Tag Archives: National / Industry / Cloud Exposure Report (NICER)

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of HTTP and HTTPS

Post Syndicated from Tod Beardsley original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/01/29/nicer-protocol-deep-dive-internet-exposure-of-http-and-https/

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of HTTP and HTTPS

Welcome to the NICER Protocol Deep Dive blog series! When we started researching what all was out on the internet way back in January, we had no idea we’d end up with a hefty, 137-page tome of a research report. The sheer length of such a thing might put off folks who might otherwise learn a thing or two about the nature of internet exposure, so we figured, why not break up all the protocol studies into their own reports?

So, here we are! What follows is taken directly from our National / Industry / Cloud Exposure Report (NICER), so if you don’t want to wait around for the next installment, you can cheat and read ahead!

[Research] Read the full NICER report today

Get Started

HTTP (TCP/80) & HTTPS (TCP/443)

One protocol to bring them all, and in the darkness, bind them.

TLDR

  • WHAT IT IS: HTTP: Pristine, plaintext Hypertext Transfer Protocol communications. HTTPS: Encrypted HTTP.
  • HOW MANY: 51,519,309 discovered HTTP nodes. 36,141,137 discovered HTTPS nodes. We’re going to be talking a bit differently about fingerprinting in this blog post, so raw, generic counts will have no context.
  • VULNERABILITIES: Hoo boy! Many! But, do you mean vulnerabilities in core web servers themselves? The add-ons folks build into them? The web applications they serve? As many users of Facebook might say, “it’s complicated.”
  • ADVICE: Go back to Gopher! Seriously, though, please continue to build awesome things using HTTPS. Just build them in such a way that folks who install and operate web servers can easily configure them securely, see patch status, and upgrade quickly and confidently.
  • ALTERNATIVES: QUIC, or “Quick UDP Internet Connection,” which is a “new multiplexed and secure transport atop UDP, designed from the ground up and optimized for HTTP/2 semantics.” While HTTP[S] will be with us for a Very Long Time, QUIC is its successor and will usher in whole new ways to deliver content securely and efficiently (and undoubtedly, exploit the same).

We’re going to talk about both HTTP and HTTPS combined (for the most part) as we identify what we found, some core areas of exposure, and opportunities for attackers. It’ll be a bit different than all the previous blogs, but that’s just part of the quirky nature of HTTP in general.

Discovery details

Way back in our Email blogs, we compared encrypted and unencrypted services. We’ll do the same here, but will be presenting a “top 12” for countries since that is the set combination between HTTP and HTTPS.

There are 30% more devices on the internet running plaintext HTTP versus encrypted HTTPS web services. The U.S. dwarfs all other countries in terms of discovered web service, very likely due to the presence of so many cloud services, hosting providers, and routers, switches, etc. in  IPv4 space allocated to the U.S.

Germany and Ireland each expose 9% more HTTPS nodes than HTTP, and both the Netherlands and U.K. are quickly closing their encryption disparity as well.

We’ll skip cloud counts since, well, everyone knows cloud servers are full of web servers and we’re not sure what good it will do letting you know that Amazon had ~640K Elastic Load Balancers (version 2.0!) running on the day our studies kicked off.

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of HTTP and HTTPS

Exposure information

To understand exposure, we need to see what is running on these web servers. That’s not as easy as you might think with just lightweight scans. For example, here are the top 20 HTTP servers by vendor/family and port:

