Tag Archives: wifi

Microsoft Buys Corp.com

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/04/microsoft_buys_.html

A few months ago, Brian Krebs told the story of the domain corp.com, and how it is basically a security nightmare:

At issue is a problem known as “namespace collision,” a situation where domain names intended to be used exclusively on an internal company network end up overlapping with domains that can resolve normally on the open Internet.

Windows computers on an internal corporate network validate other things on that network using a Microsoft innovation called Active Directory, which is the umbrella term for a broad range of identity-related services in Windows environments. A core part of the way these things find each other involves a Windows feature called “DNS name devolution,” which is a kind of network shorthand that makes it easier to find other computers or servers without having to specify a full, legitimate domain name for those resources.

For instance, if a company runs an internal network with the name internalnetwork.example.com, and an employee on that network wishes to access a shared drive called “drive1,” there’s no need to type “drive1.internalnetwork.example.com” into Windows Explorer; typing “\\drive1\” alone will suffice, and Windows takes care of the rest.

But things can get far trickier with an internal Windows domain that does not map back to a second-level domain the organization actually owns and controls. And unfortunately, in early versions of Windows that supported Active Directory — Windows 2000 Server, for example — the default or example Active Directory path was given as “corp,” and many companies apparently adopted this setting without modifying it to include a domain they controlled.

Compounding things further, some companies then went on to build (and/or assimilate) vast networks of networks on top of this erroneous setting.

Now, none of this was much of a security concern back in the day when it was impractical for employees to lug their bulky desktop computers and monitors outside of the corporate network. But what happens when an employee working at a company with an Active Directory network path called “corp” takes a company laptop to the local Starbucks?

Chances are good that at least some resources on the employee’s laptop will still try to access that internal “corp” domain. And because of the way DNS name devolution works on Windows, that company laptop online via the Starbucks wireless connection is likely to then seek those same resources at “corp.com.”

In practical terms, this means that whoever controls corp.com can passively intercept private communications from hundreds of thousands of computers that end up being taken outside of a corporate environment which uses this “corp” designation for its Active Directory domain.

Microsoft just bought it, so it wouldn’t fall into the hands of any bad actors:

In a written statement, Microsoft said it acquired the domain to protect its customers.

“To help in keeping systems protected we encourage customers to practice safe security habits when planning for internal domain and network names,” the statement reads. “We released a security advisory in June of 2009 and a security update that helps keep customers safe. In our ongoing commitment to customer security, we also acquired the Corp.com domain.”

Wi-Fi Chip Vulnerability

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/03/wi-fi_chip_vuln.html

There’s a vulnerability in Wi-Fi hardware that breaks the encryption:

The vulnerability exists in Wi-Fi chips made by Cypress Semiconductor and Broadcom, the latter a chipmaker Cypress acquired in 2016. The affected devices include iPhones, iPads, Macs, Amazon Echos and Kindles, Android devices, and Wi-Fi routers from Asus and Huawei, as well as the Raspberry Pi 3. Eset, the security company that discovered the vulnerability, said the flaw primarily affects Cypress’ and Broadcom’s FullMAC WLAN chips, which are used in billions of devices. Eset has named the vulnerability Kr00k, and it is tracked as CVE-2019-15126.

Manufacturers have made patches available for most or all of the affected devices, but it’s not clear how many devices have installed the patches. Of greatest concern are vulnerable wireless routers, which often go unpatched indefinitely.

That’s the real problem. Many of these devices won’t get patched — ever.

Wi-Fi Hotspot Tracking

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/10/wi-fi_hotspot_t.html

Free Wi-Fi hotspots can track your location, even if you don’t connect to them. This is because your phone or computer broadcasts a unique MAC address.

What distinguishes location-based marketing hotspot providers like Zenreach and Euclid is that the personal information you enter in the captive portal­ — like your email address, phone number, or social media profile­ — can be linked to your laptop or smartphone’s Media Access Control (MAC) address. That’s the unique alphanumeric ID that devices broadcast when Wi-Fi is switched on.

As Euclid explains in its privacy policy, “…if you bring your mobile device to your favorite clothing store today that is a Location — ­and then a popular local restaurant a few days later that is also a Location­ — we may know that a mobile device was in both locations based on seeing the same MAC Address.”

MAC addresses alone don’t contain identifying information besides the make of a device, such as whether a smartphone is an iPhone or a Samsung Galaxy. But as long as a device’s MAC address is linked to someone’s profile, and the device’s Wi-Fi is turned on, the movements of its owner can be followed by any hotspot from the same provider.

“After a user signs up, we associate their email address and other personal information with their device’s MAC address and with any location history we may previously have gathered (or later gather) for that device’s MAC address,” according to Zenreach’s privacy policy.

The defense is to turn Wi-Fi off on your phone when you’re not using it.

EDITED TO ADD: Note that the article is from 2018. Not that I think anything is different today….

