Tag Archives: cybersecurity

My letter urging Georgia governor to veto anti-hacking bill

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/04/my-letter-urging-georgia-governor-to.html

February 16, 2018

Office of the Governor
206 Washington Street
111 State Capitol
Atlanta, Georgia 30334

Re: SB 315

Dear Governor Deal:

I am writing to urge you to veto SB315, the “Unauthorized Computer Access” bill.

The cybersecurity community, of which Georgia is a leader, is nearly unanimous that SB315 will make cybersecurity worse. You’ve undoubtedly heard from many of us opposing this bill. It does not help in prosecuting foreign hackers who target Georgian computers, such as our elections systems. Instead, it prevents those who notice security flaws from pointing them out, thereby getting them fixed. This law violates the well-known Kirchhoff’s Principle, that instead of secrecy and obscurity, that security is achieved through transparency and openness.

That the bill contains this flaw is no accident. The justification for this bill comes from an incident where a security researcher noticed a Georgia state election system had made voter information public. This remained unfixed, months after the vulnerability was first disclosed, leaving the data exposed. Those in charge decided that it was better to prosecute those responsible for discovering the flaw rather than punish those who failed to secure Georgia voter information, hence this law.

Too many security experts oppose this bill for it to go forward. Signing this bill, one that is weak on cybersecurity by favoring political cover-up over the consensus of the cybersecurity community, will be part of your legacy. I urge you instead to veto this bill, commanding the legislature to write a better one, this time consulting experts, which due to Georgia’s thriving cybersecurity community, we do not lack.

Thank you for your attention.

Robert Graham
(formerly) Chief Scientist, Internet Security Systems

WHOIS Limits Under GDPR Will Make Pirates Harder to Catch, Groups Fear

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/whois-limits-under-gdpr-will-make-pirates-harder-to-catch-groups-fear-180413/

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a regulation in EU law covering data protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union.

As more and more personal data is gathered, stored and (ab)used online, the aim of the GDPR is to protect EU citizens from breaches of privacy. The regulation applies to all companies processing the personal data of subjects residing in the Union, no matter where in the world the company is located.

Penalties for non-compliance can be severe. While there is a tiered approach according to severity, organizations can be fined up to 4% of annual global turnover or €20 million, whichever is greater. Needless to say, the regulations will need to be taken seriously.

Among those affected are domain name registries and registrars who publish the personal details of domain name owners in the public WHOIS database. In a full entry, a person or organization’s name, address, telephone numbers and email addresses can often be found.

This raises a serious issue. While registries and registrars are instructed and contractually obliged to publish data in the WHOIS database by global domain name authority ICANN, in millions of cases this conflicts with the requirements of the GDPR, which prevents the details of private individuals being made freely available on the Internet.

As explained in detail by the EFF, ICANN has been trying to resolve this clash. Its proposed interim model for GDPR compliance (pdf) envisions registrars continuing to collect full WHOIS data but not necessarily publishing it, to “allow the existing data
to be preserved while the community discussions continue on the next generation of WHOIS.”

But the proposed changes that will inevitably restrict free access to WHOIS information has plenty of people spooked, including thousands of companies belonging to entertainment industry groups such as the MPAA, IFPI, RIAA and the Copyright Alliance.

In a letter sent to Vice President Andrus Ansip of the European Commission, these groups and dozens of others warn that restricted access to WHOIS will have a serious effect on their ability to protect their intellectual property rights from “cybercriminals” which pose a threat to their businesses.

Signed by 50 organizations involved in IP protection and other areas of online security, the letter expresses concern that in attempting to comply with the GDPR, ICANN is on a course to “over-correct” while disregarding proportionality, accountability and transparency.

A small sample of the groups calling on ICANN

“We strongly assert that this model does not properly account for the critical public and legitimate interests served by maintaining a sufficient amount of data publicly available while respecting privacy interests of registrants by instituting a tiered or layered access system for the vast majority of personal data as defined by the GDPR,” the groups write.

The letter focuses on two aspects of “over-correction”, the first being ICANN’s proposal that no personal data whatsoever of a domain name registrant will be made available “without appropriate consideration or balancing of the countervailing interests in public disclosure of a limited amount of such data.”

In response to ICANN’s proposal that only the province/state and country of a domain name registrant be made publicly available, the groups advise the organization that publishing “a natural person registrant’s e-mail address” in a publicly accessible WHOIS directory will not constitute a breach of the GDPR.

“[W]e strongly believe that the continued public availability of the registrant’s e-mail address – specifically the e-mail address that the registrant supplies to the registrar at the time the domain name is purchased and which e-mail address the registrar is required to validate – is critical for several reasons,” the groups write.

“First, it is the data element that is typically the most important to have readily available for law enforcement, consumer protection, particularly child protection, intellectual property enforcement and cybersecurity/anti-malware purposes.

“Second, the public accessibility of the registrant’s e-mail address permits a broad array of threats and illegal activities to be addressed quickly and the damage from such threats mitigated and contained in a timely manner, particularly where the abusive/illegal activity may be spawned from a variety of different domain names on different generic Top Level Domains,” they add.

