Tag Archives: Hacking Tools

SAML Raider – SAML2 Security Testing Burp Extension

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SAML Raider is a Burp Suite extension for SAML2 security testing, it contains two core functionalities – Manipulating SAML Messages and managing X.509 certificates. The extension is divided into two parts, a SAML message editor and a certificate management tool. Features Message Editor Features of the SAML Raider message editor: Sign SAML Messages…

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faker.js – Tool To Generate Fake Data For Testing

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faker.js is a tool to generate fake data in Node.js and in the browser, it has a lot of different data types to enable you to generate very customised and complete sets of fake or mock data for testing purposes. It also supports multiple languages and locales and can generate a lot of data types […]

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jSQL – Automatic SQL Injection Tool In Java

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jSQL is an automatic SQL Injection tool written in Java, it’s lightweight and supports 23 kinds of database. It is free, open source and cross-platform (Windows, Linux, Mac OS X) and is easily available in Kali, Pentest Box, Parrot Security OS, ArchStrike or BlackArch Linux. Features Automatic injection of 23 kinds of databases: Access CockroachDB…

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Jack – Drag & Drop Clickjacking Tool For PoCs

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Jack is a Drag and Drop web-based Clickjacking Tool for the assistance of development in PoCs made with static HTML and JavaScript. Jack is web based and requires either a web server to serve its HTML and JS content or can be run locally. Typically something like Apache will suffice but anything that is able […]

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CrackMapExec – Active Directory Post-Exploitation Tool

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CrackMapExec (a.k.a CME) is a post-exploitation tool that helps automate assessing the security of large Active Directory networks. Built with stealth in mind, CME follows the concept of “Living off the Land”: abusing built-in Active Directory features/protocols to achieve its functionality and allowing it to evade most endpoint protection/IDS/IPS…

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EvilAbigail – Automated Evil Maid Attack For Linux

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EvilAbigail is a Python-based tool that allows you run an automated Evil Maid attack on Linux systems, this is the Initrd encrypted root fs attack. An Evil Maid attack is a type of attack that targets a computer device that has been shut down and left unattended. An Evil Maid attack is characterized by the […]

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Ghost Phisher – Phishing Attack Tool With GUI

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Ghost Phisher is a Wireless and Ethernet security auditing and phishing attack tool written using the Python Programming Language and the Python Qt GUI library, the program is able to emulate access points and deploy. The tool comes with a fake DNS server, fake DHCP server, fake HTTP server and also has an integrated area […]

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Bluto – DNS Recon, Zone Transfer & Brute Forcer

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Bluto is a Python-based tool for DNS recon, DNS zone transfer testing, DNS wild card checks, DNS brute forcing, e-mail enumeration and more. The target domain is queried for MX and NS records. Sub-domains are passively gathered via NetCraft. The target domain NS records are each queried for potential Zone Transfers. If none of them […]

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dork-cli – Command-line Google Dork Tool

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dork-cli is a Python-based command-line Google Dork Tool to perform searches againsts Google’s custom search engine. A command-line option is always good as it allows you to script it in as part of your automated pen-testing suite. It will return a list of all the unique page results it finds, optionally filtered by a set […]

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T50 – The Fastest Mixed Packet Injector Tool

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T50 (f.k.a. F22 Raptor) is a high performance mixed packet injector tool designed to perform Stress Testing. The concept started on 2001, right after release ‘nb-isakmp.c‘, and the main goal was to have a tool to perform TCP/IP protocol fuzzing, covering common regular protocols, such as: ICMP, TCP and UDP. Why Stress Testing? Why Stress…

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PenTools – Penetration Testing Tools Bundle

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PenTools is a bundle of Python and Bash penetration testing tools for the recon and information gathering stage of a PT or VA. They are fairly simple scripts but might be interesting if you are new and want to see how some things are done, or how things can be automated using Python or Bash. […]

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Winpayloads – Undetectable Windows Payload Generation

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Winpayloads is a tool to provide undetectable Windows payload generation with some extras running on Python 2.7. It provides persistence, privilege escalation, shellcode invocation and much more. Features UACBypass – PowerShellEmpire PowerUp – PowerShellEmpire Invoke-Shellcode Invoke-Mimikatz Invoke-EventVwrBypass Persistence – Adds payload…

