All posts by Simona Badoiu

Dogfooding at scale: migrating cdnjs to Cloudflare’s Developer Platform

Post Syndicated from Simona Badoiu original https://blog.cloudflare.com/cdnjs-dev-platform-migration/

As of June 23, 2026, cdnjs, one of the Internet's busiest open-source CDNs, is running exclusively on Cloudflare’s Developer Platform. Along the way, cdnjs surfaced limits in the platform, and the platform grew to meet them.

cdnjs is a free, open-source content delivery network for JavaScript and CSS libraries. Instead of using a bundler or self-hosting jQuery, Bootstrap, or Lodash, you drop a <script> tag pointing to cdnjs.cloudflare.com and the library loads from Cloudflare's edge, instantly, anywhere in the world, with no signup, no API keys, and no rate limits. It's the infrastructure behind a significant portion of “intro to JavaScript” tutorials, CodePen demos, and Stack Overflow answers.

Community-driven, cdnjs is used on roughly 12% of all websites, a 48.3% share of the JavaScript CDN market. It serves an average of 108,000 requests per second, 9 billion per day, across more than 330 Cloudflare data centers, with a 98.6% cache hit rate. Pretty cool, Internet!

In 2011, when bundlers were exotic, npm was barely a year old, and "just drop a <script> tag" was how the web shipped JavaScript, Ryan Kirkman and Thomas Davis built cdnjs as a free, community-run mirror of every popular open-source library. 

Cloudflare stepped in to host it free of charge months later, and took over project maintenance in 2019. Back then, Cloudflare didn't have a mature Developer Platform that could fully sustain the entire cdnjs ecosystem. Fifteen years and a lot of building blocks later, the platform is mature enough to run cdnjs end to end, on Workers, Workflows, D1, Queues, Workers Cache, R2, KV, and Containers.

Why cdnjs has 9 billion requests a day 

The web has changed beyond recognition from those days. We have ES Modules (ESM), the standardized import / export syntax browsers understand natively. We have import maps, Vite, Bun, Turbopack. We have AI assistants that scaffold entire apps in seconds. Bundlers are everywhere. So why does a CDN for <script> tags still serve 9 billion requests a day?

One reason: LLMs love cdnjs. When ChatGPT, Claude, or Cursor scaffold a quick HTML demo, they reach for cdnjs because their training data is full of it. There have been 15 years of blog posts, GitHub READMEs, tutorial sites, and Q&A threads pointing to cdnjs.cloudflare.com. The URL pattern is consistent and versions are immutable — exactly the kind of dependency a model can produce reliably without hallucinating.

Every file on cdnjs has an SRI hash (we're still working on ensuring all the existing stored hashes match reality due to bugs in the old system), mirrors are auditable, and the whole project is open source. In a world increasingly worried about supply-chain attacks, an immutable, hash-verified mirror of well-known libraries is indispensable.

And it's free, forever, for everyone. No API keys. No rate limits. No "sign up to continue." That's a rare thing on today's Internet, and it's worth protecting.

Why we migrated

We didn't migrate because cdnjs was slow. We migrated because we want to keep improving it.

The previous architecture served users well: 98% cache hit, billions of requests, no outages. But internally, shipping anything new or fixing existing issues in how packages were processed was getting harder. Making a change meant coordinating deployments across GCP Functions, a VM, and Cloudflare. Observability was painful too.

The pain points  

In 2020, we migrated cdnjs to serverless, moving file serving onto Cloudflare Workers and KV, with a bare-metal origin as fallback. That change dramatically improved resilience and scalability, and let us pre-compress every asset with Brotli and gzip for smaller, faster responses, but only on the serving side.

The publishing side — the pipeline that watches npm and GitHub for new library versions, downloads them, processes them, and writes the results so cdnjs can serve them — stayed on Google Cloud Platform (GCP). At the time, Cloudflare Workers were designed for fast, short-lived HTTP requests; they didn't yet have the building blocks for a long-running, multi-step pipeline that fetches large tarballs, runs CPU-heavy compression, and orchestrates work over hours. Workflows, Queues, Durable Objects, R2, and Containers didn't exist yet.

So we built the publishing bot on what was available: a chain of GCP Functions, a VM running git-sync, and a GitHub repository as the source of truth. It worked, but six years later, that architecture was showing its age. Here's a diagram of the previous architecture:

 

The architecture had five pain points. The one that hurt most was observability: debugging meant stitching logs together by hand. We'll start there.

  1. No shared trace
    A single package update could pass through Cloud Functions, Google Cloud Storage (GCS) object events, Pub/Sub topics, a git-sync VM, and Workers KV before a file reached a user. None of those systems shared a correlation ID. GCP Logging held one half of the story, Cloudflare Logpush held the other, and the two had no common key to join on.