Vendor Family HTTPS (80) % of HTTP HTTPS (443) % of HTTPS
Microsoft IIS 5,273,393 10.24% 2,096,655 5.80%
Apache Apache 4,873,517 9.46% 2,595,714 7.18%
nginx nginx 3,938,031 7.64% 2,495,667 6.91%
Amazon Elastic Load Balancing 644,862 1.25% 386,751 1.07%
Squid Cache Squid 381,224 0.74% 8,649 0.02%
ACME Laboratories mini_httpd 125,708 0.24% 82,427 0.23%
Oracle GoAhead Webserver 48,505 0.09% 40,501 0.11%
Apache Tomcat 40,702 0.08% 32,271 0.09%
Taobao Tengine 37,626 0.07% 14,130 0.04%
Eclipse Jetty 29,750 0.06% 50,763 0.14%
Mbedthis Software Appweb 23,463 0.05% 19,470 0.05%
Virata EmWeb 22,354 0.04% 7,179 0.02%
Embedthis Appweb 17,235 0.03% 32,629 0.09%
Microsoft Windows CE Web Server 14,012 0.03% 1,027 0.00%
TornadoWeb Tornado 13,637 0.03% 10,151 0.03%
Tridium Niagara 9,772 0.02% 564 0.00%
TwistedMatrix Twisted Web 7,481 0.01% 4,984 0.01%
Caucho Resin 5,168 0.01% 1,812 0.01%
Mort Bay Jetty 5,079 0.01% 2,033 0.01%
SolarWinds Serv-U 3,232 0.01% 6,421 0.02%

Remember, we’re just counting what comes back on a `GET` request to those two ports on each active IP address, and the counts come from Recog signatures (which are great, but far from comprehensive). For some servers, we can get down to the discrete version level, which lets us build a Common Platform Enumeration identifier. That identifier lets us see how many CVEs a given instance type has associated with it. We used this capability to compare each version of each service family against the number of CVEs it has. While we do not have complete coverage across the above list, we do have some of the heavy(ier) hitters:

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of HTTP and HTTPS

We limited the view to a service family having at least having 10 or more systems exposed and used color to encode the CVSS v2 scores.

The most prevalent CVE-enumerated vulnerabilities are listed in the table below. While it’s technically possible that these CVEs have been mitigated through some other software control, patching them out entirely is really the best and easiest way to avoid uncomfortable conversations with your vulnerability manager.

And, the top 30 most prevalent are:

CVE Number
CVE-2017-8361 336
CVE-2013-2275 202
CVE-2012-1452 186
CVE-2016-1000107 184
CVE-2016-6440 184
CVE-2012-0038 168
CVE-2012-1835 165
CVE-2016-8827 165
CVE-2011-3868 164
CVE-2011-0607 160
CVE-2007-6740 154
CVE-2013-4564 150
CVE-2016-0948 149
CVE-2016-0956 149
CVE-2009-2047 146
CVE-2015-5670 145
CVE-2017-8577 143
CVE-2014-0134 135
CVE-2015-5355 135
CVE-2012-5932 127
CVE-2014-8089 120
CVE-2015-5685 118
CVE-2016-1000109 118
CVE-2015-5672 114
CVE-2016-5596 112
CVE-2016-5600 112
CVE-2016-4261 111
CVE-2016-4263 111
CVE-2016-4264 111
CVE-2016-4268 111

While we expect to see traditional web servers, there are other devices connected to the internet that expose web services or administrative interfaces (which we’ve partially enumerated below):

Vendor Device HTTP (80) HTTPS (443)
Cisco Firewall 123 986,766
AVM WAP 1,942 604,890
Asus WAP 1 177,936
Synology NAS 61,796 50,531
Check Point Firewall 16,059 30,773
SonicWALL VPN 7,413 16,061
Ubiquiti WAP 0 11,813
HP Printer 16,247 9,178
MikroTik Router 289,026 8,056
Tivo DVR 6,400 6,779
Philips Light Bulb 4,785 3,349
Polycom VoIP 369 3,079
Ubiquiti Web cam 955 922
HP Lights Out Management 601 708
ARRIS Cable Modem 350 217
Fortinet Firewall 1,221 159
Xerox Printer 1,575 29
Canon Multifunction Device 124 14
Netwave Web cam 6,420 7
HeiTel DVR 2,734 2
Samsung DVR 53,053 2
Merit LILIN DVR 2,565 1
Fidelix Industrial Control 545 0
FUHO DVR 1,249 0
Shenzhen Reecam Tech. Ltd. Web cam 1,902 0
Ubiquiti DVR 675 0
Yamaha Router 9,675 0

For instance, we found nearly a million Cisco ASA firewalls. That fact is not necessarily “bad,” since they can be configured to provide remote access services (like VPN). Having 123 instances on port 80 is, however, not the best idea.

