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From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://blog.rapid7.com/2025/06/03/from-ideology-to-financial-gain-exploring-the-convergence-from-hacktivism-to-cybercrime/

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime

Co-authored by Yaniv Allender and Alexandra Blia

Introduction

In the ever-evolving landscape of cyber threat actors, the lines between ideologically driven hacktivism and financially motivated cybercriminals have become increasingly blurred. Originally fueled by political, social, or ethical causes, hacktivist groups have historically engaged in digital protest through website defacements, data leaks, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.

However, in recent years, a noticeable trend has emerged. Some hacktivist groups are evolving into ransomware operations and even becoming ransomware affiliates. This transformation is driven by a mix of ideological fatigue, opportunity for financial gain, access to sophisticated tools, and the growing profitability of extortion-based attacks. The result is a new hybrid threat actor—one that merges the disruptive zeal of hacktivism with the ruthless efficiency of cybercrime.

Understanding this shift is crucial for defenders, as it represents a convergence of motives that complicates attribution, response, and mitigation strategies. To this end, we have examined three prominent examples of relevant threat actors, namely FunkSec, KillSec, and GhostSec, identifying the drivers behind their transition to financially motivated campaigns and exploring the shift in their modus operandi.

Threat actor analysis

FunkSec

The FunkSec ransomware group emerged within the cybercrime ecosystem as a rising star in December 2024. The ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group has claimed at least 172 victims to date. The group proudly promotes itself as an AI-driven ransomware group, with their encryptor, FunkLocker, and some of the malware’s source code allegedly generated using generative AI tools.

The group targets organizations from various sectors and regions, such as government, education, automotive, energy, IT, and manufacturing, located in countries like the United States, Israel, France, Italy, Germany, India, and Australia.

FunkSec started as a politically motivated hacking (hacktivist) group, specifically interested in targeting the United States (Figure 1). The group was known to be aligned with the “Free Palestine” movement (Figure 2), and associated itself with other hacktivist groups, such as Ghost Algeria and Cyb3r Fl00d. Among its affiliates are Scorpion (AKA DesertStorm, a suspected Algeria-based hacker), El_farado, XTN, Blako, and Bjorka (an alleged Indonesian hacktivist). In its early days, the group offered tools commonly associated with hacktivist activities, including services for DDoS and defacement attacks.

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 1 – FunkSec’s activities as a hacktivist

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 2 – FunkSec’s statement against the USA and Israel

At some point, the group transitioned its focus from politically motivated attacks to a RaaS model, offering customizable tools to its affiliates. Its victimology also changed from government entities to organizations across various sectors, such as education, technology, telecommunications, and agriculture (Figure 3).

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 3 – FunkSec’s latest active DLS

FunkSec’s reliance on relatively simple malware development using AI-based tools also explains the fast transition of the group from targeted hacktivism campaigns to broader, financially-motivated activities, with a large number of victims in a short period of time (Figure 4).

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 4 – FunkSec’s victims on their DLS

The group’s transition has also been referenced on a Russian-speaking dark web forum, where the author mentioned a cybersecurity vendor’s article on FunkSec (Figure 5).

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 5 – FunkSec’s transition being referenced on a Russian-speaking dark web forum

KillSec

The KillSec hacktivist group (AKA Kill Security) has been active since at least 2021. The Russia-aligned group targets organizations from various sectors, such as government, finance, transportation, electronics, manufacturing, travel and recreation, retail, and consumer services, located in countries like India, Bangladesh, Romania, Poland, and Brazil. The group considers itself a “prominent hacktivist group operating in the cyber realm, with a focus on both disruption and digital activism.”

KillSec initially emerged as a hacktivist group aligned with the Anonymous collective, with its operations primarily including DDoS attacks and website defacements, before pivoting to ransomware operations in October 2023. KillSec’s ransomware variants, namely KillSecurity 2.0 and KillSecurity 3.0, are designed to encrypt files and demand ransom payments for decryption.

In June 2024, KillSec introduced a RaaS operation, advertising a locker for Windows environments written in C++ and a dashboard, enabling affiliates to observe detailed statistics, conduct chat communications, and customize ransomware configurations using a builder tool. In November 2024, the group launched an additional locker for ESXi environments, expanding the breadth of its operations (Figure 6).

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 6 – KillSec launches locker for ESXi environments

The group’s shift is aligned with the overall proliferation of RaaS programs, enabling less technically skilled individuals to conduct ransomware attacks with relative ease in exchange for a fee. The group has been advertising its RaaS offering in an attempt to attract cybercriminals and further broaden its affiliate network (Figure 7).

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 7 – KillSec looking for affiliates

Although in certain incidents, KillSec leveraged solely stolen data to extort the victims, the group appears to adopt mainly double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data in addition to encrypting it and demanding a ransom payment to prevent it from being leaked. The group operates an active dedicated leak site (DLS) to which it uploads the data of victims who refuse to pay the ransom. The group also uses its DLS to advertise its services, which include penetration testing, data gathering, and its RaaS program (Figure 8).

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 8 – KillSec’s services

It should be noted that KillSec’s DLS also features a “For Sale” section, offering data allegedly exfiltrated from the targeted companies for sale, with the prices ranging between $5,000 and $350,000 (Figure 9). The group likely introduced this section in an attempt to further monetize the exfiltrated data. This offering of stolen data and additional services further suggests the financially motivated nature of the group’s activity.

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 9 – “For Sale” section on KillSec’s DLS

GhostSec

The GhostSec hacktivist group (AKA Ghost Security, GhostSecMafia, and GSM) has been active since at least 2015. The Anonymous-affiliated group gained prominence with the #OpIsis and #OpParis​​ campaigns, in which various hacktivist groups took down thousands of ISIS websites and social media accounts using defacement and DDoS attacks. Since then, GhostSec has participated in campaigns, such as #OpLebanon, #OpNigeria, #OpMyanmar, #OpEcuador, and #OpColombia. The group has also continuously launched cyberattacks on Israel in response to alleged war crimes, primarily defacing their websites to spread “Free Palestine” messages.

GhostSec’s shift towards financially motivated operations overlaps with the group’s collaboration with cybercriminals. In July 2023, GhostSec announced that they formed a partnership with the Stormous ransomware group to target organizations in Cuba (Figure 10). Following this announcement, Stormous and GhostSec jointly claimed extortion attacks against three Cuban government ministries, and GhostSec also expressed the potential for future joint operations against other countries. In August 2023, GhostSec, together with ThreatSec, Stormous, Blackforums, and SiegedSec, collectively formed a unified collective, naming themselves “The Five Families” (Figure 11). This collective attempted to extort the presidential website of Cuba and the Brazilian organization Alfa Comercial.

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 10 – Announcement of the alliance between GhostSec and Stormous on their Telegram channel

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 11 – Announcement of the “Five Families” formation on their Telegram channel

GhostSec solidified its presence in the cybercriminal ecosystem with the launch of its RaaS program “GhostLocker” in October 2023, which was shortly followed by the release of its infostealer tool, GhostStealer (Figure 12). In January 2024, the updated “REWRITE” (aka GhostLocker 2.0) version of GhostLocker was released, with a fully featured management panel allowing affiliates to track campaigns and payouts. The threat actor promoted its malware-as-a-service (MaaS) tools heavily on its Telegram channels, demonstrating its intention to attract affiliates and, in turn, maximize its profits.

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 12 – GhostLocker’s release announcement

On May 15, 2024, GhostSec announced its retirement from cybercriminal activities and its return to hacktivism. The group stated that it reached this decision after having obtained enough funding to support its hacktivist operations. GhostSec further mentioned that Stormous would remain in charge of the management and operation of GhostLocker (Figure 13).

From Ideology to Financial Gain: Exploring the Convergence from Hacktivism to Cybercrime
Figure 13 – GhostSec’s retirement from cybercriminal activities

It should be noted that Stormous seemingly had already incorporated GhostLocker into its operations, even before GhostSec’s retirement. As of May 2025, the group is still active and operates the Stormous RaaS program, which appears to be a continuation of GhostLocker. This development signifies the mutual assistance and influence among united threat groups, as collectives like the Five Families allow them to maximize the impact and breadth of their operations by sharing resources, audience, and knowledge.

Two sides of the same coin?

This analysis shows that the threat actors in scope, FunkSec, KillSec, and GhostSec, have followed a similar trajectory, pivoting from politically motivated, disruptive campaigns to financial extortion. This transition is likely facilitated by the public availability of leaked ransomware builders, such as LockBit 3.0, which threat actors can leverage to develop their payloads.

The groups specifically appear to have adopted double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data from their victims and then encrypting it, in an attempt to pressure them to comply with their ransom demands. However, despite their seeming ability to conduct ransomware operations, these groups appear to lack the level of sophistication and specialization that characterize top-tier cybercriminal groups, such as Cl0p and LockBit, which are mentioned in the Rapid7 Q1 2025 ransomware report.

Interestingly enough, all three groups embraced RaaS as their business model while pivoting towards cybercrime. This evolution is aligned with the overall current status of the ransomware ecosystem, as RaaS programs have become increasingly more common. Such programs, demonstrating the financial nature of their activities, enable threat actors to maximize their profits by allowing affiliates to use their ransomware kit for a fee and a percentage of the collected ransom.

This transition of FunkSec, KillSec, and GhostSec has also affected and amplified the victimology of their operations. While these groups once operated as hacktivists that primarily targeted government entities, their scope of activities broadened significantly as they shifted to ransomware attacks. Along this process, their attacks shifted from targeted to opportunistic, against organizations of different sizes, operating in diverse sectors and geographies, that could be relatively easily compromised.

While all of these groups follow the pattern, shifting from hacktivism to cybercrime, and specifically financially motivated RaaS operations, the reason behind this transition remains unclear. As an exception, GhostSec appears to have embraced cybercrime in an attempt to gather funding for its hacktivist operations, according to its exit message. It should be noted that other threat actors, such as CyberVolk, have also launched RaaS programs to fund their operations, but these efforts remain scarce.

Finally, other hacktivist groups, such as Ikaruz Red Team and their affiliates, also operate ransomware, but they do so to cause disruption and make political statements. Thus, the scope of their operations differs from financial gain and is not comparable to that of the groups included in this analysis.

Conclusion

The evolution of FunkSec, KillSec, and GhostSec from hacktivist collectives to RaaS operations highlights a recent trend of a shift in motivations, driving cybercriminal behavior. Initially, these groups were propelled by political and ideological aims, targeting governments and organizations in alignment with their perceived causes. However, over time, their focus has clearly shifted towards financial gain, as evidenced by their adoption of RaaS models that prioritize profit over ideology. As cybercriminals adapt to “market demands,” it becomes clear that financial motivation has come to dominate their activities, leaving behind the ideological roots of their earlier campaigns.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

FunkSec

  • Darkweb DLS:
  • funksec53xh7j5t6ysgwnaidj5vkh3aqajanplix533kwxdz3qrwugid[.]onion
  • funksec7vgdojepkipvhfpul3bvsxzyxn66ogp7q4pptvujxtpyjttad[.]onion
  • funksecsekgasgjqlzzkmcnutrrrafavpszijoilbd6z3dkbzvqu43id[.]onion
  • Clearweb DLS: http://funksec[.]top
  • Funkforum: http://funk4ph7igelwpgadmus4n4moyhh22cib723hllneen7g2qkklml4sqd[.]onion
  • Session ID: 0538d726ae3cc264c1bd8e66c6c6fa366a3dfc589567944170001e6fdbea9efb3d

GhostSec

8b758ccdfbfa5ff3a0b67b2063c2397531cf0f7b3d278298da76528f443779e9

c9f71fc4f385a4469438ef053e208065431b123e676c17b65d84b6c69ef6748a

a1b468e9550f9960c5e60f7c52ca3c058de19d42eafa760b9d5282eb24b7c55f

3ecf05857d65f7bc58b547d023bde7cc521a82712b947c04ddf9d7d1645c0ce0

Stormous

KillSec

  • DLS: http://ks5424y3wpr5zlug5c7i6svvxweinhbdcqcfnptkfcutrncfazzgz5id[.]onion
  • Telegram channel: https://t.me/killsecc
  • TOX ID: 9453686EAB63923D1C35C92DDE5E61A6534DD067B5448C1C8D996A460B92CA5055C1AB0FCD22
  • Session ID:05cb94c52170c8119f7ebc2d8afc94b9746bc7c361d91c49e7d18e96e266582a07
  • SHA256: 8cee3ec87a5728be17f838f526d7ef3a842ce8956fe101ed247a5eb1494c579d
  • IP addresses: 82[.]147[.]84[.]98, 77[.]91[.]77[.]187, 93[.]123[.]39[.]65

Rapid7 customers

InsightIDR and Managed Detection and Response (MDR) customers have existing detection coverage through Rapid7’s expansive library of detection rules. Below is a non-exhaustive list of detections that are deployed and will alert on behavior related to the FunkSec, KillSec, and GhostSec ransomware activity. We will also continue to iterate detections as new variants emerge, giving customers continuous detection without manual tuning:

Suspicious Process – Malicious Hash On Asset

While this specific detection directly covers malicious binaries linked to ransomware operations, customers also benefit from a comprehensive suite of detections that alert on post-exploitation behavior often observed prior to ransomware deployment. These include detections for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and suspicious persistence mechanisms, providing layered defense even when the specific ransomware payload is novel or obfuscated.