The groups also argue that since making email addresses is effectively required in light of Article 5.1(c) ECD, “there is no legitimate justification to discontinue public availability of the registrant’s e-mail address in the WHOIS directory and especially not in light of other legitimate purposes.”

The EFF, on the other hand, says that being able to contact a domain owner wouldn’t necessarily require an email address to be made public.

“There are other cases in which it makes sense to allow members of the public to contact the owner of a domain, without having to obtain a court order,” EFF writes.

“But this could be achieved very simply if ICANN were simply to provide something like a CAPTCHA-protected contact form, which would deliver email to the appropriate contact point with no need to reveal the registrant’s actual email address.”

The groups’ second main concern is that ICANN reportedly makes no distinction between name registrants that are “natural persons versus those that are legal entities” and intends to treat them all as if they are subject to the GDPR, despite the fact that the regulation only applies to data associated with an “identified or identifiable natural person”.

They say it is imperative that EU Data Protection Authorities are made to understand that when registrants obtain a domain for illegal purposes, they often only register it as a “natural person” when registering as a legal person (legal entity) would be more appropriate, despite that granting them less privacy.

“Consequently, the test for differentiating between a legal and natural person should not merely be the legal status of the registrant, but also whether the registrant is, in fact, acting as a legal or natural person vis a vis the use of the domain name,” the groups note.

“We therefore urge that ICANN be given appropriate guidance as to the importance of maintaining a distinction between natural person and legal person registrants and keeping as much data about legal person domain name registrants as publicly accessible as possible,” they conclude.

What will happen with WHOIS on May 25 still isn’t clear. It wasn’t until October 2017 that ICANN finally determined that it would be affected by the GDPR, meaning that it’s been scrambling ever since to meet the compliance date. And it still is, according to the latest available documentation (pdf).

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

Cybersecurity Insurance

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/04/cybersecurity_i_1.html

Good article about how difficult it is to insure an organization against Internet attacks, and how expensive the insurance is.

Companies like retailers, banks, and healthcare providers began seeking out cyberinsurance in the early 2000s, when states first passed data breach notification laws. But even with 20 years’ worth of experience and claims data in cyberinsurance, underwriters still struggle with how to model and quantify a unique type of risk.

“Typically in insurance we use the past as prediction for the future, and in cyber that’s very difficult to do because no two incidents are alike,” said Lori Bailey, global head of cyberrisk for the Zurich Insurance Group. Twenty years ago, policies dealt primarily with data breaches and third-party liability coverage, like the costs associated with breach class-action lawsuits or settlements. But more recent policies tend to accommodate first-party liability coverage, including costs like online extortion payments, renting temporary facilities during an attack, and lost business due to systems failures, cloud or web hosting provider outages, or even IT configuration errors.

In my new book — out in September — I write:

There are challenges to creating these new insurance products. There are two basic models for insurance. There’s the fire model, where individual houses catch on fire at a fairly steady rate, and the insurance industry can calculate premiums based on that rate. And there’s the flood model, where an infrequent large-scale event affects large numbers of people — but again at a fairly steady rate. Internet+ insurance is complicated because it follows neither of those models but instead has aspects of both: individuals are hacked at a steady (albeit increasing) rate, while class breaks and massive data breaches affect lots of people at once. Also, the constantly changing technology landscape makes it difficult to gather and analyze the historical data necessary to calculate premiums.

BoingBoing article.

DARPA Funding in AI-Assisted Cybersecurity

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/04/darpa_funding_i.html

DARPA is launching a program aimed at vulnerability discovery via human-assisted AI. The new DARPA program is called CHESS (Computers and Humans Exploring Software Security), and they’re holding a proposers day in a week and a half.

This is the kind of thing that can dramatically change the offense/defense balance.

Why the crypto-backdoor side is morally corrupt

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/04/why-crypto-backdoor-side-is-morally.html

Crypto-backdoors for law enforcement is a reasonable position, but the side that argues for it adds things that are either outright lies or morally corrupt. Every year, the amount of digital evidence law enforcement has to solve crimes increases, yet they outrageously lie, claiming they are “going dark”, losing access to evidence. A weirder claim is that  those who oppose crypto-backdoors are nonetheless ethically required to make them work. This is morally corrupt.

That’s the point of this Lawfare post, which claims:

What I am saying is that those arguing that we should reject third-party access out of hand haven’t carried their research burden. … There are two reasons why I think there hasn’t been enough research to establish the no-third-party access position. First, research in this area is “taboo” among security researchers. … the second reason why I believe more research needs to be done: the fact that prominent non-government experts are publicly willing to try to build secure third-party-access solutions should make the information-security community question the consensus view. 

