All posts by David Belson http://blog.cloudflare.com/author/david-belson/

A look at Internet traffic trends during Super Bowl LVIII

Post Syndicated from David Belson http://blog.cloudflare.com/author/david-belson/ original https://blog.cloudflare.com/super-bowl-lviii


After winning Super Bowl LVII in 2023, the Kansas City Chiefs entered Super Bowl LVIII with an opportunity to pull off back-to-back wins, a feat last achieved by the New England Patriots two decades earlier, in 2003 and 2004. They faced the San Francisco 49ers, five-time Super Bowl champions, although their last win was nearly three decades ago, in 1995. The game started slowly, remaining scoreless until the start of the second quarter, after which both teams traded the lead until a tie score at the end of the game made it only the second Super Bowl to go into overtime. And if you weren’t watching it for the football, the advertisements certainly didn’t disappoint. And if you weren’t watching it for the football or the advertisements, but instead were waiting to see how many times CBS cut away to a shot of Taylor Swift during the game, the answer is… 16. (By my count, at least.)

In this blog post, we will explore which Super Bowl advertisements drove the largest spikes in traffic, as well as examine how traffic to food delivery services, social media, sports betting, and video platform websites and applications changed during the game. In addition, we look at local traffic trends seen during the game, as well as email threat volume across related categories in the weeks ahead of the game.

Cloudflare Radar uses a variety of sources to provide aggregate information about Internet traffic and attack trends. In this blog post, as we did last year and the year before, we use DNS name resolution data from our 1.1.1.1 resolver to estimate traffic to websites. We can’t see who visited the websites mentioned, or what anyone did on the websites, but DNS can give us an estimate of the interest generated by the ads or across a set of sites in the categories listed above.

Ads: URLs are no longer cool

In last year’s blog post, we asked “Are URLs no longer cool?”, noting that many of the advertisements shown during Super Bowl LVII didn’t include a URL. The trend continued into 2024, as over 100 ads were shown throughout Super Bowl LVIII, but only about one-third of them contained URLs — some were displayed prominently, some were in very small type. A few of the advertisements contained QR codes, and a few suggested downloading an app from Apple or Google’s app stores, but neither approach appears to be a definitive replacement for including a link to a website in the ad. And although Artificial Intelligence (AI) has all but replaced cryptocurrency as the thing that everyone is talking about, the lone AI ad during this year’s game was for Microsoft Copilot, which the company is positioning as an “everyday AI companion”.

As we did last year, we again tracked DNS request traffic to our 1.1.1.1 resolver in United States data centers for domains associated with the advertised products or brands. Traffic growth is plotted against a baseline calculated as the mean request volume for the associated domains between 12:00-15:00 EST on Sunday, February 11 (Super Bowl Sunday). The brands highlighted below were chosen because their advertisements drove some of the largest percentage traffic spikes observed during the game.

TurboTax

Although most Americans dislike having to pay taxes, they apparently feel that winning a million dollars would make doing so a little less painful. The Intuit TurboTax Super Bowl File ad, starring Emmy Award winner Quinta Brunson, included a URL pointing visitors to turbotax.com, where they could register to win one million dollars. The promotion aired a couple of times before the game began, visible as small spikes in the graph below, but it paid off for Intuit when it was shown at 19:56, driving traffic 24,875% above baseline and placing it as the ad that drove the largest increase in traffic.

DoorDash

Most DoorDash deliveries are fairly nominal, and should be able to easily fit in the Dasher’s car. However, in a twist, the delivery for the “DoorDash all the ads” promotion includes several cars, as well as candy, cosmetics, trips, mayonnaise, and a myriad of other items, all of which appeared in Super Bowl advertisements, as a way for the company to demonstrate that they deliver more than. The ad, which prominently featured a URL for the contest site, aired at 22:03 EST and drove traffic 24,574% above baseline. The graph below shows that prominent spike, but it also shows traffic remaining 1700-2500% above baseline after the ad aired. This elevated traffic is likely due to efforts to transcribe the full promo code needed to enter the contest. The promo code, as crowdsourced in a Reddit thread, clocks in at a whopping 1,813 characters.

