Post Syndicated from Patrick Kennedy original https://www.servethehome.com/xconn-xc50256-cxl-2-0-switch-chip-linked-and-running-at-fms-2023/
XConn showed its CXL 2.0 switch with even more devices, AMD EPYC and Intel Xeon support, and running pooled memory with Samsung and MemVerge
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Post Syndicated from Patrick Kennedy original https://www.servethehome.com/samsung-processing-in-memory-technology-at-hot-chips-2023/
At Hot Chips 2023, Samsung showed its Processing in/near Memory ranging from PIM-HBM in AMD MI100 test GPUs to LPDDR-PIM and CXL-PNM modules
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Post Syndicated from Bryan Young original https://www.servethehome.com/samsung-256tb-e3-l-nvme-ssd-at-fms-2023/
We saw a Samsung 256TB NVMe SSD with a NAND accordion to simply pack as much storage as possible into an E3.L drive
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Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/samsung-encryption-flaw.html
Researchers have found a major encryption flaw in 100 million Samsung Galaxy phones.
From the abstract:
In this work, we expose the cryptographic design and implementation of Android’s Hardware-Backed Keystore in Samsung’s Galaxy S8, S9, S10, S20, and S21 flagship devices. We reversed-engineered and provide a detailed description of the cryptographic design and code structure, and we unveil severe design flaws. We present an IV reuse attack on AES-GCM that allows an attacker to extract hardware-protected key material, and a downgrade attack that makes even the latest Samsung devices vulnerable to the IV reuse attack. We demonstrate working key extraction attacks on the latest devices. We also show the implications of our attacks on two higher-level cryptographic protocols between the TrustZone and a remote server: we demonstrate a working FIDO2 WebAuthn login bypass and a compromise of Google’s Secure Key Import.
Here are the details:
As we discussed in Section 3, the wrapping key used to encrypt the key blobs (HDK) is derived using a salt value computed by the Keymaster TA. In v15 and v20-s9 blobs, the salt is a deterministic function that depends only on the application ID and application data (and constant strings), which the Normal World client fully controls. This means that for a given application, all key blobs will be encrypted using the same key. As the blobs are encrypted in AES-GCM mode-of-operation, the security of the resulting encryption scheme depends on its IV values never being reused.
Gadzooks. That’s a really embarrassing mistake. GSM needs a new nonce for every encryption. Samsung took a secure cipher mode and implemented it insecurely.