Tag Archives: Safe Harbor

UFC: Online Platforms Should Proactively Prevent Streaming Piracy

Post Syndicated from Ernesto original https://torrentfreak.com/ufc-online-platforms-should-proactively-prevent-piracy-190625/

With millions of dedicated fans around the world, Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) events are extremely popular.

They are also relatively expensive and as a result, unauthorized broadcasts are thriving.

For most popular fight cards, dozens of dedicated pirate streams are queued up via unauthorized IPTV services, streaming torrents, and streaming sites, in the latter case often masked with an overlay of ads. At the same time, unauthorized rebroadcasts also appear on more traditional Internet platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

This is a thorn in the size of rightsholders, including the UFC, which dominates the MMA fighting scene. To tackle the problem the UFC has employed various anti-piracy strategies. Most recently, it contracted Stream Enforcement, a company that specializes in taking down pirated broadcasts.

In addition, the MMA promoter also involves itself in the lawmaking process. Just a few weeks ago, UFC General Counsel Riché McKnight, shared his anti-piracy vision with the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

One of the main goals for the UFC is to criminalize unauthorized streaming. Unlike downloading, streaming is currently categorized as a public performance instead of distribution, which is punishable as a misdemeanor, instead of a felony.

The Senators made note of this call, which was shared by another major sports outfit, the NBA. They also had some additional questions, however, which McKnight could answer on paper later, so it could be added to the record.

These answers, which were just published, show that the UFC is not satisfied with how some social media companies and other online services address the pirate streaming issue.

McKnight explains that the UFC has takedown tool arrangements with several social media companies, but adds that online platforms have neglected its requests to combat illegal streaming more effectively.

“We believe communication, coordination, and cooperation could be greatly improved. Our general experience is that those subject to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) use it as a floor and do the minimum required to be in compliance,” McKnight notes.

The UFC notes that Facebook recently bettered its communication and ‘slightly’ improved its takedown response but overall, more could be done. However, most online services appear to be reluctant to voluntarily do more than the law requires, which means that in order to trigger change, the law should change.

“Private, voluntary partnerships [with online platforms] are not sufficient to combat online piracy. Addressing this problem requires a new approach that includes a strong legal framework, a combination of private and public enforcement, and enhanced cooperation with our international partners,” McKnight writes.

Criminalizing streaming is a step forward, according to the UFC. However, that doesn’t affect the platforms that host these streams, as these are protected by the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions.

According to the UFC’s General Counsel, Congress should consider other options as well. In particular, changes to the legal framework that will motivate social media companies and other online platforms to proactively prevent piracy.

“Congress should examine how best to properly incentivize platform providers to protect copyrighted online streaming content,” McKnight writes.

“Transitioning from a reactive ‘take down’ regime to a proactive ‘prevention’ regime would better protect and enhance a vibrant online ecosystem,” he adds.

McKnight specifically mentions policies to effectively ban repeat infringers, which is already part of the DMCA, but not always properly implemented.

While not specifically mentioned, the words “proactive” and “prevention” are reminiscent of the EU’s Article 17, which could potentially lead to upload filters.  The UFC doesn’t reference filters here, but other rightsholders have in the past.

Later this year, the US Copyright Office is expected to issue a report on the effectiveness of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions. This will be based on input from a variety of stakeholders, some of which discussed filtering requirements.

The UFC hopes that the Copyright Office report will further help Congress to shape a more effective legal framework to tackle online streaming.

A copy of the written responses to the questions from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary is available here (pdf).

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

Schrems II – преюдициално запитване към Съда на ЕС относно трансфера на данни ЕС- САЩ

Post Syndicated from nellyo original https://nellyo.wordpress.com/2018/04/13/20166schrems-ii/

Максимилиан Шремс е отново във фокуса на вниманието: вчера станаха известни 11 въпроса, които ирландският съд   формулира за преюдициално запитване към Съда на ЕС   по чл.267 ДФЕС.  Както е известно, в решението си от октомври 2017 (вж т.335)  съдът  вече обяви, че ще отправи преюдициално запитване.  И Шремс, и Facebook са против –    според Шремс няма нужда: уредбата е ясна, според Facebook няма нужда: предоставяната защита на гражданите на ЕС е адекватна.

Но ирландският съд ще пита дали личните данни, прехвърлени от ЕС в САЩ съгласно решението на ЕК за новия механизъм (Privacy Shield decision), нарушават правата на гражданите на ЕС  по чл. 7 и 8 от Хартата на ЕС. Ще пита и дали ограниченията, пред които са изправени гражданите на ЕС в САЩ,  са пропорционални или строго необходими по смисъла на член 52, параграф 1 от Хартата.

Ето 11-те въпроса.

 

*

Максимилиан Шремс е австрийски докторант по право,  завел дело за защита на личните данни във Фейсбук – което   доведе до обявяване на невалидността на споразуменията ЕС-САЩ за личните данни (Safe Harbor).  По -късно ЕС и САЩ въведоха нов механизъм  –  “щит за защита на личните данни между ЕС и САЩ”  (Privacy Shield).