How Apple’s "Find My" Feature Works

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/06/how_apples_find.html

Matthew Green intelligently speculates about how Apple’s new “Find My” feature works.

If you haven’t already been inspired by the description above, let me phrase the question you ought to be asking: how is this system going to avoid being a massive privacy nightmare?

Let me count the concerns:

  • If your device is constantly emitting a BLE signal that uniquely identifies it, the whole world is going to have (yet another) way to track you. Marketers already use WiFi and Bluetooth MAC addresses to do this: Find My could create yet another tracking channel.
  • It also exposes the phones who are doing the tracking. These people are now going to be sending their current location to Apple (which they may or may not already be doing). Now they’ll also be potentially sharing this information with strangers who “lose” their devices. That could go badly.

  • Scammers might also run active attacks in which they fake the location of your device. While this seems unlikely, people will always surprise you.

The good news is that Apple claims that their system actually does provide strong privacy, and that it accomplishes this using clever cryptography. But as is typical, they’ve declined to give out the details how they’re going to do it. Andy Greenberg talked me through an incomplete technical description that Apple provided to Wired, so that provides many hints. Unfortunately, what Apple provided still leaves huge gaps. It’s into those gaps that I’m going to fill in my best guess for what Apple is actually doing.

Vulnerabilities in the WPA3 Wi-Fi Security Protocol

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/04/vulnerabilities_7.html

Researchers have found several vulnerabilities in the WPA3 Wi-Fi security protocol:

The design flaws we discovered can be divided in two categories. The first category consists of downgrade attacks against WPA3-capable devices, and the second category consists of weaknesses in the Dragonfly handshake of WPA3, which in the Wi-Fi standard is better known as the Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) handshake. The discovered flaws can be abused to recover the password of the Wi-Fi network, launch resource consumption attacks, and force devices into using weaker security groups. All attacks are against home networks (i.e. WPA3-Personal), where one password is shared among all users.

News article. Research paper: “Dragonblood: A Security Analysis of WPA3’s SAE Handshake“:

Abstract: The WPA3 certification aims to secure Wi-Fi networks, and provides several advantages over its predecessor WPA2, such as protection against offline dictionary attacks and forward secrecy. Unfortunately, we show that WPA3 is affected by several design flaws,and analyze these flaws both theoretically and practically. Most prominently, we show that WPA3’s Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) handshake, commonly known as Dragonfly, is affected by password partitioning attacks. These attacks resemble dictionary attacks and allow an adversary to recover the password by abusing timing or cache-based side-channel leaks. Our side-channel attacks target the protocol’s password encoding method. For instance, our cache-based attack exploits SAE’s hash-to-curve algorithm. The resulting attacks are efficient and low cost: brute-forcing all 8-character lowercase password requires less than 125$in Amazon EC2 instances. In light of ongoing standardization efforts on hash-to-curve, Password-Authenticated Key Exchanges (PAKEs), and Dragonfly as a TLS handshake, our findings are also of more general interest. Finally, we discuss how to mitigate our attacks in a backwards-compatible manner, and explain how minor changes to the protocol could have prevented most of our attack

Security Analysis of the LIFX Smart Light Bulb

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/01/security_analys_6.html

The security is terrible:

In a very short limited amount of time, three vulnerabilities have been discovered:

  • Wifi credentials of the user have been recovered (stored in plaintext into the flash memory).
  • No security settings. The device is completely open (no secure boot, no debug interface disabled, no flash encryption).
  • Root certificate and RSA private key have been extracted.

Boing Boing post.

Major Bluetooth Vulnerability

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/07/major_bluetooth.html

Bluetooth has a serious security vulnerability:

In some implementations, the elliptic curve parameters are not all validated by the cryptographic algorithm implementation, which may allow a remote attacker within wireless range to inject an invalid public key to determine the session key with high probability. Such an attacker can then passively intercept and decrypt all device messages, and/or forge and inject malicious messages.

Paper. Website. Three news articles.

This is serious. Update your software now, and try not to think about all of the Bluetooth applications that can’t be updated.


Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/07/wpa3.html

Everyone is writing about the new WPA3 Wi-Fi security standard, and how it improves security over the current WPA2 standard.

This summary is as good as any other:

The first big new feature in WPA3 is protection against offline, password-guessing attacks. This is where an attacker captures data from your Wi-Fi stream, brings it back to a private computer, and guesses passwords over and over again until they find a match. With WPA3, attackers are only supposed to be able to make a single guess against that offline data before it becomes useless; they’ll instead have to interact with the live Wi-Fi device every time they want to make a guess. (And that’s harder since they need to be physically present, and devices can be set up to protect against repeat guesses.)

WPA3’s other major addition, as highlighted by the Alliance, is forward secrecy. This is a privacy feature that prevents older data from being compromised by a later attack. So if an attacker captures an encrypted Wi-Fi transmission, then cracks the password, they still won’t be able to read the older data — they’d only be able to see new information currently flowing over the network.

