All posts by Varun Sharma

Connect your on-premises Kubernetes cluster to AWS APIs using IAM Roles Anywhere

Post Syndicated from Varun Sharma original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/connect-your-on-premises-kubernetes-cluster-to-aws-apis-using-iam-roles-anywhere/

Many customers want to seamlessly integrate their on-premises Kubernetes workloads with AWS services, implement hybrid workloads, or migrate to AWS. Previously, a common approach involved creating long-term access keys, which posed security risks and is no longer recommended. While solutions such as Kubernetes secrets vault and third-party options exist, they fail to address the underlying issue effectively.

One option to connect your on-premises Kubernetes workloads to AWS APIs is to use the service account issuer discovery feature. This allows the Kubernetes API server to act as an OpenID Connect (OIDC) identity provider and be federated with AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). However, this approach requires public internet access to the Kubernetes API server, which might not be desirable for some customers.

To help eliminate the need for long-term access keys or exposing the Kubernetes API server to the public internet, AWS has introduced AWS IAM Roles Anywhere. This feature enables secure, seamless integration of on-premises Kubernetes workloads with AWS services, promoting robust security practices and minimizing potential risks associated with long-term credentials or public exposure.

IAM Roles Anywhere enables workloads outside of AWS to access AWS resources by exchanging X.509 bound identities for temporary AWS credentials. With IAM Roles Anywhere, you can use the same IAM roles and policies as your AWS workloads to access AWS resources, promoting consistency.

IAM Roles Anywhere can be combined with a standard public key infrastructure solution. In this blog post, we use AWS Private Certificate Authority, which has several advantages over using a self-signed certificate authority (CA). First, it reduces operational and management overhead, because AWS manages the CA for you. Second, the cryptographic key material can be stored in hardware security modules or at least vaulted, which helps you protect your private CA against key compromises. Additionally, certificates can be short-lived, which aligns with dynamic Kubernetes environments where pod lifetimes are typically shorter than traditional servers.

We also demonstrate how to integrate IAM Roles Anywhere without modifying your existing workload Docker files, and how to automate the X.509 certificate lifecycle with cert-manager and an AWS Private CA backend in short-lived certificate mode. By using these capabilities, you can seamlessly integrate your on-premises Kubernetes workloads with AWS services, promoting robust security practices, minimizing risks associated with long-term credentials, and helping to ensure a streamlined, consistent access management experience.

This post is for customers who run their own Kubernetes cluster outside of AWS without using Amazon EKS Anywhere. If you’re using Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (Amazon EKS), use IAM roles for service accounts or Amazon EKS Pod Identity instead.

Background

“Why should I prefer X.509 certificates over IAM access keys?” Access keys are long-term credentials that must be rotated regularly to minimize the risk of unauthorized access. They need to be securely deployed onto servers hosting applications that use them, requiring procedures for secure transfer and deletion of transient copies. As the number of applications and access keys grows, tracking and managing them becomes operationally challenging.

In contrast, X.509 certificates use public key infrastructure (PKI). The private key is generated directly on the application server and doesn’t leave it. Only a certificate signing request, which doesn’t contain secrets, is sent to the CA for signing and returning the certificate. This alleviates the need for securely transmitting secret keys.

However, you can argue that X.509 certificates are also long-lived credentials. This concern is valid, but not necessarily true. As demonstrated by projects such as Let’s Encrypt, it’s possible to reduce certificate lifetimes from years to months by implementing automation for certificate renewal. After such a mechanism is in place, certificate lifetimes can be further limited to days or even hours.

In this post, we introduce mutually authenticated Transport Layer Security (mTLS), which uses certificates for high-assurance bidirectional authentication. Certificates are used to establish trust between the client and server, making sure that both parties are authenticated and authorized to communicate securely. By implementing mTLS, you can achieve a higher level of security and trust in your communication channels, mitigating potential risks associated with unauthorized access or man-in-the-middle attacks. Here, we implement ephemeral certificates that are tied to the lifecycle of pods. When a pod is started, a certificate is automatically created, and it expires after a short period of time unless it’s actively in use by the pod, in which case it’s automatically renewed by the cert-manager. This approach verifies that certificates are only valid for the duration of the pod’s lifetime, minimizing the potential risk associated with long-lived credentials. Additionally, IAM Roles Anywhere supports certificate revocation list (CRL) checks, allowing you to perform explicit revocation of certificates if required. This feature provides an additional layer of security, enabling you to revoke access promptly in case of compromised credentials or other security concerns.

Throughout this post, we assume that you have a basic understanding of IAM Roles Anywhere. For more information you can see this blog post. Furthermore, we assume that you are familiar with Kubernetes, kubectl, Helm, and cert-manager.

Solution overview

This solution assumes that you have an existing Kubernetes cluster running outside of AWS.

Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of our solution. An on-premises Kubernetes cluster accessing AWS APIs using IAM Roles Anywhere with X.509 certificates issued by AWS Private CA in short-lived-certificate mode.

Figure 1: High level architecture of on-premises Kubernetes accessing AWS APIs

Figure 1: High level architecture of on-premises Kubernetes accessing AWS APIs

Here’s how the solution works, as shown in Figure 1:

  1. An AWS Private CA in short-lived certificate mode issues X.509 certificates for your pods.
  2. When you set up your AWS Private CA as a trusted source and establish a specific profile, IAM Roles Anywhere will validate and accept authentication requests that use certificates issued by your AWS Private CA.
  3. cert-manager, deployed into your Kubernetes cluster, orchestrates the issuance of AWS Private CA certificates to authorized pods.
  4. Each pod uses IAM Roles Anywhere to create an AWS session using its private key and X.509 certificate obtained from cert-manager.

Let’s explore the different parts of the architecture in more detail.

AWS Private CA short lived credentials

AWS Private CA offers a short-lived certificate, where the validity period is limited to 7 days or fewer. You can see this AWS Blog to learn how to use AWS Private CA short-lived certificates. This new mode can be used to issue certificates for your Kubernetes pods and benefit from lower costs of operations. By synchronizing the certificate lifecycle with the lifecycle of the pod, you can minimize the operational overhead for this solution. To help meet requirements for auditability and transparency, you can use the audit report feature to list the issued certificates in a machine readable format.

IAM Roles Anywhere

Figure 2 shows a detailed overview of the components involved in authentication with IAM Roles Anywhere.

Figure 2: Components of IAM Roles Anywhere

Figure 2: Components of IAM Roles Anywhere

IAM Roles Anywhere allows you to obtain temporary security credentials for workloads that run outside of AWS. Your workloads must use a certificate issued by a trusted PKI CA to authenticate with IAM Roles Anywhere. You establish trust between IAM Roles Anywhere and your CA by creating a trust anchor that points to the root of the CA.

cert-manager

Figure 3 shows a detailed overview of the cert-manager setup used in this post, including the aws-privateca-issuer add-on for the integration of AWS Private CA.

Figure 3: Detailed overview of cert-manager setup

Figure 3: Detailed overview of cert-manager setup

cert-manager is a tool for managing X.509 certificates in Kubernetes. As shown in Figure 3, cert-manager will make sure that certificates are valid and up-to-date and attempt to renew them before they expire. By using add-ons, you can configure different backends for issuing X.509 certificates. In this post, we explore how to integrate cert-manager with AWS Private CA using the aws-privateca-issuer add-on. The aws-privateca-issuer add-on defines two custom resources, AWSPCAIssuer and AWSPCAClusterIssuer, which are used to configure the link to AWS Private CA. They are similar to the Issuer and ClusterIssuer resources that come with cert-manager, but specific to aws-privateca-issuer.