This is nonsense. It’s like claiming we haven’t cured the common cold because researchers haven’t spent enough effort at it. When researchers claim they’ve tried 10,000 ways to make something work, it’s like insisting they haven’t done enough because they haven’t tried 10,001 times.
Certainly, half the community doesn’t want to make such things work. Any solution for the “legitimate” law enforcement of the United States means a solution for illegitimate states like China and Russia which would use the feature to oppress their own people. Even if I believe it’s a net benefit to the United States, I would never attempt such research because of China and Russia.
But computer scientists notoriously ignore ethics in pursuit of developing technology. That describes the other half of the crypto community who would gladly work on the problem. The reason they haven’t come up with solutions is because the problem is hard, really hard.
The second reason the above argument is wrong: it says we should believe a solution is possible because some outsiders are willing to try. But as Yoda says, do or do not, there is no try. Our opinions on the difficulty of the problem don’t change simply because people are trying. Our opinions change when people are succeeding. People are always trying the impossible, that’s not evidence it’s possible.
The paper cherry picks things, like Intel CPU features, to make it seem like they are making forward progress. No. Intel’s SGX extensions are there for other reasons. Sure, it’s a new development, and new developments may change our opinion on the feasibility of law enforcement backdoors. But nowhere in talking about this new development have they actually proposes a solution to the backdoor problem. New developments happen all the time, and the pro-backdoor side is going to seize upon each and every one to claim that this, finally, solves the backdoor problem, without showing exactly how it solves the problem.

The Lawfare post does make one good argument, that there is no such thing as “absolute security”, and thus the argument is stupid that “crypto-backdoors would be less than absolute security”. Too often in the cybersecurity community we reject solutions that don’t provide “absolute security” while failing to acknowledge that “absolute security” is impossible.
But that’s not really what’s going on here. Cryptographers aren’t certain we’ve achieved even “adequate security” with current crypto regimes like SSL/TLS/HTTPS. Every few years we find horrible flaws in the old versions and have to develop new versions. If you steal somebody’s iPhone today, it’s so secure you can’t decrypt anything on it. But then if you hold it for 5 years, somebody will eventually figure out a hole and then you’ll be able to decrypt it — a hole that won’t affect Apple’s newer phones.
The reason we think we can’t get crypto-backdoors correct is simply because we can’t get crypto completely correct. It’s implausible that we can get the backdoors working securely when we still have so much trouble getting encryption working correctly in the first place.
Thus, we aren’t talking about “insignificantly less security”, we are talking about going from “barely adequate security” to “inadequate security”. Negotiating keys between you and a website is hard enough without simultaneously having to juggle keys with law enforcement organizations.

And finally, even if cryptographers do everything correctly law enforcement themselves haven’t proven themselves reliable. The NSA exposed its exploits (like the infamous ETERNALBLUE), and OPM lost all its security clearance records. If they can’t keep those secrets, it’s unreasonable to believe they can hold onto backdoor secrets. One of the problems cryptographers are expected to solve is partly this, to make it work in a such way that makes it unlikely law enforcement will lose its secrets.


This argument by the pro-backdoor side, that we in the crypto-community should do more to solve backdoors, it simply wrong. We’ve spent a lot of effort at this already. Many continue to work on this problem — the reason you haven’t heard much from them is because they haven’t had much success. It’s like blaming doctors for not doing more to work on interrogation drugs (truth serums). Sure, a lot of doctors won’t work on this because it’s distasteful, but at the same time, there are many drug companies who would love to profit by them. The reason they don’t exist is not because they aren’t spending enough money researching them, it’s because there is no plausible solution in sight.
Crypto-backdoors designed for law-enforcement will significantly harm your security. This may change in the future, but that’s the state of crypto today. You should trust the crypto experts on this, not lawyers.

WannaCry after one year

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/03/wannacry-after-one-year.html

In the news, Boeing (an aircraft maker) has been “targeted by a WannaCry virus attack”. Phrased this way, it’s implausible. There are no new attacks targeting people with WannaCry. There is either no WannaCry, or it’s simply a continuation of the attack from a year ago.

It’s possible what happened is that an anti-virus product called a new virus “WannaCry”. Virus families are often related, and sometimes a distant relative gets called the same thing. I know this watching the way various anti-virus products label my own software, which isn’t a virus, but which virus writers often include with their own stuff. The Lazarus group, which is believed to be responsible for WannaCry, have whole virus families like this. Thus, just because an AV product claims you are infected with WannaCry doesn’t mean it’s the same thing that everyone else is calling WannaCry.

Famously, WannaCry was the first virus/ransomware/worm that used the NSA ETERNALBLUE exploit. Other viruses have since added the exploit, and of course, hackers use it when attacking systems. It may be that a network intrusion detection system detected ETERNALBLUE, which people then assumed was due to WannaCry. It may actually have been an nPetya infection instead (nPetya was the second major virus/worm/ransomware to use the exploit).

Or it could be the real WannaCry, but it’s probably not a new “attack” that “targets” Boeing. Instead, it’s likely a continuation from WannaCry’s first appearance. WannaCry is a worm, which means it spreads automatically after it was launched, for years, without anybody in control. Infected machines still exist, unnoticed by their owners, attacking random machines on the Internet. If you plug in an unpatched computer onto the raw Internet, without the benefit of a firewall, it’ll get infected within an hour.

However, the Boeing manufacturing systems that were infected were not on the Internet, so what happened? The narrative from the news stories imply some nefarious hacker activity that “targeted” Boeing, but that’s unlikely.

