Welcome to the Newest AWS Heroes (Winter 2016)

Post Syndicated from Ana Visneski original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/welcome-to-the-newest-aws-heroes-winter-2016/

AWS Community Heroes are members of the AWS Community that share their knowledge and demonstrate outstanding enthusiasm for AWS. They do this in a variety of ways including user groups, social media, meetups and workshops. Today we extend a Happy Holiday welcome to the last of the 2016 cohort of AWS Heroes:

In November all the AWS Community Heroes were invited to reInvent and got a chance to join us for a private event for Heroes on Monday evening. The final two Heroes of the 2016 cohort were surprised with an invitation on Monday morning of reInvent week to join the Hero community. They were both able to join us at the event on short notice and were able to meet the other Heroes.

 

Ayumi Tada

AyumiAyumi Tada works at Honda Motor Co. in Japan as an IT infrastructure strategist, promoting the utilization of cloud computing technologies. She also promotes cloud utilization in the CAE/HPC area at JAMA (Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association).

Previously, she worked at Honda R&D as an IT System Administrator, focused on using cloud for High Performance Computing (HPC), including an engineering simulation system (Computer Aided Engineering / CAE), and introduced the use case of HPC on AWS at re:Invent 2014. Currently, she is promoting cloud utilization in a wide range of Enterprise applications.

Ayumi is a member of JAWS-UG (Japan AWS User Group). JAWS-UG was started in 2010, and has over 50+ branches, 100+ leaders, 300+ meetup events per year, and 4000+ members. She is a one of the launch leads of new JAWS branches for HPC specialists and for beginners. She is also a one of the organizers of the JAWS for women branch and participates in other local branches including Kumamoto & JAWS for Enterprises (E-JAWS) meetup events.

Ayumi has an AWS Certified Solutions Architect – Associate certification, she is a Career Development Adviser through the National Career Development Centers’ international partner organization, and she has a BS in Electrical & Electronic Engineering and Information Engineering from Waseda University.

Shimon Tolts

ShimonShimon Tolts has been fascinated by computers since he was eight. When he got his first PC, he immediately started tearing it apart to understand how the different parts were connected to each other. Later, Linux and open source software also had a strong influence, and Shimon started his first company at the age of 15, providing web hosting on top of Linux servers in the pre-cloud era.

During his military service, Shimon served as a Computer Crimes Investigator & Forensics Analyst at the Center Unit for Special Investigations, helping him succeed in a role at Intel Security following his service.

In 2013 Shimon joined ironSource, to establish the R&D infrastructure division. One of the most innovative solutions developed was a Big Data pipeline that was used to stream hundreds of billions of monthly events from different ironSource divisions into Redshift in near real-time. After receiving requests for his solution by the tech community, this solution was released publicly as ATOM DATA.

Shimon leads the Israeli AWS user group and is a regular speaker at Big Data conferences, from AWS Summits to Pop-up Lofts.

 

-Ana

My Priorities for the Next Four Years

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/12/my_priorities_f.html

Like many, I was surprised and shocked by the election of Donald Trump as president. I believe his ideas, temperament, and inexperience represent a grave threat to our country and world. Suddenly, all the things I had planned to work on seemed trivial in comparison. Although Internet security and privacy are not the most important policy areas at risk, I believe he — and, more importantly, his cabinet, administration, and Congress — will have devastating effects in that area, both in the US and around the world.

The election was so close that I’ve come to see the result as a bad roll of the dice. A few minor tweaks here and there — a more enthusiastic Sanders endorsement, one fewer of Comey’s announcements, slightly less Russian involvement — and the country would be preparing for a Clinton presidency and discussing a very different social narrative. That alternative narrative would stress business as usual, and continue to obscure the deep social problems in our society. Those problems won’t go away on their own, and in this alternative future they would continue to fester under the surface, getting steadily worse. This election exposed those problems for everyone to see.

I spent the last month both coming to terms with this reality, and thinking about the future. Here is my new agenda for the next four years:

One, fight the fights. There will be more government surveillance and more corporate surveillance. I expect legislative and judicial battles along several lines: a renewed call from the FBI for backdoors into encryption, more leeway for government hacking without a warrant, no controls on corporate surveillance, and more secret government demands for that corporate data. I expect other countries to follow our lead. (The UK is already more extreme than us.) And if there’s a major terrorist attack under Trump’s watch, it’ll be open season on our liberties. We may lose a lot of these battles, but we need to lose as few as possible and as little of our existing liberties as possible.