Шремс  смята, че мерките в рамките на щита отново не са адекватни за защитата на данните на гражданите на ЕС, в частност по повод функционирането на Facebook: прехвърлянето на личните данни от Facebook в Ирландия на компанията-майка в САЩ  се ръководи от въпросния механизъм, който според Шремс не защитава гражданите на ЕС ефективно. Като аргумент Шремс излага отношението на Facebook c програмата за събиране на данни  Prism на NSA чрез Facebook: Правото на САЩ изисква Facebook да помага на NSA, правото на ЕС забранява точно това.

Шремс смята по-специално, че трансферът  на личните му данни към FB в САЩ е   в нарушение на неговото право на личен живот  – като гражданин на ЕС –  по правото на ЕС.

Ето защо Шремс се обръща към Ирландския орган за защита на личните данни (централата на FB за Европа е в Ирландия), въпросът стига до съда, през октомври 2017  съдът взема решение да се обърне с преюдициално запитване към Съда на ЕС,  а  на 12 април 2018 г. съдията Керълайн Костело оповестява  въпросите.

Според експерти до произнасянето има поне година  и половина, но Съдът на ЕС може да приоритизира, когато реши.

Съд на ЕС: Максимилиан Шремс може да предяви индивидуален иск срещу Facebook Ireland в Австрия

Post Syndicated from nellyo original https://nellyo.wordpress.com/2018/01/26/fb_schrems/

На 25 януари 2018 Съдът на ЕС се произнесе по дело С-498/16 Maximilian Schrems/Facebook Ireland Limited по преюдициално запитване. Запитването е отправено в рамките на спор между г‑н Maximilian Schrems, с местоживеене в Австрия, и Facebook Ireland Limited, със седалище в Ирландия, относно искания за установяване, за преустановяване, за информация, за предоставяне на отчетна документация и за плащане на сума от 4 000 EUR, във връзка с личните профили във Facebook на г‑н Schrems и на седем други лица, прехвърлили му правата си, свързани с тези профили.

Максимилиан Шремс е австрийски студент, сега вече докторант по право,  завел дело за защита на личните данни във Фейсбук – което по-късно доведе до обявяване на невалидността на споразуменията ЕС-САЩ за личните данни (Safe Harbor).  По -късно ЕС и САЩ въведоха нов механизъм  –  “щит за защита на личните данни между ЕС и САЩ”  (Privacy Shield).  Шремс  смята, че мерките в рамките на щита отново не са адекватни за защитата на данните на гражданите на ЕС, в частност относно Facebook и програмата за събиране на данни на Prism на NSA чрез Facebook. Шремс се обръща към Ирландския орган за защита на личните данни,   който от своя страна внася въпроса в Ирландския Върховен съд – вж решението на Ирландския ВС.

Паралелно пред австрийски съд Шремс по същество твърди, че ответникът Facebook  е извършил редица нарушения на разпоредби относно защитата на данни. Шремс иска  да се установи  самото качество на ответника като доставчик на услуги и задължението му да следва указания;  недействителността на договорни клаузи от условията на Facebook;   преустановяване на използването на данните му за свои цели или за целите на трети лица;  информация за използването на данните  и  отчетна документация. Нещо повече – Шремс твърди, че представлява и седем други потребители на Facebook от различни държави със същите искания.

В Австрия възникват въпроси дали Шремс има статус потребител – ако ползва FB за професионални цели, може ли да представлява други лица и каква е подсъдността.

Преюдициалните въпроси

ВС на Австрия пита:

1)      Трябва ли член 15 от Регламент (ЕО) № 44/2001 да се тълкува в смисъл, че „потребител“ по смисъла на тази разпоредба губи това качество, когато след сравнително дълго ползване на личен профил във Facebook във връзка с реализирането на правата си това лице публикува книги, чете лекции, в някои случаи и срещу заплащане, управлява интернет сайтове, събира дарения за реализирането на правата и многобройни потребители му прехвърлят правата си срещу уверението, че той ще сподели с тях евентуално спечеленото, след приспадане на процесуалните разноски?

2)      Трябва ли член 16 от Регламент (ЕО) № 44/2001 да се тълкува в смисъл, че потребител в дадена държава членка може едновременно със собствените си права, произтичащи от потребителска сделка, да предяви в съда по местоживеенето на ищеца и права със същата цел на други потребители с местоживеене:

а)      в същата държава членка,

б)      в друга държава членка или

в)      в трета страна,

ако правата на тези лица, произтичащи от потребителски сделки със същия ответник в същия правен контекст, са му прехвърлени и ако сделката по прехвърляне не попада в обхвата на професионална или търговска дейност на ищеца, а служи за общото реализиране на правата?“

Решението

По първия въпрос:

40      Всъщност тълкуване на понятието „потребител“, което изключва такива дейности, би попречило за ефективната защита на правата на потребителите спрямо съдоговорителите им търговци, включително правата на защита на личните им данни. Едно такова тълкуване би било в разрез с целта, прогласена в член 169, параграф 1 ДФЕС, да се съдейства за тяхното право на самоорганизиране с цел защита на техните интереси.

41      С оглед на изложените дотук съображения на първия въпрос следва да се отговори, че член 15 от Регламент № 44/2001 трябва да се тълкува в смисъл, че ползвателят на личен профил във Facebook не губи качеството „потребител“ по смисъла на този член, когато публикува книги, чете лекции, управлява интернет сайтове, събира дарения и многобройни потребители му прехвърлят правата си, за да ги предяви той по съдебен ред.

