Tag Archives: Ukraine

Steps we’ve taken around Cloudflare’s services in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia

Post Syndicated from Matthew Prince original https://blog.cloudflare.com/steps-taken-around-cloudflares-services-in-ukraine-belarus-and-russia/

Steps we've taken around Cloudflare's services in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia

At Cloudflare, we’ve watched in horror the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As the possibility of war looked more likely, we began to carefully monitor the situation on the ground, with the goal of keeping our employees, our customers, and our network safe.

Helping protect Ukraine against cyberattacks

Attacks against the Internet in Ukraine began even before the start of the invasion. Those attacks—and the steady stream of DDoS attacks we’ve seen in the days since—prompted us to extend our services to Ukrainian government and telecom organizations at no cost in order to ensure they can continue to operate and deliver critical information to their citizens as well as to the rest of the world about what is happening to them.

Going beyond that, under Project Galileo, we are expediting onboarding of any Ukrainian entities for our full suite of protections. We are currently assisting more than sixty organizations in Ukraine and the region—with about 25% of those organizations coming aboard during the current crisis. Many of the new organizations are groups coming together to assist refugees, share vital information, or members of the Ukrainian diaspora in nearby countries looking to organize and help. Any Ukrainian organizations that are facing attack can apply for free protection under Project Galileo by visiting www.cloudflare.com/galileo, and we will expedite their review and approval.

Securing our customers’ data during the conflict

In order to preserve the integrity of customer data, we moved customer encryption key material out of our data centers in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. Our services continued to operate in the regions using our Keyless SSL technology, which allows encryption sessions to be terminated in a secure data center away from where there may be a risk of compromise.

If any of our facilities or servers in Ukraine, Belarus, or Russia lose power or connectivity to the Internet, we have configured them to brick themselves. All data on disk is encrypted with keys that are not stored on site. Bricked machines will not be able to be booted unless a secure, machine-specific key that is not stored on site is entered.

Monitoring Internet availability in Ukraine

Our team continues to monitor Internet patterns across Ukraine. While usage across the country has declined over the last 10 days, we are thankful that in most locations the Internet is still accessible.

Steps we've taken around Cloudflare's services in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia

We are taking steps to ensure that, as long as there is connectivity out of the country, our services will continue to operate.

Staying ahead of the threat globally

Cyber threats to Ukrainian customers and telecoms is only part of the broader story of potential cyberattacks. Governments around the world have emphasized that organizations must be prepared to respond to disruptive cyber activity. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), for example, has recommended that all organizations—large and small—go “Shields Up” to protect themselves from attack. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has encouraged organizations to improve their cyber resilience.

This is where careful monitoring of the attacks in Ukraine is so important. It doesn’t just help our customers in Ukraine — it helps us learn and improve our products so that we can protect all of our customers globally. When wiper malware was identified in Ukraine, for example, we adapted our Zero Trust products to make sure our customers were protected.

We’ve long believed that everyone should have access to cybersecurity tools to protect themselves, regardless of their size or resources. But during this time of heightened threat, access to cybersecurity services is particularly critical. We have a number of free services available to protect you online — and we encourage you to take advantage of them.

Providing services in Russia

Since the invasion, providing any services in Russia is understandably fraught. Governments have been united in imposing a stream of new sanctions and there have even been some calls to disconnect Russia from the global Internet. As discussed by ICANN, the Internet Society, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Techdirt, among others, the consequences of such a shutdown would be profound.

The scope of new sanctions issued in the last few weeks have been unprecedented in their reach, frequency, and the number of different governments involved. Governments have issued sweeping new sanctions designed to impose severe costs against those who supported the invasion of Ukraine, including government entities and officials in Russia and Belarus. Sanctions have been imposed against Russia’s top financial institutions, including Russia’s two largest banks, fundamentally altering the ability of Russians to access capital. The entire break away territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, including all of the residents of those regions, are subject to comprehensive sanctions. We’ve seen sanctions on state-owned enterprises, elite Russian families, and the leaders of intelligence-directed disinformation outlets.

These sanctions are intended to make sure that those who supported the invasion are held to account. And Cloudflare has taken action to comply. Over the past several years, Cloudflare has developed a robust and comprehensive sanctions compliance program that allows us to track and take immediate steps to comply with new sanctions regulations as they are implemented. In addition to an internal compliance team and outside counsel, we employ third party tools to flag potential matches or partial ownership by sanctioned parties, and we review reports from third-parties about potential connections. We have also worked with government experts inside and outside of the United States to identify when there is a connection between a sanctioned entity and a Cloudflare account.

Over the past week, our team has ensured that we are complying with these new sanctions as they are announced. We have closed off paid access to our network and systems in the new comprehensively-sanctioned regions. And we have terminated any customers we have identified as tied to sanctions, including those related to Russian financial institutions, Russian influence campaigns, and the Russian-affiliated Donetsk and Luhansk governments. We expect additional sanctions are likely to come from governments as they determine additional steps are appropriate, and we will continue to move quickly to comply with those requirements as they are announced.