Two, prepare for those fights. Much of the next four years will be reactive, but we can prepare somewhat. The more we can convince corporate America to delete their saved archives of surveillance data and to store only what they need for as long as they need it, the safer we’ll all be. We need to convince Internet giants like Google and Facebook to change their business models away from surveillance capitalism. It’s a hard sell, but maybe we can nibble around the edges. Similarly, we need to keep pushing the truism that privacy and security are not antagonistic, but rather are essential for each other.

Three, lay the groundwork for a better future. No matter how bad the next four years get, I don’t believe that a Trump administration will permanently end privacy, freedom, and liberty in the US. I don’t believe that it portends a radical change in our democracy. (Or if it does, we have bigger problems than a free and secure Internet.) It’s true that some of Trump’s institutional changes might take decades to undo. Even so, I am confident — optimistic even — that the US will eventually come around; and when that time comes, we need good ideas in place for people to come around to. This means proposals for non-surveillance-based Internet business models, research into effective law enforcement that preserves privacy, intelligent limits on how corporations can collect and exploit our data, and so on.

And four, continue to solve the actual problems. The serious security issues around cybercrime, cyber-espionage, cyberwar, the Internet of Things, algorithmic decision making, foreign interference in our elections, and so on aren’t going to disappear for four years while we’re busy fighting the excesses of Trump. We need to continue to work towards a more secure digital future. And to the extent that cybersecurity for our military networks and critical infrastructure allies with cybersecurity for everyone, we’ll probably have an ally in Trump.

Those are my four areas. Under a Clinton administration, my list would have looked much the same. Trump’s election just means the threats will be much greater, and the battles a lot harder to win. It’s more than I can possibly do on my own, and I am therefore substantially increasing my annual philanthropy to support organizations like EPIC, EFF, ACLU, and Access Now in continuing their work in these areas.

My agenda is necessarily focused entirely on my particular areas of concern. The risks of a Trump presidency are far more pernicious, but this is where I have expertise and influence.

Right now, we have a defeated majority. Many are scared, and many are motivated — and few of those are applying their motivation constructively. We need to harness that fear and energy to start fixing our society now, instead of waiting four or even eight years, at which point the problems would be worse and the solutions more extreme. I am choosing to proceed as if this were cowpox, not smallpox: fighting the more benign disease today will be much easier than subjecting ourselves to its more virulent form in the future. It’s going to be hard keeping the intensity up for the next four years, but we need to get to work. Let’s use Trump’s victory as the wake-up call and opportunity that it is.

That anti-Trump Recode article is terrible

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2016/12/that-anti-trump-recode-article-is.html

Trump’s a dangerous populist. However, the left-wing media’s anti-Trump fetishism is doing nothing to stop Trump. It’s no better than “fake news” — it gets passed around a lot on social-media, but is intellectually bankrupt, unlikely to change anybody’s mind. A good example is this op-ed on Re/Code [*] about Silicon Valley leaders visiting Trump.

The most important feature of that Re/code article is that it contains no criticism of Trump other than the fact that he’s a Republican. Half the country voted for Trump. Half the country voted Republican. It’s not just Trump that this piece imagines as being unreasonable, but half the country. It’s a fashionable bigotry among some of Silicon Valley’s leftist elite.

But CEOs live in a world where half their customers are Republican, where half their share holders are Republican. They cannot lightly take political positions that differ from their investors/customers. The Re/code piece claims CEOs said “we are duty-bound as American citizens to attend”. No, what they said was “we are duty-bound as officers of our corporations to attend”.

The word “officer”, as in “Chief Operating Officer”, isn’t an arbitrary title like “Senior Software Engineer” that has no real meaning. Instead, “officer” means “bound by duty”. It includes a lot of legal duties, for which they can go to jail if they don’t follow. It includes additional duties to shareholders, for which the board can fire them if they don’t follow.

Normal employees can have Twitter disclaimers saying “these are my personal opinions only, not that of my employer”. Officers of corporations cannot. They are the employer. They cannot champion political causes of their own that would impact their stock price. Sure, they can do minor things, like vote, or contribute quietly to campaigns, as long as they aren’t too public. They can also do political things that enhances stock price, such as opposing encryption backdoors. Tim Cook can announce he’s gay, because that enhances the brand image among Apple’s key demographic of millennials. It’s not something he could do if he were the CEO of John Deere Tractors.

Among the things the CEO’s cannot do is take a stance against Donald Trump. The Boeing thing is a good example. The Boeing’s CEO criticized Trump’s stance on free trade, and 30 minutes later Trump tweeted criticisms of a $4 billion contract with Boeing, causing an immediate billion drop in Boeing’s stock price.

