Tag Archives: embedded

All Systems Go! 2018 CfP Open

Post Syndicated from Lennart Poettering original http://0pointer.net/blog/all-systems-go-2018-cfp-open.html

The All Systems Go! 2018 Call for Participation is Now Open!

The Call for Participation (CFP) for All Systems Go!
2018
is now open. We’d like to invite you
to submit your proposals for consideration to the CFP submission
site
.

ASG image

The CFP will close on July 30th. Notification of acceptance and
non-acceptance will go out within 7 days of the closing of the CFP.

All topics relevant to foundational open-source Linux technologies are
welcome. In particular, however, we are looking for proposals
including, but not limited to, the following topics:

  • Low-level container executors and infrastructure
  • IoT and embedded OS infrastructure
  • BPF and eBPF filtering
  • OS, container, IoT image delivery and updating
  • Building Linux devices and applications
  • Low-level desktop technologies
  • Networking
  • System and service management
  • Tracing and performance measuring
  • IPC and RPC systems
  • Security and Sandboxing

While our focus is definitely more on the user-space side of things,
talks about kernel projects are welcome, as long as they have a clear
and direct relevance for user-space.

For more information please visit our conference
website
!

Roku Displays FBI Anti-Piracy Warning to Legitimate YouTube & Netflix Users

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/roku-displays-fbi-anti-piracy-warning-to-legitimate-youtube-netflix-users-180516/

In 2018, dealing with copyright infringement claims is a daily issue for many content platforms. The law in many regions demands swift attention and in order to appease copyright holders, most platforms are happy to oblige.

While it’s not unusual for ‘pirate’ content and services to suddenly disappear in response to a DMCA or similar notice, the same is rarely true for entire legitimate services.

But that’s what appeared to happen on the Roku platform during the night, when YouTube, Netflix and other channels disappeared only to be replaced with an ominous anti-piracy warning.

As the embedded tweet shows, the message caused confusion among Roku users who were only using their devices to access legal content. Messages replacing Netflix and YouTube seemed to have caused the greatest number of complaints but many other services were affected.

FoxSportsGo, FandangoNow, and India-focused YuppTV and Hotstar were also blacked out. As were the yoga and transformational videos specialists over at Gaia, the horror buffs at ChillerFlix, and UK TV service BritBox.

But while users scratched their heads, with some misguidedly blaming Roku for not being diligent enough against piracy, Roku took to Twitter to reveal that rather than anti-piracy complaints against the channels in question, a technical hitch was to blame.

However, a subsequent statement to CNET suggested that while blacking out Netflix and YouTube might have been accidental, Roku appears to have been taking anti-piracy action against another channel or channels at the time, with the measures inadvertently spilling over to innocent parties.

“We use that warning when we detect content that has violated copyright,” Roku said in a statement.

“Some channels in our Channel Store displayed that message and became inaccessible after Roku implemented a targeted anti-piracy measure on the platform.”

The precise nature of the action taken by Roku is unknown but it’s clear that copyright infringement is currently a hot topic for the platform.

Roku is currently fighting legal action in Mexico which ordered its products off the shelves following complaints that its platform is used by pirates. That led to an FBI warning being shown for what was believed to be the first time against the XTV and other channels last year.

This March, Roku took action against the popular USTVNow channel following what was described as a “third party” copyright infringement complaint. Just a couple of weeks later, Roku followed up by removing the controversial cCloud channel.

With Roku currently fighting to have sales reinstated in Mexico against a backdrop of claims that up to 40% of its users are pirates, it’s unlikely that Roku is suddenly going to go soft on piracy, so more channel outages can be expected in the future.

In the meantime, the scary FBI warnings of last evening are beginning to fade away (for legitimate channels at least) after the company issued advice on how to fix the problem.

“The recent outage which affected some channels has been resolved. Go to Settings > System > System update > Check now for a software update. Some channels may require you to log in again. Thank you for your patience,” the company wrote in an update.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

Details on a New PGP Vulnerability

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/details_on_a_ne.html

A new PGP vulnerability was announced today. Basically, the vulnerability makes use of the fact that modern e-mail programs allow for embedded HTML objects. Essentially, if an attacker can intercept and modify a message in transit, he can insert code that sends the plaintext in a URL to a remote website. Very clever.

The EFAIL attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards to reveal the plaintext of encrypted emails. In a nutshell, EFAIL abuses active content of HTML emails, for example externally loaded images or styles, to exfiltrate plaintext through requested URLs. To create these exfiltration channels, the attacker first needs access to the encrypted emails, for example, by eavesdropping on network traffic, compromising email accounts, email servers, backup systems or client computers. The emails could even have been collected years ago.

The attacker changes an encrypted email in a particular way and sends this changed encrypted email to the victim. The victim’s email client decrypts the email and loads any external content, thus exfiltrating the plaintext to the attacker.

A few initial comments:

1. Being able to intercept and modify e-mails in transit is the sort of thing the NSA can do, but is hard for the average hacker. That being said, there are circumstances where someone can modify e-mails. I don’t mean to minimize the seriousness of this attack, but that is a consideration.

2. The vulnerability isn’t with PGP or S/MIME itself, but in the way they interact with modern e-mail programs. You can see this in the two suggested short-term mitigations: “No decryption in the e-mail client,” and “disable HTML rendering.”

3. I’ve been getting some weird press calls from reporters wanting to know if this demonstrates that e-mail encryption is impossible. No, this just demonstrates that programmers are human and vulnerabilities are inevitable. PGP almost certainly has fewer bugs than your average piece of software, but it’s not bug free.

3. Why is anyone using encrypted e-mail anymore, anyway? Reliably and easily encrypting e-mail is an insurmountably hard problem for reasons having nothing to do with today’s announcement. If you need to communicate securely, use Signal. If having Signal on your phone will arouse suspicion, use WhatsApp.

I’ll post other commentaries and analyses as I find them.

EDITED TO ADD (5/14): News articles.

Slashdot thread.

Video Deters People From Pirate Sites…Or Encourages Them to Start One?

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/video-deters-people-from-pirate-sites-or-encourages-them-to-start-one-180505/

There are almost as many anti-piracy strategies as there are techniques for downloading.

Litigation and education are probably the two most likely to be seen by the public, who are often directly targeted by the entertainment industries.

Over the years this has led to many campaigns, one of which famously stated that piracy is a crime while equating it to the physical theft of a car, a handbag, a television, or a regular movie DVD. It’s debatable whether these campaigns have made much difference but they have raised awareness and some of the responses have been hilarious.

While success remains hard to measure, it hasn’t stopped these PSAs from being made. The latest efforts come out of Sweden, where the country’s Patent and Registration Office (PRV) was commissioned by the government to increase public awareness of copyright and help change attitudes surrounding streaming and illegal downloading.

“The purpose is, among other things, to reduce the use of illegal streaming sites and make it easier and safer to find and choose legal options,” PRV says.

“Every year, criminal networks earn millions of dollars from illegal streaming. This money comes from advertising on illegal sites and is used for other criminal activities. The purpose of our film is to inform about this.”

The series of videos show pirates in their supposed natural habitats of beautiful mansions, packed with luxurious items such as indoor pools, fancy staircases, and stacks of money. For some reason (perhaps to depict anonymity, perhaps to suggest something more sinister) the pirates are all dressed in animal masks, such as this one enjoying his Dodge Viper.

The clear suggestion here is that people who visit pirate sites and stream unlicensed content are helping to pay for this guy’s bright green car. The same holds true for his indoor swimming pool, jet bike, and gold chains in the next clip.

While some might have a problem with pirates getting rich from their clicks, it can’t have escaped the targets of these videos that they too are benefiting from the scheme. Granted, hyena-man gets the pool and the Viper, but they get the latest movies. It seems unlikely that pirate streamers refused to watch the copy of Black Panther that leaked onto the web this week (a month before its retail release) on the basis that someone else was getting rich from it.

That being said, most people will probably balk at elements of the full PSA, which suggests that revenue from illegal streaming goes on to fuel other crimes, such as prescription drug offenses.

After reporting piracy cases for more than twelve years, no one at TF has ever seen evidence of this happening with any torrent or streaming site operators. Still, it makes good drama for the full video, embedded below.

“In the film we follow a fictional occupational criminal who gives us a tour of his beautiful villa. He proudly shows up his multi-criminal activity, which was made possible by means of advertising money from his illegal streaming services,” PRV explains.

The dark tone and creepy masks are bound to put some people off but one has to question the effect this kind of video could have on younger people. Do pirates really make mountains of money so huge that they can only be counted by machine? If they do, then it’s a lot less risky than almost any other crime that yields this claimed level of profit.

With that in mind, will this video deter the public or simply encourage people to get involved for some of that big money? We sent a link to the operator of a large pirate site for his considered opinion.