From Noise to Action: Introducing Intelligence Hub

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://blog.rapid7.com/2025/04/23/from-noise-to-action-introducing-intelligence-hub/

From Noise to Action: Introducing Intelligence Hub

Co-authored by Raj Samani (Chief Scientist) & Craig Adams (Chief Product Officer)

In traditional conflicts, intelligence is both integral and beneficial to decision-making at every level. Unfortunately, in cybersecurity, the impact of threat intelligence as an asset for organizations—and in particular their security operations team—has been less significant.  

Why has this been the case? While threat intelligence should be intrinsic to the detection and response process, the reality is that security teams are overwhelmed with far too much noise to efficiently gather what they need from it. Not responding in a timely fashion ultimately means that by the time any response can be mustered, it will be too late. This is particularly the case given threat actors’ dwell times have in some instances decreased to a matter of hours.

The threat landscape is not static—defenders need a continuous view of what is occurring, right now.

We are delighted to announce the availability of Intelligence Hub, an evolution in threat intelligence delivery that is designed to provide meaningful context and actionable insights integrated with the Rapid7 Command Platform.

High-fidelity data: curated intelligence

Intelligence is not a commodity. Simply gathering every feed is why many organizations are overwhelmed and unable to respond in a timely manner to disrupt the kill chain before attackers move to the final stage. Consider many of the recent significant breaches; invariably, alerts are missed and data is exfiltrated. With this in mind, the focus of Rapid7 Labs has been to increase the fidelity of data, leveraging our own approach to curated intelligence.

Data that can be trusted

The objective of curated intelligence is to extract the low-prevalence indicators and verify the malicious nature of the artifact, thus enabling a timely response while reducing the risk of false positives. Introducing high-fidelity data also provides the opportunity to automate the response. Such an approach goes beyond the analyst and considers what an appropriate response should be.

The curated intelligence within Intelligence Hub is derived from ingestion sources that are unique to Rapid7, such as our honeypot data and proprietary research, as well as insights from our open source and research communities. These include Metasploit, AttackerKB, and other global communities that make our reach into understanding the threatscape both broader and deeper. Expertly crafted machine learning (ML) models combined with manual verification from our Rapid7 Labs team create additional layers of validation.

From Noise to Action: Introducing Intelligence Hub
What matters to me? Understand prevalence quickly with the campaigns that are targeting your business sector or geography as efficiently as possible.

Decay modeling maintains relevance

Even curated intelligence can quickly get very stale. If we consider an IP address used within a given campaign, this artifact will soon cease to be relevant since threat actors will migrate once it has been identified as known bad. For this reason, Intelligence Hub shows the decay score, which will reduce over time as the artifact migrates from known bad to unknown (or another state).

From Noise to Action: Introducing Intelligence Hub
A view of campaign activities being conducted by the Mustang Panda APT group (correct at the time of writing). Intelligence Hub covers all major threat activities from organized crime and APT groups.

Contextualized information

Intelligence Hub’s higher fidelity data remains continuously updated, allowing us to move away from the problem of traditional Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs) that have provided the firehose of false positives and noisy alerts. The opportunity is to now use prevalence to allocate resources to only the areas which are necessary. In other words, if a threat campaign is targeting a specific sector and/or geography and exploiting specific vulnerabilities, then surely these will require remediation first. In addition, if the campaign is being carried out by a ransomware group whose dwell time continues to drop, then almost certainly prioritizing remediation should include automation.

Automation does, of course, demand high-fidelity data, which is why curated intelligence remains the foundation of the solution.

Actionable insights

What all of this means is the security teams can get true, actionable insights — understanding what indicators within their environment are confirmed as malicious, as well as the threat actors’ motivations. Utilizing these insights to take the appropriate action to mitigate the threat in a timely fashion now becomes a reality with Intelligence Hub.

From Noise to Action: Introducing Intelligence Hub
Learn more about the active threat groups conducting operations in the world today.

Intelligence is great, but what does this mean for your organization?

Above all else, the integration of Intelligence Hub with the Rapid7 Command Platform provides the ability to go beyond the analyst and deliver true security outcomes. Firstly, with our next-gen SIEM, Rapid7 InsightIDR, the security analyst can prioritize triaging security alerts that demand attention. For example, if there are reliable indicators regarding the possibility of a ransomware group inside the environment, this clearly demands prioritization with the intention of disrupting the kill chain before the final stage payload is delivered. Such an approach reinforces why context matters, and perhaps controversially, why attribution becomes operationally relevant.

From Noise to Action: Introducing Intelligence Hub
Migrate away from the dependency of manual tools to integrate intelligence into operations and surface the alerts that truly matter.

Threat-informed remediation: beyond the security analyst

The role of intelligence Hub therefore goes beyond the security analyst, and supports integration with the remediation actions of any organization. An upcoming integration with Remediation Hub will give security analysts the added insight to justify security updates being rolled out outside of the normal change control cycle. An example of this could be CVE-2024-55591, an authentication bypass in Fortinet firewalls, which was exploited as a zero-day in January 2025 and reported to be used by ransomware groups on March 18, 2025. This attack warrants immediate remediation in order to mitigate the potential of being exploited. This answers the question many security practitioners are often asked: Are we vulnerable? And, with the investigation option within Intelligence Hub, the opportunity exists to answer the question: Have we been compromised?

With actionable (and relevant) intelligence being incorporated into the allocation of resources for remediation, Intelligence Hub provides the critical data necessary for effective security operations.

From Noise to Action: Introducing Intelligence Hub
Intelligence Hub is the integrated threat intelligence solution that delivers proactive context and prioritization, rapidly accelerating time to remediation.

The evolution of threat intelligence

In summary, Intelligence Hub represents a significant leap forward in threat intelligence delivery. By providing curated, high-fidelity data with relevant context and actionable insights, it empowers security teams to move beyond the noise of traditional threat intelligence solutions. The integration with the Rapid7 Command Platform and Remediation Hub further offers threat-informed remediation, allowing organizations to prioritize and automate responses effectively. Ultimately, Intelligence Hub is designed to help organizations achieve true security outcomes by focusing on what truly matters and disrupting the kill chain quicker, and with greater confidence. Learn more about Intelligence Hub here.

A Bag of RATs: VenomRAT vs. AsyncRAT

Post Syndicated from Anna Širokova original https://blog.rapid7.com/2024/11/21/a-bag-of-rats-venomrat-vs-asyncrat/

Introduction

A Bag of RATs: VenomRAT vs. AsyncRAT

Remote access tools (RATs) have long been a favorite tool for cyber attackers, since they enable remote control over compromised systems and facilitate data theft, espionage, and continuous monitoring of victims. Among the well-known RATs are VenomRAT and AsyncRAT. These are open-source RATs and have been making headlines for their frequent use by different threat actors, including Blind Eagle/APT-C-36, Coral Rider, NullBulge, and OPERA1ER. Both RATs have their roots in QuasarRAT, another open-source project, which explains their similarities. However, as both have evolved over time, they have diverged in terms of functionalities and behavior, which affects how attackers use them and how they are detected.

Interestingly, as these RATs evolved, some security vendors have started to blur the line between them, often grouping detections under a single label, such as AsyncRAT or AsyncRAT/VenomRAT. This indicates how closely related the two are, but also suggests that their similarities may cause challenges for detection systems. We took a closer look at recent samples of each RAT to examine how they differ, if at all.

This comparison explores the core technical differences between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT by analyzing their architecture, capabilities, and tactics.

Here’s a comparison table between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT based on the findings

Capability VenomRAT AsyncRAT
AMSI Bypass ✔ Patches AmsiScanBuffer in amsi.dll (In-memory patching) T1562.001 ✘ Not implemented
ETW Bypass ✔ Patches EtwEventWrite in ntdll.dll (In-memory patching) T1562.006 ✘ Not implemented
Keylogging ✔ Advanced keylogger with filtering and process tracking T1056.001 ✔ Basic keylogger with clipboard logging T1056.001
Anti-analysis Techniques ✔ Uses WMI for OS detection, VM check T1497.001 ✔ VM, sandbox, and debugger detection T1497
Hardware Interaction ✔ Collects CPU, RAM, GPU, and software data using WMI T1082 ✔ Collects system data via Win32_ComputerSystem T1082
Process discovery ✔ This the capability to obtain a listing of running processes T1057 ✘ Not implemented
Anti-process Monitoring ✔ Terminates system monitoring and security processes T1562.009 ✘ Not implemented
Webcam Access ✔ Camera detection and access T1125 ✘ Not implemented
Dynamic API Resolution ✔ DInvokeCore class for dynamic API resolution T1027.007 ✘ Not implemented
Encrypts the configuration ✔ 16-byte salt ("VenomRATByVenom") T1027.013 ✔ 32-byte binary salt T1027.013
Error Handling ✔ Silent failures with basic try-catch ✔ Sends detailed error reports to C2 T1071

Technical analysis

In this technical analysis, we compare two specific RAT samples:

  • VenomRAT: 1574d418de3976fc9a2ba0be7bf734b919927d49bd5e74b57553dfc6eee67371AsyncRAT: caf9e2eac1bac6c5e09376c0f01fed66eea96acc000e564c907e8a1fbd594426

Both AsyncRAT and VenomRAT are open-source remote access tools developed in C# and built on the .NET Framework (v4.0.30319). A preliminary analysis based on CAPA results revealed several shared characteristics between the two. For example, both RATs use standard libraries like System.IO, System.Security.Cryptography, and System.Net for file handling, encryption, and networking. They also have common cryptographic components such as HMACSHA256, AES, and SHA256Managed, indicating similar encryption routines. Indeed, upon closer code examination, we found that their encryption classes were identical, with only one minor difference: AsyncRAT uses a 32-byte binary salt, while VenomRAT uses a 16-byte salt derived from the string “VenomRATByVenom.” Additionally, both RATs share similarities in configuration handling, mutex creation, and parts of their anti-analysis class.

However, the CAPA analysis also highlighted distinct differences between the two. Certain features present in one RAT were notably absent in the other. To verify, we manually reviewed code in both samples and described the differences below.

Keylogging and System Hooking

In the samples we analyzed the keylogger was present only in VenomRAT. However, the open-source version of AsyncRAT has a keylogger plugin. We therefore decided to investigate whether the VenomRAT keylogger implementation is the same as AsyncRAT’s implementation. Our findings suggest that the keylogging functionality is different. We summarized a comparative analysis of their keylogging implementations in the table below. Additionally, the VenomRAT keylogger configuration file DataLogs.conf and log files are saved in the user’s %AppData%\MyData folder.

Feature VenomRAT AsyncRAT
Low-level keyboard hook (WH_KEYBOARD_LL) ✔ ✔
Keystroke Processing ✔ ✔
Window/Process Tracking Tracks both process and window title Tracks window title only
Clipboard Logging ✘ ✔
Log Transmission Periodic log sending to C2 Continuous log sending to C2
Filtering Mechanism ✔ ✘
Error Handling Silent failures with basic try-catch Sends detailed error reports to C2
Additional Features Focused on keystrokes Handles both keystrokes and clipboard
Thread Management ✘ ✔

Anti-Analysis

Both AsyncRAT and Venom RAT have similar implementations of the anti-analysis classes. However, we can see notable differences. AsyncRAT focuses on a broad spectrum of detection techniques, including:

  • Virtual Machine Detection: It checks for known system manufacturer names such as VMware,VirtualBox, or Hyper-V.
  • Sandbox Detection: It looks for sandbox-related DLLs, such as SbieDll.dll from Sandboxie.
  • Debugger Detection: AsyncRAT uses CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent to detect if it’s being monitored by a debugger.
  • Disk Size Check: It avoids execution on machines with less than 60GB disk size.

On the other hand, VenomRAT uses a more targeted approach. The virtual machine detection method in VenomRAT relies on querying system memory through WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) to query system memory via Win32_CacheMemory. The method relies on counting cache memory entries, and if the number is less than 2 cache memories, it assumes the system is a virtual machine (VM). However, modern VMs are more sophisticated, and simply relying on counting cache memories may not be effective.

The other difference is, instead of targeting debuggers or sandboxes, VenomRAT attempts to avoid running on server operating systems by querying the Win32_OperatingSystem WMI class and checking the ProductType, which differentiates between desktop and server environments. We summarized class differences in the table below.

