All posts by Bruce Schneier

Criminal Gang Physically Assaulting People for Their Cryptocurrency

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

This is pretty horrific:

…a group of men behind a violent crime spree designed to compel victims to hand over access to their cryptocurrency savings. That announcement and the criminal complaint laying out charges against St. Felix focused largely on a single theft of cryptocurrency from an elderly North Carolina couple, whose home St. Felix and one of his accomplices broke into before physically assaulting the two victims—­both in their seventies—­and forcing them to transfer more than $150,000 in Bitcoin and Ether to the thieves’ crypto wallets.

I think cryptocurrencies are more susceptible to this kind of real-world attack because they are largely outside the conventional banking system. Yet another reason to stay away from them.

Cloudflare Reports that Almost 7% of All Internet Traffic Is Malicious

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

6.8%, to be precise.

From ZDNet:

However, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to be cybercriminals’ weapon of choice, making up over 37% of all mitigated traffic. The scale of these attacks is staggering. In the first quarter of 2024 alone, Cloudflare blocked 4.5 million unique DDoS attacks. That total is nearly a third of all the DDoS attacks they mitigated the previous year.

But it’s not just about the sheer volume of DDoS attacks. The sophistication of these attacks is increasing, too. Last August, Cloudflare mitigated a massive HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DDoS attack that peaked at 201 million requests per second (RPS). That number is three times bigger than any previously observed attack.

It wasn’t just Cloudflare that was hit by the largest DDoS attack in its history. Google Cloud reported the same attack peaked at an astonishing 398 million RPS. So, how big is that number? According to Google, Google Cloud was slammed by more RPS in two minutes than Wikipedia saw traffic during September 2023.

Hacking Scientific Citations

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

Some scholars are inflating their reference counts by sneaking them into metadata:

Citations of scientific work abide by a standardized referencing system: Each reference explicitly mentions at least the title, authors’ names, publication year, journal or conference name, and page numbers of the cited publication. These details are stored as metadata, not visible in the article’s text directly, but assigned to a digital object identifier, or DOI—a unique identifier for each scientific publication.

References in a scientific publication allow authors to justify methodological choices or present the results of past studies, highlighting the iterative and collaborative nature of science.

However, we found through a chance encounter that some unscrupulous actors have added extra references, invisible in the text but present in the articles’ metadata, when they submitted the articles to scientific databases. The result? Citation counts for certain researchers or journals have skyrocketed, even though these references were not cited by the authors in their articles.


In the journals published by Technoscience Academy, at least 9% of recorded references were “sneaked references.” These additional references were only in the metadata, distorting citation counts and giving certain authors an unfair advantage. Some legitimate references were also lost, meaning they were not present in the metadata.

In addition, when analyzing the sneaked references, we found that they highly benefited some researchers. For example, a single researcher who was associated with Technoscience Academy benefited from more than 3,000 additional illegitimate citations. Some journals from the same publisher benefited from a couple hundred additional sneaked citations.

Be careful what you’re measuring, because that’s what you’ll get. Make sure it’s what you actually want.

Upcoming Speaking Engagements

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:

  • I’m speaking—along with John Bruce, the CEO and Co-founder of Inrupt—at the 18th Annual CDOIQ Symposium in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. The symposium runs from July 16 through 18, 2024, and my session is on Tuesday, July 16 at 3:15 PM. The symposium will also be livestreamed through the Whova platform.
  • I’m speaking on “Reimagining Democracy in the Age of AI” at the Bozeman Library in Bozeman, Montana, USA, July 18, 2024. The event will also be available via Zoom.
  • I’m speaking at the TEDxBillings Democracy Event in Billings, Montana, USA, on July 19, 2024.

The list is maintained on this page.

Friday Squid Blogging: 1994 Lair of Squid Game

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

I didn’t know:

In 1994, Hewlett-Packard released a miracle machine: the HP 200LX pocket-size PC. In the depths of the device, among the MS-DOS productivity apps built into its fixed memory, there lurked a first-person maze game called Lair of Squid.


In Lair of Squid, you’re trapped in an underwater labyrinth, seeking a way out while avoiding squid roaming the corridors. A collision with any cephalopod results in death. To progress through each stage and ascend to the surface, you locate the exit and provide a hidden, scrambled code word. The password is initially displayed as asterisks, with letters revealed as you encounter them within the maze.

Blog moderation policy.