Unlike Cisco, most MikroTik routers seem to be exposed sans encryption, and over 75% of them are exposing the device’s admin interface. What could possibly go wrong?

Upward of 50,000 Synology network-attached storage devices show up as well, and the File Sharing blog posts talked at length about the sorry state of exposure in these types of devices. They’re on the internet to enable owners to play local media remotely and access other files remotely.

There are printers, and light bulbs; DVRs and home router admin interfaces; oh, and a few thousand entire building control systems.In short, you can find pretty much anything with a web interface hanging out on the internet.

Attacker’s view

There are so many layers in modern HTTP[S] services that attackers likely are often paralyzed by not knowing which ones to go after first. Attacking HTTP services on embedded systems is generally one of the safest paths to take, since they’re generally not monitored by the owner nor the network operator and can be used with almost guaranteed anonymity.

Formal web services—think Apache Struts, WebLogic, and the like—are also desirable targets, since they’re usually associated with enterprise deployments and, thus, have more potential for financial gain or access to confidential records. HTTP interfaces to firewalls and remote access systems (as we saw back in the Remote Access blog posts) have been a major focus for many attacker groups for the past 18–24 months since once compromised, they can drop an adversary right into the heart of the internal network where they can (usually) quickly establish a foothold and secondary access method.

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of HTTP and HTTPS
NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of HTTP and HTTPS

You’re also more likely to see (at least for now) more initial probes on HTTP (80), as noted by both the unique source IPv4 and total interaction views (above). It’s hard to say “watch 80 closely, and especially 80→443 moves by clients,” since most services are still offered on both ports and good sites are configured to automatically redirect clients to HTTPS. Still, if you see clients focus more on 80, you may want to flag those for potential further investigation. And, definitely be more careful with your systems that only talk HTTP (80).

Our advice

IT and IT security teams should build awesome platforms and services and put them on the internet over HTTPS! Innovation drives change and progress—plus, the internet has likely done more good than harm since the first HTTP request was made. Do keep all this patched and ensure secure configuration and coding practices are part of the development and deployment lifecycles. Do not put administrative interfaces to anything on the internet if at all possible and ensure you know what services your network devices and “Internet of Things” devices are exposing. Finally, disable `Server:` banners on everything and examine other HTTP headers for what else they might leak and sanitize what you can. Attackers on the lookout for, say, nginx will often move on if they see Apache in the Server header. You’d be surprised just how effective this one change can be.

Cloud providers should continue to offer secure, scalable web technologies. At the same time, if pre-built disk images with common application stacks are offered, keep them patched and ensure you have the ability to inform users when things go out-of-date.

Government cybersecurity agencies should keep reminding us not to put digital detritus with embedded web servers on the internet and monitor for campaigns that are targeting these invisible services. When there are major issues with core technologies such as Microsoft IIS, Apache HTTP, or nginx, processes should be in place to notify the public and work with ISPs, hosting, and cloud providers to try to contain any possible widespread damage. There should be active programs in place to ensure no critical telecommunications infrastructure has dangerous ports or services exposed, especially router administrative interfaces over HTTP/HTTPS.

[Research] Read the full NICER report today

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NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of NTP

Post Syndicated from Tod Beardsley original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/01/22/nicer-protocol-deep-dive-internet-exposure-of-ntp/

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of NTP

Welcome to the NICER Protocol Deep Dive blog series! When we started researching what all was out on the internet way back in January, we had no idea we’d end up with a hefty, 137-page tome of a research report. The sheer length of such a thing might put off folks who might otherwise learn a thing or two about the nature of internet exposure, so we figured, why not break up all the protocol studies into their own reports?