Feature AsyncRAT AntiAnalysis Class Venom RAT Anti_Analysis Class
VM Detection ✔ ✔
Sandbox Detection ✔ ✘
Debugger Detection ✔ ✘
Operating System Detection ✔ ✔
Process Discovery ✘ ✔

A Bag of RATs: VenomRAT vs. AsyncRAT
Figure 1: Side by side comparison of Anti-Analysis class of AsycRAT(let) and VenomRAT(right)

Hardware Interaction

VenomRAT has hardware interaction capabilities, allowing it to gather detailed system information through WMI queries with ManagementObjectSearcher objects. These features are encapsulated in the CGRInfo class, which enables the collection of CPU, RAM, GPU, and software data:

  • GetCPUName(): Retrieves the CPU name and the number of cores
  • GetRAM(): Fetches the total installed physical memory (RAM)
  • GetGPU(): Obtains the GPU name and driver version
  • GetInstalledApplications(): Scans the Windows Registry to compile a list of installed applications
  • GetUserProcessList(): Collects information on all running processes with visible windows

The collected data is sent back to the command-and-control (C2) server. This class is absent in both the version of AsyncRAT we analyzed and the open-source version.

DcRAT joined the party with AntiProcess and Camera classes

VenomRAT includes two notable classes absent in AsyncRAT: the AntiProcess and Camera classes.

The AntiProcess class is an anti-monitoring and anti-detection component of VenomRAT. Malware uses the Windows API function CreateToolhelp32Snapshot to get a snapshot of all running processes and search for specific processes. We categorized the processes the malware is looking for below.

System Monitoring Tools that can prevent users from identifying or stopping VenomRAT.

  • Taskmgr.exe
  • ProcessHacker.exe
  • procexp.exe

Security & Antivirus Processes: Terminating them reduces the risk of VenomRAT being detected or removed by security software.

  • MSASCui.exe
  • MsMpEng.exe
  • MpUXSrv.exe
  • MpCmdRun.exe
  • NisSrv.exe

System Configuration Utilities: By targeting these, VenomRAT prevents users from adjusting security settings, inspecting registry changes, or manually removing the malware.

  • ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe
  • MSConfig.exe
  • Regedit.exe
  • UserAccountControlSettings.exe
  • Taskkill.exe

If a matching process is found, it terminates it by its process ID (PID).

The Camera class is designed to detect webcams on a Windows system by querying the available system devices using COM interfaces. It retrieves a list of devices by category, specifically looking for video input devices. The class uses the ICreateDevEnum and IPropertyBag interfaces to enumerate and extract the device names.

However, both these classes, although absent in AasyncRAT, are not exclusive to VenomRAT only. Apparently they are exact copycats of yet another open-source RAT, DcRAT.

AMSI and ETW Bypass

This class was found only in the VenomRAT sample and is designed to bypass key Windows security mechanisms through in-memory patching. It specifically disables two critical Windows security features: AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) and ETW (Event Tracing for Windows), which are often used by antivirus software and monitoring tools to detect malware.

Key Functions:

  • AMSI Bypass: The class patches the AmsiScanBuffer function within amsi.dll to prevent AMSI from scanning for malicious content.
  • ETW Bypass: The class patches the EtwEventWrite function in ntdll.dll, which stops ETW from logging events related to the malware’s activity.

The patching process is performed in-memory. The class dynamically checks the system’s architecture (32-bit or 64-bit) and loads the appropriate DLLs (amsi.dll and ntdll.dll) to apply the patches based on the platform. The techniques used by VenomRAT closely mirror those found in the SharpSploit project, an open-source tool often used by penetration testers and red teams to test and bypass security features in a controlled environment. SharpSploit contains classes for bypassing both AMSI and ETW using similar in-memory patching methods, which likely served as inspiration for VenomRAT’s implementation.

This security bypass functionality makes VenomRAT more capable of evading modern security defenses.

Dynamic API resolution

VenomRAT has yet another class which is absent in AsyncRAT. The DInvokeCore class is implemented to dynamically resolve and call Windows API functions at runtime; this method bypasses traditional static imports, making it harder for antivirus and endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems to detect malicious activity.

Instead of statically importing Windows APIs, the class resolves function addresses at runtime (e.g., from ntdll.dll or kernel32.dll) using methods like GetLibraryAddress and GetExportAddress. This approach makes it difficult for static analysis tools to flag malicious behavior.

It uses the NtProtectVirtualMemory method to alter memory protection settings, allowing execution of code in memory regions that are normally non-executable—an effective method for in-memory execution of malicious payloads.

Implementation of DInvokeCore closely mirrors the open-source SharpSploit Generic class from the D/Invoke project by TheWover. The DInvokeCore class from VenomRAT appears to be a simplified version, which lacks some features but has core techniques for dynamic API invocation.

Conclusion

Our analysis was sparked by detection vendors grouping VenomRAT and AsyncRAT under the same label, blurring the lines between the two. While they indeed belong to the QuasarRAT family, they are still different RATs.

AsyncRAT appears to closely match the latest open-source release (v0.5.8). However, the VenomRAT seems to have evolved and added other capabilities, although a lot of them seem to be a copy-paste from another open-source RAT (DcRAT) and the SharpSploit project. Despite this, VenomRAT presents more advanced evasion techniques, making it a more sophisticated threat.

Therefore, it’s important for security vendors to treat them as distinct threats, recognizing that VenomRAT brings more advanced evasion capabilities, even if much of it isn’t truly unique. To help to resolve this confusion, we are sharing an updated VenomRAT YARA rule with the community, helping improve detection and response efforts.

Rapid7 customers

InsightIDR and Managed Detection and Response (MDR) customers have existing detection coverage through Rapid7’s expansive library of detection rules. Rapid7 recommends installing the Insight Agent on all applicable hosts to ensure visibility into suspicious processes and proper detection coverage. The following rule will alert on a wide range of malicious hashes tied to behavior in this blog:  Suspicious Process – Malicious Hash On Asset

YARA rule

The VenomRAT YARA rule can be found on the Rapid7 Labs GitHub here.

LodaRAT: Established malware, new victim patterns

Post Syndicated from Natalie Zargarov original https://blog.rapid7.com/2024/11/12/lodarat-established-malware-new-victim-patterns/

Executive Summary

LodaRAT: Established malware, new victim patterns

Rapid7 has observed an ongoing malware campaign involving a new version of LodaRAT. This version possesses the ability to steal cookies and passwords from Microsoft Edge and Brave. LodaRAT, first observed in 2016, is a remote access tool (RAT) written in AutoIt. Development of LodaRAT has continued over the past 8 years, with an Android version distributed in the wild since 2021. This article analyzes the Windows version only.

Originally created for information gathering, LodaRAT has a variety of capabilities for collecting and exfiltrating victim data, delivering additional malware, capturing the victim’s screen, controlling the victim camera or mouse, and even spreading in infected environments. Notably, this appears to be the only update made to that RAT since 2022. Even the embedded DLLs remain the same.

Distribution

Old versions of LodaRAT were using Phishing (T1566) and Known Vulnerability Exploitation (T1203) techniques in their delivery process, but Rapid7 spotted new versions being distributed by DonutLoader (S0695) and CobaltStrike (S0154). We also observed LodaRAT on systems infected with other malware families like AsyncRAT (S1087), Remcos (S0332), Xworm, and more. Though we aren’t able to say for sure whether LodaRAT was distributed with those malware families or simply present by coincidence. New LodaRAT samples masquerade (T1036) as well-known Windows software such as Discord, Skype, and Windows Update, amongst others.

Victimology

While in previous campaigns the threat actor behind this RAT showed interest in specific country-based organizations, the new campaign seems to infect victims all over the world. Approximately 30% of VirusTotal samples were uploaded from the USA.

LodaRAT: Established malware, new victim patterns

Attribution

LodaRAT was attributed to the Kasablanka APT by Cisco in 2021; the group was focused on information gathering and espionage targeting Russia and Bangladesh in 2022. The 2024 campaign observed by Rapid7 shows a notable shift in threat actor behavior — i.e., preferring worldwide distribution over specific regional targets — and therefore we would not necessarily attribute this year’s campaign to the same APT. Being an AutoIt compiled binary, LodaRAT source code can be easily extracted and customized by a skilled threat actor. Rapid7 also found a GitHub repository with leaked LodaRAT source code. Based on capabilities, variable names, and strings, the leaked code is a four-year-old LodaRAT version, meaning adversaries have had plenty of time to analyze and update the code in newer versions.

InsightIDR and Managed Detection and Response customers have existing detection coverage through Rapid7’s expansive library of detection rules. Rapid7 recommends installing the Insight Agent on all applicable hosts to ensure visibility into suspicious processes and proper detection coverage. Below is a non-exhaustive list of detections that are deployed and will alert on behavior related to this malware campaign:

  • Suspicious Process – LodaRAT Malware Executed
  • Suspicious Process – Renamed AutoIt Interpreter

Technical Analysis

In this section we will briefly describe the overall capabilities of LodaRAT. For the full capability list, please see our LodaRAT repository on GitHub. It’s worth mentioning that most of the LodaRAT samples we investigated as part of the 2024 campaign had a string obfuscation mechanism. We build a Python script to decrypt those strings and make an AutoIt script human-readable.

The LodaRAT string deobfuscator is available to the community and can be downloaded here. Some of the samples were also packed with the UPX packer.

LodaRAT execution starts with a check for a specifically named window — for example, `UOMGAYFFBC`. This is done to make sure that only one instance of the malware is executed on the system. Next, the malware changes its window title. It also checks whether the infected OS is Windows 10 or 11. Then, it defines local variables and facilitates registry persistence by adding a new value under the `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` registry key (T1547.001). Persistence is not always achieved by adding a new registry value. However, Rapid7 observed that some LodaRAT samples instead created a new scheduled task that will execute a compiled AutoIt every minute (T1053), while others did not attempt to establish persistence at all. Interestingly, in both cases where Rapid7 did not observe a new registry value being added for persistence, the malware still attempted to delete the registry value during the uninstall process.

The malware also checks if one of the following registry values is set:

  • HKCU\Software\Win32\data
  • HKCU\Software\Win32\img
  • HKCU\Software\Win32\keyx
  • HKCU\Software\Win32\imgCli
  • HKCU\Software\Win32\pidx

All the above keys are set by the malware in response to a specific command from the command-and-control (C2) server. The malware checks whether Windata and Windata\mon folders exist in the user’s %AppData% directory, and if not, it creates them. It also sets the mon directory attributes to System and Hidden to evade detection (T1564.001).

The malware will then start a TCP connection to the C2 server, capture the victim’s screen, and save the capture in the mon folder (T1113). The C2 beacon contains basic victim information, such as:

  1. Whether the user has Administrator rights; if they do, the Admin string will be passed to the C2 server, otherwise the passed parameter will be a string that varies from sample to sample.
  2. Username
  3. OS version and architecture
  4. Whether any anti-virus(AV) solution is running on the system; the malware will tell the C2 server No if no AV solution is found, and Disabled in cases where it is present but not running.
  5. Host IP address
  6. Desktop resolution
  7. Whether the endpoint is a laptop or a desktop
  8. Number of files in the mon folder

That information will be combined into the following packet:
x|<Admin/harcoded_string>|x|<Username>|<OS Version>|<OS Architecture>| | |<Disabled/No>|<Host IP address>|ddd|Pr|<Desktop Height>|X2|<Desktop Width>|X3|<Laptop/Desktop>|<Amount of files in mon folder>|beta

In the response, the RAT waits on a command from the C2 server. While a full list of LodaRAT capabilities can be found here, notable capabilities include:

  1. Downloading and executing additional payloads: We were able to spot the use of the ngrok reverse proxy utility based on the command the malware executes when receiving it from the C2 server. We can also assess with medium confidence that one other tool downloaded from the C2 server is a lateral movement utility that exploits the SMB protocol to drop and/or execute a malicious binary on a remote host. This assumption is based on malware’s attempt to connect to an internal IP on port 445, after which it receives a tool from the C2 server and uses that utility to run .bin file on the remote host.
  2. Executing commands on the victim’s host
  3. Controlling the victim’s mouse
  4. Screen capturing
  5. Stealing browser cookies and credentials
  6. Disabling Windows Firewall
  7. File enumeration and exfiltration
  8. Webcam recording
  9. Microphone recording
  10. New local user creation

In addition, the malware is capable of opening and closing a CD tray, creating a GUI chat window while the conversation is saved to a file.

IOCs

An updated IOC list can be found here.

Conclusion

LodaRAT shows that even older malware can still be a serious threat if it works well enough. While new malware families pop up all the time with fancy updates, LodaRAT has stayed mostly the same since 2021, yet it’s still spreading and infecting systems worldwide. The recent campaign, with its ability to steal credentials from browsers like Microsoft Edge and Brave, proves that small tweaks can keep malware effective without major updates. The fact that LodaRAT keeps working so well reminds us that even older threats shouldn’t be underestimated.