This incident shows why the rest of us need to oppose Trump. Such vindictive politics is how democracies have failed. We cannot allow this to happen here. But the hands of CEOs are tied — they are duty bound to avoid such hits to their stock price.

On the flip, this is one of the few chances CEOs will be able to lobby Trump. If Trump has proven anything, it’s that he has no real positions on things. This would be a great time to change his mind on “encryption backdoors”, for example.

Trump is a dangerous populist who sews distrust in the institutions that give us a stable, prosperous country. Any institution, from the press, to the military, to the intelligence services, to the election system, is attacked, brought into disrepute, even if it supports him. Trump has a dubious relationship with the truth, such as his repeated insistence he won a landslide rather than by a slim margin. He has deep character flaws, such as his vindictive attacks against those who oppose him (Boeing is just one of many examples). Hamilton electors cite deep, patriotic principles for changing their votes, such as Trump’s foreign influences and demagoguery.

What I’m demonstrating here is that thinking persons have good reasons to oppose Trump that can be articulated without mentioning political issues that divide Democrats and Republicans. That the Re/code article is unable to do so makes it simply “hyper-partisan news”, the sort that stroke’s people’s prejudices and passions to get passed around a lot on social media, but which is unlikely to inform anybody or change any minds. In other words, it’s no better than “fake-news”.


No, it’s Matt Novak who is a fucking idiot

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2016/11/no-its-matt-novak-who-is-fucking-idiot.html

I keep seeing this Gizmodo piece entitled “Snowden is a fucking idiot”. I understand the appeal of the piece. The hero worship of Edward Snowden is getting old. But the piece itself is garbage.

The author, Matt Novak, is of the new wave of hard-core leftists intolerant of those who disagree with them. His position is that everyone is an idiot who doesn’t agree with his views: Libertarians, Republicans, moderate voters who chose Trump, and even fellow left-wingers that aren’t as hard-core.

If you carefully read his piece, you’ll see that Novak doesn’t actually prove Snowden is wrong. Novak doesn’t show how Snowden disagrees with facts, but only how Snowden disagrees with the left-wing view of the world, “libertarian garbage” as Novak puts it. It’s only through deduction that we come to the conclusion: those who aren’t left-wing are idiots, Snowden is not left-wing, therefore Snowden is an idiot.

The question under debate in the piece is:

technology is more important than policy as a way to protect our liberties

In other words, if you don’t want the government spying on you, then focus on using encryption (use Signal) rather than trying to change the laws so they can’t spy on you.

On a factual basis (rather than political), Snowden is right. If you live in Germany and don’t want the NSA spying on you there is little policy-wise that you can do about it, short of convincing Germany to go to war against the United States to get the US to stop spying.

Likewise, for all those dissenters in countries with repressive regimes, technology precedes policy. You can’t effect change until you first can protect yourselves from the state police who throws you in jail for dissenting. Use Signal.

In our own country, Snowden is right about “politics”. Snowden’s leak showed how the NSA was collecting everyone’s phone records to stop terrorism. Privacy organizations like the EFF supported the reform bill, the USA FREEDOM ACT. But rather than stopping the practice, the “reform” opened up the phone records to all law enforcement (FBI, DEA, ATF, IRS, etc.) for normal law enforcement purposes.

Imagine the protestors out there opposing the Dakota Access Pipeline. The FBI is shooting down their drones and blasting them with water cannons. Now, because of the efforts of the EFF and other privacy activists, using the USA FREEDOM ACT, the FBI is also grabbing everyone’s phone records in the area. Ask yourself who is the fucking idiot here: the guy telling you to use Signal, or the guy telling you to focus on “politics” to stop this surveillance.

Novak repeats the hard-left version of the creation of the Internet:

The internet has always been monitored by the state. It was created by the fucking US military and has been monitored from day one. Surveillance of the internet wasn’t invented after September 11, 2001, no matter how many people would like to believe that to be the case.

No, the Internet was not created by the US military. Sure, the military contributed to the Internet, but the majority of contributions came from corporations, universities, and researchers. The left-wing claim that the government/military created the Internet involves highlighting their contributions while ignoring everyone else’s.

The Internet was not “monitored from day one”, because until the 1990s, it wasn’t even an important enough network to monitor. As late as 1993, the Internet was dwarfed in size and importance by numerous other computer networks – until the web took off that year, the Internet was considered a temporary research project. Those like Novak writing the history of the Internet are astonishingly ignorant of the competing networks of those years. They miss XNS, AppleTalk, GOSIP, SNA, Novel, DECnet, Bitnet, Uunet, Fidonet, X.25, Telenet, and all the other things that were really important during those years.