“WTF,” he responded.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

Secure Build with AWS CodeBuild and LayeredInsight

Post Syndicated from Asif Khan original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/secure-build-with-aws-codebuild-and-layeredinsight/

This post is written by Asif Awan, Chief Technology Officer of Layered InsightSubin Mathew – Software Development Manager for AWS CodeBuild, and Asif Khan – Solutions Architect

Enterprises adopt containers because they recognize the benefits: speed, agility, portability, and high compute density. They understand how accelerating application delivery and deployment pipelines makes it possible to rapidly slipstream new features to customers. Although the benefits are indisputable, this acceleration raises concerns about security and corporate compliance with software governance. In this blog post, I provide a solution that shows how Layered Insight, the pioneer and global leader in container-native application protection, can be used with seamless application build and delivery pipelines like those available in AWS CodeBuild to address these concerns.

Layered Insight solutions

Layered Insight enables organizations to unify DevOps and SecOps by providing complete visibility and control of containerized applications. Using the industry’s first embedded security approach, Layered Insight solves the challenges of container performance and protection by providing accurate insight into container images, adaptive analysis of running containers, and automated enforcement of container behavior.

 

AWS CodeBuild

AWS CodeBuild is a fully managed build service that compiles source code, runs tests, and produces software packages that are ready to deploy. With CodeBuild, you don’t need to provision, manage, and scale your own build servers. CodeBuild scales continuously and processes multiple builds concurrently, so your builds are not left waiting in a queue. You can get started quickly by using prepackaged build environments, or you can create custom build environments that use your own build tools.

 

Problem Definition

Security and compliance concerns span the lifecycle of application containers. Common concerns include:

Visibility into the container images. You need to verify the software composition information of the container image to determine whether known vulnerabilities associated with any of the software packages and libraries are included in the container image.

Governance of container images is critical because only certain open source packages/libraries, of specific versions, should be included in the container images. You need support for mechanisms for blacklisting all container images that include a certain version of a software package/library, or only allowing open source software that come with a specific type of license (such as Apache, MIT, GPL, and so on). You need to be able to address challenges such as:

·       Defining the process for image compliance policies at the enterprise, department, and group levels.

·       Preventing the images that fail the compliance checks from being deployed in critical environments, such as staging, pre-prod, and production.

Visibility into running container instances is critical, including:

·       CPU and memory utilization.

·       Security of the build environment.

·       All activities (system, network, storage, and application layer) of the application code running in each container instance.

Protection of running container instances that is:

·       Zero-touch to the developers (not an SDK-based approach).

·       Zero touch to the DevOps team and doesn’t limit the portability of the containerized application.

·       This protection must retain the option to switch to a different container stack or orchestration layer, or even to a different Container as a Service (CaaS ).

·       And it must be a fully automated solution to SecOps, so that the SecOps team doesn’t have to manually analyze and define detailed blacklist and whitelist policies.

 

Solution Details

In AWS CodeCommit, we have three projects:
●     “Democode” is a simple Java application, with one buildspec to build the app into a Docker container (run by build-demo-image CodeBuild project), and another to instrument said container (instrument-image CodeBuild project). The resulting container is stored in ECR repo javatestasjavatest:20180415-layered. This instrumented container is running in AWS Fargate cluster demo-java-appand can be seen in the Layered Insight runtime console as the javatestapplication in us-east-1.
●     aws-codebuild-docker-imagesis a clone of the official aws-codebuild-docker-images repo on GitHub . This CodeCommit project is used by the build-python-builder CodeBuild project to build the python 3.3.6 codebuild image and is stored at the codebuild-python ECR repo. We then manually instructed the Layered Insight console to instrument the image.
●     scan-java-imagecontains just a buildspec.yml file. This file is used by the scan-java-image CodeBuild project to instruct Layered Assessment to perform a vulnerability scan of the javatest container image built previously, and then run the scan results through a compliance policy that states there should be no medium vulnerabilities. This build fails — but in this case that is a success: the scan completes successfully, but compliance fails as there are medium-level issues found in the scan.

This build is performed using the instrumented version of the Python 3.3.6 CodeBuild image, so the activity of the processes running within the build are recorded each time within the LI console.

Build container image

Create or use a CodeCommit project with your application. To build this image and store it in Amazon Elastic Container Registry (Amazon ECR), add a buildspec file to the project and build a container image and create a CodeBuild project.

Scan container image

Once the image is built, create a new buildspec in the same project or a new one that looks similar to below (update ECR URL as necessary):

version: 0.2
phases:
  pre_build:
    commands:
      - echo Pulling down LI Scan API client scripts
      - git clone https://github.com/LayeredInsight/scan-api-example-python.git
      - echo Setting up LI Scan API client
      - cd scan-api-example-python
      - pip install layint_scan_api
      - pip install -r requirements.txt
  build:
    commands:
      - echo Scanning container started on `date`
      - IMAGEID=$(./li_add_image --name <aws-region>.amazonaws.com/javatest:20180415)
      - ./li_wait_for_scan -v --imageid $IMAGEID
      - ./li_run_image_compliance -v --imageid $IMAGEID --policyid PB15260f1acb6b2aa5b597e9d22feffb538256a01fbb4e5a95

Add the buildspec file to the git repo, push it, and then build a CodeBuild project using with the instrumented Python 3.3.6 CodeBuild image at <aws-region>.amazonaws.com/codebuild-python:3.3.6-layered. Set the following environment variables in the CodeBuild project:
●     LI_APPLICATIONNAME – name of the build to display
●     LI_LOCATION – location of the build project to display
●     LI_API_KEY – ApiKey:<key-name>:<api-key>
●     LI_API_HOST – location of the Layered Insight API service

Instrument container image

Next, to instrument the new container image:

  1. In the Layered Insight runtime console, ensure that the ECR registry and credentials are defined (click the Setup icon and the ‘+’ sign on the top right of the screen to add a new container registry). Note the name given to the registry in the console, as this needs to be referenced in the li_add_imagecommand in the script, below.
  2. Next, add a new buildspec (with a new name) to the CodeCommit project, such as the one shown below. This code will download the Layered Insight runtime client, and use it to instruct the Layered Insight service to instrument the image that was just built:
    version: 0.2
    phases:
    pre_build:
    commands:
    echo Pulling down LI API Runtime client scripts
    git clone https://github.com/LayeredInsight/runtime-api-example-python
    echo Setting up LI API client
    cd runtime-api-example-python
    pip install layint-runtime-api
    pip install -r requirements.txt
    build:
    commands:
    echo Instrumentation started on `date`
    ./li_add_image --registry "Javatest ECR" --name IMAGE_NAME:TAG --description "IMAGE DESCRIPTION" --policy "Default Policy" --instrument --wait --verbose
  3. Commit and push the new buildspec file.
  4. Going back to CodeBuild, create a new project, with the same CodeCommit repo, but this time select the new buildspec file. Use a Python 3.3.6 builder – either the AWS or LI Instrumented version.
  5. Click Continue
  6. Click Save
  7. Run the build, again on the master branch.
  8. If everything runs successfully, a new image should appear in the ECR registry with a -layered suffix. This is the instrumented image.

Run instrumented container image

When the instrumented container is now run — in ECS, Fargate, or elsewhere — it will log data back to the Layered Insight runtime console. It’s appearance in the console can be modified by setting the LI_APPLICATIONNAME and LI_LOCATION environment variables when running the container.

Conclusion

In the above blog we have provided you steps needed to embed governance and runtime security in your build pipelines running on AWS CodeBuild using Layered Insight.

 

 

 

Pirates Taunt Amazon Over New “Turd Sandwich” Prime Video Quality

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/pirates-taunt-amazon-over-new-turd-sandwich-prime-video-quality-180419/

Even though they generally aren’t paying for the content they consume, don’t fall into the trap of believing that all pirates are eternally grateful for even poor quality media.

Without a doubt, some of the most quality-sensitive individuals are to be found in pirate communities and they aren’t scared to make their voices known when release groups fail to come up with the best possible goods.

This week there’s been a sustained chorus of disapproval over the quality of pirate video releases sourced from Amazon Prime. The anger is usually directed at piracy groups who fail to capture content in the correct manner but according to a number of observers, the problem is actually at Amazon’s end.

Discussions on Reddit, for example, report that episodes in a single TV series have been declining in filesize and bitrate, from 1.56 GB in 720p at a 3073 kb/s video bitrate for episode 1, down to 907 MB in 720p at just 1514 kb/s video bitrate for episode 10.

Numerous theories as to why this may be the case are being floated around, including that Amazon is trying to save on bandwidth expenses. While this is a possibility, the company hasn’t made any announcements to that end.

Indeed, one legitimate customer reported that he’d raised the quality issue with Amazon and they’d said that the problem was “probably on his end”.

“I have Amazon Prime Video and I noticed the quality was always great for their exclusive shows, so I decided to try buying the shows on Amazon instead of iTunes this year. I paid for season pass subscriptions for Legion, Billions and Homeland this year,” he wrote.

“Just this past weekend, I have noticed a significant drop in details compared to weeks before! So naturally I assumed it was an issue on my end. I started trying different devices, calling support, etc, but nothing really helped.