The Japanese Technology and Media Attack Landscape

Post Syndicated from Tom Caiazza original https://blog.rapid7.com/2023/07/19/the-japanese-technology-and-media-attack-landscape/

The Japanese Technology and Media Attack Landscape

Recently, we released a major report analyzing the threat landscape of Japan, the globe’s third largest economy. In that report we looked at the ways in which threat actors infiltrate Japanese companies (spoiler alert: it is often through foreign subsidiaries and affiliates) and some of the most pervasive threats those companies face such as ransomware and state-sponsored threat actors.

We also took a look at some of the hardest hit industries and it should come as no surprise that some of the most commonly attacked companies are in industries where Japan currently excels on a global scale. Think manufacturing and automotive, technology & media, and financial services.

In a series of blog posts we’re going to briefly discuss the findings for one of those industries, but rest assured, more information can be found in our one-page rundowns and the report itself.

When it comes to technology and media companies, personally identifiable information, or PII, is the name of the game. Often the companies themselves aren’t the actual targets, but the information they have on their customers very much are. For instance, the breach of one IT vendor yielded access information to their own customers’ customers. Some 10 other companies were made vulnerable and attackers were able to walk away with customer data for those companies. Similarly, an overseas subsidiary of a Japanese company was breached allowing for 62 other organizations to be compromised.

The gaming industry is also not immune to cyber attacks though, like the manufacturing industry, ransomware, not credential stealing, was the main goal. In July of 2022, a major gaming company was compromised through an overseas partner by the ransomware group, BlackCat.
For more detail on the threat landscape of the technology and media industries in Japan check out our report, or the handy one-page brief specifically looking at these industries.

The Japanese Threat Landscape: A Report on Cyber Threats in the Third Largest Economy on Earth

Post Syndicated from Tom Caiazza original https://blog.rapid7.com/2023/06/28/the-japanese-threat-landscape-a-report-on-cyber-threats-in-the-third-largest-economy-on-earth/

The Japanese Threat Landscape: A Report on Cyber Threats in the Third Largest Economy on Earth

The Japanese economy is massive, global, and varied. It is also a major target for cyber threat actors. As a hub for automotive, manufacturing, technology, and financial services, Japanese companies and organizations face significant cyber risk. There is nonetheless relatively little English-language coverage of Japan’s cyber threat landscape.  

In a new report released today by Rapid7, Principal Security Analyst, Paul Prudhomme, analyzes the threat landscape of the third-largest economy in the world and enumerates threats across Japan’s main industries as well as some of the largest cyber concerns affecting those companies, such as ransomware and cyber espionage.

Perhaps the most important takeaway from the report on Japanese cyber threats is that the biggest risk to Japanese companies may not even be the companies themselves. Overseas subsidiaries and affiliates offer softer targets for threat actors targeting global Japanese brands. In many of the most recent, large-scale, attacks on Japanese companies, attackers chose to compromise overseas subsidiaries or otherwise affiliated companies in other countries as a way into the networks of Japanese targets.

The report posits two potential explanations for why attackers chose to use the overseas affiliates and subsidiaries of Japanese companies as access vectors. One possible factor is the security culture in those countries and the subsidiaries themselves. Overseas affiliates may have less optimal security oversight than their Japanese counterparts. This discrepancy could be due to acquisition of overseas firms introducing existing security vulnerabilities into the parent company, or the development of separate hierarchies that are not in lock step with the security culture at a parent company. Regulatory environments vary, and business and technology habits could be different as well. There are a multitude of ways even the most secure Japanese company could be let down by their overseas affiliates.

Another reason why attackers aim to infiltrate Japanese companies through their overseas partners could be due to language barriers. There are many Japanese speakers in the world, though most are concentrated within Japan itself. Considered a challenging language to master, attackers often seek to operate within companies with a lower language threshold to clear and when access to the main target is still available through outside companies, the path of least language resistance could be ruling the day.

Ransomware

Rapid7’s research has found that ransomware is a particular threat for Japanese companies due to the large number of manufacturing and other technical companies based there. The nature of some of the data that many manufacturing organizations possess may make it harder to sell on criminal markets, making ransomware a more lucrative way to extract funds from a breached manufacturer. In fact, ransomware incidents have increased every six months between the back half of 2020—where just 21 incidents were reported—to the first six months of 2022 when 114 incidents were reported. Manufacturing is the hardest hit with one-third of ransomware attacks being focused on this one industry in the first half of 2022.

State-sponsored Threats

Japanese companies are also high-value targets for state-sponsored threat actors, with several of its neighbors posing significant threats. In fact, of the four most well-known state sponsors of cyber attacks (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea), three of them are Japan’s neighbors and thus have reasons to target it.

Chinese cyber-espionage groups pose a significant threat to the IP of Japanese manufacturing and technology companies. As a regional competitor in these spaces, IP is a valuable resource and thus a valuable target. Chinese attackers also seem to be attempting to breach Japanese companies through their overseas affiliates and subsidiaries.

North Korean cyber criminal outfits, in contrast, prefer to steal Japanese cryptocurrency, as it is a funding source that is outside of traditional financial institutions. Cryptocurrency exchanges are not the only targets. In late 2021, a North Korean group impersonated a Japanese venture capital firm to steal cryptocurrency from individuals.

Targeted Industries

Japanese companies are major global players in the automotive, manufacturing, technology, and financial services industries. Those industries are thus among the top targets. As mentioned before, manufacturers, particularly automotive, can be subject to IP theft. Targeted data sets in the financial services industry include customer credentials and payment card details, personally identifiable information, and cryptocurrency. Technology companies are valuable targets in part because compromises of them can enable access to their customers, even including Japanese government and defense organizations.

If you’d like more information about these targeted industries check out the full report or one of our one-page briefs looking at the main points of the automotive, financial services, and technology industries.

Ultimately, Japan has a huge attack surface and is an incredibly important economy on the global stage. Its companies have global reach and are often market leaders outside of Japan. This puts Japanese companies at high risk for attacks. For more detail on what we’ve discussed in this blog (and way more detailed information about the attack surface of Japan) download the report here.

Rapid7 Threat Command Delivered 311% ROI: 2023 Forrester Consulting Total Economic Impact™ Study

Post Syndicated from Stacy Moran original https://blog.rapid7.com/2023/03/15/rapid7-threat-command-delivered-311-roi-2023-forrester-consulting-total-economic-impact-study/

Volume up (and not in a good way)

Rapid7 Threat Command Delivered 311% ROI: 2023 Forrester Consulting Total Economic Impact™ Study

Security teams must continuously contort their efforts to effectively respond to the growing volume of cyberthreats. These constantly shifting methods in the security operations center (SOC) can be difficult to manage in the face of emerging external threats—it can be like keeping multiple spinning plates in the air at once.

“63% of organizations globally were breached in 2021, and security decision-makers were more concerned about external attacks than any other attack vector,” according to the new Forrester Consulting study commissioned by Rapid7—The Total Economic Impact(™) of Rapid7 Threat Command For Digital Risk Protection and Threat Intelligence (hereafter referred to as “the study”).

As the world continues to lean into the convenience of the digital age, cyberthreats continue to rise. Greater visibility is needed. Accurate automation is needed. And enhancements to every organization’s overall security posture are most certainly needed to stay secure in the global economy.

Intelligence when you need it

The more contextualized alerts and insight you can gain on a potential threat, the better positioned you’ll be to mitigate the threat before it can have a tangible impact on the business. Threat Command from Rapid7 was specifically built to help security organizations gain clarity about external threats. Can it see around corners? Almost.

Threat Command produced an ROI of more than 300%! The characteristics of the composite organization used for this calculation were based on real-life customer interviews Forrester conducted within their Total Economic Impact (TEI) framework. This representative organization is described as a $5.7 billion global enterprise consisting of 7,500 employees and headquartered in North America. The study concluded that this business realized 311% ROI over three years while also fending off threats with a solution that prioritizes:

  • Immediate value and the ability to get up and running quickly
  • More active responses with agile detection and automated alert responses
  • Simplified workflows that leverage mapping capabilities to accelerate investigations

All of this translates into greater visibility into threats—before their truly concussive effects are felt—which can lead to significantly reduced aftershocks of cyberattacks.

Benefits and other findings

Threat Command reduced the likelihood of a major security breach by up to 70%. The composite organization was able to realize significant efficiencies—and cost savings—leading to a considerable reduction in the probability of a breach event. The Forrester Consulting study states:

“By implementing Threat Command, the composite organization gains greater efficiency to detect, investigate, respond to, and remediate cyberattacks… Having Threat Command as a part of its security environment has the effect of lowering the likelihood of successful breaches by up to 70% over the course of three years and decreasing the impact of cyberattacks. This results in up to $1.1 million (PV) in savings over three years.”

Organizations were also able to leverage Threat Command to lower signal-to-noise alert ratio, as well as proactively identify and remediate threats before they morph into significant business impact. Indeed, automation helped in this area and led to time savings. A study interviewee—the principal threat intelligence analyst for a financial services firm—estimated three analysts on the security team saved three to four hours a day after implementing Threat Command.

“We were having a lot of trouble distinguishing relevant threats from noise. It was a manual approach of pulling the information from these sources … It was very reactive.”—Principal threat intelligence analyst, financial services

Remediation efficiency

Threat Command delivered a 75% reduction in time for investigation, threat hunting, and analysis. When looked at in terms of workforce, this helped organizations avoid the cost of bringing on additional headcount due to Threat Command’s comprehensive detection and user access to Rapid7’s internal SOC and remediation teams.

What about security posture?

Threat Command created benefits of $1.88 million over three years against costs of $457,000. We believe that with numbers like that, employees would benefit, shareholders would be happy, and the company would make progress toward meeting its financial goals.

But threats still loom. So, how did interviewees’ overall security postures look after implementing Threat Command? They experienced the following gains:

  • More efficient security processes
  • Personalized alerts on potential threats
  • Rapid takedowns of accounts and domains from the dark web
  • Greater accounting of all digital assets
  • Transition from a reactive to proactive approach for threat intelligence and remediation

Make intelligence intelligent

With regard to securing an ever-expanding attack surface, information means nothing if it can’t be interpreted and acted upon. Threat Command from Rapid7 can supercharge your ability to turn intelligence into results-focused action with faster detection and automated alert responses across your environment.

There are lots of numbers in this study, and we love that. It’s great to see proof that a solution is capable of helping customers become more confident in their security postures. But Rapid7’s commitment to partnering with our customers goes beyond the numbers. We’ll never stop innovating on the effectiveness of our products and services to proactively defend against—and defeat—the growing volume of global threats.

For a deep-dive into The Total Economic Impact(™) of Rapid7 Threat Command for Digital Risk Protection and Threat Intelligence, download the study now.

Year in Review: Rapid7 Threat Intelligence

Post Syndicated from Stacy Moran original https://blog.rapid7.com/2023/01/31/year-in-review-rapid7-threat-intelligence/

Year in Review: Rapid7 Threat Intelligence

In an evolving threat landscape, non-stop alerts and more IOC feeds don’t guarantee better protection. Security teams are overwhelmed and struggle to identify relevant threat information.

Thankfully, Threat Command delivers highly contextual alerts and integration across your environment to help you cut through the noise, enable prioritization, streamline operations, and reduce brand exposure. Threat Command external threat intelligence protects organizations in every industry from targeted threats across the clear, deep, and dark web.

As we forge into 2023, we remain laser-focused and committed to addressing the critical needs of resource-constrained security operations teams:

  • Accessible and actionable external threat intelligence
  • Better visibility for faster decisions
  • Greater relevance, less noise
  • Simplified security workflows
  • Accelerated response
  • Faster time-to-value

But first, let’s take a look at the ways we improved Threat Command in 2022.

Executing on Our Promise of Value
2022 Product Feature Introductions and Enhancements

Throughout 2022, we continuously iterated and improved upon the capabilities of Threat Command, making it an even more effective resource to keep your organization safe from external threats. Here is a rundown of some of the most important improvements we made last year.

First Half 2022

In our blog “Threat Intel Enhances Rapid7 XDR With Improved Visibility and Context”, we summarize the unmistakable value threat intelligence brings to the Rapid7 solution portfolio in year one following the IntSights acquisition. Highlights include:

  • Threat Command + InsightIDR integration: The only 360-degree XDR solution in the market that infuses generic threat intelligence (IOCs) and customized digital risk protection coverage. Unlock a comprehensive view of your external and internal attack surface by seeing Threat Command alerts alongside IDR detections.
  • Threat Command Vulnerability Risk Analyzer + InsightVM integration: Rely on threat intelligence vulnerability context and risk prioritization that eliminates the guesswork of manual patch management.
  • Twitter Chatter: Know when your company is mentioned in negative discourse on Twitter.
  • Information Stealers: Get alerted when employees have been compromised by malware that gathers leaked credentials and private data from infected devices. In many cases, this scenario plays out on employee-owned personal devices, drastically amplifying potential risk to the organization.
  • Asset Management: Track your most targeted digital assets for a more proactive defense. Categorize your assets using tags and comments, and automatically generate policy conditions and bulk actions for alerts.
  • Strategic Intelligence: The first strategic dashboard for CISOs delivers visualization of threats specifically targeting the organization – critical input for assessing, planning, and budgeting for future security investments. This is the threat intelligence market’s only comprehensive view of an organization’s external threat landscape (aligned to the MITRE ATT&CK framework).
Year in Review: Rapid7 Threat Intelligence

Second Half 2022

Rapid7 + ServiceNow: In the second half of the year, we released Threat Command for ServiceNow ITSM. Users of both platforms now have access to an end-to-end integration for managing security incidents:

  • Quickly and easily create ServiceNow incidents based on Threat Command alert data for streamlined incident response from a single pane of glass within ServiceNow.
  • Create incidents in your ServiceNow instance based on Threat Command alert data and assign ITSM tickets to specific users or groups.