    The problem wasn't outright failure, it was partial success. A version that processed cleanly, wrote to KV, and then silently failed to land in the GitHub repo would serve fine for weeks until someone noticed the two stores had diverged. There was no alert for that. There couldn't be, because nothing in the system knew the full pipeline state.

  2. Split-brain storage
    Files lived in two places at once: Workers KV at the edge (with a bare-metal origin as fallback) and a GitHub repository as the source of truth. The ingestion pipeline wrote to both at the end of every run. Neither was authoritative, and when they drifted, there was no clean way to reconcile them.
  3. Pipeline glued together with object events
    The ingestion pipeline was a chain of small GCP Cloud Functions, each doing one step and handing off to the next through shared storage. One function fetched the package's release archive from npm and dropped it in a bucket. The bucket firing a "new file" event triggered the next function, which unpacked it and wrote the results somewhere else, triggering the next, and so on. Storage was doing double duty as a message queue, with no dead-letter queue, no backlog visibility, and no clean replay when a step failed.
  4. 26 functions for 26 letters
    Just checking npm for updates required 26 Cloud Functions, one per letter of the alphabet. Each shard had its own deployment and its own logs, and the only way to know if the fleet was healthy was to check all 26.
  5. The GitHub repo GitHub couldn't serve
    A separate VM ran git-sync, mirroring every processed file into cdnjs/cdnjs. Years of releases pushed it past 1.1TB of packed storage, large enough that GitHub's own archive service refused to generate tarballs or zip downloads for it. Forking became impractical, clones were slow, and the .gitignore had grown to 274 hand-curated entries blocking broken or weirdly-versioned releases. It was a documented graveyard of everything the pipeline couldn't reasonably reject upstream.

    A genuine thank you to the GitHub team for hosting this giant for over a decade. They bore with us through years of storage growth, and the project wouldn't have survived without them.

    A quieter benefit that came with the migration is having fewer moving parts to secure. Cloud Functions, a git-sync VM, container images, GCS buckets, service-account keys — every one of those was a thing to secure, patch, and audit. Retiring the pipeline closed all of the recently opened cdnjs vulnerabilities.

How we re-built it

The new cdnjs architecture runs entirely on Cloudflare’s Developer Platform.

R2 is the single source of truth for file content. It has no practical size limit, so the files that couldn't fit in KV before, like source maps, big bundles, and font packs, now live alongside everything else. As a bonus, the S3 API makes the entire cdnjs catalog accessible to any S3 client. Maintain a mirror? Open an issue on the cdnjs repository and we'll set you up with read-only credentials.

KV stores only metadata now: package info, version lists, SRI hashes. KV is built for high read volume with infrequent writes, which is exactly the shape of metadata access.

In front of the Worker sits Workers Cache, a tiered cache Cloudflare launched this year. Before, we relied on a separate internal caching layer between the edge and the Worker. That layer is gone now, replaced by one owned by the Developer Platform, the same platform that runs the rest of cdnjs. One less moving part!

The new architecture also extends a long-standing partnership. DigitalOcean has hosted the cdnjs website for years as a sponsor; now it hosts the storage too. Every file published to R2 is mirrored to DigitalOcean Spaces: architecturally a disaster-recovery copy, operationally also a live fallback. The serving worker reads through to it whenever R2 can’t return a file. The chain is cache → R2 → DigitalOcean, so R2 having a bad day doesn't take cdnjs down. A Cloudflare-hosted origin still sits in the chain during the transition, but it will retire once the GitHub backfill lands in R2.

The ingestion pipeline is built on Cloudflare Workflows. Every ten minutes, a cron job triggers PackageUpdatesWorkflow, which checks npm and GitHub for new versions. For each new version found, it spawns a DownloadPackageWorkflow that fetches the tarball into R2, then a ProcessingWorkflow per file that extracts, minifies, and compresses. Finally, PublishingWorkflow writes the results to R2 and KV and updates the Algolia search index.

Because Workflows provides durable execution, the state of each step is preserved. If anything fails — a network timeout, a compression error — the workflow resumes from the last successful step.

The trickier piece is how we glue Workflows to the external compression container. We pre-compress text-based files to streamline the delivery process. But compression is too CPU-intensive for a Worker, so we hand it off to Cloudflare Containers, wait for compression to complete, and then pick up where we left off.

The pipeline has two kinds of waiting:

Per file: Each ProcessingWorkflow writes the uncompressed file to an R2 bucket, sends a job to a Queue, and hibernates. A Rust compression service running in the container picks it up, compresses it, and writes the result to another bucket. An R2 event notification wakes the workflow up so it can continue.

Per package: The parent workflow needs to wait for all its file children before moving on to publish. A package with thousands of files means thousands of children running in parallel. We use a small Durable Object as a counter: a parent increments on each child it spawns, children decrement when they finish. The parent wakes up when the counter reaches zero.

