Tag Archives: US Government

The devil wears Pravda

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/05/the-devil-wears-pravda.html

Classic Bond villain, Elon Musk, has a new plan to create a website dedicated to measuring the credibility and adherence to “core truth” of journalists. He is, without any sense of irony, going to call this “Pravda”. This is not simply wrong but evil.

Musk has a point. Journalists do suck, and many suck consistently. I see this in my own industry, cybersecurity, and I frequently criticize them for their suckage.

But what he’s doing here is not correcting them when they make mistakes (or what Musk sees as mistakes), but questioning their legitimacy. This legitimacy isn’t measured by whether they follow established journalism ethics, but whether their “core truths” agree with Musk’s “core truths”.

An example of the problem is how the press fixates on Tesla car crashes due to its “autopilot” feature. Pretty much every autopilot crash makes national headlines, while the press ignores the other 40,000 car crashes that happen in the United States each year. Musk spies on Tesla drivers (hello, classic Bond villain everyone) so he can see the dip in autopilot usage every time such a news story breaks. He’s got good reason to be concerned about this.

He argues that autopilot is safer than humans driving, and he’s got the statistics and government studies to back this up. Therefore, the press’s fixation on Tesla crashes is illegitimate “fake news”, titillating the audience with distorted truth.

But here’s the thing: that’s still only Musk’s version of the truth. Yes, on a mile-per-mile basis, autopilot is safer, but there’s nuance here. Autopilot is used primarily on freeways, which already have a low mile-per-mile accident rate. People choose autopilot only when conditions are incredibly safe and drivers are unlikely to have an accident anyway. Musk is therefore being intentionally deceptive comparing apples to oranges. Autopilot may still be safer, it’s just that the numbers Musk uses don’t demonstrate this.

And then there is the truth calling it “autopilot” to begin with, because it isn’t. The public is overrating the capabilities of the feature. It’s little different than “lane keeping” and “adaptive cruise control” you can now find in other cars. In many ways, the technology is behind — my Tesla doesn’t beep at me when a pedestrian walks behind my car while backing up, but virtually every new car on the market does.

Yes, the press unduly covers Tesla autopilot crashes, but Musk has only himself to blame by unduly exaggerating his car’s capabilities by calling it “autopilot”.

What’s “core truth” is thus rather difficult to obtain. What the press satisfies itself with instead is smaller truths, what they can document. The facts are in such cases that the accident happened, and they try to get Tesla or Musk to comment on it.

What you can criticize a journalist for is therefore not “core truth” but whether they did journalism correctly. When such stories criticize “autopilot”, but don’t do their diligence in getting Tesla’s side of the story, then that’s a violation of journalistic practice. When I criticize journalists for their poor handling of stories in my industry, I try to focus on which journalistic principles they get wrong. For example, the NYTimes reporters do a lot of stories quoting anonymous government sources in clear violation of journalistic principles.

If “credibility” is the concern, then it’s the classic Bond villain here that’s the problem: Musk himself. His track record on business statements is abysmal. For example, when he announced the Model 3 he claimed production targets that every Wall Street analyst claimed were absurd. He didn’t make those targets, he didn’t come close. Model 3 production is still lagging behind Musk’s twice adjusted targets.

https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-tesla-tracker/

So who has a credibility gap here, the press, or Musk himself?

Not only is Musk’s credibility problem ironic, so is the name he chose, “Pravada”, the Russian word for truth that was the name of the Soviet Union Communist Party’s official newspaper. This is so absurd this has to be a joke, yet Musk claims to be serious about all this.

Yes, the press has a lot of problems, and if Musk were some journalism professor concerned about journalists meeting the objective standards of their industry (e.g. abusing anonymous sources), then this would be a fine thing. But it’s not. It’s Musk who is upset the press’s version of “core truth” does not agree with his version — a version that he’s proven time and time again differs from “real truth”.

Just in case Musk is serious, I’ve already registered “www.antipravda.com” to start measuring the credibility of statements by billionaire playboy CEOs. Let’s see who blinks first.


I stole the title, with permission, from this tweet:

Supply-Chain Security

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/supply-chain_se.html

Earlier this month, the Pentagon stopped selling phones made by the Chinese companies ZTE and Huawei on military bases because they might be used to spy on their users.

It’s a legitimate fear, and perhaps a prudent action. But it’s just one instance of the much larger issue of securing our supply chains.

All of our computerized systems are deeply international, and we have no choice but to trust the companies and governments that touch those systems. And while we can ban a few specific products, services or companies, no country can isolate itself from potential foreign interference.

In this specific case, the Pentagon is concerned that the Chinese government demanded that ZTE and Huawei add “backdoors” to their phones that could be surreptitiously turned on by government spies or cause them to fail during some future political conflict. This tampering is possible because the software in these phones is incredibly complex. It’s relatively easy for programmers to hide these capabilities, and correspondingly difficult to detect them.

This isn’t the first time the United States has taken action against foreign software suspected to contain hidden features that can be used against us. Last December, President Trump signed into law a bill banning software from the Russian company Kaspersky from being used within the US government. In 2012, the focus was on Chinese-made Internet routers. Then, the House Intelligence Committee concluded: “Based on available classified and unclassified information, Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted to be free of foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to our systems.”

Nor is the United States the only country worried about these threats. In 2014, China reportedly banned antivirus products from both Kaspersky and the US company Symantec, based on similar fears. In 2017, the Indian government identified 42 smartphone apps that China subverted. Back in 1997, the Israeli company Check Point was dogged by rumors that its government added backdoors into its products; other of that country’s tech companies have been suspected of the same thing. Even al-Qaeda was concerned; ten years ago, a sympathizer released the encryption software Mujahedeen Secrets, claimed to be free of Western influence and backdoors. If a country doesn’t trust another country, then it can’t trust that country’s computer products.

But this trust isn’t limited to the country where the company is based. We have to trust the country where the software is written — and the countries where all the components are manufactured. In 2016, researchers discovered that many different models of cheap Android phones were sending information back to China. The phones might be American-made, but the software was from China. In 2016, researchers demonstrated an even more devious technique, where a backdoor could be added at the computer chip level in the factory that made the chips ­ without the knowledge of, and undetectable by, the engineers who designed the chips in the first place. Pretty much every US technology company manufactures its hardware in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, China and Taiwan.

We also have to trust the programmers. Today’s large software programs are written by teams of hundreds of programmers scattered around the globe. Backdoors, put there by we-have-no-idea-who, have been discovered in Juniper firewalls and D-Link routers, both of which are US companies. In 2003, someone almost slipped a very clever backdoor into Linux. Think of how many countries’ citizens are writing software for Apple or Microsoft or Google.

We can go even farther down the rabbit hole. We have to trust the distribution systems for our hardware and software. Documents disclosed by Edward Snowden showed the National Security Agency installing backdoors into Cisco routers being shipped to the Syrian telephone company. There are fake apps in the Google Play store that eavesdrop on you. Russian hackers subverted the update mechanism of a popular brand of Ukrainian accounting software to spread the NotPetya malware.

In 2017, researchers demonstrated that a smartphone can be subverted by installing a malicious replacement screen.

I could go on. Supply-chain security is an incredibly complex problem. US-only design and manufacturing isn’t an option; the tech world is far too internationally interdependent for that. We can’t trust anyone, yet we have no choice but to trust everyone. Our phones, computers, software and cloud systems are touched by citizens of dozens of different countries, any one of whom could subvert them at the demand of their government. And just as Russia is penetrating the US power grid so they have that capability in the event of hostilities, many countries are almost certainly doing the same thing at the consumer level.

We don’t know whether the risk of Huawei and ZTE equipment is great enough to warrant the ban. We don’t know what classified intelligence the United States has, and what it implies. But we do know that this is just a minor fix for a much larger problem. It’s doubtful that this ban will have any real effect. Members of the military, and everyone else, can still buy the phones. They just can’t buy them on US military bases. And while the US might block the occasional merger or acquisition, or ban the occasional hardware or software product, we’re largely ignoring that larger issue. Solving it borders on somewhere between incredibly expensive and realistically impossible.

Perhaps someday, global norms and international treaties will render this sort of device-level tampering off-limits. But until then, all we can do is hope that this particular arms race doesn’t get too far out of control.

This essay previously appeared in the Washington Post.

The problematic Wannacry North Korea attribution

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2018/01/the-problematic-wannacry-north-korea.html

Last month, the US government officially “attributed” the Wannacry ransomware worm to North Korea. This attribution has three flaws, which are a good lesson for attribution in general.

It was an accident

The most important fact about Wannacry is that it was an accident. We’ve had 30 years of experience with Internet worms teaching us that worms are always accidents. While launching worms may be intentional, their effects cannot be predicted. While they appear to have targets, like Slammer against South Korea, or Witty against the Pentagon, further analysis shows this was just a random effect that was impossible to predict ahead of time. Only in hindsight are these effects explainable.
We should hold those causing accidents accountable, too, but it’s a different accountability. The U.S. has caused more civilian deaths in its War on Terror than the terrorists caused triggering that war. But we hold these to be morally different: the terrorists targeted the innocent, whereas the U.S. takes great pains to avoid civilian casualties. 
Since we are talking about blaming those responsible for accidents, we also must include the NSA in that mix. The NSA created, then allowed the release of, weaponized exploits. That’s like accidentally dropping a load of unexploded bombs near a village. When those bombs are then used, those having lost the weapons are held guilty along with those using them. Yes, while we should blame the hacker who added ETERNAL BLUE to their ransomware, we should also blame the NSA for losing control of ETERNAL BLUE.

A country and its assets are different

Was it North Korea, or hackers affilliated with North Korea? These aren’t the same.