По втория въпрос

48      Както Съдът е уточнил в друг случай, всъщност цесията на вземания сама по себе си не може да има значение при определянето на компетентния съд. Оттук следва, че компетентността на съдилища, различни от изрично посочените с Регламент № 44/2001, не може да бъде обоснована с концентрирането на множество права у само един ищец. Ето защо, както е отбелязал по същество генералният адвокат в точка 98 от заключението си, цесия като разглежданата по главното производство не може да обоснове нова специална подсъдност за потребителя цесионер.

49      С оглед на изложените дотук съображения на втория въпрос следва да се отговори, че член 16, параграф 1 от Регламент № 44/2001 трябва да се тълкува в смисъл, че не се прилага спрямо иска на потребител, с който този потребител предявява пред съда по неговото местоживеене не само собствените си права, но и права, прехвърлени му от други потребители с местоживеене в същата държава членка, в други държави членки или в трети страни.

Веднага след произнасяне на решението Шремс е казал, че щом може да съди FB във Виена,  така и ще направи.

Me on the Equifax Breach

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/11/me_on_the_equif.html

Testimony and Statement for the Record of Bruce Schneier
Fellow and Lecturer, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School

Hearing on “Securing Consumers’ Credit Data in the Age of Digital Commerce”

Before the

Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection
Committee on Energy and Commerce
United States House of Representatives

1 November 2017
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Mister Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today concerning the security of credit data. My name is Bruce Schneier, and I am a security technologist. For over 30 years I have studied the technologies of security and privacy. I have authored 13 books on these subjects, including Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World (Norton, 2015). My popular newsletter CryptoGram and my blog Schneier on Security are read by over 250,000 people.

Additionally, I am a Fellow and Lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government –where I teach Internet security policy — and a Fellow at the Berkman-Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School. I am a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, AccessNow, and the Tor Project; and an advisory board member of Electronic Privacy Information Center and VerifiedVoting.org. I am also a special advisor to IBM Security and the Chief Technology Officer of IBM Resilient.

I am here representing none of those organizations, and speak only for myself based on my own expertise and experience.

I have eleven main points:

1. The Equifax breach was a serious security breach that puts millions of Americans at risk.

Equifax reported that 145.5 million US customers, about 44% of the population, were impacted by the breach. (That’s the original 143 million plus the additional 2.5 million disclosed a month later.) The attackers got access to full names, Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and driver’s license numbers.

This is exactly the sort of information criminals can use to impersonate victims to banks, credit card companies, insurance companies, cell phone companies and other businesses vulnerable to fraud. As a result, all 143 million US victims are at greater risk of identity theft, and will remain at risk for years to come. And those who suffer identify theft will have problems for months, if not years, as they work to clean up their name and credit rating.

2. Equifax was solely at fault.

This was not a sophisticated attack. The security breach was a result of a vulnerability in the software for their websites: a program called Apache Struts. The particular vulnerability was fixed by Apache in a security patch that was made available on March 6, 2017. This was not a minor vulnerability; the computer press at the time called it “critical.” Within days, it was being used by attackers to break into web servers. Equifax was notified by Apache, US CERT, and the Department of Homeland Security about the vulnerability, and was provided instructions to make the fix.

Two months later, Equifax had still failed to patch its systems. It eventually got around to it on July 29. The attackers used the vulnerability to access the company’s databases and steal consumer information on May 13, over two months after Equifax should have patched the vulnerability.

The company’s incident response after the breach was similarly damaging. It waited nearly six weeks before informing victims that their personal information had been stolen and they were at increased risk of identity theft. Equifax opened a website to help aid customers, but the poor security around that — the site was at a domain separate from the Equifax domain — invited fraudulent imitators and even more damage to victims. At one point, the official Equifax communications even directed people to that fraudulent site.

This is not the first time Equifax failed to take computer security seriously. It confessed to another data leak in January 2017. In May 2016, one of its websites was hacked, resulting in 430,000 people having their personal information stolen. Also in 2016, a security researcher found and reported a basic security vulnerability in its main website. And in 2014, the company reported yet another security breach of consumer information. There are more.

3. There are thousands of data brokers with similarly intimate information, similarly at risk.

Equifax is more than a credit reporting agency. It’s a data broker. It collects information about all of us, analyzes it all, and then sells those insights. It might be one of the biggest, but there are 2,500 to 4,000 other data brokers that are collecting, storing, and selling information about us — almost all of them companies you’ve never heard of and have no business relationship with.

The breadth and depth of information that data brokers have is astonishing. Data brokers collect and store billions of data elements covering nearly every US consumer. Just one of the data brokers studied holds information on more than 1.4 billion consumer transactions and 700 billion data elements, and another adds more than 3 billion new data points to its database each month.

These brokers collect demographic information: names, addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, gender, age, marital status, presence and ages of children in household, education level, profession, income level, political affiliation, cars driven, and information about homes and other property. They collect lists of things we’ve purchased, when we’ve purchased them, and how we paid for them. They keep track of deaths, divorces, and diseases in our families. They collect everything about what we do on the Internet.