“Billions continued to look like a blurry mess, almost like I was watching a standard definition DVD instead of the crystal clear HD I paid for and have experienced in the past! And when I check the previous episodes, sure enough, they look fantastic again. What the heck??”

With Amazon distancing itself from the issues, piracy groups have already begun to dig in the knife. Release group DEFLATE has been particularly critical.

“Amazon, in their infinite wisdom, have decided to start fucking with the quality of their encodes. They’re now reaching Netflix’s subpar 1080p.H264 levels, and their H265 encodes aren’t even close to what Netflix produces,” the group said in a file attached to S02E07 of The Good Fight released on Sunday.

“Netflix is able to produce drastic visual improvements with their H265 encodes compared to H264 across every original. In comparison, Amazon can’t decide whether H265 or H264 is going to produce better results, and as a result we suffer for it.”

Arrr! The quality be fallin’

So what’s happening exactly?

A TorrentFreak source (who tells us he’s been working in the BluRay/DCP authoring business for the last 10 years) was kind enough to give us two opinions, one aimed at the techies and another at us mere mortals.

“In technical terms, it appears [Amazon has] increased the CRF [Constant Rate Factor] value they use when encoding for both the HEVC [H265] and H264 streams. Previously, their H264 streams were using CRF 18 and a max bitrate of 15Mbit/s, which usually resulted in file sizes of roughly 3GB, or around 10Mbit/s. Similarly with their HEVC streams, they were using CRF 20 and resulting in streams which were around the same size,” he explained.

“In the past week, the H264 streams have decreased by up to 50% for some streams. While there are no longer any x264 headers embedded in the H264 streams, the HEVC streams still retain those headers and the CRF value used has been increased, so it does appear this change has been done on purpose.”

In layman’s terms, our source believes that Amazon had previously been using an encoding profile that was “right on the edge of relatively good quality” which kept bitrates relatively low but high enough to ensure no perceivable loss of quality.

“H264 streams encoded with CRF 18 could provide an acceptable compromise between quality and file size, where the loss of detail is often negligible when watched at regular viewing distances, at a desk, or in a lounge room on a larger TV,” he explained.

“Recently, it appears these values have been intentionally changed in order to lower the bitrate and file sizes for reasons unknown. As a result, the quality of some streams has been reduced by up to 50% of their previous values. This has introduced a visual loss of quality, comparable to that of viewing something in standard definition versus high definition.”

With the situation failing to improve during the week, by the time piracy group DEFLATE released S03E14 of Supergirl on Tuesday their original criticism had transformed into flat-out insults.

“These are only being done in H265 because Amazon have shit the bed, and it’s a choice between a turd sandwich and a giant douche,” they wrote, offering these images as illustrative of the problem and these indicating what should be achievable.

With DEFLATE advising customers to start complaining to Amazon, the memes have already begun, with unfavorable references to now-defunct group YIFY (which was often chastized for its low quality rips) and even a spin on one of the most well known anti-piracy campaigns.

You wouldn’t download stream….

TorrentFreak contacted Amazon Prime for comment on both the recent changes and growing customer complaints but at the time of publication we were yet to receive a response.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

[$] Prospects for free software in cars

Post Syndicated from jake original https://lwn.net/Articles/751165/rss

Car manufacturers, like most companies, navigate a narrow lane between the
benefits of using free and open-source software and the perceived or real
importance of hiding their trade secrets. Many are using
free software in some of the myriad software components that make up a
modern car, and even work in consortia to develop free software. At the
recent LibrePlanet
conference, free-software advocate Jeremiah Foster covered progress in the
automotive sector and made an impassioned case for more free software in their
embedded systems.

Subscribers can read on for a report on the talk by guest author Andy Oram.

Linux kernel lockdown and UEFI Secure Boot

Post Syndicated from Matthew Garrett original https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/50577.html

David Howells recently published the latest version of his kernel lockdown patchset. This is intended to strengthen the boundary between root and the kernel by imposing additional restrictions that prevent root from modifying the kernel at runtime. It’s not the first feature of this sort – /dev/mem no longer allows you to overwrite arbitrary kernel memory, and you can configure the kernel so only signed modules can be loaded. But the present state of things is that these security features can be easily circumvented (by using kexec to modify the kernel security policy, for instance).

Why do you want lockdown? If you’ve got a setup where you know that your system is booting a trustworthy kernel (you’re running a system that does cryptographic verification of its boot chain, or you built and installed the kernel yourself, for instance) then you can trust the kernel to keep secrets safe from even root. But if root is able to modify the running kernel, that guarantee goes away. As a result, it makes sense to extend the security policy from the boot environment up to the running kernel – it’s really just an extension of configuring the kernel to require signed modules.

The patchset itself isn’t hugely conceptually controversial, although there’s disagreement over the precise form of certain restrictions. But one patch has, because it associates whether or not lockdown is enabled with whether or not UEFI Secure Boot is enabled. There’s some backstory that’s important here.

Most kernel features get turned on or off by either build-time configuration or by passing arguments to the kernel at boot time. There’s two ways that this patchset allows a bootloader to tell the kernel to enable lockdown mode – it can either pass the lockdown argument on the kernel command line, or it can set the secure_boot flag in the bootparams structure that’s passed to the kernel. If you’re running in an environment where you’re able to verify the kernel before booting it (either through cryptographic validation of the kernel, or knowing that there’s a secret tied to the TPM that will prevent the system booting if the kernel’s been tampered with), you can turn on lockdown.

There’s a catch on UEFI systems, though – you can build the kernel so that it looks like an EFI executable, and then run it directly from the firmware. The firmware doesn’t know about Linux, so can’t populate the bootparam structure, and there’s no mechanism to enforce command lines so we can’t rely on that either. The controversial patch simply adds a kernel configuration option that automatically enables lockdown when UEFI secure boot is enabled and otherwise leaves it up to the user to choose whether or not to turn it on.

Why do we want lockdown enabled when booting via UEFI secure boot? UEFI secure boot is designed to prevent the booting of any bootloaders that the owner of the system doesn’t consider trustworthy[1]. But a bootloader is only software – the only thing that distinguishes it from, say, Firefox is that Firefox is running in user mode and has no direct access to the hardware. The kernel does have direct access to the hardware, and so there’s no meaningful distinction between what grub can do and what the kernel can do. If you can run arbitrary code in the kernel then you can use the kernel to boot anything you want, which defeats the point of UEFI Secure Boot. Linux distributions don’t want their kernels to be used to be used as part of an attack chain against other distributions or operating systems, so they enable lockdown (or equivalent functionality) for kernels booted this way.

So why not enable it everywhere? There’s a couple of reasons. The first is that some of the features may break things people need – for instance, some strange embedded apps communicate with PCI devices by mmap()ing resources directly from sysfs[2]. This is blocked by lockdown, which would break them. Distributions would then have to ship an additional kernel that had lockdown disabled (it’s not possible to just have a command line argument that disables it, because an attacker could simply pass that), and users would have to disable secure boot to boot that anyway. It’s easier to just tie the two together.

The second is that it presents a promise of security that isn’t really there if your system didn’t verify the kernel. If an attacker can replace your bootloader or kernel then the ability to modify your kernel at runtime is less interesting – they can just wait for the next reboot. Appearing to give users safety assurances that are much less strong than they seem to be isn’t good for keeping users safe.

So, what about people whose work is impacted by lockdown? Right now there’s two ways to get stuff blocked by lockdown unblocked: either disable secure boot[3] (which will disable it until you enable secure boot again) or press alt-sysrq-x (which will disable it until the next boot). Discussion has suggested that having an additional secure variable that disables lockdown without disabling secure boot validation might be helpful, and it’s not difficult to implement that so it’ll probably happen.

Overall: the patchset isn’t controversial, just the way it’s integrated with UEFI secure boot. The reason it’s integrated with UEFI secure boot is because that’s the policy most distributions want, since the alternative is to enable it everywhere even when it doesn’t provide real benefits but does provide additional support overhead. You can use it even if you’re not using UEFI secure boot. We should have just called it securelevel.

[1] Of course, if the owner of a system isn’t allowed to make that determination themselves, the same technology is restricting the freedom of the user. This is abhorrent, and sadly it’s the default situation in many devices outside the PC ecosystem – most of them not using UEFI. But almost any security solution that aims to prevent malicious software from running can also be used to prevent any software from running, and the problem here is the people unwilling to provide that policy to users rather than the security features.
[2] This is how X.org used to work until the advent of kernel modesetting
[3] If your vendor doesn’t provide a firmware option for this, run sudo mokutil –disable-validation

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AWS Certificate Manager Launches Private Certificate Authority

Post Syndicated from Randall Hunt original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-certificate-manager-launches-private-certificate-authority/

Today we’re launching a new feature for AWS Certificate Manager (ACM), Private Certificate Authority (CA). This new service allows ACM to act as a private subordinate CA. Previously, if a customer wanted to use private certificates, they needed specialized infrastructure and security expertise that could be expensive to maintain and operate. ACM Private CA builds on ACM’s existing certificate capabilities to help you easily and securely manage the lifecycle of your private certificates with pay as you go pricing. This enables developers to provision certificates in just a few simple API calls while administrators have a central CA management console and fine grained access control through granular IAM policies. ACM Private CA keys are stored securely in AWS managed hardware security modules (HSMs) that adhere to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 security standards. ACM Private CA automatically maintains certificate revocation lists (CRLs) in Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) and lets administrators generate audit reports of certificate creation with the API or console. This service is packed full of features so let’s jump in and provision a CA.

