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Reliable GPU compute for large training & inference jobs

Post Syndicated from Netflix Technology Blog original https://netflixtechblog.com/reliable-gpu-compute-for-large-training-inference-jobs-d62b03a96d7a

Authors: Nick Rutigliano, Argha C, Samartha Chandrashekar

How we detect failing GPUs and network fabric, remediate machines automatically, and let long-running jobs survive hardware loss.

Open Netflix, and the home screen is assembled for you: which rows appear, the order they appear in, the titles within them, and the artwork for each title are chosen by machine learning models trained on how hundreds of millions of members watch. Personalization is one of the most widely used things we build, and members feel it every time they open the app. Like a growing share of Netflix, it runs on GPUs, which train those models and increasingly serve them live.

Those GPUs have to stay healthy for that experience to hold up, and keeping them healthy is harder than it sounds. A single large training job can run for weeks across hundreds of GPUs spread over many machines. It runs as a gang: the ranks move in lockstep, exchanging data every step, so the job advances only as fast as its slowest participant and stops entirely if one participant dies. Every GPU, every high-speed network adapter, and every interconnect must keep working throughout the run. At the scale at which modern machine learning runs, individual GPUs and network links can fail during a run, so the underlying platform must be prepared for this and handle it without a person in the loop.

This post describes how we keep our GPU infrastructure healthy for training and inference. We cover how we detect failing hardware before and during jobs, how we automatically remediate a bad machine, and how we let a long job survive the loss of a machine. These training workloads run on our modern Kubernetes-native Compute platform.

Why GPU reliability matters

Netflix aims to entertain the world, and machine learning has been part of how we do that for years, from the recommendations that help members find something to watch to the systems that help produce and promote titles. As generative AI advances, we are investing in it on both sides of the business: for members, through better recommendations and higher-quality promotional assets; and for storytelling, through creative tools for our production partners.

All of this runs on GPUs, for both training and inference, and GPU capacity is among the fastest-growing and most expensive parts of our infrastructure. That makes reliability a business concern on two fronts. — -

  • Availability: a training run that loses a machine, or an inference service that cannot get healthy capacity, delays work that members and creators depend on.
  • Cost efficiency: a GPU sitting idle behind a slow neighbor, or a whole machine pulled from the pool because one device is degraded, becomes capacity we paid for and are not using. Higher reliability and higher utilization mean more useful work per GPU, which is equivalent to spending less to do the same work.

Inference is a growing share of that GPU footprint as more of these AI features reach members, so the reliability and efficiency that matter for multi-week training runs increasingly matter for always-on serving too.

Why basic health checks are not enough

We start from the baseline provided by the cloud provider. Cloud providers run instance status checks on virtual machines: a system status check for the underlying host’s power, network, and hardware reachability; an instance status check to verify that the operating system is up and reachable; and a check on attached storage. It emits scheduled maintenance events when it plans to retire or reboot a host, and it can automatically recover an instance that becomes impaired. We use all of these, and the maintenance events feed one of our own checks. They catch a machine that is down, unreachable, or slated for maintenance, and they stop at the instance level. They confirm the box is up and reachable. They do not verify that each GPU, its on-chip memory, its interconnect, and its network fabric are healthy enough to support distributed training.

The next step most teams take is a GPU-level check to confirm that the driver responds and that the GPUs are visible. That catches a dead or missing GPU, but misses the cases that take the most time.

  • A GPU can answer a status query and still be faulty once a workload touches it. A fault in on-chip memory or in the firmware that manages the device can remain invisible until a job allocates memory or runs sustained compute, at which point the job fails or slows.
  • A high-speed network adapter may be present but show fewer links than expected. Collective operations still run, at a fraction of the bandwidth, so the job does not crash. It crawls, and the cause is easy to miss.
  • A check can fail in ways that leave a faulty machine looking healthy. The diagnostic tool can hang when the driver hangs, and a naive check that waits on it hangs too. A binary that the check depends on can go missing after a driver upgrade, causing the check to stop running and report nothing. A check that can silently stop running is worse than no check, because it gives false confidence while the machine keeps working.

Because a job runs as a gang, any one of these on any one machine can degrade or stop the whole job, and none of them shows up in an instance-level check or a driver-responds check. The health system has to assume the hardware can lie and the tools that inspect it can break.

