Tag Archives: infrastructure

Ransomware Attacks against Water Treatment Plants

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/10/ransomware-attacks-against-water-treatment-plants.html

According to a report from CISA last week, there were three ransomware attacks against water treatment plants last year.

WWS Sector cyber intrusions from 2019 to early 2021 include:

  • In August 2021, malicious cyber actors used Ghost variant ransomware against a California-based WWS facility. The ransomware variant had been in the system for about a month and was discovered when three supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) servers displayed a ransomware message.
  • In July 2021, cyber actors used remote access to introduce ZuCaNo ransomware onto a Maine-based WWS facility’s wastewater SCADA computer. The treatment system was run manually until the SCADA computer was restored using local control and more frequent operator rounds.
  • In March 2021, cyber actors used an unknown ransomware variant against a Nevada-based WWS facility. The ransomware affected the victim’s SCADA system and backup systems. The SCADA system provides visibility and monitoring but is not a full industrial control system (ICS).

Suing Infrastructure Companies for Copyright Violations

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/10/suing-infrastructure-companies-for-copyright-violations.html

It’s a matter of going after those with deep pockets. From Wired:

Cloudflare was sued in November 2018 by Mon Cheri Bridals and Maggie Sottero Designs, two wedding dress manufacturers and sellers that alleged Cloudflare was guilty of contributory copyright infringement because it didn’t terminate services for websites that infringed on the dressmakers’ copyrighted designs….

[Judge] Chhabria noted that the dressmakers have been harmed “by the proliferation of counterfeit retailers that sell knock-off dresses using the plaintiffs’ copyrighted images” and that they have “gone after the infringers in a range of actions, but to no avail — every time a website is successfully shut down, a new one takes its place.” Chhabria continued, “In an effort to more effectively stamp out infringement, the plaintiffs now go after a service common to many of the infringers: Cloudflare. The plaintiffs claim that Cloudflare contributes to the underlying copyright infringement by providing infringers with caching, content delivery, and security services. Because a reasonable jury could not — at least on this record — conclude that Cloudflare materially contributes to the underlying copyright infringement, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied and Cloudflare’s motion for summary judgment is granted.”

I was an expert witness for Cloudflare in this case, basically explaining to the court how the service works.

Netflix Drive

Post Syndicated from Netflix Technology Blog original https://netflixtechblog.com/netflix-drive-a607538c3055

A file and folder interface for Netflix Cloud Services

Written by Vikram Krishnamurthy, Kishore Kasi, Abhishek Kapatkar, Tejas Chopra, Prudhviraj Karumanchi, Kelsey Francis, Shailesh Birari

In this post, we are introducing Netflix Drive, a Cloud drive for media assets and providing a high level overview of some of its features and interfaces. We intend this to be a first post in a series of posts covering Netflix Drive. In the future posts, we will do an architectural deep dive into the several components of Netflix Drive.

Netflix, and particularly Studio applications (and Studio in the Cloud) produce petabytes of data backed by billions of media assets. Several artists and workflows that may be globally distributed, work on different projects, and each of these projects produce content that forms a part of the large corpus of assets.

Here is an example of globally distributed production where several artists and workflows work in conjunction to create and share assets for one or many projects.

Fig 1: Globally distributed production with artists working on different assets from different parts of the world

There are workflows in which these artists may want to view a subset of these assets from this large dataset, for example, pertaining to a specific project. These artists may want to create personal workspaces and work on generating intermediate assets. To support such use cases, access control at the user workspace and project workspace granularity is extremely important for presenting a globally consistent view of pertinent data to these artists.

Netflix Drive aims to solve this problem of exposing different namespaces and attaching appropriate access control to help build a scalable, performant, globally distributed platform for storing and retrieving pertinent assets.

Netflix Drive is envisioned to be a Cloud Drive for Studio and Media applications and lends itself to be a generic paved path solution for all content in Netflix.

It exposes a file/folder interface for applications to save their data and an API interface for control operations. Netflix Drive relies on a data store that will be the persistent storage layer for assets, and a metadata store which will provide a relevant mapping from the file system hierarchy to the data store entities. The major pieces, as shown in Fig. 2, are the file system interface, the API interface, and the metadata and data stores. We will delve into these in the following sections.

