How Bee implemented Zero Operator Access for personal AI on AWS

Post Syndicated from Gopinath Jagadesan original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/how-bee-implemented-zero-operator-access-for-personal-ai-on-aws/

Bee, an Amazon company, is a personal artificial intelligence (AI) device you wear. It listens to your day, understands what happened, and remembers the commitments and ideas you would otherwise lose. Bee uses that understanding to give you help that’s tailored to your life. With Bee, you can:

  • Get summaries of important conversations and moments.
  • Recall past interactions when you need them.
  • Capture commitments and follow-ups from meetings and client conversations.
  • Spot patterns in your routines and relationships.
  • Gain meaningful insights about your day.

To deliver these experiences, Bee handles conversations about health, finances, and family, some of the most personal parts of users’ lives. Bee securely manages this sensitive data so that it always remains protected. Bee built an architecture with no mechanism for operators (Bee engineers, other Amazon employees, and AWS infrastructure operators) to access customer data. Bee’s own controls cover the first two groups, and protection from AWS infrastructure operators is inherited from the AWS Nitro System. Bee calls this Zero Operator Access (ZOA). In this post, we show how Bee does all of this and share the AWS building blocks used to achieve ZOA.

Solution overview

The AWS shared responsibility model describes security as two domains: security of the cloud, which AWS is responsible for, and security in the cloud, which is the customer’s responsibility. AWS operator access controls are designed so that AWS personnel have no technical pathway to customer data. Bee applies the same principle to its own operators, Bee engineers and other Amazon employees. That means hardening every layer of the stack.

Bee’s core control is EC2 instance attestation: A user’s device releases the keys needed to decrypt their data only to instances running software it has verified. Attestation proves what runs inside an instance, but it can’t measure what surrounds it, such as which networks the instance can reach or who can change account permissions. So, Bee paired attestation-gated key release with network, storage, and organizational controls that close the paths attestation can’t measure. Figure 1 shows how these controls fit together. The sections that follow walk through each one.

Bee’s Zero Operator Access architecture: build-time attestation and transparency steps and runtime key release across AWS services

Figure 1: Bee’s Zero Operator Access architecture on AWS

Build time

  1. A transparency service, run by a separate Amazon team that Bee doesn’t control, keeps a copy of every approved Amazon Machine Image (AMI), container, and model for later audits. It publishes the expected measurements for each approved deployment to Sigstore Rekor, a public transparency log.
  2. The attestable AMI is shared to the Bee account, and the transparency proofs are stored in Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3).
  3. At boot, each instance records what it’s running in NitroTPM. It then gets a TLS certificate from AWS Private Certificate Authority (AWS Private CA) with its attestation and transparency proofs embedded. The Bee app checks this certificate before it shares any keys. If the software has changed, the app refuses to connect.

Runtime

  1. The Bee mobile app only connects to an attested instance over TLS.
  2. The instance presents its certificate. The app verifies the attestation against the AWS Nitro root and the transparency log.
  3. Only if they match does the app release a short-lived key. The key exists only in memory in the app servers and Redis key stores. Inference servers never receive keys.
  4. Data stored in Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS), Amazon ElastiCache, and S3 is encrypted before it leaves the boundary. AWS Lambda integrations receive plaintext only with the user’s consent.

Establish a verifiable compute foundation

The first problem Bee had to solve was trust. A user’s device needs to verify that Bee’s servers booted only with the approved software. That verification requires evidence rooted in a trusted mechanism outside the server application itself. Bee uses EC2 instance attestation to provide signed measurements of the instance’s boot software.

Bee builds its base images with an internal, hardened pipeline that produces attestable AMIs for Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2). During the build, the pipeline computes reference measurements offline from the Unified Kernel Image (UKI) and the Secure Boot configuration. These are the expected values for platform configuration registers (PCRs), which record cryptographic measurements during boot. Bee uses PCR4, PCR7, and PCR12 as verification targets. Because these values are computed without booting the image, Bee knows the expected measurements before any instance launches.

Following the AWS guidance on isolating data from your own operators, every Bee attestable AMI is built with these properties:

No interactive access. The image includes no SSH, SSM, or shell, so operators have no path into a running instance.

Only trusted software. The image contains only the components the workload needs, and every component is measured.

Read-only file system and ephemeral local storage. The root filesystem is read-only. Local instance storage is encrypted with a key held only in memory, and instances are replaced rather than rebooted, so no data outlives the instance.

At runtime, the bootloader and operating system measure the boot components and extend those measurements into NitroTPM PCRs. NitroTPM provides an attestation document containing the resulting values, signed by the AWS Nitro System through the AWS Nitro Attestation PKI. Any verifier can check these values against the approved reference measurements. With the same measured boot components and configuration, the selected PCR values remain consistent, making them suitable for remote verification.

Extend the chain of trust to your containers and data

A trusted OS is necessary but not sufficient because Bee’s application containers and model weights can change independently of the AMI. If an unauthorized user could swap a container image or a model file without detection, the attestation document would still show clean boot measurements even though the workload had been altered.

Bee solves this with a custom measured boot tool that runs before any application container starts. It resolves each Docker image in the manifest to its immutable Amazon Elastic Container Registry (Amazon ECR) digest. It also retrieves each Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) artifact’s SHA-256 checksum. It computes a deterministic hash across the manifest, all container digests, and all artifact checksums, then extends NitroTPM PCR14 with this value. Any change to any container image, model weight, or the manifest itself produces a different PCR14 and a different attestation document.

Critically, PCR14 is extended before the NitroTPM attestation document is obtained. The attestation document that Bee’s application servers present to clients therefore reflects both the OS state (PCR4, PCR7, PCR12) and the workload state (PCR14) as a single signed hardware measurement.

Before deployment, the transparency service runs an independent signing process. It resolves the same ECR digests and S3 checksums, recomputes the expected PCR14, and commits the full PCR map to Sigstore/Rekor, an independent, publicly auditable transparency log. The resulting proof bundle is stored in regionally replicated S3 buckets so that verification at boot time is fully offline, with no runtime dependency on external infrastructure.

Validate attestation at every connection

At boot, the instance first confirms that its own measurements match the approved entry in the transparency log. If they don’t, it stops there. If they match, it requests a TLS certificate from AWS Private CA, with its attestation document and transparency proof embedded in the certificate. The attestation is tied to that certificate’s key, so it can’t be reused by another instance.

The user’s device decides whether to trust the instance. When it connects, it checks the embedded evidence offline against roots built into the app, including the AWS Nitro root. If the measurements don’t match an approved configuration, the client rejects the connection and shares no keys.

The same certificates protect traffic between instances over mutual TLS. Only roles that need to start connections, such as application servers, receive client certificates. Inference instances don’t, so they can’t reach key stores or other services.

Limit what the network can reach

All attested EC2 instances run in isolated subnets of an Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) with no internet egress. The only outbound paths are VPC endpoints to Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS), Amazon ElastiCache, and tightly scoped AWS Lambda functions. These functions handle external integrations such as email or push notifications. Lambda functions receive only data already encrypted with user keys. They never see plaintext.

Keep encryption keys out of persistent storage

Users’ encryption keys originate on their devices. After verifying an instance’s attestation, the device releases a short-lived, scoped key to that instance. The key exists only in memory, in the application instance and in Redis key stores running inside attested instances with persistence disabled. It expires after 7 days without user activity. Because AWS never holds this key, no storage layer, backup, IAM policy, or KMS grant can provide access to it.

Sensitive data is encrypted inside the attested instance before it reaches Amazon RDS, Amazon ElastiCache, or Amazon S3, so those services store only ciphertext. Plaintext stays inside the attested boundary. For the full key hierarchy and data flow, see the Bee Private Compute whitepaper.

Use AWS organizational controls to eliminate unilateral access

Strong technical controls also need strong permission boundaries. If one person could change those controls, they could be bypassed. Bee is designed so that no single team can do this. The Bee team manages the private CA and the deployment pipeline but doesn’t control the transparency service. The transparency team can commit entries to the Sigstore log but has no access to Bee’s AWS accounts. Deploying code that doesn’t appear in the public transparency log would require coordination across independent teams.

AWS Service Control Policies (SCPs) back this separation at the infrastructure level. SCPs apply across all Bee accounts, limit which actions are possible in each account, and need multiple levels of approval to change. This makes the separation of duties enforceable in AWS itself, not only through process. SCPs add defense in depth. The primary safeguard is still attestation: Any change to the software changes its measurements, and the Bee app refuses to connect to software it doesn’t recognize.

Conclusion

In this post, we showed how Bee implemented Zero Operator Access for personal AI on AWS. Users hold their own keys, so they decide who can read their data. Before the Bee app shares a key, it checks that the server is running approved, publicly logged software, and no operator or policy can override that check. Amazon EC2 instance attestation makes that check verifiable. Network isolation, ephemeral storage and organizational controls close the paths attestation can’t measure.

Next, Bee is moving its inference to Amazon Bedrock Mantle, which provides zero operator access as a managed capability. User-held keys and attested application servers will stay part of the Bee architecture, so data stays protected from Bee operators.

You can apply the same pattern to any workload that handles sensitive data. To get started:

If you have a similar use case or want help building it, contact your AWS account team or reach out to AWS.

Further reading

Trail of Bits independently assessed the Bee Private Compute whitepaper, which covers the complete architecture, including client-side cryptography.

If your sensitive workloads run in containers, AWS Nitro Sandboxes give each Amazon EKS pod, Amazon ECS task,
or Amazon EC2 workload its own hardware-isolated VM, with attestation and zero operator access built in.


About the authors

Gopinath Jagadesan

Gopinath Jagadesan

Gopinath is a Senior Solution Architect at AWS, where he works with Amazon to design, build, and deploy well-architected solutions on AWS. He holds a master’s degree in electrical and computer engineering from the University of Illinois at Chicago. Gopinath is passionate about generative AI and its real-world applications, helping customers harness its potential to drive innovation and efficiency. Outside of work, he enjoys playing soccer and spending time with his family and friends.

Steve (Stepan) Korshakov

Steve (Stepan) Korshakov

Steve is a Bay Area engineer who started working on end-to-end encryption after winning Durov’s 2013 Android contest for Telegram. He kept building secure messaging as creator of the open-source Actor platform and co-founder of Openland, a YC-backed messenger for communities. He’s a founding engineer at Bee, the wearable AI company Amazon acquired, where he now leads privacy work.

Ethan Sutin

Ethan Sutin

Ethan is the Head of AI for Bee at Amazon, where he leads the AI powering Bee’s personal AI. Ethan is passionate about the promise of AI living alongside you and constantly thinking how it can make your life better.

Arvind Raghu

Arvind Raghu

Arvind is the Global Head of Confidential Compute at AWS. He works closely with customers to build Confidential compute solutions aimed at protecting sensitive data. He is currently focused on developing capabilities to build solutions for Confidential inferencing and Confidential Agents for multi-agent workflows.

Chinese-nexus actor’s Cairn AI agents found a zero-day on their own

Post Syndicated from CJ Moses original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/chinese-nexus-actors-cairn-ai-agents-found-a-zero-day-on-their-own/

Amazon Threat Intelligence is sharing findings from an investigation into a Chinese-nexus threat actor using autonomous AI agents to conduct hacking operations with minimal human involvement. The actor gave the agents a simple goal: “obtain shell access.” During the campaign, the agents found a zero-day in an open-source application and used it to gain full control of a server. These findings show that agentic offensive operations are already happening, and defenders should prepare for the speed and persistence these tools enable.

Discovery

On September 10, 2026, Amazon Threat Intelligence identified a server with a publicly hosted instance of Cairn, an open-source autonomous AI penetration-testing framework, running without authentication. Because the operator left the server publicly accessible, the operational history of the platform was visible to anyone on the internet, including project configurations, actor prompts, and AI output. The operator wrote prompts in Simplified Chinese, and the timestamps in executed scripts were configured to China Standard Time.

Analysis of the instance revealed a campaign targeting IP addresses associated with universities in East Asia outside mainland China over an approximately 48-hour period beginning September 8, 2026.

Cairn and an overview of this campaign

Cairn was built as a research and problem-solving engine for defenders. Operating it is simple. Given a starting point and an objective in plain language, it coordinates multiple AI agents to find a path to that goal. That same ease of use makes it attractive to threat actors. In this campaign, the actor provided a list of targeted IP addresses with variations of the goal to “obtain shell access.” Based on those inputs, the AI agents planned, executed, and adjusted their approach as they learned, without the operator choosing each next step.

The campaign included several operations that varied widely in complexity and outcome. The following operations show both the persistence and the capability of autonomous AI agents.

Persistence against a hardened target

The most extensive operation targeted a Redis (remote dictionary server) instance at one university that was configured to allow access without authentication. Redis is a database that keeps frequently used data in memory so applications can retrieve it quickly, which can make it a valuable foothold inside a network. Over roughly 16 hours and 148 sequential actions, the agents worked through a long list of known techniques for taking control of an open Redis server. These included abusing Redis’s replication feature to load unauthorized code, escaping its scripting sandbox, writing to its configuration files, and corrupting its memory. The agents also attempted Log4Shell injection against another service running on the same system.