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TheFatRat – Massive Exploitation Tool

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TheFatRat is an easy-to-use Exploitation Tool that can help you to generate backdoors and post exploitation attacks like browser attack DLL files. This tool compiles malware with popular payloads and then the compiled malware can be executed on Windows, Linux, Mac OS X and Android. The malware that is created with this tool also has […]

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NSA Insider Security Post-Snowden

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/06/nsa_insider_sec.html

According to a recently declassified report obtained under FOIA, the NSA’s attempts to protect itself against insider attacks aren’t going very well:

The N.S.A. failed to consistently lock racks of servers storing highly classified data and to secure data center machine rooms, according to the report, an investigation by the Defense Department’s inspector general completed in 2016.

[…]

The agency also failed to meaningfully reduce the number of officials and contractors who were empowered to download and transfer data classified as top secret, as well as the number of “privileged” users, who have greater power to access the N.S.A.’s most sensitive computer systems. And it did not fully implement software to monitor what those users were doing.

In all, the report concluded, while the post-Snowden initiative — called “Secure the Net” by the N.S.A. — had some successes, it “did not fully meet the intent of decreasing the risk of insider threats to N.S.A. operations and the ability of insiders to exfiltrate data.”

Marcy Wheeler comments:

The IG report examined seven of the most important out of 40 “Secure the Net” initiatives rolled out since Snowden began leaking classified information. Two of the initiatives aspired to reduce the number of people who had the kind of access Snowden did: those who have privileged access to maintain, configure, and operate the NSA’s computer systems (what the report calls PRIVACs), and those who are authorized to use removable media to transfer data to or from an NSA system (what the report calls DTAs).

But when DOD’s inspectors went to assess whether NSA had succeeded in doing this, they found something disturbing. In both cases, the NSA did not have solid documentation about how many such users existed at the time of the Snowden leak. With respect to PRIVACs, in June 2013 (the start of the Snowden leak), “NSA officials stated that they used a manually kept spreadsheet, which they no longer had, to identify the initial number of privileged users.” The report offered no explanation for how NSA came to no longer have that spreadsheet just as an investigation into the biggest breach thus far at NSA started. With respect to DTAs, “NSA did not know how many DTAs it had because the manually kept list was corrupted during the months leading up to the security breach.”

There seem to be two possible explanations for the fact that the NSA couldn’t track who had the same kind of access that Snowden exploited to steal so many documents. Either the dog ate their homework: Someone at NSA made the documents unavailable (or they never really existed). Or someone fed the dog their homework: Some adversary made these lists unusable. The former would suggest the NSA had something to hide as it prepared to explain why Snowden had been able to walk away with NSA’s crown jewels. The latter would suggest that someone deliberately obscured who else in the building might walk away with the crown jewels. Obscuring that list would be of particular value if you were a foreign adversary planning on walking away with a bunch of files, such as the set of hacking tools the Shadow Brokers have since released, which are believed to have originated at NSA.

Read the whole thing. Securing against insiders, especially those with technical access, is difficult, but I had assumed the NSA did more post-Snowden.

pyrasite – Inject Code Into Running Python Processes

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pyrasite is a Python-based toolkit to inject code into running Python processes. pyrasite works with Python 2.4 and newer. Injection works between versions as well, so you can run Pyrasite under Python 3 and inject into 2, and vice versa. Usage [crayon-5947fd3c82613308190200/] You can download pyrasite here: pyrasite-2.0.zip Or read more…

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snitch – Information Gathering Tool Via Dorks

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Snitch is an information gathering tool which automates the process for a specified domain. Using built-in dork categories, this tool helps gather specified information domains which can be found using web search engines. It can be quite useful in early phases of penetration tests (commonly called the Information Gathering phase). snitch can…

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credmap – The Credential Mapper

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Credmap is an open source credential mapper tool that was created to bring awareness to the dangers of credential reuse. It is capable of testing supplied user credentials on several known websites to test if the password has been reused on any of these. It is not uncommon for people who are not experts in […]

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LazyDroid – Android Security Assessment Tool

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Lazydroid is a tool written as a bash script to facilitate some aspects of an Android Security Assessment. Features It provides some common tasks such as: Set the debug flag of an application to true Set the backup flag of an application to true Re-Build the application Re-Sign the application Smart log extraction of an […]

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Who Are the Shadow Brokers?

