Tag Archives: encryption

The NSA Says that There are No Known Flaws in NIST’s Quantum-Resistant Algorithms

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/05/the-nsa-says-that-there-are-no-known-flaws-in-nists-quantum-resistant-algorithms.html

Rob Joyce, the director of cybersecurity at the NSA, said so in an interview:

The NSA already has classified quantum-resistant algorithms of its own that it developed over many years, said Joyce. But it didn’t enter any of its own in the contest. The agency’s mathematicians, however, worked with NIST to support the process, trying to crack the algorithms in order to test their merit.

“Those candidate algorithms that NIST is running the competitions on all appear strong, secure, and what we need for quantum resistance,” Joyce said. “We’ve worked against all of them to make sure they are solid.”

The purpose of the open, public international scrutiny of the separate NIST algorithms is “to build trust and confidence,” he said.

I believe him. This is what the NSA did with NIST’s candidate algorithms for AES and then for SHA-3. NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process looks good.

I still worry about the long-term security of the submissions, though. In 2018, in an essay titled “Cryptography After the Aliens Land,” I wrote:

…there is always the possibility that those algorithms will fall to aliens with better quantum techniques. I am less worried about symmetric cryptography, where Grover’s algorithm is basically an upper limit on quantum improvements, than I am about public-key algorithms based on number theory, which feel more fragile. It’s possible that quantum computers will someday break all of them, even those that today are quantum resistant.

It took us a couple of decades to fully understand von Neumann computer architecture. I’m sure it will take years of working with a functional quantum computer to fully understand the limits of that architecture. And some things that we think of as computationally hard today will turn out not to be.

Samsung Encryption Flaw

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/samsung-encryption-flaw.html

Researchers have found a major encryption flaw in 100 million Samsung Galaxy phones.

From the abstract:

In this work, we expose the cryptographic design and implementation of Android’s Hardware-Backed Keystore in Samsung’s Galaxy S8, S9, S10, S20, and S21 flagship devices. We reversed-engineered and provide a detailed description of the cryptographic design and code structure, and we unveil severe design flaws. We present an IV reuse attack on AES-GCM that allows an attacker to extract hardware-protected key material, and a downgrade attack that makes even the latest Samsung devices vulnerable to the IV reuse attack. We demonstrate working key extraction attacks on the latest devices. We also show the implications of our attacks on two higher-level cryptographic protocols between the TrustZone and a remote server: we demonstrate a working FIDO2 WebAuthn login bypass and a compromise of Google’s Secure Key Import.

Here are the details:

As we discussed in Section 3, the wrapping key used to encrypt the key blobs (HDK) is derived using a salt value computed by the Keymaster TA. In v15 and v20-s9 blobs, the salt is a deterministic function that depends only on the application ID and application data (and constant strings), which the Normal World client fully controls. This means that for a given application, all key blobs will be encrypted using the same key. As the blobs are encrypted in AES-GCM mode-of-operation, the security of the resulting encryption scheme depends on its IV values never being reused.

Gadzooks. That’s a really embarrassing mistake. GSM needs a new nonce for every encryption. Samsung took a secure cipher mode and implemented it insecurely.

News article.

Decrypting Hive Ransomware Data

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/03/decrypting-hive-ransomware-data.html

Nice piece of research:

Abstract: Among the many types of malicious codes, ransomware poses a major threat. Ransomware encrypts data and demands a ransom in exchange for decryption. As data recovery is impossible if the encryption key is not obtained, some companies suffer from considerable damage, such as the payment of huge amounts of money or the loss of important data. In this paper, we analyzed Hive ransomware, which appeared in June 2021. Hive ransomware has caused immense harm, leading the FBI to issue an alert about it. To minimize the damage caused by Hive Ransomware and to help victims recover their files, we analyzed Hive Ransomware and studied recovery methods. By analyzing the encryption process of Hive ransomware, we confirmed that vulnerabilities exist by using their own encryption algorithm. We have recovered the master key for generating the file encryption key partially, to enable the decryption of data encrypted by Hive ransomware. We recovered 95% of the master key without the attacker’s RSA private key and decrypted the actual infected data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful attempt at decrypting Hive ransomware. It is expected that our method can be used to reduce the damage caused by Hive ransomware.

Here’s the flaw:

The cryptographic vulnerability identified by the researchers concerns the mechanism by which the master keys are generated and stored, with the ransomware strain only encrypting select portions of the file as opposed to the entire contents using two keystreams derived from the master key.

The encryption keystream, which is created from an XOR operation of the two keystreams, is then XORed with the data in alternate blocks to generate the encrypted file. But this technique also makes it possible to guess the keystreams and restore the master key, in turn enabling the decode of encrypted files sans the attacker’s private key.

The researchers said that they were able to weaponize the flaw to devise a method to reliably recover more than 95% of the keys employed during encryption.

Introducing s2n-quic, a new open-source QUIC protocol implementation in Rust

Post Syndicated from Panos Kampanakis original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/introducing-s2n-quic-open-source-protocol-rust/

At Amazon Web Services (AWS), security, high performance, and strong encryption for everyone are top priorities for all our services. With these priorities in mind, less than a year after QUIC ratification in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), we are introducing support for the QUIC protocol which can boost performance for web applications that currently use Transport Layer Security (TLS) over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). We are pleased to announce the availability of s2n-quic, an open-source Rust implementation of the QUIC protocol added to our set of AWS encryption open-source libraries.

What is QUIC?

QUIC is an encrypted transport protocol designed for performance and is the foundation of HTTP/3. It is specified in a set of IETF standards ratified in May 2021. QUIC protects its UDP datagrams by using encryption and authentication keys established in a TLS 1.3 handshake carried over QUIC transport. It is designed to improve upon TCP by providing improved first-byte latency and handling of multiple streams, and solving issues such as head-of-line blocking, mobility, and data loss detection. This enables web applications to perform faster, especially over poor networks. Other potential uses include latency-sensitive connections and UDP connections currently using DTLS, which now can run faster.