The NSA Has a Long-Lost Lecture by Adm. Grace Hopper

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

The NSA has a video recording of a 1982 lecture by Adm. Grace Hopper titled “Future Possibilities: Data, Hardware, Software, and People.” The agency is (so far) refusing to release it.

Basically, the recording is in an obscure video format. People at the NSA can’t easily watch it, so they can’t redact it. So they won’t do anything.

With digital obsolescence threatening many early technological formats, the dilemma surrounding Admiral Hopper’s lecture underscores the critical need for and challenge of digital preservation. This challenge transcends the confines of NSA’s operational scope. It is our shared obligation to safeguard such pivotal elements of our nation’s history, ensuring they remain within reach of future generations. While the stewardship of these recordings may extend beyond the NSA’s typical purview, they are undeniably a part of America’s national heritage.

Surely we can put pressure on them somehow.

Apple Is Alerting iPhone Users of Spyware Attacks

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

Not a lot of details:

Apple has issued a new round of threat notifications to iPhone users across 98 countries, warning them of potential mercenary spyware attacks. It’s the second such alert campaign from the company this year, following a similar notification sent to users in 92 nations in April.

RADIUS Vulnerability

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

New attack against the RADIUS authentication protocol:

The Blast-RADIUS attack allows a man-in-the-middle attacker between the RADIUS client and server to forge a valid protocol accept message in response to a failed authentication request. This forgery could give the attacker access to network devices and services without the attacker guessing or brute forcing passwords or shared secrets. The attacker does not learn user credentials.

This is one of those vulnerabilities that comes with a cool name, its own website, and a logo.

News article. Research paper.

Reverse-Engineering Ticketmaster’s Barcode System

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original


By reverse-engineering how Ticketmaster and AXS actually make their electronic tickets, scalpers have essentially figured out how to regenerate specific, genuine tickets that they have legally purchased from scratch onto infrastructure that they control. In doing so, they are removing the anti-scalping restrictions put on the tickets by Ticketmaster and AXS.

EDITED TO ADD (7/14): More information.

On the CSRB’s Non-Investigation of the SolarWinds Attack

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

ProPublica has a long investigative article on how the Cyber Safety Review Board failed to investigate the SolarWinds attack, and specifically Microsoft’s culpability, even though they were directed by President Biden to do so.

New Open SSH Vulnerability

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

It’s a serious one:

The vulnerability, which is a signal handler race condition in OpenSSH’s server (sshd), allows unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) as root on glibc-based Linux systems; that presents a significant security risk. This race condition affects sshd in its default configuration.


This vulnerability, if exploited, could lead to full system compromise where an attacker can execute arbitrary code with the highest privileges, resulting in a complete system takeover, installation of malware, data manipulation, and the creation of backdoors for persistent access. It could facilitate network propagation, allowing attackers to use a compromised system as a foothold to traverse and exploit other vulnerable systems within the organization.

Moreover, gaining root access would enable attackers to bypass critical security mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and logging mechanisms, further obscuring their activities. This could also result in significant data breaches and leakage, giving attackers access to all data stored on the system, including sensitive or proprietary information that could be stolen or publicly disclosed.

This vulnerability is challenging to exploit due to its remote race condition nature, requiring multiple attempts for a successful attack. This can cause memory corruption and necessitate overcoming Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). Advancements in deep learning may significantly increase the exploitation rate, potentially providing attackers with a substantial advantage in leveraging such security flaws.

The details. News articles. CVE data. Slashdot thread.

Upcoming Book on AI and Democracy

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

If you’ve been reading my blog, you’ve noticed that I have written a lot about AI and democracy, mostly with my co-author Nathan Sanders. I am pleased to announce that we’re writing a book on the topic.

This isn’t a book about deep fakes, or misinformation. This is a book about what happens when AI writes laws, adjudicates disputes, audits bureaucratic actions, assists in political strategy, and advises citizens on what candidates and issues to support. It’s a book that tries to look into what an AI-assisted democratic system might look like, and then at how to best ensure that we make use of the good parts while avoiding the bad parts.

This is what I talked about in my RSA Conference speech last month, which you can both watch and read. (You can also read earlier attempts at this idea.)

The book will be published by MIT Press sometime in fall 2025, with an open-access digital version available a year after that. (It really can’t be published earlier. Nothing published this year will rise above the noise of the US presidential election, and anything published next spring will have to go to press without knowing the results of that election.)