When those attempts failed, the agents mapped the internal Docker network topology through a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a co-located Qdrant instance and launched credential sprays against PostgreSQL, SSH, and several other services. None of these attempts succeeded.

A separate operation ran for more than 6 hours and targeted a university GPU server, which is a group of high-performance computers built for computing-intensive research. The agents first built a list of about 80 real usernames by researching the university’s public presence, including faculty directories, lab websites, archived web pages, and academic papers. Then, they tested more than 30,000 credential combinations against the server’s remote login (SSH), and, on other systems across the university network, an admin dashboard, a network storage device, a VPN server, and the university’s campus portal. They never found a working login.

Neither operation succeeded, yet together they show that the agents kept adapting for nearly a full day without human direction.

Zero-day discovery

Against a target running an open-source medical imaging AI application, the outcome was different. The agents identified the application’s framework, mapped its API endpoints, and found an upload endpoint with a filename parameter. They tested that parameter for path traversal, and the parameter was vulnerable. In about 11 minutes, the agents went from mapping the application’s API to arbitrarily writing files on the server.

In a later session, the agents used the same vulnerability to write a Python reverse shell payload to sitecustomize.py, a file Python automatically imports at interpreter startup. The agents then triggered a training API endpoint to spawn a new Python process. The new process imported the payload and established a reverse shell running as root.

At the time of discovery, this path traversal vulnerability in the medical imaging application did not correspond to any assigned security advisory and was unpatched. Amazon Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that it was a zero-day based on the absence of any corresponding fix, issue, advisory, or prior mention in vulnerability databases for the affected open-source project.

Subsequent use

In another session, the threat actor stepped in. After the agents discovered the zero-day, the actor then provided the agents with a proxy that tunneled into a second university network. The server that the proxy connected to was running the same vulnerable software, and we infer the actor had used the zero-day to compromise it and establish the tunnel. The actor directed the agents to use the tunnel to target other machines in that network.

Attribution

Amazon Threat Intelligence assesses with moderate confidence that this is a Chinese-nexus threat actor based on the Simplified Chinese prompts, the China Standard Time script timestamps, and the targeting of universities likely of strategic interest to China.

Actions taken by AWS

Amazon Threat Intelligence notified the project’s maintainers of the vulnerability, and they released a fix and a GitHub Security Advisory.

The affected organizations were non-AWS customers that AWS had no direct path to notify. Instead, AWS worked with a government partner to notify the organizations about the activity.

Adoption is growing

Gambit Security was one of the first organizations in the industry to document the use of Cairn by a threat group. Its research describes a separate, financially motivated actor using Cairn to target online retailers. Together, these cases show that this autonomous AI agent framework is being adopted in both espionage and criminal operations. Additional details are available in Gambit Security’s report.

What this means for defenders

The operational tempo in these cases compresses the window available for defensive response. An agent that discovers and exploits a zero-day in minutes completes its activity faster than many security operations centers can manually triage an alert. The agents that failed against the hardened Redis target ran continuously for 16 hours without breaks, sleep, or working-hour constraints. To keep pace, organizations should prioritize high-confidence detections that trigger automated response, with humans overseeing outcomes rather than reviewing every individual action.

Behind the scenes, AWS active defense systems use global honeypots (decoy systems that attract threat actors) and network traffic analysis to identify actors that are scanning for vulnerable systems, and then help restrict that activity at the network level. These protections are built into the AWS network at no extra cost to customers.

Indicators of compromise

The following addresses appear in records dated September 8 to 10, 2026.

142[.]4.98.145

142[.]4.107.34

If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support or start a new thread on AWS re:Post.


CJ Moses

CJ Moses

CJ Moses is the CISO of Amazon Integrated Security. In his role, CJ leads security engineering and operations across Amazon. His mission is to enable Amazon businesses by making the benefits of security the path of least resistance. CJ joined Amazon in December 2007, holding various roles including Consumer CISO, and most recently AWS CISO, before becoming CISO of Amazon Integrated Security September of 2023.

Prior to joining Amazon, CJ led the technical analysis of computer and network intrusion efforts at the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber Division. CJ also served as a Special Agent with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). CJ led several computer intrusion investigations seen as foundational to the security industry today.

CJ holds degrees in Computer Science and Criminal Justice, and is an active SRO GT America GT2 race car driver.

[$] Bringing the Agama installer to openSUSE Tumbleweed

Post Syndicated from jzb original https://lwn.net/Articles/1107830/

The openSUSE Project has been working on
the Agama installer for four
years; it was the default installer for openSUSE Leap 16.0 when
it was released in 2025, and has been adopted by other openSUSE flavors as
well. Now the project is gearing up to go all-in on Agama for Tumbleweed, the rolling-release
edition that is meant to be where updates and new features land first. Even so,
the community has concerns about losing some of YaST’s legacy functionality and
the impact on installing Tumbleweed on systems that have less RAM.

Beyls: Wrapping up LLVM’s relicensing effort

Post Syndicated from jzb original https://lwn.net/Articles/1108818/

Kristof Beyls has published
a summary
to the LLVM discussion forum to announce that the project is
declaring success and bringing its relicensing
effort
to a close after eight years.

We’ve been asking past contributors to relicense their work since 2018. New
contributions have come in under Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception since January
19, 2019. Code contributed before that date was under LLVM’s earlier licenses
(UIUC/NCSA, plus MIT for some runtime libraries), so we needed permission from
its authors to move it over. […]

Today, more than 99.5% of all lines of code ever contributed to LLVM are
either covered by the new license, too small for copyright to apply, or no
longer in the repository.

Rather than trying to “chase the last tiny fraction forever” LLVM is
winding up the effort. Any contributors with code contributed before January 19,
2019 who have not signed a relicensing agreement and do not want their
contributions made available under Apache-2.0 with the LLVM-exception can still
reach out to the project to ensure their code has the appropriate SPDX license
identifier.

Vim Classic 8.3.1 released

Post Syndicated from jzb original https://lwn.net/Articles/1108817/

Version
8.3.1
of Vim Classic—a
long-term support fork of Vim maintained without LLM assistance—has been
released.

This release includes applicable Vim patches up to Vim 8.2.3237, including
numerous bug fixes, minor features, and compatibility improvements for Vim
plugins. This release also removes Python 2 support from Vim Classic.

The full list
of changes
in this release is available on sourcehut.

Bringing AI education to 300,000 young people across Canada

Post Syndicated from Anna Burton original https://www.raspberrypi.org/blog/bringing-ai-education-to-300000-young-people-across-canada/

We’re pleased to share that we will expand Experience AI across Canada to train 7,000 educators who will reach an estimated 300,000 young people across the country by 2028. This is made possible through our partnerships with Canadian education organisations Actua and Digital Moment, and generously supported by $2 million in funding from Google.org.

Educators in the classroom, training with Experience AI (Digital Moment)

Together with Actua and Digital Moments, we will help young people across Canada develop a foundational understanding of AI technologies, their social and ethical implications, and the role that AI can play in their lives.

AI literacy for young people worldwide through Experience AI

Everyday activities such as finding information, working, and solving problems are now linked with AI systems at many points. We think that all young people need more than access to AI tools and the ability to use them: they need the knowledge, skills, and confidence to understand how AI works, to think critically about its use and impact, and to create their own AI-based solutions.

Experience AI, developed in partnership with Google DeepMind, is a free educational programme that helps teachers and students learn about artificial intelligence (AI). It introduces young people to how AI systems work and how they are used in everyday contexts through lessons, classroom resources, and hands-on activities. The resources give young people opportunities to think critically about the role of AI in society.

We bring AI literacy to young people across the world with Experience AI by building trusted partnerships with local organisations that lead sustainable delivery of the programme in ways that suit their contexts. Through this global network of over 40 Experience AI partners, we have trained over 63,000 educators who can reach an estimated 6 million young people. Today, Experience AI resources are used in over 195 countries and available in over 22 languages and localised versions.

In 2025, in recognition of its global impact, Experience AI was named a laureate of the UNESCO King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa Prize for the Use of ICT in Education.

Reaching communities across Canada through partnerships

Canada, the second largest country in the world by area, is home to a diverse range of communities, languages, and educational settings. Working to make AI education accessible to all young people across such a vast country means supporting these differences by working with local partners who understand the needs of their communities.

4 educators round a table in the classroom

In 2023 we tested the Experience AI training with Canadian teachers, already in partnership with Digital Moment. Through this training we reached 500 educators and an estimated 56,000 young people. 

In this new phase of bringing Experience AI to Canada, we’re delighted to build on our relationship with Digital Moment, and to develop a new partnership with Actua. Both organisations have extensive experience of delivering STEM, digital skills, and AI education initiatives to Canadian classrooms and communities. Together we will support thousands of Canadian teachers with free training, resources, and support that will enable them to bring high-quality AI education to the young people in their classrooms.

Indra Kubicek, CEO of Digital Moment, shared:

“We’re excited to continue our partnership with the Raspberry Pi Foundation and build on our experience bringing Experience AI to educators across Canada. Together, we have an opportunity to expand access to trusted, practical classroom resources that give educators the knowledge and confidence to help young people understand AI, think critically about its impact, and make informed choices about its role in their lives. We look forward to reaching more educators and students across Canada and helping build a strong foundation for AI literacy that puts people, learning, and human values at the centre.”

Jennifer Flanagan, CEO of Actua, explained:

“For more than 25 years, Actua has helped tens of thousands of educators and millions of young Canadians build the skills and confidence to navigate a changing world. AI is changing that world faster than ever, and we need to make sure teachers and students are prepared. Through Experience AI, we’re helping educators bring AI literacy into their classrooms and give youth the knowledge to understand this technology, the confidence to question it, and the skills to help shape its future.”

Helping young people shape their digital future

All young people need opportunities to develop the skills, knowledge, and confidence to navigate and shape a world where AI technologies are widely used. With support from Google.org and in partnership with Actua and Digital Moment, we’re excited to make AI education accessible to more young people across Canada.

Classroom of educators training with Experience AI

Explore Experience AI and discover the free educational resources at experience-ai.org.

The post Bringing AI education to 300,000 young people across Canada appeared first on Raspberry Pi Foundation.

Security updates for Friday

Post Syndicated from jzb original https://lwn.net/Articles/1108811/

Security updates have been issued by AlmaLinux (bind9.18, bubblewrap, fence-agents, freerdp, grafana, grafana-pcp, gstreamer1-plugins-bad-free, jackson-core, jackson-databind, java-17-openjdk, java-21-openjdk, java-25-openjdk, kernel, kernel-rt, mysql8.4, mysql:8.4, qt5-qtbase, qt5-qtdeclarative, raptor2, resteasy, and sos), Debian (electrum, nginx, openjdk-17, pam-mysql, php8.2, and php8.4), Fedora (aws, bind9-next, blender, c-ares, composer, dr_libs, et, gh, incron, libaec, libfontenc, libXfont2, mtools, nebula, perl-Imager, perl-Text-JSCalendar, perl-Text-JSContact, php, python-loguru, python3.6, qpid-proton, roundcubemail, runc, and xen), Gentoo (nginx, PHP, and Ruby), Mageia (hplip), Oracle (.NET 10.0, .NET 11.0, .NET 8.0, .NET 9.0, bubblewrap, emacs, firefox, flatpak-builder, gcc, gimp, glibc, grafana, grafana-pcp, gstreamer1, gvfs, java-1.8.0-openjdk, java-17-openjdk, java-21-openjdk, java-25-openjdk, libssh2, mod_http2, perl-CGI, perl-DBI, perl-DBI:1.641, python3.9, rpm, squid, tesseract, thunderbird, tigervnc, util-linux, webkit2gtk3, and xdg-dbus-proxy), Red Hat (compat-openssl10, kernel, nginx, nginx:1.24, nginx:1.26, nodejs22, nodejs:22, openssl, python-urllib3, python3.12-urllib3, qt5-qtbase, and qt6-qtbase), Slackware (gnutls, perl, and php), SUSE (cifs-utils, elemental-operator, elemental-system-agent, elemental- toolkit, haproxy, java-11-openjdk, kernel, libXi, python-M2Crypto, python-oauthlib, rekor, and xen), and Ubuntu (kernel, linux, linux-aws, linux-aws-5.4, linux-azure, linux-bluefield, linux-fips, linux-gcp, linux-gcp-5.4, linux-gcp-fips, linux-hwe-5.4, linux-ibm, linux-ibm-5.4, linux-iot, linux-kvm, linux-oracle, linux-raspi, linux-raspi-5.4, linux-xilinx-zynqmp, linux, linux-aws, linux-aws-fips, linux-aws-hwe, linux-azure, linux-azure-4.15, linux-azure-fips, linux-fips, linux-gcp, linux-gcp-4.15, linux-gcp-fips, linux-hwe, linux-kvm, linux-oracle, linux, linux-aws, linux-aws-fips, linux-gcp, linux-gcp-6.8, linux-gke, linux-gkeop, linux-ibm, linux-ibm-6.8, linux-oracle-6.8, linux-vmware, linux, linux-aws, linux-fips, linux-kvm, linux-lts-xenial, linux, linux-aws, linux-gcp, linux-gcp-5.15, linux-gke, linux-gkeop, linux-ibm, linux-ibm-5.15, linux-oracle, linux, linux-aws, linux-gcp, linux-gcp-7.0, linux-gke, linux-ibm, linux-oem-7.0, linux-vmware, linux-aws-5.15, linux-aws-fips, linux-aws-fips, linux-kvm, linux-fips, linux-gcp-fips, linux-gcp-fips, linux-oracle, nginx, openjdk-17-crac, openjdk-21-crac, openjdk-25-crac, openjdk-8, pyjwt, and ruby3.3, ruby3.2, ruby3.0).