Renaming s2n

AWS has long supported open-source encryption libraries; in 2015 we introduced s2n as a TLS library. The name s2n is short for signal to noise, and is a nod to the almost magical act of encryption—disguising meaningful signals, like your critical data, as seemingly random noise.

Now that AWS introduces our new QUIC open-source library, we are renaming s2n to s2n-tls. s2n-tls is an efficient TLS library built over other crypto libraries like OpenSSL libcrypto or AWS libcrypto (AWS-LC). AWS-LC is a general-purpose cryptographic library maintained by AWS which originated from the Google project BoringSSL. The s2n family of AWS encryption open-source libraries now consists of s2n-tls, s2n-quic, and s2n-bignum. s2n-bignum is a collection of bignum arithmetic routines maintained by AWS designed for crypto applications.

s2n-quic details

Similar to s2n-tls, s2n-quic is designed to be small and fast, with simplicity as a priority. It is written in Rust, so it reaps some of its benefits such as performance, thread and memory-safety. s2n-quic depends either on s2n-tls or rustls for the TLS 1.3 handshake.

The main advantages of s2n-quic are:

  • Simple API. For example, a QUIC echo server-example can be built with just a few API calls.
  • Highly configurable. s2n-quic is configured with code through providers that allow an application to granularly control functionality. You can see an example of the server’s simple config in the QUIC echo server-example.
  • Extensive testing. Fuzzing (libFuzzer, American Fuzzy Fop (AFL), and honggfuzz), corpus replay unit testing of derived corpus files, testing of concrete and symbolic execution engines with bolero, and extensive integration and unit testing are used to validate the correctness of our implementation.
  • Thorough interoperability testing for every code change. There are multiple public QUIC implementations; s2n-quic is continuously tested to interoperate with many of them.
  • Verified correctness, post-quantum hybrid key exchange, and maturity for the TLS handshake when built with s2n-tls.
  • Thorough compliance coverage tracking of normative language in relevant standards.

Some important features in s2n-quic that can improve performance and connection management include CUBIC congestion controller support, packet pacing, Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) support, Path MTU Discovery, and unique connection identifiers detached from the address.

AWS is continuing to invest in encryption optimization techniques, UDP performance improvement technologies, and formal code verification with the AWS Automated Reasoning Group to further enhance the library.

Like s2n-tls, which has already been introduced in various AWS services, AWS services that need to make use of the benefits of QUIC will begin integrating s2n-quic. QUIC is a standardized protocol which, when introduced in a service like web content delivery, can improve user experience or application performance. AWS still plans to continue support for existing protocols like TLS, so existing applications will remain interoperable. Amazon CloudFront is scheduled to be the first AWS service to integrate s2n-quic with its support for HTTP/3 in 2022.

Conclusion

If you are interested in using or contributing to s2n-quic source code or documentation, they are publicly available under the terms of the Apache Software License 2.0 from our s2n-quic GitHub repository.

If you package or distribute s2n-quic or s2n-tls, or use it as part of a large multi-user service, you may be eligible for pre-notification of security issues. Please contact [email protected].

If you discover a potential security issue in s2n-quic or s2n-tls, we ask that you notify AWS Security by using our vulnerability reporting page.

Stay tuned for more topics on s2n-quic like quantum-resistance, performance analyses, uses, and other technical details.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Author

Panos Kampanakis

Panos has extensive experience on cybersecurity, applied cryptography, security automation, and vulnerability management. He has trained and presented on various security topics at technical events for numerous years, and also co-authored Cisco Press books, papers, standards, and research publications. He has participated in various security standards bodies to provide common interoperable protocols and languages for security information sharing, cryptography, and PKI. In his current role, Panos works with engineers and industry standards partners to provide cryptographically secure tools, protocols, and standards.

New DeadBolt Ransomware Targets NAT Devices

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/01/new-deadbolt-ransomware-targets-nat-devices.html

There’s a new ransomware that targets NAT devices made by QNAP:

The attacks started today, January 25th, with QNAP devices suddenly finding their files encrypted and file names appended with a .deadbolt file extension.

Instead of creating ransom notes in each folder on the device, the QNAP device’s login page is hijacked to display a screen stating, “WARNING: Your files have been locked by DeadBolt”….

[…]

BleepingComputer is aware of at least fifteen victims of the new DeadBolt ransomware attack, with no specific region being targeted.

As with all ransomware attacks against QNAP devices, the DeadBolt attacks only affect devices accessible to the Internet.

As the threat actors claim the attack is conducted through a zero-day vulnerability, it is strongly advised that all QNAP users disconnect their devices from the Internet and place them behind a firewall.

How to use tokenization to improve data security and reduce audit scope

Post Syndicated from Tim Winston original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-tokenization-to-improve-data-security-and-reduce-audit-scope/

Tokenization of sensitive data elements is a hot topic, but you may not know what to tokenize, or even how to determine if tokenization is right for your organization’s business needs. Industries subject to financial, data security, regulatory, or privacy compliance standards are increasingly looking for tokenization solutions to minimize distribution of sensitive data, reduce risk of exposure, improve security posture, and alleviate compliance obligations. This post provides guidance to determine your requirements for tokenization, with an emphasis on the compliance lens given our experience as PCI Qualified Security Assessors (PCI QSA).

What is tokenization?

Tokenization is the process of replacing actual sensitive data elements with non-sensitive data elements that have no exploitable value for data security purposes. Security-sensitive applications use tokenization to replace sensitive data, such as personally identifiable information (PII) or protected health information (PHI), with tokens to reduce security risks.