After the AWSPCAIssuer or AWSPCAClusterIssuer is available, aws-privateca-issuer authenticates towards AWS APIs using temporary security credentials obtained from IAM Roles Anywhere. cert-manager watches for the certificate resource, which references to an AWSPCAIssuer, which in turn references to AWS Private CA. aws-privatca-issuer requests a certificate from AWS Private CA. The auto-generated private key and the signed certificate are stored in Kubernetes secrets.

Using certificates and secrets

cert-manager supports multiple ways of integrating into your Kubernetes workloads. You can use certificate resources, which represent a human-readable definition of a certificate signing request (CSR) and contain information on certificate lifespan and renewal time. When using a certificate, the auto-generated private key and the signed certificate are stored in Kubernetes secrets.

With this option, an X.509 certificate is issued manually and saved as a secret. After a PKI is configured as an issuer, a certificate resource is created to automate the renewal of the certificate. With the certificate resource, the lifecycle of certificates is decoupled from the lifecycle of the pods that use them. This allows you to bootstrap the X.509 certificate even before the trusted PKI is deployed.

Using the CSI driver

Another way of integrating cert-manager is by using a CSI driver. In this case, the certificate lifecycle is bound to the lifecycle of the pod. An X.509 certificate and private key are mounted into a predefined folder where your workloads can read them. On pod creation, cert-manager automatically creates a private key and requests a certificate for the configured trusted PKI. When the pod is deleted, the private key and certificate are also deleted and become invalid because they aren’t renewed by cert-manager.

In this post, we use the CSI driver approach for workloads to create ephemeral certificates for IAM Roles Anywhere.

Workload configuration

Figure 4 shows a detailed view of how pods can be configured to use IAM Roles Anywhere without needing to change the underlying Docker images by using a sidecar that provides an IMDSv2 endpoint that mimics the behavior in the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instance metadata endpoint.

Figure 4: Pod configuration using a sidecar

Figure 4: Pod configuration using a sidecar

As shown in Figure 4, when using a certificate resource, the auto-generated private key and the signed certificate are stored in Kubernetes secrets and mounted into the pod. When using the CSI driver, a private key is generated locally (for the pod), a certificate is requested from cert-manager based on the given attributes and is issued by AWSPCAIssuer, and the certificates are mounted directly into the pod with no intermediate secret being created.

IAM Roles Anywhere uses the CreateSession API to authenticate requests with a SigV4a signature using the private key and its associated X.509 certificate. This exchange provides a IAM role session credential, as if you had assumed the IAM role. The aws_signing_helper binary is provided to call the CreateSession API from the command line. In this post, a sidecar container that provides an IMDSv2 endpoint to the workload container is used. This container uses the aws_signing_helper binary and uses its serve command.

This way, applications using AWS SDKs can use the AWS_EC2_METADATA_SERVICE_ENDPOINT environment variable to set the instance metadata endpoint to the correct port on the localhost interface. The X.509 certificate and private key are provided as files to the sidecar container.

Solution deployment

In this section, we show the steps needed to deploy the solution in your AWS account.

Prerequisites

To deploy the solution in this post, make sure that you have the following in place:

  • AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) v2
  • An AWS account and IAM permissions for IAM, IAM Roles Anywhere, and AWS Private CA
  • Latest stable Kubernetes
  • kubectl (matching your Kubernetes version)
  • Helm 3
  • jq

Note: As an alternative to using the AWS CLI, you can use the AWS Controllers for Kubernetes (ACK) service controller for AWS Private CA for creating and managing CertificateAuthority, Certificate, and CertificateAuthorityActivation resources directly within your Kubernetes cluster. After establishing your CA hierarchy using the ACK controller, you can proceed with the subsequent steps involving IAM Roles Anywhere integration, aws-privateca-issuer, and cert-manager as described in this post.

Step 1 – AWS Private CA

  1. Set up a root CA in AWS Private CA, which will issue short lived certificates for your pods. In this example you use only one CA; for production environments, you should check the considerations for designing CA hierarchies. Start by using the AWS CLI to create a configuration.
    cat <<EOF > ca-config.json
    {
       "KeyAlgorithm":"RSA_2048",
       "SigningAlgorithm":"SHA256WITHRSA",
       "Subject":{
          "Country":"DE",
          "Organization":"Example Corp",
          "OrganizationalUnit":"SREs",
          "State":"HE",
          "Locality":"FRANKFURT",
          "CommonName":"Blogpost CA"
       }
    }
    EOF

  2. Create the CA in AWS Private CA with short-lived certificates mode.
    aws acm-pca create-certificate-authority \
      --certificate-authority-configuration file://ca-config.json \
      --certificate-authority-type "ROOT" \
      --usage-mode SHORT_LIVED_CERTIFICATE

  3. The command will return a CertificateAuthorityArn, which you will need for further commands, so export it for later use. Replace <region> with your AWS Region.
    export PCA_ARN=arn:aws:acm-pca:<region>:012345678912:certificate-authority/8213159d-cad0-481c-bf14-a0ced4d6d479

  4. After creating the root CA, the CA is in a pending state. You need to create a CSR.
    aws acm-pca get-certificate-authority-csr \
         --certificate-authority-arn ${PCA_ARN} \
         --output text > ca.csr

  5. Now, the CSR needs to be signed by the root CA.
    aws acm-pca issue-certificate \
         --certificate-authority-arn ${PCA_ARN} \
         --csr fileb://ca.csr \
         --signing-algorithm SHA256WITHRSA \
         --template-arn arn:aws:acm-pca:::template/RootCACertificate/V1 \
         --validity Value=365,Type=DAYS

  6. This command returns a CertificateArn which you will need later. Export it.
    export ROOT_CA_CERTIFICATE_ARN=arn:aws:acm-pca:<region>:012345678912:certificate-authority/8213159d-cad0-481c-bf14-a0ced4d6d479/certificate/5830e475088eee553bd409b7f4964613

  7. Download the root CA certificate and upload it to your AWS Private CA.
    aws acm-pca get-certificate \
        --certificate-authority-arn ${PCA_ARN} \
        --certificate-arn ${ROOT_CA_CERTIFICATE_ARN} \
        --output text > cert.pem
    
    aws acm-pca import-certificate-authority-certificate \
         --certificate-authority-arn ${PCA_ARN} \
         --certificate fileb://cert.pem

  8. Verify the status of the PCA, it should be ACTIVE.
    aws acm-pca describe-certificate-authority \
        --certificate-authority-arn ${PCA_ARN} \
        --output json

Step 2 – IAM Roles Anywhere

At this point your root CA is set up and ready to use. The next step is to configure IAM Roles Anywhere.

  1. Start by defining a trust anchor that will refer to your newly created AWS Private CA and export the trustAnchorArn. Replace <value-of-trustAnchorArn> with the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) value of your IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchor.
    aws rolesanywhere create-trust-anchor \
    --name onprem-k8s-issuer \
    --enabled \
    --source sourceType=AWS_ACM_PCA,sourceData={acmPcaArn=${PCA_ARN}}
    
    export TRUST_ANCHOR_ARN=<value-of-trustAnchorArn>

  2. Create an IAM role to be used by the aws-privateca-issuer cert-manager plugin. This role needs to include the actions sts:AssumeRole, sts:SetSourceIdentity and sts:TagSession, which are required by IAMRA. Replace <TA_ID> with your trust anchor.