4. These data brokers deliberately hide their actions, and make it difficult for consumers to learn about or control their data.

If there were a dozen people who stood behind us and took notes of everything we purchased, read, searched for, or said, we would be alarmed at the privacy invasion. But because these companies operate in secret, inside our browsers and financial transactions, we don’t see them and we don’t know they’re there.

Regarding Equifax, few consumers have any idea what the company knows about them, who they sell personal data to or why. If anyone knows about them at all, it’s about their business as a credit bureau, not their business as a data broker. Their website lists 57 different offerings for business: products for industries like automotive, education, health care, insurance, and restaurants.

In general, options to “opt-out” don’t work with data brokers. It’s a confusing process, and doesn’t result in your data being deleted. Data brokers will still collect data about consumers who opt out. It will still be in those companies’ databases, and will still be vulnerable. It just don’t be included individually when they sell data to their customers.

5. The existing regulatory structure is inadequate.

Right now, there is no way for consumers to protect themselves. Their data has been harvested and analyzed by these companies without their knowledge or consent. They cannot improve the security of their personal data, and have no control over how vulnerable it is. They only learn about data breaches when the companies announce them — which can be months after the breaches occur — and at that point the onus is on them to obtain credit monitoring services or credit freezes. And even those only protect consumers from some of the harms, and only those suffered after Equifax admitted to the breach.

Right now, the press is reporting “dozens” of lawsuits against Equifax from shareholders, consumers, and banks. Massachusetts has sued Equifax for violating state consumer protection and privacy laws. Other states may follow suit.

If any of these plaintiffs win in the court, it will be a rare victory for victims of privacy breaches against the companies that have our personal information. Current law is too narrowly focused on people who have suffered financial losses directly traceable to a specific breach. Proving this is difficult. If you are the victim of identity theft in the next month, is it because of Equifax or does the blame belong to another of the thousands of companies who have your personal data? As long as one can’t prove it one way or the other, data brokers remain blameless and liability free.

Additionally, much of this market in our personal data falls outside the protections of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. And in order for the Federal Trade Commission to levy a fine against Equifax, it needs to have a consent order and then a subsequent violation. Any fines will be limited to credit information, which is a small portion of the enormous amount of information these companies know about us. In reality, this is not an effective enforcement regime.

Although the FTC is investigating Equifax, it is unclear if it has a viable case.

6. The market cannot fix this because we are not the customers of data brokers.

The customers of these companies are people and organizations who want to buy information: banks looking to lend you money, landlords deciding whether to rent you an apartment, employers deciding whether to hire you, companies trying to figure out whether you’d be a profitable customer — everyone who wants to sell you something, even governments.

Markets work because buyers choose from a choice of sellers, and sellers compete for buyers. None of us are Equifax’s customers. None of us are the customers of any of these data brokers. We can’t refuse to do business with the companies. We can’t remove our data from their databases. With few limited exceptions, we can’t even see what data these companies have about us or correct any mistakes.

We are the product that these companies sell to their customers: those who want to use our personal information to understand us, categorize us, make decisions about us, and persuade us.

Worse, the financial markets reward bad security. Given the choice between increasing their cybersecurity budget by 5%, or saving that money and taking the chance, a rational CEO chooses to save the money. Wall Street rewards those whose balance sheets look good, not those who are secure. And if senior management gets unlucky and the a public breach happens, they end up okay. Equifax’s CEO didn’t get his $5.2 million severance pay, but he did keep his $18.4 million pension. Any company that spends more on security than absolutely necessary is immediately penalized by shareholders when its profits decrease.

Even the negative PR that Equifax is currently suffering will fade. Unless we expect data brokers to put public interest ahead of profits, the security of this industry will never improve without government regulation.

7. We need effective regulation of data brokers.

In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission recommended that Congress require data brokers be more transparent and give consumers more control over their personal information. That report contains good suggestions on how to regulate this industry.

First, Congress should help plaintiffs in data breach cases by authorizing and funding empirical research on the harm individuals receive from these breaches.

Specifically, Congress should move forward legislative proposals that establish a nationwide “credit freeze” — which is better described as changing the default for disclosure from opt-out to opt-in — and free lifetime credit monitoring services. By this I do not mean giving customers free credit-freeze options, a proposal by Senators Warren and Schatz, but that the default should be a credit freeze.

The credit card industry routinely notifies consumers when there are suspicious charges. It is obvious that credit reporting agencies should have a similar obligation to notify consumers when there is suspicious activity concerning their credit report.

On the technology side, more could be done to limit the amount of personal data companies are allowed to collect. Increasingly, privacy safeguards impose “data minimization” requirements to ensure that only the data that is actually needed is collected. On the other hand, Congress should not create a new national identifier to replace the Social Security Numbers. That would make the system of identification even more brittle. Better is to reduce dependence on systems of identification and to create contextual identification where necessary.

Finally, Congress needs to give the Federal Trade Commission the authority to set minimum security standards for data brokers and to give consumers more control over their personal information. This is essential as long as consumers are these companies’ products and not their customers.