Йотова, Йотова, обади се!

Post Syndicated from Емилия Милчева original https://www.toest.bg/yotova-yotova-obadi-se/

Йотова, Йотова, обади се!

Има ли България президент на борда? Да произнесе слово на поклонението на Вежди Рашидов, да връчи отличия на офицери и да поздрави Сухопътните войски за празника им би могъл и актьор, повикан по заместване. 

Илияна Йотова спечели балотажа, за да върши същото. Когато е наложително да каже нещо извън протокола, настъпва антракт.

Йотова ли спечели, или Гюров загуби?

На президентския балотаж страхът от война победи обещанието за промяна. Емилия Милчева анализира как управляващите превърнаха мира в предизборно оръжие, защо Андрей Гюров не успя да наложи собствен дневен ред и какво политическо бъдеще очаква двамата кандидати след изборите.

От президента се очаква да задава на управляващите въпроси, които те предпочитат да подминат. За тази цел има вето, но понякога е достатъчно да вземе думата, докато решението още може да се промени. Йотова имаше такъв повод още в първите дни след балотажа, когато депутати от управляващата „Прогресивна България“ предложиха да орежат трудовите права за личните асистенти в Закона за личната помощ.

Мълча за майките

Миналата година Йотова имаше да каже доста повече. Като вицепрезидент тя обвини кабинета „Желязков“, че прокарва бюджета за 2026 г. без диалог и с „безпрецедентно арогантно отношение на властта“. И Георги Първанов навремето се намеси в дебата за бюджет 2005. Той предупреди, че може да наложи вето заради текстове, които променят правилата за интеграция на хората с увреждания. 

През 2020 г., когато изведоха майките от „Системата ни убива“ от парламента, Йотова попита защо председателката на 44-тото Народно събрание Цвета Караянчева не е отишла да разговаря с тях. Тя каза тогава, че на „Дондуков“ 2 гражданите могат да се срещнат с нея всеки ден. 

Шест години по-късно въпросът ѝ към Караянчева става въпрос към самата нея.

Проектът предвиждаше трудовите договори на личните асистенти да бъдат заменени с друг вид договори, да отпадне добавката за прослужено време, а заплащането им вече да не е обвързано с минималната заплата. За майките, които са лични асистенти на децата си, това означаваше да загубят трудови права именно за работата, която им позволява да се грижат за тях. Цинично прозвуча и коментарът от „Прогресивна България“, че така им освобождават възможност да работят на още едно място.

Майките обявиха готовност за протест и на 13 ноември, три дни след внасянето на проекта, управляващите го оттеглиха. През тези три дни от „Дондуков“ 2 не се чу нито една дума от първата жена, заела президентския пост, а също майка и баба.

Имаме си президентка. Съвсем

Светла Енчева коментира избора на първата жена президент на България. Йотова дължи възможността да заеме този пост на борбата за равноправие, но не е защитавала особено правата на жените. А след 10 години в сянката на Румен Радев тепърва ще трябва да доказва политическата си самостоятелност.

Съвсем различна беше Йотова по време на кампанията. „Първата ни задача е да се погрижим за най-бедните и уязвимите“, каза тя в Перник шест дни преди първия тур. 

За личната помощ Йотова замълча, а преди това замълча и за смъртта по пътищата. Единственото, което направи след тежката верижна катастрофа на магистрала „Тракия“, в която живота си загубиха 13 души, а десетки пострадаха, беше да прекъсне участието си в Парижкия форум за мир и да изрази съболезнования. 

Какво поиска от институциите, които отговарят за безопасността по пътищата? Нищо – защото за това се иска да заемеш позиция, но изглежда, че Илияна Йотова не се осмелява да надигне глас пред управляващите от партия „Прогресивна България“, подкрепила я за президентския пост. 

Проговори за кратко

На 16 ноември в Пномпен, където представляваше България на Срещата на върха на франкофонията, Йотова представи изводите от дискусия за предотвратяването и уреждането на конфликти. Същия ден в българската изключителна икономическа зона беше ударен товарният кораб BETUL 8, пълен с украинска пшеница, а след него и газовоз. От „Демократична България“ преброиха седем потопени плавателни съда в изключителната икономическа зона на България и настояха Йотова да свика Консултативния съвет за национална сигурност (КСНС). 

Патриоти за мъртвите – страхливци за живите

Два кораба потънаха край България, а на повърхността изплува фактът, че пак не знаем какво е станало. Докато институциите внимателно подбират условното наклонение и каканижат с „да биха били…, щяхме и ние…“, миналото напомня, че руските следи у нас не са нито нови, нито малко. От Емилия Милчева.

След честването на празника на Сухопътните войски край Гургулят на 19 ноември Йотова обясни пред журналисти защо няма да свика отново КСНС за Черно море. Според нея първо трябва да се изпълнят решенията от заседанието на 7 октомври. Като свършена работа тя посочи срещата на министрите на отбраната на България, Румъния и Турция и изтъкна дейността на общата противоминна група, чиито задачи вече включват и спасителни операции. 

За останалите мерки Йотова каза, че очаква правителството и парламентарното мнозинство да ги изпълнят в следващите дни. Готова е да изслуша мотивите на опозицията, но досега е чула призива ѝ само през медиите и не е получила официално писмо.

В същия ден и премиерът Румен Радев призова шестте черноморски държави да се договорят за спиране на атаките срещу цивилни кораби. Йотова отиде по-далеч и заговори за мораториум върху бойните действия в целия басейн. А как България ще пази корабите дотогава? Няма как, разбра се от отговора на министър-председателя:

И аз искам да унищожаваме дроновете, но няма как към момента по чисто военнотехнически причини.

След като в изборната нощ президентката каза, че българите са избрали мира, можеше от висотата на позицията си да попита какво става с разследването за произхода на дроновете. Защото дори руският президент Путин призна, че Кремъл стои зад атаките с безпилотни летателни апарати, но не и българските управляващи.

Те започнаха да удрят нашите танкери в Черно море. В отговор, както всички знаят, ние започнахме да действаме по същия начин. 

Попитана как евентуални доказателства за руски произход на дроновете биха се отразили на отношенията с Москва, Йотова обясни, че според нея Русия не се опитва да превърне България в част от войната. Тези разсъждения не носят особена полза на екипажите, които трябва да знаят кой се грижи за тяхната сигурност при плаването през вътрешното море. Черно море вече е опасен търговски маршрут, а през неговите пристанища минава около 14% от зърното, превозвано по море в света, по оценка на международната корабоплавателна асоциация BIMCO от август 2026 г. 

Страдателният залог на генерал-премиера

„Онзи-който-не-бива-да-се-назовава“ продължава да потапя кораби в Черно море. Междувременно Румъния сваля дронове и укрепва отбраната си, а ние търсим доказателства и призоваваме безадресно за мораториуми. Колко струва снишаването, когато войната вече е на брега ни? От Емилия Милчева.

Ами Комисията по досиетата?

За КСНС за ударите в Черно море Йотова каза, че не е получила официално писмо. По друг въпрос обаче президентката е сред адресатите на отворено писмо. Над сто общественици поискаха от премиера Румен Радев да оттегли проекта за закриване на Комисията по досиетата и изпратиха копие до Йотова и до председателката на Народното събрание. А над 4500 души са подписали онлайн петицията със същото искане. 

Проектът прехвърля функциите на Комисията към Държавна агенция „Архиви“. Сред публикуваните становища от общественото обсъждане няма нито едно в подкрепа на закриването. Къде стои президентката по въпроса? Може да вземе думата още сега, докато има шанс проектът да бъде оттеглен. Но тя е избрала сурово да мълчи.

Проектът за закриване на Комисията по досиетата тръгна от параграф 8 на бюджет 2026, който Йотова обнародва през юли. Това е обяснение за мълчанието, защото на практика е съучаствала в затварянето на архивите на бившите тайни служби. 

Когато парламентът приеме бюджет 2027, Йотова ще трябва да реши дали да подпише указа за обнародването му, или да го върне за ново обсъждане. От ГЕРБ вече предупредиха, че ще поискат вето, ако държавните разходи за догодина бъдат приети в този си вид. 

От юли България е в процедура при прекомерен дефицит, а в бюджет 2027 кабинетът на Радев залага дефицит от 4,2% от БВП на начислена основа и иска да поеме до 8,6 млрд. евро нов дълг. Това означава, че държавата планира бюджетен дефицит над допустимите по европейските правила 3% от БВП, въпреки че вече е под наблюдението на Европейската комисия и трябва да предприема мерки за ограничаването му. През 2013 г. президентът Росен Плевнелиев върна текстове от актуализацията на бюджета и поиска кабинетът „Орешарски“ да каже за какво ще похарчи новия дълг. 

От обяснения на вицепремиера и министър на финансите Гълъб Донев стана ясно, че около 2,1 млрд. евро са нужни за погасяване на стари задължения с настъпващ падеж. Йотова има какво да попита кабинета на Радев – за какво е предвиден останалият ресурс в година на местни избори. 

По какви критерии кабинетът ще определя кои общински проекти да финансира и кога да плати по тях? Отговорът на този въпрос се чака от регионалния министър Иван Шишков, чието министерство ще разполага с 2,51 млрд. евро, а проектите (и кметовете) се пресяват чрез обиколките по инициативата „Регионите говорят“.

Пак по време на кампанията Илияна Йотова говореше за „синхрон между институциите и за взаимен коректив“. Тя е избрала да бъде президентският статист на Радев.

На 31 декември микрофонът ще е неин. Дотогава може да зададе поне един въпрос на управляващите.

Холи Бери е в менопауза. И сега какво?

Post Syndicated from Надежда Цекулова original https://www.toest.bg/halle-berry-e-v-menopauza-i-sega-kakvo/