It’s hard for North Korea to have hackers of its own. It doesn’t have citizens who grow up with computers to pick from. Moreover, an internal hacking corps would create tainted citizens exposed to dangerous outside ideas. Update: Some people have pointed out that Kim Il-sung University in the capital does have some contact with the outside world, with academics granted limited Internet access, so I guess some tainting is allowed. Still, what we know of North Korea hacking efforts largley comes from hackers they employ outside North Korea. It was the Lazurus Group, outside North Korea, that did Wannacry.
Instead, North Korea develops external hacking “assets”, supporting several external hacking groups in China, Japan, and South Korea. This is similar to how intelligence agencies develop human “assets” in foreign countries. While these assets do things for their handlers, they also have normal day jobs, and do many things that are wholly independent and even sometimes against their handler’s interests.
For example, this Muckrock FOIA dump shows how “CIA assets” independently worked for Castro and assassinated a Panamanian president. That they also worked for the CIA does not make the CIA responsible for the Panamanian assassination.
That CIA/intelligence assets work this way is well-known and uncontroversial. The fact that countries use hacker assets like this is the controversial part. These hackers do act independently, yet we refuse to consider this when we want to “attribute” attacks.

Attribution is political

We have far better attribution for the nPetya attacks. It was less accidental (they clearly desired to disrupt Ukraine), and the hackers were much closer to the Russian government (Russian citizens). Yet, the Trump administration isn’t fighting Russia, they are fighting North Korea, so they don’t officially attribute nPetya to Russia, but do attribute Wannacry to North Korea.
Trump is in conflict with North Korea. He is looking for ways to escalate the conflict. Attributing Wannacry helps achieve his political objectives.
That it was blatantly politics is demonstrated by the way it was released to the press. It wasn’t released in the normal way, where the administration can stand behind it, and get challenged on the particulars. Instead, it was pre-released through the normal system of “anonymous government officials” to the NYTimes, and then backed up with op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. The government leaks information like this when it’s weak, not when its strong.

The proper way is to release the evidence upon which the decision was made, so that the public can challenge it. Among the questions the public would ask is whether it they believe it was North Korea’s intention to cause precisely this effect, such as disabling the British NHS. Or, whether it was merely hackers “affiliated” with North Korea, or hackers carrying out North Korea’s orders. We cannot challenge the government this way because the government intentionally holds itself above such accountability.

Conclusion

We believe hacking groups tied to North Korea are responsible for Wannacry. Yet, even if that’s true, we still have three attribution problems. We still don’t know if that was intentional, in pursuit of some political goal, or an accident. We still don’t know if it was at the direction of North Korea, or whether their hacker assets acted independently. We still don’t know if the government has answers to these questions, or whether it’s exploiting this doubt to achieve political support for actions against North Korea.

New White House Announcement on the Vulnerability Equities Process

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/11/new_white_house_1.html

The White House has released a new version of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP). This is the inter-agency process by which the US government decides whether to inform the software vendor of a vulnerability it finds, or keep it secret and use it to eavesdrop on or attack other systems. You can read the new policy or the fact sheet, but the best place to start is Cybersecurity Coordinator Rob Joyce’s blog post.

In considering a way forward, there are some key tenets on which we can build a better process.

Improved transparency is critical. The American people should have confidence in the integrity of the process that underpins decision making about discovered vulnerabilities. Since I took my post as Cybersecurity Coordinator, improving the VEP and ensuring its transparency have been key priorities, and we have spent the last few months reviewing our existing policy in order to improve the process and make key details about the VEP available to the public. Through these efforts, we have validated much of the existing process and ensured a rigorous standard that considers many potential equities.

The interests of all stakeholders must be fairly represented. At a high level we consider four major groups of equities: defensive equities; intelligence / law enforcement / operational equities; commercial equities; and international partnership equities. Additionally, ordinary people want to know the systems they use are resilient, safe, and sound. These core considerations, which have been incorporated into the VEP Charter, help to standardize the process by which decision makers weigh the benefit to national security and the national interest when deciding whether to disclose or restrict knowledge of a vulnerability.

Accountability of the process and those who operate it is important to establish confidence in those served by it. Our public release of the unclassified portions Charter will shed light on aspects of the VEP that were previously shielded from public review, including who participates in the VEP’s governing body, known as the Equities Review Board. We make it clear that departments and agencies with protective missions participate in VEP discussions, as well as other departments and agencies that have broader equities, like the Department of State and the Department of Commerce. We also clarify what categories of vulnerabilities are submitted to the process and ensure that any decision not to disclose a vulnerability will be reevaluated regularly. There are still important reasons to keep many of the specific vulnerabilities evaluated in the process classified, but we will release an annual report that provides metrics about the process to further inform the public about the VEP and its outcomes.

Our system of government depends on informed and vigorous dialogue to discover and make available the best ideas that our diverse society can generate. This publication of the VEP Charter will likely spark discussion and debate. This discourse is important. I also predict that articles will make breathless claims of “massive stockpiles” of exploits while describing the issue. That simply isn’t true. The annual reports and transparency of this effort will reinforce that fact.

Mozilla is pleased with the new charter. I am less so; it looks to me like the same old policy with some new transparency measures — which I’m not sure I trust. The devil is in the details, and we don’t know the details — and it has giant loopholes that pretty much anything can fall through:

The United States Government’s decision to disclose or restrict vulnerability information could be subject to restrictions by partner agreements and sensitive operations. Vulnerabilities that fall within these categories will be cataloged by the originating Department/Agency internally and reported directly to the Chair of the ERB. The details of these categories are outlined in Annex C, which is classified. Quantities of excepted vulnerabilities from each department and agency will be provided in ERB meetings to all members.

This is me from last June:

There’s a lot we don’t know about the VEP. The Washington Post says that the NSA used EternalBlue “for more than five years,” which implies that it was discovered after the 2010 process was put in place. It’s not clear if all vulnerabilities are given such consideration, or if bugs are periodically reviewed to determine if they should be disclosed. That said, any VEP that allows something as dangerous as EternalBlue — or the Cisco vulnerabilities that the Shadow Brokers leaked last August — to remain unpatched for years isn’t serving national security very well. As a former NSA employee said, the quality of intelligence that could be gathered was “unreal.” But so was the potential damage. The NSA must avoid hoarding vulnerabilities.

I stand by that, and am not sure the new policy changes anything.

More commentary.

Here’s more about the Windows vulnerabilities hoarded by the NSA and released by the Shadow Brokers.

EDITED TO ADD (11/18): More news.

EDITED TO ADD (11/22): Adam Shostack points out that the process does not cover design flaws or trade-offs, and that those need to be covered:

…we need the VEP to expand to cover those issues. I’m not going to claim that will be easy, that the current approach will translate, or that they should have waited to handle those before publishing. One obvious place it gets harder is the sources and methods tradeoff. But we need the internet to be a resilient and trustworthy infrastructure.

Some notes about the Kaspersky affair

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/10/some-notes-about-kaspersky-affair.html

I thought I’d write up some notes about Kaspersky, the Russian anti-virus vendor that many believe has ties to Russian intelligence.

There’s two angles to this story. One is whether the accusations are true. The second is the poor way the press has handled the story, with mainstream outlets like the New York Times more intent on pushing government propaganda than informing us what’s going on.

The press

Before we address Kaspersky, we need to talk about how the press covers this.
The mainstream media’s stories have been pure government propaganda, like this one from the New York Times. It garbles the facts of what happened, and relies primarily on anonymous government sources that cannot be held accountable. It’s so messed up that we can’t easily challenge it because we aren’t even sure exactly what it’s claiming.
The Society of Professional Journalists have a name for this abuse of anonymous sources, the “Washington Game“. Journalists can identify this as bad journalism, but the big newspapers like The New York Times continues to do it anyway, because how dare anybody criticize them?
For all that I hate the anti-American bias of The Intercept, at least they’ve had stories that de-garble what’s going on, that explain things so that we can challenge them.

Our Government

Our government can’t tell us everything, of course. But at the same time, they need to tell us something, to at least being clear what their accusations are. These vague insinuations through the media hurt their credibility, not help it. The obvious craptitude is making us in the cybersecurity community come to Kaspersky’s defense, which is not the government’s aim at all.
There are lots of issues involved here, but let’s consider the major one insinuated by the NYTimes story, that Kaspersky was getting “data” files along with copies of suspected malware. This is troublesome if true.
But, as Kaspersky claims today, it’s because they had detected malware within a zip file, and uploaded the entire zip — including the data files within the zip.
This is reasonable. This is indeed how anti-virus generally works. It completely defeats the NYTimes insinuations.
This isn’t to say Kaspersky is telling the truth, of course, but that’s not the point. The point is that we are getting vague propaganda from the government further garbled by the press, making Kaspersky’s clear defense the credible party in the affair.
It’s certainly possible for Kaspersky to write signatures to look for strings like “TS//SI/OC/REL TO USA” that appear in secret US documents, then upload them to Russia. If that’s what our government believes is happening, they need to come out and be explicit about it. They can easily setup honeypots, in the way described in today’s story, to confirm it. However, it seems the government’s description of honeypots is that Kaspersky only upload files that were clearly viruses, not data.

Kaspersky

I believe Kaspersky is guilty, that the company and Eugene himself, works directly with Russian intelligence.
That’s because on a personal basis, people in government have given me specific, credible stories — the sort of thing they should be making public. And these stories are wholly unrelated to stories that have been made public so far.
You shouldn’t believe me, of course, because I won’t go into details you can challenge. I’m not trying to convince you, I’m just disclosing my point of view.
But there are some public reasons to doubt Kaspersky. For example, when trying to sell to our government, they’ve claimed they can help us against terrorists. The translation of this is that they could help our intelligence services. Well, if they are willing to help our intelligence services against customers who are terrorists, then why wouldn’t they likewise help Russian intelligence services against their adversaries?
Then there is how Russia works. It’s a violent country. Most of the people mentioned in that “Steele Dossier” have died. In the hacker community, hackers are often coerced to help the government. Many have simply gone missing.
Being rich doesn’t make Kaspersky immune from this — it makes him more of a target. Russian intelligence knows he’s getting all sorts of good intelligence, such as malware written by foreign intelligence services. It’s unbelievable they wouldn’t put the screws on him to get this sort of thing.
Russia is our adversary. It’d be foolish of our government to buy anti-virus from Russian companies. Likewise, the Russian government won’t buy such products from American companies.