We have now have over 15 years of experience with network worms getting into strange places disconnected and even “air gapped” from the Internet. The most common reason is laptops. Somebody takes their laptop to some place like an airport WiFi network, and gets infected. They put their laptop to sleep, then wake it again when they reach their destination, and plug it into the manufacturing network. At this point, the virus spreads and infects everything. This is especially the case with maintenance/support engineers, who often have specialized software they use to control manufacturing machines, for which they have a reason to connect to the local network even if it doesn’t have useful access to the Internet. A single engineer may act as a sort of Typhoid Mary, going from customer to customer, infecting each in turn whenever they open their laptop.

Another cause for infection is virtual machines. A common practice is to take “snapshots” of live machines and save them to backups. Should the virtual machine crash, instead of rebooting it, it’s simply restored from the backed up running image. If that backup image is infected, then bringing it out of sleep will allow the worm to start spreading.

Jake Williams claims he’s seen three other manufacturing networks infected with WannaCry. Why does manufacturing seem more susceptible? The reason appears to be the “killswitch” that stops WannaCry from running elsewhere. The killswitch uses a DNS lookup, stopping itself if it can resolve a certain domain. Manufacturing networks are largely disconnected from the Internet enough that such DNS lookups don’t work, so the domain can’t be found, so the killswitch doesn’t work. Thus, manufacturing systems are no more likely to get infected, but the lack of killswitch means the virus will continue to run, attacking more systems instead of immediately killing itself.

One solution to this would be to setup sinkhole DNS servers on the network that resolve all unknown DNS queries to a single server that logs all requests. This is trivially setup with most DNS servers. The logs will quickly identify problems on the network, as well as any hacker or virus activity. The side effect is that it would make this killswitch kill WannaCry. WannaCry isn’t sufficient reason to setup sinkhole servers, of course, but it’s something I’ve found generally useful in the past.


Something obviously happened to the Boeing plant, but the narrative is all wrong. Words like “targeted attack” imply things that likely didn’t happen. Facts are so loose in cybersecurity that it may not have even been WannaCry.

The real story is that the original WannaCry is still out there, still trying to spread. Simply put a computer on the raw Internet (without a firewall) and you’ll get attacked. That, somehow, isn’t news. Instead, what’s news is whenever that continued infection hits somewhere famous, like Boeing, even though (as Boeing claims) it had no important effect.

Election Security

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/02/election_securi_2.html

I joined a letter supporting the Secure Elections Act (S. 2261):

The Secure Elections Act strikes a careful balance between state and federal action to secure American voting systems. The measure authorizes appropriation of grants to the states to take important and time-sensitive actions, including:

  • Replacing insecure paperless voting systems with new equipment that will process a paper ballot;
  • Implementing post-election audits of paper ballots or records to verify electronic tallies;

  • Conducting “cyber hygiene” scans and “risk and vulnerability” assessments and supporting state efforts to remediate identified vulnerabilities.

    The legislation would also create needed transparency and accountability in elections systems by establishing clear protocols for state and federal officials to communicate regarding security breaches and emerging threats.

Jumping Air Gaps

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/02/jumping_air_gap_2.html

Nice profile of Mordechai Guri, who researches a variety of clever ways to steal data over air-gapped computers.

Guri and his fellow Ben-Gurion researchers have shown, for instance, that it's possible to trick a fully offline computer into leaking data to another nearby device via the noise its internal fan generates, by changing air temperatures in patterns that the receiving computer can detect with thermal sensors, or even by blinking out a stream of information from a computer hard drive LED to the camera on a quadcopter drone hovering outside a nearby window. In new research published today, the Ben-Gurion team has even shown that they can pull data off a computer protected by not only an air gap, but also a Faraday cage designed to block all radio signals.

Here’s a page with all the research results.

BoingBoing post.

Internet Security Threats at the Olympics

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/02/internet_securi.html

There are a lot:

The cybersecurity company McAfee recently uncovered a cyber operation, dubbed Operation GoldDragon, attacking South Korean organizations related to the Winter Olympics. McAfee believes the attack came from a nation state that speaks Korean, although it has no definitive proof that this is a North Korean operation. The victim organizations include ice hockey teams, ski suppliers, ski resorts, tourist organizations in Pyeongchang, and departments organizing the Pyeongchang Olympics.

Meanwhile, a Russia-linked cyber attack has already stolen and leaked documents from other Olympic organizations. The so-called Fancy Bear group, or APT28, began its operations in late 2017 –­ according to Trend Micro and Threat Connect, two private cybersecurity firms­ — eventually publishing documents in 2018 outlining the political tensions between IOC officials and World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) officials who are policing Olympic athletes. It also released documents specifying exceptions to anti-doping regulations granted to specific athletes (for instance, one athlete was given an exception because of his asthma medication). The most recent Fancy Bear leak exposed details about a Canadian pole vaulter’s positive results for cocaine. This group has targeted WADA in the past, specifically during the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics. Assuming the attribution is right, the action appears to be Russian retaliation for the punitive steps against Russia.

A senior analyst at McAfee warned that the Olympics may experience more cyber attacks before closing ceremonies. A researcher at ThreatConnect asserted that organizations like Fancy Bear have no reason to stop operations just because they’ve already stolen and released documents. Even the United States Department of Homeland Security has issued a notice to those traveling to South Korea to remind them to protect themselves against cyber risks.