A machine can pass a basic check and still be faulty. Layered checks, timeouts, a fallback path, and checks that fail when a dependency is missing close these gaps.

Our approach

We treat reliability as four layers, each catching what the layer below cannot:

1/ Node and hardware health: find bad GPUs, network adapters, interconnects, memory errors, and thermal issues, then taint or recycle the machine.

2/ Scheduler and platform: retry at the task & job level, validate a machine before it takes work, and drain & recycle machines safely.

3/ Training loop: checkpoint and use elastic workers so a job survives losing a machine.

4/ Observability: metrics, service-level objectives, and failure attribution across the other three.

The first two layers keep hardware problems away from jobs. The third accepts that some loss is unavoidable and makes it cheap. The fourth tells us whether the first three are working.

Four layers: Each catches what the layer below cannot.

How the health checks work

Checks run in two tiers. Device-level checks look at each GPU. A node-level agent, built on the open-source Kubernetes node-problem-detector, runs on every GPU machine every 30 seconds and turns check results into conditions on the Kubernetes node, the same mechanism Kubernetes uses to mark a node NotReady. Controllers watch those conditions and decide whether the machine can take on work.

GPU device checks are built on NVIDIA’s DCGM for driver-reported error codes, uncorrectable memory errors, interconnect integrity, and thermal state, and networking adapter checks inspect the host state for the count and link state of the Elastic Fabric Adapter interfaces that carry cross-machine traffic. A few of these checks deserve detail.

Two-tier health checking. Device-level and node-level checks become Kubernetes node conditions, which controllers then turn into taints, drains, terminates, and replaces.
  • Failing closed: if the driver or the diagnostic tool is unresponsive, the check times out and marks the machine unhealthy. A check that cannot reach the hardware reports a problem rather than passing, so a wedged driver takes the machine out of rotation rather than letting it hide behind a hung tool.
  • A fallback path: driver error codes are the strongest signal that a GPU has faulted, but the tool that reads them can itself be broken in certain failure modes! When it does, we read the kernel log dmesg directly for those codes, so no Xid or SXid errors are missed.
  • Our own fatal-error map: vendor driver error catalogs lag newer GPU generations and do not always match what we see in production, so we keep our own mapping of which codes are fatal for each GPU family. A code that means reset-the-GPU in one generation can be benign in another, and one GPU generation emits a burst of normally-fatal code on every healthy boot, which we learned to treat as noise rather than drain fresh machines.
  • No silent no-ops: a check fails when a required dependency is missing. This one came from an upgrade that dropped a binary the network-adapter check relied on. The check quietly stopped running, and machines with the wrong number of adapters shipped for days before the slow jobs were traced back to them. Now a missing dependency fails the check.

Turning a bad machine into healthy capacity, automatically

When a check fails, the machine’s node condition changes, and controllers take over. We distinguish two levels. A problem condition blocks new work from landing while jobs are running, because pulling a job off a machine is disruptive, and many problems clear on their own. If the condition persists beyond a tolerance window, it escalates to a failure condition, which evacuates the machine, drains its tasks (overriding the normal disruption limits to move quickly), terminates it, and replaces it.

Karpenter node auto-repair is used on our compute stack. We have customized it with a policy and a controller that maps each node condition to the duration we tolerate it before acting, so a fast-fatal error is actioned within minutes. At the same time, a flaky signal gets a longer window, and a cap limits how much of a cluster we will disrupt at once, so a bad rollout of the checks themselves cannot cascade into tearing down a whole cluster. We plan to upstream this feature to all Karpenter users.

Graded remediation. A problem is tolerated and may clear; a persistent failure escalates to evacuation and draining, then to a fast in-place fix or termination for confirmed hardware faults.

Not every fault requires a full replacement, and replacement is the slowest way to restore capacity. We match the action to the fault. Killing the offending job clears a software wedge. Resetting a single GPU clears many transient device faults. Rebooting the machine clears the firmware state that has drifted over a long uptime. Terminating and replacing is reserved for hardware that fails a test we trust. For that last case, we record the GPU’s immutable hardware identifier, which stays with the physical device across reboots and relaunches even when the instance changes, report it to the cloud provider, and keep our own list, so a device that fails repeatedly does not quietly rejoin the pool under a new instance.