Poppi

Super Bowl ads for “new” drink brands have frequently driven significant amounts of traffic, such as the growth seen by Cutwater Spirits in 2022. Relative newcomer Poppi, a brand of soda that contains prebiotics, continued the trend, with traffic spiking 7,329% above baseline after its ad appeared at 20:04 EST, despite no URL appearing in the advertisement. However, it appears that not everyone was a fan of the ad, as critics complained that it “food shamed” those who choose to drink traditional sodas.

e.l.f. Cosmetics

The cosmetic brand’s second Super Bowl advertisement featured Judge Judy presiding over a courtroom scene featuring musician Meghan Trainor and the cast of the USA Network legal drama Suits. While the ad drove traffic for elfcosmetics.com to 8,118% over baseline despite lacking a URL, the timing of the growth is unusual as it doesn’t align with the time the ad aired (20:22 EST). The traffic starts to tick up around 21:24 EST, just after a Chiefs touchdown put them in the lead, peaking at 22:53, several minutes after the Chiefs won the game. It isn’t clear why e.l.f. appears to buck the trend seen for most Super Bowl ads, showing a gradual ramp in traffic before peaking, as opposed to a large spike aligned with the time that the ad was broadcast.

In addition to the advertisements discussed above, a number of others also experienced traffic spikes greater than 1,000% above baseline, including ads for the NFL, Hallow, He Gets Us, homes.com, Kawasaki, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. 2024, Snapchat, Skechers, and Volkswagen.

App traffic sees mixed impacts

Using the same baseline calculations described above, we also looked at traffic for domains associated with several groups of sites, including food delivery, messaging, social media, and sports betting to see how events that occurred during the game impacted traffic. Traffic shifts among most of these groups remained fairly nominal during the game, with sports betting seeing the largest movement. Halftime is clearly visible within the graphs, as viewers apparently focused on the musical performance, which featured R&B singer Usher, joined by guests Alicia Keys, H.E.R., will.i.am, Ludacris, and Lil Jon.

Food delivery

Traffic for food delivery sites remained relatively constant, on average, through the first quarter of the game, and started to decline as the second quarter started. A more significant dip is visible during halftime, with the drop continuing through the end of overtime. The outlier, of course, is the spike that occurred when the DoorDash advertisement aired, even though it featured a domain other than doordash.com, which is a member of this group.

Messaging

Traffic to domains associated with messaging applications generally remained just below baseline throughout the first half of the game. The spikes above baseline during the first half were nominal, and don’t appear to be associated with any notable in-game events. Traffic picked back up briefly as the halftime show ended, jumping to 14% above baseline. After that, traffic continued to drop until 22:46 EST, when the Chiefs sealed their victory with an overtime touchdown, causing traffic for messaging sites to spike to 34% above baseline.

Social media

Traffic for social media sites often spikes in conjunction with major plays, such as fumbles or touchdowns, as fans take to their favorite sites and apps to share photos or videos, or to celebrate or vent, depending on the team they support. Although social media traffic was fairly flat ahead of the start of the game, it began to see some spikiness as Post Malone sang America the Beautiful. This nominal spikiness continued through halftime, although none of the peaks were clearly correlated with major plays during the first half.  Similar to messaging, a notable drop in traffic occurred during halftime followed by a spike as Usher’s halftime show ended. In the second half, traffic spiked as the Chiefs tied the game with a field goal, for the overtime coin toss, and as the 49ers took the lead with an overtime field goal. Interestingly, that final spike visible in the graph occurs approximately six minutes after the Chiefs’ game-winning touchdown during an ad break ahead of the post-game show.