De-tokenization returns the original data element for a provided token. Applications may require access to the original data, or an element of the original data, for decisions, analysis, or personalized messaging. To minimize the need to de-tokenize data and to reduce security exposure, tokens can retain attributes of the original data to enable processing and analysis using token values instead of the original data. Common characteristics tokens may retain from the original data are:

Format attributes

Length for compatibility with storage and reports of applications written for the original data
Character set for compatibility with display and data validation of existing applications
Preserved character positions such as first 6 and last 4 for credit card PAN

Analytics attributes

Mapping consistency where the same data always results in the same token
Sort order

Retaining functional attributes in tokens must be implemented in ways that do not defeat the security of the tokenization process. Using attribute preservation functions can possibly reduce the security of a specific tokenization implementation. Limiting the scope and access to tokens addresses limitations introduced when using attribute retention.

Why tokenize? Common use cases

I need to reduce my compliance scope

Tokens are generally not subject to compliance requirements if there is sufficient separation of the tokenization implementation and the applications using the tokens. Encrypted sensitive data may not reduce compliance obligations or scope. Such industry regulatory standards as PCI DSS 3.2.1 still consider systems that store, process, or transmit encrypted cardholder data as in-scope for assessment; whereas tokenized data may remove those systems from assessment scope. A common use case for PCI DSS compliance is replacing PAN with tokens in data sent to a service provider, which keeps the service provider from being subject to PCI DSS.

I need to restrict sensitive data to only those with a “need-to-know”

Tokenization can be used to add a layer of explicit access controls to de-tokenization of individual data items, which can be used to implement and demonstrate least-privileged access to sensitive data. For instances where data may be co-mingled in a common repository such as a data lake, tokenization can help ensure that only those with the appropriate access can perform the de-tokenization process and reveal sensitive data.

I need to avoid sharing sensitive data with my service providers

Replacing sensitive data with tokens before providing it to service providers who have no access to de-tokenize data can eliminate the risk of having sensitive data within service providers’ control, and avoid having compliance requirements apply to their environments. This is common for customers involved in the payment process, which provides tokenization services to merchants that tokenize the card holder data, and return back to their customers a token they can use to complete card purchase transactions.

I need to simplify data lake security and compliance

A data lake centralized repository allows you to store all your structured and unstructured data at any scale, to be used later for not-yet-determined analysis. Having multiple sources and data stored in multiple structured and unstructured formats creates complications for demonstrating data protection controls for regulatory compliance. Ideally, sensitive data should not be ingested at all; however, that is not always feasible. Where ingestion of such data is necessary, tokenization at each data source can keep compliance-subject data out of data lakes, and help avoid compliance implications. Using tokens that retain data attributes, such as data-to-token consistency (idempotence) can support many of the analytical capabilities that make it useful to store data in the data lake.

I want to allow sensitive data to be used for other purposes, such as analytics

Your organization may want to perform analytics on the sensitive data for other business purposes, such as marketing metrics, and reporting. By tokenizing the data, you can minimize the locations where sensitive data is allowed, and provide tokens to users and applications needing to conduct data analysis. This allows numerous applications and processes to access the token data and maintain security of the original sensitive data.

I want to use tokenization for threat mitigation

Using tokenization can help you mitigate threats identified in your workload threat model, depending on where and how tokenization is implemented. At the point where the sensitive data is tokenized, the sensitive data element is replaced with a non-sensitive equivalent throughout the data lifecycle, and across the data flow. Some important questions to ask are:

  • What are the in-scope compliance, regulatory, privacy, or security requirements for the data that will be tokenized?
  • When does the sensitive data need to be tokenized in order to meet security and scope reduction objectives?
  • What attack vector is being addressed for the sensitive data by tokenizing it?
  • Where is the tokenized data being hosted? Is it in a trusted environment or an untrusted environment?

For additional information on threat modeling, see the AWS security blog post How to approach threat modeling.

Tokenization or encryption consideration

Tokens can provide the ability to retain processing value of the data while still managing the data exposure risk and compliance scope. Encryption is the foundational mechanism for providing data confidentiality.

Encryption rarely results in cipher text with a similar format to the original data, and may prevent data analysis, or require consuming applications to adapt.

Your decision to use tokenization instead of encryption should be based on the following:

Reduction of compliance scope As discussed above, by properly utilizing tokenization to obfuscate sensitive data you may be able to reduce the scope of certain framework assessments such as PCI DSS 3.2.1.
Format attributes Used for compatibility with existing software and processes.
Analytics attributes Used to support planned data analysis and reporting.
Elimination of encryption key management A tokenization solution has one essential API—create token—and one optional API—retrieve value from token. Managing access controls can be simpler than some non-AWS native general purpose cryptographic key use policies. In addition, the compromise of the encryption key compromises all data encrypted by that key, both past and future. The compromise of the token database compromises only existing tokens.

Where encryption may make more sense

Although scope reduction, data analytics, threat mitigation, and data masking for the protection of sensitive data make very powerful arguments for tokenization, we acknowledge there may be instances where encryption is the more appropriate solution. Ask yourself these questions to gain better clarity on which solution is right for your company’s use case.

Scalability If you require a solution that scales to large data volumes, and have the availability to leverage encryption solutions that require minimal key management overhead, such as AWS Key Management Services (AWS KMS), then encryption may be right for you.
Data format If you need to secure data that is unstructured, then encryption may be the better option given the flexibility of encryption at various layers and formats.
Data sharing with 3rd parties If you need to share sensitive data in its original format and value with a 3rd party, then encryption may be the appropriate solution to minimize external access to your token vault for de-tokenization processes.

What type of tokenization solution is right for your business?

When trying to decide which tokenization solution to use, your organization should first define your business requirements and use cases.