Conclusion

I have enormous disrespect for mainstream outlets like The New York Times and the way they’ve handled the story. It makes me want to come to Kaspersky’s defense.

I have enormous respect for Kaspersky technology. They do good work.

But I hear stories. I don’t think our government should be trusting Kaspersky at all. For that matter, our government shouldn’t trust any cybersecurity products from Russia, China, Iran, etc.

IoT Cybersecurity: What’s Plan B?

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/10/iot_cybersecuri.html

In August, four US Senators introduced a bill designed to improve Internet of Things (IoT) security. The IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017 is a modest piece of legislation. It doesn’t regulate the IoT market. It doesn’t single out any industries for particular attention, or force any companies to do anything. It doesn’t even modify the liability laws for embedded software. Companies can continue to sell IoT devices with whatever lousy security they want.

What the bill does do is leverage the government’s buying power to nudge the market: any IoT product that the government buys must meet minimum security standards. It requires vendors to ensure that devices can not only be patched, but are patched in an authenticated and timely manner; don’t have unchangeable default passwords; and are free from known vulnerabilities. It’s about as low a security bar as you can set, and that it will considerably improve security speaks volumes about the current state of IoT security. (Full disclosure: I helped draft some of the bill’s security requirements.)

The bill would also modify the Computer Fraud and Abuse and the Digital Millennium Copyright Acts to allow security researchers to study the security of IoT devices purchased by the government. It’s a far narrower exemption than our industry needs. But it’s a good first step, which is probably the best thing you can say about this legislation.

However, it’s unlikely this first step will even be taken. I am writing this column in August, and have no doubt that the bill will have gone nowhere by the time you read it in October or later. If hearings are held, they won’t matter. The bill won’t have been voted on by any committee, and it won’t be on any legislative calendar. The odds of this bill becoming law are zero. And that’s not just because of current politics — I’d be equally pessimistic under the Obama administration.

But the situation is critical. The Internet is dangerous — and the IoT gives it not just eyes and ears, but also hands and feet. Security vulnerabilities, exploits, and attacks that once affected only bits and bytes now affect flesh and blood.

Markets, as we’ve repeatedly learned over the past century, are terrible mechanisms for improving the safety of products and services. It was true for automobile, food, restaurant, airplane, fire, and financial-instrument safety. The reasons are complicated, but basically, sellers don’t compete on safety features because buyers can’t efficiently differentiate products based on safety considerations. The race-to-the-bottom mechanism that markets use to minimize prices also minimizes quality. Without government intervention, the IoT remains dangerously insecure.

The US government has no appetite for intervention, so we won’t see serious safety and security regulations, a new federal agency, or better liability laws. We might have a better chance in the EU. Depending on how the General Data Protection Regulation on data privacy pans out, the EU might pass a similar security law in 5 years. No other country has a large enough market share to make a difference.

Sometimes we can opt out of the IoT, but that option is becoming increasingly rare. Last year, I tried and failed to purchase a new car without an Internet connection. In a few years, it’s going to be nearly impossible to not be multiply connected to the IoT. And our biggest IoT security risks will stem not from devices we have a market relationship with, but from everyone else’s cars, cameras, routers, drones, and so on.

We can try to shop our ideals and demand more security, but companies don’t compete on IoT safety — and we security experts aren’t a large enough market force to make a difference.

We need a Plan B, although I’m not sure what that is. E-mail me if you have any ideas.

This essay previously appeared in the September/October issue of IEEE Security & Privacy.

More on the Vulnerabilities Equities Process

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/08/more_on_the_vul_1.html

Richard Ledgett — a former Deputy Director of the NSA — argues against the US government disclosing all vulnerabilities:

Proponents argue that this would allow patches to be developed, which in turn would help ensure that networks are secure. On its face, this argument might seem to make sense — but it is a gross oversimplification of the problem, one that not only would not have the desired effect but that also would be dangerous.

Actually, he doesn’t make that argument at all. He basically says that security is a lot more complicated than finding and disclosing vulnerabilities — something I don’t think anyone disagrees with. His conclusion:

Malicious software like WannaCry and Petya is a scourge in our digital lives, and we need to take concerted action to protect ourselves. That action must be grounded in an accurate understanding of how the vulnerability ecosystem works. Software vendors need to continue working to build better software and to provide patching support for software deployed in critical infrastructure. Customers need to budget and plan for upgrades as part of the going-in cost of IT, or for compensatory measures when upgrades are impossible. Those who discover vulnerabilities need to responsibly disclose them or, if they are retained for national security purposes, adequately safeguard them. And the partnership of intelligence, law enforcement and industry needs to work together to identify and disrupt actors who use these vulnerabilities for their criminal and destructive ends. No single set of actions will solve the problem; we must work together to protect ourselves. As for blame, we should place it where it really lies: on the criminals who intentionally and maliciously assembled this destructive ransomware and released it on the world.

I don’t think anyone would argue with any of that, either. The question is whether the US government should prioritize attack over defense, and security over surveillance. Disclosing, especially in a world where the secrecy of zero-day vulnerabilities is so fragile, greatly improves the security of our critical systems.

AWS GovCloud (US) Heads East – New Region in the Works for 2018

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-govcloud-us-heads-east-new-region-in-the-works-for-2018/

AWS GovCloud (US) gives AWS customers a place to host sensitive data and regulated workloads in the AWS Cloud. The first AWS GovCloud (US) Region was launched in 2011 and is located on the west coast of the US.

I’m happy to announce that we are working on a second Region that we expect to open in 2018. The upcoming AWS GovCloud (US-East) Region will provide customers with added redundancy, data durability, and resiliency, and will also provide additional options for disaster recovery.

Like the existing region, which we now call AWS GovCloud (US-West), the new region will be isolated and meet top US government compliance requirements including International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), NIST standards, Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) Moderate and High, Department of Defense Impact Levels 2-4, DFARs, IRS1075, and Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) requirements. Visit the GovCloud (US) page to learn more about the compliance regimes that we support.

Government agencies and the IT contactors that serve them were early adopters of AWS GovCloud (US), as were companies in regulated industries. These organizations are able to enjoy the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of public cloud while benefiting from the isolation and data protection offered by a region designed and built to meet their regulatory needs and to help them to meet their compliance requirements. Here’s a small sample from our customer base:

Federal (US) GovernmentDepartment of Veterans Affairs, General Services Administration 18F (Digital Services Delivery), NASA JPL, Defense Digital Service, United States Air Force, United States Department of Justice.

Regulated IndustriesCSRA, Talen Energy, Cobham Electronics.

SaaS and Solution ProvidersFIGmd, Blackboard, Splunk, GitHub, Motorola.

Federal, state, and local agencies that want to move their existing applications to the AWS Cloud can take advantage of the AWS Cloud Adoption Framework (CAF) offered by AWS Professional Services.

Jeff;

 

 

Healthcare Industry Cybersecurity Report

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/06/healthcare_indu.html

New US government report: “Report on Improving Cybersecurity in the Health Care Industry.” It’s pretty scathing, but nothing in it will surprise regular readers of this blog.

It’s worth reading the executive summary, and then skimming the recommendations. Recommendations are in six areas.

The Task Force identified six high-level imperatives by which to organize its recommendations and action items. The imperatives are:

  1. Define and streamline leadership, governance, and expectations for health care industry cybersecurity.
  2. Increase the security and resilience of medical devices and health IT.

  3. Develop the health care workforce capacity necessary to prioritize and ensure cybersecurity awareness and technical capabilities.

  4. Increase health care industry readiness through improved cybersecurity awareness and education.

  5. Identify mechanisms to protect research and development efforts and intellectual property from attacks or exposure.

  6. Improve information sharing of industry threats, weaknesses, and mitigations.

News article.

Slashdot thread.

Tweetponic lavender: nourishing nature with the Twitter API

Post Syndicated from Janina Ander original https://www.raspberrypi.org/blog/tweetponic-lavender/

In a Manhattan gallery, there is an art installation that uses a Raspberry Pi to control the lights, nourishing an underground field of lavender. The twist: the Pi syncs the intensity of the lights to the activity of a dozen or so Twitter accounts belonging to media personalities and members of the US government.

In May 2017 I cultivated a piece of land in Midtown Manhattan nurtured by tweets.

204 Likes, 5 Comments – Martin Roth (@martinroth02) on Instagram: “In May 2017 I cultivated a piece of land in Midtown Manhattan nurtured by tweets.”

Turning tweets into cellulose

Artist Martin Roth has used the Raspberry Pi to access the accounts via the Twitter API, and to track their behaviour. This information is then relayed to the lights in real time. The more tweets, retweets, and likes there are on these accounts at a given moment, the brighter the lights become, and the better the lavender plants grow. Thus Twitter storms are converted into plant food, and ultimately into a pleasant lavender scent.

Until June 21st @ ACF (11 East 52nd Street)

39 Likes, 1 Comments – Martin Roth (@martinroth02) on Instagram: “Until June 21st @ ACF (11 East 52nd Street)”

Regarding his motivation to create the art installation, Martin Roth says:

[The] Twitter storm is something to be resisted. But I am using it in my exhibition as a force to create growth.

The piece, descriptively titled In May 2017 I cultivated a piece of land in Midtown Manhattan nurtured by tweets, is on show at the Austrian Cultural Forum, New York.

Using the Twitter API as part of digital making

We’ve seen a number of cool makes using the Twitter API. These often involve the posting of tweets in response to real-world inputs. Some of our favourites are the tweeting cat flap Flappy McFlapface, the tweeting dog Oliver Twitch, and of course Pi Towers resident Bert the plant. It’s interesting to see the concept turned on its head.

