Tag Archives: indicators of compromise

More notes on US-CERTs IOCs

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/06/more-notes-on-us-certs-iocs.html

Yet another Russian attack against the power grid, and yet more bad IOCs from the DHS US-CERT.

IOCs are “indicators of compromise“, things you can look for in order to order to see if you, too, have been hacked by the same perpetrators. There are several types of IOCs, ranging from the highly specific to the uselessly generic.

A uselessly generic IOC would be like trying to identify bank robbers by the fact that their getaway car was “white” in color. It’s worth documenting, so that if the police ever show up in a suspected cabin in the woods, they can note that there’s a “white” car parked in front.

But if you work bank security, that doesn’t mean you should be on the lookout for “white” cars. That would be silly.

This is what happens with US-CERT’s IOCs. They list some potentially useful things, but they also list a lot of junk that waste’s people’s times, with little ability to distinguish between the useful and the useless.

An example: a few months ago was the GRIZZLEYBEAR report published by US-CERT. Among other things, it listed IP addresses used by hackers. There was no description which would be useful IP addresses to watch for, and which would be useless.

Some of these IP addresses were useful, pointing to servers the group has been using a long time as command-and-control servers. Other IP addresses are more dubious, such as Tor exit nodes. You aren’t concerned about any specific Tor exit IP address, because it changes randomly, so has no relationship to the attackers. Instead, if you cared about those Tor IP addresses, what you should be looking for is a dynamically updated list of Tor nodes updated daily.

And finally, they listed IP addresses of Yahoo, because attackers passed data through Yahoo servers. No, it wasn’t because those Yahoo servers had been compromised, it’s just that everyone passes things though them, like email.

A Vermont power-plant blindly dumped all those IP addresses into their sensors. As a consequence, the next morning when an employee checked their Yahoo email, the sensors triggered. This resulted in national headlines about the Russians hacking the Vermont power grid.

Today, the US-CERT made similar mistakes with CRASHOVERRIDE. They took a report from Dragos Security, then mutilated it. Dragos’s own IOCs focused on things like hostile strings and file hashes of the hostile files. They also included filenames, but similar to the reason you’d noticed a white car — because it happened, not because you should be on the lookout for it. In context, there’s nothing wrong with noting the file name.

But the US-CERT pulled the filenames out of context. One of those filenames was, humorously, “svchost.exe”. It’s the name of an essential Windows service. Every Windows computer is running multiple copies of “svchost.exe”. It’s like saying “be on the lookout for Windows”.

Yes, it’s true that viruses use the same filenames as essential Windows files like “svchost.exe”. That’s, generally, something you should be aware of. But that CRASHOVERRIDE did this is wholly meaningless.

What Dragos Security was actually reporting was that a “svchost.exe” with the file hash of 79ca89711cdaedb16b0ccccfdcfbd6aa7e57120a was the virus — it’s the hash that’s the important IOC. Pulling the filename out of context is just silly.

Luckily, the DHS also provides some of the raw information provided by Dragos. But even then, there’s problems: they provide it in formatted form, for HTML, PDF, or Excel documents. This corrupts the original data so that it’s no longer machine readable. For example, from their webpage, they have the following:

import “pe”
import “hash”

Among the problems are the fact that the quote marks have been altered, probably by Word’s “smart quotes” feature. In other cases, I’ve seen PDF documents get confused by the number 0 and the letter O, as if the raw data had been scanned in from a printed document and OCRed.

If this were a “threat intel” company,  we’d call this snake oil. The US-CERT is using Dragos Security’s reports to promote itself, but ultimate providing negative value, mutilating the content.

This, ultimately, causes a lot of harm. The press trusted their content. So does the network of downstream entities, like municipal power grids. There are tens of thousands of such consumers of these reports, often with less expertise than even US-CERT. There are sprinklings of smart people in these organizations, I meet them at hacker cons, and am fascinated by their stories. But institutionally, they are dumbed down the same level as these US-CERT reports, with the smart people marginalized.

There are two solutions to this problem. The first is that when the stupidity of what you do causes everyone to laugh at you, stop doing it. The second is to value technical expertise, empowering those who know what they are doing. Examples of what not to do are giving power to people like Obama’s cyberczar, Michael Daniels, who once claimed his lack of technical knowledge was a bonus, because it allowed him to see the strategic picture instead of getting distracted by details.

Some notes on Trump’s cybersecurity Executive Order

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/05/some-notes-on-trumps-cybersecurity.html

President Trump has finally signed an executive order on “cybersecurity”. The first draft during his first weeks in power were hilariously ignorant. The current draft, though, is pretty reasonable as such things go. I’m just reading the plain language of the draft as a cybersecurity expert, picking out the bits that interest me. In reality, there’s probably all sorts of politics in the background that I’m missing, so I may be wildly off-base.

