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<channel>
	<title>voting &#8211; Noise</title>
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	<link>https://noise.getoto.net</link>
	<description>The collective thoughts of the interwebz</description>
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		<title>IACR Nullifies Election Because of Lost Decryption Key</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2025/11/24/iacr-nullifies-election-because-of-lost-decryption-key/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2025 12:03:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[keys]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[operational security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=71237</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The International Association of Cryptologic Research—the academic cryptography association that’s been putting conferences like Crypto (back when “crypto” meant “cryptography”) and Eurocrypt since the 1980s—had to <a href="https://www.iacr.org/news/item/27138">nullify</a> an online election when trustee Moti Yung lost his decryption key.</p>
<blockquote><p>For this election and in accordance with the bylaws of the IACR, the three members of the IACR 2025 Election Committee acted as independent trustees, each holding a portion of the cryptographic key material required to jointly decrypt the results. This aspect of Helios’ design ensures that no two trustees could collude to determine the outcome of an election or the contents of individual votes on their own: all trustees must provide their decryption shares...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>AI and Voter Engagement</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2025/11/18/ai-and-voter-engagement/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2025 12:01:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LLM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=71151</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Social media has been a familiar, even mundane, part of life for nearly two decades. It can be easy to forget it was not always that way.</p>
<p>In 2008, social media was just emerging into the mainstream. <a href="https://thefulcrum.us/media-technology/news-literacy-project">Facebook</a> reached <a href="https://www.cnet.com/culture/facebook-hits-100-million-users/">100 million users</a> that summer. And a singular candidate was integrating social media into his political campaign: Barack Obama. His campaign’s use of social media was so bracingly innovative, so impactful, that it was viewed by journalist <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2008/08/19/219185/how-obama-really-did-it-2/">David Talbot</a> and others as the strategy that enabled the first term Senator to win the White House...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>How Cybersecurity Fears Affect Confidence in Voting Systems</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2025/06/30/how-cybersecurity-fears-affect-confidence-in-voting-systems/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Jun 2025 11:05:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[essays]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trust]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=70420</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>American democracy runs on trust, and that trust is cracking.</p>
<p>Nearly half of Americans, both Democrats and Republicans, question whether elections are <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/651185/partisan-split-election-integrity-gets-even-wider.aspx">conducted fairly</a>. Some voters accept election results only <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/rule-law-united-states">when their side wins</a>. The problem isn’t just political polarization—it’s a creeping <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/10/29/elections-in-america-concerns-over-security-divisions-over-expanding-access-to-voting/">erosion of trust</a> in the machinery of democracy itself.</p>
<p>Commentators blame ideological tribalism, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/09/business/media/election-disinformation-2024.html">misinformation campaigns</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/opinion/social-media-polarization-democracy.html">partisan echo chambers</a> for this crisis of trust. But these explanations miss a critical piece of the puzzle: a growing unease with the digital infrastructure that now underpins nearly every aspect of how Americans vote...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>The Voter Experience</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2025/05/22/the-voter-experience/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2025 11:06:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=70286</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Technology and innovation have transformed every part of society, including our electoral experiences. Campaigns are spending and doing more than at any other time in history. Ever-growing war chests fuel billions of voter contacts every cycle. Campaigns now have better ways of scaling outreach methods and offer volunteers and donors more efficient ways to contribute time and money. Campaign staff have adapted to vast changes in media and social media landscapes, and use data analytics to forecast voter turnout and behavior.</p>
<p>Yet despite these unprecedented investments in mobilizing voters, overall trust in electoral health, democratic institutions, voter satisfaction, and electoral engagement has significantly declined. What might we be missing?...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Security Analysis of the MERGE Voting Protocol</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/11/25/security-analysis-of-the-merge-voting-protocol/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Nov 2024 12:09:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[academic papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[darpa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[protocols]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=69616</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Interesting analysis: <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.11796">An Internet Voting System Fatally Flawed in Creative New Ways</a>.</p>