Fig 2: Netflix Drive components

File interface for Netflix Drive

Creative applications such as Nuke, Maya, Adobe Photoshop store and retrieve content using files and folders. Netflix Drive relies on FUSE (File System In User Space) to provide POSIX files and folders interface to such applications. A FUSE based POSIX interface provides feature customization elasticity, deployment configuration flexibility as well as a standard and seamless file/folder interface. A similar user space abstraction is available for Windows (WinFSP) and MacOS (MacFUSE)

The operations that originate from user, application and system actions on files and folders translate to a well defined set of function and system calls which are forwarded by the Linux Virtual File System Layer (or a pass-through/filter driver in Windows) to the FUSE layer in user space. The resulting metadata and data operations will be implemented by appropriate metadata and data adapters in Netflix Drive.

Fig 3: POSIX interface of Netflix Drive

The POSIX files and folders interface for Netflix Drive is designed as a layered system with the FUSE implementation hooks forming the top layer. This layer will provide entry points for all of the relevant VFS calls that will be implemented. Netflix Drive contains an abstraction layer below FUSE which allows different metadata and data stores to be plugged into the architecture by having their corresponding adapters implement the interface. We will discuss more about the layered architecture in the section below.

API Interface for Netflix Drive

Along with exposing a file interface which will be a hub of all abstractions, Netflix Drive also exposes API and Polled Task interfaces to allow applications and workflow tools to trigger control operations in Netflix Drive.

For example, applications can explicitly use REST endpoints to publish files stored in Netflix Drive to cloud, and later use a REST endpoint to retrieve a subset of the published files from cloud. The API interface can also be used to track the transfers of large files and allows other applications to be built on top of Netflix Drive.

Fig 4: Control interface of Netflix Drive

The Polled Task interface allows studio and media workflow orchestrators to post or dispatch tasks to Netflix Drive instances on disparate workstations or containers. This allows Netflix Drive to be bootstrapped with an empty namespace when the workstation comes up and dynamically project a specific set of assets relevant to the artists’ work sessions or workflow stages. Further these assets can be projected into a namespace of the artist’s or application’s choosing.

Alternatively, workstations/containers can be launched with the assets of interest prefetched at startup. These allow artists and applications to obtain a workstation which already contains relevant files and optionally add and delete asset trees during the work session. For example, artists perform transformative work on files, and use Netflix Drive to store/fetch intermediate results as well as the final copy which can be transformed back into a media asset.

Bootstrapping Netflix Drive

Given the two different modes in which applications can interact with Netflix Drive, now let us discuss how Netflix Drive is bootstrapped.

On startup, Netflix Drive expects a manifest that contains information about the data store, metadata store, and credentials (tied to a user login) to form an instance of namespace hierarchy. A Netflix Drive mount point may contain multiple Netflix Drive namespaces.

A dynamic instance allows Netflix Drive to show a user-selected and user-accessible subset of data from a large corpus of assets. A user instance allows it to act like a Cloud Drive, where users can work on content which is automatically synced in the background periodically to Cloud. On restart on a new machine, the same files and folders will be prefetched from the cloud. We will cover the different namespaces of Netflix Drive in more detail in a subsequent blog post.

Here is an example of a typical bootstrap manifest file.

This image shows a bootstrap manifest json which highlights how Netflix Drive can work with different metadata stores (such as Redis, CockroachDB), and data stores (such as Ceph, S3) and tie them together to provide persistence layer for assets
A sample manifest file.

The manifest is a persistent artifact which renders a user workstation its Netflix Drive personality. It survives instance failures and is able to recreate the same stateful interface on any newly deployed instance.

Metadata and Data Store Abstractions

In order to allow a variety of different metadata stores and data stores to be easily plugged into the architecture, Netflix Drive exposes abstract interfaces for both metadata and data stores. Here is a high level diagram explaining the different layers of abstractions in Netflix Drive

Fig 5: Layered architecture of Netflix Drive

Metadata Store Characteristics

Each file in Netflix Drive would have one or many corresponding metadata nodes, corresponding to different versions of the file. The file system hierarchy would be modeled as a tree in the metadata store where the root node is the top level folder for the application.

