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	<title>videoconferencing &#8211; Noise</title>
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	<link>https://noise.getoto.net</link>
	<description>The collective thoughts of the interwebz</description>
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		<title>Zoom Can Spy on Your Calls and Use the Conversation to Train AI, But Says That It Won’t</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/08/15/zoom-can-spy-on-your-calls-and-use-the-conversation-to-train-ai-but-says-that-it-wont/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Aug 2023 11:03:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terms of Service]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[videoconferencing]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67655</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://gizmodo.com/zoom-ai-privacy-policy-train-on-your-data-1850712655">This is why</a> we need regulation:</p>
<blockquote><p>Zoom updated its <a href="https://explore.zoom.us/en/terms/">Terms of Service</a> in March, spelling out that the company reserves the right to train AI on user data with no mention of a way to opt out. On Monday, the company said in a blog post that there’s no need to worry about that. Zoom execs <a href="https://blog.zoom.us/zooms-term-service-ai/">swear</a> the company won’t actually train its AI on your video calls without permission, even though the Terms of Service still say it can.</p></blockquote>
<p>Of course, these are Terms of Service. They can change at any time. Zoom can renege on its promise at any time. There are no rules, only the whims of the company as it tries to maximize its profits...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>Leaking Screen Information on Zoom Calls through Reflections in Eyeglasses</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2022/09/23/leaking-screen-information-on-zoom-calls-through-reflections-in-eyeglasses/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Sep 2022 11:43:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[academic papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[side-channel attacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[videoconferencing]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=65896</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Okay, it’s an obscure threat. But people are <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2022/09/17/glasses_reflections_zoom/">researching it</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>Our models and experimental results in a controlled lab setting show it is possible to reconstruct and recognize with over 75 percent accuracy on-screen texts that have heights as small as 10 mm with a 720p webcam.” That corresponds to 28 pt, a font size commonly used for headings and small headlines.</p>
<p>[…]</p>
<p>Being able to read reflected headline-size text isn’t quite the privacy and security problem of being able to read smaller 9 to 12 pt fonts. But this technique is expected to provide access to smaller font sizes as high-resolution webcams become more common...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Video Conferencing Apps Sometimes Ignore the Mute Button</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2022/04/29/video-conferencing-apps-sometimes-ignore-the-mute-button/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Apr 2022 14:18:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[academic papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[videoconferencing]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=65380</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>New research: “<a href="https://wiscprivacy.com/publication/vca_mute/">Are You Really Muted?: A Privacy Analysis of Mute Buttons in Video Conferencing Apps</a>“:</p>
<blockquote><p><b>Abstract:</b> In the post-pandemic era, video conferencing apps (VCAs) have converted previously private spaces — bedrooms, living rooms, and kitchens — into semi-public extensions of the office. And for the most part, users have accepted these apps in their personal space, without much thought about the permission models that govern the use of their personal data during meetings. While access to a device’s video camera is carefully controlled, little has been done to ensure the same level of privacy for accessing the microphone. In this work, we ask the question: what happens to the microphone data when a user clicks the mute button in a VCA? We first conduct a user study to analyze users’ understanding of the permission model of the mute button. Then, using runtime binary analysis tools, we trace raw audio in many popular VCAs as it traverses the app from the audio driver to the network. We find fragmented policies for dealing with microphone data among VCAs — some continuously monitor the microphone input during mute, and others do so periodically. One app transmits statistics of the audio to its telemetry servers while the app is muted. Using network traffic that we intercept en route to the telemetry server, we implement a proof-of-concept background activity classifier and demonstrate the feasibility of inferring the ongoing background activity during a meeting — cooking, cleaning, typing, etc. We achieved 81.9% macro accuracy on identifying six common background activities using intercepted outgoing telemetry packets when a user is muted...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Zoom Lied about End-to-End Encryption</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2021/08/05/zoom-lied-about-end-to-end-encryption/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Aug 2021 11:25:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[courts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[videoconferencing]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=63530</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The facts aren’t news, but Zoom <a href="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/08/zoom-to-pay-85m-for-lying-about-encryption-and-sending-data-to-facebook-and-google/">will pay $85M</a> — to the class-action attorneys, and to users — for lying to users about end-to-end encryption, and for giving user data to Facebook and Google without consent.</p>
<blockquote><p>The <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.357336/gov.uscourts.cand.357336.190.0.pdf">proposed settlement</a> would generally give Zoom users $15 or $25 each and was filed Saturday at US District Court for the Northern District of California. It came nine months after Zoom agreed to security improvements and a “prohibition on privacy and security misrepresentations” in a settlement with the Federal Trade Commission, but the FTC settlement didn’t include compensation for users...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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