Right now, the organization of the book is in six parts:

AI-Assisted Politicians
AI-Assisted Legislators
The AI-Assisted Administration
The AI-Assisted Legal System
AI-Assisted Citizens
Getting the Future We Want

It’s too early to share a more detailed table of contents, but I would like help thinking about titles. Below are my current list of brainstorming ideas: both titles and subtitles. Please mix and match, or suggest your own in the comments. No idea is too far afield, because anything can spark more ideas.


AI and Democracy
Democracy with AI
Democracy after AI
Democratia ex Machina
Democracy ex Machina
E Pluribus, Machina
Democracy and the Machines
Democracy with Machines
Building Democracy with Machines
Democracy in the Loop
We the People + AI
Artificial Democracy
AI Enhanced Democracy
The State of AI
Citizen AI

Trusting the Bots
Trusting the Computer
Trusting the Machine

The End of the Beginning
Sharing Power
Better Run
Speed, Scale, Scope, and Sophistication
The New Model of Governance
Model Citizen
Artificial Individualism


How AI Upsets the Power Balances of Democracy
Twenty (or So) Ways AI will Change Democracy
Reimagining Democracy for the Age of AI
Who Wins and Loses
How Democracy Thrives in an AI-Enhanced World
Ensuring that AI Enhances Democracy and Doesn’t Destroy It
How AI Will Change Politics, Legislating, Bureaucracy, Courtrooms, and Citizens
AI’s Transformation of Government, Citizenship, and Everything In-Between
Remaking Democracy, from Voting to Legislating to Waiting in Line
How to Make Democracy Work for People in an AI Future
How AI Will Totally Reshape Democracies and Democratic Institutions
Who Wins and Loses when AI Governs
How to Win and Not Lose With AI as a Partner
AI’s Transformation of Democracy, for Better and for Worse
How AI Can Improve Society and Not Destroy It
How AI Can Improve Society and Not Subvert It
Of the People, for the People, with a Whole lot of AI
How AI Will Reshape Democracy
How the AI Revolution Will Reshape Democracy


Imagining a Thriving Democracy in the Age of AI: How Technology Enhances Democratic Ideals and Nurtures a Society that Serves its People

Making Model Citizens: How to Put AI to Use to Help Democracy
Modeling Citizenship: Who Wins and Who Loses when AI Transforms Democracy
A Model for Government: Democracy with AI, and How to Make it Work for Us

AI of, By, and for the People: How Artificial Intelligence will reshape Democracy
The (AI) Political Revolution: Speed, Scale, Scope, Sophistication, and our Democracy
Speed, Scale, Scope, Sophistication: The AI Democratic Revolution
The Artificial Political Revolution: X Ways AI will Change Democracy…Forever

EDITED TO ADD (7/10): More options:

The Silicon Realignment: The Future of Political Power in a Digital World
Political Machines
EveryTHING is political

Model Extraction from Neural Networks

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original

A new paper, “Polynomial Time Cryptanalytic Extraction of Neural Network Models,” by Adi Shamir and others, uses ideas from differential cryptanalysis to extract the weights inside a neural network using specific queries and their results. This is much more theoretical than practical, but it’s a really interesting result.


Billions of dollars and countless GPU hours are currently spent on training Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) for a variety of tasks. Thus, it is essential to determine the difficulty of extracting all the parameters of such neural networks when given access to their black-box implementations. Many versions of this problem have been studied over the last 30 years, and the best current attack on ReLU-based deep neural networks was presented at Crypto’20 by Carlini, Jagielski, and Mironov. It resembles a differential chosen plaintext attack on a cryptosystem, which has a secret key embedded in its black-box implementation and requires a polynomial number of queries but an exponential amount of time (as a function of the number of neurons). In this paper, we improve this attack by developing several new techniques that enable us to extract with arbitrarily high precision all the real-valued parameters of a ReLU-based DNN using a polynomial number of queries and a polynomial amount of time. We demonstrate its practical efficiency by applying it to a full-sized neural network for classifying the CIFAR10 dataset, which has 3072 inputs, 8 hidden layers with 256 neurons each, and about 1.2 million neuronal parameters. An attack following the approach by Carlini et al. requires an exhaustive search over 2^256 possibilities. Our attack replaces this with our new techniques, which require only 30 minutes on a 256-core computer.