Sports betting

Compared to the relatively anemic traffic growth (when it was actually above baseline) seen for the categories above, traffic for domains associated with sports betting sites and apps remained significantly above baseline throughout the game with the exception of the dip during halftime, similar to what was also seen in the categories above. The first spike occurred just minutes before the coin toss, jumping to 412% above baseline. The game’s first touchdown, scored by the 49ers, caused traffic to spike 705% above baseline. A 413% spike occurred when the Chiefs took the lead late in the third quarter, with a slightly smaller one occurring at the end of regulation play as the game entered overtime. The final spike occurred just a couple of minutes after the Chiefs scored the game-winning touchdown, reaching 548% above baseline.

Zooming in to Kansas City and San Francisco

Using the same baseline calculations highlighted in the previous two sections, we also looked at changes in DNS traffic for the domains associated with the Kansas City Chiefs (chiefs.com) and the San Francisco 49ers (49ers.com). In addition, we looked at HTTP traffic from these two cities, using traffic levels from one week prior as a baseline.

By and large, DNS traffic for chiefs.com did not appear to be significantly impacted by most of the team’s field goals or touchdowns during the game, as seen in the graph below. The exception is the traffic spike seen as the team tied the game towards the end of the fourth quarter, forcing the game into overtime. That play resulted in a spike of traffic for the team’s website that reached 1,887% above baseline. Traffic spiked again after the Chiefs won the game, spiking to 1,360% above baseline.

DNS traffic for 49ers.com did not exhibit significant shifts correlated with field goals or touchdowns. The most significant spike reached 1,023% over baseline at the end of the third quarter, minutes after the team called for a timeout.

When comparing traffic trends for Kansas City and San Francisco, they could hardly be more different. Looking at request traffic from Kansas City, we find that it remains below traffic seen during the same time frame on February 4, with notable drops at the start of the game, during halftime, and when the Chiefs tied the game with a field goal late in the fourth quarter. Traffic hit its lowest point when the Chiefs won the game, but then recovered to meet/exceed the prior week’s traffic levels once the broadcast had concluded.

In contrast, traffic from San Francisco remained well below traffic levels seen the previous Sunday before unexpectedly spiking around 19:30 EST. Request traffic then remained well above the previous week’s levels until San Francisco kicked a field goal to take the initial lead during overtime play. Traffic remained roughly in line with the previous week until the broadcast ended, and then remained slightly higher.

Email threats and “The Big Game”

As we noted in last year’s blog post, spammers and scammers will frequently try to take advantage of the popularity of major events when running their campaigns, hoping the tie-in will entice the user to open the message and click on a malicious link, or visit a malicious website where they give up a password or credit card number. The Cloudflare Area 1 Email Security team once again analyzed the subject lines of email messages processed by the service in the weeks leading up to the Super Bowl to identify malicious, suspicious, and spam messages across four topic areas: Super Bowl/football, sports media/websites, sports gambling, and food delivery.

Super Bowl/Football

Spammers and scammers apparently didn’t feel that the “Super Wild Card Weekend” nor the divisional playoffs were sufficiently interesting to use as bait for their campaigns, as the volume of Super Bowl and football themed unwanted and potentially malicious email messages throughout January remained relatively low and fairly consistent. However, they apparently knew that the big game itself would draw interest, as the volume of such messages increased more than 6x over the prior week in the days ahead of the game.

Sports media/websites

Attackers appeared to lose interest in using messages with subject lines related to sports media and websites as January progressed, with the volume of related messages peaking the first week of the month. However, similar to Super Bowl and football themed messages, this theme took on renewed interest in the week leading up to the Super Bowl, with message volume reaching over 3x the previous week, and 1.8x the peak seen durinthe first week of the year.

Sports gambling

The final weekend of regular season games (on January 6 & 7) again drove the highest volume of sports gambling themed messages, similar to the pattern seen in 2023. Message volume dropped by about a third over the next two weeks, but picked back up around the divisional and conference playoff games and into the Super Bowl. Even with the growth into the Super Bowl, gambling-themed spam and malicious message volume remained 10% lower than the peak seen a month earlier.