An overview of the new architecture, with R2 as the source of truth and Workflows running the pipeline:

Pushing the limits

Designing the new architecture was one challenge. Migrating the existing catalog into it, without disturbing a single file already in the wild, was another.

We'd actually tried this once before and had to roll back. The plan, back then, was to re-process old packages and write the results directly to R2, but the regenerated files didn't byte-match what KV had been serving. Minifiers and compressors aren't fully deterministic across versions, so the new outputs were correct but had different SRI hashes. For a CDN where users pin those hashes in their HTML, that's a serving break. So we rolled back, and now, we migrated the existing content from KV to R2 as-is instead of regenerating it.

That decision shifted the problem from "re-process millions of files" to "copy millions of files between accounts, without missing any." And that's where we ran into the Workers subrequest limit, capped at 1,000 per invocation on paid plans. A package with thousands of files would burn through it in one go. Parallelizing didn't help, since every Worker hits the same ceiling. So we sharded the migration by package name and fanned the work out across many invocations via Queues, whose at-least-once delivery guarantee meant no package could silently fall out of the migration.

We hit two platform limits during the migration: 1,000 subrequests per Worker invocation and 1,024 steps per Workflow. Instead of just working around them, we asked the Workers and Workflows teams to raise them — which they did. Subrequests now go up to 10 million on paid plans; Workflows now default to 10,000 steps, configurable to 25,000.

The cdnjs pipeline runs on the same building blocks anyone can use: Workers, Workflows, R2, KV, Queues, Containers, and Durable Objects. The limits we hit are limits we lifted for everyone. If the Cloudflare Developer Platform can serve 9 billion requests a day and publish packages with hundreds of thousands of compressed, minified files, it can probably run whatever you're building.

What’s next

There's an obvious next question hiding in all of this: could cdnjs also serve modern, browser-native ES modules? The same packages, transformed on publish, ready to import without a bundler. The architecture doesn't rule it out. The Workflows-plus-Containers pattern that pre-compresses files today would work just as well for transforming them. We're not committing to it, but it's the kind of thing that's now possible to consider, which wasn't true a year ago.

git commit -m "with love" --author="cdnjs team"

We follow every open issue on GitHub and we want your feedback. Don't hesitate to contribute and help make the Internet better for everyone.

Cloudflare Zaraz supports CSP

Post Syndicated from Simona Badoiu original https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-zaraz-supports-csp/

Cloudflare Zaraz supports CSP

Cloudflare Zaraz supports CSP

Cloudflare Zaraz can be used to manage and load third-party tools on the cloud, achieving significant speed, privacy and security improvements. Content Security Policy (CSP) configuration prevents malicious content from being run on your website.

If you have Cloudflare Zaraz enabled on your website, you don’t have to ask yourself twice if you should enable CSP because there’s no harmful collision between CSP & Cloudflare Zaraz.

Why would Cloudflare Zaraz collide with CSP?

Cloudflare Zaraz, at its core, injects a <script> block on every page where it runs. If the website enforces CSP rules, the injected script can be automatically blocked if inline scripts are not allowed. To prevent this, at the moment of script injection, Cloudflare Zaraz adds a nonce to the script-src policy in order for everything to work smoothly.

Cloudflare Zaraz supports CSP enabled by using both Content-Security-Policy headers or Content-Security-Policy <meta> blocks.

What is CSP?

Content Security Policy (CSP) is a security standard meant to protect websites from Cross-site scripting (XSS) or Clickjacking by providing the means to list approved origins for scripts, styles, images or other web resources.

Although CSP is a reasonably mature technology with most modern browsers already implementing the standard, less than 10% of websites use this extra layer of security. A Google study says that more than 90% of the websites using CSP are still leaving some doors open for attackers.

Why this low adoption and poor configuration? An early study on ‘why CSP adoption is failing’ says that the initial setup for a website is tedious and can generate errors, risking doing more harm for the business than an occasional XSS attack.

We’re writing this to confirm that Cloudflare Zaraz will comply with your CSP settings without any other additional configuration from your side and to share some interesting findings from our research regarding how CSP works.

What is Cloudflare Zaraz?

Cloudflare Zaraz aims to make the web faster by moving third-party script bloat away from the browser.

There are tens of third-parties loaded by almost every website on the Internet (analytics, tracking, chatbots, banners, embeds, widgets etc.). Most of the time, the third parties have a slightly small role on a particular website compared to the high-volume and complex code they provide (for a good reason, because it’s meant to deal with all the issues that particular tool can tackle). This code, loaded a huge number of times on every website is simply inefficient.

Cloudflare Zaraz reduces the amount of code executed on the client side and the amount of time consumed by the client with anything that is not directly serving the user and their experience on the web.