Customers can install the app now from the ServiceNow store.

Learn more: Threat Command ServiceNow ITSM Integration Brief

Year in Review: Rapid7 Threat Intelligence

Rapid7 + MISP: Our Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP) now integrates with MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform), an open-source TI platform that collects and shares indicators of compromise related to security incidents. This integration allows users to ingest enriched IOCs from our TIP and create events in MISP cloud devices.

Year in Review: Rapid7 Threat Intelligence

TIP Investigation Enhancements

  • Filterable user events now appear in the IOC Timeline for improved visibility and investigation efficiency. Users can view events related to specific IOCs, sorted by date.
  • See the relation types between related IOCs on the Investigation map for 360-degree visibility and faster investigations.
  • View Threat Command alert indications on IOC nodes in the Investigation map for additional visibility.

Leaked Credentials Enhancements

  • Our Leaked Credentials coverage now supports a wide variety of additional database formats, allowing broader visibility into the ever-expanding threat of leaked credentials detected in various breaches and hacker campaigns across the clear, deep, and dark web.

Looking Ahead

Lots happening in 2023! Look for our new Forrester Total Economic Impact of Rapid7 Threat Command for Digital Risk Protection and Threat Intelligence in early Q2 (sneak peak: our ROI number surpasses that of our primary competitors!) and new solutions packages that scale with customer needs across the maturity spectrum and offer opportunities to maximize ROI.

Stay tuned!

There are many more exciting feature enhancements and new releases planned throughout the year. A big thank you to all of our customers and partners. We look forward to delivering even more value to you in 2023!

Learn more about how Threat Command simplifies threat intelligence, delivering instant value for organizations of any size or maturity, while reducing risk exposure. Watch an on-demand demo to see how Threat Command takes the complexity out of threat intelligence with an intuitive platform that prioritizes the most critical threats to your organization.

Want to find out where and how your organization is being targeted? Get a free threat report now.

Year in Review: Rapid7 Threat Intelligence

One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

Post Syndicated from Stacy Moran original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/09/22/one-year-after-intsights-acquisition-threat-intels-value-is-clear/

Rapid7 Strengthens Market Position With 360-Degree XDR and Best-in-Class Threat Intelligence Offerings

One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

Time flies… and provides opportunities to establish proof points. After recently passing the one-year milestone of Rapid7’s acquisition of IntSights, the added value threat intelligence brings to our product portfolio is unmistakable.  

Cross-platform SIEM, SOAR, and VM integrations expand capabilities and deliver super-charged XDR

Integrations with Rapid7 InsightIDR (SIEM) and InsightConnect (SOAR) strengthen our product offerings. Infusing these tools with threat intelligence elevates customer security outcomes and delivers greater visibility across applications, while speeding response times. The combination of expertly vetted detections, contextual intelligence, and automated workflows within the security operations center (SOC) helps teams gain immediate visibility into the external attack surface from within their SIEM environments.

The threat intelligence integration with IDR is unique to Rapid7. It’s the only XDR solution in the market to infuse both generic threat intelligence IOCs and customized digital risk protection coverage. Users receive contextual, tailored alerts based on their digital assets, enabling them to detect potential threats before they hit endpoints and become incident response cases.

One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

Capabilities

  • Expand and accelerate threat detection with native integration of Threat Command alerts and TIP Threat Library IOCs with InsightIDR.
  • Proactively thwart attack plans with alerts that identify active threats across the attack surface.
One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

Benefits

  • 360-degree visibility and protection across your internal and external attack surface
  • Faster automated discovery and elimination of threats via correlation of Threat Command alerts with InsightIDR investigative capabilities

Learn more: 360-Degree XDR and Attack Surface Coverage, XDR Solution Brief

One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

The Threat Command Vulnerability Risk Analyzer (VRA) + InsightVM integration delivers complete visibility into digital assets and vulnerabilities across your attack surface, including attacker perspective, trends, and active discussions and exploits. Joint customers can import data from InsightVM into their VRA environment where CVEs are enriched with valuable context and prioritized by vulnerability criticality and risk, eliminating the guesswork of manual patch management. VRA is a bridge connecting objective critical data with contextualized threat intelligence derived from tactical observations and deep research. In addition to VRA, customers can leverage Threat Command’s Browser Extension to obtain additional context on CVEs, and TIP module to see related IOCs and block actively exploited vulnerabilities.

Integration benefits

  • Visibility: Continuously monitor assets and associated vulnerabilities.
  • Speed: Instantly assess risk from emerging vulnerabilities and improve patching cadence.
  • Assessment: Eliminate blind spots with enhanced vulnerability coverage.
  • Productivity: Reduce time security analysts spend searching for threats by 75% or more.
  • Prioritization: Focus on the vulnerabilities that matter most.
  • Automation: Integrate CVEs enriched with threat intelligence into existing security stack.
  • Simplification: Rely on intuitive dashboards for centralized vulnerability management.
One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

Learn how to leverage this integration to effectively prioritize and accelerate vulnerability remediation in this short demo and Integration Solution Brief.

In addition to these game-changing integrations that infuse Rapid7 Insight Platform solutions with external threat intelligence, Threat Command also introduced numerous feature and platform enhancements during the past several months.

Expanded detections and reduced noise

Of all mainstream social media platforms, Twitter has the fewest restrictions and regulations; coupled with maximum anonymity, this makes the service a breeding ground for hostile discourse.

Twitter by the numbers (in 2021)

One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

Threat Command Twitter Chatter coverage continually monitors Twitter discourse and alerts customers regarding mentions of company domains. Expanded Twitter coverage later this year will include company and brand names.

One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

Threat Command’s Information Stealers feature expands the platform’s botnets credentials coverage. We now detect and alert on information-stealing malware that gathered leaked credentials and private data from infected devices. Customers are alerted when employees or users have been compromised (via corporate email, website, or mobile app). Rely on extended protection against this prevalent and growing malware threat based on our unique ability to obtain compromised data via our exclusive access to threat actors.

Accelerated time to value

The recently enhanced Threat Command Asset Management dashboard provides visibility into the risk associated with specific assets, displays asset targeting trends, and enables drill-down for alert investigation. Users can now categorize assets using tags and comments, generate bulk actions for multiple assets, and see a historical perspective of all activity related to specific assets.

Better visibility for faster decisions

One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

Strategic Intelligence is now available to existing Threat Command customers for a limited time in Open Preview mode. The Strategic Intelligence dashboard, aligned to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, enables CISOs and other security executives to track risk over time and assess, plan, and budget for future security investments.

Capabilities

  • View potential vulnerabilities attackers may use to execute an attack – aligned to the MITRE ATT&CK framework (tactics & techniques).
  • See trends in your external attack surface and track progress over time in exposed areas.
  • Benchmark your exposure relative to other Threat Command customers in your sector/vertical.
  • Easily communicate gaps and trends to management via dashboard and/or reports.

Benefits

  • Rapid7 is the first vendor in the TI space to provide a comprehensive strategic view of an organization’s external threat landscape.
  • Achieve your security goals with complete, forward-looking, and actionable intelligence context about your external assets.
  • Bridge the communication and reporting gap between your CTI analysts dealing with everyday threats and the CISO, focused on the bigger picture.
One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

Stay tuned!

There are many more exciting feature enhancements and new releases planned by year end.

Learn more about how Threat Command simplifies threat intelligence, delivering instant value  for organizations of any size or maturity, while reducing risk exposure.

One Year After IntSights Acquisition, Threat Intel’s Value Is Clear

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Network Access for Sale: Protect Your Organization Against This Growing Threat

Post Syndicated from Jeremy Makowski original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/08/22/network-access-for-sale-protect-your-organization-against-this-growing-threat/

Network Access for Sale: Protect Your Organization Against This Growing Threat

Vulnerable network access points are a potential gold mine for threat actors who, once inside, can exploit them persistently. Many cybercriminals are not only interested in obtaining personal information but also seek corporate information that could be sold to the highest bidder.

Infiltrating corporate networks

To infiltrate corporate networks, threat actors typically use several techniques, including:

Social engineering and phishing attacks

Threat actors collect email addresses, phone numbers, and information shared on social media platforms to target key people within an organization using phishing campaigns to collect credentials. Moreover, many threat actors managed to find the details of potential victims via leaked databases posted on dark web forums.

Malware infection and remote access

Another technique used by threat actors to gain access to corporate networks is malware infection. This technique consists of spreading malware, such as trojans, through a network of botnets to infect thousands of computers around the world.

Once infected, a computer can be remotely controlled to gain full access to the company network that it is connected to. It is not rare to find threat actors with botnets on hacking forums looking for partnerships to target companies.

Network Access for Sale: Protect Your Organization Against This Growing Threat

Network and system vulnerabilities

Some threat actors will prefer to take advantage of vulnerabilities within networks or systems rather than developing offensive cyber tools or using social engineering techniques. The vulnerabilities exploited are usually related to:

  • Outdated or unpatched software that exposes systems and networks
  • Misconfigured operating systems or firewalls allowing default policies to be enabled
  • Ports that are open by default on servers
  • Poor network segmentation with unsecured interconnections

Selling network access on underground forums and markets

Since gaining access to corporate networks can take a lot of effort, some cybercriminals prefer to simply buy access to networks that have already been compromised or information that was extracted from them. As a result, it has become common for cybercriminals to sell access to corporate networks on cybercrime forms.

Usually, the types of access that are sold on underground hacking forums are SSH, cPanels, RDP, RCE, SH, Citrix, SMTP, and FTP. The price of network access is usually based on a few criteria, such as the size and revenue of the company, as well as the number of devices connected to the network. It usually goes from a few hundred dollars to a couple thousand dollars. Companies in all industries and sectors have been impacted.

Network Access for Sale: Protect Your Organization Against This Growing Threat

Network Access for Sale: Protect Your Organization Against This Growing Threat

For these reasons, it is increasingly important for organizations to have visibility into external threats. Threat intelligence solutions can deliver 360-degree visibility of what is happening on forums, markets, encrypted messaging applications, and other deep and darknet platforms where many cybercriminals operate tirelessly.

In order to protect your internal assets, ensure the following measures exist within the company and are implemented correctly.

  • Keep all systems and network updated.
  • Implement a network and systems access control solution.
  • Implement a two-factor authentication solution.
  • Use an encrypted VPN.
  • Perform network segmentation with security interfaces between networks.
  • Perform periodic internal security audit.
  • Use a threat intelligence solution to keep updated on external threats.

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360-Degree XDR and Attack Surface Coverage With Rapid7

Post Syndicated from Margaret Wei original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/08/18/360-degree-xdr-and-attack-surface-coverage-with-rapid7/

360-Degree XDR and Attack Surface Coverage With Rapid7

Today’s already resource-constrained security teams are tasked with protecting more as environments sprawl and alerts pile up, while attackers continue to get stealthier and add to their arsenal. To be successful against bad actors, security teams need to be proactive against evolving attacks in their earliest stages and ready to detect and respond to advanced threats that make it past defenses (because they will).

Eliminate blindspots and extinguish threats earlier and faster

Rapid7’s external threat intelligence solution, Threat Command, reduces the noise of numerous threat feeds and external sources, and prioritizes and alerts on the most relevant threats to your organization. When used alongside InsightIDR, Rapid7’s next-gen SIEM and XDR, and InsightConnect, Rapid7’s SOAR solution, you’ll unlock a complete view of your internal and external attack surface with unmatched signal to noise.

Leverage InsightIDR, Threat Command, and InsightConnect to:

  • Gain 360-degree visibility with expanded coverage beyond the traditional network perimeter thanks to Threat Command alerts being ingested into InsightIDR, giving you a more holistic picture of your threat landscape.
  • Proactively thwart attack plans with Threat Command alerts that identify active threats from across your attack surface.
  • Find and eliminate threats faster when you correlate and investigate Threat Command alerts with InsightIDR’s rich investigative capabilities.
  • Automate your response by attaching an InsightConnect workflow to take action as soon as a detection or a Threat Command alert surfaces in InsightIDR.
360-Degree XDR and Attack Surface Coverage With Rapid7
Threat Command alerts alongside InsightIDR Detection Rules

Stronger signal to noise with Threat Command Threat Library

The power of InsightIDR and Threat Command doesn’t end there. We added another layer to our threat intelligence earlier this year when we integrated Threat Command’s Threat Library into InsightIDR to give more visibility into new indicators of compromise (IOCs) and continued strength around signal to noise.