Food delivery

Peak volume of food delivery themed messages was an order of magnitude (10x) higher than the Super Bowl and football themed peak, which was the next largest. Due to the popularity of such services, it appears that it is a regular theme for spam and potentially malicious messages, as volume remained extremely high throughout January. After peaking the week of January 8-14, message volume was lower each of the following weeks, reaching its nadir in the week leading up to the Super Bowl, 47% lower than the peak volume.

Conclusion

Likely peaking during the so-called “dot.com” Super Bowls nearly a quarter-century ago, most Super Bowl ads no longer drive traffic to associated websites by including a URL in their ad. However, as our DNS traffic analysis found, it appears that viewers don’t seem to have much trouble finding these sites. We also found that in-game events had a mixed impact on traffic across domains associated with multiple types of apps, as well as traffic for the websites associated with the teams playing in the Super Bowl.

For more insights into Internet trends, we encourage you to visit Cloudflare Radar. You can contact the Cloudflare Radar team at [email protected] or on social media at @CloudflareRadar (X/Twitter), cloudflare.social/@radar (Mastodon), and radar.cloudflare.com (Bluesky).

Q4 2023 Internet disruption summary

Post Syndicated from David Belson http://blog.cloudflare.com/author/david-belson/ original https://blog.cloudflare.com/q4-2023-internet-disruption-summary


Cloudflare’s network spans more than 310 cities in over 120 countries, where we interconnect with over 13,000 network providers in order to provide a broad range of services to millions of customers. The breadth of both our network and our customer base provides us with a unique perspective on Internet resilience, enabling us to observe the impact of Internet disruptions.

During previous quarters, we tracked a number of government directed Internet shutdowns in Iraq, intended to prevent cheating on academic exams. We expected to do so again during the fourth quarter, but there turned out to be no need to, as discussed below. While we didn’t see that set of expected shutdowns, we did observe a number of other Internet outages and disruptions due to a number of commonly seen causes, including fiber/cable issues, power outages, extreme weather, infrastructure maintenance, general technical problems, cyberattacks, and unfortunately, military action. As we have noted in the past, this post is intended as a summary overview of observed disruptions, and is not an exhaustive or complete list of issues that have occurred during the quarter.

Government directed

Iraq

In a slight departure from the usual subject of this blog post, this time we lead off with coverage of government directed Internet shutdowns that didn’t happen. Iraq has been a frequent subject of this series of posts, as they have historically implemented daily multi-hour Internet shutdowns during exam periods, intended to prevent cheating. Earlier this year, there was some hope that this practice might be ending, and in our Q2 2023 Internet disruption summary post, we noted “In the weeks prior to the start of this year’s shutdowns, it was reported that the Iraqi Ministry of Communications had announced it had refused a request from the Ministry of Education to impose an Internet shutdown during the exams as part of efforts to prevent cheating. Unfortunately, this refusal was short-lived, with shutdowns ultimately starting two weeks later.” In addition to these second quarter shutdowns, they also occurred during the third quarter across multiple weeks in July, August, and September.

During the fourth quarter, the third round of 12th grade high school final exams was scheduled to begin on November 13 and end on November 21, taking place at 13:00 local time, as shown in the schedule below, which was published on the Iraqi Ministry of Education’s Facebook page.

November 2023 exam schedule in Iraq

However, in looking at Internet traffic for Iraq during that period, it appears that the nationwide Internet shutdowns that would have normally taken place did not occur, as the graph shows a very consistent diurnal pattern with no evidence of disruptions to Internet connectivity like we have seen in the past. Additionally, other civil society groups, academic researchers, and Internet analysts that also monitor these shutdowns did not report seeing any related drops in traffic. It is unclear whether a request for shutdowns was submitted by the Ministry of Education and again refused by the Ministry of Communications, or if no request was ever submitted for this round of exams. Regardless, we hope that Iraq continues to keep the Internet connected during future rounds of exams.