Note that we’re just getting the new standard this week. Actual devices that implement the standard are still months away.

HackSpace magazine 7: Internet of Everything

Post Syndicated from Andrew Gregory original https://www.raspberrypi.org/blog/hackspace-magazine-7-internet-of-everything/

We’re usually averse to buzzwords at HackSpace magazine, but not this month: in issue 7, we’re taking a deep dive into the Internet of Things.HackSpace magazine issue 7 cover

Internet of Things (IoT)

To many people, IoT is a shady term used by companies to sell you something you already own, but this time with WiFi; to us, it’s a way to make our builds smarter, more useful, and more connected. In HackSpace magazine #7, you can join us on a tour of the boards that power IoT projects, marvel at the ways in which other makers are using IoT, and get started with your first IoT project!

Awesome projects

DIY retro computing: this issue, we’re taking our collective hat off to Spencer Owen. He stuck his home-brew computer on Tindie thinking he might make a bit of beer money — now he’s paying the mortgage with his making skills and inviting others to build modules for his machine. And if that tickles your fancy, why not take a crack at our Z80 tutorial? Get out your breadboard, assemble your jumper wires, and prepare to build a real-life computer!

Inside HackSpace magazine issue 7

Shameless patriotism: combine Lego, Arduino, and the car of choice for 1960 gold bullion thieves, and you’ve got yourself a groovy weekend project. We proudly present to you one man’s epic quest to add LED lights (controllable via a smartphone!) to his daughter’s LEGO Mini Cooper.


Patriotism intensifies: for the last 200-odd years, the Black Country has been a hotbed of making. Urban Hax, based in Walsall, is the latest makerspace to show off its riches in the coveted Space of the Month pages. Every space has its own way of doing things, but not every space has a portrait of Rob Halford on the wall. All hail!

Inside HackSpace magazine issue 7

Diversity: advice on diversity often boils down to ‘Be nice to people’, which might feel more vague than actionable. This is where we come in to help: it is truly worth making the effort to give people of all backgrounds access to your makerspace, so we take a look at why it’s nice to be nice, and at the ways in which one makerspace has put niceness into practice — with great results.

And there’s more!

We also show you how to easily calculate the size and radius of laser-cut gears, use a bank of LEDs to etch PCBs in your own mini factory, and use chemistry to mess with your lunch menu.

Inside HackSpace magazine issue 7
Helen Steer inside HackSpace magazine issue 7
Inside HackSpace magazine issue 7

All this plus much, much more waits for you in HackSpace magazine issue 7!

Get your copy of HackSpace magazine

If you like the sound of that, you can find HackSpace magazine in WHSmith, Tesco, Sainsbury’s, and independent newsagents in the UK. If you live in the US, check out your local Barnes & Noble, Fry’s, or Micro Center next week. We’re also shipping to stores in Australia, Hong Kong, Canada, Singapore, Belgium, and Brazil, so be sure to ask your local newsagent whether they’ll be getting HackSpace magazine.

And if you can’t get to the shops, fear not: you can subscribe from £4 an issue from our online shop. And if you’d rather try before you buy, you can always download the free PDF. Happy reading, and happy making!

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3D-printed speakers from the Technical University of Denmark

Post Syndicated from Alex Bate original https://www.raspberrypi.org/blog/technical-university-denmark-speakers/

Students taking Design of Mechatronics at the Technical University of Denmark have created some seriously elegant and striking Raspberry Pi speakers. Their builds are part of a project asking them to “explore, design and build a 3D printed speaker, around readily available electronics and components”.

The students have been uploading their designs, incorporating Raspberry Pis and HiFiBerry HATs, to Thingiverse throughout April. The task is a collaboration with luxury brand Bang & Olufsen’s Create initiative, and the results wouldn’t look out of place in a high-end showroom; I’d happily take any of these home.

The Sphere

Søren Qvist Sphere 3D-printed laser-cut Raspberry Pi Speaker
Søren Qvist Sphere 3D-printed laser-cut Raspberry Pi Speaker
Søren Qvist Sphere 3D-printed laser-cut Raspberry Pi Speaker

Søren Qvist’s wall-mounted kitchen sphere uses 3D-printed and laser-cut parts, along with the HiFiBerry HAT and B&O speakers to create a sleek-looking design.

Hex One

Otto Ømann Hex One 3D-printed laser-cut Raspberry Pi Speaker

Otto Ømann Hex One 3D-printed laser-cut Raspberry Pi Speaker

Otto Ømann’s group have designed the Hex One – a work-in-progress wireless 360° speaker. A particular objective for their project is to create a speaker using as many 3D-printed parts as possible.

Portable B&O-Create Speaker

“The design is supposed to resemble that of a B&O speaker, and from a handful of categories we chose to create a portable and wearable speaker,” explain Gustav Larsen and his team.