    Note: You should specify a PrincipalTag with the CN. Furthermore, it should be scoped to the IAMRA service principal. This further restricts authorization based on attributes that are extracted from the X.509 certificate and provides an additional layer of security by helping to ensure that even if an unauthorized party gains access to a valid certificate, they cannot assume the role unless the certificate’s CN matches the specified value.

    cat <<EOF > trust-policy.json
    {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [{
            "Sid": "Statement1",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "Service": "rolesanywhere.amazonaws.com"
            },
            "Action": [
                "sts:AssumeRole",
                "sts:SetSourceIdentity",
                "sts:TagSession"
            ],
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "aws:PrincipalTag/x509Subject/CN": "iamra-issuer"
                },
                "ArnEquals": {
                    "aws:SourceArn": [
                        "arn:aws:rolesanywhere:<region>:012345678912:trust-anchor/<TA_ID>"
                    ]
                }
    
            }
        }]
    }
    EOF

    • Use the following to create the iamra-issuer role:
      aws iam create-role --role-name iamra-issuer \
        --assume-role-policy-document file://trust-policy.json

  3. The command will return a JSON document containing information about the newly created role. Export the ARN for later use.
    export IAMRA_ISSUER_ROLE=arn:aws:iam::012345678912:role/iamra-issuer

  4. Attach an inline policy that allows the role request certificates from your PCA and retrieve these. Note that there is a condition limiting the AWS Private CA templates to only allow EndEntityCertificate.
    cat <<EOF > inline-policy.json
    {
      "Version": "2012-10-17",
      "Statement": [
        {
          "Sid": "awspcaissuerread",
          "Action": [
            "acm-pca:DescribeCertificateAuthority",
            "acm-pca:GetCertificate"
          ],
          "Effect": "Allow",
          "Resource": "$PCA_ARN"
        },
        {
          "Sid": "awspcaissuerwrite",
          "Action": [
            "acm-pca:IssueCertificate"
          ],
          "Effect": "Allow",
          "Resource": "$PCA_ARN",
          "Condition":{
            "StringEquals":{
              "acm-pca:TemplateArn":"arn:aws:acm-pca:::template/EndEntityCertificate/V1"
            }
          }
        }
      ]
    }
    EOF

    • Use the following to associate the inline policy (created in the preceding step) with the iamra-issuer role.
      aws iam put-role-policy --role-name iamra-issuer \
        --policy-name iamra-issuer \
        --policy-document file://inline-policy.json

  5. To finish, create a profile that defines which IAM roles can be assumed and then export the returned ARN.
    aws rolesanywhere create-profile --name iamra-issuer \
      --role-arns ${IAMRA_ISSUER_ROLE} \
      --enabled

    • Export the returned ARN:
      export IAMRA_PROFILE_ARN=arn:aws:rolesanywhere:<region>:012345678912:profile/<Profile_ID>

The created role iamra-issuer will only be used by the aws-privateca-issuer to integrate with AWS Private CA. You should repeat the process of creating IAM roles and IAMRA profiles for your workloads. it’s recommended to create a separate IAM role for each workload and limit its use with condition statements in the trust policy, checking for the workload identity and trust anchor (for example, matching the common name). Furthermore, it’s important that you add IAMRA to the trust policy and allow the aforementioned actions. Best practice with IAM roles is to apply least-privilege permissions.

Step 3 – Create the init container

To integrate IAM Roles Anywhere within your Kubernetes environment, you need to provide an IMDSv2 endpoint to your application containers by running the aws_signing_helper binary as a sidecar. You also need to configure your applications using an environment variable to use the new instance metadata endpoint. To do so, build a Docker image that works as a sidecar.

In this step, create a basic image that fulfills the preceding requirements. In your environment, you might want to adapt this example to use your own base image and implement your image hardening processes.

Copy the following script and save it as init.sh.

#!/bin/sh

if [[ -z "$TRUST_ANCHOR_ARN" ]]; then
  echo "Must provide TRUST_ANCHOR_ARN environment variable." 1>&2
  exit 1
fi

if [[ -z "$PROFILE_ARN" ]]; then
  echo "Must provide PROFILE_ARN environment variable." 1>&2
  exit 1
fi

if [[ -z "$ROLE_ARN" ]]; then
  echo "Must provide ROLE_ARN environment variable." 1>&2
  exit 1
fi

echo "starting IMDSv2 endpoint with aws_signing_helper ..."
/aws_signing_helper serve \
  --certificate /iamra/tls.crt         \
  --private-key /iamra/tls.key         \
  --trust-anchor-arn $TRUST_ANCHOR_ARN \
  --profile-arn $PROFILE_ARN           \
  --role-arn $ROLE_ARN

This script is the entry point of the sidecar container. It expects the environment variables TRUST_ANCHOR_ARN, PROFILE_ARN, and ROLE_ARN, which are required by aws_signing_helper. It also expects an X.509 certificate and its private key in the folder /iamra, which will be mounted in a later stage during pod initialization. Finally, it invokes the aws_signing_helper with the serve directive which creates an IMDSv2 endpoint listening on 9911 by default. This can be customized using the --port parameter.

Now let’s inspect the Docker file.

Note: At the time of writing, we used the alpine3.17.0 image. Use a hardened base image that’s designed to be secure and aligns with the requirements of your environment.

FROM alpine:3.17.0

COPY init.sh .
RUN apk add --no-cache libc6-compat libgcc wget
RUN wget https://rolesanywhere.amazonaws.com/releases/1.3.0/X86_64/Linux/aws_signing_helper
RUN chmod +x /aws_signing_helper /init.sh 
RUN ln -s /lib/libc.musl-x86_64.so.1 /lib/libresolv.so.2
ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c", "/init.sh"]

This Docker file copies the init.sh and downloads the aws_signing_helper binary. The init.sh script is defined as an entry point to the container. Dynamic libraries required by aws_signing_helper are installed using Alpine Linux package manager (Apk).

Now build the docker image, sign in to it, and push it for later use. For the following commands replace <my-docker-registry> with the hostname of your local registry or use an ECR Repository.

docker build . -t <my-docker-registry>/iamra-sidecar
docker login <my-docker-registry>
docker push <my-docker-registry>/iamra-sidecar

Step 4 – Install cert-manager

In this step, install cert-manager into your cluster and configure aws-privateca-issuer using a manually bootstrapped certificate. cert-manager-approver-policy is used to control which certificates can be requested by the workloads. Then, set up the cert-manager CSI driver to automatically provision X.509 certificates for your workload pods.