Provisioning a Private Certificate Authority (CA)

First, I’ll navigate to the ACM console in my region and select the new Private CAs section in the sidebar. From there I’ll click Get Started to start the CA wizard. For now, I only have the option to provision a subordinate CA so we’ll select that and use my super secure desktop as the root CA and click Next. This isn’t what I would do in a production setting but it will work for testing out our private CA.

Now, I’ll configure the CA with some common details. The most important thing here is the Common Name which I’ll set as secure.internal to represent my internal domain.

Now I need to choose my key algorithm. You should choose the best algorithm for your needs but know that ACM has a limitation today that it can only manage certificates that chain up to to RSA CAs. For now, I’ll go with RSA 2048 bit and click Next.

In this next screen, I’m able to configure my certificate revocation list (CRL). CRLs are essential for notifying clients in the case that a certificate has been compromised before certificate expiration. ACM will maintain the revocation list for me and I have the option of routing my S3 bucket to a custome domain. In this case I’ll create a new S3 bucket to store my CRL in and click Next.

Finally, I’ll review all the details to make sure I didn’t make any typos and click Confirm and create.

A few seconds later and I’m greeted with a fancy screen saying I successfully provisioned a certificate authority. Hooray! I’m not done yet though. I still need to activate my CA by creating a certificate signing request (CSR) and signing that with my root CA. I’ll click Get started to begin that process.

Now I’ll copy the CSR or download it to a server or desktop that has access to my root CA (or potentially another subordinate – so long as it chains to a trusted root for my clients).

Now I can use a tool like openssl to sign my cert and generate the certificate chain.


$openssl ca -config openssl_root.cnf -extensions v3_intermediate_ca -days 3650 -notext -md sha256 -in csr/CSR.pem -out certs/subordinate_cert.pem
Using configuration from openssl_root.cnf
Enter pass phrase for /Users/randhunt/dev/amzn/ca/private/root_private_key.pem:
Check that the request matches the signature
Signature ok
The Subject's Distinguished Name is as follows
stateOrProvinceName   :ASN.1 12:'Washington'
localityName          :ASN.1 12:'Seattle'
organizationName      :ASN.1 12:'Amazon'
organizationalUnitName:ASN.1 12:'Engineering'
commonName            :ASN.1 12:'secure.internal'
Certificate is to be certified until Mar 31 06:05:30 2028 GMT (3650 days)
Sign the certificate? [y/n]:y


1 out of 1 certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]y
Write out database with 1 new entries
Data Base Updated

After that I’ll copy my subordinate_cert.pem and certificate chain back into the console. and click Next.

Finally, I’ll review all the information and click Confirm and import. I should see a screen like the one below that shows my CA has been activated successfully.

Now that I have a private CA we can provision private certificates by hopping back to the ACM console and creating a new certificate. After clicking create a new certificate I’ll select the radio button Request a private certificate then I’ll click Request a certificate.

From there it’s just similar to provisioning a normal certificate in ACM.

Now I have a private certificate that I can bind to my ELBs, CloudFront Distributions, API Gateways, and more. I can also export the certificate for use on embedded devices or outside of ACM managed environments.

Available Now
ACM Private CA is a service in and of itself and it is packed full of features that won’t fit into a blog post. I strongly encourage the interested readers to go through the developer guide and familiarize themselves with certificate based security. ACM Private CA is available in in US East (N. Virginia), US East (Ohio), US West (Oregon), Asia Pacific (Singapore), Asia Pacific (Sydney), Asia Pacific (Tokyo), Canada (Central), EU (Frankfurt) and EU (Ireland). Private CAs cost $400 per month (prorated) for each private CA. You are not charged for certificates created and maintained in ACM but you are charged for certificates where you have access to the private key (exported or created outside of ACM). The pricing per certificate is tiered starting at $0.75 per certificate for the first 1000 certificates and going down to $0.001 per certificate after 10,000 certificates.

I’m excited to see administrators and developers take advantage of this new service. As always please let us know what you think of this service on Twitter or in the comments below.

Randall

Engineering deep dive: Encoding of SCTs in certificates

Post Syndicated from Let's Encrypt - Free SSL/TLS Certificates original https://letsencrypt.org/2018/04/04/sct-encoding.html

<p>Let&rsquo;s Encrypt recently <a href="https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/signed-certificate-timestamps-embedded-in-certificates/57187">launched SCT embedding in
certificates</a>.
This feature allows browsers to check that a certificate was submitted to a
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency">Certificate Transparency</a>
log. As part of the launch, we did a thorough review
that the encoding of Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) in our certificates
matches the relevant specifications. In this post, I&rsquo;ll dive into the details.
You&rsquo;ll learn more about X.509, ASN.1, DER, and TLS encoding, with references to
the relevant RFCs.</p>

<p>Certificate Transparency offers three ways to deliver SCTs to a browser: In a
TLS extension, in stapled OCSP, or embedded in a certificate. We chose to
implement the embedding method because it would just work for Let&rsquo;s Encrypt
subscribers without additional work. In the SCT embedding method, we submit
a &ldquo;precertificate&rdquo; with a <a href="#poison">poison extension</a> to a set of
CT logs, and get back SCTs. We then issue a real certificate based on the
precertificate, with two changes: The poison extension is removed, and the SCTs
obtained earlier are added in another extension.</p>

<p>Given a certificate, let&rsquo;s first look for the SCT list extension. According to CT (<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3">RFC 6962
section 3.3</a>),
the extension OID for a list of SCTs is <code>1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2</code>. An <a href="http://www.hl7.org/Oid/information.cfm">OID (object
ID)</a> is a series of integers, hierarchically
assigned and globally unique. They are used extensively in X.509, for instance
to uniquely identify extensions.</p>

<p>We can <a href="https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/cert/031f2484307c9bc511b3123cb236a480d451">download an example certificate</a>,
and view it using OpenSSL (if your OpenSSL is old, it may not display the
detailed information):</p>

<pre><code>$ openssl x509 -noout -text -inform der -in Downloads/031f2484307c9bc511b3123cb236a480d451

CT Precertificate SCTs:
Signed Certificate Timestamp:
Version : v1(0)
Log ID : DB:74:AF:EE:CB:29:EC:B1:FE:CA:3E:71:6D:2C:E5:B9:
AA:BB:36:F7:84:71:83:C7:5D:9D:4F:37:B6:1F:BF:64
Timestamp : Mar 29 18:45:07.993 2018 GMT
Extensions: none
Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:44:02:20:7E:1F:CD:1E:9A:2B:D2:A5:0A:0C:81:E7:
13:03:3A:07:62:34:0D:A8:F9:1E:F2:7A:48:B3:81:76:
40:15:9C:D3:02:20:65:9F:E9:F1:D8:80:E2:E8:F6:B3:
25:BE:9F:18:95:6D:17:C6:CA:8A:6F:2B:12:CB:0F:55:
FB:70:F7:59:A4:19
Signed Certificate Timestamp:
Version : v1(0)
Log ID : 29:3C:51:96:54:C8:39:65:BA:AA:50:FC:58:07:D4:B7:
6F:BF:58:7A:29:72:DC:A4:C3:0C:F4:E5:45:47:F4:78
Timestamp : Mar 29 18:45:08.010 2018 GMT
Extensions: none
Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:46:02:21:00:AB:72:F1:E4:D6:22:3E:F8:7F:C6:84:
91:C2:08:D2:9D:4D:57:EB:F4:75:88:BB:75:44:D3:2F:
95:37:E2:CE:C1:02:21:00:8A:FF:C4:0C:C6:C4:E3:B2:
45:78:DA:DE:4F:81:5E:CB:CE:2D:57:A5:79:34:21:19:
A1:E6:5B:C7:E5:E6:9C:E2
</code></pre>

<p>Now let&rsquo;s go a little deeper. How is that extension represented in
the certificate? Certificates are expressed in
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_Syntax_Notation_One">ASN.1</a>,
which generally refers to both a language for expressing data structures
and a set of formats for encoding them. The most common format,
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.690#DER_encoding">DER</a>,
is a tag-length-value format. That is, to encode an object, first you write
down a tag representing its type (usually one byte), then you write
down a number expressing how long the object is, then you write down
the object contents. This is recursive: An object can contain multiple
objects within it, each of which has its own tag, length, and value.</p>

<p>One of the cool things about DER and other tag-length-value formats is that you
can decode them to some degree without knowing what they mean. For instance, I
can tell you that 0x30 means the data type &ldquo;SEQUENCE&rdquo; (a struct, in ASN.1
terms), and 0x02 means &ldquo;INTEGER&rdquo;, then give you this hex byte sequence to
decode:</p>