  1. What are your own specific use cases for tokenized data, and what is your business goal? Identifying which use cases apply to your business and what the end state should be is important when determining the correct solution for your needs.
  2. What type of data does your organization want to tokenize? Understanding what data elements you want to tokenize, and what that tokenized data will be used for may impact your decision about which type of solution to use.
  3. Do the tokens need to be deterministic, the same data always producing the same token? Knowing how the data will be ingested or used by other applications and processes may rule out certain tokenization solutions.
  4. Will tokens be used internally only, or will the tokens be shared across other business units and applications? Identifying a need for shared tokens may increase the risk of token exposure and, therefore, impact your decisions about which tokenization solution to use.
  5. How long does a token need to be valid? You will need to identify a solution that can meet your use cases, internal security policies, and regulatory framework requirements.

Choosing between self-managed tokenization or tokenization as a service

Do you want to manage the tokenization within your organization, or use Tokenization as a Service (TaaS) offered by a third-party service provider? Some advantages to managing the tokenization solution with your company employees and resources are the ability to direct and prioritize the work needed to implement and maintain the solution, customizing the solution to the application’s exact needs, and building the subject matter expertise to remove a dependency on a third party. The primary advantages of a TaaS solution are that it is already complete, and the security of both tokenization and access controls are well tested. Additionally, TaaS inherently demonstrates separation of duties, because privileged access to the tokenization environment is owned by the tokenization provider.

Choosing a reversible tokenization solution

Do you have a business need to retrieve the original data from the token value? Reversible tokens can be valuable to avoid sharing sensitive data with internal or third-party service providers in payments and other financial services. Because the service providers are passed only tokens, they can avoid accepting additional security risk and compliance scope. If your company implements or allows de-tokenization, you will need to be able to demonstrate strict controls on the management and use of de-tokenization privilege. Eliminating the implementation of de-tokenization is the clearest way to demonstrate that downstream applications cannot have sensitive data. Given the security and compliance risks of converting tokenized data back into its original data format, this process should be highly monitored, and you should have appropriate alerting in place to detect each time this activity is performed.

Operational considerations when deciding on a tokenization solution

While operational considerations are outside the scope of this post, they are important factors for choosing a solution. Throughput, latency, deployment architecture, resiliency, batch capability, and multi-regional support can impact the tokenization solution of choice. Integration mechanisms with identity and access control and logging architectures, for example, are important for compliance controls and evidence creation.

No matter which deployment model you choose, the tokenization solution needs to meet security standards, similar to encryption standards, and must prevent determining what the original data is from the token values.

Conclusion

Using tokenization solutions to replace sensitive data offers many security and compliance benefits. These benefits include lowered security risk and smaller audit scope, resulting in lower compliance costs and a reduction in regulatory data handling requirements.

Your company may want to use sensitive data in new and innovative ways, such as developing personalized offerings that use predictive analysis and consumer usage trends and patterns, fraud monitoring and minimizing financial risk based on suspicious activity analysis, or developing business intelligence to improve strategic planning and business performance. If you implement a tokenization solution, your organization can alleviate some of the regulatory burden of protecting sensitive data while implementing solutions that use obfuscated data for analytics.

On the other hand, tokenization may also add complexity to your systems and applications, as well as adding additional costs to maintain those systems and applications. If you use a third-party tokenization solution, there is a possibility of being locked into that service provider due to the specific token schema they may use, and switching between providers may be costly. It can also be challenging to integrate tokenization into all applications that use the subject data.

In this post, we have described some considerations to help you determine if tokenization is right for you, what to consider when deciding which type of tokenization solution to use, and the benefits. disadvantages, and comparison of tokenization and encryption. When choosing a tokenization solution, it’s important for you to identify and understand all of your organizational requirements. This post is intended to generate questions your organization should answer to make the right decisions concerning tokenization.

You have many options available to tokenize your AWS workloads. After your organization has determined the type of tokenization solution to implement based on your own business requirements, explore the tokenization solution options available in AWS Marketplace. You can also build your own solution using AWS guides and blog posts. For further reading, see this blog post: Building a serverless tokenization solution to mask sensitive data.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the Amazon Security Assurance Services or contact AWS Support.

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Author

Tim Winston

Tim is a Senior Assurance Consultant with AWS Security Assurance Services. He leverages more than 20 years’ experience as a security consultant and assessor to provide AWS customers with guidance on payment security and compliance. He is a co-author of the “Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) 3.2.1 on AWS”.

Author

Kristine Harper

Kristine is a Senior Assurance Consultant and PCI DSS Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) with AWS Security Assurance Services. Her professional background includes security and compliance consulting with large fintech enterprises and government entities. In her free time, Kristine enjoys traveling, outdoor activities, spending time with family, and spoiling her pets.

Author

Michael Guzman

Michael is an Assurance Consultant with AWS Security Assurance Services. Michael is a PCI QSA and HITRUST CCSFP, along with holding several AWS certifications. His background is in Financial Services IT Operations and Administrations, with over 20 years experience within that industry. In his spare time Michael enjoy’s spending time with his family, continuing to improve his golf skills and perfecting his Tri-Tip recipe.

China’s Olympics App Is Horribly Insecure

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/01/chinas-olympics-app-is-horribly-insecure.html

China is mandating that athletes download and use a health and travel app when they attend the Winter Olympics next month. Citizen Lab examined the app and found it riddled with security holes.

Key Findings:

  • MY2022, an app mandated for use by all attendees of the 2022 Olympic Games in Beijing, has a simple but devastating flaw where encryption protecting users’ voice audio and file transfers can be trivially sidestepped. Health customs forms which transmit passport details, demographic information, and medical and travel history are also vulnerable. Server responses can also be spoofed, allowing an attacker to display fake instructions to users.
  • MY2022 is fairly straightforward about the types of data it collects from users in its public-facing documents. However, as the app collects a range of highly sensitive medical information, it is unclear with whom or which organization(s) it shares this information.
  • MY2022 includes features that allow users to report “politically sensitive” content. The app also includes a censorship keyword list, which, while presently inactive, targets a variety of political topics including domestic issues such as Xinjiang and Tibet as well as references to Chinese government agencies.
  • While the vendor did not respond to our security disclosure, we find that the app’s security deficits may not only violate Google’s Unwanted Software Policy and Apple’s App Store guidelines but also China’s own laws and national standards pertaining to privacy protection, providing potential avenues for future redress.