If you feel inspired by these projects, head on over to our resource introducing the Twitter API using Python. Or do you already have a project, in progress or finished, that uses the API? Let us know about it in the comments!

The post Tweetponic lavender: nourishing nature with the Twitter API appeared first on Raspberry Pi.

Some non-lessons from WannaCry

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/06/some-non-lessons-from-wannacry.html

This piece by Bruce Schneier needs debunking. I thought I’d list the things wrong with it.

The NSA 0day debate

Schneier’s description of the problem is deceptive:

When the US government discovers a vulnerability in a piece of software, however, it decides between two competing equities. It can keep it secret and use it offensively, to gather foreign intelligence, help execute search warrants, or deliver malware. Or it can alert the software vendor and see that the vulnerability is patched, protecting the country — and, for that matter, the world — from similar attacks by foreign governments and cybercriminals. It’s an either-or choice.

The government doesn’t “discover” vulnerabilities accidentally. Instead, when the NSA has a need for something specific, it acquires the 0day, either through internal research or (more often) buying from independent researchers.

The value of something is what you are willing to pay for it. If the NSA comes across a vulnerability accidentally, then the value to them is nearly zero. Obviously such vulns should be disclosed and fixed. Conversely, if the NSA is willing to pay $1 million to acquire a specific vuln for imminent use against a target, the offensive value is much greater than the fix value.

What Schneier is doing is deliberately confusing the two, combing the policy for accidentally found vulns with deliberately acquired vulns.

The above paragraph should read instead:

When the government discovers a vulnerability accidentally, it then decides to alert the software vendor to get it patched. When the government decides it needs as vuln for a specific offensive use, it acquires one that meets its needs, uses it, and keeps it secret. After spending so much money acquiring an offensive vuln, it would obviously be stupid to change this decision and not use it offensively.

Hoarding vulns

Schneier also says the NSA is “hoarding” vulns. The word has a couple inaccurate connotations.
One connotation is that the NSA is putting them on a heap inside a vault, not using them. The opposite is true: the NSA only acquires vulns it for which it has an active need. It uses pretty much all the vulns it acquires. That can be seen in the ShadowBroker dump, all the vulns listed are extremely useful to attackers, especially ETERNALBLUE. Efficiency is important to the NSA. Your efficiency is your basis for promotion. There are other people who make their careers finding waste in the NSA. If you are hoarding vulns and not using them, you’ll quickly get ejected from the NSA.
Another connotation is that the NSA is somehow keeping the vulns away from vendors. That’s like saying I’m hoarding naked selfies of myself. Yes, technically I’m keeping them away from you, but it’s not like they ever belong to you in the first place. The same is true the NSA. Had it never acquired the ETERNALBLUE 0day, it never would’ve been researched, never found.

The VEP

Schneier describes the “Vulnerability Equities Process” or “VEP”, a process that is supposed to manage the vulnerabilities the government gets.

There’s no evidence the VEP process has ever been used, at least not with 0days acquired by the NSA. The VEP allows exceptions for important vulns, and all the NSA vulns are important, so all are excepted from the process. Since the NSA is in charge of the VEP, of course, this is at the sole discretion of the NSA. Thus, the entire point of the VEP process goes away.

Moreover, it can’t work in many cases. The vulns acquired by the NSA often come with clauses that mean they can’t be shared.

New classes of vulns

One reason sellers forbid 0days from being shared is because they use new classes of vulnerabilities, such that sharing one 0day will effectively ruin a whole set of vulnerabilities. Schneier poo-poos this because he doesn’t see new classes of vulns in the ShadowBroker set.
This is wrong for two reasons. The first is that the ShadowBroker 0days are incomplete. There’s no iOS exploits, for example, and we know that iOS is a big target of the NSA.
Secondly, I’m not sure we’ve sufficiently analyzed the ShadowBroker exploits yet to realize there may be a new class of vuln. It’s easy to miss the fact that a single bug we see in the dump may actually be a whole new class of vulnerability. In the past, it’s often been the case that a new class was named only after finding many examples.
In any case, Schneier misses the point denying new classes of vulns exist. He should instead use the point to prove the value of disclosure, that instead of playing wack-a-mole fixing bugs one at a time, vendors would be able to fix whole classes of bugs at once.

Rediscovery

Schneier cites two studies that looked at how often vulnerabilities get rediscovered. In other words, he’s trying to measure the likelihood that some other government will find the bug and use it against us.
These studies are weak, scarcely better than anecdotal evidence. Schneier’s own study seems almost unrelated to the problem, and the Rand’s study cannot be replicated, as it relies upon private data. Also, there is little differentiation between important bugs (like SMB/MSRPC exploits and full-chain iOS exploits) and lesser bugs.
Whether from the Rand study or from anecdotes, we have good reason to believe that the longer an 0day exists, the less likely it’ll be rediscovered. Schneier argues that vulns should only be used for 6 months before being disclosed to a vendor. Anecdotes suggest otherwise, that if it hasn’t been rediscovered in the first year, it likely won’t ever be.
The Rand study was overwhelmingly clear on the issue that 0days are dramatically more likely to become obsolete than be rediscovered. The latest update to iOS will break an 0day, rather than somebody else rediscovering it. Win10 adoption will break older SMB exploits faster than rediscovery.
In any case, this post is about ETERNALBLUE specifically. What we learned from this specific bug is that it was used for at least 5 year without anybody else rediscovering it (before it was leaked). Chances are good it never would’ve been rediscovered, just made obsolete by Win10.

Notification is notification

All disclosure has the potential of leading to worms like WannaCry. The Conficker worm of 2008, for example, was written after Microsoft patched the underlying vulnerability.
Thus, had the NSA disclosed the bug in the normal way, chances are good it still would’ve been used for worming ransomware.
Yes, WannaCry had a head-start because ShadowBrokers published a working exploit, but this doesn’t appear to have made a difference. The Blaster worm (the first worm to compromise millions of computers) took roughly the same amount of time to create, and almost no details were made public about the vulnerability, other than the fact it was patched. (I know from personal experience — we used diff to find what changed in the patch in order to reverse engineer the 0day).
In other words, the damage the NSA is responsible for isn’t really the damage that came after it was patched — that was likely to happen anyway, as it does with normal vuln disclosure. Instead, the only damage the NSA can truly be held responsible for is the damage ahead of time, such as the months (years?) the ShadowBrokers possessed the exploits before they were patched.

Disclosed doesn’t mean fixed

One thing we’ve learned from 30 years of disclosure is that vendors ignore bugs.
We’ve gotten to the state where a few big companies like Microsoft and Apple will actually fix bugs, but the vast majority of vendors won’t. Even Microsoft and Apple have been known to sit on tricky bugs for over a year before fixing them.
And the only reason Microsoft and Apple have gotten to this state is because we, the community, bullied them into it. When we disclose bugs to them, we give them a deadline when we make the bug public, whether or not its been fixed.
The same goes for the NSA. If they quietly disclose bugs to vendors, in general, they won’t be fixed unless the NSA also makes the bug public within a certain time frame. Either Schneier has to argue that the NSA should do such public full-disclosures, or argue that disclosures won’t always lead to fixes.

Replacement SMB/MSRPC

The ETERNALBLUE vuln is so valuable to the NSA that it’s almost certainly seeking a replacement.
Again, I’m trying to debunk the impression Schneier tries to form that somehow the NSA stumbled upon ETERNALBLUE by accident to begin with. The opposite is true: remote exploits for the SMB (port 445) or MSRPC (port 135) services are some of the most valuable vulns, and the NSA will work hard to acquire them.

That it was leaked

The only issue here is that the 0day leaked. If the NSA can’t keep it’s weaponized toys secret, then maybe it shouldn’t have them.
Instead of processing this new piece of information, which is important, Schneier takes this opportunity to just re-hash the old inaccurate and deceptive VEP debate.

Conclusion

Except for a tiny number of people working for the NSA, none of us really know what’s going on with 0days inside government. Schneier’s comments seem more off-base than most. Like all activists, he deliberately uses language to deceive rather than explain (like “discover” instead of “acquire”). Like all activists, he seems obsessed with the VEP, even though as far as anybody can tell, it’s not used for NSA acquired vulns. He deliberate ignores things he should be an expert in, such as how all patches/disclosures sometimes lead to worms/exploits, and how not all disclosure leads to fixes.

WannaCry and Vulnerabilities

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/06/wannacry_and_vu.html

There is plenty of blame to go around for the WannaCry ransomware that spread throughout the Internet earlier this month, disrupting work at hospitals, factories, businesses, and universities. First, there are the writers of the malicious software, which blocks victims’ access to their computers until they pay a fee. Then there are the users who didn’t install the Windows security patch that would have prevented an attack. A small portion of the blame falls on Microsoft, which wrote the insecure code in the first place. One could certainly condemn the Shadow Brokers, a group of hackers with links to Russia who stole and published the National Security Agency attack tools that included the exploit code used in the ransomware. But before all of this, there was the NSA, which found the vulnerability years ago and decided to exploit it rather than disclose it.

All software contains bugs or errors in the code. Some of these bugs have security implications, granting an attacker unauthorized access to or control of a computer. These vulnerabilities are rampant in the software we all use. A piece of software as large and complex as Microsoft Windows will contain hundreds of them, maybe more. These vulnerabilities have obvious criminal uses that can be neutralized if patched. Modern software is patched all the time — either on a fixed schedule, such as once a month with Microsoft, or whenever required, as with the Chrome browser.

When the US government discovers a vulnerability in a piece of software, however, it decides between two competing equities. It can keep it secret and use it offensively, to gather foreign intelligence, help execute search warrants, or deliver malware. Or it can alert the software vendor and see that the vulnerability is patched, protecting the country — and, for that matter, the world — from similar attacks by foreign governments and cybercriminals. It’s an either-or choice. As former US Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith has said, “Every offensive weapon is a (potential) chink in our defense — and vice versa.”