8. Resist complaints from the industry that this is “too hard.”

The credit bureaus and data brokers, and their lobbyists and trade-association representatives, will claim that many of these measures are too hard. They’re not telling you the truth.

Take one example: credit freezes. This is an effective security measure that protects consumers, but the process of getting one and of temporarily unfreezing credit is made deliberately onerous by the credit bureaus. Why isn’t there a smartphone app that alerts me when someone wants to access my credit rating, and lets me freeze and unfreeze my credit at the touch of the screen? Too hard? Today, you can have an app on your phone that does something similar if you try to log into a computer network, or if someone tries to use your credit card at a physical location different from where you are.

Moreover, any credit bureau or data broker operating in Europe is already obligated to follow the more rigorous EU privacy laws. The EU General Data Protection Regulation will come into force, requiring even more security and privacy controls for companies collecting storing the personal data of EU citizens. Those companies have already demonstrated that they can comply with those more stringent regulations.

Credit bureaus, and data brokers in general, are deliberately not implementing these 21st-century security solutions, because they want their services to be as easy and useful as possible for their actual customers: those who are buying your information. Similarly, companies that use this personal information to open accounts are not implementing more stringent security because they want their services to be as easy-to-use and convenient as possible.

9. This has foreign trade implications.

The Canadian Broadcast Corporation reported that 100,000 Canadians had their data stolen in the Equifax breach. The British Broadcasting Corporation originally reported that 400,000 UK consumers were affected; Equifax has since revised that to 15.2 million.

Many American Internet companies have significant numbers of European users and customers, and rely on negotiated safe harbor agreements to legally collect and store personal data of EU citizens.

The European Union is in the middle of a massive regulatory shift in its privacy laws, and those agreements are coming under renewed scrutiny. Breaches such as Equifax give these European regulators a powerful argument that US privacy regulations are inadequate to protect their citizens’ data, and that they should require that data to remain in Europe. This could significantly harm American Internet companies.

10. This has national security implications.

Although it is still unknown who compromised the Equifax database, it could easily have been a foreign adversary that routinely attacks the servers of US companies and US federal agencies with the goal of exploiting security vulnerabilities and obtaining personal data.

When the Fair Credit Reporting Act was passed in 1970, the concern was that the credit bureaus might misuse our data. That is still a concern, but the world has changed since then. Credit bureaus and data brokers have far more intimate data about all of us. And it is valuable not only to companies wanting to advertise to us, but foreign governments as well. In 2015, the Chinese breached the database of the Office of Personal Management and stole the detailed security clearance information of 21 million Americans. North Korea routinely engages in cybercrime as way to fund its other activities. In a world where foreign governments use cyber capabilities to attack US assets, requiring data brokers to limit collection of personal data, securely store the data they collect, and delete data about consumers when it is no longer needed is a matter of national security.

11. We need to do something about it.

Yes, this breach is a huge black eye and a temporary stock dip for Equifax — this month. Soon, another company will have suffered a massive data breach and few will remember Equifax’s problem. Does anyone remember last year when Yahoo admitted that it exposed personal information of a billion users in 2013 and another half billion in 2014?

Unless Congress acts to protect consumer information in the digital age, these breaches will continue.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be pleased to answer your questions.

Съдът на ЕС ще трябва да се произнесе и по поредното споразумение ЕС – САЩ за защитата на данните

Post Syndicated from nellyo original https://nellyo.wordpress.com/2017/11/05/fb_shield/

Макс Шремс стана известен като човекът, завел дело за защита на личните данни във Фейсбук – което по-късно доведе до обявяване на невалидността на споразуменията ЕС-САЩ за личните данни (Safe Harbor).  По -късно ЕС и САЩ въведоха нов механизъм  –  “щит за защита на личните данни между ЕС и САЩ”  (Privacy Shield).

Шремс  смята, че мерките в рамките на щита отново не са адекватни за защитата на данните на гражданите на ЕС, в частност относно Facebook и програмата за събиране на данни на Prism на NSA чрез Facebook. Шремс се обръща към Ирландския орган за защита на личните данни,   който от своя страна внася въпроса в Ирландския Върховен съд.

На 3 октомври 2017 г. е огласено решението (153 страници) на  Ирландския ВС.

Според ВС опасенията, че защитата на гражданите е недостатъчна и в рамките на щита (новото споразумение) имат основание и  следва да бъдат отнесени до Съда на Европейския съюз.

Шремс коментира решението така:

американското законодателство изисква Facebook да помогне на NSA с масов надзор, а правото на ЕС забранява точно това.  Facebook е обект на двете юрисдикции,  поради което се озовава пред правна дилема, която не може да реши в дългосрочен план.

Резюме на решението на Ирландския ВС

Графиката е от http://www.europe-v-facebook.org

Filed under: Digital, EU Law, Media Law

EU Compliance Update

Post Syndicated from Craig Liebendorfer original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/eu-compliance-update/

C5 logo

AWS made many launch announcements at AWS re:Invent 2016, including the announcement of a new compliance service, AWS Artifact. After so much recent activity, I want to highlight some EU-related news that you might have missed.