And, mass Internet surveillance did indeed come only after 9/11. The NSA’s focus before that was on signals and telephone lines, because that’s where all the information was.  When 9/11 happened, they were still trying to catch up to the recent growth of the Internet. Virtually everything Snowden documents came after 9/11. Sure, they had programs like FAIRVIEW that were originally created to get telephone information in the 1970s, but these programs only started delivering mass Internet information after 9/11. Sure, the NSA occasionally got emails before 9/11, but nothing like the enormous increase in collection afterwards.

What I’ve shown here is that Matt Novak is a fucking idiot. He gets basic facts wrong about how the Internet works. He doesn’t prove Snowden’s actually wrong by citing evidence, only that Snowden is wrong because he disagrees with what leftists like Novak believe to be right. All the actual evidence supports Snowden in this case.

It doesn’t mean we should avoid politics. Technology and politics are different things, it’s not either-or. Whether we do one has no impact on deciding to do the other. But if you are a DAP protester, use Signal instead of unencrypted messaging or phone, instead of waiting for activists to pass legislation.

Comments for my biracial niece

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2016/11/comments-for-my-biracial-niece.html

I spent the night after Trump’s victory consoling my biracial niece worried about the election. Here are my comments. You won’t like them, expecting the opposite given the title. But it’s what I said.

I preferred Hillary, but that doesn’t mean Trump is an evil choice.
Don’t give into the hate. You get most of your news via social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, which are at best one-sided and unfair. At worst, they are completely inaccurate. Social media posts are driven by emotion, not logic. Sometimes that emotion is love of cute puppies. Mostly it’s anger, fear, and hate. Instead of blindly accepting what you read, challenge it. Find the original source. Find a better explanation. Search for context.
Don’t give into the hate. The political issues that you are most concerned about are not simple and one-sided with obvious answers. They are complex and nuanced. Just because somebody disagrees with you doesn’t mean they are unreasonable or evil. In today’s politics, it has become the norm that we can’t simply disagree with somebody, but must also vilify and hate them. We’ve redefined politics to be the fight between the virtuous (whatever side we are on) and the villains (the other side). The reality is that both sides are equally reasonable, equally virtuous.
Don’t give into the hate. Learn “critical thinking”. Learn how “cherry picking” the fringe of the opposing side is used to tarnish the mainstream. Learn how “strawman arguments” makes the other side sound dumb. Learn how “appeal to emotion” replaces logic. Learn how “ad hominem” statements attack the credibility of opponent’s arguments. Learn how issues are simplified into “black vs. white” options rather than the nuance and complexity that actually exists.
Don’t give into the hate. The easy argument is that it’s okay to be hateful and bigoted toward Trump and his supporters because they are bigoted against you. No, it’s not okay to hate anybody, not even Hitler, as Atticus Finch explains in “To Kill A Mockingbird”. In that book, Atticus even tries to understand, and not hate, Robert Ewell, the racist antagonist in the book who eventually tries to stab Scout (Atticus’s daughter). Trump’s supporters may be wrong, but it’s a wrongness largely based on ignorance, not malice. Yes, they probably need to be kindly educated, but they don’t deserve punishment and hate.

America is the same country it was last week. It’s citizens haven’t changed, only one man in an office has changed. The President has little actual power, either to fix things (as his supporters want) or to break things (as his opponents fear). We have strong institutions, from Congress, to the Courts, to the military, that will hold him check. The biggest worries are that he’s the first President in history with no government experience, and that he’s strongly “populist” (which historically has been damaging for countries). We should be watchful, and more willing to stand up and fight when Trump does something bad. However, we shouldn’t give into hate.

Automatically Identifying Government Secrets

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/11/automatically_i.html

Interesting research: “Using Artificial Intelligence to Identify State Secrets,” by Renato Rocha Souza, Flavio Codeco Coelho, Rohan Shah, and Matthew Connelly.

Abstract: Whether officials can be trusted to protect national security information has become a matter of great public controversy, reigniting a long-standing debate about the scope and nature of official secrecy. The declassification of millions of electronic records has made it possible to analyze these issues with greater rigor and precision. Using machine-learning methods, we examined nearly a million State Department cables from the 1970s to identify features of records that are more likely to be classified, such as international negotiations, military operations, and high-level communications. Even with incomplete data, algorithms can use such features to identify 90% of classified cables with <11% false positives. But our results also show that there are longstanding problems in the identification of sensitive information. Error analysis reveals many examples of both overclassification and underclassification. This indicates both the need for research on inter-coder reliability among officials as to what constitutes classified material and the opportunity to develop recommender systems to better manage both classification and declassification.