<blockquote><p><b>Abstract:</b> The recently published “MERGE” protocol is designed to be used in the prototype CAC-vote system. The voting kiosk and protocol transmit votes over the internet and then transmit voter-verifiable paper ballots through the mail. In the MERGE protocol, the votes transmitted over the internet are used to tabulate the results and determine the winners, but audits and recounts use the paper ballots that arrive in time. The enunciated motivation for the protocol is to allow (electronic) votes from overseas military voters to be included in preliminary results before a (paper) ballot is received from the voter. MERGE contains interesting ideas that are not inherently unsound; but to make the system trustworthy—to apply the MERGE protocol—would require major changes to the laws, practices, and technical and logistical abilities of U.S. election jurisdictions. The gap between theory and practice is large and unbridgeable for the foreseeable future. Promoters of this research project at DARPA, the agency that sponsored the research, should acknowledge that MERGE is internet voting (election results rely on votes transmitted over the internet except in the event of a full hand count) and refrain from claiming that it could be a component of trustworthy elections without sweeping changes to election law and election administration throughout the U.S...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Problems with Georgia’s Voter Registration Portal</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/08/07/problems-with-georgias-voter-registration-portal/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 07 Aug 2024 11:10:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[fraud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Georgia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[identification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national security policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=69231</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>It’s possible to <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/georgia-voter-registration-cancellation-portal-mtg-raffensperger">cancel</a> other people’s voter registrations:</p>
<blockquote><p>On Friday, four days after Georgia Democrats <a href="https://x.com/GASenateDems/status/1817949715234717988">began warning</a> that bad actors could abuse the state’s new online portal for canceling voter registrations, the Secretary of State’s Office acknowledged to ProPublica that it had identified multiple such attempts…</p>
<p>…the portal suffered at least two security glitches that briefly exposed voters’ dates of birth, the last four digits of their Social Security numbers and their full driver’s license numbers—the exact information needed to cancel others’ voter registrations...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>On Secure Voting Systems</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/03/26/on-secure-voting-systems/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2024 11:08:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68650</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Andrew Appel shepherded a <a href="https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2024/03/18/suggested-principles-for-state-statutes-regarding-ballot-marking-and-vote-tabulation/">public comment</a>—signed by twenty election cybersecurity experts, including myself—on best practices for ballot marking devices and vote tabulation. It was written for the Pennsylvania legislature, but it’s general in nature.</p>
<p>From the executive summary:</p>
<blockquote><p>We believe that no system is perfect, with each having trade-offs. Hand-marked and hand-counted ballots remove the uncertainty introduced by use of electronic machinery and the ability of bad actors to exploit electronic vulnerabilities to remotely alter the results. However, some portion of voters mistakenly mark paper ballots in a manner that will not be counted in the way the voter intended, or which even voids the ballot. Hand-counts delay timely reporting of results, and introduce the possibility for human error, bias, or misinterpretation...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Second Interdisciplinary Workshop on Reimagining Democracy</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2024/01/08/second-interdisciplinary-workshop-on-reimagining-democracy/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jan 2024 12:03:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[conferences]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Schneier news]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68272</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Last month, I convened the Second Interdisciplinary Workshop on Reimagining Democracy (<a href="https://www.schneier.com/iword/2023/">IWORD 2023</a>) at the Harvard Kennedy School Ash Center. As with <a href="https://www.schneier.com/iword/2022/">IWORD 2022</a>, the goal was to bring together a diverse set of thinkers and practitioners to talk about how democracy might be reimagined for the twenty-first century.</p>
<p>My thinking is very broad here. Modern democracy was invented in the mid-eighteenth century, using mid-eighteenth-century technology. Were democracy to be invented from scratch today, with today’s technologies, it would look very different. Representation would look different. Adjudication would look different. Resource allocation and reallocation would look different. Everything would look different, because we would have much more powerful technology to build on and no legacy systems to worry about...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>AI and Lossy Bottlenecks</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/12/28/ai-and-lossy-bottlenecks/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[B. Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Dec 2023 12:01:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LLM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68241</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Artificial intelligence is poised to upend much of society, removing human limitations inherent in many systems. One such limitation is information and logistical bottlenecks in decision-making.</p>
<p>Traditionally, people have been forced to reduce complex choices to a small handful of options that don’t do justice to their true desires. Artificial intelligence has the potential to remove that limitation. And it has the potential to drastically change how democracy functions.</p>
<p>AI researcher <a href="https://tantum.substack.com/p/democracy-on-mars-red-sky-thinking">Tantum</a> <a href="https://tantum.substack.com/p/democracy-on-mars-3-new-tools-for">Collins</a> and I, a <a href="https://www.schneier.com/">public-interest technology scholar...</a></p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Security Analysis of a Thirteenth-Century Venetian Election Protocol</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/12/06/security-analysis-of-a-thirteenth-century-venetian-election-protocol/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Dec 2023 18:18:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[academic papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[history of security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Italy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[protocols]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=68170</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Interesting <a href="https://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2007/HPL-2007-28R1.html">analysis</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>This paper discusses the protocol used for electing the Doge of Venice between 1268 and the end of the Republic in 1797. We will show that it has some useful properties that in addition to being interesting in themselves, also suggest that its fundamental design principle is worth investigating for application to leader election protocols in computer science. For example, it gives some opportunities to minorities while ensuring that more popular candidates are more likely to win, and offers some resistance to corruption of voters...