Beyond this, we have received several calls to terminate all of Cloudflare’s services inside Russia. We have carefully considered these requests and discussed them with government and civil society experts. Our conclusion, in consultation with those experts, is that Russia needs more Internet access, not less.

As the conflict has continued, we’ve seen a dramatic increase in requests from Russian networks to worldwide media, reflecting a desire by ordinary Russian citizens to see world news beyond that provided within Russia.

Steps we've taken around Cloudflare's services in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia

We’ve also seen an increase in Russian blocking and throttling efforts, combined with Russian efforts to control the content of the media operating inside Russia with a new “fake news” law.

The Russian government itself, over the last several years, has threatened repeatedly to block certain Cloudflare services and customers. Indiscriminately terminating service would do little to harm the Russian government, but would both limit access to information outside the country, and make significantly more vulnerable those who have used us to shield themselves as they have criticized the government.

In fact, we believe the Russian government would celebrate us shutting down Cloudflare’s services in Russia. We absolutely appreciate the spirit of many Ukrainians making requests across the tech sector for companies to terminate services in Russia. However, when what Cloudflare is fundamentally providing is a more open, private, and secure Internet, we believe that shutting down Cloudflare’s services entirely in Russia would be a mistake.

Our thoughts are with the people of Ukraine and the entire team at Cloudflare prays for a peaceful resolution as soon as possible.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Post Syndicated from John Graham-Cumming original https://blog.cloudflare.com/internet-traffic-patterns-in-ukraine-since-february-21-2022/

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Cloudflare operates in more than 250 cities worldwide where we connect our equipment to the Internet to provide our broad range of services. We have data centers in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia and across the world. To operate our service we monitor traffic trends, performance and errors seen at each data center, aggregate data about DNS, and congestion and packet loss on Internet links.

Internet Traffic

For reference, here is a map of Ukraine showing its major cities. Note that whenever we talk about dates and times in this post, we are using UTC. Ukraine’s current time zone is UTC+2.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022
© OpenStreetMap contributors

Internet traffic in Ukraine generally follows a pretty predictable pattern based on day and night. Lowest in the hours after local midnight and picking up as people wake up. It’s not uncommon to see a dip around lunchtime and a peak when people go home in the evening. That pattern is clearly visible in this chart of overall Internet traffic seen by Cloudflare for Ukrainian networks on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday prior to the invasion.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Starting Thursday, traffic was significantly lower. On Thursday, we saw about 70% of our normal request volume and about 60% on Friday. Request volumes recovered to 70% of pre-invasion volume on Saturday and Sunday before peaking on Monday and Tuesday because of attacks that we mitigated coming from networks in Ukraine.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

This chart shows attack traffic blocked by Cloudflare that originated on networks in Ukraine. Note that this is quite different from attacks against .ua domains, which can originate anywhere in the world and are discussed below.

Analysis of network traffic from different cities in Ukraine gives us some insight into people’s use of the Internet and availability of Internet access. Here’s Internet traffic from the capital, Kyiv:

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Once again the “normal” ebb and flow of Internet traffic is seen on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. Early on Thursday morning, Internet traffic picks up after Vladimir Putin’s announcement of the attack but never reaches normal levels that day. Friday is even lower, but traffic in Kyiv has gradually increased since then.

Moving westward to Lviv, we see a very different pattern of use.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

The same normal flows on Monday to Wednesday are visible, followed by a smaller drop for three days and then a dramatic increase in traffic. As many Ukrainians have moved westward towards Poland, Slovakia and Romania, away from the fighting, it appears that Internet traffic has grown with their arrival in Lviv.

The city of Uzhhorod on the Slovakian border shows a similar pattern.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

To the east of Lviv, the city of Ternopil has also seen an increase in Internet traffic.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

As has Rivne.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Looking at Rivne, Ternopil, Uzhhorod, and Lviv, it’s possible that the peaks in Internet traffic on different days show the movement of people westward as they try to escape fighting around the capital and in the east and south.

On the opposite side of Ukraine, the situation is quite different. Here’s the traffic pattern for the city of Kharkiv. It has stayed at roughly between 50% and 60% (March 3) of the usual rate since the beginning of the invasion.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

North of Kharkiv, the city of Sumy (north-eastern Ukraine, near the Russian border), traffic levels are very low since yesterday, March 3, 2022.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

A similar trend can be seen in the city Izyum, south of Kharkiv (east of Ukraine), where traffic is very low since March 2.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Traffic in Donetsk has remained fairly consistent throughout the invasion, except for March 1 when there was a dramatic change in traffic. This was most likely caused by an attack against a single .ua domain name, with the attack traffic coming, at least in part, from Donetsk.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Some other areas with fighting have experienced the largest drops and partial Internet outages. Moving to the south, traffic in Mariupol declined after the invasion and has dropped dramatically in the last three days with outages on local networks.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Here’s a view of traffic from AS43554 in Mariupol showing what seems to be a total outage on March 1 that continued through March 4.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

To the west of Mariupol, Osypenko shows a gradual decline in traffic followed by three days of minimal Internet use.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Similar large drops are seen in Irpin (just outside Kyiv to the northwest).