Desktop Loudspeaker

Oliver Repholtz Behrens loudspeaker

Oliver Repholtz Behrens loudspeaker

Oliver Repholtz Behrens and team have housed a Raspberry Pi and HiFiBerry HAT inside this this stylish airplay speaker. You can follow their design progress on their team blog.


Tue Thomsen’s six-person team Mechatastic have produced the B&O TILE. “The speaker consists of four 3D-printed cabinet and top parts, where the top should be covered by fabric,” they explain. “The speaker insides consists of laser-cut wood to hold the tweeter and driver and encase the Raspberry Pi.”

The team aimed to design a speaker that would be at home in a kitchen. With a removable upper casing allowing for a choice of colour, the TILE can be customised to fit particular tastes and colour schemes.

Build your own speakers with Raspberry Pis

Raspberry Pi’s onboard audio jack, along with third-party HATs such as the HiFiBerry and Pimoroni Speaker pHAT, make speaker design and fabrication with the Pi an interesting alternative to pre-made tech. These builds don’t tend to be technically complex, and they provide some lovely examples of tech-based projects that reflect makers’ own particular aesthetic style.

If you have access to a 3D printer or a laser cutter, perhaps at a nearby maker space, then those can be excellent resources, but fancy kit isn’t a requirement. Basic joinery and crafting with card or paper are just a couple of ways you can build things that are all your own, using familiar tools and materials. We think more people would enjoy getting hands-on with this sort of thing if they gave it a whirl, and we publish a free magazine to help.

Raspberry Pi Zero AirPlay Speaker

Looking for a new project to build around the Raspberry Pi Zero, I came across the pHAT DAC from Pimoroni. This little add-on board adds audio playback capabilities to the Pi Zero. Because the pHAT uses the GPIO pins, the USB OTG port remains available for a wifi dongle.

This video by Frederick Vandenbosch is a great example of building AirPlay speakers using a Pi and HAT, and a quick search will find you lots more relevant tutorials and ideas.

Have you built your own? Share your speaker-based Pi builds with us in the comments.

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IoT Inspector Tool from Princeton

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/iot_inspector_t.html

Researchers at Princeton University have released IoT Inspector, a tool that analyzes the security and privacy of IoT devices by examining the data they send across the Internet. They’ve already used the tool to study a bunch of different IoT devices. From their blog post:

Finding #3: Many IoT Devices Contact a Large and Diverse Set of Third Parties

In many cases, consumers expect that their devices contact manufacturers’ servers, but communication with other third-party destinations may not be a behavior that consumers expect.

We have found that many IoT devices communicate with third-party services, of which consumers are typically unaware. We have found many instances of third-party communications in our analyses of IoT device network traffic. Some examples include:

  • Samsung Smart TV. During the first minute after power-on, the TV talks to Google Play, Double Click, Netflix, FandangoNOW, Spotify, CBS, MSNBC, NFL, Deezer, and Facebook­even though we did not sign in or create accounts with any of them.
  • Amcrest WiFi Security Camera. The camera actively communicates with cellphonepush.quickddns.com using HTTPS. QuickDDNS is a Dynamic DNS service provider operated by Dahua. Dahua is also a security camera manufacturer, although Amcrest’s website makes no references to Dahua. Amcrest customer service informed us that Dahua was the original equipment manufacturer.

  • Halo Smoke Detector. The smart smoke detector communicates with broker.xively.com. Xively offers an MQTT service, which allows manufacturers to communicate with their devices.

  • Geeni Light Bulb. The Geeni smart bulb communicates with gw.tuyaus.com, which is operated by TuYa, a China-based company that also offers an MQTT service.

We also looked at a number of other devices, such as Samsung Smart Camera and TP-Link Smart Plug, and found communications with third parties ranging from NTP pools (time servers) to video storage services.

Their first two findings are that “Many IoT devices lack basic encryption and authentication” and that “User behavior can be inferred from encrypted IoT device traffic.” No surprises there.

Boingboing post.

Related: IoT Hall of Shame.

OMG The Stupid It Burns

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/04/omg-stupid-it-burns.html

This article, pointed out by @TheGrugq, is stupid enough that it’s worth rebutting.