This is all well-trod ground, and in 2010 the US government put in place an interagency Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) to help balance the trade-off. The details are largely secret, but a 2014 blog post by then President Barack Obama’s cybersecurity coordinator, Michael Daniel, laid out the criteria that the government uses to decide when to keep a software flaw undisclosed. The post’s contents were unsurprising, listing questions such as “How much is the vulnerable system used in the core Internet infrastructure, in other critical infrastructure systems, in the US economy, and/or in national security systems?” and “Does the vulnerability, if left unpatched, impose significant risk?” They were balanced by questions like “How badly do we need the intelligence we think we can get from exploiting the vulnerability?” Elsewhere, Daniel has noted that the US government discloses to vendors the “overwhelming majority” of the vulnerabilities that it discovers — 91 percent, according to NSA Director Michael S. Rogers.

The particular vulnerability in WannaCry is code-named EternalBlue, and it was discovered by the US government — most likely the NSA — sometime before 2014. The Washington Post reported both how useful the bug was for attack and how much the NSA worried about it being used by others. It was a reasonable concern: many of our national security and critical infrastructure systems contain the vulnerable software, which imposed significant risk if left unpatched. And yet it was left unpatched.

There’s a lot we don’t know about the VEP. The Washington Post says that the NSA used EternalBlue “for more than five years,” which implies that it was discovered after the 2010 process was put in place. It’s not clear if all vulnerabilities are given such consideration, or if bugs are periodically reviewed to determine if they should be disclosed. That said, any VEP that allows something as dangerous as EternalBlue — or the Cisco vulnerabilities that the Shadow Brokers leaked last August to remain unpatched for years isn’t serving national security very well. As a former NSA employee said, the quality of intelligence that could be gathered was “unreal.” But so was the potential damage. The NSA must avoid hoarding vulnerabilities.

Perhaps the NSA thought that no one else would discover EternalBlue. That’s another one of Daniel’s criteria: “How likely is it that someone else will discover the vulnerability?” This is often referred to as NOBUS, short for “nobody but us.” Can the NSA discover vulnerabilities that no one else will? Or are vulnerabilities discovered by one intelligence agency likely to be discovered by another, or by cybercriminals?

In the past few months, the tech community has acquired some data about this question. In one study, two colleagues from Harvard and I examined over 4,300 disclosed vulnerabilities in common software and concluded that 15 to 20 percent of them are rediscovered within a year. Separately, researchers at the Rand Corporation looked at a different and much smaller data set and concluded that fewer than six percent of vulnerabilities are rediscovered within a year. The questions the two papers ask are slightly different and the results are not directly comparable (we’ll both be discussing these results in more detail at the Black Hat Conference in July), but clearly, more research is needed.

People inside the NSA are quick to discount these studies, saying that the data don’t reflect their reality. They claim that there are entire classes of vulnerabilities the NSA uses that are not known in the research world, making rediscovery less likely. This may be true, but the evidence we have from the Shadow Brokers is that the vulnerabilities that the NSA keeps secret aren’t consistently different from those that researchers discover. And given the alarming ease with which both the NSA and CIA are having their attack tools stolen, rediscovery isn’t limited to independent security research.

But even if it is difficult to make definitive statements about vulnerability rediscovery, it is clear that vulnerabilities are plentiful. Any vulnerabilities that are discovered and used for offense should only remain secret for as short a time as possible. I have proposed six months, with the right to appeal for another six months in exceptional circumstances. The United States should satisfy its offensive requirements through a steady stream of newly discovered vulnerabilities that, when fixed, also improve the country’s defense.

The VEP needs to be reformed and strengthened as well. A report from last year by Ari Schwartz and Rob Knake, who both previously worked on cybersecurity policy at the White House National Security Council, makes some good suggestions on how to further formalize the process, increase its transparency and oversight, and ensure periodic review of the vulnerabilities that are kept secret and used for offense. This is the least we can do. A bill recently introduced in both the Senate and the House calls for this and more.

In the case of EternalBlue, the VEP did have some positive effects. When the NSA realized that the Shadow Brokers had stolen the tool, it alerted Microsoft, which released a patch in March. This prevented a true disaster when the Shadow Brokers exposed the vulnerability on the Internet. It was only unpatched systems that were susceptible to WannaCry a month later, including versions of Windows so old that Microsoft normally didn’t support them. Although the NSA must take its share of the responsibility, no matter how good the VEP is, or how many vulnerabilities the NSA reports and the vendors fix, security won’t improve unless users download and install patches, and organizations take responsibility for keeping their software and systems up to date. That is one of the important lessons to be learned from WannaCry.

This essay originally appeared in Foreign Affairs.

The US Senate Is Using Signal

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/05/the_us_senate_i.html

The US Senate just approved Signal for staff use. Signal is a secure messaging app with no backdoor, and no large corporate owner who can be pressured to install a backdoor.

Susan Landau comments.

Maybe I’m being optimistic, but I think we just won the Crypto War. A very important part of the US government is prioritizing security over surveillance.

New – USASpending.gov on an Amazon RDS Snapshot

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-usaspending-gov-on-an-amazon-rds-snapshot/

My colleague Jed Sundwall runs the AWS Public Datasets program. He wrote the guest post below to tell you about an important new dataset that is available as an Amazon RDS Snapshot. In the post, Jed introduces the dataset and shows you how to create an Amazon RDS DB Instance from the snapshot.

Jeff;


I am very excited to announce that, starting today, the entire public USAspending.gov database is available for anyone to copy via Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS). USAspending.gov data includes data on all spending by the federal government, including contracts, grants, loans, employee salaries, and more. The data is available via a PostgreSQL snapshot, which provides bulk access to the entire USAspending.gov database, and is updated nightly. At this time, the database includes all USAspending.gov for the second quarter of fiscal year 2017, and data going back to the year 2000 will be added over the summer. You can learn more about the database and how to access it on its AWS Public Dataset landing page.

Through the AWS Public Datasets program, we work with AWS customers to experiment with ways that the cloud can make data more accessible to more people. Most of our AWS Public Datasets are made available through Amazon S3 because of its tremendous flexibility and ability to scale to serve any volume of any kind of data files. What’s exciting about the USAspending.gov database is that it provides a great example of how Amazon RDS can be used to share an entire relational database quickly and easily. Typically, sharing a relational database requires extract, transfer, and load (ETL) processes that require redundant storage capacity, time for data transfer, and often scripts to migrate your database schema from one database engine to another. ETL processes can be so intimidating and cumbersome that they’re effectively impossible for many people to carry out.

By making their data available as a public Amazon RDS snapshot, the team at USASPending.gov has made it easy for anyone to get a copy of their entire production database for their own use within minutes. This will be useful for researchers and businesses who want to work with real data about all US Government spending and quickly combine it with their own data or other data resources.

Deploying the USASpending.gov Database Using the AWS Management Console
Let’s go through the steps involved in deploying the database in your AWS account using the AWS Management Console.

  1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and select the US East (N. Virginia) region in the menu bar.
  2. Open the Amazon RDS Console and choose Snapshots in the navigation pane.
  3. In the filter for the search bar, select All Public Snapshots and search for 515495268755:
  4. Select the snapshot named arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:515495268755:snapshot:usaspending-db.
  5. Select Snapshot Actions -> Restore Snapshot. Select an instance size, and enter the other details, then click on Restore DB Instance.
  6. You will see that a DB Instance is being created from the snapshot, within your AWS account.
  7. After a few minutes, the status of the instance will change to Available.
  8. You can see the endpoint for your database on the main page along with other useful info:

Deploying the USASpending.gov Database Using the AWS CLI
You can also install the AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) and use it to create a DB Instance from the snapshot. Here’s a sample command:

$ aws rds restore-db-instance-from-db-snapshot --db-instance-identifier my-test-db-cli \
  --db-snapshot-identifier arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:515495268755:snapshot:usaspending-db \
  --region us-east-1

This will give you an ARN (Amazon Resource Name) that you can use to reference the DB Instance. For example:

$ aws rds describe-db-instances \
  --db-instance-identifier arn:aws:rds:us-east-1:917192695859:db:my-test-db-cli

This command will display the Endpoint.Address that you use to connect to the database.

Connecting to the DB Instance
After following the AWS Management Console or AWS CLI instructions above, you will have access to the full USAspending.gov database within this Amazon RDS DB instance, and you can connect to it using any PostgreSQL client using the following credentials:

  • Username: root
  • Password: password
  • Database: data_store_api

If you use psql, you can access the database using this command:

$ psql -h my-endpoint.rds.amazonaws.com -U root -d data_store_api

You should change the database password after you log in:

ALTER USER "root" WITH ENCRYPTED PASSWORD '{new password}';

If you can’t connect to your instance but think you should be able to, you may need to check your VPC Security Groups and make sure inbound and outbound traffic on the port (usually 5432) is allowed from your IP address.

Exploring the Data
The USAspending.gov data is very rich, so it will be hard to do it justice in this blog post, but hopefully these queries will give you an idea of what’s possible. To learn about the contents of the database, please review the USAspending.gov Data Dictionary.

The following query will return the total amount of money the government is obligated to pay for contracts awarded by NASA that include “Mars” or “Martian” in the description of the award:

select sum(total_obligation) from awards, subtier_agency 
  where (awards.description like '% MARTIAN %' OR awards.description like '% MARS %') 
  AND subtier_agency.name = 'National Aeronautics and Space Administration';

As I write this, the result I get for this query is $55,411,025.42. Note that the database is updated nightly and will include more historical data in the coming months, so you may get a different result if you run this query.

Now, here’s the same query, but looking for awards with “Jupiter” or “Jovian” in the description:

select sum(total_obligation) from awards, subtier_agency
  where (awards.description like '%JUPITER%' OR awards.description like '%JOVIAN%') 
  AND subtier_agency.name = 'National Aeronautics and Space Administration';

The result I get is $14,766,392.96.