One subtlety sits between detection and scheduling. A freshly checked machine was handed to the scheduler just as its checks were still settling, so a job could land on it a moment before a slow check flagged it. We now hold capacity until the checks have run and settled, which closed that window.

Validating a machine before it takes work

A machine that just booted is not trusted until it proves itself. Before we release its capacity, it passes system checks, confirms the GPUs and their topology are present, and runs a round of GPU diagnostics. We then wait for the health checks to run twice, because the longer checks, such as counting network adapters, take more than one cycle to fire, and releasing after a single pass would let work land before those checks are reported. Only then do we remove the startup taint. On teardown, we run deeper diagnostics and record the GPU identifiers, which feed the same bad-hardware list, so hardware that failed once does not silently cycle back into service.

Letting long jobs survive machine loss

Even with all of the above, some machines are lost mid-job, so we make that cheap. Jobs checkpoint their state, and on a lost machine, they resume from the last healthy checkpoint rather than restarting from the beginning of a multi-week run. Workers are elastic and retryable, and the scheduler automatically retries platform-caused failures.

Attribution is what makes automatic retries safe. If we retried every failure, we would mask genuine bugs in a job and burn GPU hours looping on an error the platform cannot fix, so we classify each failure as platform or application before retrying. One example of why this matters: a class of timeouts in NCCL, the collective communication library GPUs use to exchange data, appeared to be a network fault and was traced to data-loading stalls at high worker counts. The GPUs and the network were fine, and the fix was in the data pipeline. Treated as hardware failures, those timeouts would have cycled healthy machines without fixing the cause.

Measuring whether it works

We track GPU reliability along three service-level objectives, each split by cause, so a miss points at the layer responsible:

  • Availability: the amount of GPU capacity available for scheduling at any given moment.
  • Job-start success: whether a job starts promptly once its capacity is available.
  • Job success: whether a job finishes without a platform-caused failure.

Each objective is split into hardware, driver, platform, and user causes. Hence, an availability dip from bad hardware reads differently from one caused by a scheduler change or a user misconfiguration. We optimize for goodput, the useful work the fleet completes, because a job held back by one slow GPU can look healthy on an uptime chart while getting almost nothing done. Specific targets for each objective are provided here for illustrative purposes.

A closed remediation loop

These pieces form a loop. Hardware is validated at allocation, before a job starts, with a short collective communication run and pairwise network tests. Hence, any machine that fails within the first minute fails before the job is admitted. During the job, we watch passively for driver errors, memory errors, thermal events, and more. We view each job as a distributed system, which lets us identify a single slow rank dragging the rest, rather than only whole-machine failures. When something is wrong, remediation is automatic and graded. The loop is the same whether a job runs through our batch scheduler, Kueue, or Ray.

The reliability loop: validate, watch, actively check, view the job as a system, remediate, then repeat.

Sharing GPUs safely

Not every workload needs a whole GPU, and leaving small inference jobs on dedicated GPUs wastes capacity. We partition GPUs with MIG for memory-level isolation between tenants, so a fault or a memory hog in one partition does not affect another. We also reconfigure those partitions without restarting the machine, so that a pool can shift between many small slices and a few large ones as demand changes. GPU and network adapter allocation is device-plugin-based today, to move to Kubernetes Dynamic Resource Allocation once it is supported in Karpenter. This matters because a GPU talking to a network adapter or working with a CPU on the wrong PCIE root of the machine incurs a bandwidth penalty.

On a multi-GPU machine, we isolate a single faulty GPU, keep the rest in service, and partition healthy GPUs across multiple tenants with memory-level isolation.

Device-level allocation also changes how we handle a single bad GPU. With DRA support, instead of losing the whole machine, we could isolate the one faulty device and keep the others serving, which matters most for inference, where many small jobs share a machine. And because allocation is expressive, a job can request the capabilities it needs, such as memory or tensor-core support, and the platform matches a suitable GPU type, so users are not pinned to a model they had to choose in advance.