Each metadata node will contain several attributes, such as checksum of the file, location of the data, user permissions to access data, file metadata such as size, modification time, etc. A metadata node may also provide support for extended attributes which can be used to model ACLs, symbolic links, or other expressive file system constructs.

Metadata Store may also expose the concept of workspaces, where each user/application can have several workspaces, and can share workspaces with other users/applications. These are higher level constructs that are very useful to Studio applications.

Data Store Characteristics

Netflix Drive relies on a data store that allows streaming bytes into files/objects persisted on the storage media. The data store should expose APIs that allow Netflix Drive to perform I/O operations. The transfer mechanism for transport of bytes is a function of the data store.

In the first manifestation, Netflix Drive is using an object store (such as Amazon S3) as a data store. In order to expose file store-like properties, there were some changes needed in the object store. Each file can be stored as one or more objects. For Studio applications, file sizes may exceed the maximum object size for Cloud Storage, and so, the data store service should have the ability to store multiple parts of a file as separate objects. It is the responsibility of the data store service to tie these objects to a single file and inform the metadata store of the single unique Id for these several object parts. This Data store internally implements the chunking of file into several parts, encrypting of the content, and life cycle management of the data.

Multi-tiered architecture

Netflix Drive allows multiple data stores to be a part of the same installation via its bootstrap manifest.

Fig 6: Multiple data stores of Netflix Drive

Some studio applications such as encoding and transcoding have different I/O characteristics than a typical cloud drive.

Most of the data produced by these applications is ephemeral in nature, and is read often initially. The final encoded copy needs to be persisted and the ephemeral data can be deleted. To serve such applications, Netflix Drive can persist the ephemeral data in storage tiers which are closer to the application that allow lower read latencies and better economies for read request, since cloud storage reads incur an egress cost. Finally, once the encoded copy is prepared, this copy can be persisted by Netflix Drive to a persistent storage tier in the cloud. A single data store may also choose to archive some subset of content stored in cheaper alternatives.

Security

Studio applications require strict adherence to security models where only users or applications with specific permissions should be allowed to access specific assets. Security is one of the cornerstones of Netflix Drive design. Netflix Drive dynamic namespace design allows an artist or workflow to access only a small subset of the assets based on the workspace information and access control and is one of the benefits of using Netflix Drive in Studio workflows. Netflix Drive encapsulates the authentication and authorization models in its metadata store. These are translated into POSIX ACLs in Netflix Drive. In the future, Netflix Drive can allow more expressive ACLs by leveraging extended attributes associated with Metadata nodes corresponding to an asset.

Netflix Drive is currently being used by several Studio teams as the paved path solution for working with assets and is integrated with several media suite applications. As of today, Netflix Drive can be installed on CentOS, MacOS and Windows. In the future blog posts, we will cover implementation details, learnings, performance analysis of Netflix Drive, and some of the applications and workflows built on top of Netflix Drive.

If you are passionate about building Storage and Infrastructure solutions for Netflix Data Platform, we are always looking for talented engineers and managers. Please check out our job listings


Netflix Drive was originally published in Netflix TechBlog on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

GPS Vulnerabilities

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/gps-vulnerabilities.html

Really good op-ed in the New York Times about how vulnerable the GPS system is to interference, spoofing, and jamming — and potential alternatives.

The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act included funding for the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Transportation to jointly conduct demonstrations of various alternatives to GPS, which were concluded last March. Eleven potential systems were tested, including eLoran, a low-frequency, high-power timing and navigation system transmitted from terrestrial towers at Coast Guard facilities throughout the United States.

“China, Russia, Iran, South Korea and Saudi Arabia all have eLoran systems because they don’t want to be as vulnerable as we are to disruptions of signals from space,” said Dana Goward, the president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, a nonprofit that advocates for the implementation of an eLoran backup for GPS.

Also under consideration by federal authorities are timing systems delivered via fiber optic network and satellite systems in a lower orbit than GPS, which therefore have a stronger signal, making them harder to hack. A report on the technologies was submitted to Congress last week.