All IOCs related to threat actors tracked in Threat Command are automatically applied to customer data sent to InsightIDR, which means you automatically get current and future coverage as new IOCs are found by the research team. Alongside InsightIDR’s variety of detection types — User Behavior Analytics (UBA), Attacker Behavior Analytics (ABA), and custom detections — you’re covered against all infiltrations, from lateral movement to unique attacker behaviors and everything in between. The impact? Your team is never behind on emerging threats to your organization.

Faster, more efficient responses with InsightConnect

Strong signal to noise is taken a step further with automation, so teams can not only identify threats quickly but respond immediately. The expanded integration between InsightConnect and InsightIDR allows you to respond to any alert being generated in your environment. With this, you can easily create and map InsightConnect workflows to any ABA, UBA, or custom detection rule, so tailored response actions can be initiated as soon as there is a new detection.

See something suspicious that didn’t trip a detection? You can invoke on-demand automation with integrated Quick Actions from any page in InsightIDR.

360-Degree XDR and Attack Surface Coverage With Rapid7
Mapping of InsightConnect workflows to an ABA alert in InsightIDR

Sophisticated XDR without any headaches

With Rapid7, you’ll achieve sophisticated detection and response outcomes with greater efficiency and efficacy — no matter where you and your team are on your security journey. Stay up to date on the latest from InsightIDR, Threat Command, and InsightConnect as we continue to up-level our cross-product integrations to bring you the most comprehensive XDR solution.

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To Maze and Beyond: How the Ransomware Double Extortion Space Has Evolved

Post Syndicated from Tom Caiazza original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/07/27/to-maze-and-beyond-how-the-ransomware-double-extortion-space-has-evolved/

To Maze and Beyond: How the Ransomware Double Extortion Space Has Evolved

We’re here with the final installment in our Pain Points: Ransomware Data Disclosure Trends report blog series, and today we’re looking at a unique aspect of the report that clarifies not just what ransomware actors choose to disclose, but who discloses what, and how the ransomware landscape has changed over the last two years.

Firstly, we should tell you that our research centered around the concept of double extortion. Unlike traditional ransomware attacks, where bad actors take over a victim’s network and hold the data hostage for ransom, double extortion takes it a step further and extorts the victim for more money with the threat (and, in some cases, execution) of the release of sensitive data. So not only does a victim experience a ransomware attack, they also experience a data breach, and the additional risk of that data becoming publicly available if they do not pay.

According to our research, there have been a handful of major players in the double extortion field starting in April 2020, when our data begins, and February 2022. Double extortion itself was in many ways pioneered by the Maze ransomware group, so it should not surprise anyone that we will focus on them first.

The rise and fall of Maze and the splintering of ransomware double extortion

Maze’s influence on the current state of ransomware should not be understated. Prior to the group’s pioneering of double extortion, many ransomware actors intended to sell the data they encrypted to other criminal entities. Maze, however, popularized another revenue stream for these bad actors, leaning on the victims themselves for more money. Using coercive pressure, Maze did an end run around one of the most important safeguards organizations can take against ransomware: having safely secured and regularly updated backups of their important data.

Throughout most of 2020 Maze was the leader of the double extortion tactic among ransomware groups, accounting for 30% of the 94 reported cases of double extortion between April and December of 2020. This is even more remarkable given the fact that Maze itself was shut down in November of 2020.

Other top ransomware groups also accounted for large percentages of data disclosures. For instance, in that same year, REvil/Sodinokibi accounted for 19%, Conti accounted for 14%, and NetWalker 12%. To give some indication of just how big Maze’s influence was and offer explanation for what happened after they were shut down, Maze and REvil/Sodinokibi accounted for nearly half of all double extortion attacks that year.

However, once Maze was out of the way, double extortion still continued, just with far more players taking smaller pieces of the pie. Conti and REvil/Sodinokibi were still major players in 2021, but their combined market share barely ticked up, making up just 35% of the market even without Maze dominating the space. Conti accounted for 19%, and REvil/Sodinokibi dropped to 16%.

But other smaller players saw increases in 2021. CL0P’s market share rose to 9%, making it the third most active group. Darkside and RansomEXX both went from 2% in 2020 to 6% in 2021. There were 16 other groups who came onto the scene, but none of them took more than 5% market share. Essentially, with Maze out of the way, the ransomware market splintered with even the big groups from the year before being unable to step in and fill Maze’s shoes.

What they steal depends on who they are

Even ransomware groups have their own preferred types of data to steal, release, and hold hostage. REvil/Sodinokibi focused heavily on releasing customer and patient data (present in 55% of their disclosures), finance and accounting data (present in 55% of their disclosures), employee PII and HR data (present in 52% of their disclosures), and sales and marketing data (present in 48% of their disclosures).

CL0P on the other hand was far more focused on Employee PII & HR data with that type of information present in 70% of their disclosures, more than double any other type of data. Conti overwhelmingly focused on Finance and Accounting data (present in 81% of their disclosures) whereas Customer & Patient Data was just 42% and Employee PII & HR data at just 27%.

Ultimately, these organizations have their own unique interests in the type of data they choose to steal and release during the double extortion layer of their ransomware attacks. They can act as calling cards for the different groups that help illuminate the inner workings of the ransomware ecosystem.

Thank you for joining us on this unprecedented dive into the world of double extortion as told through the data disclosures themselves. To dive even deeper into the data, download the full report.

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ISO 27002 Emphasizes Need For Threat Intelligence

Post Syndicated from Drew Burton original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/07/25/iso-27002-emphasizes-need-for-threat-intelligence/

ISO 27002 Emphasizes Need For Threat Intelligence

With employees reluctant to return to the office following the COVID-19 pandemic, the concept of a well-defined network perimeter has become a thing of the past for many organizations. Attack surfaces continue to expand, and as a result, threat intelligence has taken on even greater importance.

Earlier this year, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) released ISO 27002, which features a dedicated threat intelligence control (Control 5.7). This control is aimed at helping organizations collect and analyze threat intelligence data more effectively. It also provides guidelines for creating policies that limit the impact of threats. In short, ISO 27002’s Control 5.7 encourages a proactive approach to threat intelligence.

Control 5.7 specifies that threat intelligence must be “relevant, perceptive, contextual, and actionable” in order to be effective. It also recommends that organizations consider threat intelligence on three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.

  • Strategic threat intelligence is defined as high-level information about the evolving threat landscape (information about threat actors, types of attacks, etc.)
  • Operational threat intelligence is information about the tactics, tools, and procedures (TTPs) used by attackers.
  • Tactical threat intelligence includes detailed information on particular attacks, including technical indicators.

ISO 27002 is intended to be used with ISO 27001, which provides guidance for establishing and maintaining information security management systems. Many organizations use ISO 27001 and 27002 in conjunction as a framework for showing compliance with regulations where detailed requirements are not provided, for example Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US and the Data Protection Directive in the EU.

How Rapid7 can help

In addition to our threat intelligence and digital risk protection solution Threat Command, there are several Rapid7 products and services that can help you address a variety of controls recommended in ISO 27002.

InsightVM identifies and classifies assets, audits password policies, and identifies and prioritizes vulnerabilities. Metasploit can be used to validate vulnerability exploitability, audit the effectiveness of network segmentation, and conduct technical compliance tests. InsightAppSec tests the security of web applications. InsightIDR monitors user access to the network, collects and analyzes events, and assists in incident response.

Additionally, Rapid7 can provide security consulting services, perform an assessment of your organization’s current state of controls against the ISO 27002 framework, and identify gaps in your security program. We can also develop and review security policies, conduct penetration tests, respond to security incidents, and more.

Addressing ISO 27002 Control 5.7

A dedicated threat intelligence and digital risk protection solution like Rapid7 Threat Command can greatly ease the process of addressing Control 5.7.

Threat Command is designed to simplify the collection and analysis of threat intelligence data — from detection to remediation. It proactively monitors thousands of sources across the clear, deep, and dark web and delivers tailored threat intelligence information specific to your organization. Even better, Threat Command helps reduce the information overload with comprehensive external threat protection from a single pane of glass.

Threat Command enables you to make informed decisions, rapidly detect and mitigate threats,  and minimize exposure to your organization. Simply input your digital assets and properties, and you’ll receive relevant alerts categorized by severity, type of threat, and source. Fast detection and integration with SIEM, SOAR, EDR, and firewall allow you to quickly turn threat intelligence into action.

To learn more about how Threat Command fits into your organization’s security strategy, schedule a demo today.

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For Finserv Ransomware Attacks, Obtaining Customer Data Is the Focus

Post Syndicated from Tom Caiazza original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/07/07/for-finserv-ransomware-attacks-obtaining-customer-data-is-the-focus/

For Finserv Ransomware Attacks, Obtaining Customer Data Is the Focus

Welcome back to the third installment of Rapid7’s Pain Points: Ransomware Data Disclosure Trends blog series, where we’re distilling the key highlights of our ransomware data disclosure research paper one industry at a time. This week, we’ll be focusing on the financial services industry, one of the most most highly regulated — and frequently attacked — industries we looked at.

Rapid7’s threat intelligence platform (TIP) scans the clear, deep, and dark web for data on threats, and operationalizes that data automatically with our Threat Command product. We used that data to conduct unique research into the types of data threat actors disclose about their victims. The data points in this research come from the threat actors themselves, making it a rare glimpse into their actions, motivations, and preferences.

Last week, we discussed how the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries are particularly impacted by double extortion in ransomware. We found that threat actors target and release specific types of data to coerce victims into paying the ransom. In this case, it was internal financial information (71%), which was somewhat surprising, considering financial information is not the focus of these two industries. Less surprising, but certainly not less impactful, were the disclosure of customer or patient information (58%) and the unusually strong emphasis on intellectual property in the pharmaceuticals sector of this vertical (43%).

Customer data is the prime target for finserv ransomware

But when we looked at financial services, something interesting did stand out: Customer data was found in the overwhelming majority of data disclosures (82%), not necessarily the company’s internal financial information. It seems threat actors were more interested in leveraging the public’s implied trust in financial services companies to keep their personal financial information private than they were in exposing the company’s own financial information.

Since much of the damage done by ransomware attacks — or really any cybersecurity incident — lies in the erosion of trust in that institution, it appears threat actors are seeking to hasten that erosion with their initial data disclosures. The financial services industry is one of the most highly regulated industries in the market entirely because it holds the financial health of millions of people in their hands. Breaches at these institutions tend to have outsized impacts.

Employee info is also at risk

The next most commonly disclosed form of data in the financial services industry was personally identifiable information (PII) and HR data. This is personal data of those who work in the financial industry and can include identifying information like Social Security numbers and the like. Some 59% of disclosures from this sector included this kind of information.

This appears to indicate that threat actors want to undermine the company’s ability to keep their own employees’ data safe, and that can be corroborated by another data point: In some 29% of cases, data disclosure pointed to reconnaissance for future IT attacks as the motive. Threat actors want financial services companies and their employees to know that they are and will always be a major target. Other criminals can use information from these disclosures, such as credentials and network maps, to facilitate future attacks.

As with the healthcare and pharmaceutical sectors, our data showed some interesting and unique motivations from threat actors, as well as confirmed some suspicions we already had about why they choose the data they choose to disclose. Next time, we’ll be taking a look at some of the threat actors themselves and the ways they’ve impacted the overall ransomware “market” over the last two years.

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Two Rapid7 Solutions Take Top Honors at SC Awards Europe

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/06/23/two-rapid7-solutions-take-top-honors-at-sc-awards-europe/

Two Rapid7 Solutions Take Top Honors at SC Awards Europe

LONDON—We are pleased to announce that two Rapid7 solutions were recognized on Tuesday, June 21, at the prestigious SC Awards Europe, which were presented at the London Marriott, Grosvenor Square. InsightIDR took the top spot in the Best SIEM Solution category, and Threat Command brought home the award for Best Threat Intelligence Technology for the second year in a row.

The SC Awards Europe recognize and reward products and services that stand out from the crowd and exceed customer expectations. This year’s awards, which come at a time of rapid digital transformation and technology innovation, were assessed by a panel of highly experienced judges from a variety of industries. SC Media UK, which hosts the awards, is a leading information resource for cybersecurity professionals across Europe.

InsightIDR named “Best SIEM”

Security practitioners are using Rapid7 InsightIDR to address the challenges most everyone shares: Digital transformation is driving constant change, the attack surface continues to sprawl, and the skills gap drags on.