Results

Moving from basic checks and manual draining to layered checks and automatic remediation changed two things users feel. More of the GPU fleet is available for scheduling at any time because bad machines are caught and cycled quickly, rather than sitting in the pool or waiting on an on-call engineer. And fewer jobs fail due to platform issues because most faults are caught before a job lands, and the rest are automatically remediated and retried. Graded remediation also returns capacity in minutes for faults that only require a job kill, a GPU reset, or a reboot, rather than the longer wait for a replacement machine.

Since the above improvements have landed, we’ve seen:

  • Consistently achieving >99.95% availability of our GPU nodes
  • Job success rate has gone from ~98% to above 99.5%

What is next

We are extending active checks to cover additional failure modes under load, widening burn-in so more classes of failures can be cleared before a user encounters them, and making remediation more granular so more error types are cleared in place rather than requiring a full node replacement loop for certain Xid errors. Additionally, we want to do more periodic diagnostics between jobs.

We are working to make placement more topology-aware using Kubernetes Dynamic Resource Allocation (DRA) once it lands in Karpenter, for example, by aligning on Compute/IMEX Domains, PCIe roots, and NUMA nodes.

More on the performance side for multi-GPU training, we plan to run a custom Linux scheduler built on sched_ext. Firstly, we can prioritize processes during collective coordination, such as when GPUs exchange results before the next round of compute, thereby reducing overall GPU idle time by establishing a fleet-wide priority for these tasks. The effect is small on one machine but grows across hundreds of machines, where a few percent of throughput amounts to a large amount of capacity. Secondly, we can prioritize data-loading processes to minimize the bottleneck that sometimes occurs when data is not loaded onto GPUs quickly enough to maintain steady progress.

While we already monitor throttling events, GPUs do not have to report throttling for it to hurt a job. One running ten to fifteen degrees hotter than its peers, even within healthy limits, sets the pace for the gang, so we can treat a large temperature gap as a fault, stop the job, and move it to cooler GPUs.

Additionally, we plan to expand our NCCL RAS (reliability, availability, serviceability) monitoring to identify NCCL issues sooner, such as mismatched collectives or hangs, to more quickly resume work.

Closing

Hardware fails, and at this scale, it fails often enough that the platform has to treat failure as normal. Detecting problems before and during jobs, automatically remediating machines, and allowing long jobs to resume after a loss lets teams run large-scale training and inference without babysitting the hardware. If you like these kinds of problems, we are hiring.


Reliable GPU compute for large training & inference jobs was originally published in Netflix TechBlog on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

The Data Canary: How Netflix Validates Catalog Metadata

Post Syndicated from Netflix Technology Blog original https://medium.com/netflix-techblog/the-data-canary-how-netflix-validates-catalog-metadata-18b699d58e36

By Celina Amados

At Netflix, our catalog metadata is crucial to our member experience, and a single corrupted data state can impact millions of viewers immediately. To protect streaming reliability, we built an automated data canary system that validates data transformations using production traffic. This canary detects issues in under 10 minutes, and blocks bad data from reaching our members.

Intro

Catalog metadata is what makes Netflix functional. It defines what titles exist, where they’re available, whether they can be played, and more. This data gets transformed and distributed across our vast infrastructure near-continuously, powering everything that helps members find what they want to watch. Accurate catalog data delivers moments of joy. Corrupted catalog data breaks streaming.

What Went Wrong

A production incident revealed a critical gap in our resilience strategy. No code had been deployed. No configuration had changed. But, a manual mitigation action taken during a previous incident had inadvertently corrupted a data feed, rendering it empty for a subset of titles.

The impact was immediate: missing metadata prevented manifest generation, causing failures in our catalog service and playback issues.

Engineers were alerted immediately, but identifying the root cause took time. After intense triaging, responders pinpointed the corrupted data feed and pinned services back to a known-good state, restoring playback.

The problem? Our sophisticated code canary deployments had caught nothing. No code had changed — the data had.

This incident exposed a fundamental gap in our resiliency capabilities: we can validate code deployments, but we had no equivalent for our high-velocity data pipelines. Our catalog metadata, consisting of titles, artwork, availability, and more, was continuously transformed from multiple upstream sources and published at a regular cadence. Each upstream source had its own validation, but these checks didn’t catch corruption in the final transformed output.

We needed to treat data deployments with the same rigor as code deployments.