GPS is a piece of our critical infrastructure that is essential to a lot of the rest of our critical infrastructure. It needs to be more secure.

Attack against Florida Water Treatment Facility

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/attack-against-florida-water-treatment-facility.html

A water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida, was attacked last Friday. The attacker took control of one of the systems, and increased the amount of sodium hydroxide — that’s lye — by a factor of 100. This could have been fatal to people living downstream, if an alert operator hadn’t noticed the change and reversed it.

We don’t know who is behind this attack. Despite its similarities to a Russian attack of a Ukrainian power plant in 2015, my bet is that it’s a disgruntled insider: either a current or former employee. It just doesn’t make sense for Russia to be behind this.

ArsTechnica is reporting on the poor cybersecurity at the plant:

The Florida water treatment facility whose computer system experienced a potentially hazardous computer breach last week used an unsupported version of Windows with no firewall and shared the same TeamViewer password among its employees, government officials have reported.

Brian Krebs points out that the fact that we know about this attack is what’s rare:

Spend a few minutes searching Twitter, Reddit or any number of other social media sites and you’ll find countless examples of researchers posting proof of being able to access so-called “human-machine interfaces” — basically web pages designed to interact remotely with various complex systems, such as those that monitor and/or control things like power, water, sewage and manufacturing plants.

And yet, there have been precious few known incidents of malicious hackers abusing this access to disrupt these complex systems. That is, until this past Monday, when Florida county sheriff Bob Gualtieri held a remarkably clear-headed and fact-filled news conference about an attempt to poison the water supply of Oldsmar, a town of around 15,000 not far from Tampa.

Including Hackers in NATO Wargames

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/01/including-hackers-in-nato-wargames.html

This essay makes the point that actual computer hackers would be a useful addition to NATO wargames:

The international information security community is filled with smart people who are not in a military structure, many of whom would be excited to pose as independent actors in any upcoming wargames. Including them would increase the reality of the game and the skills of the soldiers building and training on these networks. Hackers and cyberwar experts would demonstrate how industrial control systems such as power supply for refrigeration and temperature monitoring in vaccine production facilities are critical infrastructure; they’re easy targets and should be among NATO’s priorities at the moment.

Diversity of thought leads to better solutions. We in the information security community strongly support the involvement of acknowledged nonmilitary experts in the development and testing of future cyberwar scenarios. We are confident that independent experts, many of whom see sharing their skills as public service, would view participation in these cybergames as a challenge and an honor.

More on the Security of the 2020 US Election

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/11/more-on-the-security-of-the-2020-us-election.html

Last week I signed on to two joint letters about the security of the 2020 election. The first was as one of 59 election security experts, basically saying that while the election seems to have been both secure and accurate (voter suppression notwithstanding), we still need to work to secure our election systems:

We are aware of alarming assertions being made that the 2020 election was “rigged” by exploiting technical vulnerabilities. However, in every case of which we are aware, these claims either have been unsubstantiated or are technically incoherent. To our collective knowledge, no credible evidence has been put forth that supports a conclusion that the 2020 election outcome in any state has been altered through technical compromise.

That said, it is imperative that the US continue working to bolster the security of elections against sophisticated adversaries. At a minimum, all states should employ election security practices and mechanisms recommended by experts to increase assurance in election outcomes, such as post-election risk-limiting audits.

The New York Times wrote about the letter.

The second was a more general call for election security measures in the US:

Obviously elections themselves are partisan. But the machinery of them should not be. And the transparent assessment of potential problems or the assessment of allegations of security failure — even when they could affect the outcome of an election — must be free of partisan pressures. Bottom line: election security officials and computer security experts must be able to do their jobs without fear of retribution for finding and publicly stating the truth about the security and integrity of the election.

These pile on to the November 12 statement from Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the other agencies of the Election Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council (GCC) Executive Committee. While I’m not sure how they have enough comparative data to claim that “the November 3rd election was the most secure in American history,” they are certainly credible in saying that “there is no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.”

We have a long way to go to secure our election systems from hacking. Details of what to do are known. Getting rid of touch-screen voting machines is important, but baseless claims of fraud don’t help.