One presumes the Olympics network is sufficiently protected against the more pedestrian DDoS attacks and the like, but who knows?

EDITED TO ADD: There was already one attack.

Poor Security at the UK National Health Service

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/02/poor_security_a.html

The Guardian is reporting that “every NHS trust assessed for cyber security vulnerabilities has failed to meet the standard required.”

This is the same NHS that was debilitated by WannaCry.

EDITED TO ADD (2/13): More news.

And don’t think that US hospitals are much better.

Addressing Data Residency with AWS

Post Syndicated from Min Hyun original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/addressing-data-residency-with-aws/

Whitepaper image

AWS has released a new whitepaper that has been requested by many AWS customers: AWS Policy Perspectives: Data Residency. Data residency is the requirement that all customer content processed and stored in an IT system must remain within a specific country’s borders, and it is one of the foremost concerns of governments that want to use commercial cloud services. General cybersecurity concerns and concerns about government requests for data have contributed to a continued focus on keeping data within countries’ borders. In fact, some governments have determined that mandating data residency provides an extra layer of security.

This approach, however, is counterproductive to the data protection objectives and the IT modernization and global economic growth goals that many governments have set as milestones. This new whitepaper addresses the real and perceived security risks expressed by governments when they demand in-country data residency by identifying the most likely and prevalent IT vulnerabilities and security risks, explaining the native security embedded in cloud services, and highlighting the roles and responsibilities of cloud service providers (CSPs), governments, and customers in protecting data.

Large-scale, multinational CSPs, often called hyperscale CSPs, represent a transformational disruption in technology because of how they support their customers with high degrees of efficiency, agility, and innovation as part of world-class security offerings. The whitepaper explains how hyperscale CSPs, such as AWS, that might be located out of country provide their customers the ability to achieve high levels of data protection through safeguards on their own platform and with turnkey tooling for their customers. They do this while at the same time preserving nation-state regulatory sovereignty.

The whitepaper also considers the commercial, public-sector, and economic effects of data residency policies and offers considerations for governments to evaluate before enforcing requirements that can unintentionally limit public-sector digital transformation goals, in turn possibly leading to increased cybersecurity risk.

AWS continues to engage with governments around the world to hear and address their top-of-mind security concerns. We take seriously our commitment to advocate for our customers’ interests and enforce security from “ground zero.” This means that when customers use AWS, they can have the confidence that their data is protected with a level of assurance that meets, if not exceeds, their needs, regardless of where the data resides.

– Min Hyun, Cloud Security Policy Strategist

EU Compliance Update: AWS’s 2017 C5 Assessment

Post Syndicated from Oliver Bell original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/eu-compliance-update-awss-2017-c5-assessment/

C5 logo

AWS has completed its 2017 assessment against the Cloud Computing Compliance Controls Catalog (C5) information security and compliance program. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)—Germany’s national cybersecurity authority—established C5 to define a reference standard for German cloud security requirements. With C5 (as well as with IT-Grundschutz), customers in German member states can use the work performed under this BSI audit to comply with stringent local requirements and operate secure workloads in the AWS Cloud.

Continuing our commitment to Germany and the AWS European Regions, AWS has added 16 services to this year’s scope:

The English version of the C5 report is available through AWS Artifact. The German version of the report will be available through AWS Artifact in the coming weeks.

– Oliver

Susan Landau’s New Book: Listening In

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/01/susan_landaus_n.html

Susan Landau has written a terrific book on cybersecurity threats and why we need strong crypto. Listening In: Cybersecurity in an Insecure Age. It’s based in part on her 2016 Congressional testimony in the Apple/FBI case; it examines how the Digital Revolution has transformed society, and how law enforcement needs to — and can — adjust to the new realities. The book is accessible to techies and non-techies alike, and is strongly recommended.

And if you’ve already read it, give it a review on Amazon. Reviews sell books, and this one needs more of them.

Some notes on Meltdown/Spectre

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2018/01/some-notes-on-meltdownspectre.html

I thought I’d write up some notes.

You don’t have to worry if you patch. If you download the latest update from Microsoft, Apple, or Linux, then the problem is fixed for you and you don’t have to worry. If you aren’t up to date, then there’s a lot of other nasties out there you should probably also be worrying about. I mention this because while this bug is big in the news, it’s probably not news the average consumer needs to concern themselves with.

This will force a redesign of CPUs and operating systems. While not a big news item for consumers, it’s huge in the geek world. We’ll need to redesign operating systems and how CPUs are made.

Don’t worry about the performance hit. Some, especially avid gamers, are concerned about the claims of “30%” performance reduction when applying the patch. That’s only in some rare cases, so you shouldn’t worry too much about it. As far as I can tell, 3D games aren’t likely to see less than 1% performance degradation. If you imagine your game is suddenly slower after the patch, then something else broke it.

This wasn’t foreseeable. A common cliche is that such bugs happen because people don’t take security seriously, or that they are taking “shortcuts”. That’s not the case here. Speculative execution and timing issues with caches are inherent issues with CPU hardware. “Fixing” this would make CPUs run ten times slower. Thus, while we can tweek hardware going forward, the larger change will be in software.