The Challenge: Validating Data at Short Intervals

Our catalog metadata service operates as a high-velocity data pipeline: it processes multiple input feeds, transforms them, and publishes the final catalog state that gets distributed across our infrastructure.

This creates unique validation challenges that our traditional canary analysis tools aren’t designed to handle:

Time Constraints: Our existing canary analysis tools require 30–60 minutes to reach statistical confidence. We had a much shorter window between data cycles; we needed to detect issues, make a decision, and block publishing all within a single cycle.

Emergent Issues: While each upstream data source has independent validation, problems often only manifest in the final transformed state. We needed to validate the actual output that clients would consume, not just the inputs, as close to the clients as possible.

Production Traffic is Essential: We initially considered shadow traffic, but quickly realized it was insufficient. Shadow traffic can only replay requests to our catalog metadata service; it can’t simulate the entire playback lifecycle across multiple services and domains. To detect real customer impact, we needed real production traffic.

Limit Blast Radius: Despite using production traffic for validation, we couldn’t allow customers to experience widespread issues during the validation process. Any regression needed to be detected and contained immediately.

Our Solution: The Data Canary Orchestrator Pattern

After evaluating several architectural approaches, we developed a solution built around three key innovations:

1. Dedicated Orchestrator Pattern

We created a dedicated cluster for the purposes of canarying new catalog metadata that separates concerns, avoids self-testing, and provides a pattern for extensibility. Here’s how it works:

Orchestrator Instance: A dedicated orchestrator instance of our catalog metadata service coordinates the data canary flow. When a new catalog version is published to the canary environment, the orchestrator validates that both baseline and canary clusters are healthy and version-synchronized, then triggers a chaos experiment.

Permanent Baseline & Canary Clusters: Two dedicated service clusters run continuously in our canary region. The baseline cluster always serves the latest production catalog version, while the canary cluster receives new versions for validation.

Generic Integration Point: Upon chaos experiment completion, the orchestrator reports results back to the transformer service via a REST endpoint. This generic interface means new data sources can implement their own orchestrator patterns without requiring transformer code changes.

This pattern can now be adopted by other teams at Netflix for validating different data sources, which is exactly the kind of extensibility we designed for.

Data Canary workflow

2. Utilizing and Extending our Chaos Platform

Meeting the 10-minute constraint required not only leaning on our chaos platform, but also extending it to meet our needs:

Custom Threshold Tuning: We worked with our Resilience team to customize experiment thresholds for our use case. Standard chaos experiment thresholds were too conservative for our time constraints.

Multi-Tenant Testing: Our catalog service supports multiple client types with different traffic patterns and downstream dependencies. We ran separate experiments for major client types and discovered that running traffic through the tenant that handles playback requests consistently identified failures fastest.

Sticky Canaries: To isolate experiment traffic, sticky canaries use session affinity to guarantee that once a user’s traffic is routed to the baseline or canary clusters, it stays there for the duration of the experiment window. This prevents cross-contamination from concurrent chaos experiments, ensuring a clean apples-to-apples comparison between data versions.

Behavioral Metrics Over Technical Metrics: We focused on Starts Per Second (SPS), or actual customer playback attempts, as our primary signal. SPS proved more reliable than latency or error rates for detecting catalog corruption because it directly measures customer impact, and data errors may not always manifest as application errors to our catalog metadata service.

Immediate Abort on Regression: Instead of collecting data for post-hoc analysis, we stream metrics in real-time and abort experiments the moment we detect regression. This trades some statistical confidence for speed, but our tight thresholds and clear signal make this not only acceptable, but necessary.

3. Production-Hardened Edge Case Handling

Building a system that runs in production every 10 minutes taught us that the devil is in the details:

In-Flight Experiments During Redeployment: When the orchestrator restarts, it must detect and continue polling any ongoing experiments, as we can’t abandon a validation cycle mid-flight.

Leader Election: During orchestrator deployments, multiple instances might be running simultaneously. We implemented safeguards to ensure only one experiment is triggered per version announcement.

Version Synchronization: In a multi-tenant service where different clients consume data at different cadences, we track version state to ensure baseline and canary clusters are properly aligned before triggering experiments.