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>AI and US Election Rules</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/10/20/ai-and-us-election-rules/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 2023 11:10:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deep fake]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[essays]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[laws]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67973</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>If an AI breaks the rules for you, does that count as breaking the rules? This is the essential question being taken up by the Federal Election Commission this month, and public input is needed to curtail the potential for AI to take US campaigns (even more) off the rails.</p>
<p>At issue is whether candidates using AI to create deepfaked media for political advertisements should be considered fraud or legitimate electioneering. That is, is it allowable to use <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2023/6/8/23753626/deepfake-political-attack-ad-ron-desantis-donald-trump-anthony-fauci">AI image generators</a> to create photorealistic images depicting Trump hugging Anthony Fauci? And is it allowable to use ...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Security Vulnerability of Switzerland’s E-Voting System</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/10/17/security-vulnerability-of-switzerlands-e-voting-system/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2023 11:11:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Switzerland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67937</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Online voting is insecure, period. This doesn’t stop organizations and governments from using it. (And for low-stakes elections, it’s probably fine.) Switzerland—not low stakes—uses online voting for national elections. Andrew Appel <a href="https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2023/10/06/switzerlands-e-voting-system-has-predictable-implementation-blunder/">explains</a> why it’s a bad idea:</p>
<blockquote><p>Last year, I published <a href="https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/27/how-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/">a 5-part series about Switzerland’s e-voting system</a>. Like any internet voting system, it has inherent security vulnerabilities: if there are malicious insiders, they can corrupt the vote count; and if thousands of voters’ computers are hacked by malware, the malware can change votes as they are transmitted. Switzerland “solves” the problem of malicious insiders in their printing office by officially declaring that they won’t consider that threat model in their cybersecurity assessment...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Deepfake Election Interference in Slovakia</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/10/06/deepfake-election-interference-in-slovakia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Oct 2023 07:04:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deep fake]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67872</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Well designed and well timed <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/slovakia-election-deepfakes">deepfake</a> or two Slovakian politicians discussing how to rig the election:</p>
<blockquote><p>Šimečka and <i>Denník N</i> immediately denounced the audio as fake. The fact-checking department of news agency AFP <a href="https://fakty.afp.com/doc.afp.com.33WY9LF">said</a> the audio showed signs of being manipulated using AI. But the recording was posted during a 48-hour moratorium ahead of the polls opening, during which media outlets and politicians are supposed to stay silent. That meant, under Slovakia’s election rules, the post was difficult to widely debunk. And, because the post was audio, it exploited a loophole in Meta’s manipulated-media policy, which ...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Political Disinformation and AI</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/10/05/political-disinformation-and-ai/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Oct 2023 11:12:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ChatGPT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[essays]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[propaganda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67848</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Elections around the world are facing an evolving threat from foreign actors, one that involves artificial intelligence.</p>
<p>Countries trying to influence each other’s elections entered a new era in 2016, when the Russians launched a series of social media disinformation campaigns targeting the US presidential election. Over the next seven years, a number of countries—most prominently China and Iran—used social media to influence foreign elections, both in the US and elsewhere in the world. There’s no reason to expect 2023 and 2024 to be any different...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>December’s Reimagining Democracy Workshop</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/08/23/decembers-reimagining-democracy-workshop/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Aug 2023 11:06:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[essays]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67710</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Imagine that we’ve all—all of us, all of society—landed on some alien planet, and we have to form a government: clean slate. We don’t have any legacy systems from the US or any other country. We don’t have any special or unique interests to perturb our thinking.</p>
<p>How would we govern ourselves?</p>
<p>It’s unlikely that we would use the systems we have today. The modern representative democracy was the best form of government that mid-eighteenth-century technology could conceive of. The twenty-first century is a different place scientifically, technically and socially...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>UK Electoral Commission Hacked</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/08/16/uk-electoral-commission-hacked/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Aug 2023 11:17:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67678</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The UK Electoral Commission discovered last year that it was hacked the year before. That&#8217;s fourteen months between the hack and the discovery. It doesn&#8217;t know who was behind the hack.