Traditional security information and event management (SIEM) solutions put the burden of heavy rule configuration, detection telemetry integration, dashboard and reporting content curation, and incident response on the customer. But industry-leading InsightIDR has always been different. It ties together disparate data from across a customer’s environment, including user activity, logs, cloud, endpoints, network traffic, and more into one place, ending tab-hopping and multi-tasking. Security teams get curated out-of-the box detections, high-context actionable insights, and built-in automation.

With easy SaaS deployment and lightning fast time-to-value, 72% of users report greatly improved team efficiency, 71% report accelerated detection of compromised assets, and most report reducing time to address an incident by 25-50%.  

Threat Command named “Best Threat Intelligence Technology”

Rapid7 Threat Command is an external threat protection solution that proactively monitors thousands of sources across the clear, deep, and dark web. It enables security practitioners to anticipate threats, mitigate business risk, increase efficiency, and make informed decisions.

Threat Command delivers industry-leading AI/ML threat intelligence technology along with expert human intelligence analysis to continuously discover threats and map intelligence to organizations’ digital assets and vulnerabilities. This includes:

  • Patented technology and techniques for the detection, removal, and/or blocking of malicious threats
  • Dark web monitoring from analysts with unique access to invitation-only hacker forums and criminal marketplaces
  • The industry’s only 24/7/365 intelligence support from experts for deeper investigation into critical alerts
  • Single-click remediation including takedowns, facilitated by our in-house team of experts

100% of Threat Command users surveyed said the tool delivered faster time to value than other threat intelligence solutions they’d used, and 85% said adopting Threat Command improved their detection and response capabilities.

InsightIDR + Threat Command

Using InsightIDR and Threat Command together can further increase security teams’ efficiency and reduce risk. Users get a 360-degree view of internal and external threats, enabling them to avert attacks, accelerate investigations with comprehensive threat context, and flag the most relevant information — minimizing the time it takes to respond. With InsightIDR and Threat Command, customers are able to more effectively and efficiently see relevant threat data across their attack surface and quickly pivot to take immediate action – in the earliest stages of attack, even before a threat has fully evolved.

Learn more about how InsightIDR and Threat Command can fit into your organization’s security strategy.

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New Report Shows What Data Is Most at Risk to (and Prized by) Ransomware Attackers

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/06/16/new-report-shows-what-data-is-most-at-risk-to-and-prized-by-ransomware-attackers/

New Report Shows What Data Is Most at Risk to (and Prized by) Ransomware Attackers

Ransomware is one of the most pressing and diabolical threats faced by cybersecurity teams today. Gaining access to a network and holding that data for ransom has caused billions in losses across nearly every industry and around the world. It has stopped critical infrastructure like healthcare services in its tracks, putting the lives and livelihoods of many at risk.

In recent years, threat actors have upped the ante by using “double extortion” as a way to inflict maximum pain on an organization. Through this method, not only are threat actors holding data hostage for money – they also threaten to release that data (either publicly or for sale on dark web outlets) to extract even more money from companies.

At Rapid7, we often say that when it comes to ransomware, we may all be targets, but we don’t all have to be victims. We have means and tools to mitigate the impact of ransomware — and one of the most important assets we have on our side is data about ransomware attackers themselves.

Reports about trends in ransomware are pretty common these days. But what isn’t common is information about what kinds of data threat actors prefer to collect and release.

A new report from Rapid7’s Paul Prudhomme uses proprietary data collection tools to analyze the disclosure layer of double-extortion ransomware attacks. He identified the types of data attackers initially disclose to coerce victims into paying ransom, determining trends across industry, and released it in a first-of-its-kind analysis.

“Pain Points: Ransomware Data Disclosure Trends” reveals a story of how ransomware attackers think, what they value, and how they approach applying the most pressure on victims to get them to pay.

The report looks at all ransomware data disclosure incidents reported to customers through our Threat Command threat intelligence platform (TIP). It also incorporates threat intelligence coverage and Rapid7’s institutional knowledge of ransomware threat actors.

From this, we were able to determine:

  • The most common types of data attackers disclosed in some of the most highly affected industries, and how they differ
  • How leaked data differs by threat actor group and target industry
  • The current state of the ransomware market share among threat actors, and how that has changed over time

Finance, pharma, and healthcare

Overall, trends in ransomware data disclosures pertaining to double extortion varied slightly, except in a few key verticals: pharmaceuticals, financial services, and healthcare. In general, financial data was leaked most often (63%), followed by customer/patient data (48%).

However, in the financial services sector, customer data was leaked most of all, rather than financial data from the firms themselves. Some 82% of disclosures linked to the financial services sector were of customer data. Internal company financial data, which was the most exposed data in the overall sample, made up just 50% of data disclosures in the financial services sector. Employees’ personally identifiable information (PII) and HR data were more prevalent, at 59%.

In the healthcare and pharmaceutical sectors, internal financial data was leaked some 71% of the time, more than any other industry — even the financial services sector itself. Customer/patient data also appeared with high frequency, having been released in 58% of disclosures from the combined sectors.

One thing that stood out about the pharmaceutical industry was the prevalence of threat actors to release intellectual property (IP) files. In the overall sample, just 12% of disclosures included IP files, but in the pharma industry, 43% of all disclosures included IP. This is likely due to the high value placed on research and development within this industry.

The state of ransomware actors

One of the more interesting results of the analysis was a clearer understanding of the state of ransomware threat actors. It’s always critical to know your enemy, and with this analysis, we can pinpoint the evolution of ransomware groups, what data the individual groups value for initial disclosures, and their prevalence in the “market.”

For instance, between April and December 2020, the now-defunct Maze Ransomware group was responsible for 30%. This “market share” was only slightly lower than that of the next two most prevalent groups combined (REvil/Sodinokibi at 19% and Conti at 14%). However, the demise of Maze in November of 2020 saw many smaller actors stepping in to take its place. Conti and REvil/Sodinokibi swapped places respectively (19% and 15%), barely making up for the shortfall left by Maze. The top five groups in 2021 made up just 56% of all attacks with a variety of smaller, lesser-known groups being responsible for the rest.

Recommendations for security operations

While there is no silver bullet to the ransomware problem, there are silver linings in the form of best practices that can help to protect against ransomware threat actors and minimize the damage, should they strike. This report offers several that are aimed around double extortion, including:

  • Going beyond backing up data and including strong encryption and network segmentation
  • Prioritizing certain types of data for extra protection, particularly for those in fields where threat actors seek out that data in particular to put the hammer to those organizations the hardest
  • Understanding that certain industries are going to be targets of certain types of leaks and ensuring that customers, partners, and employees understand the heightened risk of disclosures of those types of data and to be prepared for them

To get more insights and view some (well redacted) real-world examples of data breaches, check out the full paper.

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MDR Plus Threat Intel: 414 New Detections in 251 Days (You’re Welcome)

Post Syndicated from Sam Adams original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/04/06/mdr-plus-threat-intel-414-new-detections-in-251-days-youre-welcome/

MDR Plus Threat Intel: 414 New Detections in 251 Days (You’re Welcome)

Last summer, Rapid7 acquired IntSights and its advanced external threat intelligence solution (now Threat Command by Rapid7). Threat Command monitors hundreds of thousands of sources across the clear, deep, and dark web, identifying malicious actors and notifying customers of potential attacks against their organizations.

The reason for the acquisition? With these external intelligence sources built into InsightIDR, its breadth of high-fidelity, low-noise detections would be unmatched.

Detections have been a Rapid7 thing since the start.

In an industry focused on ingesting data – and placing the burden on security teams to write their own detections – we went another way. We went detections first, delivering the most robust set of actionable detections out of the box.

Today, our detections library includes threat intelligence from our open-source communities, advanced attack surface mapping, proprietary machine learning, research projects, real-world follow-the-sun security operations center (SOC) experience, and 2.1+ trillion weekly security events observed across our detection and response (D&R) platform.

Now, Threat Command’s threat intelligence platform (TIP) content is integrated with our leading detection and response products and services. You get earlier threat identification and faster remediation.

MDR and InsightIDR customers have an even larger, expertly curated library

Right now, Rapid7 customers can find a lot more needles in haystacks. And we’ve made sure you can spot them quickly, easily, and reliably.

Our Threat Intelligence and Detection Engineering Team (TIDE) has done its work developing signatures and analytic detections for existing and emerging threats. TIDE analysts continuously provide InsightIDR users and managed detection and response (MDR) SOC analysts with the surrounding context needed to defend against threats with new detection mechanisms for vulnerability exploits and attack campaigns.

The detections are for newcomers as well as familiar names like the notorious Russian hacking group EvilCorp. As always, detections ensure coverage for various indicators of compromise (IOCs) that they and other attackers use in the wild.

Think of us as your research and execution team: As additional IOCs are added to the Rapid7 Threat Command Threat Library, they are automatically tested and applied to your logs to create alerts when identified.

What’s better and better, by the numbers

Now, InsightIDR has your back with:

  • 138 threats powered by Threat Command’s Threat Library
  • 414 detection rules powered by dynamic IOC feeds
  • Monitoring for all IOCs associated with each threat actor is automatic as they are added to the Threat Library

The mission is always to deliver more actionable alerts (with recommendations) and to reduce noise. So our TIDE Team tests IOCs and disables those we find to be unsuitable for alerting.

And this is just the beginning: All detections improve in fidelity over time as our MDR analysts inform the threat intelligence team of rule suppressions to provide a tailored approach for customers, add granularity, reduce noise, and avoid recurrency. And as Threat Command adds IOCs, they’ll turn into meticulous, out-of-the-box detections – whether you use InsightIDR, rely on our MDR SOC analysts, or collaborate with us to keep your environment secure.

If you’re an MDR customer or just considering it, here are other numbers to know:

  • With a 95% 4-year analyst retention rate, Rapid7 is an employer of choice during the cybersecurity staffing crisis and The Great Resignation
  • Our team of 24/7/365  global SOC analysts are proven threat hunters and DFIR experts
  • Together, the staff has a combined  500+ security certifications

Now, with even more detections, the strongest back-end system capturing threats as they evolve, and unmatched knowledge in the field, you can level up your D&R program with Rapid7 InsightIDR — or a partnership with the best-in-breed MDR analyst teams out there.

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Cybercriminals’ Recruiting Effort Highlights Need for Proper User Access Controls

Post Syndicated from Jeremy Makowski original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/03/15/cybercriminals-recruiting-effort-highlights-need-for-proper-user-access-controls/

Cybercriminals’ Recruiting Effort Highlights Need for Proper User Access Controls

The Lapsus$ ransomware gang’s modus operandi seems to be evolving. Following the recent data breaches of Nvidia and Samsung, on March 10, 2022, the Lapsus$ ransomware gang posted a message on their Telegram channel claiming that they were looking to recruit employees/insiders of companies in the telecommunications, software/gaming, call center/BPM, and server hosting industries.

This marks a departure from their previous attacks, which relied on phishing to gain access to victims’ networks. Now they are taking a more direct approach, actively recruiting employees who can provide them with VPN or Citrix access to corporate networks.

Cybercriminals’ Recruiting Effort Highlights Need for Proper User Access Controls

Additionally, the group appears to be taking requests. On March 6, 2022, Lapsus$ posted a survey on their Telegram channel asking people which victim’s source code they should leak next.

Cybercriminals’ Recruiting Effort Highlights Need for Proper User Access Controls

Following this survey, on March 12, 2022, the Lapsus$ ransomware gang posted a message on its Telegram channel in which they claimed to have hacked the source code of Vodafone Group.  The next day, March 13, they posted another message to say that they are preparing the Vodafone data to leak.

Cybercriminals’ Recruiting Effort Highlights Need for Proper User Access Controls

Cybercriminals’ Recruiting Effort Highlights Need for Proper User Access Controls

The Lapsus$ ransomware gang calls on people to join their Telegram chat group or contact them by email at the following address: [email protected].

Cybercriminals’ Recruiting Effort Highlights Need for Proper User Access Controls

Generally, cybercriminal groups exploiting ransomware infect employee computers by using techniques such as phishing or Remote Access Trojans. However, the Lapsus$ ransomware gang’s bold new approach to target companies from within is concerning and shows their willingness to expand their capabilities and attack vectors.

As a result, we recommend that companies increase the vigilance they exercise regarding their internal security policy. Regardless of whether Lapsus$ recruiting tactics prove successful, they emphasize the need for proper user access control. It is critical to ensure that employees with access to the company network have only the security rights they require and not more.

To learn more about Rapid7’s role-based access control capabilities, check out Solving the Access Goldilocks Problem: RBAC for InsightAppSec Is Here.

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Russia-Ukraine Cybersecurity Updates

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/03/04/russia-ukraine-cybersecurity-updates/

Russia-Ukraine Cybersecurity Updates

Cyberattacks are a distinct concern in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with the potential to impact individuals and organizations far beyond the physical frontlines. With events unfolding rapidly, we want to provide a single channel by which we can communicate to the security community the major cyber-related developments from the conflict each day.