Questions & Comments
I’m looking forward to seeing what people can do with this data. If you have any questions about the data, please create an issue on the USAspending.gov API’s issue tracker on GitHub.

— Jed

FBI’s Comey dangerous definition of "valid" journalism

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/05/fbis-comey-dangerous-definition-of.html

The First Amendment, the “freedom of speech” one, does not mention journalists. When it says “freedom of the press” it means the physical printing press. Yes, that does include newspapers, but it also includes anybody else publishing things, such as the famous agitprop pamphlets published by James Otis, John Dickinson, and Thomas Paine. There was no journalistic value to Thomas Paine’s Common Sense. The pamphlet argued for abolishing the monarchy and for American independence.

Today in testimony before congress, FBI directory James Comey came out in support of journalism, pointing out that they would not prosecute journalists doing their jobs. But he then modified his statement, describing “valid” journalists as those who in possession of leaks would first check with the government, to avoid publishing anything that would damage national security. It’s a power the government has abused in the past to delay or censor leaks. It’s specifically why Edward Snowden contacted Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras — he wanted journalists who would not kowtow the government on publishing the leaks.

Comey’s testimony today was in regards to prosecuting Assange and Wikileaks. Under the FBI’s official “journalist” classification scheme, Wikileaks are not real journalists, but instead publish “intelligence porn” and are hostile to America’s interests.

To be fair, there may be good reasons to prosecute Assange. Publishing leaks is one thing, but the suspicion with Wikileaks is that they do more, that they actively help getting the leaks in the first place. The original leaks that started Wikileaks may have come from hacks by Assange himself. Assange may have helped Manning grab the diplomatic cables. Wikileaks may have been involved in hacking the DNC and Podesta emails, more than simply receiving and publishing the information.

If that’s the case, then the US government would have good reason to prosecute Wikileaks.

But that’s not what Comey said today. Instead, Comey referred only to Wikileaks constitutionally protected publishing activities, and how since they didn’t fit his definition of “journalism”, they were open to prosecution. This is fundamentally wrong, and a violation of the both the spirit and the letter of the First Amendment. The FBI should not have a definition of “journalism” it thinks is valid. Yes, Assange is an anti-American douchebag. Being an apologist for Putin’s Russia disproves his claim of being a neutral journalist targeting the corrupt and powerful. But these activities are specifically protected by the Constitution.

If this were 1776, Comey would of course be going after Thomas Paine, for publishing “revolution porn”, and not being a real journalist.

Who is Publishing NSA and CIA Secrets, and Why?

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/05/who_is_publishi.html

There’s something going on inside the intelligence communities in at least two countries, and we have no idea what it is.

Consider these three data points. One: someone, probably a country’s intelligence organization, is dumping massive amounts of cyberattack tools belonging to the NSA onto the Internet. Two: someone else, or maybe the same someone, is doing the same thing to the CIA.

Three: in March, NSA Deputy Director Richard Ledgett described how the NSA penetrated the computer networks of a Russian intelligence agency and was able to monitor them as they attacked the US State Department in 2014. Even more explicitly, a US ally­ — my guess is the UK — ­was not only hacking the Russian intelligence agency’s computers, but also the surveillance cameras inside their building. “They [the US ally] monitored the [Russian] hackers as they maneuvered inside the U.S. systems and as they walked in and out of the workspace, and were able to see faces, the officials said.”

Countries don’t often reveal intelligence capabilities: “sources and methods.” Because it gives their adversaries important information about what to fix, it’s a deliberate decision done with good reason. And it’s not just the target country who learns from a reveal. When the US announces that it can see through the cameras inside the buildings of Russia’s cyber warriors, other countries immediately check the security of their own cameras.

With all this in mind, let’s talk about the recent leaks at NSA and the CIA.

Last year, a previously unknown group called the Shadow Brokers started releasing NSA hacking tools and documents from about three years ago. They continued to do so this year — ­five sets of files in all­ — and have implied that more classified documents are to come. We don’t know how they got the files. When the Shadow Brokers first emerged, the general consensus was that someone had found and hacked an external NSA staging server. These are third-party computers that the NSA’s TAO hackers use to launch attacks from. Those servers are necessarily stocked with TAO attack tools. This matched the leaks, which included a “script” directory and working attack notes. We’re not sure if someone inside the NSA made a mistake that left these files exposed, or if the hackers that found the cache got lucky.

That explanation stopped making sense after the latest Shadow Brokers release, which included attack tools against Windows, PowerPoint presentations, and operational notes — ­documents that are definitely not going to be on an external NSA staging server. A credible theory, which I first heard from Nicholas Weaver, is that the Shadow Brokers are publishing NSA data from multiple sources. The first leaks were from an external staging server, but the more recent leaks are from inside the NSA itself.

So what happened? Did someone inside the NSA accidentally mount the wrong server on some external network? That’s possible, but seems very unlikely. Did someone hack the NSA itself? Could there be a mole inside the NSA, as Kevin Poulsen speculated?

If it is a mole, my guess is that he’s already been arrested. There are enough individualities in the files to pinpoint exactly where and when they came from. Surely the NSA knows who could have taken the files. No country would burn a mole working for it by publishing what he delivered. Intelligence agencies know that if they betray a source this severely, they’ll never get another one.

That points to two options. The first is that the files came from Hal Martin. He’s the NSA contractor who was arrested in August for hoarding agency secrets in his house for two years. He can’t be the publisher, because the Shadow Brokers are in business even though he is in prison. But maybe the leaker got the documents from his stash: either because Martin gave the documents to them or because he himself was hacked. The dates line up, so it’s theoretically possible, but the contents of the documents speak to someone with a different sort of access. There’s also nothing in the public indictment against Martin that speaks to his selling secrets to a foreign power, and I think it’s exactly the sort of thing that the NSA would leak. But maybe I’m wrong about all of this; Occam’s Razor suggests that it’s him.

The other option is a mysterious second NSA leak of cyberattack tools. The only thing I have ever heard about this is from a Washington Post story about Martin: “But there was a second, previously undisclosed breach of cybertools, discovered in the summer of 2015, which was also carried out by a TAO employee, one official said. That individual also has been arrested, but his case has not been made public. The individual is not thought to have shared the material with another country, the official said.” But “not thought to have” is not the same as not having done so.

On the other hand, it’s possible that someone penetrated the internal NSA network. We’ve already seen NSA tools that can do that kind of thing to other networks. That would be huge, and explain why there were calls to fire NSA Director Mike Rogers last year.

The CIA leak is both similar and different. It consists of a series of attack tools from about a year ago. The most educated guess amongst people who know stuff is that the data is from an almost-certainly air-gapped internal development wiki­a Confluence server­ — and either someone on the inside was somehow coerced into giving up a copy of it, or someone on the outside hacked into the CIA and got themselves a copy. They turned the documents over to WikiLeaks, which continues to publish it.

This is also a really big deal, and hugely damaging for the CIA. Those tools were new, and they’re impressive. I have been told that the CIA is desperately trying to hire coders to replace what was lost.

For both of these leaks, one big question is attribution: who did this? A whistleblower wouldn’t sit on attack tools for years before publishing. A whistleblower would act more like Snowden or Manning, publishing immediately — ­and publishing documents that discuss what the US is doing to whom, not simply a bunch of attack tools. It just doesn’t make sense. Neither does random hackers. Or cybercriminals. I think it’s being done by a country or countries.

My guess was, and is still, Russia in both cases. Here’s my reasoning. Whoever got this information years before and is leaking it now has to 1) be capable of hacking the NSA and/or the CIA, and 2) willing to publish it all. Countries like Israel and France are certainly capable, but wouldn’t ever publish. Countries like North Korea or Iran probably aren’t capable. The list of countries who fit both criteria is small: Russia, China, and…and…and I’m out of ideas. And China is currently trying to make nice with the US.

Last August, Edward Snowden guessed Russia, too.

So Russia — ­or someone else­ — steals these secrets, and presumably uses them to both defend its own networks and hack other countries while deflecting blame for a couple of years. For it to publish now means that the intelligence value of the information is now lower than the embarrassment value to the NSA and CIA. This could be because the US figured out that its tools were hacked, and maybe even by whom; which would make the tools less valuable against US government targets, although still valuable against third parties.

The message that comes with publishing seems clear to me: “We are so deep into your business that we don’t care if we burn these few-years-old capabilities, as well as the fact that we have them. There’s just nothing you can do about it.” It’s bragging.

Which is exactly the same thing Ledgett is doing to the Russians. Maybe the capabilities he talked about are long gone, so there’s nothing lost in exposing sources and methods. Or maybe he too is bragging: saying to the Russians that he doesn’t care if they know. He’s certainly bragging to every other country that is paying attention to his remarks. (He may be bluffing, of course, hoping to convince others that the US has intelligence capabilities it doesn’t.)

What happens when intelligence agencies go to war with each other and don’t tell the rest of us? I think there’s something going on between the US and Russia that the public is just seeing pieces of. We have no idea why, or where it will go next, and can only speculate.

This essay previously appeared on Lawfare.com.

In Case You Missed These: AWS Security Blog Posts from January, February, and March

Post Syndicated from Craig Liebendorfer original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/in-case-you-missed-these-aws-security-blog-posts-from-january-february-and-march/

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In case you missed any AWS Security Blog posts published so far in 2017, they are summarized and linked to below. The posts are shown in reverse chronological order (most recent first), and the subject matter ranges from protecting dynamic web applications against DDoS attacks to monitoring AWS account configuration changes and API calls to Amazon EC2 security groups.