Using Disinformation to Cause a Blackout

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/08/using_disinform.html

Interesting paper: “How weaponizing disinformation can bring down a city’s power grid“:

Abstract: Social media has made it possible to manipulate the masses via disinformation and fake news at an unprecedented scale. This is particularly alarming from a security perspective, as humans have proven to be one of the weakest links when protecting critical infrastructure in general, and the power grid in particular. Here, we consider an attack in which an adversary attempts to manipulate the behavior of energy consumers by sending fake discount notifications encouraging them to shift their consumption into the peak-demand period. Using Greater London as a case study, we show that such disinformation can indeed lead to unwitting consumers synchronizing their energy-usage patterns, and result in blackouts on a city-scale if the grid is heavily loaded. We then conduct surveys to assess the propensity of people to follow-through on such notifications and forward them to their friends. This allows us to model how the disinformation may propagate through social networks, potentially amplifying the attack impact. These findings demonstrate that in an era when disinformation can be weaponized, system vulnerabilities arise not only from the hardware and software of critical infrastructure, but also from the behavior of the consumers.

I’m not sure the attack is practical, but it’s an interesting idea.

Work-from-Home Security Advice

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/03/work-from-home_.html

SANS has made freely available its “Work-from-Home Awareness Kit.”

When I think about how COVID-19’s security measures are affecting organizational networks, I see several interrelated problems:

One, employees are working from their home networks and sometimes from their home computers. These systems are more likely to be out of date, unpatched, and unprotected. They are more vulnerable to attack simply because they are less secure.

Two, sensitive organizational data will likely migrate outside of the network. Employees working from home are going to save data on their own computers, where they aren’t protected by the organization’s security systems. This makes the data more likely to be hacked and stolen.

Three, employees are more likely to access their organizational networks insecurely. If the organization is lucky, they will have already set up a VPN for remote access. If not, they’re either trying to get one quickly or not bothering at all. Handing people VPN software to install and use with zero training is a recipe for security mistakes, but not using a VPN is even worse.

Four, employees are being asked to use new and unfamiliar tools like Zoom to replace face-to-face meetings. Again, these hastily set-up systems are likely to be insecure.

Five, the general chaos of “doing things differently” is an opening for attack. Tricks like business email compromise, where an employee gets a fake email from a senior executive asking him to transfer money to some account, will be more successful when the employee can’t walk down the hall to confirm the email’s validity — and when everyone is distracted and so many other things are being done differently.

Worrying about network security seems almost quaint in the face of the massive health risks from COVID-19, but attacks on infrastructure can have effects far greater than the infrastructure itself. Stay safe, everyone, and help keep your networks safe as well.

Iranian Attacks on Industrial Control Systems

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/12/iranian_attacks.html

New details:

At the CyberwarCon conference in Arlington, Virginia, on Thursday, Microsoft security researcher Ned Moran plans to present new findings from the company’s threat intelligence group that show a shift in the activity of the Iranian hacker group APT33, also known by the names Holmium, Refined Kitten, or Elfin. Microsoft has watched the group carry out so-called password-spraying attacks over the past year that try just a few common passwords across user accounts at tens of thousands of organizations. That’s generally considered a crude and indiscriminate form of hacking. But over the last two months, Microsoft says APT33 has significantly narrowed its password spraying to around 2,000 organizations per month, while increasing the number of accounts targeted at each of those organizations almost tenfold on average.

[…]

The hackers’ motivation — and which industrial control systems they’ve actually breached — remains unclear. Moran speculates that the group is seeking to gain a foothold to carry out cyberattacks with physically disruptive effects. “They’re going after these producers and manufacturers of control systems, but I don’t think they’re the end targets,” says Moran. “They’re trying to find the downstream customer, to find out how they work and who uses them. They’re looking to inflict some pain on someone’s critical infrastructure that makes use of these control systems.”

It’s unclear whether the attackers are causing any actual damage, or just gaining access for some future use.

On Chinese "Spy Trains"

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/09/on_chinese_spy_.html

The trade war with China has reached a new industry: subway cars. Congress is considering legislation that would prevent the world’s largest train maker, the Chinese-owned CRRC Corporation, from competing on new contracts in the United States.