Start with the cert-manager setup:

  1. Add the cert-manager repository to Helm and install the chart.

    Note: At the time of writing, we used cert-manager version 1.16.2. Check for the latest stable version.

    helm repo add jetstack https://charts.jetstack.io
    helm repo update
    helm install \
      cert-manager jetstack/cert-manager \
      --namespace cert-manager \
      --create-namespace \
      --version v1.16.2 \
      --set installCRDs=true \
      --set extraArgs={--controllers='*\,-certificaterequests-approver'}
      
    helm install \
      cert-manager-approver-policy jetstack/cert-manager-approver-policy \
      --namespace cert-manager \
      --wait \
        --set app.approveSignerNames="{\
    issuers.cert-manager.io/*,clusterissuers.cert-manager.io/*,\
    awspcaclusterissuers.awspca.cert-manager.io/*,awspcaissuers.awspca.cert-manager.io/*\
    }"
    
    
    #make modifications in cert-manager-approver-policy and add below permissions
    
    kubectl edit  Clusterrole cert-manager-approver-policy -n cert-manager -o yaml
    
    - apiGroups:
      - awspca.cert-manager.io
      resources:
      - awspcaissuers
      - awspcaclusterissuers
      verbs:
      - get
      - list
      - watch
    - apiGroups:
      - cert-manager.io
      - awspca.cert-manager.io
      resources:
      - signers
      verbs:
      - approve

    Now, install the cert-manager aws-privateca-issuer plugin. This integration connects cert-manager with AWS Private CA and lets you issue short-lived certificates automatically. Currently, aws-privateca-issuer Helm chart doesn’t support IAMRA natively. So, you’re going to use the same init-container to set up IAMRA as for the workload pods.

    You need to issue the first X.509 certificate for aws-privateca-issuer IAMRA manually. Later, cert-manager will renew it automatically.

  2. Create the bootstrap certificate. When asked for a common name, enter iamra-issuer.
    openssl req -out iamra.csr -new -newkey rsa:2048 \
    -nodes -keyout iamra.key
    

    The previous command will create an RSA private key named iamra.key and a certificate signing request name iamra.csr. Now you need to call AWS Private CA to issue the bootstrap certificate.

  3. Set the validity period of the certificate to 1 day so that cert-manager will replace it after it’s set up. The IAM role that’s performing this action must have permissions to AWS Certificate Manager (ACM), IAM, and IAM Roles Anywhere to complete the setup.
    aws acm-pca issue-certificate \
          --certificate-authority-arn ${PCA_ARN} \
          --csr fileb://iamra.csr \
          --signing-algorithm "SHA256WITHRSA" \
          --validity Value=1,Type="DAYS"

  4. The command will return a CertificateArn for your iamra-issuer certificate. Export it and save the certificate to a file.
    export IAMRA_ISSUER_CERT_ARN=arn:aws:acm-pca:<region>:012345678912:certificate-authority/8213159d-cad0-481c-bf14-a0ced4d6d479/certificate/afc47911ed2ded9c2664fa597a33b9fb
    aws acm-pca get-certificate \
          --certificate-authority-arn ${PCA_ARN} \
          --certificate-arn ${IAMRA_ISSUER_CERT_ARN} | \
          jq -r .'Certificate' > iamra-cert.pem

  5. Create a Kubernetes secret that contains the certificate and private key.
    kubectl create secret tls -n cert-manager iamra-issuer \
      --cert=iamra-cert.pem \
      --key=iamra.key

    You’re ready to install the aws-privateca-issuer. You need to modify the Helm chart because it doesn’t currently support IAMRA. You will render the Helm chart into YAML manifests, which are then adapted for IAMRA.

  6. Install the Helm repository and render the charts into a file.
    helm repo add awspca https://cert-manager.github.io/aws-privateca-issuer
     helm template --release-name iamra --include-crds awspca/aws-privateca-issuer \
       -n cert-manager > privateca-issuer.yaml

  7. Add your previously built image as a sidecar and replace the environment variables with your exported values. Search for the deployment definition and add the following section:
    # Source: aws-privateca-issuer/templates/deployment.yaml
    apiVersion: apps/v1
    kind: Deployment
    metadata:
      name: iamra-aws-privateca-issuer
      namespace: cert-manager
      labels:
        helm.sh/chart: aws-privateca-issuer-v1.4.0
        app.kubernetes.io/name: aws-privateca-issuer
        app.kubernetes.io/instance: iamra
        app.kubernetes.io/version: "v1.4.0"
        app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: Helm
    spec:
      replicas: 1
      revisionHistoryLimit: 10
      selector:
        matchLabels:
          app.kubernetes.io/name: aws-privateca-issuer
          app.kubernetes.io/instance: iamra
      template:
        metadata:
          labels:
            app.kubernetes.io/name: aws-privateca-issuer
            app.kubernetes.io/instance: iamra
        spec:
          serviceAccountName: iamra-aws-privateca-issuer
          securityContext:
            runAsUser: 65532
          volumes:
            - name: "iamra-secret"
              projected:
                sources:
                  - secret:
                      name: iamra-issuer
          containers:
            - name: iamra-sidecar
              image: 012345678912.dkr.ecr.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/<replace-with-iamra-sidecar-repository>
              imagePullPolicy: Always
              env:
                - name: "TRUST_ANCHOR_ARN"
                  value: "arn:aws:rolesanywhere:us-east-2:012345678912:trust-anchor/05d183f8-a34e-4f0c-ad2a-de6f803"
                - name: "PROFILE_ARN"
                  value: "arn:aws:rolesanywhere:us-east-2:012345678912:profile/7b45f9a9-73fa-47f8-a20f-88aacbf57"
                - name: "ROLE_ARN"
                  value: "arn:aws:iam::012345678912:role/iamra-issuer"
              volumeMounts:
                - name: iamra-secret
                  mountPath: "/iamra"
                  readOnly: true
            - name: aws-privateca-issuer
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
              image: "public.ecr.aws/k1n1h4h4/cert-manager-aws-privateca-issuer:latest"
              env:
               - name: "AWS_EC2_METADATA_SERVICE_ENDPOINT"
                 value: "http://localhost:9911/"
              imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
              command:
                - /manager
              args:
                - --leader-elect
              ports:
                - containerPort: 8080
                  name: http
              livenessProbe:
                httpGet:
                  path: /healthz
                  port: 8081
                initialDelaySeconds: 15
                periodSeconds: 20
              readinessProbe:
                httpGet:
                  path: /healthz
                  port: 8081
                initialDelaySeconds: 5
                periodSeconds: 10
          terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 10

  8. Apply your modified manifest to install aws-privateca-issuer and verify the deployment you have modified. It should show that one pod is ready and available.
    kubectl apply -f privateca-issuer.yaml
    
    kubectl get deployment -n cert-manager -l app.kubernetes.io/name=aws-privateca-issuer
    
    NAME                         READY   UP-TO-DATE   AVAILABLE   AGE
    iamra-aws-privateca-issuer   1/1     1            1           4d10h

  9. Define an AWSPCAIssuer, which will be used for renewal of the manually bootstrapped certificate for the aws-privateca-issuer add-on.

    Note: At the time of writing, we used awspca cert-manager API version v1beta1. Check for the latest stable version.

    export AWS_REGION=<region>
    cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
    apiVersion: awspca.cert-manager.io/v1beta1
    kind: AWSPCAIssuer
    metadata:
      name: iamra-cm-issuer
      namespace: cert-manager
    spec:
      arn: ${PCA_ARN}
      region: ${AWS_REGION}
    EOF

  10. After at least one AWSPCAIssuer or AWSPCAClusterIssuer is available, aws-privateca-issuer is going to authenticate towards AWS APIs by calling sts.get-caller-identity and verify the authentication method. You can verify this using its log files. It should print the assumed role.
    kubectl logs -n cert-manager -l app.kubernetes.io/name=aws-privateca-issuer -c aws-privateca-issuer | grep -i getcalleridentity
    
    Defaulted container "aws-privateca-issuer" out of: aws-privateca-issuer, iamra-init (init)
    {"level":"info","ts":1669240040.2704494,"logger":"controllers.GenericIssuer","msg":"sts.GetCallerIdentity","genericissuer":"cert-manager/iamra-cm-issuer","arn":"arn:aws:sts::012345678912:assumed-role/iamra-issuer/5bafffcfb691969f0616a9b1a68032ec","account":"012345678912","user_id":"AROA2EIPPI5BVJ6SKBYOY:5bafffcfb691969f0616a9b1a68032ec"}

    Now, you can create a cert-manager Certificate resource that represents a desired certificate that should be issued by the referenced cert-manager Issuer. It combines information of a CSR with details on the validity period and renewal.