Military action

Palestine

On Saturday, October 7, 2023, attacks from the Palestinian group Hamas launched from the Gaza Strip against the south of Israel started a new conflict in the region, with Israel officially declaring the next day that it was at war. This had an almost immediate impact on Internet traffic in both Israel and Palestine, with traffic in the former showing ~170% growth as compared to the prior week, and ~100% growth in the latter as compared to the previous week. These trends are discussed in our October 9 blog post, Internet traffic patterns in Israel and Palestine following the October 2023 attacks.

However, in the hours and days following the initial attacks, a number of Palestinian Internet providers saw traffic fall significantly, with many winding up largely or totally offline, potentially as a result of power outages caused by retaliatory Israeli airstrikes. Impacted networks included AS42314 (fusion), AS203905 (DCC_North_ASN), AS210974 (AjyalFI), AS60268 (DIGITAL-COMMUNICATION-PALESTINE-ASN), AS60353 (DCC_RAFAH_ASN), AS62027 (DCC_Khanyouns_ASN), AS57704 (SPEED-CLICK-LTD), AS199046 (JETNET), and AS213207 (TechHub-HiNet), as shown in the graphs below.

In addition to the outages illustrated above, throughout October, November, and December, Paltel (Palestine Telecommunications Company) posted a number of times on its official X account about disruptions to its landline, mobile, and Internet services, citing causes including fiber damage due to bombardment and fuel depletion. Posts were made on October 27, October 31, November 16, December 4, December 14, December 20, and December 26. The associated outages varied in length, some lasting for hours, while others lasted for multiple days — each outage is shaded in the graphs below, which show Paltel traffic within four Palestinian governorates in the Gaza Strip region.

Fiber/cable trouble

Namibia

On November 13, Telecom Namibia (AS36996) reported that it was experiencing interruptions to its fixed voice and data services in several areas, resulting from cable theft. The impact of these interruptions is shown in the figure below, with Internet traffic disrupted between 13:45 local time (11:45 UTC) on November 13 and 08:30 local time (06:30 UTC) on November 14. The disruption to connectivity due to cable theft was not an isolated incident, as the provider posted several additional notices on its social media accounts in November and December about similar occurrences.

Cuba

A day later, on November 14, ETECSA (AS27725) posted a notice about a terrestrial fiber cut that disrupted Internet services. As the state-owned telecommunications provider in Cuba, the cut impacted Internet traffic nationwide, as well as at a network level, as seen in the graphs below. The disruption was relatively short-lived, occurring between 06:30 – 08:15 local time (11:30 – 13:15 UTC), with a follow-up post announcing the re-establishment of Internet service.

Chad

On December 7 & 8, a near-complete outage observed in Chad was reportedly due to fiber optic cable cuts in neighboring countries. A published article cited SudaChad as claiming that the outage seen in the graphs below was due to an issue with CAMTEL, a Cameroonian partner. It also cites Moov Africa’s (formerly known as Millicom Chad) apology to customers, which points at “the fiber-optic cut in Cameroon and Sudan” as the root cause. Since simultaneous cuts in fiber optic cables in Chad’s two neighboring countries would certainly be an unusual occurrence, it isn’t clear if such an event happened, though routing data for SudaChad shows that the network’s two upstream providers are AS15706 (Sudatel) in Sudan and AS15964 (CAMNET) in Cameroon. The three providers are also partners on the WE-AFRICA-NA terrestrial cable, which stretches from Port-Sudan on the Red Sea in Sudan to Kribi on the Atlantic Ocean in Cameroon via Chad, but it isn’t known whether that cable system was involved in this outage.

The disruption lasted approximately fourteen hours, from 20:00 local time on December 7 until 10:15 local time on December 8 (19:00 UTC on December 7 until 09:15 UTC on December 8), with the impact visible country-wide, as well as at SudaChad and several downstream network providers.