Validating the Validator: Controlled Failure Injection

To prove the system worked, we needed to break things on purpose. We ran a series of controlled experiments where we deliberately corrupted catalog data — denylisting high-profile titles and simulating real data corruption scenarios — to validate that the canary could detect issues and block publication.

These experiments were coordinated as proactive incidents during business hours, with product operations teams on standby. We routed approximately 0.2% of global traffic through the validation flow, minimizing blast radius while still generating meaningful signal.

Key Results:

  • Detection Speed: Issues identified in 2.5–4 minutes depending on client type
  • Clear Signal: 10x error differential between canary and baseline
  • Automatic Blocking: Publishing workflow blocked as designed when regressions detected

The experiments validated our end-to-end workflow and revealed important operational insights: different client traffic patterns detect failures at different speeds, and threshold tuning requires careful refinement based on the magnitude of impact we want this system to detect. Most importantly, they proved that even with a 10-minute validation window, far shorter than traditional 30–60 minute canary analysis, we had sufficient signal to catch high-impact catalog corruption.

Bringing Code Validation Principles to Data

This effort wasn’t just about building a validation system, it was about recognizing that data deployments deserve the same rigor as code deployments. Just because something isn’t a binary doesn’t mean it can’t break production. The patterns we landed on aren’t specific to catalog metadata, and can be applied to systems with high-velocity data pipelines more broadly.

If you’re working with data that changes frequently and impacts customers directly, ask yourself:

  • What’s your MTTD for data corruption?
  • Can you validate with production traffic safely?
  • How would you detect emergent issues in transformed data?
  • What behavioral metric most closely indicates customer impact in your domain?

Today, the failure mode that caused the aforementioned incident would be caught and mitigated in under 10 minutes. We all know outages aren’t a question of if, but when. The next time you find yourself faced with bad data, how fast will you be able to respond?

Acknowledgments

This work was a collaborative effort across multiple teams at Netflix. Special thanks to Jongyoon Lee, David Su, and Zubeen Lalani of the Catalog Foundations & Distribution team for their contributions to the design, and to Ales Plsek of the Resilience team for their support in customizing our chaos platform for our unique use case.


The Data Canary: How Netflix Validates Catalog Metadata was originally published in Netflix TechBlog on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

When protections outlive their purpose: A lesson on managing defense systems at scale

Post Syndicated from Thomas Kjær Aabo original https://github.blog/engineering/infrastructure/when-protections-outlive-their-purpose-a-lesson-on-managing-defense-systems-at-scale/


To keep a platform like GitHub available and responsive, it’s critical to build defense mechanisms. A whole lot of them. Rate limits, traffic controls, and protective measures spread across multiple layers of infrastructure. These all play a role in keeping the service healthy during abuse or attacks.

We recently ran into a challenge: Those same protections can quietly outlive their usefulness and start blocking legitimate users. This is especially true for protections added as emergency responses during incidents, when responding quickly means accepting broader controls that aren’t necessarily meant to be long-term. User feedback led us to clean up outdated mitigations and reinforced that observability is just as critical for defenses as it is for features.

We apologize for the disruption. We should have caught and removed these protections sooner. Here’s what happened.

What users reported

We saw reports on social media from people getting “too many requests” errors during normal, low-volume browsing, such as when following a GitHub link from another service or app, or just browsing around with no obvious pattern of abuse.

Screenshot of a 'Too many requests' screen encountered by users.
Users encountered a “Too many requests” error during normal browsing.

These were users making a handful of normal requests hitting rate limits that shouldn’t have applied to them.

What we found

Investigating these reports, we discovered the root cause: Protection rules added during past abuse incidents had been left in place. These rules were based on patterns that had been strongly associated with abusive traffic when they were created. The problem is that those same patterns were also matching some logged-out requests from legitimate clients.

These patterns are combinations of industry-standard fingerprinting techniques alongside platform-specific business logic — composite signals that help us distinguish legitimate usage from abuse. But, unfortunately, composite signals can occasionally produce false positives.

The composite approach did provide filtering. Among requests that matched the suspicious fingerprints, only about 0.5–0.9% were actually blocked; specifically, those that also triggered the business-logic rules. Requests that matched both criteria were blocked 100% of the time.