So, here we are! What follows is taken directly from our National / Industry / Cloud Exposure Report (NICER), so if you don’t want to wait around for the next installment, you can cheat and read ahead!

[Research] Read the full NICER report today

Get Started

NTP (123)

In the immortal words of The Smiths, “How soon is now?”

TLDR

  • WHAT IT IS: Network Time Protocol—the service that keeps us all in sync.
  • HOW MANY: 1,638,577 discovered nodes. 1,638,495 (99.9%) gave up version and/or other fingerprintable information and (much) smaller subsets provided operating system information.
  • VULNERABILITIES: A few. Mostly denial-of-service and information disclosure, but there have been remote code execution ones from time to time.
  • ADVICE: Use it! Just not on the internet. And, configured properly. And, patched.
  • ALTERNATIVES: Nope. This is the de facto way to keep time on the internet.
  • GETTING: Stuck in time. There was literally no change from 2019.

The internet could not function the way it does without NTP. You’d think with that much power NTP would be all BPOC and act all smug and superior. Yet, it does it’s thing—keeping all computers that use it in sync, time-wise—with little fanfare, except when it’s being used in denial-of-service attacks. It has been around since around 1985, and while it is not the only network-based time synchronization protocol, it is The Standard.

NTP servers operate in a hierarchy with up to 15 levels dubbed stratum. There are authoritative, highly available NTP servers we all use every day (most of the time provided by operating system vendors and running on obviously named hosts such as time.apple.com and time.windows.com).

Virtually anything can be an NTP server, from a router, to your phone, to a RaspberryPi, so dedicated appliances that key off of GPS signals as a time-source. Now, just because something can be a time server does not mean it should be a time server.

Discovery details

Project Sonar found 1,638,577 NTP servers on the public internet, so one might say we have quite a bit of time on our hands. Our editors say otherwise, so let’s see what time looks like across countries and clouds.

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of NTP

The United States has many IPv4 blocks, many computers, and many major ISPs and IT companies that like to control things. It also has a decent number of businesses that run NTP for no good reason. All of this helps push it to the top spot. Russia finally shows up in second place, for similar reasons, though two of Russia’s major ISPs account for just over 40% of Russia’s exposure. China—with its vast IPv4 space and population—comes in at No. 3, which means businesses and ISPs have figured out needlessly exposing NTP can cause more problems than it’s worth.

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of NTP

Rapid7 Labs was glad to see cloud environments (both the runners and the customers) seem to take the dangers of running NTP seriously as well, with most having almost no exposure.

Exposure information

Now, you know NTP has to be a bit dangerous if the main support site for the protocol itself has a big, bad warning about the dangers of NTP right at the top of its page. The biggest danger comes from using it for amplification DDoS (it is a UDP-based protocol). While it is still used today, there are way better services, such as memcached, to use for such things.

NTP servers are just bits of software that have vulnerabilities like all other software. When you put anything on the internet, bad folks are going to try to gain control over it. If an organization needs—for some odd reason—to run its own NTP server, there’s no reason it has to be on the public internet. And, if there is some weird reason it does, there’s no reason it has to be configured to respond to requests from all subnets.

Why are we picking nits? Well, it’s one more thing you’re not going to patch. Then, there’s the problem of all the information you might be giving to attackers about your network setup. In our NTP corpus, 255,602 (15.5%) reveal the private IP address scheme on the internal network interface.