News article:

It’s not clear whether the security flaws were intentional or not, but the report speculated that proper encryption might interfere with some of China’s ubiquitous online surveillance tools, especially systems that allow local authorities to snoop on phones using public wireless networks or internet cafes. Still, the researchers added that the flaws were probably unintentional, because the government will already be receiving data from the app, so there wouldn’t be a need to intercept the data as it was being transferred.

[…]

The app also included a list of 2,422 political keywords, described within the code as “illegalwords.txt,” that worked as a keyword censorship list, according to Citizen Lab. The researchers said the list appeared to be a latent function that the app’s chat and file transfer function was not actively using.

The US government has already advised athletes to leave their personal phones and laptops home and bring burners.

UK Government to Launch PR Campaign Undermining End-to-End Encryption

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/01/uk-government-to-launch-pr-campaign-undermining-end-to-end-encryption.html

Rolling Stone is reporting that the UK government has hired the M&C Saatchi advertising agency to launch an anti-encryption advertising campaign. Presumably they’ll lean heavily on the “think of the children!” rhetoric we’re seeing in this current wave of the crypto wars. The technical eavesdropping mechanisms have shifted to client-side scanning, which won’t actually help — but since that’s not really the point, it’s not argued on its merits.

Hardening the security of your AWS Elastic Beanstalk Application the Well-Architected way

Post Syndicated from Laurens Brinker original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/hardening-the-security-of-your-aws-elastic-beanstalk-application-the-well-architected-way/

Launching an application in AWS Elastic Beanstalk is straightforward. You define a name for your application, select the platform you want to run it on (for example, Ruby), and upload the source code. The default Elastic Beanstalk configuration is intended to be a starting point which prioritizes simplicity and ease of setup. This allows you to quickly deploy a web application on the AWS Cloud. For increased security of production applications, we recommend additional steps you can take to complement the default configuration.

In this post we will describe our recommendations, which are aligned with the AWS Well-Architected Framework, to help you harden the security posture of your Elastic Beanstalk applications. The Well-Architected Framework provides best practices to help you build secure, high-performing, resilient, and efficient infrastructure for your applications and workloads. Focusing on the Security pillar of the framework, we will walk you through additional configurations for increased network protection and protection of data at rest and in transit.

Introduction to Elastic Beanstalk

Elastic Beanstalk is an orchestration service that provisions and operates infrastructure in the AWS Cloud. You can use Elastic Beanstalk to deploy and manage applications in the cloud. Elastic Beanstalk supports many programming languages and frameworks, such as Java, .NET, PHP, Node.js, Python, Ruby, Go, and Docker. Elastic Beanstalk can help you decrease overhead by handling tasks such as resource provisioning, load balancing, auto scaling, and health monitoring. You only need to upload the application code. Elastic Beanstalk automatically integrates with other AWS services such as Amazon CloudWatch for logging and monitoring.

Target scenario for this post

This post shows you how to achieve the following things:

  • Launch a highly available Ruby application on Elastic Beanstalk.
  • Attach a MySQL database to the application using Amazon RDS.
  • Protect your sensitive data.
  • Align your application’s security configuration to the Security pillar of the Well-Architected Framework.

Figure 1: Target architecture for the two-tier web application deployed using Elastic Beanstalk

Figure 1: Target architecture for the two-tier web application deployed using Elastic Beanstalk

Figure 1 depicts the target architecture, which is a two-tier web application. Clients resolve the website’s domain name using the Domain Name System (DNS) service Amazon Route 53. An Application Load Balancer (ALB) is used to direct traffic to and from the Amazon EC2 instances which are running the web servers. The EC2 instances are deployed in an Auto Scaling group in private subnets. To ensure that clients can always access the application, the infrastructure is setup so that it can automatically deal with system failures and scale up when there’s an increase in demand. This is done by placing the EC2 instances in the Auto Scaling group across two Availability Zones for high availability. There is also an RDS MySQL database deployed in a private subnet, which is replicated to a stand-by instance in another Availability Zone for disaster recovery. Logs and Metrics are sent to CloudWatch, and Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) is used to store logs and source code. Finally, a Network Address Translation (NAT) gateway and Internet gateway manage inbound and outbound traffic to subnets.

The following sections focus on the four main security configurations numbered in Figure 1:

  1. Deploying the EC2 and RDS instances from the web and database layer in private subnets.
  2. Encrypting the logging and source code S3 bucket.
  3. Encrypting the RDS instance and its stand-by replica.
  4. Encrypting data in transit by using the HTTPS protocol.

Strengthening your Elastic Beanstalk application based on the Security pillar of the Well-Architected Framework

To harden the security of your Elastic Beanstalk application, you can build on top of the default setup to incorporate the following security best practices:

  1. Protect networks In the default Elastic Beanstalk setup, the EC2 instances are deployed together with an Application Load Balancer (ALB) in a public subnet. In most cases, EC2 instances do not need to be directly accessible from the internet and therefore should be placed in private subnets. The ALB should be left in the public subnet to provide a single entry-point for inbound traffic from external clients and forward this traffic to the instances over a private network. If these instances need to make a direct outbound connection to the internet, for example to call third-party APIs, we recommend creating a Network Address Translation (NAT) gateway in a public subnet, and adding a route from the private subnet where your instances are running to the NAT Gateway. Your instances can then send requests to the internet and receive corresponding responses through the NAT gateway, but the instances themselves will not be directly accessible from the internet. For more options on interactively accessing instances see AWS Systems Manager.
  2. Protect data at rest We recommend encrypting data at rest. Elastic Beanstalk does not encrypt data stored in Amazon S3 buckets by default, so you should modify the default setup to encrypt the bucket. Similarly, when you set up an RDS database directly through Elastic Beanstalk, you don’t have the option to encrypt the database, so you need to set up your database independently and enable encryption.
  3. Protect data in transit – Web traffic sent between your clients and the ALB over the internet should use HTTPS rather than HTTP. The HTTPS protocol creates an encrypted connection through TLS (Transport Layer Security) between client and server before sending any web traffic. The default setup in Elastic Beanstalk uses HTTP, so the choice to use HTTPS and how to enable it sits with the user. Setting up HTTPS can be done with SSL / TLS server certificates (X.509 certificates) which you manage inside AWS using AWS Certificate Manager or through an external provider. ALB supports TLS-termination, which means that it takes care of the encryption and decryption of the traffic communicated with clients, and then forwards the traffic to the instances over the AWS private network.