  11. Create the certificate object:
    cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f - 
      apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
      kind: Certificate
      metadata:
        name: iamra-privateca-issuer-cert
        namespace: cert-manager
      spec:
        secretName: iamra-issuer
        duration: 168h # 7d
        renewBefore: 24h # 15d
        subject:
          organizations:
            - "Example Corp."
          organizationalUnits:
            - "Admin"
        commonName: "iamra-issuer"
        isCA: false
        usages:
          - "client auth"
          - "server auth"
        issuerRef:
          group: awspca.cert-manager.io
          kind: AWSPCAIssuer
          name: iamra-cm-issuer
      EOF
      helm upgrade -i -n cert-manager cert-manager-csi-driver jetstack/cert-manager-csi-driver --wait
      -- > install policies:
      policy + role + role binding to allow service account to accept certs.
      cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f - 
      apiVersion: policy.cert-manager.io/v1alpha1
      kind: CertificateRequestPolicy
      metadata:
        name: iamra-issuer-policy
      spec:
        allowed:
          commonName:
            required: true
            value: "iamra-issuer"
          subject:
            organizations:
              values: ["Example Corp."]
              required: true
            organizationalUnits:
              values: ["Admin"]
              required: true
          usages:
          - "server auth"
          - "client auth"
        selector:
          issuerRef:
            group: awspca.cert-manager.io
            kind: AWSPCAIssuer
            name: iamra-cm-issuer
      ---
      apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
      kind: ClusterRole
      metadata:
        name: cert-manager-policy:iamra-issuer-policy
      rules:
        - apiGroups: ["policy.cert-manager.io"]
          resources: ["certificaterequestpolicies"]
          verbs: ["use"]
          resourceNames: ["iamra-issuer-policy"]
      ---
      apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
      kind: ClusterRoleBinding
      metadata:
        name: cert-manager-policy:iamra-issuer-policy
      roleRef:
        apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
        kind: ClusterRole
        name: cert-manager-policy:iamra-issuer-policy
      subjects:
      - kind: ServiceAccount
        name: cert-manager
        namespace: cert-manager
      EOF

Step 5 – Deploy your workload

In Step 4, sub-step 9, you created an AWSPCAIssuer named iamra-cm-issuer. You then used this AWSPCAIssuer to renew the manually bootstrapped certificate for the aws-privateca-issuer.

In Step 4, sub-step 11, you created the certificate iamra-privateca-issuer-cert, which is used by the aws-privateca-issuer.

In this step, you will deploy the sample workload. When deploying the sample workload, make sure to repeat the process of creating IAM roles and IAMRA profiles (from Step 2), the AWSPCAIssuer (Step 4, sub-step 9), and the CertificateRequestPolicy (Step 4, sub-step 11) for the certificate request.

For more information on certificate request policies, see the cert-manager documentation on approval policies.

Use the following code to deploy the workload.

cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
  
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
   creationTimestamp: null
   labels:
     run: acmpca-csi-test
   name: acmpca-csi-test
spec:
  containers:
      - name: iamra-sidecar
        image: 056930860237.dkr.ecr.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/aws_sighning:latest
        imagePullPolicy: Always
        env:
          - name: "TRUST_ANCHOR_ARN"
            value: "arn:aws:rolesanywhere:us-east-2:012345678912:trust-anchor/05d183f8-a34e-4f0c-ad2a-de6f803ac172"
          - name: "PROFILE_ARN"
            value: "arn:aws:rolesanywhere:us-east-2:012345678912:profile/7b45f9a9-73fa-47f8-a20f-88aacbf579d2"
          - name: "ROLE_ARN"
            value: "arn:aws:iam::012345678912:role/iam-roles-anywhere-s3-full-access"
        volumeMounts:
          - name: "iamra-csi"
            mountPath: "/iamra"
            readOnly: true
      - name: aws-cli
        image: amazon/aws-cli:latest
        env:
        - name: "AWS_EC2_METADATA_SERVICE_ENDPOINT"
          value: "http://127.0.0.1:9911/"
        command:
          - sleep
          - "3600"
  dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
  restartPolicy: Never
  volumes:
    - name: "iamra-csi"
      csi:
        readOnly: true
        driver: csi.cert-manager.io
        volumeAttributes:
            csi.cert-manager.io/issuer-name: my-pca
            csi.cert-manager.io/issuer-group: awspca.cert-manager.io
            csi.cert-manager.io/issuer-kind: AWSPCAIssuer
            csi.cert-manager.io/common-name: "${SERVICE_ACCOUNT_NAME}.${POD_NAMESPACE}"
            csi.cert-manager.io/duration: 168h
            csi.cert-manager.io/renew-before: 24h
            csi.cert-manager.io/is-ca: "false"
            csi.cert-manager.io/key-usages: "client auth, server auth"
  EOF

Step 6 – Test your deployment

To test the deployment, you can use kubectl exec to access the iamra-sidecar container. Navigate to the iamra directory and check if the certificate and key are mounted.

Command:
kubectl exec -it acmpca-csi-test  – sh
ls | grep iamra

Output: iamra

Command:
cd iamra
/iamra# ls

Output: ca.crt   tls.crt  tls.key

You can also exec into the aws-cli container and verify the caller identity and make API calls to Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3):

Command:
kubectl exec -it acmpca-csi-test -c aws-cli  – sh
$aws sts get-caller-identity

Output: You should see iam-roles-anywhere-s3-full-access in caller-identity.

Command:
$aws s3 ls

Output: You should be able to list the S3 bucket based on the permissions associated with the assumed role.

Summary

In this post, you learned about a solution for securely connecting on-premises Kubernetes workloads to AWS services using IAM Roles Anywhere. The approach alleviates the need for long-term access keys or public internet exposure of the Kubernetes API server. By using this solution for containerized and full stack applications, you can benefit from:

  • Enhanced security: Use short-lived X.509 certificates instead of long-term credentials.
  • Simplified management: Automate the certificate lifecycle with cert-manager and AWS Private CA.
  • Seamless integration: No modifications are required to existing workload Docker files.
  • Consistent policies: Use the same IAM roles and policies across AWS and on premises.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.
 

