All posts by corbet

[$] A new generation of futexes

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1102988/

Futexes
are a kernel subsystem that provides support for fast mutexes
in user space. While futexes can indeed be fast, they are not fast enough
for a number of users. Partly as a result of that, the implementation of
futexes has grown in complexity over the years, with two basic variants
on offer. The desire for faster futexes remains, though, and that inspires
new patches, including this series
from Suleiman Souhlal
adding a third futex class called “futex PING”
for “priority inheritance next generation”.

Stenberg: 30 years of Internet transfers with curl

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1107151/

Daniel Stenberg reflects
on the 30th anniversary of the curl project.

libcurl runs in an estimated thirty billion installations today. It
is a rough estimate since the majority of all libcurl users never
tell us they use it, but we need to find it mentioned in their
credit screens, open source license windows or their manuals. A
super popular app might use libcurl today and not tomorrow, or vice
versa, which can make the numbers shift by several billions
overnight. In reality of course, once the pulse raise has calmed
down and your ego is content, these numbers do not matter. In our
corner of the world, things don’t change notably when we go from a
thousand installs to billions. We still work with similar people,
in similar ways, with similar challenges.

In Memoriam: Tim Peters 1952–2026

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1106901/

Guido van Rossum conveys
the sad (and somewhat delayed) news
of the passing of Tim Peters.

It’s hard to overestimate Tim’s influence on Python. He’s probably
best known for writing the Zen of Python (PEP 20), but to me he
was a mentor and language co-designer long before that.

Tim found Python not long after its initial release. His first deed
was to convince me that Python should support mixed arithmetic
between int and float, because most users would expect them to work
that way. And he never stopped contributing.

[$] Git considers voting to determine its LLM policy

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1104195/

One of the dominant themes of 2026 has been the debate within development
projects about the terms under which LLM-written contributions should be
accepted — if, indeed, they should be accepted at all. The Git project has not been immune to this
trend; the topic was discussed
at the recent Git Contributor’s Summit. In this case, the path to a
resolution may be somewhat circuitous; the project, which has never been
governed as a democracy, is considering adopting a voting process as a way
of bringing the discussion to an acceptable conclusion.

Asahi Linux 7.3 progress report

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1105936/

The Asahi Linux developers have put out a new report
on their progress toward a Linux distribution for Apple devices.

Some time ago, we were made aware of multiple attempts to exploit
our permissive licensing to hijack our work, with a direct view to
replacing the project and aggressively monetising Linux on Apple
Silicon. In some extreme cases, in-development feature code was
being lifted straight out of our personal forks and published
without attribution or lazily rewritten with LLM assistance to
obfuscate its origin. The MIT licence explicitly allows this, and
has no carveouts to protect against bad faith actors.

As such, we made the difficult decision to begin the process of
transitioning all of our repositories to the GNU General Public
License version 2 or later. Going forward all Asahi Linux code will
be licenced under strong copyleft licences only. Those who do not
learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

Amutable Foundations: A Technical Overview

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1105934/

Lennart Poettering, Michael Vogt, and Joaquim Rocha have put together a
detailed overview
of what the Amutable Operating System (AOS) and
associated infrastructure will look like.

The image-based OS approach enables us to enforce some very strict
but powerful security properties, which elevate the security
posture of the system substantially above traditional Linux
systems. Specifically, let’s highlight seven major essential
security properties of AOS here:

  1. No Shell + No SSH + No Language Interpreters. By default AOS
    does not install a UNIX shell, nor makes remote access via SSH
    available on the nodes. Moreover, we do not install any of the usual
    language interpreters (Python, Perl, …) by default. For most nodes a
    shell or interpreted language support is not required and it removes a
    whole class of attacks.

  2. Signed Images Only. On AOS only images that come with Verity
    data signed by a signing key listed in the Verity keyring may be
    activated.

  3. […]

[$] User namespaces + file capabilities = trouble

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1103429/

User namespaces are a key part of the
kernel’s toolkit for assembling containers; processes within a user
namespace can appear to have full root access to the system while gaining
no extra privileges in the wider system. At least, that is the intent. In
practice, keeping privilege contained within a user namespace has often
turned out to be difficult. As an example, consider this
small patch series
from Josef Bacik, which is intended to address some
situations where a process within a user namespace can elevate the
privileges of processes outside of it.