Implementing the recommended best practices for your application

To implement the best practices from the section above, you will take the following steps to launch your application, protect networks and to protect data at rest and in transit:

  1. Create your own VPC with public and private subnets.
  2. Create a highly-available Elastic Beanstalk application.
  3. Modify the configuration to deploy instances in private subnets.
  4. Encrypt the log and source code bucket.
  5. Launch an encrypted RDS instance.
  6. Set up encryption in-transit by using the HTTPS protocol.

Create your VPC with public and private subnets

  1. In the AWS Management Console, go to VPC, and select Launch VPC wizard.
  2. Select the VPC with Public and Private Subnets option on the left-hand side, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Launch VPC wizard

Figure 2: Launch VPC wizard

  1. Click Select.
  2. Adjust the VPC specifications as needed. Specify a CIDR range and a name for the VPC. For the private and public subnets, you need to additionally specify the subnets CIDR range as well as which Availability Zone they should be created in. In order for instances in the private subnet to access the internet, the set-up creates a NAT gateway that resides in the public subnet. In order to do that, you need to specify an Elastic IP ID. If you don’t have an Elastic IP yet, under the VPC console go to Elastic IP addresses, click on Allocate Elastic IP address and Allocate. Use the Allocation ID in the VPC wizard.
  3. Select Create VPC.
  4. Because the target architecture is highly available, another set of public and private subnets needs to be created and set to reside in a different Availability Zone from the subnets you configured in step 4. This is done by going to the Subnets section in the VPC Console. Click on Create subnet, select the VPC you just created, add a new subnet, making sure to assign it to a different Availability Zone. Press Add new subnet to add a second subnet on the same configuration page. When done, press Create subnet.
  5. By default, the subnets will use the main routing table, which will treat them as private subnets. In order to make one of the newly created subnets public, it needs to be added to the route table, which has a route to the Internet Gateway. Go to the Route Tables section in the VPC Console and find the route table associated with your newly created VPC, which has the route to the Internet Gateway. This should be the Route Table which has 1 explicit subnet association. Click on the Route Table’s ID, and verify that there’s a route to a target with the igw- prefix. Then, under the Subnet association tab, edit the explicit subnet associations to include the newly created subnet.

After this is done, you should have two public and two private subnets across two Availability Zones for your new VPC.

Create a highly available Elastic Beanstalk application

The following steps will show you how to create a highly available Elastic Beanstalk application.

  1. In the AWS Management Console, choose Elastic Beanstalk, and then, in the Get Started section, select Create Application.
  2. Provide a name for the application and define the platform it should run on. In our example, the platform is Ruby.
  3. Provide the source code for your web application or use the sample code provided in the Elastic Beanstalk setup console.
    • To use the sample code, select Sample Application.
    • To upload your own source code, in the Source code origin section, for Version label, enter the name of your application code, and then for Source code origin, choose Local file, select Choose File, and navigate to the file that you want to use, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Source code origin section of the Elastic Beanstalk console

Figure 3: Source code origin section of the Elastic Beanstalk console

  1. Select Configure more options
  2. Depending on your application’s needs, you can select a configuration preset that includes recommended values for several configurations. Select High Availability to include a load balancer and auto scaling for multiple Availability Zones.

Deploy your instances in private subnets

In this step, you will set up Elastic Beanstalk to deploy the Application Load Balancer in public subnets to provide a point of access for inbound traffic from the internet, and you deploy the EC2 instances in a private subnet.

While still in the Configure more options settings:

  1. In the Network section, select Edit, and then, from the dropdown list, select the VPC that you just created.
  2. To deploy your instances in private subnets, in the Load balancer settings section, for Load balancer subnets, check the box next to each public subnet, and in the Instance settings section, for Instance subnets, check the box next to each private subnet, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Elastic Beanstalk subnet settings for Load Balancer and instances

Figure 4: Elastic Beanstalk subnet settings for Load Balancer and instances

  1. Select Save.

Encrypt the log and source code bucket and block public access

After Elastic Beanstalk has created the application, you can encrypt the S3 bucket.

  1. Open the S3 console and choose the bucket that was created automatically as part of the Elastic Beanstalk setup. The bucket name will have the following structure: elasticbeanstalk-region-account-id.
  2. To encrypt the bucket, choose Properties, and then, for Default Encryption, select Edit, and for Server-side encryption, select Enable.
  3. For Encryption key type, you can use an S3-managed encryption key by selecting Amazon S3 key (SSE-S3). If you want more control over the keys used for encryption, select AWS Key Management Service key (SSE-KMS), which is an encryption key protected by AWS Key Management Service (KMS). Here, you can specify to use an AWS managed key or one of your own Customer managed keys from KMS. For more information on SSE-KMS, visit Protecting Data Using Server-Side Encryption with KMS keys Stored in AWS Key Management Service (SSE-KMS).
  4. Select Save changes.

Even though the bucket that was created by Elastic Beanstalk is non-public by default, we recommend to enable “S3 Block Public Access” at the account level or at least at the bucket level to prevent tampering or accidentally changing this setting in the future.