<pre><code>30 06 02 01 03 02 01 0A
</code></pre>

<p>You could tell me right away that decodes to:</p>

<pre><code>SEQUENCE
INTEGER 3
INTEGER 10
</code></pre>

<p>Try it yourself with this great <a href="https://lapo.it/asn1js/#300602010302010A">JavaScript ASN.1
decoder</a>. However, you wouldn&rsquo;t know
what those integers represent without the corresponding ASN.1 schema (or
&ldquo;module&rdquo;). For instance, if you knew that this was a piece of DogData, and the
schema was:</p>

<pre><code>DogData ::= SEQUENCE {
legs INTEGER,
cutenessLevel INTEGER
}
</code></pre>

<p>You&rsquo;d know this referred to a three-legged dog with a cuteness level of 10.</p>

<p>We can take some of this knowledge and apply it to our certificates. As a first
step, convert the above certificate to hex with
<code>xxd -ps &lt; Downloads/031f2484307c9bc511b3123cb236a480d451</code>. You can then copy
and paste the result into
<a href="https://lapo.it/asn1js">lapo.it/asn1js</a> (or use <a href="https://lapo.it/asn1js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this handy link</a>). You can also run <code>openssl asn1parse -i -inform der -in Downloads/031f2484307c9bc511b3123cb236a480d451</code> to use OpenSSL&rsquo;s parser, which is less easy to use in some ways, but easier to copy and paste.</p>

<p>In the decoded data, we can find the OID <code>1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2</code>, indicating
the SCT list extension. Per <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-17">RFC 5280, section
4.1</a>, an extension is defined:</p>

<pre><code>Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING
— contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
— corresponding to the extension type identified
— by extnID
}
</code></pre>

<p>We&rsquo;ve found the <code>extnID</code>. The &ldquo;critical&rdquo; field is omitted because it has the
default value (false). Next up is the <code>extnValue</code>. This has the type
<code>OCTET STRING</code>, which has the tag &ldquo;0x04&rdquo;. <code>OCTET STRING</code> means &ldquo;here&rsquo;s
a bunch of bytes!&rdquo; In this case, as described by the spec, those bytes
happen to contain more DER. This is a fairly common pattern in X.509
to deal with parameterized data. For instance, this allows defining a
structure for extensions without knowing ahead of time all the structures
that a future extension might want to carry in its value. If you&rsquo;re a C
programmer, think of it as a <code>void*</code> for data structures. If you prefer Go,
think of it as an <code>interface{}</code>.</p>

<p>Here&rsquo;s that <code>extnValue</code>:</p>

<pre><code>04 81 F5 0481F200F0007500DB74AFEECB29ECB1FECA3E716D2CE5B9AABB36F7847183C75D9D4F37B61FBF64000001627313EB19000004030046304402207E1FCD1E9A2BD2A50A0C81E713033A0762340DA8F91EF27A48B3817640159CD30220659FE9F1D880E2E8F6B325BE9F18956D17C6CA8A6F2B12CB0F55FB70F759A419007700293C519654C83965BAAA50FC5807D4B76FBF587A2972DCA4C30CF4E54547F478000001627313EB2A0000040300483046022100AB72F1E4D6223EF87FC68491C208D29D4D57EBF47588BB7544D32F9537E2CEC10221008AFFC40CC6C4E3B24578DADE4F815ECBCE2D57A579342119A1E65BC7E5E69CE2
</code></pre>

<p>That&rsquo;s tag &ldquo;0x04&rdquo;, meaning <code>OCTET STRING</code>, followed by &ldquo;0x81 0xF5&rdquo;, meaning
&ldquo;this string is 245 bytes long&rdquo; (the 0x81 prefix is part of <a href="#variable-length">variable length
number encoding</a>).</p>

<p>According to <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3">RFC 6962, section
3.3</a>, &ldquo;obtained SCTs
can be directly embedded in the final certificate, by encoding the
SignedCertificateTimestampList structure as an ASN.1 <code>OCTET STRING</code>
and inserting the resulting data in the TBSCertificate as an X.509v3
certificate extension&rdquo;</p>

<p>So, we have an <code>OCTET STRING</code>, all&rsquo;s good, right? Except if you remove the
tag and length from extnValue to get its value, you&rsquo;re left with:</p>

<pre><code>04 81 F2 00F0007500DB74AFEEC…
</code></pre>

<p>There&rsquo;s that &ldquo;0x04&rdquo; tag again, but with a shorter length. Why
do we nest one <code>OCTET STRING</code> inside another? It&rsquo;s because the
contents of extnValue are required by RFC 5280 to be valid DER, but a
SignedCertificateTimestampList is not encoded using DER (more on that
in a minute). So, by RFC 6962, a SignedCertificateTimestampList is wrapped in an
<code>OCTET STRING</code>, which is wrapped in another <code>OCTET STRING</code> (the extnValue).</p>

<p>Once we decode that second <code>OCTET STRING</code>, we&rsquo;re left with the contents:</p>

<pre><code>00F0007500DB74AFEEC…
</code></pre>

<p>&ldquo;0x00&rdquo; isn&rsquo;t a valid tag in DER. What is this? It&rsquo;s TLS encoding. This is
defined in <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-4">RFC 5246, section 4</a>
(the TLS 1.2 RFC). TLS encoding, like ASN.1, has both a way to define data
structures and a way to encode those structures. TLS encoding differs
from DER in that there are no tags, and lengths are only encoded when necessary for
variable-length arrays. Within an encoded structure, the type of a field is determined by
its position, rather than by a tag. This means that TLS-encoded structures are
more compact than DER structures, but also that they can&rsquo;t be processed without
knowing the corresponding schema. For instance, here&rsquo;s the top-level schema from
<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3">RFC 6962, section 3.3</a>:</p>

<pre><code> The contents of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING embedded in an OCSP extension
or X509v3 certificate extension are as follows:

opaque SerializedSCT&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;

struct {
SerializedSCT sct_list &lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
} SignedCertificateTimestampList;

Here, &quot;SerializedSCT&quot; is an opaque byte string that contains the
serialized TLS structure.
</code></pre>

<p>Right away, we&rsquo;ve found one of those variable-length arrays. The length of such
an array (in bytes) is always represented by a length field just big enough to
hold the max array size. The max size of an <code>sct_list</code> is 65535 bytes, so the
length field is two bytes wide. Sure enough, those first two bytes are &ldquo;0x00
0xF0&rdquo;, or 240 in decimal. In other words, this <code>sct_list</code> will have 240 bytes. We
don&rsquo;t yet know how many SCTs will be in it. That will become clear only by
continuing to parse the encoded data and seeing where each struct ends (spoiler
alert: there are two SCTs!).</p>

<p>Now we know the first SerializedSCT starts with <code>0075…</code>. SerializedSCT
is itself a variable-length field, this time containing <code>opaque</code> bytes (much like <code>OCTET STRING</code>
back in the ASN.1 world). Like SignedCertificateTimestampList, it has a max size
of 65535 bytes, so we pull off the first two bytes and discover that the first
SerializedSCT is 0x0075 (117 decimal) bytes long. Here&rsquo;s the whole thing, in
hex:</p>

<pre><code>00DB74AFEECB29ECB1FECA3E716D2CE5B9AABB36F7847183C75D9D4F37B61FBF64000001627313EB19000004030046304402207E1FCD1E9A2BD2A50A0C81E713033A0762340DA8F91EF27A48B3817640159CD30220659FE9F1D880E2E8F6B325BE9F18956D17C6CA8A6F2B12CB0F55FB70F759A419
</code></pre>

<p>This can be decoded using the TLS encoding struct defined in <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#page-13">RFC 6962, section
3.2</a>:</p>

<pre><code>enum { v1(0), (255) }
Version;

struct {
opaque key_id[32];
} LogID;

opaque CtExtensions&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;

struct {
Version sct_version;
LogID id;
uint64 timestamp;
CtExtensions extensions;
digitally-signed struct {
Version sct_version;
SignatureType signature_type = certificate_timestamp;
uint64 timestamp;
LogEntryType entry_type;
select(entry_type) {
case x509_entry: ASN.1Cert;
case precert_entry: PreCert;
} signed_entry;
CtExtensions extensions;
};
} SignedCertificateTimestamp;
</code></pre>

<p>Breaking that down:</p>

<pre><code># Version sct_version v1(0)
00
# LogID id (aka opaque key_id[32])
DB74AFEECB29ECB1FECA3E716D2CE5B9AABB36F7847183C75D9D4F37B61FBF64
# uint64 timestamp (milliseconds since the epoch)
000001627313EB19
# CtExtensions extensions (zero-length array)
0000
# digitally-signed struct
04030046304402207E1FCD1E9A2BD2A50A0C81E713033A0762340DA8F91EF27A48B3817640159CD30220659FE9F1D880E2E8F6B325BE9F18956D17C6CA8A6F2B12CB0F55FB70F759A419
</code></pre>

<p>To understand the &ldquo;digitally-signed struct,&rdquo; we need to turn back to <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-4.7">RFC 5246,
section 4.7</a>. It says:</p>

<pre><code>A digitally-signed element is encoded as a struct DigitallySigned:

struct {
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm;
opaque signature&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;
} DigitallySigned;
</code></pre>

<p>And in <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1">section
7.4.1.4.1</a>:</p>

<pre><code>enum {
none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5),
sha512(6), (255)
} HashAlgorithm;

enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) }
SignatureAlgorithm;

struct {
HashAlgorithm hash;
SignatureAlgorithm signature;
} SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
</code></pre>

<p>We have &ldquo;0x0403&rdquo;, which corresponds to sha256(4) and ecdsa(3). The next two
bytes, &ldquo;0x0046&rdquo;, tell us the length of the &ldquo;opaque signature&rdquo; field, 70 bytes in
decimal. To decode the signature, we reference <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#page-20">RFC 4492 section
5.4</a>, which says:</p>

<pre><code>The digitally-signed element is encoded as an opaque vector &lt;0..2^16-1&gt;, the
contents of which are the DER encoding corresponding to the
following ASN.1 notation.

Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER,
s INTEGER
}
</code></pre>

<p>Having dived through two layers of TLS encoding, we are now back in ASN.1 land!
We
<a href="https://lapo.it/asn1js/#304402207E1FCD1E9A2BD2A50A0C81E713033A0762340DA8F91EF27A48B3817640159CD30220659FE9F1D880E2E8F6B325BE9F18956D17C6CA8A6F2B12CB0F55FB70F759A419">decode</a>
the remaining bytes into a SEQUENCE containing two INTEGERS. And we&rsquo;re done! Here&rsquo;s the whole
extension decoded:</p>

<pre><code># Extension SEQUENCE – RFC 5280
30
# length 0x0104 bytes (260 decimal)
820104
# OBJECT IDENTIFIER
06
# length 0x0A bytes (10 decimal)
0A
# value (1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2)
2B06010401D679020402
# OCTET STRING
04
# length 0xF5 bytes (245 decimal)
81F5
# OCTET STRING (embedded) – RFC 6962
04
# length 0xF2 bytes (242 decimal)
81F2
# Beginning of TLS encoded SignedCertificateTimestampList – RFC 5246 / 6962
# length 0xF0 bytes
00F0
# opaque SerializedSCT&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;
# length 0x75 bytes
0075
# Version sct_version v1(0)
00
# LogID id (aka opaque key_id[32])
DB74AFEECB29ECB1FECA3E716D2CE5B9AABB36F7847183C75D9D4F37B61FBF64
# uint64 timestamp (milliseconds since the epoch)
000001627313EB19
# CtExtensions extensions (zero-length array)
0000
# digitally-signed struct – RFC 5426
# SignatureAndHashAlgorithm (ecdsa-sha256)
0403
# opaque signature&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;
# length 0x0046
0046
# DER-encoded Ecdsa-Sig-Value – RFC 4492
30 # SEQUENCE
44 # length 0x44 bytes
02 # r INTEGER
20 # length 0x20 bytes
# value
7E1FCD1E9A2BD2A50A0C81E713033A0762340DA8F91EF27A48B3817640159CD3
02 # s INTEGER
20 # length 0x20 bytes
# value
659FE9F1D880E2E8F6B325BE9F18956D17C6CA8A6F2B12CB0F55FB70F759A419
# opaque SerializedSCT&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;
# length 0x77 bytes
0077
# Version sct_version v1(0)
00
# LogID id (aka opaque key_id[32])
293C519654C83965BAAA50FC5807D4B76FBF587A2972DCA4C30CF4E54547F478
# uint64 timestamp (milliseconds since the epoch)
000001627313EB2A
# CtExtensions extensions (zero-length array)
0000
# digitally-signed struct – RFC 5426
# SignatureAndHashAlgorithm (ecdsa-sha256)
0403
# opaque signature&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;
# length 0x0048
0048
# DER-encoded Ecdsa-Sig-Value – RFC 4492
30 # SEQUENCE
46 # length 0x46 bytes
02 # r INTEGER
21 # length 0x21 bytes
# value
00AB72F1E4D6223EF87FC68491C208D29D4D57EBF47588BB7544D32F9537E2CEC1
02 # s INTEGER
21 # length 0x21 bytes
# value
008AFFC40CC6C4E3B24578DADE4F815ECBCE2D57A579342119A1E65BC7E5E69CE2
</code></pre>

<p>One surprising thing you might notice: In the first SCT, <code>r</code> and <code>s</code> are twenty
bytes long. In the second SCT, they are both twenty-one bytes long, and have a
leading zero. Integers in DER are two&rsquo;s complement, so if the leftmost bit is
set, they are interpreted as negative. Since <code>r</code> and <code>s</code> are positive, if the
leftmost bit would be a 1, an extra byte has to be added so that the leftmost
bit can be 0.</p>

<p>This is a little taste of what goes into encoding a certificate. I hope it was
informative! If you&rsquo;d like to learn more, I recommend &ldquo;<a href="http://luca.ntop.org/Teaching/Appunti/asn1.html">A Layman&rsquo;s Guide to a
Subset of ASN.1, BER, and DER</a>.&rdquo;</p>

<p><a name="poison"></a>Footnote 1: A &ldquo;poison extension&rdquo; is defined by <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.1">RFC 6962
section 3.1</a>:</p>

<pre><code>The Precertificate is constructed from the certificate to be issued by adding a special
critical poison extension (OID `1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.3`, whose
extnValue OCTET STRING contains ASN.1 NULL data (0x05 0x00))
</code></pre>

<p>In other words, it&rsquo;s an empty extension whose only purpose is to ensure that
certificate processors will not accept precertificates as valid certificates. The
specification ensures this by setting the &ldquo;critical&rdquo; bit on the extension, which
ensures that code that doesn&rsquo;t recognize the extension will reject the whole
certificate. Code that does recognize the extension specifically as poison
will also reject the certificate.</p>

<p><a name="variable-length"></a>Footnote 2: Lengths from 0-127 are represented by
a single byte (short form). To express longer lengths, more bytes are used (long form).
The high bit (0x80) on the first byte is set to distinguish long form from short
form. The remaining bits are used to express how many more bytes to read for the
length. For instance, 0x81F5 means &ldquo;this is long form because the length is
greater than 127, but there&rsquo;s still only one byte of length (0xF5) to decode.&rdquo;</p>

Facebook and Cambridge Analytica

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/03/facebook_and_ca.html

In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, news articles and commentators have focused on what Facebook knows about us. A lot, it turns out. It collects data from our posts, our likes, our photos, things we type and delete without posting, and things we do while not on Facebook and even when we’re offline. It buys data about us from others. And it can infer even more: our sexual orientation, political beliefs, relationship status, drug use, and other personality traits — even if we didn’t take the personality test that Cambridge Analytica developed.

But for every article about Facebook’s creepy stalker behavior, thousands of other companies are breathing a collective sigh of relief that it’s Facebook and not them in the spotlight. Because while Facebook is one of the biggest players in this space, there are thousands of other companies that spy on and manipulate us for profit.

Harvard Business School professor Shoshana Zuboff calls it “surveillance capitalism.” And as creepy as Facebook is turning out to be, the entire industry is far creepier. It has existed in secret far too long, and it’s up to lawmakers to force these companies into the public spotlight, where we can all decide if this is how we want society to operate and — if not — what to do about it.

There are 2,500 to 4,000 data brokers in the United States whose business is buying and selling our personal data. Last year, Equifax was in the news when hackers stole personal information on 150 million people, including Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and driver’s license numbers.

You certainly didn’t give it permission to collect any of that information. Equifax is one of those thousands of data brokers, most of them you’ve never heard of, selling your personal information without your knowledge or consent to pretty much anyone who will pay for it.

Surveillance capitalism takes this one step further. Companies like Facebook and Google offer you free services in exchange for your data. Google’s surveillance isn’t in the news, but it’s startlingly intimate. We never lie to our search engines. Our interests and curiosities, hopes and fears, desires and sexual proclivities, are all collected and saved. Add to that the websites we visit that Google tracks through its advertising network, our Gmail accounts, our movements via Google Maps, and what it can collect from our smartphones.

That phone is probably the most intimate surveillance device ever invented. It tracks our location continuously, so it knows where we live, where we work, and where we spend our time. It’s the first and last thing we check in a day, so it knows when we wake up and when we go to sleep. We all have one, so it knows who we sleep with. Uber used just some of that information to detect one-night stands; your smartphone provider and any app you allow to collect location data knows a lot more.

Surveillance capitalism drives much of the internet. It’s behind most of the “free” services, and many of the paid ones as well. Its goal is psychological manipulation, in the form of personalized advertising to persuade you to buy something or do something, like vote for a candidate. And while the individualized profile-driven manipulation exposed by Cambridge Analytica feels abhorrent, it’s really no different from what every company wants in the end. This is why all your personal information is collected, and this is why it is so valuable. Companies that can understand it can use it against you.