The article starts with the question “Why did the lessons of Stuxnet, Wannacry, Heartbleed and Shamoon go unheeded?“. It then proceeds to ignore the lessons of those things.
Some of the actual lessons should be things like how Stuxnet crossed air gaps, how Wannacry spread through flat Windows networking, how Heartbleed comes from technical debt, and how Shamoon furthers state aims by causing damage.
But this article doesn’t cover the technical lessons. Instead, it thinks the lesson should be the moral lesson, that we should take these things more seriously. But that’s stupid. It’s the sort of lesson people teach you that know nothing about the topic. When you have nothing of value to contribute to a topic you can always take the moral high road and criticize everyone for being morally weak for not taking it more seriously. Obviously, since doctors haven’t cured cancer yet, it’s because they don’t take the problem seriously.
The article continues to ignore the lesson of these cyber attacks and instead regales us with a list of military lessons from WW I and WW II. This makes the same flaw that many in the military make, trying to understand cyber through analogies with the real world. It’s not that such lessons could have no value, it’s that this article contains a poor list of them. It seems to consist of a random list of events that appeal to the author rather than events that have bearing on cybersecurity.
Then, in case we don’t get the point, the article bullies us with hyperbole, cliches, buzzwords, bombastic language, famous quotes, and citations. It’s hard to see how most of them actually apply to the text. Rather, it seems like they are included simply because he really really likes them.
The article invests much effort in discussing the buzzword “OODA loop”. Most attacks in cyberspace don’t have one. Instead, attackers flail around, trying lots of random things, overcoming defense with brute-force rather than an understanding of what’s going on. That’s obviously the case with Wannacry: it was an accident, with the perpetrator experimenting with what would happen if they added the ETERNALBLUE exploit to their existing ransomware code. The consequence was beyond anybody’s ability to predict.
You might claim that this is just the first stage, that they’ll loop around, observe Wannacry’s effects, orient themselves, decide, then act upon what they learned. Nope. Wannacry burned the exploit. It’s essentially removed any vulnerable systems from the public Internet, thereby making it impossible to use what they learned. It’s still active a year later, with infected systems behind firewalls busily scanning the Internet so that if you put a new system online that’s vulnerable, it’ll be taken offline within a few hours, before any other evildoer can take advantage of it.
See what I’m doing here? Learning the actual lessons of things like Wannacry? The thing the above article fails to do??
The article has a humorous paragraph on “defense in depth”, misunderstanding the term. To be fair, it’s the cybersecurity industry’s fault: they adopted then redefined the term. That’s why there’s two separate articles on Wikipedia: one for the old military term (as used in this article) and one for the new cybersecurity term.
As used in the cybersecurity industry, “defense in depth” means having multiple layers of security. Many organizations put all their defensive efforts on the perimeter, and none inside a network. The idea of “defense in depth” is to put more defenses inside the network. For example, instead of just one firewall at the edge of the network, put firewalls inside the network to segment different subnetworks from each other, so that a ransomware infection in the customer support computers doesn’t spread to sales and marketing computers.
The article talks about exploiting WiFi chips to bypass the defense in depth measures like browser sandboxes. This is conflating different types of attacks. A WiFi attack is usually considered a local attack, from somebody next to you in bar, rather than a remote attack from a server in Russia. Moreover, far from disproving “defense in depth” such WiFi attacks highlight the need for it. Namely, phones need to be designed so that successful exploitation of other microprocessors (namely, the WiFi, Bluetooth, and cellular baseband chips) can’t directly compromise the host system. In other words, once exploited with “Broadpwn”, a hacker would need to extend the exploit chain with another vulnerability in the hosts Broadcom WiFi driver rather than immediately exploiting a DMA attack across PCIe. This suggests that if PCIe is used to interface to peripherals in the phone that an IOMMU be used, for “defense in depth”.
Cybersecurity is a young field. There are lots of useful things that outsider non-techies can teach us. Lessons from military history would be well-received.
But that’s not this story. Instead, this story is by an outsider telling us we don’t know what we are doing, that they do, and then proceeds to prove they don’t know what they are doing. Their argument is based on a moral suasion and bullying us with what appears on the surface to be intellectual rigor, but which is in fact devoid of anything smart.
My fear, here, is that I’m going to be in a meeting where somebody has read this pretentious garbage, explaining to me why “defense in depth” is wrong and how we need to OODA faster. I’d rather nip this in the bud, pointing out if you found anything interesting from that article, you are wrong.

Notes on setting up Raspberry Pi 3 as WiFi hotspot

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/04/notes-on-setting-up-raspberry-pi-3-as.html

I want to sniff the packets for IoT devices. There are a number of ways of doing this, but one straightforward mechanism is configuring a “Raspberry Pi 3 B” as a WiFi hotspot, then running tcpdump on it to record all the packets that pass through it. Google gives lots of results on how to do this, but they all demand that you have the precise hardware, WiFi hardware, and software that the authors do, so that’s a pain.

I got it working using the instructions here. There are a few additional notes, which is why I’m writing this blogpost, so I remember them.

I’m using the RPi-3-B and not the RPi-3-B+, and the latest version of Raspbian at the time of this writing, “Raspbian Stretch Lite 2018-3-13”.

Some things didn’t work as described. The first is that it couldn’t find the package “hostapd”. That solution was to run “apt-get update” a second time.

The second problem was error message about the NAT not working when trying to set the masquerade rule. That’s because the ‘upgrade’ updates the kernel, making the running system out-of-date with the files on the disk. The solution to that is make sure you reboot after upgrading.