  1. In your S3 console, click on Block Public Access settings for this account.
  2. If Block all public access is not yet enabled, click on Edit, check the box next to Block all public access and click Save.
  3. Apart from that, you can also block public access at the bucket level. For this, click on the respective bucket, open the Permissions section and edit Block public access (bucket settings) similarly to how you did in step 2.

Launch an encrypted RDS instance

Elastic Beanstalk allows you to set up and run RDS instances in your Elastic Beanstalk environment. Until recently, the database was tied to the lifecycle of the Elastic Beanstalk environment, and its use was recommended to be limited to development and testing environments only. For example, if you previously launched an RDS instance using Elastic Beanstalk, and the Elastic Beanstalk environment was terminated, the RDS instance would also be deleted. As of October 6, 2021, Elastic Beanstalk now supports Database Decoupling, so that the database will persist when the environment is deleted.

However, Elastic Beanstalk currently does not allow you to set up encryption for your database. For this reason, this post shows you how to set up your Elastic Beanstalk application with a decoupled database, by creating the database directly in the RDS service, separate from your Elastic Beanstalk application. RDS allows you to encrypt your database.

Decoupling your database and setting it up directly through the RDS service in the AWS console will require additional steps for integration with your Elastic Beanstalk application, which this post will walk you through.

Note: If you are using the Elastic Beanstalk service to create your RDS instance, you can select one of three options:

  • The first option, enabled by selecting the Create snapshot retention option in the database settings in the Elastic Beanstalk console, makes sure that Elastic Beanstalk creates a snapshot of your database prior to termination. You can restore an existing snapshot of your database through the Elastic Beanstalk console. Bear in mind that there will be downtime of your database between snapshot creation and snapshot restore.
  • The second option, Retain, creates a decoupled database, which persists if the Elastic Beanstalk environment has been terminated.
  • The third option Delete removes the database upon termination.

In this step, you will create an encrypted RDS database, allow access to the database from your application’s instances only, and add the required environment variables to your application so you can use your database in the application.

  1. On the RDS service page in the console, select Create database.
  2. For the database creation method, select Standard create.
  3. For Engine options, choose MySQL and select the latest version.
  4. For Templates choose either the Dev/Test or Production template according to your use case.
  5. In the Settings section, provide a name to use as the database identifier and set a username and password.
  6. Select the appropriate DB instance class that meets your processing power and memory requirements.
  7. For Storage, select your storage type and allocate storage.
  8. If you need Multi-AZ deployment, in the Availability & durability section, choose Create a standby instance.
  9. In the Connectivity section, select the VPC that you created in the Create your VPC with public and private subnets section earlier in this blog post, and verify that Public access has been set to No. For VPC security group, choose Create new and provide a name to identify the group later on.
  10. In the Additional configuration section, under Encryption, choose Enable Encryption. You can choose the default AWS KMS key if you’re happy with AWS managing the keys, or provide a custom key if you want more control. Bear in mind that the encryption option cannot be changed after the database has been created.
  11. Leave the defaults for the remaining settings and select Create database.

After you set up the RDS database and your new Elastic Beanstalk application, you can add the database to your application.

  1. In the RDS console, go to your newly created RDS database and scroll down to Security group rules.
  2. Select the security group that has the CIDR/IP – Inbound type.
  3. Under Inbound rules, select the rule that is listed, and then select Edit inbound rules.
  4. Under the Source column, make sure Custom is selected, and in the search-box next to it, select the security group associated with your Elastic Beanstalk Auto Scaling group.

Important: As a security best practice, you should allow traffic to your RDS database from your instances only. Therefore, make sure the security group allows traffic only from the Auto Scaling group’s security group, and that it has no additional entries.

  1. To add the RDS details to the Elastic Beanstalk environment properties, go to your application’s environment in the Elastic Beanstalk service and navigate to Configuration > Software > Edit > Environment Properties. Add RDS_HOSTNAME, RDS_PORT, RDS_DB_NAME, RDS_USERNAME and RDS_PASSWORD as properties and provide the values that you used to set up the database.
  2. Restart the application by going back to your Elastic Beanstalk environment, and then under Environment actions, choose Restart app server(s).

After the server has restarted, you can access the RDS database in your web application by using the environment properties you set in the console, just as you would if you attached the database directly through the Elastic Beanstalk setup. For more information on using environment properties, visit Environment properties and other software settings.

The new database is now separate from your application and it is encrypted to provide data protection at rest.

Important: The environment properties, including the database username and password, are visible and stored in plain text in the Environment Properties in Elastic Beanstalk.

Depending on your security requirements, you can choose to use AWS Secrets Manager to protect your database credentials, which you can then fetch programmatically in your Elastic Beanstalk instance or through Elastic Beanstalk’s custom environment configuration files (.ebextensions). To learn more about using Secrets Manager to protect and rotate database credentials, see Rotate Amazon RDS database credentials automatically with AWS Secrets Manager. However, this will require additional configuration for Elastic Beanstalk and is beyond the scope of this post.

A second possibility is to use IAM database authentication, which allows you to use your Elastic Beanstalk’s EC2 IAM role to connect to your database. This method leverages short-lived authentication tokens rather than a static database password. In order to set this up, you need to enable IAM database authentication, create an IAM policy to allow IAM database access and create a database account for IAM authentication using the AWSAuthenticationPlugin (for MySQL). Authentication tokens are valid for 15 minutes, and if your web instances need to create a new database connection, or reconnect, authentication tokens will need to be refreshed if they have expired, otherwise the connection will be rejected.

For an implementation guide, check out How do I allow users to authenticate to an Amazon RDS MySQL DB instance using their IAM credentials. For Ruby applications, you can get the authentication token in your application by leveraging the auth_token_generator method in the Ruby aws-sdk.

Set up encryption in transit using the HTTPS protocol

In the Elastic Beanstalk architecture, you can encrypt data in transit at three connection points: from your clients to the load balancer, from the load balancer to the EC2 instances, and from the EC2 instances to the RDS database.