Varun Sharma
Varun Sharma

Varun is a Senior AWS Cloud Security Engineer who wears his security cape proudly. Varun is a go-to subject matter expert for Amazon Cognito and IAM. When he’s not busy securing the cloud, you’ll find him in the world of security penetration testing. Outside of work, Varun switches gears to capture the beauty of nature through the lens of his camera.
Nishant Mainro
Nishant Mainro

Nishant is a Senior Security Consultant in the AWS Professional Services team and is based in Atlanta, Georgia. He is a technical and passionate Amazonian with over 16 years of professional experience with a specialization in security, risk, and compliance. His specializes developing and enabling security controls at scale to empower customers to achieve the required security goals for their workloads.
Roshini Jagarapu
Roshini Jagarapu

Roshini is an Amazon EKS subject matter expert and an AWS Cloud Support Engineer based in India. She works with services such as Amazon EKS and Amazon ECS, helping customers run at scale. Her day-to-day work involves troubleshooting issues related to container technologies. Roshini conducts learning sessions to educate customers and is passionate about cloud-native solutions.

How to enforce creation of roles in a specific path: Use IAM role naming in hierarchy models

Post Syndicated from Varun Sharma original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-enforce-creation-of-roles-in-a-specific-path-use-iam-role-naming-in-hierarchy-models/

An AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role is an IAM identity that you create in your AWS account that has specific permissions. An IAM role is similar to an IAM user because it’s an AWS identity with permission policies that determine what the identity can and cannot do on AWS. However, as outlined in security best practices in IAM, AWS recommends that you use IAM roles instead of IAM users. An IAM user is uniquely associated with one person, while a role is intended to be assumable by anyone who needs it. An IAM role doesn’t have standard long-term credentials such as a password or access keys associated with it. Instead, when you assume a role, it provides you with temporary security credentials for your role session that are only valid for certain period of time.

This blog post explores the effective implementation of security controls within IAM roles, placing a specific focus on the IAM role’s path feature. By organizing IAM roles hierarchically using paths, you can address key challenges and achieve practical solutions to enhance IAM role management.

Benefits of using IAM paths

A fundamental benefit of using paths is the establishment of a clear and organized organizational structure. By using paths, you can handle diverse use cases while creating a well-defined framework for organizing roles on AWS. This organizational clarity can help you navigate complex IAM setups and establish a cohesive structure that’s aligned with your organizational needs.

Furthermore, by enforcing a specific structure, you can gain precise control over the scope of permissions assigned to roles, helping to reduce the risk of accidental assignment of overly permissive policies. By assisting in preventing inadvertent policy misconfigurations and assisting in coordinating permissions with the planned organizational structure, this proactive solution improves security. This approach is highly effective when you consistently apply established naming conventions to paths, role names, and policies. Enforcing a uniform approach to role naming enhances the standardization and efficiency of IAM role management. This practice fosters smooth collaboration and reduces the risk of naming conflicts.

Path example

In IAM, a role path is a way to organize and group IAM roles within your AWS account. You specify the role path as part of the role’s Amazon Resource Name (ARN).

As an example, imagine that you have a group of IAM roles related to development teams, and you want to organize them under a path. You might structure it like this:

Role name: Dev App1 admin
Role path: /D1/app1/admin/
Full ARN: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/D1/app1/admin/DevApp1admin

Role name: Dev App2 admin
Role path: /D2/app2/admin/
Full ARN: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/D2/app2/admin/DevApp2admin

In this example, the IAM roles DevApp1admin and DevApp2admin are organized under two different development team paths: D1/app1/admin and D2/app2/admin, respectively. The role path provides a way to group roles logically, making it simpler to manage and understand their purpose within the context of your organization.

Solution overview

Figure 1: Sample architecture

Figure 1: Sample architecture

The sample architecture in Figure 1 shows how you can separate and categorize the enterprise roles and development team roles into a hierarchy model by using a path in an IAM role. Using this hierarchy model, you can enable several security controls at the level of the service control policy (SCP), IAM policy, permissions boundary, or the pipeline. I recommend that you avoid incorporating business unit names in paths because they could change over time.

Here is what the IAM role path looks like as an ARN:

arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EnT/iam/adm/IAMAdmin

In this example, in the resource name, /EnT/iam/adm/ is the role path, and IAMAdmin is the role name.

You can now use the role path as part of a policy, such as the following:

arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EnT/iam/adm/*

In this example, in the resource name, /EnT/iam/adm/ is the role path, and * indicates any IAM role inside this path.

Walkthrough of examples for preventative controls

Now let’s walk through some example use cases and SCPs for a preventative control that you can use based on the path of an IAM role.

PassRole preventative control example

The following SCP denies passing a role for enterprise roles, except for roles that are part of the IAM admin hierarchy within the overall enterprise hierarchy.

		{
	"Version": "2012-10-17",
	"Statement": [
		{
			"Sid": "DenyEnTPassRole",
			"Effect": "Deny",
			"Action": "iam:PassRole",
			"Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/*",
			"Condition": {
				"ArnNotLike": {
					"aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/fed/iam/*"
				}
			}
		}
	]
}

With just a couple of statements in the SCP, this preventative control helps provide protection to your high-privilege roles for enterprise roles, regardless of the role’s name or current status.

This example uses the following paths:

  • /EnT/ — enterprise roles (roles owned by the central teams, such as cloud center of excellence, central security, and networking teams)
  • /fed/ — federated roles, which have interactive access
  • /iam/ — roles that are allowed to perform IAM actions, such as CreateRole, AttachPolicy, or DeleteRole

IAM actions preventative control example

The following SCP restricts IAM actions, including CreateRole, DeleteRole, AttachRolePolicy, and DetachRolePolicy, on the enterprise path.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "DenyIAMActionsonEnTRoles",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": [
                "iam:CreateRole",
                "iam:DeleteRole",
                "iam:DetachRolePolicy",
                "iam:AttachRolePolicy"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/*",
            "Condition": {
                "ArnNotLike": {
                    "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/fed/iam/*"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

This preventative control denies an IAM role that is outside of the enterprise hierarchy from performing the actions CreateRole, DeleteRole, DetachRolePolicy, and AttachRolePolicy in this hierarchy. Every IAM role will be denied those API actions except the one with the path as arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/fed/iam/*

The example uses the following paths:

  • /EnT/ — enterprise roles (roles owned by the central teams, such as cloud center of excellence, central security, or network automation teams)
  • /fed/ — federated roles, which have interactive access
  • /iam/ — roles that are allowed to perform IAM actions (in this case, CreateRole, DeteleRole, DetachRolePolicy, and AttachRolePolicy)

IAM policies preventative control example

The following SCP policy denies attaching certain high-privilege AWS managed policies such as AdministratorAccess outside of certain IAM admin roles. This is especially important in an environment where business units have self-service capabilities.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "RolePolicyAttachment",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": "iam:AttachRolePolicy",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/EnT/fed/iam/*",
            "Condition": {
                "ArnNotLike": {
                    "iam:PolicyARN": "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

AssumeRole preventative control example

The following SCP doesn’t allow non-production roles to assume a role in production accounts. Make sure to replace <Your production OU ID> and <your org ID> with your own information.

{
	"Version": "2012-10-17",
	"Statement": [
		{
			"Sid": "DenyAssumeRole",
			"Effect": "Deny",
			"Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
			"Resource": "*",
			"Condition": {
				"StringLike": {
					"aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/np/*"
				},
				"ForAnyValue:StringLike": {
					"aws:ResourceOrgPaths": "<your org ID>/r-xxxx/<Your production OU ID>/*"
				}
			}
		}
	]
}

This example uses the /np/ path, which specifies non-production roles. The SCP denies non-production IAM roles from assuming a role in the production organizational unit (OU) (in our example, this is represented by <your org ID>/r-xxxx/<Your production OU ID>/*”). Depending on the structure of your organization, the ResourceOrgPaths will have one of the following formats:

  • “o-a1b2c3d4e5/*”
  • “o-a1b2c3d4e5/r-ab12/ou-ab12-11111111/*”
  • “o-a1b2c3d4e5/r-ab12/ou-ab12-11111111/ou-ab12-22222222/”

Walkthrough of examples for monitoring IAM roles (detective control)

Now let’s walk through two examples of detective controls.