Shutting the Door on the XCPE Botnet (Threat Intelligence)

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1104847/

The Google Threat Intelligence blog describes,
in great detail
, the XCPE botnet, which has just been taken down.

Last week, Google and industry partners dismantled the XCPE
backdoor which enrolled more than 1.3 million set-top boxes into a
botnet. We assess with high confidence that the backdoor and botnet
were intentionally developed, deployed, and operated for financial
gain by Videostrong Technology Co., an Android Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) and Original Device Manufacturer (ODM).

Videostrong monetized the backdoor by selling access to criminal
affiliates and loading those affiliates’ malware modules onto
infected devices. These secondary modules were conducting ad-fraud;
silently enrolling infected devices into residential proxy
networks; and loading additional malware onto XCPE-compromised
devices.

[$] Managing the kernel CVE flood

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1100894/

We recently looked at how the
kernel community is dealing with the firehose of vulnerability reports, but
said little about how users of the kernel are responding. At the 2026 Linux Plumbers Conference, Amazon employees
Dylan Johnson and Justinien Bouron discussed the problem from the point of
view of engineers trying to keep AWS running and secure in the face of a
storm of CVE disclosures. The kernel community’s longstanding advice is to
run current kernels, and that turns out to work — sort of.

Kernel prepatch 7.4-rc1

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1104654/

The 7.4-rc1 kernel prepatch is out, and
the merge window is closed for this development cycle.

This is a *BIG* merge window. I think the reason is the by now
obvious one, but I’m actually taking it as a good sign: I’m *much*
happier with the flood of AI triggered work going into the merge
window than it showing up mainly as extra fixes during the -rc
period. So I’m hoping that this merge window being larger than
usual is a sign that the AI fixes are becoming more part of the
“normal development” than a flood of fixes that go into the whole
stabilization phase. I think that’s a much healthier model.

There were 18,591 non-merge changesets brought in during this merge window
— this is not just a record, but it nearly matches the patch volume during
the entire (record-setting) 7.3 development cycle. So far, 2,678
developers have contributed to 7.4; 625 of them are first-time kernel
contributors. Subscribers can find more details in the KSDB 7.4 page.