AWS has completed its assessment against the Cloud Computing Compliance Controls Catalogue (C5) information security and compliance program. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)—Germany’s national cybersecurity authority—established C5 to define a reference standard for German cloud security requirements. With C5 (as well as with IT-Grundschutz), customers in German member states can leverage the work performed under this BSI audit to comply with stringent local requirements and operate secure workloads in the AWS Cloud. Although this is a newer program, BSI’s C5 standard is a key assurance framework that will be an authoritative program for not only German customers moving to the cloud, but also an influential one for all EU member states. C5 has comprehensive cloud-security criteria and is audited using a proven global assessment and reporting standard. AWS is the first cloud provider to achieve this certification, and it shows our commitment to Germany and the EU region.

This completed C5 assessment follows the August announcement of our transition from Safe Harbor to the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework. Though the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework does not affect the way you use or work with AWS, it ensures that you can continue to transfer data between the US and EU in an internationally recognized, compliant way. You can contact our team at [email protected], or read the FAQ.

– Chad

In Case You Missed These: AWS Security Blog Posts from June, July, and August

Post Syndicated from Craig Liebendorfer original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/in-case-you-missed-these-aws-security-blog-posts-from-june-july-and-august/

In case you missed any AWS Security Blog posts from June, July, and August, they are summarized and linked to below. The posts are shown in reverse chronological order (most recent first), and the subject matter ranges from a tagging limit increase to recording SSH sessions established through a bastion host.

August

August 16: Updated Whitepaper Available: AWS Best Practices for DDoS Resiliency
We recently released the 2016 version of the AWS Best Practices for DDoS Resiliency Whitepaper, which can be helpful if you have public-facing endpoints that might attract unwanted distributed denial of service (DDoS) activity.

August 15: Now Organize Your AWS Resources by Using up to 50 Tags per Resource
Tagging AWS resources simplifies the way you organize and discover resources, allocate costs, and control resource access across services. Many of you have told us that as the number of applications, teams, and projects running on AWS increases, you need more than 10 tags per resource. Based on this feedback, we now support up to 50 tags per resource. You do not need to take additional action—you can begin applying as many as 50 tags per resource today.

August 11: New! Import Your Own Keys into AWS Key Management Service
Today, we are happy to announce the launch of the new import key feature that enables you to import keys from your own key management infrastructure (KMI) into AWS Key Management Service (KMS). After you have exported keys from your existing systems and imported them into KMS, you can use them in all KMS-integrated AWS services and custom applications.

August 2: Customer Update: Amazon Web Services and the EU-US Privacy Shield
Recently, the European Commission and the US Government agreed on a new framework called the EU-US Privacy Shield, and on July 12, the European Commission formally adopted it. AWS welcomes this new framework for transatlantic data flow. As the EU-US Privacy Shield replaces Safe Harbor, we understand many of our customers have questions about what this means for them. The security of our customers’ data is our number one priority, so I wanted to take a few moments to explain what this all means.

August 2: How to Remove Single Points of Failure by Using a High-Availability Partition Group in Your AWS CloudHSM Environment
In this post, I will walk you through steps to remove single points of failure in your AWS CloudHSM environment by setting up a high-availability (HA) partition group. Single points of failure occur when a single CloudHSM device fails in a non-HA configuration, which can result in the permanent loss of keys and data. The HA partition group, however, allows for one or more CloudHSM devices to fail, while still keeping your environment operational.

July

July 28: Enable Your Federated Users to Work in the AWS Management Console for up to 12 Hours
AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) supports identity federation, which enables external identities, such as users in your corporate directory, to sign in to the AWS Management Console via single sign-on (SSO). Now with a small configuration change, your AWS administrators can allow your federated users to work in the AWS Management Console for up to 12 hours, instead of having to reauthenticate every 60 minutes. In addition, administrators can now revoke active federated user sessions. In this blog post, I will show how to configure the console session duration for two common federation use cases: using Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 and using a custom federation broker that leverages the sts:AssumeRole* APIs (see this downloadable sample of a federation proxy). I will wrap up this post with a walkthrough of the new session revocation process.

July 28: Amazon Cognito Your User Pools is Now Generally Available
Amazon Cognito makes it easy for developers to add sign-up, sign-in, and enhanced security functionality to mobile and web apps. With Amazon Cognito Your User Pools, you get a simple, fully managed service for creating and maintaining your own user directory that can scale to hundreds of millions of users.

July 27: How to Audit Cross-Account Roles Using AWS CloudTrail and Amazon CloudWatch Events
In this blog post, I will walk through the process of auditing access across AWS accounts by a cross-account role. This process links API calls that assume a role in one account to resource-related API calls in a different account. To develop this process, I will use AWS CloudTrail, Amazon CloudWatch Events, and AWS Lambda functions. When complete, the process will provide a full audit chain from end user to resource access across separate AWS accounts.

July 25: AWS Becomes First Cloud Service Provider to Adopt New PCI DSS 3.2
We are happy to announce the availability of the Amazon Web Services PCI DSS 3.2 Compliance Package for the 2016/2017 cycle. AWS is the first cloud service provider (CSP) to successfully complete the assessment against the newly released PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) version 3.2, 18 months in advance of the mandatory February 1, 2018, deadline. The AWS Attestation of Compliance (AOC), available upon request, now features 26 PCI DSS certified services, including the latest additions of Amazon EC2 Container Service (ECS), AWS Config, and AWS WAF (a web application firewall). We at AWS are committed to this international information security and compliance program, and adopting the new standard as early as possible once again demonstrates our commitment to information security as our highest priority. Our customers (and customers of our customers) can operate confidently as they store and process credit card information (and any other sensitive data) in the cloud knowing that AWS products and services are tested against the latest and most mature set of PCI compliance requirements.