At the same time, Cloudflare Zaraz does the integration between website owners and third-parties by providing a common management interface with an easy ‘one-click’ method.

Cloudflare Zaraz & CSP

When auto-inject is enabled, Cloudflare Zaraz ‘bootstraps’ on your website by running a small inline script that collects basic information from the browser (Screen Resolution, User-Agent, Referrer, page URL) and also provides the main `track` function. The `track` function allows you to track the actions your users are taking on your website, and other events that might happen in real time. Common user actions a website will probably be interested in tracking are successful sign-ups, calls-to-action clicks, and purchases.

Before adding CSP support, Cloudflare Zaraz would’ve been blocked on any website that implemented CSP and didn’t include ‘unsafe-inline’ in the script-src policy or default-src policy. Some of our users have signaled collisions between CSP and Cloudflare Zaraz so we decided to make peace with CSP once and forever.

To solve the issue, when Cloudflare Zaraz is automatically injected on a website implementing CSP, it enhances the response header by appending a nonce value in the script-src policy. This way we make sure we’re not harming any security that was already enforced by the website owners, and we are still able to perform our duties – making the website faster and more secure by asynchronously running third parties on the server side instead of clogging the browser with irrelevant computation from the user’s point of view.

CSP – Edge Cases

In the following paragraphs we’re describing some interesting CSP details we had to tackle to bring Cloudflare Zaraz to a trustworthy state. The following paragraphs assume that you already know what CSP is, and you know how a simple CSP configuration looks like.

Dealing with multiple CSP headers/<meta> elements

The CSP standard allows multiple CSP headers but, on a first look, it’s slightly unclear how the multiple headers will be handled.

You would think that the CSP rules will be somehow merged and the final CSP rule will be a combination of all of them but in reality the rule is much more simple – the most restrictive policy among all the headers will be applied. Relevant examples can be found in the w3c’s standard description and in this multiple CSP headers example.

The rule of thumb is that “A connection will be allowed only if all the CSP headers will allow it”.

In order to make sure that the Cloudflare Zaraz script is always running, we’re adding the nonce value to all the existing CSP headers and/or <meta http-equiv=”Content-Security-Policy”> blocks.

Adding a nonce to a CSP header that already allows unsafe-inline

Just like when sending multiple CSP headers, when configuring one policy with multiple values, the most restrictive value has priority.

An illustrative example for a given CSP header:

Content-Security-Policy: default-src ‘self’; script-src ‘unsafe-inline’ ‘nonce-12345678’

If ‘unsafe-inline’ is set in the script-src policy, adding nonce-123456789 will disable the effect of unsafe-inline and will allow only the inline script that mentions that nonce value.

This is a mistake we already made while trying to make Cloudflare Zaraz compliant with CSP. However, we solved it by adding the nonce only in the following situations:

  • if ‘unsafe-inline’ is not already present in the header
  • If ‘unsafe-inline’ is present in the header but next to it, a ‘nonce-…’ or ‘sha…’ value is already set (because in this situation ‘unsafe-inline’ is practically disabled)

Adding the script-src policy if it doesn’t exist already

Another interesting case we had to tackle was handling a CSP header that didn’t include the script-src policy, a policy that was relying only on the default-src values. In this case, we’re copying all the default-src values to a new script-src policy, and we’re appending the nonce associated with the Cloudflare Zaraz script to it(keeping in mind the previous point of course)

Notes

Cloudflare Zaraz is still not 100% compliant with CSP because some tools still need to use eval() – usually for setting cookies, but we’re already working on a different approach so, stay tuned!

The Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only header is not modified by Cloudflare Zaraz yet – you’ll be seeing error reports regarding the Cloudflare Zaraz <script> element if Cloudflare Zaraz is enabled on your website.

Content-Security-Policy Report-Only can not be set using a <meta> element

Conclusion

Cloudflare Zaraz supports the evolution of a more secure web by seamlessly complying with CSP.

If you encounter any issue or potential edge-case that we didn’t cover in our approach, don’t hesitate to write on Cloudflare Zaraz’s Discord Channel, we’re always there fixing issues, listening to feedback and announcing exciting product updates.

For more details on how Cloudflare Zaraz works and how to use it, check out the official documentation.

Resources:

[1] https://wiki.mozilla.org/index.php?title=Security/CSP/Spec&oldid=133465
[2] https://storage.googleapis.com/pub-tools-public-publication-data/pdf/45542.pdf
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy
[4] https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#enforcing-multiple-policies
[5] https://chrisguitarguy.com/2019/07/05/working-with-multiple-content-security-policy-headers/
[6]https://www.bitsight.com/blog/content-security-policy-limits-dangerous-activity-so-why-isnt-everyone-doing-it
[7]https://wkr.io/publication/raid-2014-content_security_policy.pdf