OS Count Percentage
UNIX (generic) 1,089,876 69.61%
Cisco device 294,330 18.80%
Linux+kernel version 99,032 6.32%
BSD+kernel version 38,798 2.48%
Juniper device+version 32,469 2.07%
VMware+version 8,597 0.55%
SunOS 948 0.06%
Other 657 0.04%
vxWorks 505 0.03%
Sidewinder+version 332 0.02%
QNX+version 186 0.01%
macOS+version 66 0.00%

Over 1.5 million NTP servers give hints about the operating system and version they run. In total, 180,410 (11%) give us precise NTP version and build information, with all but roughly 4,000 giving us the precise release date:

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of NTP

There’s an [un]healthy mix of remote code execution, information leakage, local service DoS, and amplification DDoS spread throughout that mix of NTP devices.

Hopefully we’ve managed to at least start to convince you otherwise if you were thinking, “Well, it’s just an NTP server” at the start of this section.

Attacker’s view

The Exposure Information section provided a great deal of information on the potential (and measured) weaknesses in NTP systems. Attackers will judge your potential as a victim (and cyber-insurers will likely up your premiums) from how your attack surface is configured. NTP can reveal all the cracks in your configuration and patch management processes, and even provide a means of entry.

And, attackers still use NTP in amplification attacks, so that NTP server you didn’t realize you had or really thought you needed will likely be used in attacks on other sites.

Our advice

IT and IT security teams should use NTP behind the firewall and keep it patched. If you do need to run NTP externally, only let it talk to specific hosts/networks.

Cloud providers should keep up the great work by only exposing as much NTP as they need to and offering guidance to customers for how to run NTP securely (off the internet).

Government cybersecurity agencies should provide timely notifications when new vulnerabilities in NTP surface or there are known, active NTP DoS campaigns. Educational materials should be made available on dangers of exposing NTP to the internet and on how to securely configure various NTP services.

[Research] Read the full NICER report today

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NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS-over-TLS

Post Syndicated from Tod Beardsley original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/01/15/nicer-protocol-deep-dive-internet-exposure-of-dns-over-tls/

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS-over-TLS

Welcome to the NICER Protocol Deep Dive blog series! When we started researching what all was out on the internet way back in January, we had no idea we’d end up with a hefty, 137-page tome of a research report. The sheer length of such a thing might put off folks who might otherwise learn a thing or two about the nature of internet exposure, so we figured, why not break up all the protocol studies into their own reports?

So, here we are! What follows is taken directly from our National / Industry / Cloud Exposure Report (NICER), so if you don’t want to wait around for the next installment, you can cheat and read ahead!

[Research] Read the full NICER report today

Get Started

DNS-over-TLS (DoT) (TCP/853)

Encrypting DNS is great! Unless it’s baddies doing the encrypting.

TLDR

  • WHAT IT IS: DNS over TLS is just what it says on the tin: the DNS protocol embedded in a TLS connection, ostensibly to make your DNS request more confidential.
  • HOW MANY: 3,237 discovered nodes. A hodgepodge mix of vendor/version information was discernible, but you’ll need to read the details to find out more.
  • VULNERABILITIES: Whatever is in the DNS that backs the service or in the code that presents TLS (more often than not, a plain, ol’ web server).
  • ADVICE: It’s complicated (read on to find out why!)
  • ALTERNATIVES: Plain, simple, uncomplicated, and woefully unconfidential UDP DNS; DNS over HTTPS (DoH); DNS over QUIC (DoQ); DNS over avian carriers (DoAC).
  • GETTING: Drunk with power. There are nearly two times as many as April 2019.

At face value, DNS over TLS (henceforth referred to as DoT) aims to be the confidentiality solution for a legacy cleartext protocol that has managed to resist numerous other confidentiality (and integrity) fixup attempts. It is one of a handful of modern efforts to help make DNS less susceptible to eavesdropping and person-in-the-middle attacks.

Discovery details

We chose to examine DoT because web browsers have become the new operating system of the internet, and DoT and cousins all allow browsers (or any app, really) to bypass your home, ISP, or organization’s choices of DNS resolution method and resolution provider. Since it’s presented over TLS, it can also be a great way for attackers to continue to use DNS as a command-and-control channel as well as an exfiltration channel.