July 20: New AWS Compute Blog Post: Help Secure Container-Enabled Applications with IAM Roles for ECS Tasks
Amazon EC2 Container Service (ECS) now allows you to specify an IAM role that can be used by the containers in an ECS task, as a new AWS Compute Blog post explains.

July 14: New Whitepaper Now Available: The Security Perspective of the AWS Cloud Adoption Framework
Today, AWS released the Security Perspective of the AWS Cloud Adoption Framework (AWS CAF). The AWS CAF provides a framework to help you structure and plan your cloud adoption journey, and build a comprehensive approach to cloud computing throughout the IT lifecycle. The framework provides seven specific areas of focus or Perspectives: business, platform, maturity, people, process, operations, and security.

July 14: New Amazon Inspector Blog Post on the AWS Blog
On the AWS Blog yesterday, Jeff Barr published a new security-related blog post written by AWS Principal Security Engineer Eric Fitzgerald. Here’s the beginning of the post, which is entitled, Scale Your Security Vulnerability Testing with Amazon Inspector:

July 12: How to Use AWS CloudFormation to Automate Your AWS WAF Configuration with Example Rules and Match Conditions
We recently announced AWS CloudFormation support for all current features of AWS WAF. This enables you to leverage CloudFormation templates to configure, customize, and test AWS WAF settings across all your web applications. Using CloudFormation templates can help you reduce the time required to configure AWS WAF. In this blog post, I will show you how to use CloudFormation to automate your AWS WAF configuration with example rules and match conditions.

July 11: How to Restrict Amazon S3 Bucket Access to a Specific IAM Role
In this blog post, I show how you can restrict S3 bucket access to a specific IAM role or user within an account using Conditions instead of with the NotPrincipal element. Even if another user in the same account has an Admin policy or a policy with s3:*, they will be denied if they are not explicitly listed. You can use this approach, for example, to configure a bucket for access by instances within an Auto Scaling group. You can also use this approach to limit access to a bucket with a high-level security need.

July 7: How to Use SAML to Automatically Direct Federated Users to a Specific AWS Management Console Page
In this blog post, I will show you how to create a deep link for federated users via the SAML 2.0 RelayState parameter in Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS). By using a deep link, your users will go directly to the specified console page without additional navigation.

July 6: How to Prevent Uploads of Unencrypted Objects to Amazon S3
In this blog post, I will show you how to create an S3 bucket policy that prevents users from uploading unencrypted objects, unless they are using server-side encryption with S3–managed encryption keys (SSE-S3) or server-side encryption with AWS KMS–managed keys (SSE-KMS).

June

June 30: The Top 20 AWS IAM Documentation Pages so Far This Year
The following 20 pages have been the most viewed AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) documentation pages so far this year. I have included a brief description with each link to give you a clearer idea of what each page covers. Use this list to see what other people have been viewing and perhaps to pique your own interest about a topic you’ve been meaning to research.

June 29: The Most Viewed AWS Security Blog Posts so Far in 2016
The following 10 posts are the most viewed AWS Security Blog posts that we published during the first six months of this year. You can use this list as a guide to catch up on your blog reading or even read a post again that you found particularly useful.

June 25: AWS Earns Department of Defense Impact Level 4 Provisional Authorization
I am pleased to share that, for our AWS GovCloud (US) Region, AWS has received a Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Provisional Authorization (PA) at Impact Level 4 (IL4). This will allow Department of Defense (DoD) agencies to use the AWS Cloud for production workloads with export-controlled data, privacy information, and protected health information as well as other controlled unclassified information. This new authorization continues to demonstrate our advanced work in the public sector space; you might recall AWS was the first cloud service provider to obtain an Impact Level 4 PA in August 2014, paving the way for DoD pilot workloads and applications in the cloud. Additionally, we recently achieved a FedRAMP High provisional Authorization to Operate (P-ATO) from the Joint Authorization Board (JAB), also for AWS GovCloud (US), and today’s announcement allows DoD mission owners to continue to leverage AWS for critical production applications.

June 23: AWS re:Invent 2016 Registration Is Now Open
Register now for the fifth annual AWS re:Invent, the largest gathering of the global cloud computing community. Join us in Las Vegas for opportunities to connect, collaborate, and learn about AWS solutions. This year we are offering all-new technical deep-dives on topics such as security, IoT, serverless computing, and containers. We are also delivering more than 400 sessions, more hands-on labs, bootcamps, and opportunities for one-on-one engagements with AWS experts.

June 23: AWS Achieves FedRAMP High JAB Provisional Authorization
We are pleased to announce that AWS has received a FedRAMP High JAB Provisional Authorization to Operate (P-ATO) from the Joint Authorization Board (JAB) for the AWS GovCloud (US) Region. The new Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) High JAB Provisional Authorization is mapped to more than 400 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) security controls. This P-ATO recognizes AWS GovCloud (US) as a secure environment on which to run highly sensitive government workloads, including Personally Identifiable Information (PII), sensitive patient records, financial data, law enforcement data, and other Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).