Cyberattacks

Ukraine

Ukrainian Internet provider Kyivstar announced on the morning of December 12 that they were the “target of a powerful hacker attack”. They noted that the attack caused a “technical failure” that resulted in mobile communication and Internet access becoming temporarily unavailable. Although Kyivstar has been targeted by around 500 cyberattacks since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this was reportedly the largest attack to date. A subsequent report referenced an interview with Illia Vitiuk, the head of the cybersecurity department at Ukraine’s security service (SBU), in which he claimed that “the hackers attempted to penetrate Kyivstar in March 2023 or earlier, managed to get into the system at least as early as May, and likely gained full access to the network in November.

Recovery took several days, with Kyivstar posting on December 15 that “the Internet is everywhere” but warning that connection speeds might be slightly reduced. These posts align with the traffic disruption shown in the figure below, which lasted from 06:30 local time (04:30 UTC) on December 12 until 14:00 local time (12:00 UTC) on December 15.

Power outages

Brunei

A major power outage in Brunei on October 17 disrupted key services including mobile and fixed Internet connectivity. Starting around 11:30 local time (03:30 UTC), traffic was disrupted for approximately 13 hours, recovering to expected levels around just after midnight local time on October 18 (16:45 UTC). Two Unified National Networks autonomous systems (AS10094 and AS131467) saw lower traffic volumes during the power outage.

Kenya

A widespread power outage in Kenya on November 11 disrupted Internet connectivity across the county for approximately seven hours. An X post from Kenya Power at 20:30 local time (17:30 UTC) reported a partial power outage, stating “We have lost power supply to parts of the country. Our engineers are working to restore supply to the affected areas.” Kenya Power kept customers informed of progress, posting updates at 22:00, 23:57, and the morning of November 12, with the final update reporting “We have successfully restored normal power supply in all the areas that were affected by the partial outage.

Curaçao

On November 14, a Facebook post from Aqualectra, the water and power company in Curaçao, stated in part, “Around 14:00 this afternoon, a blackout occurred. Preliminary investigation indicates that one of the main cables responsible for transporting electricity between the substations at Nijlweg and Weis experienced a short circuit. It is important to emphasize that this is not due to a lack of production capacity.” The power outage resulted in a near complete loss of traffic at Flow Curaçao (AS52233), with significant disruptions also visible at United Telecommunication Services (AS11081) and at a country level, as seen in the graphs below. The disruption lasted eight hours, from 14:00 until 22:00 local time (18:00 UTC on November 14 until 02:00 UTC on November 15).

Sri Lanka

After stabilizing its electrical infrastructure in the wake of 2022’s problems with its electrical power grid, the failure of a main transmission line caused an island-wide power outage in Sri Lanka on December 9, in turn disrupting Internet connectivity. Traffic from the island nation initially dropped by around 50% starting around 16:45 local time (11:15 UTC). Repairs took several hours, with the country’s Internet traffic returning to expected levels around 01:00 local time on December 10 (19:30 UTC).

Panama

On the morning of December 24, Panamanian electric distribution company ENSA initially reported an event that affected electrical services to their customers. A subsequent report posted just 30 minutes later provided additional details, pointing to an incident in the “National Interconnected System” that affected the electrical supply in a number of areas, but within an hour, it had spread nationally. Although the initial regional power issues did not have a noticeable impact on Panama’s Internet traffic, the loss of traffic in the graph below aligns with the national growth of the power outage, occurring at 11:45 local time (16:45 UTC). Traffic returned to expected levels at around 15:00 local time (20:00 UTC), aligning with an X post from ENSA stating that “At 3:12pm the supply of electrical energy to all our clients has been normalized after an event at the Transmission level originating in the Panama 1 Substation of ETESA.