March

March 22: How to Help Protect Dynamic Web Applications Against DDoS Attacks by Using Amazon CloudFront and Amazon Route 53
Using a content delivery network (CDN) such as Amazon CloudFront to cache and serve static text and images or downloadable objects such as media files and documents is a common strategy to improve webpage load times, reduce network bandwidth costs, lessen the load on web servers, and mitigate distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. AWS WAF is a web application firewall that can be deployed on CloudFront to help protect your application against DDoS attacks by giving you control over which traffic to allow or block by defining security rules. When users access your application, the Domain Name System (DNS) translates human-readable domain names (for example, www.example.com) to machine-readable IP addresses (for example, 192.0.2.44). A DNS service, such as Amazon Route 53, can effectively connect users’ requests to a CloudFront distribution that proxies requests for dynamic content to the infrastructure hosting your application’s endpoints. In this blog post, I show you how to deploy CloudFront with AWS WAF and Route 53 to help protect dynamic web applications (with dynamic content such as a response to user input) against DDoS attacks. The steps shown in this post are key to implementing the overall approach described in AWS Best Practices for DDoS Resiliency and enable the built-in, managed DDoS protection service, AWS Shield.

March 21: New AWS Encryption SDK for Python Simplifies Multiple Master Key Encryption
The AWS Cryptography team is happy to announce a Python implementation of the AWS Encryption SDK. This new SDK helps manage data keys for you, and it simplifies the process of encrypting data under multiple master keys. As a result, this new SDK allows you to focus on the code that drives your business forward. It also provides a framework you can easily extend to ensure that you have a cryptographic library that is configured to match and enforce your standards. The SDK also includes ready-to-use examples. If you are a Java developer, you can refer to this blog post to see specific Java examples for the SDK. In this blog post, I show you how you can use the AWS Encryption SDK to simplify the process of encrypting data and how to protect your encryption keys in ways that help improve application availability by not tying you to a single region or key management solution.

March 21: Updated CJIS Workbook Now Available by Request
The need for guidance when implementing Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)–compliant solutions has become of paramount importance as more law enforcement customers and technology partners move to store and process criminal justice data in the cloud. AWS services allow these customers to easily and securely architect a CJIS-compliant solution when handling criminal justice data, creating a durable, cost-effective, and secure IT infrastructure that better supports local, state, and federal law enforcement in carrying out their public safety missions. AWS has created several documents (collectively referred to as the CJIS Workbook) to assist you in aligning with the FBI’s CJIS Security Policy. You can use the workbook as a framework for developing CJIS-compliant architecture in the AWS Cloud. The workbook helps you define and test the controls you operate, and document the dependence on the controls that AWS operates (compute, storage, database, networking, regions, Availability Zones, and edge locations).

March 9: New Cloud Directory API Makes It Easier to Query Data Along Multiple Dimensions
Today, we made available a new Cloud Directory API, ListObjectParentPaths, that enables you to retrieve all available parent paths for any directory object across multiple hierarchies. Use this API when you want to fetch all parent objects for a specific child object. The order of the paths and objects returned is consistent across iterative calls to the API, unless objects are moved or deleted. In case an object has multiple parents, the API allows you to control the number of paths returned by using a paginated call pattern. In this blog post, I use an example directory to demonstrate how this new API enables you to retrieve data across multiple dimensions to implement powerful applications quickly.

March 8: How to Access the AWS Management Console Using AWS Microsoft AD and Your On-Premises Credentials
AWS Directory Service for Microsoft Active Directory, also known as AWS Microsoft AD, is a managed Microsoft Active Directory (AD) hosted in the AWS Cloud. Now, AWS Microsoft AD makes it easy for you to give your users permission to manage AWS resources by using on-premises AD administrative tools. With AWS Microsoft AD, you can grant your on-premises users permissions to resources such as the AWS Management Console instead of adding AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user accounts or configuring AD Federation Services (AD FS) with Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). In this blog post, I show how to use AWS Microsoft AD to enable your on-premises AD users to sign in to the AWS Management Console with their on-premises AD user credentials to access and manage AWS resources through IAM roles.

March 7: How to Protect Your Web Application Against DDoS Attacks by Using Amazon Route 53 and an External Content Delivery Network
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are attempts by a malicious actor to flood a network, system, or application with more traffic, connections, or requests than it is able to handle. To protect your web application against DDoS attacks, you can use AWS Shield, a DDoS protection service that AWS provides automatically to all AWS customers at no additional charge. You can use AWS Shield in conjunction with DDoS-resilient web services such as Amazon CloudFront and Amazon Route 53 to improve your ability to defend against DDoS attacks. Learn more about architecting for DDoS resiliency by reading the AWS Best Practices for DDoS Resiliency whitepaper. You also have the option of using Route 53 with an externally hosted content delivery network (CDN). In this blog post, I show how you can help protect the zone apex (also known as the root domain) of your web application by using Route 53 to perform a secure redirect to prevent discovery of your application origin.

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February

February 27: Now Generally Available – AWS Organizations: Policy-Based Management for Multiple AWS Accounts
Today, AWS Organizations moves from Preview to General Availability. You can use Organizations to centrally manage multiple AWS accounts, with the ability to create a hierarchy of organizational units (OUs). You can assign each account to an OU, define policies, and then apply those policies to an entire hierarchy, specific OUs, or specific accounts. You can invite existing AWS accounts to join your organization, and you can also create new accounts. All of these functions are available from the AWS Management Console, the AWS Command Line Interface (CLI), and through the AWS Organizations API.To read the full AWS Blog post about today’s launch, see AWS Organizations – Policy-Based Management for Multiple AWS Accounts.

February 23: s2n Is Now Handling 100 Percent of SSL Traffic for Amazon S3
Today, we’ve achieved another important milestone for securing customer data: we have replaced OpenSSL with s2n for all internal and external SSL traffic in Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) commercial regions. This was implemented with minimal impact to customers, and multiple means of error checking were used to ensure a smooth transition, including client integration tests, catching potential interoperability conflicts, and identifying memory leaks through fuzz testing.

February 22: Easily Replace or Attach an IAM Role to an Existing EC2 Instance by Using the EC2 Console
AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles enable your applications running on Amazon EC2 to use temporary security credentials. IAM roles for EC2 make it easier for your applications to make API requests securely from an instance because they do not require you to manage AWS security credentials that the applications use. Recently, we enabled you to use temporary security credentials for your applications by attaching an IAM role to an existing EC2 instance by using the AWS CLI and SDK. To learn more, see New! Attach an AWS IAM Role to an Existing Amazon EC2 Instance by Using the AWS CLI. Starting today, you can attach an IAM role to an existing EC2 instance from the EC2 console. You can also use the EC2 console to replace an IAM role attached to an existing instance. In this blog post, I will show how to attach an IAM role to an existing EC2 instance from the EC2 console.

February 22: How to Audit Your AWS Resources for Security Compliance by Using Custom AWS Config Rules
AWS Config Rules enables you to implement security policies as code for your organization and evaluate configuration changes to AWS resources against these policies. You can use Config rules to audit your use of AWS resources for compliance with external compliance frameworks such as CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark and with your internal security policies related to the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP), and other regimes. AWS provides some predefined, managed Config rules. You also can create custom Config rules based on criteria you define within an AWS Lambda function. In this post, I show how to create a custom rule that audits AWS resources for security compliance by enabling VPC Flow Logs for an Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). The custom rule meets requirement 4.3 of the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark: “Ensure VPC flow logging is enabled in all VPCs.”

February 13: AWS Announces CISPE Membership and Compliance with First-Ever Code of Conduct for Data Protection in the Cloud
I have two exciting announcements today, both showing AWS’s continued commitment to ensuring that customers can comply with EU Data Protection requirements when using our services.

February 13: How to Enable Multi-Factor Authentication for AWS Services by Using AWS Microsoft AD and On-Premises Credentials
You can now enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for users of AWS services such as Amazon WorkSpaces and Amazon QuickSight and their on-premises credentials by using your AWS Directory Service for Microsoft Active Directory (Enterprise Edition) directory, also known as AWS Microsoft AD. MFA adds an extra layer of protection to a user name and password (the first “factor”) by requiring users to enter an authentication code (the second factor), which has been provided by your virtual or hardware MFA solution. These factors together provide additional security by preventing access to AWS services, unless users supply a valid MFA code.

February 13: How to Create an Organizational Chart with Separate Hierarchies by Using Amazon Cloud Directory
Amazon Cloud Directory enables you to create directories for a variety of use cases, such as organizational charts, course catalogs, and device registries. Cloud Directory offers you the flexibility to create directories with hierarchies that span multiple dimensions. For example, you can create an organizational chart that you can navigate through separate hierarchies for reporting structure, location, and cost center. In this blog post, I show how to use Cloud Directory APIs to create an organizational chart with two separate hierarchies in a single directory. I also show how to navigate the hierarchies and retrieve data. I use the Java SDK for all the sample code in this post, but you can use other language SDKs or the AWS CLI.

February 10: How to Easily Log On to AWS Services by Using Your On-Premises Active Directory
AWS Directory Service for Microsoft Active Directory (Enterprise Edition), also known as Microsoft AD, now enables your users to log on with just their on-premises Active Directory (AD) user name—no domain name is required. This new domainless logon feature makes it easier to set up connections to your on-premises AD for use with applications such as Amazon WorkSpaces and Amazon QuickSight, and it keeps the user logon experience free from network naming. This new interforest trusts capability is now available when using Microsoft AD with Amazon WorkSpaces and Amazon QuickSight Enterprise Edition. In this blog post, I explain how Microsoft AD domainless logon works with AD interforest trusts, and I show an example of setting up Amazon WorkSpaces to use this capability.

February 9: New! Attach an AWS IAM Role to an Existing Amazon EC2 Instance by Using the AWS CLI
AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles enable your applications running on Amazon EC2 to use temporary security credentials that AWS creates, distributes, and rotates automatically. Using temporary credentials is an IAM best practice because you do not need to maintain long-term keys on your instance. Using IAM roles for EC2 also eliminates the need to use long-term AWS access keys that you have to manage manually or programmatically. Starting today, you can enable your applications to use temporary security credentials provided by AWS by attaching an IAM role to an existing EC2 instance. You can also replace the IAM role attached to an existing EC2 instance. In this blog post, I show how you can attach an IAM role to an existing EC2 instance by using the AWS CLI.