There’s no good way to disclose this. The cybersecurity industry has a process for coordinating the release of such bugs, which appears to have broken down. In truth, it didn’t. Once Linus announced a security patch that would degrade performance of the Linux kernel, we knew the coming bug was going to be Big. Looking at the Linux patch, tracking backwards to the bug was only a matter of time. Hence, the release of this information was a bit sooner than some wanted. This is to be expected, and is nothing to be upset about.

It helps to have a name. Many are offended by the crassness of naming vulnerabilities and giving them logos. On the other hand, we are going to be talking about these bugs for the next decade. Having a recognizable name, rather than a hard-to-remember number, is useful.

Should I stop buying Intel? Intel has the worst of the bugs here. On the other hand, ARM and AMD alternatives have their own problems. Many want to deploy ARM servers in their data centers, but these are likely to expose bugs you don’t see on x86 servers. The software fix, “page table isolation”, seems to work, so there might not be anything to worry about. On the other hand, holding up purchases because of “fear” of this bug is a good way to squeeze price reductions out of your vendor. Conversely, later generation CPUs, “Haswell” and even “Skylake” seem to have the least performance degradation, so it might be time to upgrade older servers to newer processors.

Intel misleads. Intel has a press release that implies they are not impacted any worse than others. This is wrong: the “Meltdown” issue appears to apply only to Intel CPUs. I don’t like such marketing crap, so I mention it.

Statements from companies:

Copyright Holders Want ISPs to Police Pirate Sites and Issue Warnings

Post Syndicated from Ernesto original https://torrentfreak.com/copyright-holders-want-isps-to-police-pirate-sites-and-issue-warnings-171124/

Online piracy is a worldwide phenomenon and increasingly it ends up on the desks of lawmakers everywhere.

Frustrated by the ever-evolving piracy landscape, copyright holders are calling on local authorities to help out.

This is also the case in South Africa at the moment, where the Government is finalizing a new Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill.

Responding to a call for comments, anti-piracy group SAFACT, film producers, and local broadcaster M-Net seized the opportunity to weigh in with some suggestions. Writing to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, they ask for measures to make it easier to block pirate sites and warn copyright infringers.

“A balanced approach to address the massive copyright infringement on the Internet is necessary,” they say.

On the site-blocking front, the copyright holder representatives suggest an EU-style amendment that would allow for injunctions against ISPs to bar access to pirate sites.

“It is suggested that South Africa should consider adopting technology-neutral ‘no fault’ enforcement legislation that would enable intermediaries to take action against online infringements, in line with Article 8.3 of the EU Copyright Directive (2001/29/EC), which addresses copyright infringement through site blocking,” it reads.

Request and response (via Business Tech)

In addition, ISPs should also be obliged to take further measures to deter piracy. New legislation should require providers to “police” unauthorized file-sharing and streaming sites, and warn subscribers who are caught pirating.

“Obligations should be imposed on ISPs to co-operate with rights-holders and Government to police illegal filesharing or streaming websites and to issue warnings to end-users identified as engaging in illegal file-sharing and to block infringing content,” the rightsholders say.

The demands were made public by the Department recently, which also included an official response from the Government. While the suggestions are not dismissed based on their content, they don’t fit the purpose of the legislation.

“The Bill does not deal with copyright infringements. These aspects must be dealt with in terms of copyright-related legislation,” the Department writes.

SAFACT, the filmmakers, and M-Net are not without options though. The Government points out that the new Copyright Amendment Bill, which was introduced recently, would be a better fit for these asks. So it’s likely that they will try again.

This doesn’t mean that any of the proposed language will be adopted, of course. However, now that the demands are on the table, South Africans are likely to hear more blocking and warning chatter in the near future.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN discounts, offers and coupons

Your Holiday Cybersecurity Guide

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/11/your-holiday-cybersecurity-guide.html

Many of us are visiting parents/relatives this Thanksgiving/Christmas, and will have an opportunity to help our them with cybersecurity issues. I thought I’d write up a quick guide of the most important things.

1. Stop them from reusing passwords

By far the biggest threat to average people is that they re-use the same password across many websites, so that when one website gets hacked, all their accounts get hacked.
To demonstrate the problem, go to haveibeenpwned.com and enter the email address of your relatives. This will show them a number of sites where their password has already been stolen, like LinkedIn, Adobe, etc. That should convince them of the severity of the problem.

They don’t need a separate password for every site. You don’t care about the majority of website whether you get hacked. Use a common password for all the meaningless sites. You only need unique passwords for important accounts, like email, Facebook, and Twitter.

Write down passwords and store them in a safe place. Sure, it’s a common joke that people in offices write passwords on Post-It notes stuck on their monitors or under their keyboards. This is a common security mistake, but that’s only because the office environment is widely accessible. Your home isn’t, and there’s plenty of places to store written passwords securely, such as in a home safe. Even if it’s just a desk drawer, such passwords are safe from hackers, because they aren’t on a computer.

Write them down, with pen and paper. Don’t put them in a MyPasswords.doc, because when a hacker breaks in, they’ll easily find that document and easily hack your accounts.