Holding managers accountable

This is a great idea in theory. But government heads are rarely accountable for anything, so it’s hard to see if they’ll have the nerve to implement this in practice. When the next breech happens, we’ll see if anybody gets fired.
“antiquated and difficult to defend Information Technology”

The government uses laughably old computers sometimes. Forces in government wants to upgrade them. This won’t work. Instead of replacing old computers, the budget will simply be used to add new computers. The old computers will still stick around.
“Legacy” is a problem that money can’t solve. Programmers know how to build small things, but not big things. Everything starts out small, then becomes big gradually over time through constant small additions. What you have now is big legacy systems. Attempts to replace a big system with a built-from-scratch big system will fail, because engineers don’t know how to build big systems. This will suck down any amount of budget you have with failed multi-million dollar projects.
It’s not the antiquated systems that are usually the problem, but more modern systems. Antiquated systems can usually be protected by simply sticking a firewall or proxy in front of them.

“address immediate unmet budgetary needs necessary to manage risk”

Nobody cares about cybersecurity. Instead, it’s a thing people exploit in order to increase their budget. Instead of doing the best security with the budget they have, they insist they can’t secure the network without more money.

An alternate way to address gaps in cybersecurity is instead to do less. Reduce exposure to the web, provide fewer services, reduce functionality of desktop computers, and so on. Insisting that more money is the only way to address unmet needs is the strategy of the incompetent.

Use the NIST framework
Probably the biggest thing in the EO is that it forces everyone to use the NIST cybersecurity framework.
The NIST Framework simply documents all the things that organizations commonly do to secure themselves, such run intrusion-detection systems or impose rules for good passwords.
There are two problems with the NIST Framework. The first is that no organization does all the things listed. The second is that many organizations don’t do the things well.
Password rules are a good example. Organizations typically had bad rules, such as frequent changes and complexity standards. So the NIST Framework documented them. But cybersecurity experts have long opposed those complex rules, so have been fighting NIST on them.

Another good example is intrusion-detection. These days, I scan the entire Internet, setting off everyone’s intrusion-detection systems. I can see first hand that they are doing intrusion-detection wrong. But the NIST Framework recommends they do it, because many organizations do it, but the NIST Framework doesn’t demand they do it well.
When this EO forces everyone to follow the NIST Framework, then, it’s likely just going to increase the amount of money spent on cybersecurity without increasing effectiveness. That’s not necessarily a bad thing: while probably ineffective or counterproductive in the short run, there might be long-term benefit aligning everyone to thinking about the problem the same way.
Note that “following” the NIST Framework doesn’t mean “doing” everything. Instead, it means documented how you do everything, a reason why you aren’t doing anything, or (most often) your plan to eventually do the thing.
preference for shared IT services for email, cloud, and cybersecurity
Different departments are hostile toward each other, with each doing things their own way. Obviously, the thinking goes, that if more departments shared resources, they could cut costs with economies of scale. Also obviously, it’ll stop the many home-grown wrong solutions that individual departments come up with.
In other words, there should be a single government GMail-type service that does e-mail both securely and reliably.
But it won’t turn out this way. Government does not have “economies of scale” but “incompetence at scale”. It means a single GMail-like service that is expensive, unreliable, and in the end, probably insecure. It means we can look forward to government breaches that instead of affecting one department affecting all departments.

Yes, you can point to individual organizations that do things poorly, but what you are ignoring is the organizations that do it well. When you make them all share a solution, it’s going to be the average of all these things — meaning those who do something well are going to move to a worse solution.

I suppose this was inserted in there so that big government cybersecurity companies can now walk into agencies, point to where they are deficient on the NIST Framework, and say “sign here to do this with our shared cybersecurity service”.
“identify authorities and capabilities that agencies could employ to support the cybersecurity efforts of critical infrastructure entities”
What this means is “how can we help secure the power grid?”.
What it means in practice is that fiasco in the Vermont power grid. The DHS produced a report containing IoCs (“indicators of compromise”) of Russian hackers in the DNC hack. Among the things it identified was that the hackers used Yahoo! email. They pushed these IoCs out as signatures in their “Einstein” intrusion-detection system located at many power grid locations. The next person that logged into their Yahoo! email was then flagged as a Russian hacker, causing all sorts of hilarity to ensue, such as still uncorrected stories by the Washington Post how the Russians hacked our power-grid.
The upshot is that federal government help is also going to include much government hindrance. They really are this stupid sometimes and there is no way to fix this stupid. (Seriously, the DHS still insists it did the right thing pushing out the Yahoo IoCs).
Resilience Against Botnets and Other Automated, Distributed Threats

The government wants to address botnets because it’s just the sort of problem they love, mass outages across the entire Internet caused by a million machines.