We chose to examine DoT versus DoH because, well, it is far easier to enumerate DoT endpoints than it is DoH endpoints. It’s getting easier to enumerate DoH since there seems to be some agreement on the standard way to query it, so that will likely make it to a future report, but for now, let’s take a look at what DoT Project Sonar found:

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS-over-TLS

Yes, you read that chart correctly! Ireland is No. 1 in terms of the number of nodes running a DoT service, and it’s all thanks to a chap named Daniel Cid, who co-runs CleanBrowsing, which is a “DNS-based content filtering service that offers a safe way to browse the web without surprises.” Daniel has his name on AS205157, which is allocated to Ireland, but the CleanBrowsing service itself is run out of California. In fact, CleanBrowsing comprises almost 50% of the DoT corpus (1,612 nodes), with 563 nodes attributed to the United States and a tiny number of servers attributed to a dozen or so other country network spaces.

Both the U.S. and Germany have a cornucopia of server types and autonomous systems presenting DoT services (none really stand out besides CleanBrowsing).

Since Bulgaria rarely makes it into top 10 exposure lists, we took a look at what was there and it’s a ton (relatively, anyway: 242) of DoT servers in Fiber Optics Bulgaria OOD, which is a kind of “meta” service provider for ISPs. Given the relative scarcity of IPv4 addresses, setting aside 242 of them just for DoT is a pretty major investment.

Even though the numbers are small, Japan’s presence is interesting, as it’s nearly all due to a single ISP: Internet Initiative Japan Inc.

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS-over-TLS

In case you have been left unawares, Google is a big player] in the DoT space, but it tends to concentrate DNS exposure to a tiny handful of IP addresses (i.e., that bar is not Google-proper). When we filter out CleanBrowsing (yep, they’re everywhere), we’re left with the major exposure in Google being … a couple dozen servers running an instance of Pi-hole (dnsmasq-pi-hole-2.80, to be precise). Cut/paste that finding for OV and DigitalOcean and yep, that same Pi-hole setup is tops in those two clouds as well.

You don’t need to get all fancy and run a Pi-hole setup to host your own DoT server. Just fire up an nginx instance, create a basic configuration, set up your own DNS behind it, and now, you too can stop your ISP from snooping your DNS queries.

Exposure information

Here is where we’d normally talk about versions and CVEs, etc., but the DoT situation is complicated by a few things. First, we have big players in this space using proprietary solutions, so version fingerprints such as  “CleanBrowsing v1.6a” are not very useful information. Second, should we focus on the version of the web server or of the back-end DNS server (or, both)? The latter might not be useful, since you can configure an nginx DoT setup to proxy to a third party, and that’s what will get picked up in the response. Lastly, even if we focus on the second-tier “big guns,” such as PowerDNS, we end up with a situation like this:

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS-over-TLS

Giving you that glimpse does help to show it’s utter chaos even in PowerDNS-land, but DNS and chaos seem to go hand in hand.

Attacker’s view

There are no DoT honeypots in project Heisenberg, but DoT is just a TLS wrapper over a traditional DNS binary-format query. When we looked for that in the TCP/853 full packet captures, we saw us (!) and a couple other researchers. Not very exciting, but with the goal of DoT being privacy, we really shouldn’t see random DoT requests.

Attackers are more likely to stand up their own DoT servers or reconfigure other DoT servers to use their DNS back-ends and then use those as covert channels once they gain a foothold after a successful phishing attack. This is a big reason we enumerate/catalog DoT, and we’re starting to see more DoT in residential ISP space and traditional hosting provider IP space. It looks like more folks are experimenting with DoT with each monthly study.