You might help them out with getting a password manager, or two-factor authentication (2FA). Good 2FA like YubiKey will stop a lot of phishing threats. But this is difficult technology to learn, and of course, you’ll be on the hook for support issues, such as when they lose the device. Thus, while 2FA is best, I’m only recommending pen-and-paper to store passwords. (AccessNow has a guide, though I think YubiKey/U2F keys for Facebook and GMail are the best).

2. Lock their phone (passcode, fingerprint, faceprint)
You’ll lose your phone at some point. It has the keys all all your accounts, like email and so on. With your email, phones thieves can then reset passwords on all your other accounts. Thus, it’s incredibly important to lock the phone.

Apple has made this especially easy with fingerprints (and now faceprints), so there’s little excuse not to lock the phone.

Note that Apple iPhones are the most secure. I give my mother my old iPhones so that they will have something secure.

My mom demonstrates a problem you’ll have with the older generation: she doesn’t reliably have her phone with her, and charged. She’s the opposite of my dad who religiously slaved to his phone. Even a small change to make her lock her phone means it’ll be even more likely she won’t have it with her when you need to call her.

3. WiFi (WPA)
Make sure their home WiFi is WPA encrypted. It probably already is, but it’s worthwhile checking.

The password should be written down on the same piece of paper as all the other passwords. This is importance. My parents just moved, Comcast installed a WiFi access point for them, and they promptly lost the piece of paper. When I wanted to debug some thing on their network today, they didn’t know the password, and couldn’t find the paper. Get that password written down in a place it won’t get lost!

Discourage them from extra security features like “SSID hiding” and/or “MAC address filtering”. They provide no security benefit, and actually make security worse. It means a phone has to advertise the SSID when away from home, and it makes MAC address randomization harder, both of which allows your privacy to be tracked.

If they have a really old home router, you should probably replace it, or at least update the firmware. A lot of old routers have hacks that allow hackers (like me masscaning the Internet) to easily break in.

4. Ad blockers or Brave

Most of the online tricks that will confuse your older parents will come via advertising, such as popups claiming “You are infected with a virus, click here to clean it”. Installing an ad blocker in the browser, such as uBlock Origin, stops most all this nonsense.

For example, here’s a screenshot of going to the “Speedtest” website to test the speed of my connection (I took this on the plane on the way home for Thanksgiving). Ignore the error (plane’s firewall Speedtest) — but instead look at the advertising banner across the top of the page insisting you need to download a browser extension. This is tricking you into installing malware — the ad appears as if it’s a message from Speedtest, it’s not. Speedtest is just selling advertising and has no clue what the banner says. This sort of thing needs to be blocked — it fools even the technologically competent.

uBlock Origin for Chrome is the one I use. Another option is to replace their browser with Brave, a browser that blocks ads, but at the same time, allows micropayments to support websites you want to support. I use Brave on my iPhone.
A side benefit of ad blockers or Brave is that web surfing becomes much faster, since you aren’t downloading all this advertising. The smallest NYtimes story is 15 megabytes in size due to all the advertisements, for example.

5. Cloud Backups
Do backups, in the cloud. It’s a good idea in general, especially with the threat of ransomware these days.

In particular, consider your photos. Over time, they will be lost, because people make no effort to keep track of them. All hard drives will eventually crash, deleting your photos. Sure, a few key ones are backed up on Facebook for life, but the rest aren’t.
There are so many excellent online backup services out there, like DropBox and Backblaze. Or, you can use the iCloud feature that Apple provides. My favorite is Microsoft’s: I already pay $99 a year for Office 365 subscription, and it comes with 1-terabyte of online storage.

6. Separate email accounts
You should have three email accounts: work, personal, and financial.

First, you really need to separate your work account from personal. The IT department is already getting misdirected emails with your spouse/lover that they don’t want to see. Any conflict with your work, such as getting fired, gives your private correspondence to their lawyers.

Second, you need a wholly separate account for financial stuff, like Amazon.com, your bank, PayPal, and so on. That prevents confusion with phishing attacks.

Consider this warning today:

If you had split accounts, you could safely ignore this. The USPS would only know your financial email account, which gets no phishing attacks, because it’s not widely known. When your receive the phishing attack on your personal email, you ignore it, because you know the USPS doesn’t know your personal email account.

Phishing emails are so sophisticated that even experts can’t tell the difference. Splitting financial from personal emails makes it so you don’t have to tell the difference — anything financial sent to personal email can safely be ignored.

7. Deauth those apps!

Twitter user @tompcoleman comments that we also need deauth apps.
Social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Google encourage you to enable “apps” that work their platforms, often demanding privileges to generate messages on your behalf. The typical scenario is that you use them only once or twice and forget about them.
A lot of them are hostile. For example, my niece’s twitter account would occasional send out advertisements, and she didn’t know why. It’s because a long time ago, she enabled an app with the permission to send tweets for her. I had to sit down and get rid of most of her apps.
Now would be a good time to go through your relatives Facebook, Twitter, and Google/GMail and disable those apps. Don’t be a afraid to be ruthless — they probably weren’t using them anyway. Some will still be necessary. For example, Twitter for iPhone shows up in the list of Twitter apps. The URL for editing these apps for Twitter is https://twitter.com/settings/applications. Google link is here (thanks @spextr). I don’t know of simple URLs for Facebook, but you should find it somewhere under privacy/security settings.
Update: Here’s a more complete guide for a even more social media services.