AssumeRole in CloudTrail Lake

The following is an example of a detective control to monitor IAM roles in AWS CloudTrail Lake.

SELECT
    userIdentity.arn as "Username", eventTime, eventSource, eventName, sourceIPAddress, errorCode, errorMessage
FROM
    <Event data store ID>
WHERE
    userIdentity.arn IS NOT NULL
    AND eventName = 'AssumeRole'
    AND userIdentity.arn LIKE '%/np/%'
    AND errorCode = 'AccessDenied'
    AND eventTime > '2023-07-01 14:00:00'
    AND eventTime < '2023-11-08 18:00:00';

This query lists out AssumeRole events for non-production roles in the organization for AccessDenied errors. The output is stored in an Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) bucket from CloudTrail Lake, from which the csv file can be downloaded. The following shows some example output:

Username,eventTime,eventSource,eventName,sourceIPAddress,errorCode,errorMessage
arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/np/test,2023-12-09 10:35:45.000,iam.amazonaws.com,AssumeRole,11.11.113.113,AccessDenied,User: arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/np/test is not authorized to perform: sts:AssumeRole on resource: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/hello because no identity-based policy allows the sts:AssumeRole action

You can modify the query to audit production roles as well.

CreateRole in CloudTrail Lake

Another example of a CloudTrail Lake query for a detective control is as follows:

SELECT
    userIdentity.arn as "Username", eventTime, eventSource, eventName, sourceIPAddress, errorCode, errorMessage
FROM
    <Event data store ID>
WHERE
    userIdentity.arn IS NOT NULL
    AND eventName = 'CreateRole'
    AND userIdentity.arn LIKE '%/EnT/fed/iam/%'
    AND eventTime > '2023-07-01 14:00:00'
    AND eventTime < '2023-11-08 18:00:00';

This query lists out CreateRole events for roles in the /EnT/fed/iam/ hierarchy. The following are some example outputs:

Username,eventTime,eventSource,eventName,sourceIPAddress,errorCode,errorMessage

arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/EnT/fed/iam/security/test,2023-12-09 16:31:11.000,iam.amazonaws.com,CreateRole,10.10.10.10,AccessDenied,User: arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/EnT/fed/iam/security/test is not authorized to perform: iam:CreateRole on resource: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EnT/fed/iam/security because no identity-based policy allows the iam:CreateRole action

arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/EnT/fed/iam/security/test,2023-12-09 16:33:10.000,iam.amazonaws.com,CreateRole,10.10.10.10,AccessDenied,User: arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/EnT/fed/iam/security/test is not authorized to perform: iam:CreateRole on resource: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EnT/fed/iam/security because no identity-based policy allows the iam:CreateRole action

Because these roles can create additional enterprise roles, you should audit roles created in this hierarchy.

Important considerations

When you implement specific paths for IAM roles, make sure to consider the following:

  • The path of an IAM role is part of the ARN. After you define the ARN, you can’t change it later. Therefore, just like the name of the role, consider what the path should be during the early discussions of design.
  • IAM roles can’t have the same name, even on different paths.
  • When you switch roles through the console, you need to include the path because it’s part of the role’s ARN.
  • The path of an IAM role can’t exceed 512 characters. For more information, see IAM and AWS STS quotas.
  • The role name can’t exceed 64 characters. If you intend to use a role with the Switch Role feature in the AWS Management Console, then the combined path and role name can’t exceed 64 characters.
  • When you create a role through the console, you can’t set an IAM role path. To set a path for the role, you need to use automation, such as AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) commands or SDKs. For example, you might use an AWS CloudFormation template or a script that interacts with AWS APIs to create the role with the desired path.

Conclusion

By adopting the path strategy, you can structure IAM roles within a hierarchical model, facilitating the implementation of security controls on a scalable level. You can make these controls effective for IAM roles by applying them to a path rather than specific roles, which sets this approach apart.

This strategy can help you elevate your overall security posture within IAM, offering a forward-looking solution for enterprises. By establishing a scalable IAM hierarchy, you can help your organization navigate dynamic changes through a robust identity management structure. A well-crafted hierarchy reduces operational overhead by providing a versatile framework that makes it simpler to add or modify roles and policies. This scalability can help streamline the administration of IAM and help your organization manage access control in evolving environments.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS Security, Identity, & Compliance re:Post or contact AWS Support.

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Varun Sharma

Varun Sharma

Varun is an AWS Cloud Security Engineer who wears his security cape proudly. With a knack for unravelling the mysteries of Amazon Cognito and IAM, Varun is a go-to subject matter expert for these services. When he’s not busy securing the cloud, you’ll find him in the world of security penetration testing. And when the pixels are at rest, Varun switches gears to capture the beauty of nature through the lens of his camera.

Export a Software Bill of Materials using Amazon Inspector

Post Syndicated from Varun Sharma original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/export-a-software-bill-of-materials-using-amazon-inspector/

Amazon Inspector is an automated vulnerability management service that continually scans Amazon Web Services (AWS) workloads for software vulnerabilities and unintended network exposure. Amazon Inspector has expanded capability that allows customers to export a consolidated Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for supported Amazon Inspector monitored resources, excluding Windows EC2 instances.

Customers have asked us to provide additional software application inventory collected from Amazon Inspector monitored resources. This makes it possible to precisely track the software supply chain and security threats that might be connected to the results of the current Amazon Inspector. Generating an SBOM gives you critical security information that offers you visibility into specifics about your software supply chain, including the packages you use the most frequently and the related vulnerabilities that might affect your whole company.

This blog post includes steps that you can follow to export a consolidated SBOM for the resources monitored by Amazon Inspector across your organization in industry standard formats, including CycloneDx and SPDX. It also shares insights and approaches for analyzing SBOM artifacts using Amazon Athena.

Overview

An SBOM is defined as a nested inventory with a list of ingredients that make up software components. Security teams can export a consolidated SBOM to Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) for an entire organization from the resource coverage page in the AWS Management Console for Amazon Inspector.

Using CycloneDx and SPDX industry standard formats, you can use insights gained from an SBOM to make decisions such as which software packages need to be updated across your organization or deprecated, if there’s no other option. Individual application or security engineers can also export an SBOM for a single resource or group of resources by applying filters for a specific account, resource type, resource ID, tags, or a combination of these as a part of the SBOM export workflow in the console or application programming interfaces.

Exporting SBOMs

To export Amazon Inspector SBOM reports to an S3 bucket, you must create and configure a bucket in the AWS Region where the SBOM reports are to be exported. You must configure your bucket permissions to allow only Amazon Inspector to put new objects into the bucket. This prevents other AWS services and users from adding objects to the bucket.

Each SBOM report is stored in an S3 bucket and has the name Cyclonedx_1_4 (Json) or Spdx_2_3-compatible (Json), depending on the export format that you specify. You can also use S3 event notifications to alert different operational teams that new SBOM reports have been exported.