Part of the reasoning behind this legislation is economic, and stems from worries about Chinese industries undercutting the competition and dominating key global industries. But another part involves fears about national security. News articles talk about “spy trains,” and the possibility that the train cars might surreptitiously monitor their passengers’ faces, movements, conversations or phone calls.

This is a complicated topic. There is definitely a national security risk in buying computer infrastructure from a country you don’t trust. That’s why there is so much worry about Chinese-made equipment for the new 5G wireless networks.

It’s also why the United States has blocked the cybersecurity company Kaspersky from selling its Russian-made antivirus products to US government agencies. Meanwhile, the chairman of China’s technology giant Huawei has pointed to NSA spying disclosed by Edward Snowden as a reason to mistrust US technology companies.

The reason these threats are so real is that it’s not difficult to hide surveillance or control infrastructure in computer components, and if they’re not turned on, they’re very difficult to find.

Like every other piece of modern machinery, modern train cars are filled with computers, and while it’s certainly possible to produce a subway car with enough surveillance apparatus to turn it into a “spy train,” in practice it doesn’t make much sense. The risk of discovery is too great, and the payoff would be too low. Like the United States, China is more likely to try to get data from the US communications infrastructure, or from the large Internet companies that already collect data on our every move as part of their business model.

While it’s unlikely that China would bother spying on commuters using subway cars, it would be much less surprising if a tech company offered free Internet on subways in exchange for surveillance and data collection. Or if the NSA used those corporate systems for their own surveillance purposes (just as the agency has spied on in-flight cell phone calls, according to an investigation by the Intercept and Le Monde, citing documents provided by Edward Snowden). That’s an easier, and more fruitful, attack path.

We have credible reports that the Chinese hacked Gmail around 2010, and there are ongoing concerns about both censorship and surveillance by the Chinese social-networking company TikTok. (TikTok’s parent company has told the Washington Post that the app doesn’t send American users’ info back to Beijing, and that the Chinese government does not influence the app’s use in the United States.)

Even so, these examples illustrate an important point: there’s no escaping the technology of inevitable surveillance. You have little choice but to rely on the companies that build your computers and write your software, whether in your smartphones, your 5G wireless infrastructure, or your subway cars. And those systems are so complicated that they can be secretly programmed to operate against your interests.

Last year, Le Monde reported that the Chinese government bugged the computer network of the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa. China had built and outfitted the organization’s new headquarters as a foreign aid gift, reportedly secretly configuring the network to send copies of confidential data to Shanghai every night between 2012 and 2017. China denied having done so, of course.

If there’s any lesson from all of this, it’s that everybody spies using the Internet. The United States does it. Our allies do it. Our enemies do it. Many countries do it to each other, with their success largely dependent on how sophisticated their tech industries are.

China dominates the subway car manufacturing industry because of its low prices­ — the same reason it dominates the 5G hardware industry. Whether these low prices are because the companies are more efficient than their competitors or because they’re being unfairly subsidized by the Chinese government is a matter to be determined at trade negotiations.

Finally, Americans must understand that higher prices are an inevitable result of banning cheaper tech products from China.

We might willingly pay the higher prices because we want domestic control of our telecommunications infrastructure. We might willingly pay more because of some protectionist belief that global trade is somehow bad. But we need to make these decisions to protect ourselves deliberately and rationally, recognizing both the risks and the costs. And while I’m worried about our 5G infrastructure built using Chinese hardware, I’m not worried about our subway cars.

This essay originally appeared on CNN.com.

EDITED TO ADD: I had a lot of trouble with CNN’s legal department with this essay. They were very reluctant to call out the US and its allies for similar behavior, and spent a lot more time adding caveats to statements that I didn’t think needed them. They wouldn’t let me link to this Intercept article talking about US, French, and German infiltration of supply chains, or even the NSA document from the Snowden archives that proved the statements.

Maciej Cegłowski on Privacy in the Information Age

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/06/maciej_ceglowsk.html

Maciej Cegłowski has a really good essay explaining how to think about privacy today:

For the purposes of this essay, I’ll call it “ambient privacy” — the understanding that there is value in having our everyday interactions with one another remain outside the reach of monitoring, and that the small details of our daily lives should pass by unremembered. What we do at home, work, church, school, or in our leisure time does not belong in a permanent record. Not every conversation needs to be a deposition.