February 8: How to Remediate Amazon Inspector Security Findings Automatically
The Amazon Inspector security assessment service can evaluate the operating environments and applications you have deployed on AWS for common and emerging security vulnerabilities automatically. As an AWS-built service, Amazon Inspector is designed to exchange data and interact with other core AWS services not only to identify potential security findings but also to automate addressing those findings. Previous related blog posts showed how you can deliver Amazon Inspector security findings automatically to third-party ticketing systems and automate the installation of the Amazon Inspector agent on new Amazon EC2 instances. In this post, I show how you can automatically remediate findings generated by Amazon Inspector. To get started, you must first run an assessment and publish any security findings to an Amazon Simple Notification Service (SNS) topic. Then, you create an AWS Lambda function that is triggered by those notifications. Finally, the Lambda function examines the findings and then implements the appropriate remediation based on the type of issue.

February 6: How to Simplify Security Assessment Setup Using Amazon EC2 Systems Manager and Amazon Inspector
In a July 2016 AWS Blog post, I discussed how to integrate Amazon Inspector with third-party ticketing systems by using Amazon Simple Notification Service (SNS) and AWS Lambda. This AWS Security Blog post continues in the same vein, describing how to use Amazon Inspector to automate various aspects of security management. In this post, I show you how to install the Amazon Inspector agent automatically through the Amazon EC2 Systems Manager when a new Amazon EC2 instance is launched. In a subsequent post, I will show you how to update EC2 instances automatically that run Linux when Amazon Inspector discovers a missing security patch.

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January

January 30: How to Protect Data at Rest with Amazon EC2 Instance Store Encryption
Encrypting data at rest is vital for regulatory compliance to ensure that sensitive data saved on disks is not readable by any user or application without a valid key. Some compliance regulations such as PCI DSS and HIPAA require that data at rest be encrypted throughout the data lifecycle. To this end, AWS provides data-at-rest options and key management to support the encryption process. For example, you can encrypt Amazon EBS volumes and configure Amazon S3 buckets for server-side encryption (SSE) using AES-256 encryption. Additionally, Amazon RDS supports Transparent Data Encryption (TDE). Instance storage provides temporary block-level storage for Amazon EC2 instances. This storage is located on disks attached physically to a host computer. Instance storage is ideal for temporary storage of information that frequently changes, such as buffers, caches, and scratch data. By default, files stored on these disks are not encrypted. In this blog post, I show a method for encrypting data on Linux EC2 instance stores by using Linux built-in libraries. This method encrypts files transparently, which protects confidential data. As a result, applications that process the data are unaware of the disk-level encryption.

January 27: How to Detect and Automatically Remediate Unintended Permissions in Amazon S3 Object ACLs with CloudWatch Events
Amazon S3 Access Control Lists (ACLs) enable you to specify permissions that grant access to S3 buckets and objects. When S3 receives a request for an object, it verifies whether the requester has the necessary access permissions in the associated ACL. For example, you could set up an ACL for an object so that only the users in your account can access it, or you could make an object public so that it can be accessed by anyone. If the number of objects and users in your AWS account is large, ensuring that you have attached correctly configured ACLs to your objects can be a challenge. For example, what if a user were to call the PutObjectAcl API call on an object that is supposed to be private and make it public? Or, what if a user were to call the PutObject with the optional Acl parameter set to public-read, therefore uploading a confidential file as publicly readable? In this blog post, I show a solution that uses Amazon CloudWatch Events to detect PutObject and PutObjectAcl API calls in near-real time and helps ensure that the objects remain private by making automatic PutObjectAcl calls, when necessary.

January 26: Now Available: Amazon Cloud Directory—A Cloud-Native Directory for Hierarchical Data
Today we are launching Amazon Cloud Directory. This service is purpose-built for storing large amounts of strongly typed hierarchical data. With the ability to scale to hundreds of millions of objects while remaining cost-effective, Cloud Directory is a great fit for all sorts of cloud and mobile applications.

January 24: New SOC 2 Report Available: Confidentiality
As with everything at Amazon, the success of our security and compliance program is primarily measured by one thing: our customers’ success. Our customers drive our portfolio of compliance reports, attestations, and certifications that support their efforts in running a secure and compliant cloud environment. As a result of our engagement with key customers across the globe, we are happy to announce the publication of our new SOC 2 Confidentiality report. This report is available now through AWS Artifact in the AWS Management Console.

January 18: Compliance in the Cloud for New Financial Services Cybersecurity Regulations
Financial regulatory agencies are focused more than ever on ensuring responsible innovation. Consequently, if you want to achieve compliance with financial services regulations, you must be increasingly agile and employ dynamic security capabilities. AWS enables you to achieve this by providing you with the tools you need to scale your security and compliance capabilities on AWS. The following breakdown of the most recent cybersecurity regulations, NY DFS Rule 23 NYCRR 500, demonstrates how AWS continues to focus on your regulatory needs in the financial services sector.

January 9: New Amazon GameDev Blog Post: Protect Multiplayer Game Servers from DDoS Attacks by Using Amazon GameLift
In online gaming, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks target a game’s network layer, flooding servers with requests until performance degrades considerably. These attacks can limit a game’s availability to players and limit the player experience for those who can connect. Today’s new Amazon GameDev Blog post uses a typical game server architecture to highlight DDoS attack vulnerabilities and discusses how to stay protected by using built-in AWS Cloud security, AWS security best practices, and the security features of Amazon GameLift. Read the post to learn more.

January 6: The Top 10 Most Downloaded AWS Security and Compliance Documents in 2016
The following list includes the 10 most downloaded AWS security and compliance documents in 2016. Using this list, you can learn about what other people found most interesting about security and compliance last year.

January 6: FedRAMP Compliance Update: AWS GovCloud (US) Region Receives a JAB-Issued FedRAMP High Baseline P-ATO for Three New Services
Three new services in the AWS GovCloud (US) region have received a Provisional Authority to Operate (P-ATO) from the Joint Authorization Board (JAB) under the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP). JAB issued the authorization at the High baseline, which enables US government agencies and their service providers the capability to use these services to process the government’s most sensitive unclassified data, including Personal Identifiable Information (PII), Protected Health Information (PHI), Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), criminal justice information (CJI), and financial data.

January 4: The Top 20 Most Viewed AWS IAM Documentation Pages in 2016
The following 20 pages were the most viewed AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) documentation pages in 2016. I have included a brief description with each link to give you a clearer idea of what each page covers. Use this list to see what other people have been viewing and perhaps to pique your own interest about a topic you’ve been meaning to research.

January 3: The Most Viewed AWS Security Blog Posts in 2016
The following 10 posts were the most viewed AWS Security Blog posts that we published during 2016. You can use this list as a guide to catch up on your blog reading or even read a post again that you found particularly useful.

January 3: How to Monitor AWS Account Configuration Changes and API Calls to Amazon EC2 Security Groups
You can use AWS security controls to detect and mitigate risks to your AWS resources. The purpose of each security control is defined by its control objective. For example, the control objective of an Amazon VPC security group is to permit only designated traffic to enter or leave a network interface. Let’s say you have an Internet-facing e-commerce website, and your security administrator has determined that only HTTP (TCP port 80) and HTTPS (TCP 443) traffic should be allowed access to the public subnet. As a result, your administrator configures a security group to meet this control objective. What if, though, someone were to inadvertently change this security group’s rules and enable FTP or other protocols to access the public subnet from any location on the Internet? That expanded access could weaken the security posture of your assets. Consequently, your administrator might need to monitor the integrity of your company’s security controls so that the controls maintain their desired effectiveness. In this blog post, I explore two methods for detecting unintended changes to VPC security groups. The two methods address not only control objectives but also control failures.

If you have questions about or issues with implementing the solutions in any of these posts, please start a new thread on the forum identified near the end of each post.

– Craig

WikiLeaks Not Disclosing CIA-Hoarded Vulnerabilities to Companies

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/03/wikileaks_not_d.html

WikiLeaks has started publishing a large collection of classified CIA documents, including information on several — possibly many — unpublished (i.e., zero-day) vulnerabilities in computing equipment used by Americans. Despite assurances that the US government prioritizes defense over offense, it seems that the CIA was hoarding vulnerabilities. (It’s not just the CIA; last year we learned that the NSA is, too.)

Publishing those vulnerabilities into the public means that they’ll get fixed, but it also means that they’ll be used by criminals and other governments in the time period between when they’re published and when they’re patched. WikiLeaks has said that it’s going to do the right thing and privately disclose those vulnerabilities to the companies first.

This process seems to be hitting some snags:

This week, Assange sent an email to Apple, Google, Microsoft and all the companies mentioned in the documents. But instead of reporting the bugs or exploits found in the leaked CIA documents it has in its possession, WikiLeaks made demands, according to multiple sources familiar with the matter who spoke on condition of anonymity.

WikiLeaks included a document in the email, requesting the companies to sign off on a series of conditions before being able to receive the actual technical details to deploy patches, according to sources. It’s unclear what the conditions are, but a source mentioned a 90-day disclosure deadline, which would compel companies to commit to issuing a patch within three months.

I’m okay with a 90-day window; that seems reasonable. But I have no idea what the other conditions are, and how onerous they are.

Honestly, at this point the CIA should do the right thing and disclose all the vulnerabilities to the companies. They’re burned as CIA attack tools. I have every confidence that Russia, China, and several other countries can hack WikiLeaks and get their hands on a copy. By now, their primary value is for defense. The CIA should bypass WikiLeaks and get the vulnerabilities fixed as soon as possible.