We worked with external security experts and the Nation...]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Buying Campaign Contributions as a Hack</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/07/14/buying-campaign-contributions-as-a-hack/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jul 2023 11:09:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[debates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67541</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The first Republican primary debate has a popularity threshold to determine who gets to appear: 40,000 individual contributors. Now there are a lot of conventional ways a candidate can get that many contributors. Doug Burgum came up with a novel idea: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/10/us/politics/doug-burgum-donations-debate.html">buy them</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>A long-shot contender at the bottom of recent polls, Mr. Burgum is offering $20 gift cards to the first 50,000 people who donate at least $1 to his campaign. And one lucky donor, as his campaign advertised on Facebook, will have the chance to win a Yeti Tundra 45 cooler that typically costs more than $300—just for donating at least $1...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Large Language Models and Elections</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/05/04/large-language-models-and-elections/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 May 2023 10:45:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deep fake]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[essays]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=67301</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this week, the Republican National Committee <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLMMxgtxQ1Y&#38;themeRefresh=1">released a video</a> that it claims was “built entirely with AI imagery.” The content of the ad isn’t especially novel—a dystopian vision of America under a second term with President Joe Biden—but the deliberate emphasis on the technology used to create it stands out: It’s a “<a href="https://adage.com/article/campaign-trail/daisy-50-america-s-influential-political-ad/294849">Daisy</a>” moment for the 2020s.</p>
<p>We should expect more of this kind of thing. The <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/craigsmith/2022/12/02/how-artificial-intelligence-swayed-the-midterm-electionsand-will-become-a-permanent-feature-of-democracy/?sh=13effb117b31">applications</a> of AI to political <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/28/us/politics/artificial-intelligence-2024-campaigns.html">advertising</a> have not escaped campaigners, who are already “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/28/us/politics/artificial-intelligence-2024-campaigns.html">pressure testing</a>” possible uses for the technology. In the 2024 presidential election campaign, you can bank on the appearance of AI-generated personalized fundraising emails, text messages from chatbots urging you to vote, and maybe even some deepfaked campaign ...</p>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>US Cyber Command Operations During the 2022 Midterm Elections</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2023/01/25/us-cyber-command-operations-during-the-2022-midterm-elections/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2023 12:00:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national security policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=66667</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The head of both US Cyber Command and the NSA, Gen. Paul Nakasone, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/22/cybercom-russia-iran-attacks/">broadly discussed</a> that first organization’s offensive cyber operations during the runup to the 2022 midterm elections. He didn’t name names, of course:</p>
<blockquote><p>We did conduct operations persistently to make sure that our foreign adversaries couldn’t utilize infrastructure to impact us,” said Nakasone. “We understood how foreign adversaries utilize infrastructure throughout the world. We had that mapped pretty well. And we wanted to make sure that we took it down at key times.”</p>
<p>Nakasone noted that Cybercom’s national mission force, aided by NSA, followed a “campaign plan” to deprive the hackers of their tools and networks. “Rest assured,” he said. “We were doing operations well before the midterms began, and we were doing operations likely on the day of the midterms.” And they continued until the elections were certified, he said...</p></blockquote>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Analyzing the Swiss E-Voting System</title>
		<link>https://noise.getoto.net/2022/07/01/analyzing-the-swiss-e-voting-system/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bruce Schneier]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jul 2022 14:33:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.schneier.com/?p=65622</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Andrew Appel has a long analysis of the Swiss online voting system. It&#8217;s a really good analysis of both the system and the official analyses.
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