Our advice

IT and IT security teams should block TCP/853, lock down DoT and DoH browser settings as much as possible so there is no way to bypass organizational IT policies, and monitor for all attempts to use DoT or DoH services internally (or externally). In other words, unless you’re the ones setting them up, disallowing rogue, internal DoT is the safest course.

Cloud providers should consider offering managed DoT solutions and provide patched, secure disk images for folks who want to stand up their own. (This is one of the few cases where organizational advice and cloud advice are quite nearly opposite.)

Government cybersecurity agencies should monitor for malicious use of DoT and provide timely updates to the public. These centers should also be a source of unbiased, expert information on DoT, DoH, DoQ (et al).

[Research] Read the full NICER report today

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NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS

Post Syndicated from Tod Beardsley original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/01/05/nicer-protocol-deep-dive-internet-exposure-of-dns/

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS

Welcome to the NICER Protocol Deep Dive blog series! When we started researching what all was out on the internet way back in January, we had no idea we’d end up with a hefty, 137-page tome of a research report. The sheer length of such a thing might put off folks who might otherwise learn a thing or two about the nature of internet exposure, so we figured, why not break up all the protocol studies into their own reports?

So, here we are! What follows is taken directly from our National / Industry / Cloud Exposure Report (NICER), so if you don’t want to wait around for the next installment, you can cheat and read ahead!

[Research] Read the full NICER report today

Get Started

Domain Name System (DNS) (UDP/53)

“The Achilles Heel of the Internet” – Sir Tim Berners-Lee

TLDR

  • WHAT IT IS: Domain Name System (DNS): The globally distributed address book of services on the internet.
  • HOW MANY: 4,717,658 discovered nodes. 3,498,439 (74.1%) have Recog fingerprints (15 total vendor+service families)
  • VULNERABILITIES: Around 200 across all service families with every CVSS score imaginable.
  • ADVICE: You kinda have no other choice but to use it.
  • ALTERNATIVES: DNS over TLS (DoH), DNS over HTTPS (DoH), DNS over QUIC (DoQ); downgrade to Novell Netware.
  • GETTING: Used about as much as last year, which kind of makes sense since DNS makes the internet work.

Nobody wants to memorize IP addresses in order to get to network resources, nor does anyone want to maintain a giant standalone list of hostname to IP address mappings. However, nobody also wants to wait forever to get a response to the request for the IP address of, say, example.com. Thus was the atmosphere that begat what we posit is the most ubiquitous user-facing but also most user-overlooked service on the internet: the Domain Name System  (DNS).

Discovery details

Project Sonar discovered nearly 5 million DNS servers via UDP requests on port 53. This is a far fewer number than the total sum of, say, web servers, but it is a non-trivial number of systems and the reasons for that make sense. ISPs provide DNS services to home and small-business users, organizations host their own DNS to maintain control of their brand namespace, and vendors provide customized DNS services in either an outsourcing capacity or to provide enhanced services such as malware and other types of content filtering. Finally, large technology companies such as Google, Cloudflare, IBM (via Quad9), and others also provide centralized DNS services for various good (?) reasons. This is all to say, outside of the giant centralized DNS providers, the global DNS footprint tends to track very closely with the allocated country IPv4 space; the more IP allocations a given country has, the more DNS servers are there to keep track of them all.

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS
NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS

Conversely, it really doesn’t make much sense to waste precious (and costly) cloud resources by hosting DNS in there. However, it seems OVH users have plenty of cycles (and money) to burn. Yep, those aren’t just OVH’s DNS servers. We come to that conclusion based on the diversity of DNS vendor software and the version spread. Now, OVH does have the largest data center on the planet and is not just a cloud services provider, so it’s pretty reasonable to see that it can and should be in the top spot.

Given that most small orgs use their ISPs’ external DNS (directly or via recursive DNS) and that the vast majority of home users still use their ISP DNS, you can imagine that autonomous system DNS server distribution has a very long tail.