Weather

Ukraine

Internet disruptions in Ukraine due to the conflict there have been covered in multiple quarterly Internet disruption summary blog posts over the last two years. However, in November, connectivity in multiple areas of the country was disrupted by power outages caused by a major winter storm. Snow and high winds knocked out power to hundreds of towns and villages, damaging electrical power infrastructure. The impact is visible in the graphs below as a drop in traffic occurring around 01:00 local time on November 27 (23:00 UTC on November 26), observed in regions including Donetsk, Kherson Oblast, and Luhansk. Traffic appeared to return to expected levels early in the morning local time on November 28.

Mexico

On October 25, Hurricane Otis made landfall near Acapulco, a popular tourist destination in Mexico. In addition to catastrophic structural damage, it was reported that “more than 10,000 utility poles were destroyed, knocking out power and internet/communications across the region, while numerous transmission lines, electrical substations, and a power plant were also heavily damaged.” This damage to electrical and communications infrastructure in the area resulted in significant disruption to Internet connectivity. As shown in the graph below, Internet traffic from Acapulco dropped by around 80% as Otis made landfall. Traffic started to show some growth in early November, but peak volumes remained relatively consistent, and well below pre-hurricane levels, through the end of the year. (Several large spikes are visible on December 26 & 30, but it isn’t clear what those are associated with.) Although Acapulco’s tourism industry experienced a notable recovery heading into the end of the year, it appears that infrastructure recovery has not been quite as swift.

Fire

Hawaii

Last quarter, we reported on the impact of wildfires that started on August 7 in Hawaii, including killing nearly 100 people, as well as destroying homes, businesses, and infrastructure, causing power outages and disrupting Internet connectivity. One of the most impacted areas was the town of Lahaina, where Internet connectivity remained sparse for weeks after the fires began. Repair and restoration efforts continued throughout the fourth quarter, with traffic clearly growing throughout October, with peak levels in November and December approaching pre-fire levels.

Maintenance

Yemen

Two maintenance-related Internet disruptions impacted Internet connectivity in Yemen in the fourth quarter. The first lasted over four hours during the morning of November 10, from 03:10 – 07:45 local time (00:10 – 04:45 UTC), and followed two other disruptions the prior day. The impact was visible at a country level, as well as at a network level on PTC-YemenNet (AS30873).

An Associated Press article noted that in a statement to the state news agency, Yemen’s Public Telecom Corp. (PTC-YemenNet) blamed the outage on maintenance, apparently of the FALCON submarine cable. The article also cited a statement from GCX, the operator of the FALCON cable, regarding scheduled maintenance to the cable system that had been in planning for the previous three months.

The second maintenance-related disruption occurred on December 15 just before 23:00 local time (20:00 UTC). An X post from Mosfer Alnomeir, the Minister of Telecommunication and Information Technology in Yemen, explained what happened: “We note that half an hour ago there was an interruption in the Internet service that lasted approximately 30 minutes. This is while engineers carry out emergency replacement and upgrade work on some service equipment. Service was restored immediately. On behalf of the team, I say thank you for your understanding.” Once again, the impact was visible at both a country and network level.

Technical problems

Australia

“Changes to routing information” after a “routine software upgrade” were reportedly responsible for a multi-hour Internet outage at Australian telecommunications provider Optus (AS4804) on November 8 local time. Connectivity began to drop just after 04:00 Sydney time, with the outage lasting from 04:30 – 10:00 Sydney time (17:30 – 23:00 UTC on November 7). Traffic didn’t fully recover to expected levels until around 23:00 Sydney time (12:00 UTC).

The network issue impacted more than 10 million customers, as well as hospitals and payment and transport systems, and drew comparisons to July 2023’s outage at Canadian provider Rogers Communications. Optus submitted a report to the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications that detailed the cause of the outage, noting “It is now understood that the outage occurred due to approximately 90 PE routers automatically self-isolating in order to protect themselves from an overload of IP routing information. … This unexpected overload of IP routing information occurred after a software upgrade at one of the Singtel internet exchanges (known as STiX) in North America, one of Optus’ international networks. During the upgrade, the Optus network received changes in routing information from an alternate Singtel peering router. These routing changes were propagated through multiple layers of our IP Core network. As a result, at around 4:05am (AEDT), the pre-set safety limits on a significant number of Optus network routers were exceeded.” The report also detailed the recovery efforts and timelines for consumer Internet, DNS, and mobile services.