A massive pile of security updates for Saturday

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1104612/

Security updates have been issued by AlmaLinux (.NET 10.0, .NET 11.0, .NET 8.0, .NET 9.0, aspell, bind, bind9.18, container-tools:1.0, container-tools:rhel8, curl, dogtag-pki, ignition, java-21-openjdk, python-pillow, tomcat, and virt:rhel, virt-devel:rhel), Debian (antiword, cyrus-sasl2, dovecot, dpdk, nss, python-git, and thunderbird), Fedora (7zip, aegisub, aom, apptainer, arm-none-eabi-binutils-cs, assimp, avr-binutils, baresip, barman, bind9-next, btrfs-backup-ng, chezmoi, chromium, cifs-utils, clevis-pin-trustee, composer, containerd, curl, docker-buildx, dotnet10.0, evolution, evolution-data-server, evolution-ews, exim, fips-provider, firefox, flare-im, forgejo, freeipa, freerdp, gcc, gegl04, ghostscript, GitPython, glib-networking, gnome-shell-extension-gsconnect, golang-x-mobile, hcloud, helix, httpd, ImageMagick, iperf3, jfrog-cli, jupyterlab, keepassxc, kernel, knot-resolver, krb5, kryoptic, libdigidocpp, libheif, libindi, libinstpatch, libpng12, libpng15, librabbitmq, libre, libXi, libzip, linux-firmware, Lmod, log4net, markdownlint-cli2, mingw-freetype, mingw-gstreamer1, mingw-gstreamer1-plugins-bad-free, mingw-gstreamer1-plugins-base, mingw-gstreamer1-plugins-good, mingw-libpng, mingw-LibRaw, mingw-python-certifi, mingw-python3, mongo-c-driver, mstflint, mutt, nant, nebula, nix, nsd, ntpsec, openbao, openjpeg, openssl3, openvpn, perl-Badger, perl-CLI-Simple, perl-Cpanel-JSON-XS, perl-CSS-Inliner, perl-Encoding-FixLatin, perl-ExtUtils-Typemaps-Default, perl-GD-SecurityImage, perl-HTML-Query, perl-libnet, perl-Markdown-Render, perl-Net-IDN-Encode, perl-Net-Whois-Raw, perl-Plack, perl-Plack-Middleware-ReverseProxy, perl-Text-CSV_XS, pgbouncer, php-getid3, php-pecl-mongodb2, python-boto3, python-botocore, python-cairosvg, python-django5, python-django6, python-jupyter-builder, python-mkdocs-rss-plugin, python-nbdime, python-nh3, python-notebook, python-pydantic-core, python-pypdf, python-uv-build, python3.10, python3.11, python3.12, python3.13, python3.14, qdigidoc, qdl, qt5-qtbase, radicale, rclone, rt, ruff, rust-ammonia, rust-archive-trait, rust-astral-html, rust-astral-ini, rust-astral-mail-headers, rust-astral-pubgrub, rust-astral-version-ranges, rust-astral_async_http_range_reader, rust-astral_async_zip, rust-asyncband, rust-backtrace, rust-blake2b_simd, rust-blake3, rust-cargo-semver-checks, rust-chrono, rust-clap-cargo, rust-constant_time_eq, rust-dua-cli, rust-faster-hex, rust-gengo-bin, rust-gitui, rust-lzma-rust2, rust-object, rust-object0.37, rust-object0.38, rust-object0.39, rust-onefetch, rust-ppmd-rust, rust-quick-junit, rust-rbw, rust-regorus, rust-reqsign, rust-reqsign-aliyun-oss, rust-reqsign-aws-core, rust-reqsign-aws-v4, rust-reqsign-aws-v4a, rust-reqsign-azure-storage, rust-reqsign-command-execute-tokio, rust-reqsign-core, rust-reqsign-file-read-tokio, rust-reqsign-google, rust-reqsign-http-send-reqwest, rust-reqsign-huaweicloud-obs, rust-reqsign-oracle, rust-reqsign-tencent-cos, rust-reqsign-volcengine-tos, rust-routinator, rust-rustls, rust-ruzstd, rust-sccache, rust-tar-codec, rust-tar-framing, rust-tokei, rust-totp-rs, rust-trustfall-rustdoc-adapter, rust-trustfall-rustdoc-adapter57, rust-trustfall-rustdoc-adapter60, rust-typed-path, rust-zip, rust-zip0.6, rust-zip2, rustup, samba, SDL3_image, socat, stargz-snapshotter, stgit, sudo, syncthing, thunderbird, tor, trafficserver, ty, unbound, unshield, uv, webkitgtk, wordpress, xorg-x11-server, xorg-x11-server-Xwayland, zchunk, and zvbi), Mageia (libgit2), Red Hat (go-toolset:rhel8 and rhc), SUSE (ab-av1, ansible-core, aws-nitro-enclaves-cli, bouncycastle, cadvisor, chromium, cifs-utils, coredns, crun, dr_libs-devel-20260901, dssim, epiphany, expat, forgejo, freetype2-devel, fuseiso-20260614, gh, ghostscript, gosec, gvfs, hashcat, hauler, hugo, ImageMagick, kernel-devel, kubevirt1.9, libmikmod, libsoup, percona-toolkit, perl-cpanel-json-xs, perl-dancer2-plugin-auth-extensible, perl-mozilla-ca, pocketbase, putty, python-brotli, python-CairoSVG, python-cairosvg, python-django, python-pypdf, python-urllib3_1, roundcubemail, rsyslog, shadowsocks-rust, shadowsocks-libev, stgit, suseconnect-ng, tailscale, trivy, and vlc), and Ubuntu (brotli).

How We Could Have Backdoored Bash (Hacktron blog)

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1104262/

The Hacktron blog documents how
the group was able to compromise the GNU Savannah forge and could have
pushed malware into any of the projects hosted there.

Using Hacktron, we found that an email address like
`touch${IFS}/tmp/savane-rce-proof`@attacker.example gave any
registered user code execution on its backend. From there, we made
our account a superuser, impersonated Bash’s maintainer, and
confirmed we could add an SSH key with push access to the upstream
Bash repository. An unpatched kernel gave us root access and access
to a GNU backup server. We reported it to the FSF on May 11, 2026.