None of this is new. The media has been reporting on surveillance capitalism for years. In 2015, I wrote a book about it. Back in 2010, the Wall Street Journal published an award-winning two-year series about how people are tracked both online and offline, titled “What They Know.”

Surveillance capitalism is deeply embedded in our increasingly computerized society, and if the extent of it came to light there would be broad demands for limits and regulation. But because this industry can largely operate in secret, only occasionally exposed after a data breach or investigative report, we remain mostly ignorant of its reach.

This might change soon. In 2016, the European Union passed the comprehensive General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR. The details of the law are far too complex to explain here, but some of the things it mandates are that personal data of EU citizens can only be collected and saved for “specific, explicit, and legitimate purposes,” and only with explicit consent of the user. Consent can’t be buried in the terms and conditions, nor can it be assumed unless the user opts in. This law will take effect in May, and companies worldwide are bracing for its enforcement.

Because pretty much all surveillance capitalism companies collect data on Europeans, this will expose the industry like nothing else. Here’s just one example. In preparation for this law, PayPal quietly published a list of over 600 companies it might share your personal data with. What will it be like when every company has to publish this sort of information, and explicitly explain how it’s using your personal data? We’re about to find out.

In the wake of this scandal, even Mark Zuckerberg said that his industry probably should be regulated, although he’s certainly not wishing for the sorts of comprehensive regulation the GDPR is bringing to Europe.

He’s right. Surveillance capitalism has operated without constraints for far too long. And advances in both big data analysis and artificial intelligence will make tomorrow’s applications far creepier than today’s. Regulation is the only answer.

The first step to any regulation is transparency. Who has our data? Is it accurate? What are they doing with it? Who are they selling it to? How are they securing it? Can we delete it? I don’t see any hope of Congress passing a GDPR-like data protection law anytime soon, but it’s not too far-fetched to demand laws requiring these companies to be more transparent in what they’re doing.

One of the responses to the Cambridge Analytica scandal is that people are deleting their Facebook accounts. It’s hard to do right, and doesn’t do anything about the data that Facebook collects about people who don’t use Facebook. But it’s a start. The market can put pressure on these companies to reduce their spying on us, but it can only do that if we force the industry out of its secret shadows.

This essay previously appeared on CNN.com.

EDITED TO ADD (4/2): Slashdot thread.

[$] The Sound Open Firmware project launches

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/749888/rss

It is an increasingly poorly kept secret that, underneath the hood of
the components that most of us view as “hardware”, there is a great deal of
proprietary software. This code, written by anonymous developers, rarely
sees the light of day; as a result, it tends to have all of the pathologies
associated with software that nobody can either review or fix. The 2018
Embedded Linux Conference
saw an announcement for a new project that, with luck, will change that
situation, at least for one variety of hardware: audio devices.

[$] Two perspectives on the maintainer relationship

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/749676/rss

Developers and maintainers of free-software projects are drawn from
the same pool of people, and maintainers in one project are often developers
in another, but there is still a certain amount of friction between the
two groups. Maintainers depend on developers to contribute changes, but
the two groups have a different set of incentives when it comes to reviewing and
accepting those changes. Two talks at the 2018 Embedded Linux Conference
shed some light on this relationship and how it can be made to work more
smoothly.

[$] Super long-term kernel support

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/749530/rss

Some years ago, prominent community leaders doubted that even
short-term stable maintenance of kernel releases was feasible. More
recently, selecting an occasional kernel for a two-year maintenance cycle
has become routine, and some kernels, such as 3.2 under the care of Ben
Hutchings, have received constant maintenance for as much as six years. But
even that sort of extended maintenance is not enough for some use cases, as
Yoshitake Kobayashi explained in his Embedded Linux Conference talk. To
meet those needs, the Civil
Infrastructure Platform (CIP)
project is
setting out to maintain releases for a minimum of 20 years.

Microsoft: Poisoned Torrent Client Triggered Coin Miner Outbreak

Post Syndicated from Ernesto original https://torrentfreak.com/microsoft-poisoned-torrent-client-triggered-coin-miner-outbreak-180315/

First released in 2010, MediaGet has been around for a while. Initially, the torrent client was available in Russian only, but the team later expanded its reach across the world.

While it’s a relatively small player, it has been installed on millions of computers in recent years. It still has a significant reach, which is what Microsoft also found out recently.

This week the Windows Defender Research team reported that a poisoned version of the BitTorrent client was used to start the Dofoil campaign, which attempted to offload hundreds of thousands of malicious cryptocurrency miners.

Although Windows Defender caught and blocked the culprit within milliseconds, the team further researched the issue to find out how this could have happened.

It turns out that the update process for the application was poisoned. This then enabled a signed version of MediaGet to drop off a compromised version, as can be seen in the diagram below.

“A signed mediaget.exe downloads an update.exe program and runs it on the machine to install a new mediaget.exe. The new mediaget.exe program has the same functionality as the original but with additional backdoor capability,” Microsoft’s team explains.

The update poisoning

The malicious MediaGet version eventually triggered the mass coin miner outbreak. Windows Defender Research stresses that the poisoned version was signed by a third-party software company, not MediaGet itself.

Once the malware was launched the client built a list of command-and-control servers, using embedded NameCoin DNS servers and domains with the non-ICANN-sanctioned .bit TLD, making it harder to shut down.

More detailed information on the attack and how Dofoil was used to infect computers can be found in Microsoft’s full analysis.

MediaGet informs TorrentFreak that hackers compromised the update server to carry out their attack.

“Hackers got access to our update server, using an exploit in the Zabbix service and deeply integrated into our update mechanics. They modified the original version of Mediaget to add their functionality,” MediaGet reveals.

The company says that roughly five percent of all users were affected by the compromised update servers. All affected users were alerted and urged to update their software.

The issue is believed to be fully resolved at MediaGet’s end and they’re working with Microsoft to take care of any copies that may still be floating around in the wild.

“We patched everything and improved our verification system. To all the poisoned users we sent the message about an urgent update. Also, we are in contact with Microsoft, they will clean up all the poisoned versions,” MediaGet concludes.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

Voksi ‘Pirates’ New Serious Sam Game With Permission From Developers

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/voksi-pirates-new-serious-sam-game-with-permission-from-developers-180312/

Bulgarian cracker Voksi is unlike many others in his line of work. He makes himself relatively available online, interacting with fans and revealing surprising things about his past.

Only last month he told TF that he is entirely self-taught and had been cracking games since he was 15-years-old, just six years ago.

Voksi is probably best known for his hatred of anti-piracy technology Denuvo and to this day is still one of just four groups/people who have managed to crack v4 of the anti-tamper technology. As such, he and his kind are often painted as enemies of the gaming industry but that doesn’t represent the full picture.

In discussion with TF over the weekend, Voksi told us that he’s a huge fan of the Serious Sam franchise so when he found out about the latest title – Serious Sam’s Bogus Detour (SSBD) – he wanted to play it – badly. That led to a remarkable series of events.

“One month before the game’s official release I got into the closed beta, thanks to a friend of mine, who invited me in. I introduced myself to the developers [Crackshell]. I told them what I do for a living, but also assured them that I didn’t have any malicious intents towards the game. They were very cool about it, even surprisingly cool,” Voksi informs TF.

The game eventually hit the market (without Voksi targeting it, of course) with some interesting additions. As shown in the screenshot taken from the game and embedded below, Voksi was listed as a tester for the game.

An unusual addition to the game credits….

Perhaps even more impressively, official Stream screenshots here show Voksi as a player in the game. It’s not exactly what one might expect for someone in his position but from there, the excitement began to fade. Despite a 9/10 rating on Steam, the books didn’t balance.

“The game was released officially on 20 of June, 2017. Months passed. We all hoped it’d be a success, but sadly that was not the case,” Voksi explains.

“Even with all the official marketing done by Devolver Digital, no one batted an eye and really gave it a chance. In December 2017, I found out how bad the sales really were, which even didn’t cover the expenses for the making game, let alone profit.”

Voksi was really disappointed that things hadn’t gone to plan so he contacted the developers with an idea – why didn’t he get involved to try and drum up some support from an entirely unconventional angle? How about giving a special edition of the game away for free while calling on ‘pirates’ to chip in with whatever they could afford?

“Last week I contacted the main dev of SSBD over Steam and proposed what I can do to help boost the game. He immediately agreed,” Voksi says.

“The plan was to release a build of the game that was playable from start to finish, playable in co-op with up to 4 players, not to miss anything important gameplay wise and add a little message in the bottom corner, which is visible at all times, telling you: “We are small indie studio. If you liked the game, please consider buying it. Thank you and enjoy the game!”

Message at the bottom of the screen

But Voksi’s marketing plan didn’t stop there. This special build of the game is also tied to a unique giveaway challenge with several prizes. It’s underway on Voksi’s REVOLT forum and is intended to encourage more people to play the game and share the word among family, friends and whoever else can support the developers.