/* ==========================================================================
„Анатомия на пола: Менопауза“ — ефекти при скрол за ТАЗИ статия
Зарежда се в началото на статията (Post → Code injection → Header).
Работи заедно с menopause.js. Не пипа стиловете на темата: всичко е
закачено за data-fx атрибути и класове с префикс mx-.
========================================================================== */
:root{
/* „топлина“ палитра на проекта */
–mx-red:#dc1010; –mx-lime:#c2d910; –mx-amber:#ecb716;
–mx-teal:#0e8da3; –mx-blue:#042da6; –mx-maroon:#600202;
–mx-ink:var(–black, hsl(220,5%,12%));
–mx-mute:var(–grey, hsl(210,3%,63%));
}
/* ———- лента за четене: същата на темата,
но с топлинен градиент вместо акцентния цвят ———- */
.post-progress[value]::-webkit-progress-value{
background:linear-gradient(90deg,var(–mx-blue),var(–mx-teal),var(–mx-lime),var(–mx-amber),var(–mx-red),var(–mx-maroon));
background-size:100vw 100%;
}
.post-progress[value]::-moz-progress-bar{
background:linear-gradient(90deg,var(–mx-blue),var(–mx-teal),var(–mx-lime),var(–mx-amber),var(–mx-red),var(–mx-maroon));
background-size:100vw 100%;
}
/* ———- общо ———- */
.mx-w,.mx-l{display:inline-block}
.mx-show [data-fx]{outline:2px dashed var(–mx-teal);outline-offset:3px;background:rgba(14,141,163,.08)}
/* ———- data-fx=”pop”: думите подскачат една по една ———- */
.mx-js [data-fx=”pop”] .mx-w{transform-origin:50% 80%}
.mx-js [data-fx=”pop”].mx-in .mx-w{animation:mx-pop .8s cubic-bezier(.3,1.7,.5,1) both;animation-delay:calc(var(–i)*.14s)}
@keyframes mx-pop{
0%{transform:translateY(0) scale(1)}
40%{transform:translateY(-.4em) scale(1.4);color:var(–mx-red)}
100%{transform:none}
}
/* ———- data-fx=”not”: от нормален към най-дебелия шрифт ———-
(Snaga има отделно семейство за всяко тегло, затова тук се сменят семействата) */
[data-fx=”not”]{font-family:’SnagaText-Regular’,sans-serif}
.mx-js [data-fx=”not”][data-w=”1″]{font-family:’SnagaText-Medium’,sans-serif}
.mx-js [data-fx=”not”][data-w=”2″]{font-family:’SnagaText-Semibold’,sans-serif}
.mx-js [data-fx=”not”][data-w=”3″]{font-family:’SnagaText-Black’,sans-serif}
/* ———- data-fx=”blur”: размазано → рязко, вързано за скрола ———- */
.mx-js [data-fx=”blur”] .mx-w{filter:blur(calc(var(–b,1)*9px));opacity:calc(1 – var(–b,1)*.5);will-change:filter}
/* ———- data-fx=”reveal”: думите се проявяват, накрая жълт маркер ———-
Маркерът е вътрешен около думите, които да се подчертаят */
.mx-js [data-fx=”reveal”] .mx-w{color:var(–mx-mute);transition:color .35s}
.mx-js [data-fx=”reveal”] .mx-w.mx-on{color:var(–mx-ink)}
.mx-js [data-fx=”reveal”] .mx-mk{background:linear-gradient(var(–mx-amber),var(–mx-amber)) no-repeat 0 90%/0 42%;transition:background-size .7s ease-out}
.mx-js [data-fx=”reveal”] .mx-mk.mx-hot{background-size:100% 42%}
/* ———- data-fx=”grow”: уголемява се докато скролваш ———- */
/* Оформлението е винаги в крайния размер (1.9×), а при скрол само се мащабира с transform.
Така редовете се пренасят еднакво и текстът под него не скача. */
[data-fx=”grow”]{display:block;font-size:1.9em;line-height:1.2;margin-bottom:.2em;transform-origin:0 0;transform:scale(calc(.526 + var(–p,0)*.474))}
/* ———- data-fx=”scatter”: думата „избухва“ в букви ———- */
[data-fx=”scatter”]{position:relative;display:inline-block}
.mx-js [data-fx=”scatter”].mx-in{animation:mx-blast .7s cubic-bezier(.3,1.6,.5,1)}
@keyframes mx-blast{0%{transform:scale(1)}30%{transform:scale(1.3);color:var(–mx-red)}100%{transform:scale(1)}}
.mx-pt{position:absolute;top:50%;z-index:5;line-height:1;white-space:nowrap;pointer-events:none;opacity:0}
/* ———- data-fx=”boldup”: удебелява се докато скролваш ———- */
[data-fx=”boldup”]{-webkit-text-stroke:calc(var(–p,0)*.055em) currentColor}
/* ———- data-fx=”shimmer”: топлинен спектър минава през думата ———- */
[data-fx=”shimmer”]{
/* черно → топлинна лента → черно: лентата минава през думата и тя остава черна */
background:linear-gradient(100deg,var(–mx-ink) 0 30%,var(–mx-blue) 35%,var(–mx-teal) 41%,var(–mx-lime) 47%,var(–mx-amber) 53%,var(–mx-red) 59%,var(–mx-maroon) 64%,var(–mx-ink) 70% 100%);
background-size:300% 100%;
background-position:calc(100% – var(–p,0)*100%) 0;
-webkit-background-clip:text;background-clip:text;
-webkit-text-fill-color:transparent;color:transparent;
}
/* ———- data-fx=”redsweep”: думите се оцветяват в червено една по една ———- */
[data-fx=”redsweep”] .mx-w{display:inline;transition:color .35s}
[data-fx=”redsweep”] .mx-w.mx-hot{color:var(–mx-red)}
/* ———- инфографика: точки + число (div.mx-ig) ———-
!important е нужен, защото темата задава font-size на .post-content p с !important на мобилен */
.mx-ig-wrap{margin:40px 0 44px}
.post-content .mx-ig-intro{font-size:14px!important;line-height:19px!important;margin:0 0 26px;color:hsl(230,5%,38%)}
.mx-ig{display:flex;gap:26px;align-items:center;margin-bottom:30px}
.mx-ig-grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(10,1fr);gap:6px;width:190px;flex:none}
.mx-ig[data-total=”5″] .mx-ig-grid{grid-template-columns:repeat(5,13.6px);justify-content:start;align-content:center}
.mx-ig .mx-p{display:block;aspect-ratio:1/1;position:relative;border-radius:50%;overflow:hidden;background:hsl(210,3%,82%)}
.mx-ig .mx-p::after{content:””;position:absolute;inset:0;background:var(–c);clip-path:inset(0 calc(100% – var(–f,0%)) 0 0)}
.post-content .mx-ig-num{font-size:56px!important;line-height:1!important;margin:0 0 8px;color:var(–nc,var(–mx-ink))}
.post-content .mx-ig-lab{margin:0;max-width:300px}
.mx-ig-wrap figcaption{font-size:14px;line-height:19px;color:hsl(230,5%,38%)}
@media (max-width:600px){
.mx-ig{flex-direction:column;align-items:flex-start;gap:16px}
.post-content .mx-ig-num{font-size:52px!important}
}
/* ———- ако е включено „намалено движение“ (JS слага .mx-static): крайни състояния ———- */
.mx-static [data-fx=”not”]{font-family:’SnagaText-Black’,sans-serif}
.mx-static [data-fx=”shimmer”]{background-position:0 0}
.mx-static [data-fx=”reveal”] .mx-mk{background:linear-gradient(var(–mx-amber),var(–mx-amber)) no-repeat 0 90%/100% 42%}
.mx-static [data-fx=”grow”],.mx-static [data-fx=”boldup”]{–p:1}
.mx-static [data-fx=”redsweep”]{color:var(–mx-red)}

/* ==========================================================================
„Анатомия на пола: Менопауза“ — ефекти при скрол за ТАЗИ статия
Зарежда се в края на статията (Post → Code injection → Footer) или с defer.
Работи с menopause.css. Търси елементи с data-fx=”…” и .mx-ig в текста.
Ефектите се намират по ТЕКСТ (виж списъка FX вътре) — не е нужно HTML в параграфите.
Не променя нищо друго на страницата.
Ефекти (слагат се ръчно в HTML-а на статията):
data-fx=”pop” думите подскачат една по една при стигане до тях
data-fx=”not” от нормален към най-дебелия шрифт
data-fx=”blur” от размазано към рязко
data-fx=”reveal” думите се проявяват; получава жълт маркер
data-fx=”grow” уголемява се
data-fx=”scatter” думата „избухва“ в букви
data-fx=”boldup” удебелява се
data-fx=”shimmer” топлинен спектър минава през думата
data-fx=”redsweep” думите стават червени една по една
.mx-ig инфографика с точки (виж snippets.html)
========================================================================== */
(function(){
‘use strict’;
function init(){
var root = document.documentElement;
var reduce = window.matchMedia && window.matchMedia(‘(prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)’).matches;
function $$(s){ return Array.prototype.slice.call(document.querySelectorAll(s)); }
var HEAT = [‘#dc1010′,’#ecb716′,’#c2d910′,’#0e8da3′,’#042da6′,’#600202’];
var PAL = [[4,45,166],[14,141,163],[194,217,16],[236,183,22],[220,16,16],[96,2,2]];
function pal(x){
x = Math.min(1, Math.max(0, x)) * (PAL.length-1);
var i = Math.min(PAL.length-2, Math.floor(x)), f = x – i, a = PAL[i], b = PAL[i+1];
return ‘rgb(‘ + [0,1,2].map(function(k){ return Math.round(a[k] + (b[k]-a[k])*f); }).join(‘,’) + ‘)’;
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КАКВО КЪДЕ СЕ СЛУЧВА — тук се определят ефектите, текстът в Ghost остава обикновен.
fx — ефектът (pop, not, blur, reveal, grow, scatter, boldup, shimmer, redsweep)
find — фразата в текста (интервалите са без значение)
wrap — по желание: само част от find да получи ефекта (напр. само „не“)
target — по желание: слагане върху целия елемент, напр. ‘h4′ (за reveal и redsweep)
mark — по желание, за reveal: част от find, която получава жълт маркер
Ако фраза не се намери, в конзолата излиза предупреждение „[mx] не е намерена“.
========================================================================== */
/* ЗАКЪСНЕНИЕ: колко по-късно да започват ефектите при скрол (0.12 = 12% от височината на екрана).
По-голямо число = ефектите се пускат, когато текстът е по-високо на екрана. 0 = без закъснение. */
var DELAY = .12;
var FX = [
{fx:’pop’, find:’слаби, красиви, млади и успешни’},
{fx:’not’, find:’изследванията не потвърдили’, wrap:’не’},
{fx:’blur’, find:’„просто остарявам“’},
{fx:’blur’, find:’„това се случва на всички жени“’},
{fx:’reveal’, find:’„И тази се опитва да ни продаде остаряването“’, target:’h4′, mark:’продаде остаряването’},
{fx:’grow’, find:’„Аз съм в менопауза“,’},
{fx:’scatter’, find:’избухна’},
{fx:’boldup’, find:’без изключение са част от маркетингова стратегия’},
{fx:’shimmer’, find:’лонджевити’},
{fx:’redsweep’, find:’окей, вече ни е социално разрешено да остаряваме, но само ако не ни личи.’, target:’h4′}
];
function escRe(s){ return s.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, ‘\\$&’); }
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var re = new RegExp(phrase.split(/\s+/).map(escRe).join(‘\\s+’));
var w = document.createTreeWalker(root, NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT, {acceptNode:function(n){
var p = n.parentNode && n.parentNode.nodeName;
if(p === ‘SCRIPT’ || p === ‘STYLE’) return NodeFilter.FILTER_REJECT;
if(n.parentNode.closest && n.parentNode.closest(‘.mx-assets,[data-fx],.mx-ig-wrap’)) return NodeFilter.FILTER_REJECT;
return NodeFilter.FILTER_ACCEPT;
}});
var n;
while((n = w.nextNode())){
var m = re.exec(n.nodeValue);
if(m){ var r = document.createRange(); r.setStart(n, m.index); r.setEnd(n, m.index + m[0].length); return r; }
}
return null;
}
function wrapRange(r, attrs){
var span = document.createElement(‘span’);
Object.keys(attrs).forEach(function(k){ span.setAttribute(k, attrs[k]); });
r.surroundContents(span);
return span;
}
function autoFx(){
var root = document.querySelector(‘.post-content’) || document.body;
FX.forEach(function(spec){
var r = findRange(root, spec.find);
if(!r){ console.warn(‘[mx] не е намерена фраза:’, spec.find); return; }
if(spec.target){
var el = r.startContainer.parentNode.closest(spec.target);
if(!el){ console.warn(‘[mx] няма’, spec.target, ‘около:’, spec.find); return; }
if(spec.mark){
var mr = findRange(el, spec.mark);
if(mr) wrapRange(mr, {‘class’:’mx-mk’});
}
el.setAttribute(‘data-fx’, spec.fx);
return;
}
if(spec.wrap){
var rel = new RegExp(escRe(spec.wrap));
var txt = r.toString(), at = txt.search(rel);
if(at 10 ? 0 : .62);
var to = el.hasAttribute(‘data-heat-to’) ? +el.getAttribute(‘data-heat-to’) : (total > 10 ? 1 : from + .1*(total-1));
for(var i=0;i 1 ? i/(total-1) : 0));
f.style.setProperty(‘–c’, f._col);
grid.appendChild(f); figs.push(f);
}
return {el:el, total:total, target:target, figs:figs, val:el.querySelector(‘.mx-ig-val’), fmt:el.getAttribute(‘data-fmt’) || ‘int’, top:0, a:.85 – DELAY, b:.4 – DELAY};
});
function applyIG(o, p){
var k = o.target * p;
o.figs.forEach(function(f, j){
var part = o.total 0 ? 1 : 0) : Math.min(1, Math.max(0, k – j)); // малките редове (1 от 5) се пълнят цели
var s = (part * 100).toFixed(0) + ‘%’;
if(f._s !== s){ f.style.setProperty(‘–f’, s); f._s = s; }
});
var last = o.figs[Math.max(0, Math.ceil(k) – 1)];
o.el.style.setProperty(‘–nc’, last ? last._col : ‘inherit’);
if(o.val) o.val.textContent = o.fmt === ‘dec’ ? k.toFixed(1).replace(‘.’, ‘,’) : String(Math.round(k));
}
/* ———- без анимации ———- */
if(reduce){
root.classList.add(‘mx-static’);
igs.forEach(function(o){ applyIG(o, 1); });
return;
}
root.classList.add(‘mx-js’);
$$(‘[data-fx=”pop”],[data-fx=”blur”]’).forEach(function(el){ splitDeep(el, {i:0}); });
/* ———- 1) еднократни: pop ———- */
var io = new IntersectionObserver(function(entries){
entries.forEach(function(en){
if(en.isIntersecting) en.target.classList.add(‘mx-in’);
else en.target.classList.remove(‘mx-in’); // пуска се пак при следващо стигане
});
}, {rootMargin:’-10% 0px -‘ + Math.round(28 + DELAY*100) + ‘% 0px’, threshold:0});
$$(‘[data-fx=”pop”]’).forEach(function(e){ io.observe(e); });
/* ———- 2) избухване ———- */
var bursts = $$(‘[data-fx=”scatter”]’);
var ALPHA = ‘абвгдежзиклмнопрстуфхцчшюяАБВГДЕЖЗИКЛМНОПРСТ’;
function burst(el){
el.classList.add(‘mx-in’);
var word = el.textContent.replace(/\s/g,”), n = 44;
var spread = Math.min(1, window.innerWidth/900);
for(var i=0;i<n;i++){
var s = document.createElement('span'); s.className = 'mx-pt';
s.textContent = Math.random() < .5 ? word.charAt(Math.floor(Math.random()*word.length)) : ALPHA.charAt(Math.floor(Math.random()*ALPHA.length));
s.style.left = (Math.random()*100) + '%';
s.style.fontSize = (.8 + Math.random()*1.5).toFixed(2) + 'em';
s.style.color = HEAT[Math.floor(Math.random()*HEAT.length)];
el.appendChild(s);
var a = Math.random()*Math.PI*2, d = (70 + Math.random()*170)*spread;
var dx = Math.cos(a)*d*1.35, dy = Math.sin(a)*d*.85, rot = Math.round(Math.random()*240 – 120);
var anim = s.animate([
{transform:'translate(-50%,-50%) scale(.2) rotate(0deg)', opacity:0},
{transform:'translate(calc(-50% + '+(dx*.35).toFixed(0)+'px),calc(-50% + '+(dy*.35).toFixed(0)+'px)) scale(1.1) rotate('+(rot*.4)+'deg)', opacity:1, offset:.18},
{transform:'translate(calc(-50% + '+dx.toFixed(0)+'px),calc(-50% + '+dy.toFixed(0)+'px)) scale(.9) rotate('+rot+'deg)', opacity:0}
], {duration:1000 + Math.random()*900, delay:Math.random()*140, easing:'cubic-bezier(.12,.75,.3,1)', fill:'forwards'});
anim.onfinish = (function(node){ return function(){ node.remove(); }; })(s);
}
}
var ioB = new IntersectionObserver(function(entries){
entries.forEach(function(en){
var el = en.target;
if(en.isIntersecting){
if(el._armed === false) return;
el._armed = false;
setTimeout(function(){ burst(el); }, 450);
} else { el._armed = true; el.classList.remove('mx-in'); }
});
}, {rootMargin:'-32% 0px -' + Math.round(32 + DELAY*100) + '% 0px', threshold:0});
bursts.forEach(function(e){ ioB.observe(e); });
/* ———- 3) вързани за скрола ———- */
var cfg = { grow:[.85,.45], boldup:[.85,.45], redsweep:[.85,.4], blur:[.95,.5], not:[.85,.5], shimmer:[.9,.3], reveal:[.85,.45] };
var linked = $$('[data-fx="grow"],[data-fx="boldup"],[data-fx="shimmer"],[data-fx="redsweep"],[data-fx="blur"],[data-fx="not"],[data-fx="reveal"]').map(function(el){
var type = el.getAttribute('data-fx'), o = {el:el, type:type, a:cfg[type][0] – DELAY, b:cfg[type][1] – DELAY, top:0, last:-1};
if(type === 'redsweep'){ o.n = splitDeep(el, {i:0}); o.words = Array.prototype.slice.call(el.querySelectorAll('.mx-w')); }
if(type === 'reveal'){ o.n = splitDeep(el, {i:0}); o.words = Array.prototype.slice.call(el.querySelectorAll('.mx-w')); o.mk = el.querySelector('.mx-mk'); }
if(type === 'blur'){ o.words = Array.prototype.slice.call(el.querySelectorAll('.mx-w')); o.n = o.words.length; }
return o;
});
function ease(p){ return p*p*(3-2*p); }
function apply(o, p){
if(o.type === 'reveal'){
var kr = Math.round(p*o.n);
if(kr !== o.last){ o.words.forEach(function(w,i){ w.classList.toggle('mx-on', i = .98);
} else if(o.type === ‘redsweep’){
var k = Math.round(p*o.n);
if(k !== o.last){ o.words.forEach(function(w,i){ w.classList.toggle(‘mx-hot’, i < k); }); o.last = k; }
} else if(o.type === 'blur'){
var spread = .6;
o.words.forEach(function(w,i){
var q = Math.min(1, Math.max(0, p*(1+spread) – (i/Math.max(1,o.n-1))*spread));
w.style.setProperty('–b', (1-ease(q)).toFixed(3));
});
} else if(o.type === 'not'){
var s = p < .25 ? 0 : p < .5 ? 1 : p < .75 ? 2 : 3;
if(s !== o.last){ o.el.setAttribute('data-w', s); o.last = s; }
} else {
o.el.style.setProperty('–p', ease(p).toFixed(4));
}
}
function measure(){
// позицията се мери при изключен ефект, за да няма обратна връзка с layout-а
linked.forEach(function(o){
if(o.type==='not'){ o.el.setAttribute('data-w',0); o.last=0; }
else if(o.type==='blur'){ o.words.forEach(function(w){ w.style.setProperty('–b',1); }); }
else if(o.type!=='redsweep' && o.type!=='reveal'){ o.el.style.setProperty('–p', 0); }
});
linked.forEach(function(o){ o.top = o.el.getBoundingClientRect().top + window.scrollY; });
igs.forEach(function(o){ o.top = o.el.getBoundingClientRect().top + window.scrollY; });
update();
}
function update(){
var vh = window.innerHeight, y = window.scrollY;
linked.forEach(function(o){
apply(o, Math.min(1, Math.max(0, (y + vh*o.a – o.top) / (vh*(o.a-o.b)))));
});
igs.forEach(function(o){
applyIG(o, Math.min(1, Math.max(0, (y + vh*o.a – o.top) / (vh*(o.a-o.b)))));
});
}
var tick = false;
window.addEventListener('scroll', function(){ if(tick) return; tick = true; requestAnimationFrame(function(){ tick = false; update(); }); }, {passive:true});
window.addEventListener('resize', measure);
window.addEventListener('load', measure);
measure();
/* помощни функции за преглед/тест */
window.mxShow = function(on){ root.classList.toggle('mx-show', !!on); };
window.mxReplay = function(){
$$('[data-fx].mx-in').forEach(function(e){ e.classList.remove('mx-in'); });
window.scrollTo({top:0, behavior:'smooth'});
setTimeout(function(){ bursts.forEach(function(e){ e._armed = true; }); }, 700);
};
}
if(document.readyState === 'loading') document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', init);
else init();
})();