Amazon Inspector requires that you use an AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) key to encrypt the SBOM report. The key must be a customer managed, symmetric KMS encryption key and must be in the same Region as the S3 bucket that you configured to store the SBOM report. The new KMS key for the SBOM report requires a key policy to be configured to grant permissions for Amazon Inspector to use the key. (Shown in Figure 1.)

Figure 1: Amazon Inspector SBOM export

Figure 1: Amazon Inspector SBOM export

Deploy prerequisites

The AWS CloudFormation template provided creates an S3 bucket with an associated bucket policy to enable Amazon Inspector to export SBOM report objects into the bucket. The template also creates a new KMS key to be used for SBOM report exports and grants the Amazon Inspector service permissions to use the key.

The export can be initiated from the AWS Inspector delegated administrator account or the AWS Inspector administrator account itself. This way, the S3 bucket contains reports for the AWS Inspector member accounts. To export the SBOM reports from Amazon Inspector deployed in the same Region, make sure the CloudFormation template is deployed within the AWS account and Region. If you enabled AWS Inspector in multiple accounts, the CloudFormation stack must be deployed in each Region where AWS Inspector is enabled.

To deploy the CloudFormation template

  1. Choose the following Launch Stack button to launch a CloudFormation stack in your account.

    Launch Stack

  2. Review the stack name and the parameters (MyKMSKeyName and MyS3BucketName) for the template. Note that the S3 bucket name must be unique.
  3. Choose Next and confirm the stack options.
  4. Go to the next page and choose Submit. The deployment of the CloudFormation stack will take 1–2 minutes.

After the CloudFormation stack has deployed successfully, you can use the S3 bucket and KMS key created by the stack to export SBOM reports.

Export SBOM reports

After setup is complete, you can export SBOM reports to an S3 bucket.

To export SBOM reports from the console

  1. Navigate to the AWS Inspector console in the same Region where the S3 bucket and KMS key were created.
  2. Select Export SBOMs from the navigation pane.
  3. Add filters to create reports for specific subsets of resources. The SBOMs for all active, supported resources are exported if you don’t supply a filter.
  4. Select the export file type you want. Options are Cyclonedx_1_4 (Json) or Spdx_2_3-compatible (Json).
  5. Enter the S3 bucket URI from the output section of the CloudFormation template and enter the KMS key that was created.
  6. Choose Export. It can take 3–5 minutes to complete depending on the number of artifacts to be exported.
Figure 2: SBOM export configuration

Figure 2: SBOM export configuration

When complete, all SBOM artifacts will be in the S3 bucket. This gives you the flexibility to download the SBOM artifacts from the S3 bucket, or you can use Amazon S3 Select to retrieve a subset of data from an object using standard SQL queries.

Figure 3: Amazon S3 Select

Figure 3: Amazon S3 Select

You can also run advanced queries using Amazon Athena or create dashboards using Amazon QuickSight to gain insights and map trends.

Querying and visualization

With Athena, you can run SQL queries on raw data that’s stored in S3 buckets. The Amazon Inspector reports are exported to an S3 bucket, and you can query the data and create tables by following the Adding an AWS Glue crawler tutorial.

To enable AWS Glue to crawl the S3 data, you must add the role as described in the AWS Glue crawler tutorial to the AWS KMS key permissions so that AWS Glue can decrypt the S3 data.

The following is an example policy JSON that you can update for your use case. Make sure to replace the AWS account ID <111122223333> and S3 bucket name <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET-111122223333> with your own information.

{
    "Sid": "Allow the AWS Glue crawler usage of the KMS key",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": {
        "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::<111122223333>:role/service-role/AWSGlueServiceRole-S3InspectorSBOMReports"
    },
    "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey*"
    ],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::<DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET-111122223333>"
},

Note: The role created for AWS Glue also needs permission to read the S3 bucket where the reports are exported for creating the crawlers. The AWS Glue AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role allows the crawler to run and access your Amazon S3 data stores.

After an AWS Glue Data Catalog has been built, you can run the crawler on a scheduled basis to help ensure that it’s kept up to date with the latest Amazon Inspector SBOM manifests as they’re exported into the S3 bucket.

You can further navigate to the added table using the crawler and view the data in Athena. Using Athena, you can run queries against the Amazon Inspector reports to generate output data relevant to your environment. The schema for the generated SBOM report is different depending on the specific resources (Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), AWS Lambda, Amazon Elastic Container Registry (Amazon ECR)) in the reports. So, depending on the schema, you can create a SQL Athena query to fetch information from the reports.

The following is an Athena example query that identifies the top 10 vulnerabilities for resources in an SBOM report. You can use the common vulnerability and exposures (CVE) IDs from the report to list the individual components affected by the CVEs.

SELECT
   account,
   vuln.id as vuln_id, 
   count(*) as vuln_count
FROM
   <Insert_table_name>,
   UNNEST(Inset_table_name.vulnerabilities)as t(vuln)
GROUP BY
   account,
   vuln.id
ORDER BY
vuln_count DESC
LIMIT 10;

The following Athena example query can be used to identify the top 10 operating systems (OS) along with the resource types and their count.

SELECT
   resource,
   metadata.component.name as os_name,
   count(*) as os_count 
FROM
   <Insert_table_name>
WHERE
   resource = 'AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION'
GROUP BY
   resource,
   metadata.component.name 
ORDER BY
   os_count DESC 
LIMIT 10;

If you have a package that has a critical vulnerability and you need to know if the package is used as a primary package or adds a dependency, you can use the following Athena sample query to check for the package in your application. In this example, I’m searching for a Log4j package. The result returns account ID, resource type, package_name, and package_count.

SELECT
   account,
   resource,
   comp.name as package_name,
   count(*) as package_count 
FROM
   <Insert_Table _name>,
   UNNEST(<Insert_Table_name>.components) as t(comp) 
WHERE
   comp.name = 'Log4j' 
GROUP BY
   account,
   comp.name,
   resource 
ORDER BY
   package_count DESC 
LIMIT 10 ;

Note: The sample Athena queries must be customized depending on the schema of the SBOM export report.

To further extend this solution, you can use Amazon QuickSight to produce dashboards to visualize the data by connecting to the AWS Glue table.

Conclusion

The new SBOM generation capabilities in Amazon Inspector improve visibility into the software supply chain by providing a comprehensive list of software packages across multiple levels of dependencies. You can also use SBOMs to monitor the licensing information for each of the software packages and identify potential licensing violations in your organization, helping you avoid potential legal risks.

The most important benefit of SBOM export is to help you comply with industry regulations and standards. By providing an industry-standard format (SPDX and CycloneDX) and enabling easy integration with other tools, systems, or services (such as Nexus IQ and WhiteSource), you can streamline the incident response processes, improve the accuracy and speed of security assessments, and adhere to compliance with regulatory requirements.

In addition to these benefits, the SBOM export feature provides a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the OS packages and software libraries found in their resources, further enhancing your ability to adhere to industry regulations and standards.

 
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Varun Sharma

Varun Sharma

Varun is an AWS Cloud Security Engineer who wears his security cape proudly. With a knack for unravelling the mysteries of Amazon Cognito and IAM, Varun is a go-to subject matter expert for these services. When he’s not busy securing the cloud, you’ll find him in the world of security penetration testing. And when the pixels are at rest, Varun switches gears to capture the beauty of nature through the lens of his camera.