But frankly, botnets don’t even make the top 10 list of problems they should be addressing. Number #1 is clearly “phishing” — you know, the attack that’s been getting into the DNC and Podesta e-mails, influencing the election. You know, the attack that Gizmodo recently showed the Trump administration is partially vulnerable to. You know, the attack that most people blame as what probably led to that huge OPM hack. Replace the entire Executive Order with “stop phishing”, and you’d go further fixing federal government security.

But solving phishing is tough. To begin with, it requires a rethink how the government does email, and how how desktop systems should be managed. So the government avoids complex problems it can’t understand to focus on the simple things it can — botnets.

Dealing with “prolonged power outage associated with a significant cyber incident”

The government has had the hots for this since 2001, even though there’s really been no attack on the American grid. After the Russian attacks against the Ukraine power grid, the issue is heating up.

Nation-wide attacks aren’t really a threat, yet, in America. We have 10,000 different companies involved with different systems throughout the country. Trying to hack them all at once is unlikely. What’s funny is that it’s the government’s attempts to standardize everything that’s likely to be our downfall, such as sticking Einstein sensors everywhere.

What they should be doing is instead of trying to make the grid unhackable, they should be trying to lessen the reliance upon the grid. They should be encouraging things like Tesla PowerWalls, solar panels on roofs, backup generators, and so on. Indeed, rather than industrial system blackout, industry backup power generation should be considered as a source of grid backup. Factories and even ships were used to supplant the electric power grid in Japan after the 2011 tsunami, for example. The less we rely on the grid, the less a blackout will hurt us.

“cybersecurity risks facing the defense industrial base, including its supply chain”

So “supply chain” cybersecurity is increasingly becoming a thing. Almost anything electronic comes with millions of lines of code, silicon chips, and other things that affect the security of the system. In this context, they may be worried about intentional subversion of systems, such as that recent article worried about Kaspersky anti-virus in government systems. However, the bigger concern is the zillions of accidental vulnerabilities waiting to be discovered. It’s impractical for a vendor to secure a product, because it’s built from so many components the vendor doesn’t understand.

“strategic options for deterring adversaries and better protecting the American people from cyber threats”

Deterrence is a funny word.

Rumor has it that we forced China to backoff on hacking by impressing them with our own hacking ability, such as reaching into China and blowing stuff up. This works because the Chinese governments remains in power because things are going well in China. If there’s a hiccup in economic growth, there will be mass actions against the government.

But for our other cyber adversaries (Russian, Iran, North Korea), things already suck in their countries. It’s hard to see how we can make things worse by hacking them. They also have a strangle hold on the media, so hacking in and publicizing their leader’s weird sex fetishes and offshore accounts isn’t going to work either.

Also, deterrence relies upon “attribution”, which is hard. While news stories claim last year’s expulsion of Russian diplomats was due to election hacking, that wasn’t the stated reason. Instead, the claimed reason was Russia’s interference with diplomats in Europe, such as breaking into diplomat’s homes and pooping on their dining room table. We know it’s them when they are brazen (as was the case with Chinese hacking), but other hacks are harder to attribute.

Deterrence of nation states ignores the reality that much of the hacking against our government comes from non-state actors. It’s not clear how much of all this Russian hacking is actually directed by the government. Deterrence polices may be better directed at individuals, such as the recent arrest of a Russian hacker while they were traveling in Spain. We can’t get Russian or Chinese hackers in their own countries, so we have to wait until they leave.

Anyway, “deterrence” is one of those real-world concepts that hard to shoe-horn into a cyber (“cyber-deterrence”) equivalent. It encourages lots of bad thinking, such as export controls on “cyber-weapons” to deter foreign countries from using them.

“educate and train the American cybersecurity workforce of the future”

The problem isn’t that we lack CISSPs. Such blanket certifications devalue the technical expertise of the real experts. The solution is to empower the technical experts we already have.

In other words, mandate that whoever is the “cyberczar” is a technical expert, like how the Surgeon General must be a medical expert, or how an economic adviser must be an economic expert. For over 15 years, we’ve had a parade of non-technical people named “cyberczar” who haven’t been experts.

Once you tell people technical expertise is valued, then by nature more students will become technical experts.