Importantly, Voski isn’t getting paid to do any of this, he just wants to help the developers and support a game he feels deserves a lot more attention. For those interested in taking it for a spin, the download links are available here in the official thread.

The ‘pirate’ build – Serious.Sam.Bogus.Detour.B126.RIP-Voksi – is slightly less polished than those available officially but it’s hoped that people will offer their support on Steam and GOG if they like the game.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN discounts, offers and coupons

UK Govt. Met With Copyright Holders Dozens of Times in Just Three Months

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/uk-govt-met-with-copyright-holders-dozens-of-times-in-just-three-months-180310/

While doing business with clients and suppliers is the usual day-to-day routine for most businesses, companies in the entertainment sector seem keener than most to spend time with those in power.

Whether there’s pressure to be applied in respect of upcoming changes in policy or long-term plans for modifying legislation, at least a few times a year news breaks of rightsholders having private meetings with officials. Most of the time, however, the head-to-heads fly under the radar.

This week, however, the UK government published a response to a Freedom of Information Request which asked for details of meetings between the government and copyright owner organizations, enforcement organizations, and collection societies (think BPI, MPA, FACT, Publishers Association, PRS, etc) including times, dates and topics discussed.

The request asked for details of meetings held between May 2016 and April 2017 but the government declined to provide all of this information since the effort required to extract the information “would exceed the cost limit.”

Given the amount of data published, this isn’t a surprise. Even though the government chose to limit the response to events held between January 16, 2017 and April 17, 2017, the meetings between the government and the above groups number in their dozens.

January 2017 got off to a pretty slow start but week three and beyond saw a flurry of meetings with groups and companies such as ITV, BBC, PRS for Music, Copyright Licensing Agency and several other organizations to discuss the EU’s Digital Single Market proposals.

On January 18, 2017 Time Warner had a meeting to discuss content protection and analytics, followed a day later by the Premier League who were booked in to discuss “illicit streaming devices” (a topic mirrored in March during a meeting with the Audiovisual Anti-Piracy Alliance).

Just a few days later the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit held a “Partnership Working Group Meeting involving industry” and two days after that the police, Trading Standards, and the EU Police Agency convened to discuss enforcement activity.

January 26, 2017 saw an IP Outreach Workshop involving members of the IP Crime Group. This was potentially a big meeting. The IPCG consists of several regional police forces, PIPCU, National Crime Agency, Crown Prosecution Service, Department of Culture, Media and Sport, Trading Standards, HMRC, IFPI, BPI, FACT, Sky TV, PRS, FAST and the Publishers Association, to name just a few.

As the first month of the year was drawing to a close, Amazon met with the government to discuss “current procedures for removing copyright, design and trademark infringing material from their platform.” A similar meeting was held with eBay on February 1 and on February 20, Facebook had its turn on the same topic.

All three companies had come in for criticism from copyright holders for not doing enough to stem the tide of infringing content available on their platforms, particularly so-called Kodi boxes that provide access to movies, shows, and live TV.

However, in the months that followed they each responded positively, with eBay, Amazon and Facebook announcing restrictions on devices sold. While all three platforms still have a problem with infringing device sales, the situation appears to have improved since last year.

On the final day of January 2017, the MPAA attended a meeting to discuss the looming Digital Economy Bill and digital TV piracy. A couple of days later they were back again for a “business awareness seminar” with other big shots including the Alliance for IP, the Anti-Counterfeiting Group, Trading Standards and the Premier League.

However, given the dozens that took place, perhaps one of the more interesting meetings in terms of the mix of those in attendance took place February 7.

Titled “Organized Crime Task Force Meeting – Belfast” it was attended by the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the National Crime Agency, Trading Standards, HM Revenue and Customs, the Border Force, and (spot the odd one out) the Federation Against Copyright Theft.

This seems to suggest that FACT (a private company) is effectively embedded at the highest level of law enforcement, something that has made people very uncomfortable in the past.

Later in February, there was a roundtable meeting with the Alliance for IP, MPAA, Publishers’ Association, BPI, Premier League and Federation Against Copyright Theft (again) to discuss Brexit, the Digital Single Market, IP enforcement and industrial strategy. A similar meeting was held in March which was attended by UK Music, BPI, PRS, Featured Artists Coalition, and many more.

The full list of meetings, which number in their dozens for just a three-month period, can be found here pdf. Whether the volume is representative of other three-month periods isn’t clear but it seems reasonable to conclude that copyright organizations have the ears of government officials in the UK on an almost continual basis.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN discounts, offers and coupons

Trump Promises Copyright Crackdown as DoJ Takes Aim at Streaming Pirates

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/trump-promises-copyright-crackdown-as-doj-takes-aim-at-streaming-pirates-180308/

For the past several years most of the world has been waking up to the streaming piracy phenomenon, with pre-configured set-top boxes making inroads into millions of homes.

While other countries, notably the UK, arrested many individuals while warning of a grave and looming danger, complaints from the United States remained relatively low-key. It was almost as if the stampede towards convenient yet illegal streaming had caught the MPAA and friends by surprise.

In October 2017, things quickly began to change. The Alliance for Creativity and Entertainment sued Georgia-based Tickbox TV, a company selling “fully-loaded” Kodi boxes. In January 2018, the same anti-piracy group targeted Dragon Media, a company in the same line of business.

With this growing type of piracy now firmly on the radar, momentum seems to be building. Yesterday, a panel discussion on the challenges associated with piracy from streaming media boxes took place on Capitol Hill.

Hosted by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), ‘Unboxing the Piracy Threat of Streaming Media Boxes’ went ahead with some big name speakers in attendance, not least Neil Fried, Senior Vice President, Federal Advocacy and Regulatory Affairs at the MPAA.

ITIF and various industry groups tweeted many interesting comments throughout the event. Kevin Madigan from Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property told the panel that torrent-based content “is becoming obsolete” in an on-demand digital environment that’s switching to streaming-based piracy.

While there’s certainly a transition taking place, 150 million worldwide torrent users would probably argue against the term “obsolete”. Nevertheless, the same terms used to describe torrent sites are now being used to describe players in the streaming field.

“There’s a criminal enterprise going on here that’s stealing content and making a profit,” Fried told those in attendance.

“The piracy activity out there is bad, it’s hurting a lot of economic activity & creators aren’t being compensated for their work,” he added.

Tom Galvin, Executive Director at the Digital Citizens Alliance, was also on the panel. Unsurprisingly, given the organization’s focus on the supposed dangers of piracy, Galvin took the opportunity to underline that position.

“If you go down the piracy road, those boxes aren’t following proper security protocols, there are many malware risks,” he said. It’s a position shared by Fried, who told the panel that “video piracy is the leading source of malware.”

Similar claims were made recently on Safer Internet Day but the facts don’t seem to back up the scare stories. Still, with the “Piracy is Dangerous” strategy already out in the open, the claims aren’t really unexpected.

What might also not come as a surprise is that ACE’s lawsuits against Tickbox and Dragon Media could be just a warm-up for bigger things to come. In the tweet embedded below, Fried can be seen holding a hexagonal-shaped streaming box, warning that the Department of Justice is now looking for candidates for criminal action.

What form this action will take when it arrives isn’t clear but when the DoJ hits targets on home soil, it tends to cherry-pick the most blatant of infringers in order to set an example with reasonably cut-and-dried cases.

Of course, every case can be argued but with hundreds of so-called “Kodi box” sellers active all over the United States, many of them clearly breaking the law as they, in turn, invite their customers to break the law, picking a sitting duck shouldn’t be too difficult.

And then, of course, we come to President Trump. Not usually that vocal on matters of intellectual property and piracy, yesterday – perhaps coincidentally, perhaps not – he suddenly delivered one of his “something is coming” tweets.

Given Trump’s tendency to focus on problems overseas causing issues for companies back home, a comment by Kevin Madigan during the panel yesterday immediately comes to mind.

“To combat piracy abroad, USTR needs to work with the creative industries to improve enforcement and target the source of pirated material,” Madigan said.

Interesting times and much turmoil in the streaming world ahead, it seems.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN discounts, offers and coupons

Welte: Report from the Geniatech vs. McHardy GPL violation court hearing

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/748761/rss

Harald Welte attended a hearing in one of the Patrick McHardy GPL cases and
wrote up
what he saw
.

I’m not arguing for a “too soft” approach. It’s
almost 15 years since the first court cases on license violations on
(embedded) Linux, and the fact that the problem still exists today clearly
shows the industry is very far from having solved a seemingly rather simple
problem.

On the other hand, such activities must always be oriented to compliance,
and compliance only. Collecting huge amounts of contractual penalties is
questionable. And if it was necessary to collect such huge amounts to
motivate large corporations to be compliant, then this must be done in the
open, with the community knowing about it, and the proceeds of such
contractual penalties must be donated to free software related entities to
prove that personal financial gain is not a motivation.