Thus, what you do at the start is:

apt-get update
apt-get upgrade
apt-get update
shutdown -r now

Then it’s just “apt-get install tcpdump” and start capturing on wlan0. This will get the non-monitor-mode Ethernet frames, which is what I want.

Build a solar-powered nature camera for your garden

Post Syndicated from Alex Bate original https://www.raspberrypi.org/blog/solar-powered-nature-camera/

Spring has sprung, and with it, sleepy-eyed wildlife is beginning to roam our gardens and local woodlands. So why not follow hackster.io maker reichley’s tutorial and build your own solar-powered squirrelhouse nature cam?

Raspberry Pi- and solar-powered nature camera


“I live half a mile above sea level and am SURROUNDED by animals…bears, foxes, turkeys, deer, squirrels, birds”, reichley explains in his tutorial. “Spring has arrived, and there are LOADS of squirrels running around. I was in the building mood and, being a nerd, wished to combine a common woodworking project with the connectivity and observability provided by single-board computers (and their camera add-ons).”

Building a tiny home

reichley started by sketching out a design for the house to determine where the various components would fit.

Raspberry Pi- and solar-powered nature camera

Since he’s fan of autonomy and renewable energy, he decided to run the project’s Raspberry Pi Zero W via solar power. To do so, he reiterated the design to include the necessary tech, scaling the roof to fit the panels.

Raspberry Pi- and solar-powered squirrel cam
Raspberry Pi- and solar-powered squirrel cam
Raspberry Pi- and solar-powered squirrel cam

To keep the project running 24/7, reichley had to figure out the overall power consumption of both the Zero W and the Raspberry Pi Camera Module, factoring in the constant WiFi connection and the sunshine hours in his garden.

Raspberry Pi- and solar-powered nature camera

He used a LiPo SHIM to bump up the power to the required 5V for the Zero. Moreover, he added a BH1750 lux sensor to shut off the LiPo SHIM, and thus the Pi, whenever it’s too dark for decent video.

Raspberry Pi- and solar-powered nature camera

To control the project, he used Calin Crisan’s motionEyeOS video surveillance operating system for single-board computers.

Build your own nature camera

To build your own version, follow reichley’s tutorial, in which you can also find links to all the necessary code and components. You can also check out our free tutorial for building an infrared bird box using the Raspberry Pi NoIR Camera Module. As Eben said in our YouTube live Q&A last week, we really like nature cameras here at Pi Towers, and we’d love to see yours. So if you have any live-stream links or photography from your Raspberry Pi–powered nature cam, please share them with us!

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WannaCry after one year

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/03/wannacry-after-one-year.html

In the news, Boeing (an aircraft maker) has been “targeted by a WannaCry virus attack”. Phrased this way, it’s implausible. There are no new attacks targeting people with WannaCry. There is either no WannaCry, or it’s simply a continuation of the attack from a year ago.

It’s possible what happened is that an anti-virus product called a new virus “WannaCry”. Virus families are often related, and sometimes a distant relative gets called the same thing. I know this watching the way various anti-virus products label my own software, which isn’t a virus, but which virus writers often include with their own stuff. The Lazarus group, which is believed to be responsible for WannaCry, have whole virus families like this. Thus, just because an AV product claims you are infected with WannaCry doesn’t mean it’s the same thing that everyone else is calling WannaCry.

Famously, WannaCry was the first virus/ransomware/worm that used the NSA ETERNALBLUE exploit. Other viruses have since added the exploit, and of course, hackers use it when attacking systems. It may be that a network intrusion detection system detected ETERNALBLUE, which people then assumed was due to WannaCry. It may actually have been an nPetya infection instead (nPetya was the second major virus/worm/ransomware to use the exploit).

Or it could be the real WannaCry, but it’s probably not a new “attack” that “targets” Boeing. Instead, it’s likely a continuation from WannaCry’s first appearance. WannaCry is a worm, which means it spreads automatically after it was launched, for years, without anybody in control. Infected machines still exist, unnoticed by their owners, attacking random machines on the Internet. If you plug in an unpatched computer onto the raw Internet, without the benefit of a firewall, it’ll get infected within an hour.

However, the Boeing manufacturing systems that were infected were not on the Internet, so what happened? The narrative from the news stories imply some nefarious hacker activity that “targeted” Boeing, but that’s unlikely.

We have now have over 15 years of experience with network worms getting into strange places disconnected and even “air gapped” from the Internet. The most common reason is laptops. Somebody takes their laptop to some place like an airport WiFi network, and gets infected. They put their laptop to sleep, then wake it again when they reach their destination, and plug it into the manufacturing network. At this point, the virus spreads and infects everything. This is especially the case with maintenance/support engineers, who often have specialized software they use to control manufacturing machines, for which they have a reason to connect to the local network even if it doesn’t have useful access to the Internet. A single engineer may act as a sort of Typhoid Mary, going from customer to customer, infecting each in turn whenever they open their laptop.