Холи Бери е в менопауза. И сега какво?

Всички жени, които говорят публично за менопаузата, изглеждат слаби, красиви, млади и успешни. Или поне аз само такива намерих. Това със сигурност е добра стратегия за „ребрандиране“ на менопаузата (фразата е на Холи Бери, за нея – малко по-долу), но какво си мисли жената, която не се е появявала на корица на списание, когато се погледне в огледалото и нищо в тялото ѝ не функционира както преди? 


Когато си жената котка, дори менопаузата ти стои секси. 

Холи Бери, американската актриса, изиграла жената котка в едноименния филм и още десетки роли, които са я направили разпознаваема в целия свят, стана едно от най-популярните лица на менопаузата, разказа за целия си преход към нея, създаде около него мащабен бизнес, написа законопроект и взе на абордаж няколко американски медицински университета.

Започвам този текст с нейната история, защото е много ярък (и секси) пример, върху който да поразсъждаваме за границата между маркетинга и работата в обществена полза в контекста на една дълго (в смисъл хилядолетия) неглижирана здравна тема като менопаузата. Маркетингът не е задължително нещо лошо, напротив – създава възможност да се предложи информация там, където публичните политики никакви ги няма (например в здравното образование).

Остава обаче впечатлението, че всеки, който говори по една от най-важните теми за съвременната жена, се опитва да ѝ продаде нещо. А понякога имаме нужда просто някой да ни избърше сълзите, да ни каже, че петте кила отгоре много ни отиват, и да ни предпише вагинален естроген (но за него – в друг текст).

Холи Бери има дълга и изцяло публична история със симптомите на преходната възраст, която започва, когато актрисата е на 54 г. 

Тя разказва публично, как потърсила помощ заради силна болка след секс и получила диагноза „херпес“, която изследванията не потвърдили. Оказало се, че симптомите са свързани с перименопаузата. Потвърждаването на това обаче отнело време, защото дори лекарят ѝ в началото се смущавал да спомене думата „менопауза“ пред нея, разказва Бери в страницата на инициативата си Re-spin. 

„Лекарите ми казваха, че „просто остарявам“ и че „това се случва на всички жени“, продължава актрисата. Тя споделя, че когато най-после стига до специалист по менопаузата, е толкова объркана и неподготвена, че дори не знае какви въпроси да му зададе, давайки си сметка, че щом тя, световноизвестна актриса, носителка на „Оскар“, кралица на красотата, жена с множество успешни инициативи и влияние, се чувства така, то как ли се чувстват жените от по-непривилегировани социални групи? 

Водена от фрустрацията си, през 2020 г. Бери създава платформата Re-spin – първоначално като място, на което жените могат да получат насоки и основана на науката информация. През 2025 г. инициативата се ребрандира като „услуга на едно гише“ за жени в перименопауза и менопауза с амбицията да им предложи всичко необходимо. 

„И тази се опитва да ни продаде остаряването“,

ще си кажете и ще е обяснимо, защото това е усещането напоследък. Но за Холи няма да сте напълно прави. Наред с бизнеса си актрисата развива мащабна застъпническа дейност. През 2024 г. застава на емблематичния за САЩ хълм Капитолия редом до група сенаторки както от Демократическата, така и от Републиканската партия, за да представят законопроект за по-добри грижи за жените на средна възраст. 

„Аз съм в менопауза“,

обявява тя пред журналистите и това явно е толкова впечатляващо, че го отразяват дори български медии.

Законопроектът все още не е гласуван, но Бери продължава да говори публично за нуждата от него, като паралелно работи и за промяна на обучителните програми в медицинските университети, така че бъдещите лекари да знаят по-добре какво се случва с жените в перименопауза и менопауза и как да им осигурят адекватни грижи.

Че има нужда от такава промяна, доказват и данните. В проучване, публикувано през 2019 г. в Mayo Clinic Proceedings, са анкетирани 183 лекари, специализиращи обща медицина, вътрешни болести и акушерство и гинекология в 20 програми в САЩ. Близо 94% от отговорилите на съответния въпрос смятат обучението за грижи при менопауза за важно или много важно, но едва 6,8% се чувстват достатъчно подготвени, а всеки пети съобщава, че по време на специализацията си не е имал нито една лекция по темата.

Проучване сред 183 лекари от 20 програми за специализация в САЩ.

94%

смятат обучението за грижи при менопауза за важно или много важно

6,8%

се чувстват достатъчно подготвени

1 от всеки 5

не е имал нито една лекция по темата по време на специализацията си

Източник: Mayo Clinic Proceedings, 2019

Сред пионерите в открития публичен разговор за менопаузата е и Анджелина Джоли, която шокира не само феновете си, когато премахна млечните си жлези и яйчниците си, за да се предпази от развитие на онкологични заболявания. Това стана през 2013–2015 г. и актрисата коментираше спокойно, открито и в детайли както решенията си за превантивните операции, така и последиците от тях, сред които и настъпилата вследствие на интервенциите менопауза. 

В последните няколко години обаче темата буквално избухна и сякаш внезапно се оказа, че десетки публично известни жени имат какво да ни кажат за прехода си към живот в репродуктивно неактивна възраст, и са готови да вложат усилия за по-адекватни публични политики в държавите си. 

Менопаузата: Упътване за употреба

Менопаузата е навсякъде, а ние се лутаме между научни знания, клишета и обещания за вечна младост. В първия текст от новата ни поредица Надежда Цекулова тръгва от своя опит, за да потърси какво знаем за този период, защо засяга всички и как да се ориентираме сред съветите, симптомите и маркетинга.

В Съединените щати и Обединеното кралство като че ли разговорите достигат до най-широка аудитория и дори и до нас – някои от следваните и от жени в България лекарки инфлуенсърки по темата, като д-р Мери Клер Хейвър, д-р Луиз Нюсън, д-р Рина Малик, са далеч от представата ни за скучен човек в бяла престилка и доста по-близо до образа на „селебрити“ (личност, която вече е толкова известна, че дори не помним защо точно е известна). В разговора за остаряването и последиците от него се включват Опра Уинфри, Наоми Уотс, Мишел Обама, Ема Томпсън… И всъщност мога да продължа така, изброявайки имена, до края на текста. 

Вълната залива целия свят

Макар у нас да не сме чували за част от активистките за по-адекватна информация и грижи за жените в перименопауза и менопауза, много от тях са истински звезди в своите държави. В Шотландия например олимпийската шампионка по бягане с препятствия Сали Гънъл стана лице на кампания, която цели да мотивира спортните клубове да адаптират тренировъчните си програми така, че да са по-подходящи за атлетки в менопаузален преход.

В Германия книгата на журналистката Мириам Щайн Die gereizte Frau („Раздразнената жена“), издадена през 2022 г., стана много бързо бестселър на Der Spiegel и това провокира разгръщането ѝ в поредица – след нея се появиха Die weisen Frauen („Мъдрите жени“), а съвсем скоро от печат излиза и последната книга от трилогията – Die unverschämte Frau („Безсрамната жена“¹). Наскоро беше издаден и комиксът Peri Мeno на илюстраторката Рина Ланг. 