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/05/who_are_the_sha.html

In 2013, a mysterious group of hackers that calls itself the Shadow Brokers stole a few disks full of NSA secrets. Since last summer, they’ve been dumping these secrets on the Internet. They have publicly embarrassed the NSA and damaged its intelligence-gathering capabilities, while at the same time have put sophisticated cyberweapons in the hands of anyone who wants them. They have exposed major vulnerabilities in Cisco routers, Microsoft Windows, and Linux mail servers, forcing those companies and their customers to scramble. And they gave the authors of the WannaCry ransomware the exploit they needed to infect hundreds of thousands of computer worldwide this month.

After the WannaCry outbreak, the Shadow Brokers threatened to release more NSA secrets every month, giving cybercriminals and other governments worldwide even more exploits and hacking tools.

Who are these guys? And how did they steal this information? The short answer is: we don’t know. But we can make some educated guesses based on the material they’ve published.

The Shadow Brokers suddenly appeared last August, when they published a series of hacking tools and computer exploits­ — vulnerabilities in common software — ­from the NSA. The material was from autumn 2013, and seems to have been collected from an external NSA staging server, a machine that is owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by the US, but with no connection to the agency. NSA hackers find obscure corners of the Internet to hide the tools they need as they go about their work, and it seems the Shadow Brokers successfully hacked one of those caches.

In total, the group has published four sets of NSA material: a set of exploits and hacking tools against routers, the devices that direct data throughout computer networks; a similar collection against mail servers; another collection against Microsoft Windows; and a working directory of an NSA analyst breaking into the SWIFT banking network. Looking at the time stamps on the files and other material, they all come from around 2013. The Windows attack tools, published last month, might be a year or so older, based on which versions of Windows the tools support.

The releases are so different that they’re almost certainly from multiple sources at the NSA. The SWIFT files seem to come from an internal NSA computer, albeit one connected to the Internet. The Microsoft files seem different, too; they don’t have the same identifying information that the router and mail server files do. The Shadow Brokers have released all the material unredacted, without the care journalists took with the Snowden documents or even the care WikiLeaks has taken with the CIA secrets it’s publishing. They also posted anonymous messages in bad English but with American cultural references.

Given all of this, I don’t think the agent responsible is a whistleblower. While possible, it seems like a whistleblower wouldn’t sit on attack tools for three years before publishing. They would act more like Edward Snowden or Chelsea Manning, collecting for a time and then publishing immediately­ — and publishing documents that discuss what the US is doing to whom. That’s not what we’re seeing here; it’s simply a bunch of exploit code, which doesn’t have the political or ethical implications that a whistleblower would want to highlight. The SWIFT documents are records of an NSA operation, and the other posted files demonstrate that the NSA is hoarding vulnerabilities for attack rather than helping fix them and improve all of our security.

I also don’t think that it’s random hackers who stumbled on these tools and are just trying to harm the NSA or the US. Again, the three-year wait makes no sense. These documents and tools are cyber-Kryptonite; anyone who is secretly hoarding them is in danger from half the intelligence agencies in the world. Additionally, the publication schedule doesn’t make sense for the leakers to be cybercriminals. Criminals would use the hacking tools for themselves, incorporating the exploits into worms and viruses, and generally profiting from the theft.

That leaves a nation state. Whoever got this information years before and is leaking it now has to be both capable of hacking the NSA and willing to publish it all. Countries like Israel and France are capable, but would never publish, because they wouldn’t want to incur the wrath of the US. Country like North Korea or Iran probably aren’t capable. (Additionally, North Korea is suspected of being behind WannaCry, which was written after the Shadow Brokers released that vulnerability to the public.) As I’ve written previously, the obvious list of countries who fit my two criteria is small: Russia, China, and­ — I’m out of ideas. And China is currently trying to make nice with the US.