Until recently, ambient privacy was a simple fact of life. Recording something for posterity required making special arrangements, and most of our shared experience of the past was filtered through the attenuating haze of human memory. Even police states like East Germany, where one in seven citizens was an informer, were not able to keep tabs on their entire population. Today computers have given us that power. Authoritarian states like China and Saudi Arabia are using this newfound capacity as a tool of social control. Here in the United States, we’re using it to show ads. But the infrastructure of total surveillance is everywhere the same, and everywhere being deployed at scale.

Ambient privacy is not a property of people, or of their data, but of the world around us. Just like you can’t drop out of the oil economy by refusing to drive a car, you can’t opt out of the surveillance economy by forswearing technology (and for many people, that choice is not an option). While there may be worthy reasons to take your life off the grid, the infrastructure will go up around you whether you use it or not.

Because our laws frame privacy as an individual right, we don’t have a mechanism for deciding whether we want to live in a surveillance society. Congress has remained silent on the matter, with both parties content to watch Silicon Valley make up its own rules. The large tech companies point to our willing use of their services as proof that people don’t really care about their privacy. But this is like arguing that inmates are happy to be in jail because they use the prison library. Confronted with the reality of a monitored world, people make the rational decision to make the best of it.

That is not consent.

Ambient privacy is particularly hard to protect where it extends into social and public spaces outside the reach of privacy law. If I’m subjected to facial recognition at the airport, or tagged on social media at a little league game, or my public library installs an always-on Alexa microphone, no one is violating my legal rights. But a portion of my life has been brought under the magnifying glass of software. Even if the data harvested from me is anonymized in strict conformity with the most fashionable data protection laws, I’ve lost something by the fact of being monitored.

He’s not the first person to talk about privacy as a societal property, or to use pollution metaphors. But his framing is really cogent. And “ambient privacy” is new — and a good phrasing.

The Human Cost of Cyberattacks

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/05/the_human_cost_.html

The International Committee of the Red Cross has just published a report: “The Potential Human Cost of Cyber-Operations.” It’s the result of an “ICRC Expert Meeting” from last year, but was published this week.

Here’s a shorter blog post if you don’t want to read the whole thing. And commentary by one of the authors.

Visiting the NSA

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/05/visiting_the_ns.html

Yesterday, I visited the NSA. It was Cyber Command’s birthday, but that’s not why I was there. I visited as part of the Berklett Cybersecurity Project, run out of the Berkman Klein Center and funded by the Hewlett Foundation. (BERKman hewLETT — get it? We have a web page, but it’s badly out of date.)

It was a full day of meetings, all unclassified but under the Chatham House Rule. Gen. Nakasone welcomed us and took questions at the start. Various senior officials spoke with us on a variety of topics, but mostly focused on three areas:

  • Russian influence operations, both what the NSA and US Cyber Command did during the 2018 election and what they can do in the future;
  • China and the threats to critical infrastructure from untrusted computer hardware, both the 5G network and more broadly;

  • Machine learning, both how to ensure a ML system is compliant with all laws, and how ML can help with other compliance tasks.

It was all interesting. Those first two topics are ones that I am thinking and writing about, and it was good to hear their perspective. I find that I am much more closely aligned with the NSA about cybersecurity than I am about privacy, which made the meeting much less fraught than it would have been if we were discussing Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, Section 215 the USA Freedom Act (up for renewal next year), or any 4th Amendment violations. I don’t think we’re past those issues by any means, but they make up less of what I am working on.

More on the Triton Malware

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/04/more_on_the_tri.html

FireEye is releasing much more information about the Triton malware that attacks critical infrastructure. It has been discovered in more places.

This is also a good — but older — article on Triton. We don’t know who wrote it. Initial speculation was Iran; more recent speculation is Russia. Both are still speculations.

Fireeye report. BoingBoing post.