Another cause for infection is virtual machines. A common practice is to take “snapshots” of live machines and save them to backups. Should the virtual machine crash, instead of rebooting it, it’s simply restored from the backed up running image. If that backup image is infected, then bringing it out of sleep will allow the worm to start spreading.

Jake Williams claims he’s seen three other manufacturing networks infected with WannaCry. Why does manufacturing seem more susceptible? The reason appears to be the “killswitch” that stops WannaCry from running elsewhere. The killswitch uses a DNS lookup, stopping itself if it can resolve a certain domain. Manufacturing networks are largely disconnected from the Internet enough that such DNS lookups don’t work, so the domain can’t be found, so the killswitch doesn’t work. Thus, manufacturing systems are no more likely to get infected, but the lack of killswitch means the virus will continue to run, attacking more systems instead of immediately killing itself.

One solution to this would be to setup sinkhole DNS servers on the network that resolve all unknown DNS queries to a single server that logs all requests. This is trivially setup with most DNS servers. The logs will quickly identify problems on the network, as well as any hacker or virus activity. The side effect is that it would make this killswitch kill WannaCry. WannaCry isn’t sufficient reason to setup sinkhole servers, of course, but it’s something I’ve found generally useful in the past.


Something obviously happened to the Boeing plant, but the narrative is all wrong. Words like “targeted attack” imply things that likely didn’t happen. Facts are so loose in cybersecurity that it may not have even been WannaCry.

The real story is that the original WannaCry is still out there, still trying to spread. Simply put a computer on the raw Internet (without a firewall) and you’ll get attacked. That, somehow, isn’t news. Instead, what’s news is whenever that continued infection hits somewhere famous, like Boeing, even though (as Boeing claims) it had no important effect.

2018-03-17 малък видео setup

Post Syndicated from Vasil Kolev original https://vasil.ludost.net/blog/?p=3381

Събирам (засега основно в главата си) setup за видео streaming и запис в hackerspace-овете в България. Изискванията са:

– минимална инвестиция в нов хардуер;
– (сравнително) лесно за използване (предполагам, че хората там са поне донякъде технически грамотни);
– възможност за stream-ване на текущите платформи, и може би и в тяхната си страница;
– запис/архивиране;
– поносимо качество.

Целта на setup-а е да се справи с най-простия тип събитие, което е един лектор с презентация.

Компонентите са следните:

– запис на звука – може да е от въздуха, но по-добре една брошка на лектора, + запис на залата по някакъв начин, за въпроси и т.н.;
– усилване на звука – дори в малка зала е добре да се усили звука от лектора и да се пусне на едни колони, най-малкото има feedback дали си е пуснал микрофона;
– видео запис – да се запише видеото от презентацията и може би самия лектор как говори. Това има варианта с камера, която снима лектора и екрана, или screen capture, директно от лаптопа му (или някой по-сложен setup, за който вероятно няма смисъл да пиша);
– streaming – да се извадят аудио/видео сигнала в/у някакъв протокол и да се stream-нат до някоя услуга;
– restreaming – услугата да го разпрати навсякъде и може би да го запише.

Вариантите за компоненти/setup-и в главата ми са следните:

– ffmpeg команда, която stream-ва екрана + звук от звуковата карта, в която има един свестен микрофон – това го имаме в няколко варианта, тествани и работещи (за windows и linux), трябва да ги качим някъде. Това е най-бързия начин, почти не иска допълнителен хардуер (освен един микрофон, щото тия на лаптопите за нищо не стават). Микрофонът може да е например някоя bluetooth/usb слушалка, или просто от слушалки с микрофон, да е близо до главата на лектора. Може да е от стандартните брошки, които се използват по различни събития, аз имам една китайска цифрова, дето в общи линии ме радва и е около 200-и-нещо лева от aliexpress;

– проста малка камера, която може да записва видео от екрана и звук, която може да бълва и по IP някакси. Това в общи линии са gopro-та (ако се намери как да им се пъхне звук) и още някакви подобни камери, които нямат особено добро качество (особено на звука, та задължително трябва външен микрофон), но на хората и се намират.

– проста камера, която обаче не може да бълва по IP, и има HDMI изход. Това е от нещата, които на хората им се намират по някакви причини, и в тая категория са половината DSLR-и и фотоапарати (които не прегряват след дълга (2-часова) употреба), gopro-та и нормален клас камери. Това се комбинира с устройство, което може да capture-ва HDMI и да го stream-ва, където засега опцията е един китайски device.

– streaming service – човек може да ползва youtube, моя streaming, или ако се мрази, facebook. Много места би трябвало да могат да си пуснат нещо просто при тях (например един nginx с модула за rtmp), да stream-ват до него, то да записва, и от него да restream-ват на други места и да дават някакъв лесен начин на хората ги гледат (с едно video.js/hls.js, както последно направихме за openfest).