Exposure information

DNS has had … challenges … over the years. It is a binary protocol that receives quite a bit of attention paid to it by both researchers and attackers. Because of this, and the nature of the UDP service, it is possible to craft a binary DNS request that ends up being around 60 bytes that asks for a DNS response, which ends up potentially being near 4,000 bytes (~7:1 amplification), making it great for use in low-to-mid-level amplification DDoS attacks. It is also possible to compromise a DNS server via specially crafted binary messages, though that task gets more difficult with each passing year.

DNS Service Prevalence

Vendor Count Percentage
ISC BIND 2,007,593 57.39%
Thekelleys Dnsmasq 556,228 15.90%
NLnet Labs NSD 520,785 14.89%
PowerDNS PowerDNS 342,143 9.78%
Microsoft DNS 43,185 1.23%
NLnet Labs Unbound 14,158 0.40%
Nominum Vantio 7,596 0.22%
DrayTek DNS 2,674 0.08%
cz.nic Knot 1,897 0.05%
Michael Tokarev rbldnsd 898 0.03%
RIPE Atlas Anchor 614 0.02%
ALU DNS 539 0.02%
Incognito DNS 78 0.00%
D J Bernstein djbdns 45 0.00%
Check Point META IP 6 0.00%

BIND (now ISC BIND) was the first DNS server and is still the most prevalent one (of those we had Recog fingerprints for), which is likely why it has 119 CVEs (most all of them DoS-related). The picture really isn’t this clean, though. Within ISC BIND alone, we found 550 distinct version strings (most legit, too). We can look at version diversity by vendor across all autonomous systems with DNS servers to see just how crazy the situation really is:

NICER Protocol Deep Dive: Internet Exposure of DNS

If this were a social media service instead of a serious research paper, now’s about the time we’d post a “Do You Even…?” meme gif with the word “Patch” in it. So, not only do we forget about DNS when we’re using it, we also seem to forget about it when we run it, too. Denial-of-service flaws are found every year in these servers, but when DNS is running, it’s running, and you likely need it to keep running.

Attacker’s view

We’re not in the DDoS protection services racket market, nor do we have DDoS probes sitting in key locations to be able to detect when DDoS attacks are happening. We see both TCP- and UDP-based DNS traffic in Heisenberg, but they’re mostly inventory scans or misconfigurations.

This is not to say attackers care not about DNS anymore. Every DDoS mitigation vendor makes a point of reminding us about this a few times a year in their service reports, and Verizon noted a serious uptick in DoS in general in 2019 (in which DNS played a part). And, there are always new, crafty attack vectors being researched and developed.

But, attackers do more with DNS than just DoS. Organizations must register public, top-level domain names and set up various types of records for them so we can all buy things without leaving home. This exposes two potential avenues of for attack: first at the registrar level, which is why it is vital that you protect your domain registration account with multi-factor authentication (preferably app-based for this versus just SMS) and then do the same for your external DNS provider (if you’re using an external DNS provider). In May 2020, the Internet Systems Consortium hosted a webinar on this very topic that should help provide more background information, and SpamHaus estimates that GoDaddy has around 100 newly hijacked domains daily.

They who control DNS control who you are on the internet.

Our advice

IT and IT security teams should safeguard registrar and external DNS provider accounts with multi-factor authentication, keep internal and external DNS systems fully patched, relentlessly monitor DNS for signs of abuse and configuration changes, and consider treating DNS like a first-class application in your environment as opposed to the plumbing that sits hidden behind drywall.

Cloud providers that offer DNS registration and hosting services should mandate multi-factor authentication be used and have processes in place to detect potential malicious activity (i.e., takeover attempts). All machine images with DNS services installed by default should be updated immediately after new DNS server versions are released and then notify all existing users about the need to upgrade.

Government cybersecurity agencies should provide timely notifications regarding DNS attacks of all kinds and have resources available that document how to securely maintain DNS infrastructure.

[Research] Read the full NICER report today

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