Armenia

Failure of international links caused a brief Internet disruption at Telecom Armenia (AS12297) on November 11, similar to a disruption that occurred almost exactly a year earlier. As shown in the graph below, the disruption began just around 15:15 local time (11:15 UTC), with short periods where traffic dropped to zero. Traffic recovered to expected levels by 21:00 local time (17:00 UTC). As one of the largest telecommunications providers in the country, the service disruption was visible at a country level as well.

United Kingdom

A sizable drop in traffic was observed between 15:00 and 21:30 local time (15:00 – 21:30 UTC) on mobile and broadband Internet provider Three UK (AS206067) on December 1, as seen in the graph below. Although the provider acknowledged that customers were experiencing issues and provided several updates (1, 2, 3, 4) on service restoration over the next day, it never disclosed any additional information on the cause of the disruption. However, a published report stated that Three UK blamed technical issues at one of its data centers as the cause of the problem, which impacted more than 20,000 users.

Egypt

On December 5, Telecom Egypt (AS8452) posted on X that a technical malfunction affecting one of their main network devices was responsible for an Internet disruption that occurred on their network, which also impacted connectivity on several other network providers, including LINKdotNET (AS24863), Vodadfone Egypt (AS24835), and Etisalat (AS36992), as well as traffic at a national level, as seen in the graphs below. Although one news report claimed that the disruption, which occurred between 14:15 – 00:00 local time (12:15 – 22:00 UTC), was due to damage to the FLAG and SeaMeWe-4 submarine cables, a subsequent post from Telecom Egypt about service restoration dispelled that claim, noting “The company also confirms that there is no truth to what has been circulated on some social media sites about the presence of a break in one of the submarine cables.

Tunisia

A reported DNS server outage (albeit unconfirmed) at Tunisian Internet provider Topnet (AS37705) caused a brief Internet disruption for the provider’s customers on December 17, also impacting traffic volumes at a national level. The incident lasted less than two hours, from 13:00 – 14:45 local time (12:00 – 13:45 UTC).

Guinea

An unspecified incident on the Orange Guinée (AS37461) network impacted Internet connectivity, as well as telephone calls and text messages during the morning of December 22. The graph below shows a near-complete outage on the network between 09:15 – 11:30 local time (09:15 – 11:30 UTC). The provider posted a subsequent update regarding the restoration of calls, text messages, and Internet connectivity.

Conclusion

Within the Cloudflare Radar 2023 Year in Review, we highlighted over 180 major Internet disruptions that were observed year-to-date through the end of November, though the actual number was likely closer to 200 by the end of the year. While that may seem like a lot, it is worth nothing that the actual number is even higher, as these posts are not exhaustive in their coverage of such events. For example, while we covered the Internet shutdown in Manipur, India that took place across multiple months in 2023, internetshutdowns.in shows that over 90 more smaller localized shutdowns were put into place across the country.

In addition, 2024 is shaping up to be an important year for elections, with voting taking place in more than 50 countries around the world. Unfortunately, some countries have taken to implementing Internet shutdowns or otherwise disrupting Internet connectivity during elections. The Freedom Online Coalition’s Joint Statement on Internet Shutdowns and Elections details the detrimental effects of such actions. The Cloudflare Radar team will be monitoring for election-related Internet shutdowns, sharing our observations on the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center, via social media, and in posts on blog.cloudflare.com.

Follow us on social media at @CloudflareRadar (X), cloudflare.social/@radar (Mastodon), and radar.cloudflare.com (Bluesky), or contact us via email.