Та, за момента основните неща, които издирвам са:

– евтини и работещи микрофони;
– евтини работещи камери с hdmi изход (или с ethernet порт, тва с wifi-то е боза), които да са switchable м/у 50hz и 60hz;
– hdmi capture вариант.

Приемам идеи, и ще гледам да сглобя едно такова за initLab.

Numerous vulnerabilities in AMD processors

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/749191/rss

A company called CTS has disclosed a long
series of vulnerabilities
in AMD processors. “The chipset is a
central component on Ryzen and Ryzen Pro workstations: it links the
processor with hardware devices such as WiFi and network cards, making it
an ideal target for malicious actors. The Ryzen chipset is currently being
shipped with exploitable backdoors that could let attackers inject
malicious code into the chip, providing them with a safe haven to operate
” See the associated
white paper
for more details.

Update: there are a lot of questions circulating about the actual
severity of these vulnerabilities and the motivations of the people
reporting them. It may not be time to panic quite yet.

2018-03-13 китайски лаптоп

Post Syndicated from Vasil Kolev original https://vasil.ludost.net/blog/?p=3380

(те всичките лаптопи се правят в Китай вече, ама не ми хрумва как да го кръстя иначе)

Преди някакво време разбрах за един проект на ентусиасти от Китай за нови дъна за стари лаптопи. От много време ми липсваше 4:3 дисплея, T420 от време на време ми беше бавен (дори с 16GB памет и SSD), по-новите thinkpad-и са с гадна клавиатура, а Retro проекта в крайна сметка не беше customizable и не беше приемлив (с тая NVidia карта и широк дисплей, да не говорим за цената).

Поръчах си един t60p от ebay, и след като дойде тръгнах да си поръчвам дъното. От форума на хората и някаква facebook страница намерих контакти, писах си с един човек, който ми предложи директно лаптоп, но аз си поръчах само дъното (in hindsight, да си бях взел цял лаптоп). Няколко неща по темата с поръчването:
– опциите бяха SWIFT и western union. Не ми се разхождаше, та го направих по SWIFT, и там се оказа, че има допълнителни такси, които взимат от получателя (които не могат да вземат от мен);
– За освобождаване от митница ми поискаха следните неща: фактура (която поисках да ми издадат, щото нямаше) която включва и цената и транспортните разходи, EORI номер, пълномощно да ме представляват и документ за направеното плащане (изискване на митниците за стоки от Китай и Хонг Конг, пише “SWIFT или PayPal”);
– EORI номер може да си издадете безплатно, ако имате електронен подпис и търпение (бях си издал за нещо друго, отне около седмица);
– DHL могат да пратят как изглежда митническата декларация, да си я платите с един online превод и да си получите нещата (иначе искат 24 лв да направят превода те);

Дъното беше $780 и доставка, вариантът за това дъно с цял лаптоп (без памет) беше $980 за 1400×1050 матрица и $1100 с 1600×1200 матрица (нови, IPS, по думи на продавача).

Хората си имат и форум, в който има и инструкции за сглобяване (google translate е ваш добър приятел за тия страници). При мен сглобяването се забави, понеже се оказа, че има вариант на T60p, който е с 16:10 матрица, за който дъното не става, и аз съм взел точно такъв, та си поръчвах нов и чаках да пристигне.

Последва сглабянето с помощта на добрите хора от adsys (на които им отрових живота, щото се оказа доста пипкава работа):
– има малко рязане по кутията (има го описано във форума, със снимки);
– болтовете за закачане са по-малко, дупките на някои са запушени;
– на дъното до конектора за монитор има превключвател за типа на дисплея (1024×768 или по-голям);
– трябва ви DDR4 памет;
– най-вероятно wifi картата от преди няма да ви върши работа, аз си взех моята от T420-ката, и малко трябваше да се лепне с тиксо, понеже е половината слот и нямам преходник;
– CD-то от T60 няма да влезе, понеже е PATA, а конектора на дъното е SATA (не, че ползвам CD). Трябва да си измисля нещо за запушване на дупката;

Неща за дооправяне:
– поне за момента под linux GPU-то не работи (забива на boot), и за това си ползвам xfwm4 вместо compiz, submit-нал съм bug report;
– горните бутони на touchpad-а спират да работят след suspend/resume, направил съм един fix, ама трябва да събера желание да рестартирам.

Моята работна среда на 4:3 се усеща доста по-приятно и най-накрая мога да си пусна email клиента в режим като преди (отляво списък папки, отдясно разделено на две – отгоре списък писма, отдолу отвореното писмо, вместо три вертикални колони, дето едвам пасваха). Също така с тоя процесор вече firefox-а се движи почти прилично, като си оправя и GPU-то, вероятно всичко ще лети.