Each business day, we will update this blog at 5 pm EST with what we believe are the need-to-know updates in cybersecurity and threat intelligence relating to the Russia-Ukraine war. We hope this blog will make it easier for you to stay current with these events during an uncertain and quickly changing time.

March 3, 2022

Additional sanctions: The US Treasury Dept. announced another round of sanctions on Russian elites, as well as many organizations it characterized as outlets of disinformation and propaganda.

Public policy: The Russia-Ukraine conflict is adding momentum to cybersecurity regulatory actions. Most recently, that includes

  • Incident reporting law: Citing the need to defend against potential retaliatory attacks from Russia, the US Senate passed a bill to require critical infrastructure owners and operators to report significant cybersecurity incidents to CISA, as well as ransomware payments. The US House is now considering fast-tracking this bill, which means it may become law quite soon.
  • FCC inquiry on BGP security: “[E]specially in light of Russia’s escalating actions inside of Ukraine,” FCC seeks comment on vulnerabilities threatening the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that is central to the Internet’s global routing system.

CISA threat advisory: CISA recently reiterated that it has no specific, credible threat against the U.S. at this time. It continues to point to its Shields Up advisory for resources and updates related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Threat Intelligence Update

  • An Anonymous-affiliated hacking group claims to have hacked a branch Russian Military and Rosatom, the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation.

The hacktivist group Anonymous and its affiliate have hacked and leaked access to the phone directory of the military prosecutor’s office of the southern military district of Russia, as well as documents from the Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation.

Available in Threat Library as: OpRussia 2022 (for Threat Command customers who want to learn more)

  • A threat actor supporting Russia claims to have hacked and leaked sensitive information related to the Ukrainian military.

The threat actor “Lenovo” claims to have hacked a branch of the Ukrainian military and leaked confidential information related to its soldiers. The information was published on an underground Russian hacking forum.

Source: XSS forum (discovered by our threat hunters on the dark web)

  • An Anonymous hacktivist associated group took down the popular Russian news website lenta.ru

As part of the OpRussia cyber-attack campaign, an Anonymous hacktivist group known as “El_patron_real” took down one of the most popular Russian news websites, lenta.ru. As of Thursday afternoon, March 3, the website is still down.

Available in Threat Library as: El_patron_real (for Threat Command customers who want to learn more)

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The Top 5 Russian Cyber Threat Actors to Watch

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/03/03/the-top-5-russian-cyber-threat-actors-to-watch/

The Top 5 Russian Cyber Threat Actors to Watch

As we continue to monitor the situation between Russia and Ukraine – and the potential for global cybersecurity impacts – we realize that our customers and other business and industry stakeholders may be interested in additional information and context to help them understand the landscape. An important part of the equation we are studying is the activity of cyber threat actors.

In an effort to help our clients know what to look for in their environments and anticipate potential attacks, this post provides guidance on the top 5 Russian threat actors and their known tactics and techniques, based on information from the Threat Library within Threat Command.

The following threat actors are identified by our Threat Intelligence Research team as the most likely (i.e., highest risk) to carry out cyberattacks against European and US companies.

1. The UAC-0056 threat group (AKA TA471, SaintBear, and Lorec53)

The UAC-0056 threat group has been active since at least March 2021. The group was observed attacking government and critical infrastructure organizations in Georgia and Ukraine. UAC-0056’s targets are aligned with the interests of the Russian government, although it is unknown whether it is state-sponsored.

The threat actors gain initial access via the sending of spear phishing email messages that contain either Word documents (with malicious macro or JavaScript codes) or PDF files (with links leading to the download of ZIP archives embedded with malicious LNK files). These are used to install and execute first-stage malware loaders that fetch other malicious payloads, such as the OutSteel document stealer and the SaintBot loader. The latter is used to download even more payloads by injecting them into spawned processes or loading them into memory.

UAC-0056 hosts its malicious payloads on Discord’s content delivery network (CDN). They are often obfuscated and have anti-analysis mechanisms.

In February 2022, amidst the geopolitical tension between Russia and Ukraine, the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) attributed UAC-0056 with an attack against a Ukrainian energy organization. The threat actors used spear phishing email messages, allegedly on behalf of the National Police of Ukraine, suggesting that a certain individual (Belous Alexei Sergeevich) had committed a crime. This attack was associated with a larger campaign that was initiated by the group against Ukrainian entities from the beginning of 2021

UAC-0056 is actively targeting Ukraine. Their previous cyberattacks demonstrated the use of a spoofing phishing technique to reach their targets. This technique could be used to target various companies in Europe or the United States.

Targeted industries/sectors

  • Government
  • Energy

2. Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team, also called Black Energy, BlackEnergy , ELECTRUM, Iron Viking, Quedagh

Sandworm, TeleBots, TEMP.Noble, or VOODOO BEAR, is a group of Russian hackers that have been behind the major cyber campaign targeting foreign-government leaders and institutions, especially Ukrainian ones, since 2009. They may also have been involved in the cyberattacks launched against Georgia during the 2008 Russo-Georgian confrontation.

Sandworm Team is known to have a strong interest in US and European critical systems. In one campaign, Sandworm Team used a zero-day exploit, CVE-2014-4114. In that campaign, they targeted Ukrainian government officials, members of the EU, and NATO.

Sandworm Team’s previous activity in Europe and the United States exposed their interest in targeting critical systems and indicated preparation for cyber attacks.

In February 2022, the United States’ and United Kingdom’s cybersecurity and law enforcement agencies uncovered a novel botnet that has been used by Sandworm since June 2019. The malware, dubbed Cyclops Blink, targets WatchGuard Firebox and other Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, and grants the threat actors remote access to networks. Cyclops Blink leverages the legitimate firmware update process and maintains system access and persistence by injecting malicious code and installing repacked firmware images. In addition, the malware is deployed along with modules that are developed to download and execute additional files from a remote command and control (C2) server, collect and send general system information, and update the malware. Cyclops Blink is estimated to affect approximately 1% of all active Watchguard firewall appliances in the world.

Targeted industries/sectors

  • Government
  • Critical systems (energy, transportation, healthcare)

3. Gamaredon Group

Active since at least 2013, Gamaredon Group is a Russian state-sponsored APT group. In 2016, the Gamaredon Group was responsible for a cyber espionage campaign, tracked as Operation Armageddon (an operation that has been active since at least mid-2013), targeting the Ukrainian government, military, and law enforcement officials. The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) blamed Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) for the cyberattacks. Furthermore, evidence found by researchers suggested that the malware used by the threat actor had been built on a Russian operating system. The Gamaredon group leveraged spear-phishing emails to deliver common remote access tools (RATs), such as UltraVNC and Remote Manipulator System (RMS).

Gamaredon Group is known to use strikingly off-the-shelf tools in their hacking activities. At the beginning of 2017, the Gamaredon Group made a shift to custom-developed malware instead of common RATs, showing that the group has improved its technical capabilities.

For their custom-built malware distribution, Gamaredon Group primarily makes use of compromised domains, dynamic DNS providers, Russian and Ukrainian country code top-level domains (ccTLDs), and Russian hosting providers. The new malware is very sophisticated, and it is able to avoid the detection of security solutions.

While Gamaredon has started using new malware, it also relies on self-extracting archives (SFX) and much of the same infrastructure as when its activities were first analyzed.

In January 2022, Symantec researchers reported that Gamaredon initiated a campaign between July and August 2021, targeting Ukrainian organizations. The campaign included the sending of spear phishing email messages embedded with malicious macro codes. Once the macro was enabled, it executed a VBS file that dropped the group’s custom backdoor, Pteranodon. In addition, Gamaredon used 8 other malicious payloads that were dropped from 7-zip SFX self-extracting binaries. These payloads had different functionalities, such as creating scheduled tasks, connecting to a C2 server, and downloading additional files.

In February 2022, cybersecurity researchers reported that on January 19, 2022, Gamaredon attempted to compromise an undisclosed Western government entity operating in Ukraine. This was done as part of a phishing campaign, in which the threat actors leveraged a Ukrainian job search and employment platform to upload a malware downloader masquerading as a resume for a job ad that was posted by the targeted organization.

In addition, the researchers discovered another Gamaredon campaign that took place in December 2021 and targeted the State Migration Service (SMS) of Ukraine. The threat actors used weaponized Word documents that deployed an open-source UltraVNC virtual network computing (VNC) software for maintaining remote access to the compromised systems. Gamaredon was observed to use an infrastructure of more than 700 malicious domains, 215 IP addresses, and over 100 samples of malware. The group was also found to recycle its used domains by consistently rotating them across new infrastructure, which is unique among threat actors.

Targeted Industry / Sector

  • Government
  • TechnologyStay vigilant

4. APT29 (AKA Dukes or Cozy Bear)

APT29 is a well-resourced, highly dedicated, and organized cyberespionage group. Security researchers suspect that the group is a part of the Russian intelligence services. The group has been active since at least 2008, and its main purpose is to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy decision-making.

APT29 primarily targets Western governments and related organizations, such as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, governmental subcontractors, diplomatic, healthcare organizations, and energy targets.

APT29 engages in targeted campaigns, utilizing different toolsets. The targets and timing of these campaigns appear to align with the known foreign and security policy interests of the Russian Federation at those times.

The group frequently uses publicly available exploits to conduct widespread scanning and exploitation against vulnerable systems, likely in an effort to obtain authentication credentials to allow further access. This broad targeting gives the group potential access to a large number of systems globally, many of which are unlikely to be of immediate intelligence value. The group may maintain a store of stolen credentials in order to access these systems in the event that they become more relevant in the future.

In addition to targeted attacks, APT29 has engaged in apparently biannual large-scale spear-phishing campaigns against hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions and affiliated organizations. These campaigns involve a fast but noisy break-in followed by a rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as possible. If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, APT29 switches the toolset used and moves to using stealthier tactics focused on persistent compromise and long-term intelligence gathering.

Throughout 2020, APT29 has targeted various organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, most likely with the intention of stealing information and intellectual property relating to the development and testing of COVID-19 vaccines.

Targeted industries/sectors

  • Telecom
  • Technology
  • Pharmaceutical

5. APT28 (AKA Fancy Bear)

APT 28, also called Group 74, Pawn Storm, SNAKEMACKEREL, STRONTIUM, Sednit, Sofacy, Swallowtail, TG-4127, Threat Group-4127, or Tsar Team, is a state-sponsored hacking group associated with the Russian military intelligence agency GRU. The group has been active since 2007 and usually targets privileged information related to government, military, and security organizations. Among the Russian APT groups, Fancy Bear dominated in 2017, especially at the end of that year.

Between February 10 and 14, 2015, during the ceasefire in Donbass (East Ukraine), APT 28 scanned 8,536,272 Ukrainian IP addresses for possible vulnerabilities. After February 14, 2015, APT28 shifted its attention to the west. They have also scanned for vulnerabilities in Spain, the UK, Portugal, USA, and Mexico.

According to the UK foreign secretary, Dominic Raab, APT28 was responsible for the 2015 cyber attacks on Germany’s Parliament. The official also said, “The UK stands shoulder to shoulder with Germany and our European partners to hold Russia to account for cyberattacks designed to undermine Western democracies. This criminal behavior brings the Russian Government into further disrepute.”

In August 2020, a joint report of the NSA and the FBI was released, in which they attributed a new malware to APT28 named Drovorub. Drovorub is a Linux malware consisting of an implant coupled with a kernel module rootkit, a file transfer, and port forwarding tool, and a command and control (C2) server.

When deployed on a victim machine, the Drovorub implant (client) provides the capability for direct communications with the actor-controlled C2 infrastructure, file download and upload capabilities, execution of arbitrary commands as “root,” and port forwarding of network traffic to other hosts on the network.

On August 9, 2020, the QuoIntelligence team disseminated a warning to its government customers in Europe about a new APT28 campaign. This campaign targets government bodies of NATO members (or countries cooperating with NATO). The researchers discovered a malicious file uploaded to VirusTotal, which ultimately drops a Zebrocy malware and communicates with a C2 in France.

In September 2020, Microsoft researchers reported that state-sponsored Russian hacking group APT28 was observed targeting organizations and individuals involved in the US presidential election. According to the researchers, the group’s efforts are focused on stealing the targets’ credentials and compromising their accounts to potentially disrupt the elections and to harvest intelligence to be used as part of future attacks.

Targeted industries/sectors

  • Military
  • Security
  • Government
  • Press

Notable cyber adversaries

Based on their previous cyber operations against Western countries and due to their direct or indirect implication in the current Russian/Ukrainian cyber conflict, we’ve identified these APT groups as potential cyber threats. The sophistication of their attacks and the fact that they often target European countries and the US make them a higher risk. We, along with the rest of the cybersecurity community, will continue to monitor the activities of these threat actors, and we recommend security teams worldwide do the same.

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