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

And in Bucha, which is next to Irpin; both Bucha and Irpin are close to Hostomel airport.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Enerhodar is the small city in the south of Ukraine where Europe’s largest nuclear plant, Zaporizhzhya NPP, is located.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

There has also been minimal traffic (or possible outage) from Severodonetsk (north of Luhansk) for the past four of days.

We have started to see traffic from Starlink terminals in Ukraine, although traffic levels remain very low.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Cyberattacks

The physical world invasion has been accompanied by an increase in cyberattacks against Ukrainian domain names and networks.

Just prior to the invasion, on February 23, Cloudflare’s automated systems detected a large amount of packet loss on a major Internet connection to our Kyiv data center and automatically mitigated the problem by routing traffic onto other networks. This packet loss was caused by congestion on the transit provider’s network, which in turn was caused by a large DDoS attack. It appeared in our dashboards as packet loss over a 30-minute period between 1500-1530 (the different colors are different parts of our network infrastructure in Kyiv).

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

This next chart gives an overview of traffic to .ua domains protected by Cloudflare and requests that are “mitigated” (i.e. blocked by our firewall products). The chart shows only layer 7 traffic and does not give information about layer 3/4 DDoS, which is covered separately below.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

On the first day of the invasion attacks against .ua domains were prevalent and at times responsible for almost 50% of the requests being sent to those domains. From Friday, February 25 attacks returned to levels seen prior to the invasion and started picking up again on Tuesday, March 1.

Digging into the layer 7 mitigations we can see that the biggest attacks over all are layer 7 DDoS attacks.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

The next largest attacks are being mitigated by firewall rules put in place by customers.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Followed by blocking requests based on our IP threat reputation database.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Layer 3/4 traffic is harder to attribute to a specific domain or target as IP addresses are shared across different customers. Looking at network-level DDoS traffic hitting our Kyiv data center, we see occasional peaks of DDoS traffic reaching a high of nearly  1.8 Gbps.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Note that although the layer 3/4 and layer 7 attacks we are mitigating have been relatively small, that does not mean they are not devastating or problematic. A small website or service can be taken down by relatively small attacks, and the layer 7 attack traffic often includes vulnerability scanning, credential stuffing, SQL injection, and the usual panoply of techniques carried out to either deface or penetrate an Internet service.

Unprotected Internet properties are vulnerable to even small attacks and need protection.

Social media and communications

Much of the imagery and information coming out of Ukraine is being shared on social networks. Looking at social networks in Ukraine via DNS data shows that Facebook use has increased.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

As has Instagram.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

However, TikTok seems to have lost traffic initially, but it has started to return (although not to its pre-conflict levels) in the last two days.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Twitter usage increased and has remained higher than levels seen before the invasion.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Turning to messaging apps, we can compare Messenger, Signal, Telegram and WhatsApp. WhatsApp traffic appears to have declined inline with the broad change in Internet traffic across Ukraine.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Telegram stayed largely unchanged until early this week, when we observed a small increase in use.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Messenger shows a similar pattern.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

But the largest change has been traffic to the end-to-end encrypted messaging app Signal, which has seen dramatic growth since the invasion began. We are seeing 8x to 10x the DNS volume for Signal as compared to the days before the start of the conflict.

Internet traffic patterns in Ukraine since February 21, 2022

Insurance Coverage for NotPetya Losses

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/02/insurance-coverage-for-notpetya-losses.html

Tarah Wheeler and Josephine Wolff analyze a recent court decision that the NotPetya attacks are not considered an act of war under the wording of Merck’s insurance policy, and that the insurers must pay the $1B+ claim. Wheeler and Wolff argue that the judge “did the right thing for the wrong reasons..”

Malicious Barcode Scanner App

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/malicious-barcode-scanner-app.html

Interesting story about a barcode scanner app that has been pushing malware on to Android phones. The app is called Barcode Scanner. It’s been around since 2017 and is owned by the Ukrainian company Lavabird Ldt. But a December 2020 update included some new features:

However, a rash of malicious activity was recently traced back to the app. Users began noticing something weird going on with their phones: their default browsers kept getting hijacked and redirected to random advertisements, seemingly out of nowhere.

Generally, when this sort of thing happens it’s because the app was recently sold. That’s not the case here.

It is frightening that with one update an app can turn malicious while going under the radar of Google Play Protect. It is baffling to me that an app developer with a popular app would turn it into malware. Was this the scheme all along, to have an app lie dormant, waiting to strike after it reaches popularity? I guess we will never know.