BTW, the best technical experts are software engineers and sysadmins. The best cybersecurity for Windows is already built into Windows, whose sysadmins need to be empowered to use those solutions. Instead, they are often overridden by a clueless cybersecurity consultant who insists on making the organization buy a third-party product instead that does a poorer job. We need more technical expertise in our organizations, sure, but not necessarily more cybersecurity professionals.

Conclusion

This is really a government document, and government people will be able to explain it better than I. These are just how I see it as a technical-expert who is a government-outsider.

My guess is the most lasting consequential thing will be making everyone following the NIST Framework, and the rest will just be a lot of aspirational stuff that’ll be ignored.

The Yahoo-email-search story is garbage

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2016/10/the-yahoo-email-search-story-is-garbage.html

Joseph Menn (Reuters) is reporting that Yahoo! searched emails for the NSA. The details of the story are so mangled that it’s impossible to say what’s actually going on.

The first paragraph says this:

Yahoo Inc last year secretly built a custom software program to search all of its customers’ incoming emails

The second paragraph says this:

The company complied with a classified U.S. government demand, scanning hundreds of millions of Yahoo Mail accounts

Well? Which is it? Did they “search incoming emails” or did they “scan mail accounts”? Whether we are dealing with emails in transmit, or stored on the servers, is a BFD (Big Fucking Detail) that you can’t gloss over and confuse in a story like this. Whether searches are done indiscriminately across all emails, or only for specific accounts, is another BFD.

The third paragraph seems to resolve this, but it doesn’t:

Some surveillance experts said this represents the first case to surface of a U.S. Internet company agreeing to an intelligence agency’s request by searching all arriving messages, as opposed to examining stored messages or scanning a small number of accounts in real time.

Who are these “some surveillance experts”? Why is the story keeping their identities secret? Are they some whistleblowers afraid for their jobs? If so, then that should be mentioned. In reality, they are unlikely to be real surveillance experts, but just some random person that knows slightly more about the subject than Joseph Menn, and their identities are being kept secret in order to prevent us from challenging these experts — which is a violation of journalistic ethics.

And, are they analyzing the raw information the author sent them? Or are they opining on the garbled version of events that we see in the first two paragraphs.

The confusion continues:

It is not known what information intelligence officials were looking for, only that they wanted Yahoo to search for a set of characters. That could mean a phrase in an email or an attachment, said the sources, who did not want to be identified.

What the fuck is a “set of characters”??? Is this an exact quote for somewhere? Or something the author of the story made up? The clarification of what this “could mean” doesn’t clear this up, because if that’s what it “actually means”, then why not say this to begin with?

It’s not just technical terms, but also legal ones:

The request to search Yahoo Mail accounts came in the form of a classified edict sent to the company’s legal team, according to the three people familiar with the matter.

What the fuck is a “classified edict”? An NSL? A FISA court order? What? This is also a BFD.

We outsiders already know about the NSA/FBI’s ability to ask for strong selectors (email addresses). What what we don’t know about is their ability to search all emails, regardless of account, for arbitrary keywords/phases. If that’s what’s going on, then this would be a huge story. But the story doesn’t make it clear that this is actually what’s going on — just strongly implies it.

There are many other ways to interpret this story. For example, the government may simply be demanding that when Yahoo satisfies demands for emails (based on email addresses), that it does so from the raw incoming stream, before it hits spam/malware filters. Or, they may be demanding that Yahoo satisfies their demands with more secrecy, so that the entire company doesn’t learn of the email addresses that a FISA order demands. Or, the government may be demanding that the normal collection happen in real time, in the seconds that emails arrive, instead of minutes later.

Or maybe this isn’t an NSA/FISA story at all. Maybe the DHS has a cybersecurity information sharing program that distributes IoCs (indicators of compromise) to companies under NDA. Because it’s a separate program under NDA, Yahoo would need to setup a email malware scanning system separate from their existing malware system in order to use those IoCs. (@declanm‘s stream has further variations on this scenario).

My point is this: the story is full of mangled details that really tell us nothing. I can come up with multiple, unrelated scenarios that are consistent with the content in the story. The story certainly doesn’t say that Yahoo did anything wrong, or that the government is doing anything wrong (at least, wronger than we already know).

I’m convinced the government is up to no good, strong arming companies like Yahoo into compliance. The thing that’s stopping us from discovering malfeasance is poor reporting like this.

OpenIOC – Sharing Threat Intelligence

Post Syndicated from Darknet original http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/darknethackers/~3/D2fKidZeuds/

OpenIOC is an open framework for sharing threat intelligence, sophisticated threats require sophisticated indicators. In the current threat environment, rapid communication of pertinent threat information is the key to quickly detecting, responding and containing targeted attacks. OpenIOC is designed to fill a void that currently exists for…

Read the full post at darknet.org.uk