Във Франция телевизионната журналистка Клер Фурние създаде подкаста Chaud dedans („Жега отвътре“), провокирана отново от болезнения личен опит, съчетаващ неинформираност и усещането, че няма към кого да се обърнеш (което е комбинирано и с представата за драматичен личен провал, когато се имаш за добър журналист, ерго – информиран човек, б.а.)

Сходни примери намираме в Нова Зеландия и Австралия, дори в Индия. Разказвам ви всички тези неща, за да ви улесня в намирането на информация. Но и за да е ясно, че по света ври и кипи и жените „на средна възраст“ са доста сигурни, че са тук, за да останат. 

Ура, не сме на самотен остров!

В България често световният „хайп“ достига с известно закъснение. Нямам ясно обяснение защо е така, намираме се в сърцето на най-благоденстващия континент все пак (да влязат социолозите)! Но вълната, задвижена от жени като Анджелина Джоли и Холи Бери, през 2025-та – 2026-та явно най-после е заляла и нашия бряг. 

Едно от най-разпознаваемите лица (или може би е по-подходящо да кажа „най-разпознаваемият глас“) на застъпничеството за повече информираност относно менопаузата е актрисата Силвия Лулчева. През 2025 г. тя става лице на информационната кампания „Изключи горещите вълни“ и споделя в поредица интервюта за личния си сблъсък с изострената тревожност, която я съпътства в този период. И не е единствена. За трудностите и позитивите на зрялата възраст говорят открито и колежките ѝ Маргита Гошева, Елена Петрова, Катерина Евро, журналистката Люба Пашова. Техните изяви обаче са част от рекламни кампании на различни брандове, а не лична кауза. 

Ако трябва да сме честни, изкуственият интелект откри, че още във вече далечната 1996 г. у нас е била създадена Българската асоциация по менопауза и андропауза (БАМА). Организацията обаче има активна дейност едва няколко години, а през 2020 г. е официално заличена. От 2006 г. насам са регистрирани още три организации с аналогично име и предмет на дейност.

През последните две години се появиха няколко български инициативи с амбиция да подкрепят жените в прехода им към менопауза. Част от тях са специализирани програми на клиники за репродуктивна медицина, което е в някаква степен логично.

Стартъпът Womeno се опитва да събере всички нужди в една точка и да осигури както базови насоки и ориентация за жените къде по трасето на този преход се намират, така и най-сложното – да представи на потребителките си конкретни лекари от широк спектър специалности, които имат интерес и познания за особеностите и нуждите на жените в тази възраст.

Създадена е и фондация на име „Академия Менопауза – България“, която публикува периодично интервюта с български специалисти. От тази година съществува и платформата „Меноморфоза“. Зад нея стои Яна Балникова, чиято история повтаря познатото дотук – на 44 години се сблъсква с безсъние, изтощение, затруднена концентрация, а обяснението на лекарите, че наближава менопаузата, върви с препоръката да свиква. Търсенето на по-удовлетворително решение се превръща във видеоканал в социалните мрежи, уебсайт с информация, ръководства и дневник за проследяване на симптомите. В световния ден на менопаузата беше представена и едноименната книга с експертни отговори и лични истории. Самата Яна пък е пример как подкрепата за жените в сходно положение може да бъде стимул и за развитие на личен бизнес.

Наред с това през последните две години в София се проведоха най-малко пет събития, посветени на „жената в преход“, и изглежда, всички те са се радвали на интерес. Този списък, разбира се, не претендира за изчерпателност. Но с него обръщам внимание, че част от инициативите не са особено активни и от публичните им канали дори не става ясно дали все още функционират. А тези, които са, без изключение са част от маркетингова стратегия, при която образоването на жените е част от маркетинговата политика на даден продукт или услуга. 

Това е проблем, защото затруднява жените при ориентирането коя от рекламните препоръки е наистина основана на наука и има ли как да си помогнат, ако не могат да отделят сериозна сума. Ето как менопаузалното здраве се превръща от право в индустрия. 

Един пример до какво води това, е разминаването между стремежа

да останем здрави, докато сме живи, и превръщането на вечната младост в култ и символ на успеха.

На фона на десетилетните усилия на феминизма да зачеркне или поне да обуздае култа към слабото женско тяло, към силиконовите форми и хирургически опънатата кожа, която уж крие възрастта, сравнително новото движение за менопаузално здраве наля живително гориво у тези вредни за жените тенденции. 

От Холивуд до София обещанието за вечна младост вече си има и име, което звучи почти като медицинска специалност – longevity (лонджевити, в случай че не знаете). Гуинет Полтроу разказва пред ELLE за венозните вливания с модерното вещество NAD+, а марката ѝ Goop слага същата съставка в крем. В София медицински центрове предлагат такива вливания като „антиейджинг“ терапия или като „ъпгрейд“ на клетъчно ниво – практика, която при недостатъчен контрол може да се окаже дори опасна за живота.

Засега няма убедителни данни, че тези процедури забавят стареенето, но пък има данни за нежелани странични реакции – американската Агенция по храните и лекарствата обяви, че е получила сигнали за тежко втрисане и повръщане след употреба на инжекционни препарати с NAD+.

И докато обсъждаме как да си върнем младостта на клетъчно ниво, рискуваме да приемем за даденост, че видимата възраст на една жена е проблем, който тя е длъжна да реши за своя сметка, за да докаже социалната си ценност. Или да го кажем по-просто – 

окей, вече ни е социално разрешено да остаряваме, но само ако не ни личи. 

При това положение може ли да се сърдим, че за жените краят на младостта изглежда като край на живота? 

Въпросът е риторичен.

Иска ми се покрай целия този шум около менопаузата да извоюваме нещо съвсем практично – да можем да остаряваме на видно място и когато имаме нужда от компетентни грижи, да знаем къде да ги търсим и да можем да ги получим.

1 Книгите не са издавани на български език. Всички преводи са на авторката на текста. – Б.р.

Холи Бери е в менопауза. И сега какво?

С финансовата подкрепа на Български фонд за жените и Европейския съюз. Изразените възгледи и мнения са единствено на автора(ите) и не отразяват непременно тези на Български фонд за жените, Европейския съюз или Европейската изпълнителна агенция за образование и култура. Нито БФЖ, нито ЕС, нито ЕИАОК могат да бъдат държани отговорни за тях.

Metasploit Wrap Up: Breaking Zimbra’s Identity Boundaries

Post Syndicated from Christopher Granleese original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrap-up-breaking-zimbra-s-identity-boundaries

This release we have three pull requests from jburgess-r7 building out coverage for the identity-boundary issues detailed in Rapid7’s Breaking Zimbra Identity Boundaries, Part One research.

First up is a new shared mixin, Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Zimbra, which gives every current and future Zimbra module a common foundation for account/admin SOAP authentication, canonical identity resolution, mailbox-server lookup, and version parsing, allowing future modules to stay focused on the vulnerability instead of re-implementing Zimbra’s SOAP plumbing.

Built on top of that mixin are two new modules targeting CVEs from the same research track:

CVE-2026-73571 (#22080) It’s an authorization bypass in Zimbra’s SaveDraftRequest handling that lets an ordinary authenticated user send mail as another local mailbox without a delegation grant, landing a message in the victim’s own Sent folder in the process.

CVE-2026-93637 (#22070) Is a rate-limit bypass in Zimbra’s Network Edition GraphQL authentication endpoint, which lets credential-stuffing attempts skip the source-IP lockout counter that normally protects the SOAP login path.

Both modules were validated against live Zimbra 10.1.16 Network Edition instances. Super cool contributions from our very own jburgess-r7.

New module content (6)

Zimbra SaveDraftRequest Email Impersonation

Authors: Ayoub Nabil Boubagrat and Crypto-Cat

Type: Auxiliary

Pull request: #22080 contributed by jburgess-r7

Path: admin/http/zimbra_email_impersonation

CVE reference: CVE-2026-73571

Description: Adds an auxiliary module for CVE-2026-73571, allowing an authenticated user to send email as another local mailbox on Zimbra 10.1.16. The module supports optional Inbox delivery verification.

Zimbra GraphQL Authentication Rate Limit Bypass

Author: Crypto-Cat

Type: Auxiliary

Pull request: #22070 contributed by jburgess-r7

Path: scanner/http/zimbra_graphql_brute

CVE reference: CVE-2026-93637

Description: This adds an auxiliary scanner for CVE-2026-93637 that tests Zimbra Network Edition authentication through GraphQL batches. The module supports configurable batches, safe stopping controls, and storage of verified credentials.

BeyondTrust Remote Support MRS Origin Validation File Upload

Author: jheysel

Type: Exploit

Pull request: #22083 contributed by jheysel-r7

Path: linux/http/beyondtrust_rs_mrs_file_upload

CVE reference: CVE-2026-102764

Description: Adds an exploit module for an origin validation vulnerability in Beyond Trust Remote Support which allows for unauthenticated file upload resulting in RCE. The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-102764.

Openfire Deleted Administrator Account Authentication Bypass RCE

Authors: Admin9961, Jatin Mannepalli, h00die-gr3y [email protected], and xRogue

Type: Exploit

Pull request: #22043 contributed by mjatin2007

Path: multi/http/openfire_deleted_admin_rce_cve_2024_25420

CVE reference: CVE-2024-25420

Description: Adds exploit module for CVE-2024-25420, an vulnerability in Ignite Realtime Openfire before 4.8.1 that allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the admin.authorizedJIDs system property component.

Cisco Secure Email Gateway AMP Arbitrary File Write RCE

Author: sfewer-r7

Type: Exploit

Pull request: #22028 contributed by sfewer-r7

Path: unix/smtp/cisco_secure_email_gateway_amp_file_write_rce

CVE reference: CVE-2026-76519

Description: Adds a new exploit module for CVE-2026-76519 an unauth RCE in Cisco Secure Email Gateway which was disclosed last month by the vendor and reported as being exploited in-the-wild. The vulnerability is a file write in the Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) File Reputation feature. When processing a TAR file which contains a PAX archive, we can force an existing file to be overwritten. The module overwrites an existing script /data/bin/core_watch.sh with a Metasploit payload. This script file is executed every 5 minutes by a cron job, giving us RCE with root privs.

Cisco Secure Email Gateway ECS Message-ID SQL Injection RCE

Author: sfewer-r7

Type: Exploit

Pull request: #22024 contributed by sfewer-r7

Path: unix/smtp/cisco_secure_email_gateway_ecs_sqli_rce

CVE reference: CVE-2026-76461

Description: This adds an exploit module for an unauthenticated SQL injection in the Cisco Secure Email Gateway (SEG) Email Cloud Scanner (ECS) URL-retrospective message database. We believe this is CVE-2026-76461 being tracked as, which was reported as being exploited in-the-wild last month as a zero-day.

Enhancements and features (2)

  • #22055 from kx7m2qd – Improve ADSelfService Plus check result clarity.
  • #22091 from jburgess-r7 – This adds a shared Zimbra SOAP support for account and administrator authentication, account discovery, and version retrieval. Zimbra modules can now reuse consistent token routing, response validation, and error handling.

Bugs fixed (24)

  • #21879 from JothamB – Fixes a crash in the exploits/windows/local/unquoted_service_path module.
  • #21931 from Pushpenderrathore – Improves the performance of Malleable profiles in versions of Ruby older than or equal to version 3.1.
  • #21948 from s-r-e-e-r-a-j – Fixes a crash when running Metasploit with Apktool 3.x.
  • #21968 from pauljccode – Fixes a crash when running Android payload generation.
  • #21986 from Aaditya1273 – Fixed OptArray normalization so accepted values that differ only by capitalization are canonicalized and deduplicated correctly.
  • #21991 from pauljccode – Fixes intermittent UDP receive failures when routing traffic through a Quectel modem session.
  • #22026 from kx7m2qd – Fixes a warning message when running the SNMP login scanner module.
  • #22062 from Yeagerist0 – Fix dlink_dir_645_password_extractor crashing after it extracts credentials.
  • #22063 from Yeagerist0 – Fixes NoMethodError in auxiliary/scanner/misc/oki_scanner.
  • #22074 from bc-idpotat – Skip invalid SPNs during LDAP enumeration.
  • #22075 from Yeagerist0 – Removes duplicate target prefix from vnc_login module output.
  • #22076 from Yeagerist0 – Removes duplicate target prefix from rsh_login and rlogin_login module output.
  • #22078 from Yeagerist0 – Fixes auxiliary/scanner/http/coldfusion_locale_traversal ignoring FINGERPRINT when FILE is set.
  • #22079 from Yeagerist0 – Fixes a crash when running the xorcom_completepbx_diagnostics_file_read module.
  • #22087 from Yeagerist0 – Reject invalid bytes in the binary encoding checker.
  • #22105 from dwelch-r7 – Updates the msfdb bootstrap capabilities when creating and securing a created PostgreSQL database.
  • #22107 from jankesec – Removes duplicate peer:port prefixes from several scanners.
  • #22108 from jankesec – Removes duplicate peer:port prefixes from several scanners.
  • #22111 from cgranleese-r7 – Adds additional validation to Metasploit’s hardware bridge support.
  • #22116 from Army-R – Updates the post/windows/manage/enable_rdp module’s error handling.
  • #22128 from sjanusz-r7 – Fixes false positives reported by the check method for auxiliary/gather/solarwinds_webhelpdesk_backdoor.
  • #22142 from Yeagerist0 – Fixes Msf::RPC::JSON::Request rejecting valid JSON-RPC responses as InvalidResponse when symbolize_names: false is used.
  • #22143 from urvalkheni – Fixes a crash when running the pihole_domains_api_exec module when a token is not found.
  • #22151 from sjanusz-r7 – Fixes a false positive result in the auxiliary/scanner/http/litellm_proxy_sqli vulnerability detection check.