Chart showing percentage of fingerprint matches that were blocked by also triggering business-logic rules, fluctuating between 0.5-0.9% over 60 minutes
Not all fingerprint matches resulted in blocks — only those also matching business logic patterns.

The overall impact was small but consistent; however, for the customers who were affected, we recognize that any incorrect blocking is unacceptable and can be disruptive. To put all of this in perspective, the following shows the false-positive rate relative to total traffic.

Chart showing false positives as approximately 0.003-0.004% of total traffic, with a reference line at 100%
False positives represented roughly 0.003-0.004% of total traffic.

Although the percentage was low, it still meant that real users were incorrectly blocked during normal browsing, which is not acceptable. The chart below zooms in specifically on this false-positive pattern over time.

Chart showing false positive rate over 60 minutes, hovering around 0.003-0.004%
In the hour before cleanup, approximately 3-4 requests per 100,000 (0.003-0.004%) were incorrectly blocked.

This is a common challenge when defending platforms at scale. During active incidents, you need to respond quickly, and you accept some tradeoffs to keep the service available. The mitigations are correct and necessary at that moment. Those emergency controls don’t age well as threat patterns evolve and legitimate tools and usage change.

Without active maintenance, temporary mitigations become permanent, and their side effects compound quietly.

Tracing through the stack

The investigation itself highlighted why these issues can persist. When users reported errors, we traced requests across multiple layers of infrastructure to identify where the blocks occurred.

To understand why this tracing is necessary, it helps to see how protection mechanisms are applied throughout our infrastructure. We’ve built a custom, multi-layered protection infrastructure tailored to GitHub’s unique operational requirements and scale, building upon the flexibility and extensibility of open-source projects like HAProxy. Here’s a simplified view of how requests flow through these defense layers (simplified to avoid disclosing specific defense mechanisms and to keep the concepts broadly applicable):

Diagram showing user requests flowing through multiple infrastructure layers (Edge, Application, Service, Backend), with protection mechanisms at each layer including DDoS protection, rate limits, authentication, and access controls.

Each layer has legitimate reasons to rate-limit or block requests. During an incident, a protection might be added at any of these layers depending on where the abuse is best mitigated and what controls are fastest to deploy.

The challenge: When a request gets blocked, tracing which layer made that decision requires correlating logs across multiple systems, each with different schemas.

In this case, we started with user reports and worked backward:

  1. User reports provided timestamps and approximate behavior patterns.
  2. Edge tier logs showed the requests reaching our infrastructure.
  3. Application tier logs revealed 429 “Too Many Requests” responses.
  4. Protection rule analysis ultimately identified which rules matched these requests.

The investigation took us from external reports to distributed logs to rule configurations, demonstrating that maintaining comprehensive visibility into what’s actually blocking requests and where is essential.

The lifecycle of incident mitigations

Here’s how these protections outlived their purpose:

Diagram showing incident mitigation lifecycle: control added during incident, works initially, remains active over time without review, eventually blocks legitimate traffic.

Each mitigation was necessary when added. But the controls where we didn’t consistently apply lifecycle management (setting expiration dates, conducting post-incident rule reviews, or monitoring impact) became technical debt that accumulated until users noticed.

What we did

We reviewed these mitigations, analyzing what each one was blocking today versus what it was meant to block when created. We removed the rules that were no longer serving their purpose, and kept protections against ongoing threats.

What we’re building

Beyond the immediate fix, we’re improving the lifecycle management of protective controls:

  • Better visibility across all protection layers to trace the source of rate limits and blocks.
  • Treating incident mitigations as temporary by default. Making them permanent should require an intentional, documented decision.
  • Post-incident practices that evaluate emergency controls and evolve them into sustainable, targeted solutions.

Defense mechanisms – even those deployed quickly during incidents – need the same care as the systems they protect. They need observability, documentation, and active maintenance. When protections are added during incidents and left in place, they become technical debt that quietly accumulates.

Thanks to everyone who reported issues publicly! Your feedback directly led to these improvements. And thanks to the teams across GitHub who worked on the investigation and are building better lifecycle management into how we operate. Our platform, team, and community are better together!

The post When protections outlive their purpose: A lesson on managing defense systems at scale appeared first on The GitHub Blog.