Haas: Postgres 19 is late, and it’s AI’s fault

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1104210/

PostgreSQL developer Robert Haas writes
about the struggles
the project has encountered in putting together its
next release.

In the end, I don’t think that the delay in shipping PostgreSQL 19
is particularly concerning. It is not a long delay in the grand
scheme of things, and it emerges directly from the project’s
concern for quality.

The long-term picture is less clear and in some ways more
troubling: given that we have forty years of bugs that humans were
unable to find but LLMs are quite capable of discovering, how are
we ever going to catch up, and how will PostgreSQL continue to
innovate? Right now, I’m not sure. What I do know is that I, and
many others, are working really hard to figure it out.

LWN looked at the PostgreSQL 19 release
and its challenges in September.

[$] Containers as a recognized kernel object

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1102593/

The foundation of the design for containers in the kernel is that there
isn’t one; there is no container abstraction that the kernel recognizes.
Instead, the kernel provides a long list of components — namespaces,
control groups, sandboxing mechanisms, and more — along with a note that
says, in effect, “some assembly required”. There have been attempts (repeatedly) over the years to turn containers
into first-class objects with kernel support, but they have never gotten
far. Now Josef Bacik is making a
try
with a concept that he calls “cells”.

A report from the LPC sched_ext microconference

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1103426/

The Linux Plumbers Conference blog has a
report
from the sched_ext microconference held in Prague.

Three main topics dominated the discussions

  • Priority inversion and how to handle it in sched_ext: lock holder and
    lock waiter preemption, time slice extension, and making proxy execution
    work together with BPF schedulers.
  • Paravirtualized scheduling: letting the host and guest schedulers
    cooperate across the VM boundary, with sched_ext as the policy engine on
    the host.
  • Device and topology-aware scheduling: using hardware feedback (Intel
    HFI), device/accelerator locality and cache topology to drive task
    placement.

Today’s PHP Security Release, and How We’re Strengthening PHP Security (PHP Foundation)

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1102060/

The PHP Foundation has put out a
blog entry
explaining how the vulnerabilities disclosed today came
about and why they took so long to fix.

To fix the OOM problem, the PHP security team developed several
competing approaches, but each came with its own trade-offs:
backward compatibility breaks, new denial-of-service potential, or
requiring changes to many third-party extensions which seemed
impossible to coordinate. The PHP security team, operating on
consensus, struggled to choose between these and feared the
repercussions of shipping the wrong choice. Combined with the lack
of a known path to remote code execution and the small team of core
developers with the necessary deep knowledge of the engine occupied
with many responsibilities, this decision process caused work on a
fix to stall and restart repeatedly over months. We won’t pretend
otherwise: the delay was a structural failure, caused by both the
security team’s decision process and its lack of resources.

Upstreaming Tyr: Rust, DRM, and the Linux Kernel (Collabora)

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1102024/

The Collabora blog provides
an update on Tyr
, a driver for Arm Mali GPUs.

One of our biggest challenges has been developing Tyr while the
Rust kernel abstractions and driver interfaces are also being
developed. As the driver interfaces are naturally revised and
improved, we have rewritten Tyr several times to adapt to the
larger Rust ecosystem. This not only makes progress much slower
than it would be with a mature API, but also stalls progress for
capabilities, such as job scheduling, while the abstraction is
properly designed, reviewed, tested, and merged upstream.

But working in this evolving environment is also precisely where
Tyr is able to provide the most value. As a user of these new Rust
abstractions, Tyr helps to expose their requirements and
limitations.

[$] Development statistics for the 7.3 kernel

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1100241/

Linus Torvalds released
the 7.3 kernel, at the end of the usual nine-week development cycle, on
October 18. This cycle, abundantly fueled by LLM-assisted
contributions, broke just about every record imaginable. As usual, we have
compiled some statistics showing how this release, which is expected to be
the next long-term-support (LTS) kernel, came together. Also included is
an attempt to determine whether automated patch review is actually reducing
the number of bugs introduced into the kernel.