Documentation added (1)

You can always find more documentation on our docsite at docs.metasploit.com.

Get it

As always, you can update to the latest Metasploit Framework with msfupdate and you can get more details on the changes since the last blog post from GitHub:

If you are a git user, you can clone the Metasploit Framework repo (master branch) for the latest. To install fresh without using git, you can use the open-source-only Nightly Installers or the commercial edition Metasploit Pro

nginx2root: Five new nginx vulnerabilities, and how Cloudflare protects origins from the worst of them

Post Syndicated from Dan Jones original https://blog.cloudflare.com/nginx2root/

On November 18, 2026, F5 and nginx.org disclosed ten vulnerabilities in nginx. Five of them, detailed by the Xint research team and published under the name nginx2root, are memory corruption flaws that an unauthenticated attacker can use to crash an nginx worker or, per Xint's research, run commands on the server. Xint also found a Linux kernel bug that turns that foothold into root on the host, including from inside a Docker container. Other teams found the two HTTP/2 bugs independently: F5 also credits Rapid7, Wiz Research and Ikotas Labs for CVE-2026-123007, and Metnir, Wiz Research, and Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 for CVE-2026-123633.

nginx is an HTTP web server that also serves as reverse proxy, content cache, load balancer, TCP/UDP proxy server, and mail proxy server. nginx runs a large share of the world's web servers, so this is a patch-now event. But if your nginx server is reachable only through Cloudflare's proxy, attackers cannot reach the vulnerable code paths for the most serious of these bugs, giving you protection while you update your servers.

Here is where Cloudflare stands, what that protection covers, where it stops, and how the bugs work.

The short version

  • Cloudflare's edge is not affected. Much of the proxy that handles customer traffic at our edge now runs on FL2, written in Rust. We reviewed the parts still built on our heavily modified nginx fork against all five bugs before disclosure, and an update closing the related code paths finished rolling out globally before the vulnerabilities were published. The same releases fix five other nginx CVEs, including CVE-2026-118899, an infinite loop while reading a request body over TLS 1.3.
  • Origins behind Cloudflare's HTTP proxy are shielded from the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 attacks. For proxied hostnames, Cloudflare terminates every client HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 connection at our edge and opens a separate connection to your origin. The attacker's frames never reach your nginx.
  • The resolver and mail proxy vulnerabilities depend on specific configuration. Many configurations of nginx will not be vulnerable, but the safest way to be sure is to update your install or disable features.
  • You should still patch. Update to nginx 1.30.7 or 1.31.9 (or your vendor's fixed build) and restart. Some configurations, covered below, are not protected by the proxy.

What was disclosed

nginx2root is five independent bugs. Each one works on its own and each one needs a different configuration.

CVE

Bug class

Affected configuration

First affected release

CVE-2026-123007

Integer overflow leading to out-of-bounds heap read/write

HTTP/2 enabled

1.9.5 (2015)

CVE-2026-123633

Use-after-free

HTTP/2 with proxy_pass to a backend, worker low on worker_connections

1.19.7

CVE-2026-121810

Use-after-free

HTTP/3 (QUIC) with proxy_pass to a backend

1.25.0

CVE-2026-123634

Use-after-free

resolver + proxy_pass with variables + a subrequest (mirror or SSI)

0.6.18

CVE-2026-113425

Use-after-free

Mail proxy with proxy on and auth_http

0.5.33

F5 rates each one High (CVSS 3.1: 8.1) and Critical (CVSS 4.0: 9.2), and notes that code execution requires disabling or bypassing ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization). For CVE-2026-123007, Xint's write-up shows how it leaked memory addresses to do exactly that.

CVE-2026-123007 is the one to worry about most. It only needs HTTP/2 turned on, which is commonly enabled on TLS deployments, and it has been in every nginx release since HTTP/2 support shipped in 1.9.5. Xint ran the exploit over the public Internet against servers on AWS, GCP and Azure. Xint searched Shodan on November 10, before the disclosure, and found 56.7 million hosts matching product:nginx. Of the 11.94 million that reported a version, 98.9% fell in the affected range. As of November 19, Censys's nginx2root exposure tracker counts about 8.8 million services running a potentially affected version with HTTP/2 enabled. Version strings don't prove a host is vulnerable, since distributions backport fixes, but the exposure is large.

The same nginx releases also fix five other bugs. The most serious, CVE-2026-118899, is an infinite loop when reading a request body over TLS 1.3 that lets an unauthenticated attacker stall a worker, in nginx 1.13.0 and later.

The Linux kernel bug is the sixth part of nginx2root. Xint found a use-after-free in the kernel's SCTP send path, present since Linux 4.15 (2018): while a send operation waits, its SCTP association can be moved to another socket, and the waiting send can then free it. An attacker who already runs code as the nginx worker can use it to gain root on the host, and Xint did this from an nginx running inside a Docker container. Many distributions load the SCTP module automatically the first time a program opens an SCTP socket, so hosts that never use SCTP can still be exposed. As of November 18, no kernel fix was available and Xint was withholding the details until there is one.

As of November 19, none of the five nginx2root CVEs is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and we have not seen reports of exploitation in the wild. Xint and Wiz Research have not released their exploits. Rapid7 has published a proof of concept, which it describes as suitable only for demonstrating the attack against a freshly started local container. Fake 'exploits' are also circulating on GitHub.

Why Cloudflare's proxy protects your origin

nginx2root's most dangerous bugs live in how nginx parses and manages HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 connections. To trigger them, an attacker has to send a carefully ordered stream of protocol frames directly to the nginx process: billions of WINDOW_UPDATE frames, a SETTINGS frame that holds response data back, PING frames that fill the send buffers, partial HEADERS frames, RST_STREAM at exactly the right moment.

When your DNS record is proxied through Cloudflare, that connection ends at our edge.

Cloudflare reads the client's HTTP request, applies your security and caching rules, and then makes its own request to your origin over a connection Cloudflare controls. The flow-control frames, pings, settings, and stream resets that the attacker sends are consumed by our edge. They are not forwarded. Your nginx only ever sees the requests Cloudflare chooses to send, framed the way Cloudflare frames them. This also holds when Cloudflare connects to your origin over HTTP/2: Cloudflare runs its own flow control on that connection and sends WINDOW_UPDATE and RST_STREAM frames only as its own traffic needs, so a client can't make it relay the billions of WINDOW_UPDATE frames the attack requires.

Rapid7 makes the same point in its analysis of CVE-2026-123007: if the HTTP/2 connection is proxied, the attacker's frames "will likely not be retransmitted" in a way that allows exploitation. This breaks each of the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 attacks.

CVE

What the attacker needs

Behind Cloudflare's HTTP proxy

CVE-2026-123007

Direct control over HTTP/2 WINDOW_UPDATE, SETTINGS, PING and RST_STREAM on one connection to nginx

Protected. Control frames terminate at Cloudflare's edge.

CVE-2026-123633

The first part of a HEADERS frame on a direct HTTP/2 connection, plus the ability to exhaust nginx connection slots and reset the TCP connection

Protected. The client's HTTP/2 connection terminates at Cloudflare.

CVE-2026-121810

A direct QUIC/HTTP/3 connection to nginx

Protected. HTTP/3 terminates at Cloudflare's edge. We do not communicate to origins over HTTP/3

CVE-2026-123634

A request and its mirror or SSI subrequest waiting on the same DNS lookup, and the main request ending while the answer is processed. In Xint's exploit, nginx's resolver had to reach the attacker's DNS server.

Not fully protected. Depends on how your config builds proxy_pass. Patch.

CVE-2026-113425

A direct IMAP/POP3/SMTP connection to the nginx mail proxy

Not protected. Cloudflare's HTTP proxy does not carry mail traffic.

There is one condition to be protected by Cloudflare here: your origin must not be reachable directly. If an attacker can find your origin's IP and connect to it directly (TCP 443 or 80 for HTTP/2, UDP 443 for HTTP/3, or the mail ports), Cloudflare isn't in the path and the protection doesn't apply. You should ensure that your origin servers can only be accessed through Cloudflare’s proxies, using one of the following approaches:

  • Cloudflare Tunnel. Your origin makes an outbound-only connection to Cloudflare and exposes no inbound ports.
  • Firewall to Cloudflare IP ranges. Accept inbound HTTP/HTTPS only from Cloudflare's published IP ranges. This must be done using an IP firewall, not based on configuration in your nginx server.
  • Authenticated Origin Pulls (mTLS). Your origin rejects any TLS connection that doesn't present Cloudflare's client certificate.

Xint's own exposure check makes the same point: "If a CDN or reverse proxy sits in front of nginx, the test only reaches the proxy, so also run it directly against the nginx server."

Where the protection does not apply

There are several situations in which Cloudflare’s HTTP proxy does not provide protection.

  • Spectrum TCP/UDP applications. For these configurations, traffic from the Internet is passed unmodified through to your origin. If your origin is running nginx, patch or disable the affected features.
  • nginx mail proxy. Cloudflare's HTTP proxy does not carry IMAP, POP3 or SMTP. Restrict mail listeners to trusted networks until patched.
  • CVE-2026-123634 (resolver). This depends on how your configuration builds the proxy_pass target from the request, combined with a carefully timed cancellation of an HTTP request. Passing your traffic through Cloudflare’s proxy makes it harder to exploit this, but does not provide full protection. Update regardless.
  • DNS-only (grey-cloud), internal or non-proxied nginx. Any nginx server an attacker can reach without going through Cloudflare, including internal services behind a compromised host, needs to be patched.

Cloudflare’s WAF rules are not relevant to these vulnerabilities. These are protocol-level bugs. Because Cloudflare’s proxy handles parsing the HTTP protocol messages, and creates new messages to fetch information from origin servers, origins behind Cloudflare's HTTP proxy are protected from the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 bugs without needing a rule. We have therefore not released a managed rule. The protection comes from connection termination, not from pattern matching.

What to do now

  1. Find every nginx server. Include nginx Plus, distribution packages, container images and appliances. Run nginx -V and nginx -T on each and note HTTP/2, HTTP/3/QUIC listeners, proxy_pass with variables plus SSI or mirror, and any mail block.
  2. Patch. Update nginx Open Source to 1.30.7 or 1.31.9, nginx Plus to 37.0.8.1 or 37.3.0.1, or your distribution's fixed package. F5 lists nginx Plus R34 to R36 as affected with no fixed build, so move those to a fixed 37.x release. Then restart nginx or complete a binary upgrade. A config reload does not replace the running binary.
  3. Check backport versions carefully. Distributions often patch without changing the version nginx -v reports. Compare the full package version against your distribution's advisory.
  4. Make sure your origin is only reachable through Cloudflare. Use Tunnel, IP allowlisting or Authenticated Origin Pulls.
  5. If you can't patch yet, disable what you don't need. http2 off; (nginx 1.25.1 and later; on older versions, remove http2 from the listen directive) blocks CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633. Removing QUIC listeners and setting http3 off; blocks CVE-2026-121810. Point proxy_pass at fixed upstream groups for CVE-2026-123634. Don't rely on mirror_request_body alone: Xint's tested setup set it to off, and the default on stopped that exploit, but SSI and other subrequests can still reach the bug. Bind mail listeners to trusted networks for CVE-2026-113425. Restart so old connections close.
  6. Block SCTP if you don't use it. Add install sctp /bin/false to a file in /etc/modprobe.d/ to stop the kernel module from loading. This doesn't unload an already-loaded module or disable SCTP built into the kernel. When your distribution ships a kernel update for the SCTP bug, install it and reboot. Blocking the module is a stopgap until then.

The Cloudflare Radar Zero Wire entry for nginx2root has the full checklist, a prompt you can give an agent to run a read-only assessment of your fleet, and links to every vendor advisory.

Technical deep dive

Let’s dig into the details of the five bugs by looking through the code. We’re looking at nginx 1.31.8 (commit 140aa94) which was the most recent code published before the fixes, and comparing this to the fixes in 1.31.9 (which were also included in release 1.30.7 on the stable branch).

A note on methodology: we based our analysis on the public advisories, and to verify our reading of the code, we built the public 1.31.8 and 1.31.9 releases with AddressSanitizer and ran tests for four of the five bugs (flow control, HTTP/2 use-after-free, resolver and mail proxy). Each one faults on 1.31.8 and runs clean on 1.31.9. We did not reproduce the HTTP/3 bug; that section is based on the fix commit and the published analysis.

One pattern, in four places

Four of the five bugs are use-after-free bugs. This is a common issue with programs that manually manage memory without language support: one part of the code frees an object that another part is still using.

nginx is event driven. A handler runs, calls other code, and that code returns to the handler. Three of the bugs occur when the called code tears down the connection or request the handler is working on. In the fourth, a second connection still holds a pointer to the object.

  • CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-121810. A request needs a connection slot to reach its upstream. nginx is low on slots, so it closes an idle connection to free one. The connection it chooses is the one the request belongs to.
  • CVE-2026-123634. A resolver callback ends a request. Cleanup of that request frees a second resolver context that the resolver is about to call next.
  • CVE-2026-113425. When a write to a mail client fails, the client connection is closed while the connection to the authentication service still points at its session.

F5 rates all four as potential code execution if address space layout randomization (ASLR) is disabled or bypassed, and in its tests Xint reports code execution with the privileges of the nginx worker.

The fifth bug, CVE-2026-123007, is of a different kind: an accounting error that becomes a length error.

CVE-2026-123007: two flow-control pieces that each look correct

HTTP/2 flow control limits the amount of response data a server may send. nginx tracks a send window for each stream and one for the connection, h2c->send_window. The client enlarges a window with a WINDOW_UPDATE frame, and the protocol caps every window at 2^31 − 1.

nginx enforces that cap when a WINDOW_UPDATE arrives (ngx_http_v2_state_window_update()):

if (window > NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c->send_window) {
   /* logs "client violated connection flow control" */
   return ngx_http_v2_connection_error(h2c, NGX_HTTP_V2_FLOW_CTRL_ERROR);
}

On its own, this check is correct. But the connection window also grows in a second place. When nginx queues DATA frames for a stream, it subtracts their length from the window. If the stream is canceled before those frames go out, ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup() takes them off the queue and returns the credit:

h2c->send_window += window;

Nothing caps this line. As the fix commit describes, if the client enlarges the connection window after the frames are queued and before the stream is terminated, the refund pushes the window past 2^31 − 1.

From that point the first check no longer works. h2c->send_window is an unsigned size_t, so NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c->send_window wraps around to a very large number and every subsequent WINDOW_UPDATE is accepted. The client can then raise the window as far as it wants.

The window is unsigned, but the code that sizes DATA frames compares it as a signed value (ngx_http_v2_send_chain()):

if (limit == 0 || limit > (off_t) h2c->send_window) {
   limit = h2c->send_window;
}
...
if ((off_t) frame_size > limit) {
   frame_size = (size_t) limit;
}

After the window passes 2^63, it is negative as an off_t. The frame size becomes the window value itself, a number between 2^63 and 2^64, and nginx builds a buffer whose last pointer lies before its pos pointer.

Over TLS, that buffer reaches a memcpy() in ngx_ssl_send_chain() with that length. Our TLS test stops at that point under AddressSanitizer. Xint's write-up explains how, with the window pushed close to 2^64, this turns into a controlled out-of-bounds write and an address leak, and Xint, Rapid7, and Wiz each report code execution from it. This post goes no further than the fault.

Over cleartext HTTP/2, the same invalid buffer follows a different output path. Our cleartext test also faults under AddressSanitizer on 1.31.8 and runs clean on 1.31.9. The public write-ups address the TLS case.

How much traffic the known attacks require

The biggest step a WINDOW_UPDATE can take is 2^31 − 1, and a WINDOW_UPDATE frame is 13 bytes. Bringing a 64-bit window near its top therefore requires about 2^33 frames: roughly 8.6 billion frames, or about 112 GB (104 GiB).

Rapid7, which published a proof of concept, gives the same figure and adds that nginx limits control-frame traffic relative to other traffic on the connection, so its run also sends about 15 GiB of other request traffic. Its total comes to approximately 128 GB of HTTP/2 data: about two minutes on a 10 Gbit/s link and about seventeen minutes at 1 Gbit/s. Rapid7 estimates the WINDOW_UPDATE traffic needed to reach 2^63 at about 2^32 frames, or 52 GiB, half of the 104 GiB figure. It also notes that these figures describe its route and are not a proven minimum.

For defenders, this is the useful fact about the bug. At this volume, the known attacks are hard to hide: nginx receives tens of gigabytes from a single client over one long-lived connection and sends little back, much more than the requests in the access log account for.

Why it was difficult to find

The refund line has existed in nginx since HTTP/2 support arrived in 1.9.5 in 2015. Two things made it difficult to notice.

First, each piece looks correct on its own. The check on WINDOW_UPDATE is the right check. The refund is the right refund. The bug is that the check relies on an assumption the refund does not preserve.

Second, testing that waits for a crash is very unlikely to reach it, because a crash requires tens of gigabytes of input. The bad state itself can be reached with very little traffic: Censys published a cleartext test that reaches what it calls the corrupted flow-control state with a 5.69 MB capture. A test that asserts "the send window never exceeds its protocol maximum" after every frame would flag the bad state as soon as a test sequence got there. A test that waits for memory corruption would not.

The fix

The fix (6 lines added) introduces a counter, h2c->send_queued, for DATA that is queued but not yet sent. The WINDOW_UPDATE check now includes those bytes in the window:

if (window > NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c->send_window - h2c->send_queued) {

From the client's perspective, queued frames still count toward the window, so the client can no longer refill credit that nginx is about to refund. On a fixed version the attempt is rejected with a flow-control error.

CVE-2026-123633: where two protections interact

An nginx worker has a fixed number of connection slots (worker_connections), which the client and upstream connections share. Since 1.19.2, when free slots run low (1/16 of the total or fewer), ngx_get_connection() calls ngx_drain_connections(), which closes connections marked "reusable": connections with nothing in progress, such as idle keep-alive connections.

This works only if a reusable connection truly has nothing in progress. For HTTP/2 that was not always the case. Two commits landed on the same day in February 2021 and were released together in 1.19.7:

  • "HTTP/2: fixed reusing connections with active requests" fixed a case in which a cleartext HTTP/2 connection could remain reusable while it had a request.
  • "HTTP/2: reuse of connections with incomplete frames" registered a connection as reusable while it waits for the remainder of a partly received frame, so that a client cannot hold slots with partial frames.

The second change is the relevant one here. As the fix commit explains, if the remainder of that frame is a HEADERS frame, a stream is created, but the reusable status was not reset until the connection next went idle. The connection then has a request and remains in the reusable queue.

If that request is proxied, nginx requests a slot for the upstream connection. If slots are short, the drain runs inside that call and can choose this same connection. The drain instructs the connection to close and nginx attempts to send GOAWAY. If that send fails, nginx frees the connection and every stream on it. Control then goes back to the upstream code, which continues to use the request it was called for.

Each change made sense on its own. The interaction between them was subtle and stayed unnoticed until this year. F5's advisory credits Albert Ebb of Metnir, Nir Ohfeld at Wiz Research, Xint.io and memN0ps of Palo Alto Networks Unit 42; nginx.org's changelog credits Albert of Vexera AI.

The fix

Two lines added: ngx_http_v2_create_stream() now calls ngx_reusable_connection(h2c->connection, 0). A connection that has a stream is never reusable, regardless of the state it was in before.

CVE-2026-121810: the same idea, in QUIC

According to the fix commit and Xint's analysis, the HTTP/3 bug reaches the same result by a different route.

In nginx's QUIC code, each QUIC connection uses one connection slot and each stream uses another. A QUIC connection may be drained only when every stream remaining in its tree can be cancelled, and nginx determines this by walking the connection's tree of streams.

ngx_quic_create_stream() removes the QUIC connection from the reusable queue and then requests a slot for the new stream. Before the fix, the new stream was added to the tree only after that. If the slot request triggered a drain that closed another, idle stream of the same QUIC connection, the code handling the closed stream walked the tree, did not find the stream being created, concluded the connection was idle, and made it reusable again. A later drain, for example when the new request connects to its upstream, could then close the QUIC connection while that request was running.

F5's advisory states that exploitation "also depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control". Xint writes that the bug "is triggered by a slightly different mechanism" from the HTTP/2 one.

The fix

Four lines added: the stream goes into the tree before the slot is requested, and is taken out again on the error paths.

CVE-2026-123634: freeing the next item of a list during the walk

When proxy_pass contains a variable, nginx resolves the host name while handling the request. If a lookup for the same name is already in progress, the new request waits on the same resolver node. When the answer arrives, nginx detaches the list of waiting contexts and calls each in turn:

next = rn->waiting;
rn->waiting = NULL;

while (next) {
   ctx = next;
   ...
   next = ctx->next;

   ctx->handler(ctx);
}

The loop stores next before the handler call, so a handler may free its own context. The trouble starts when a handler frees a different context in the same list. This happens when two contexts belong to one request, as with a request and its mirror subrequest resolving the same name (the case Xint tested; F5 also lists SSI subrequests). If the first handler ends the request, the request's cleanup calls ngx_resolve_name_done() for the second context. That function searches the node's waiting list for the context, does not find it because the list has been detached, and frees the context regardless. The loop then advances to the freed context.

Usually nginx logs this. On vulnerable versions, when the search fails, it writes

could not cancel <name> resolving

to the error log at alert level. This line is worth searching for. It is not proof either way: the fix commit notes that one variant, while following a CNAME, produced no alert.

The fix

A context cancelled while it sits in a detached list is no longer freed immediately. Its handler is swapped for one that frees it when the loop gets to it (31 lines added). The fix also downgrades the alert to a debug message, so the line above shows up at alert level only on unpatched versions.

CVE-2026-113425: two connections, one session

With auth_http, the mail proxy asks an HTTP service to verify each login. During the wait, it holds two connections for one session: the client connection and the connection to the authentication service. The second points at the session and uses the memory pool of the client connection.

Before the fix, the reply the protocol handler had prepared for the client remained queued while the authentication request was in progress, and the client's write handler was still ngx_mail_send(). If that handler ran and the write failed because the client had reset the connection, it closed the client connection and destroyed the session. The authentication connection still pointed at the session, and the next event on that connection used freed memory.

Xint describes two conditions for this: the client's write event must already be registered (for example, because the client stopped reading replies), and the login command and the reset must be handled in the same pass of the event loop. Valid credentials are not needed, because this happens before the login is checked.

The fix

Two added lines discard the queued reply when the authentication request begins. The same release contains three further commits that block client writes while the proxy waits for the authentication response, while it connects to the upstream and reads its greeting, and while it resolves an SMTP client's address and name.

What the fixes share

The five fixes each involve minor corrections to the code. They add between 2 and 31 lines each, and the mail proxy fix came with three further commits. There is no design change needed. Each fix restores an invariant that the rest of the code already depended on:

  • a send window never goes above the protocol maximum
  • a connection with a request in progress is never reusable
  • an object that other code is about to use is not freed out from under it

In every case, one code path failed to keep a rule that the rest of the code relied on, and the fix makes that path keep it. As code is modified over time, it is very easy for these kinds of rules to become broken.

What to watch for

Attempts to exploit this will typically trigger some characteristic log messages. Three of these messages (the two at info and the one at warn) fall below nginx's default error_log level of error and appear only if a lower level is set. The alert messages are logged by default.

Bug

Log messages or other signals

CVE-2026-123007

A single long-lived HTTP/2 connection on which nginx receives tens of gigabytes from a client and sends little back, much more than its logged requests account for. On fixed versions a rejected attempt logs client violated connection flow control: received WINDOW_UPDATE frame with window increment ... not allowed for window ... (level info; older versions have the same message for ordinary violations). http2 flood detected (level info) on such a connection can be a failed attempt, but nginx also logs that message for several other limits.

CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810

worker process <pid> exited on signal 11 (level alert) on servers that accept HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 and proxy to an upstream, along with worker_connections are not enough, reusing connections (level warn). A use-after-free does not always crash.

CVE-2026-123634

could not cancel <name> resolving (level alert, unpatched versions only). The absence of this message does not rule the bug out.

CVE-2026-113425

Worker crashes in a mail proxy using auth_http, with client connections reset during login.

All five

Unexpected programs launched by an nginx worker process, for example from an auditd rule on execve for the worker's user. Xint recommends this check, and it is the strongest sign of a successful attack.

Timeline

Date (UTC)

Event

Oct 11, 2026

Xint discovers the vulnerabilities

Oct 16, 2026

Reported to F5 via HackerOne

Oct 27, 2026

Reports delivered to the nginx development team

Nov 10, 2026

Xint completes patch validation

Nov 18, 2026

Public disclosure; nginx 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 released

Closing

CVE-2026-123007 sat in nginx for more than ten years. The SCTP bug has been in the Linux kernel since 2018. Xint says one of its researchers found CVE-2026-123007 by hand and an automated Xint scan found the other four nginx bugs. Several other teams found the two HTTP/2 bugs independently. Meanwhile, nginx's advisory list has gone from two entries in 2025 to 36 so far this year. AI-assisted research is finding bugs in heavily reviewed code faster than before, and more disclosures like this one are coming.

That's a large part of why it's worth putting Cloudflare in front of your origin. A protocol bug in your web server becomes much less of a risk when the attacker can't speak that protocol to your server directly. Our edge is not affected, and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 attacks against your nginx end at our network. Patch anyway, lock down your origin so Cloudflare is the only way in, and use the Radar Zero Wire page to check your fleet.

Sources

The collective thoughts of the interwebz