Gen. Nakasone on US Cyber Command

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/02/gen_nakasone_on.html

Really interesting article by and interview with Paul M. Nakasone (Commander of US Cyber Command, Director of the National Security Agency, and Chief of the Central Security Service) in the current issue of Joint Forces Quarterly. He talks about the evolving role of US Cyber Command, and its new posture of “persistent engagement” using a “cyber-persistant force.”

From the article:

We must “defend forward” in cyberspace, as we do in the physical domains. Our naval forces do not defend by staying in port, and our airpower does not remain at airfields. They patrol the seas and skies to ensure they are positioned to defend our country before our borders are crossed. The same logic applies in cyberspace. Persistent engagement of our adversaries in cyberspace cannot be successful if our actions are limited to DOD networks. To defend critical military and national interests, our forces must operate against our enemies on their virtual territory as well. Shifting from a response outlook to a persistence force that defends forward moves our cyber capabilities out of their virtual garrisons, adopting a posture that matches the cyberspace operational environment.

From the interview:

As we think about cyberspace, we should agree on a few foundational concepts. First, our nation is in constant contact with its adversaries; we’re not waiting for adversaries to come to us. Our adversaries understand this, and they are always working to improve that contact. Second, our security is challenged in cyberspace. We have to actively defend; we have to conduct reconnaissance; we have to understand where our adversary is and his capabilities; and we have to understand their intent. Third, superiority in cyberspace is temporary; we may achieve it for a period of time, but it’s ephemeral. That’s why we must operate continuously to seize and maintain the initiative in the face of persistent threats. Why do the threats persist in cyberspace? They persist because the barriers to entry are low and the capabilities are rapidly available and can be easily repurposed. Fourth, in this domain, the advantage favors those who have initiative. If we want to have an advantage in cyberspace, we have to actively work to either improve our defenses, create new accesses, or upgrade our capabilities. This is a domain that requires constant action because we’re going to get reactions from our adversary.

[…]

Persistent engagement is the concept that states we are in constant contact with our adversaries in cyberspace, and success is determined by how we enable and act. In persistent engagement, we enable other interagency partners. Whether it’s the FBI or DHS, we enable them with information or intelligence to share with elements of the CIKR [critical infrastructure and key resources] or with select private-sector companies. The recent midterm elections is an example of how we enabled our partners. As part of the Russia Small Group, USCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency [NSA] enabled the FBI and DHS to prevent interference and influence operations aimed at our political processes. Enabling our partners is two-thirds of persistent engagement. The other third rests with our ability to act — that is, how we act against our adversaries in cyberspace. Acting includes defending forward. How do we warn, how do we influence our adversaries, how do we position ourselves in case we have to achieve outcomes in the future? Acting is the concept of operating outside our borders, being outside our networks, to ensure that we understand what our adversaries are doing. If we find ourselves defending inside our own networks, we have lost the initiative and the advantage.

[…]

The concept of persistent engagement has to be teamed with “persistent presence” and “persistent innovation.” Persistent presence is what the Intelligence Community is able to provide us to better understand and track our adversaries in cyberspace. The other piece is persistent innovation. In the last couple of years, we have learned that capabilities rapidly change; accesses are tenuous; and tools, techniques, and tradecraft must evolve to keep pace with our adversaries. We rely on operational structures that are enabled with the rapid development of capabilities. Let me offer an example regarding the need for rapid change in technologies. Compare the air and cyberspace domains. Weapons like JDAMs [Joint Direct Attack Munitions] are an important armament for air operations. How long are those JDAMs good for? Perhaps 5, 10, or 15 years, some-times longer given the adversary. When we buy a capability or tool for cyberspace…we rarely get a prolonged use we can measure in years. Our capabilities rarely last 6 months, let alone 6 years. This is a big difference in two important domains of future conflict. Thus, we will need formations that have ready access to developers.

Solely from a military perspective, these are obviously the right things to be doing. From a societal perspective — from the perspective a potential arms race — I’m much less sure. I’m also worried about the singular focus on nation-state actors in an environment where capabilities diffuse so quickly. But Cyber Command’s job is not cybersecurity and resilience.

The whole thing is worth reading, regardless of whether you agree or disagree.

EDITED TO ADD (2/26): As an example US CyberCommand disrupted a Russian troll farm during the 2018 midterm elections.