June 22: AWS IAM Service Last Accessed Data Now Available for South America (Sao Paulo) and Asia Pacific (Seoul) Regions
In December, AWS IAM released service last accessed data, which helps you identify overly permissive policies attached to an IAM entity (a user, group, or role). Today, we have extended service last accessed data to support two additional regions: South America (Sao Paulo) and Asia Pacific (Seoul). With this release, you can now view the date when an IAM entity last accessed an AWS service in these two regions. You can use this information to identify unnecessary permissions and update policies to remove access to unused services.

June 20: New Twitter Handle Now Live: @AWSSecurityInfo
Today, we launched a new Twitter handle: @AWSSecurityInfo. The purpose of this new handle is to share security bulletins, security whitepapers, compliance news and information, and other AWS security-related and compliance-related information. The scope of this handle is broader than that of @AWSIdentity, which focuses primarily on Security Blog posts. However, feel free to follow both handles!

June 15: Announcing Two New AWS Quick Start Reference Deployments for Compliance
As part of the Professional Services Enterprise Accelerator – Compliance program, AWS has published two new Quick Start reference deployments to assist federal government customers and others who need to meet National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-53 (Revision 4) security control requirements, including those at the high-impact level. The new Quick Starts are AWS Enterprise Accelerator – Compliance: NIST-based Assurance Frameworks and AWS Enterprise Accelerator – Compliance: Standardized Architecture for NIST High-Impact Controls Featuring Trend Micro Deep Security. These Quick Starts address many of the NIST controls at the infrastructure layer. Furthermore, for systems categorized as high impact, AWS has worked with Trend Micro to incorporate its Deep Security product into a Quick Start deployment in order to address many additional high-impact controls at the workload layer (app, data, and operating system). In addition, we have worked with Telos Corporation to populate security control implementation details for each of these Quick Starts into the Xacta product suite for customers who rely upon that suite for governance, risk, and compliance workflows.

June 14: Now Available: Get Even More Details from Service Last Accessed Data
In December, AWS IAM released service last accessed data, which shows the time when an IAM entity (a user, group, or role) last accessed an AWS service. This provided a powerful tool to help you grant least privilege permissions. Starting today, it’s easier to identify where you can reduce permissions based on additional service last accessed data.

June 14: How to Record SSH Sessions Established Through a Bastion Host
A bastion host is a server whose purpose is to provide access to a private network from an external network, such as the Internet. Because of its exposure to potential attack, a bastion host must minimize the chances of penetration. For example, you can use a bastion host to mitigate the risk of allowing SSH connections from an external network to the Linux instances launched in a private subnet of your Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). In this blog post, I will show you how to leverage a bastion host to record all SSH sessions established with Linux instances. Recording SSH sessions enables auditing and can help in your efforts to comply with regulatory requirements.

June 14: AWS Granted Authority to Operate for Department of Commerce and NOAA
AWS already has a number of federal agencies onboarded to the cloud, including the Department of Energy, The Department of the Interior, and NASA. Today we are pleased to announce the addition of two more ATOs (authority to operate) for the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Specifically, the DOC will be utilizing AWS for their Commerce Data Service, and NOAA will be leveraging the cloud for their “Big Data Project.” According to NOAA, the goal of the Big Data Project is to “create a sustainable, market-driven ecosystem that lowers the cost barrier to data publication. This project will create a new economic space for growth and job creation while providing the public far greater access to the data created with its tax dollars.”

June 2: How to Set Up DNS Resolution Between On-Premises Networks and AWS by Using Unbound
In previous AWS Security Blog posts, Drew Dennis covered two options for establishing DNS connectivity between your on-premises networks and your Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) environments. His first post explained how to use Simple AD to forward DNS requests originating from on-premises networks to an Amazon Route 53 private hosted zone. His second post showed how you can use Microsoft Active Directory (also provisioned with AWS Directory Service) to provide the same DNS resolution with some additional forwarding capabilities. In this post, I will explain how you can set up DNS resolution between your on-premises DNS with Amazon VPC by using Unbound, an open-source, recursive DNS resolver. This solution is not a managed solution like Microsoft AD and Simple AD, but it does provide the ability to route DNS requests between on-premises environments and an Amazon VPC–provided DNS.

June 1: How to Manage Secrets for Amazon EC2 Container Service–Based Applications by Using Amazon S3 and Docker
In this blog post, I will show you how to store secrets on Amazon S3, and use AWS IAM roles to grant access to those stored secrets using an example WordPress application deployed as a Docker image using ECS. Using IAM roles means that developers and operations staff do not have the credentials to access secrets. Only the application and staff who are responsible for managing the secrets can access them. The deployment model for ECS ensures that tasks are run on dedicated EC2 instances for the same AWS account and are not shared between customers, which gives sufficient isolation between different container environments.

If you have comments  about any of these posts, please add your comments in the “Comments” section of the appropriate post. If you have questions about or issues implementing the solutions in any of these posts, please start a new thread on the AWS IAM forum.

– Craig