It was generally believed last August, when the first documents were released and before it became politically controversial to say so, that the Russians were behind the leak, and that it was a warning message to President Barack Obama not to retaliate for the Democratic National Committee hacks. Edward Snowden guessed Russia, too. But the problem with the Russia theory is, why? These leaked tools are much more valuable if kept secret. Russia could use the knowledge to detect NSA hacking in its own country and to attack other countries. By publishing the tools, the Shadow Brokers are signaling that they don’t care if the US knows the tools were stolen.

Sure, there’s a chance the attackers knew that the US knew that the attackers knew — ­and round and round we go. But the “we don’t give a damn” nature of the releases points to an attacker who isn’t thinking strategically: a lone hacker or hacking group, which clashes with the nation-state theory.

This is all speculation on my part, based on discussion with others who don’t have access to the classified forensic and intelligence analysis. Inside the NSA, they have a lot more information. Many of the files published include operational notes and identifying information. NSA researchers know exactly which servers were compromised, and through that know what other information the attackers would have access to. As with the Snowden documents, though, they only know what the attackers could have taken and not what they did take. But they did alert Microsoft about the Windows vulnerability the Shadow Brokers released months in advance. Did they have eavesdropping capability inside whoever stole the files, as they claimed to when the Russians attacked the State Department? We have no idea.

So, how did the Shadow Brokers do it? Did someone inside the NSA accidentally mount the wrong server on some external network? That’s possible, but seems very unlikely for the organization to make that kind of rookie mistake. Did someone hack the NSA itself? Could there be a mole inside the NSA?

If it is a mole, my guess is that the person was arrested before the Shadow Brokers released anything. No country would burn a mole working for it by publishing what that person delivered while he or she was still in danger. Intelligence agencies know that if they betray a source this severely, they’ll never get another one.

That points to two possibilities. The first is that the files came from Hal Martin. He’s the NSA contractor who was arrested in August for hoarding agency secrets in his house for two years. He can’t be the publisher, because the Shadow Brokers are in business even though he is in prison. But maybe the leaker got the documents from his stash, either because Martin gave the documents to them or because he himself was hacked. The dates line up, so it’s theoretically possible. There’s nothing in the public indictment against Martin that speaks to his selling secrets to a foreign power, but that’s just the sort of thing that would be left out. It’s not needed for a conviction.

If the source of the documents is Hal Martin, then we can speculate that a random hacker did in fact stumble on it — ­no need for nation-state cyberattack skills.

The other option is a mysterious second NSA leaker of cyberattack tools. Could this be the person who stole the NSA documents and passed them on to someone else? The only time I have ever heard about this was from a Washington Post story about Martin:

There was a second, previously undisclosed breach of cybertools, discovered in the summer of 2015, which was also carried out by a TAO employee [a worker in the Office of Tailored Access Operations], one official said. That individual also has been arrested, but his case has not been made public. The individual is not thought to have shared the material with another country, the official said.

Of course, “not thought to have” is not the same as not having done so.

It is interesting that there have been no public arrests of anyone in connection with these hacks. If the NSA knows where the files came from, it knows who had access to them — ­and it’s long since questioned everyone involved and should know if someone deliberately or accidentally lost control of them. I know that many people, both inside the government and out, think there is some sort of domestic involvement; things may be more complicated than I realize.

It’s also not over. Last week, the Shadow Brokers were back, with a rambling and taunting message announcing a “Data Dump of the Month” service. They’re offering to sell unreleased NSA attack tools­ — something they also tried last August­ — with the threat to publish them if no one pays. The group has made good on their previous boasts: In the coming months, we might see new exploits against web browsers, networking equipment, smartphones, and operating systems — Windows in particular. Even scarier, they’re threatening to release raw NSA intercepts: data from the SWIFT network and banks, and “compromised data from Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or North Korean nukes and missile programs.”

Whoever the Shadow Brokers are, however they stole these disks full of NSA secrets, and for whatever reason they’re releasing them, it’s going to be a long summer inside of Fort Meade­ — as it will be for the rest of us.

This essay previously appeared in the Atlantic, and is an update of this essay from Lawfare.