8. Up-to-date software? maybe

I put this last because it can be so much work.

You should install the latest OS (Windows 10, macOS High Sierra), and also turn on automatic patching.

But remember it may not be worth the huge effort involved. I want my parents to be secure — but no so secure I have to deal with issues.

For example, when my parents updated their HP Print software, the icon on the desktop my mom usually uses to scan things in from the printer disappeared, and needed me to spend 15 minutes with her helping find the new way to access the software.
However, I did get my mom a new netbook to travel with instead of the old WinXP one. I want to get her a Chromebook, but she doesn’t want one.
For iOS, you can probably make sure their phones have the latest version without having these usability problems.


You can’t solve every problem for your relatives, but these are the more critical ones.

New White House Announcement on the Vulnerability Equities Process

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/11/new_white_house_1.html

The White House has released a new version of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP). This is the inter-agency process by which the US government decides whether to inform the software vendor of a vulnerability it finds, or keep it secret and use it to eavesdrop on or attack other systems. You can read the new policy or the fact sheet, but the best place to start is Cybersecurity Coordinator Rob Joyce’s blog post.

In considering a way forward, there are some key tenets on which we can build a better process.

Improved transparency is critical. The American people should have confidence in the integrity of the process that underpins decision making about discovered vulnerabilities. Since I took my post as Cybersecurity Coordinator, improving the VEP and ensuring its transparency have been key priorities, and we have spent the last few months reviewing our existing policy in order to improve the process and make key details about the VEP available to the public. Through these efforts, we have validated much of the existing process and ensured a rigorous standard that considers many potential equities.

The interests of all stakeholders must be fairly represented. At a high level we consider four major groups of equities: defensive equities; intelligence / law enforcement / operational equities; commercial equities; and international partnership equities. Additionally, ordinary people want to know the systems they use are resilient, safe, and sound. These core considerations, which have been incorporated into the VEP Charter, help to standardize the process by which decision makers weigh the benefit to national security and the national interest when deciding whether to disclose or restrict knowledge of a vulnerability.

Accountability of the process and those who operate it is important to establish confidence in those served by it. Our public release of the unclassified portions Charter will shed light on aspects of the VEP that were previously shielded from public review, including who participates in the VEP’s governing body, known as the Equities Review Board. We make it clear that departments and agencies with protective missions participate in VEP discussions, as well as other departments and agencies that have broader equities, like the Department of State and the Department of Commerce. We also clarify what categories of vulnerabilities are submitted to the process and ensure that any decision not to disclose a vulnerability will be reevaluated regularly. There are still important reasons to keep many of the specific vulnerabilities evaluated in the process classified, but we will release an annual report that provides metrics about the process to further inform the public about the VEP and its outcomes.

Our system of government depends on informed and vigorous dialogue to discover and make available the best ideas that our diverse society can generate. This publication of the VEP Charter will likely spark discussion and debate. This discourse is important. I also predict that articles will make breathless claims of “massive stockpiles” of exploits while describing the issue. That simply isn’t true. The annual reports and transparency of this effort will reinforce that fact.

Mozilla is pleased with the new charter. I am less so; it looks to me like the same old policy with some new transparency measures — which I’m not sure I trust. The devil is in the details, and we don’t know the details — and it has giant loopholes that pretty much anything can fall through:

The United States Government’s decision to disclose or restrict vulnerability information could be subject to restrictions by partner agreements and sensitive operations. Vulnerabilities that fall within these categories will be cataloged by the originating Department/Agency internally and reported directly to the Chair of the ERB. The details of these categories are outlined in Annex C, which is classified. Quantities of excepted vulnerabilities from each department and agency will be provided in ERB meetings to all members.

This is me from last June:

There’s a lot we don’t know about the VEP. The Washington Post says that the NSA used EternalBlue “for more than five years,” which implies that it was discovered after the 2010 process was put in place. It’s not clear if all vulnerabilities are given such consideration, or if bugs are periodically reviewed to determine if they should be disclosed. That said, any VEP that allows something as dangerous as EternalBlue — or the Cisco vulnerabilities that the Shadow Brokers leaked last August — to remain unpatched for years isn’t serving national security very well. As a former NSA employee said, the quality of intelligence that could be gathered was “unreal.” But so was the potential damage. The NSA must avoid hoarding vulnerabilities.

I stand by that, and am not sure the new policy changes anything.

More commentary.

Here’s more about the Windows vulnerabilities hoarded by the NSA and released by the Shadow Brokers.

EDITED TO ADD (11/18): More news.

EDITED TO ADD (11/22): Adam Shostack points out that the process does not cover design flaws or trade-offs, and that those need to be covered:

…we need the VEP to expand to cover those issues. I’m not going to claim that will be easy, that the current approach will translate, or that they should have waited to handle those before publishing. One obvious place it gets harder is the sources and methods tradeoff. But we need the internet to be a resilient and trustworthy infrastructure.