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	<title>security standards &#8211; Noise</title>
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	<link>https://noise.getoto.net</link>
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		<title>NIST Releases First Post-Quantum Encryption Algorithms</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/08/15/nist-releases-first-post-quantum-encryption-algorithms/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Aug 2024 15:37:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cryptography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national security policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nist]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantum computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=69264</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>From the <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-08-14/pdf/2024-17956.pdf">Federal Register</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>After three rounds of evaluation and analysis, NIST selected four algorithms it will standardize as a result of the PQC Standardization Process. The public-key encapsulation mechanism selected was CRYSTALS-KYBER, along with three digital signature schemes: CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+.</p></blockquote>
<p>These algorithms are part of three NIST standards that have been finalized:</p>
<ul>
<li>FIPS 203: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final">Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard</a></li>
<li>FIPS 204: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final">Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard</a></li>
<li>FIPS 205: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final">Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard...</a></li></ul>]]></description>
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>Data Wallets Using the Solid Protocol</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/07/25/data-wallets-using-the-solid-protocol/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jul 2024 11:05:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[data privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[inrupt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=69191</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>I am the Chief of Security Architecture at <a href="https://www.inrupt.com/">Inrupt, Inc.</a>, the company that is commercializing Tim Berners-Lee’s <a href="https://solidproject.org/">Solid</a> open W3C standard for distributed data ownership. This week, we <a href="https://www.inrupt.com/blog/data-wallet-release">announced</a> a digital wallet based on the Solid architecture.</p>
<p>Details are <a href="https://www.inrupt.com/release/data-wallet">here</a>, but basically a digital wallet is a repository for personal data and documents. Right now, there are hundreds of different wallets, but no standard. We think designing a wallet around Solid makes sense for lots of reasons. A wallet is more than a data store—data in wallets is for using and sharing. That requires interoperability, which is what you get from an open standard. It also requires fine-grained permissions and robust security, and that’s what the Solid protocols provide...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Detecting Malicious Trackers</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/05/21/detecting-malicious-trackers/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 11:09:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Apple]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bluetooth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[false positives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[google]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stalking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tracking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68939</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>From <a href="https://apple.slashdot.org/story/24/05/13/2014230/apple-and-google-introduce-alerts-for-unwanted-bluetooth-tracking">Slashdot</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>Apple and Google have launched a new industry standard called “<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-detecting-unwanted-location-trackers/01/">Detecting Unwanted Location Trackers</a>” to <a href="https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2024/05/apple-and-google-deliver-support-for-unwanted-tracking-alerts-in-ios-and-android/">combat the misuse of Bluetooth trackers for stalking</a>. Starting Monday, iPhone and Android users will receive alerts when an unknown Bluetooth device is detected moving with them. The move comes after numerous cases of trackers like Apple’s AirTags being <a href="https://apple.slashdot.org/story/24/01/12/165230/apple-knew-airdrop-users-could-be-identified-and-tracked-as-early-as-2019">used for malicious purposes</a>.</p>
<p>Several Bluetooth tag companies have committed to making their future products compatible with the new standard. Apple and Google said they will continue collaborating with the Internet Engineering Task Force to further develop this technology and address the issue of unwanted tracking...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>Apple Announces Post-Quantum Encryption Algorithms for iMessage</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/02/26/apple-announces-post-quantum-encryption-algorithms-for-imessage/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Feb 2024 12:04:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[academic papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Apple]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cryptanalysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nist]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantum computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68476</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Apple announced <a href="https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/">PQ3</a>, its post-quantum encryption standard based on the <a href="https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/">Kyber</a> secure key-encapsulation protocol, one of the post-quantum algorithms <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/selected-algorithms-2022">selected</a> by NIST in 2022.</p>
<p>There’s a lot of detail in the Apple <a href="https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/">blog post</a>, and more in Douglas Stabila’s <a href="https://security.apple.com/assets/files/Security_analysis_of_the_iMessage_PQ3_protocol_Stebila.pdf">security analysis</a>.</p>
<p>I am of two minds about this. On the one hand, it’s probably premature to switch to any particular post-quantum algorithms. The mathematics of cryptanalysis for these lattice and other systems is still rapidly evolving, and we’re likely to break more of them—and learn a lot in the process—over the coming few years. But if you’re going to make the switch, this is an excellent choice. And Apple’s ability to do this so efficiently speaks well about its algorithmic agility, which is probably more important than its particular cryptographic design. And it is probably about the right time to worry about, and defend against, attackers who are storing encrypted messages in hopes of breaking them later on future quantum computers...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>You Can’t Rush Post-Quantum-Computing Cryptography Standards</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/08/08/you-cant-rush-post-quantum-computing-cryptography-standards/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2023 11:13:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cryptography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national security policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nist]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantum computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67648</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>I just read <a href="https://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/nist-encryption-standards/">an article</a> complaining that NIST is taking too long in finalizing its post-quantum-computing cryptography standards.</p>
<blockquote><p>This process has been going on since 2016, and since that time there has been a huge increase in quantum technology and an equally large increase in quantum understanding and interest. Yet seven years later, we have <a href="https://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/quantum-safe-cryptography-standards/">only four algorithms</a>, although last week NIST <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2023/additional-pqc-digital-signature-candidates">announced</a> that a number of other candidates are under consideration, a process that is expected to take “several years.</p>
<p>The delay in developing quantum-resistant algorithms is especially troubling given the time it will take to get those products to market. It generally takes four to six years with a new standard for a vendor to develop an ASIC to implement the standard, and it then takes time for the vendor to get the product validated, which seems to be taking a troubling amount of time...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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