Securing the connection from clients to the ALB

You can use a custom domain name to use HTTPS for your Elastic Beanstalk environment and have your clients can connect securely to your environment. If you don’t have a domain name, you can assign a self-signed server certificate to your ALB to use HTTPS for development and testing purposes.

To secure the connection to your ALB, add a HTTPS listener for the traffic inbound port (typically 443) and attach an TLS / SSL server certificate (X.509 certificate). To generate certificates, use AWS Certificate Manager or third-party providers such as Let’s Encrypt. For a walkthrough on how to set up an HTTPS listener through the console or through .ebextensions configuration files, see the Configuring your Elastic Beanstalk environment’s load balancer to terminate HTTPS.

Securing the connection from the ALB to the EC2 instances

While securing the connection between clients and the ALB is enough for most applications, in some cases a complete end-to-end encryption may be required; for example, to comply with (external) regulations. To secure the connection from your ALB to your application running on an EC2 instance, you must use the .ebextensions configuration files to modify the software running on the instance. You then need to allow the HTTPS traffic to pass through from the ALB to your EC2 instance by allowing inbound traffic on port 443 on the instance’s security group. For a Ruby specific example, see Terminating HTTPS on EC2 instances running Ruby.

For a complete end-to-end encryption walkthrough, see How can I configure HTTPS for my Elastic Beanstalk environment?

Securing the RDS connection

To securely connect from your application to your RDS database, you can use SSL or TLS to encrypt the connection. You will need to download an RDS root certificate and require your application to use this certificate when connecting to the RDS instance to verify the RDS server certificate. For more information on how to download and use the root certificate to setup a secure RDS connection, see the Using SSL with a MySQL DB instance documentation page.

This post has shown you how to align your application with some of the security best practices of the Well-Architected Framework. After completing these steps, your architecture includes four key modifications to improve security:

  1. The EC2 and RDS instances are deployed in a private subnet.
  2. The logging and source code S3 bucket is encrypted.
  3. An encrypted RDS instance is attached.
  4. Encryption occurs in transit by using the HTTPS protocol.

Conclusion

In this post, we’ve covered the additional configuration you should be aware of to harden the security posture of your Elastic Beanstalk applications, aligning to the Security pillar of the Well-Architected Framework. The final setup you created uses a VPC and private subnets to allow internet access only to resources that require it, and provides encryption at rest and in transit using AWS Cloud Security services and secure protocols. The Well-Architected Framework describes additional concepts, design principles, and architectural best practices for designing and running workloads in the cloud. To learn more, see AWS Well-Architected.

 
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Laurens Brinker

Laurens Brinker

Laurens Brinker is an Associate Solutions Architect based in London who is part of the Security Community at AWS. Laurens joined AWS as part of the TechU Graduate program in 2020 and now helps customers running their workloads securely in the AWS Cloud. Outside of work, Laurens enjoys cycling, a casual game of chess, and building small web applications.

Katja Philipp

Katja Philipp

Katja Philipp is an Associate Solutions Architect based in Germany. With a background in M.Sc. Information Systems, she joined AWS in September 2020 with the TechU Graduate program. She enables her customers in the Power & Utilities vertical with best practices around their cloud journey. Katja is passionate about sustainability and how technology can be leveraged to solve current challenges for a better future.

Laura Verghote

Laura Verghote

Laura Verghote is an Associate Technical Trainer based in London, UK. With a background in electrical engineering, she joined AWS in September 2020 with the TechU Graduate program. She delivers a variety of technical trainings to AWS customers across EMEA.

Kimessha Paupamah

Kimessha Paupamah

Kimessha Paupamah is a ProServe Consultant based in South Africa. With a background in Computer Science, she joined AWS in September 2020 with the TechU Graduate program. She accelerates customer business outcomes through guidance on how to architect, design, develop and implement the AWS platform. Kimessha is passionate about enabling customers to build innovative solutions in the cloud.

Benjamin Richer

Benjamin Richer

Benjamin Richer is an Associate Solutions Architect based in Paris. With a background in Network & Telecom, he joined AWS in 2020 through the TechU Graduate Program. Currently working in the Digital Native Business segment he helps grown up Startups optimizing their workload in the Cloud.

New German Government is Pro-Encryption and Anti-Backdoors

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/12/new-german-government-is-pro-encryption-and-anti-backdoors.html

I hope this is true:

According to Jens Zimmermann, the German coalition negotiations had made it “quite clear” that the incoming government of the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens and the business-friendly liberal FDP would reject “the weakening of encryption, which is being attempted under the guise of the fight against child abuse” by the coalition partners.

Such regulations, which are already enshrined in the interim solution of the ePrivacy Regulation, for example, “diametrically contradict the character of the coalition agreement” because secure end-to-end encryption is guaranteed there, Zimmermann said.

Introducing backdoors would undermine this goal of the coalition agreement, he added.

I have written about this.

Migrate and secure your Windows PKI to AWS with AWS CloudHSM

Post Syndicated from Govindarajan Varadan original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/migrate-and-secure-your-windows-pki-to-aws-with-aws-cloudhsm/

AWS CloudHSM provides a cloud-based hardware security module (HSM) that enables you to easily generate and use your own encryption keys in AWS. Using CloudHSM as part of a Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) public key infrastructure (PKI) fortifies the security of your certificate authority (CA) private key and ensures the security of the trust hierarchy. In this blog post, we walk you through how to migrate your existing Microsoft AD CS CA private key to the HSM in a CloudHSM cluster.

The challenge

Organizations implement public key infrastructure (PKI) as an application to provide integrity and confidentiality between internal and customer-facing applications. A PKI provides encryption/decryption, message hashing, digital certificates, and digital signatures to ensure these security objectives are met. Microsoft AD CS is a popular choice for creating and managing a CA for enterprise applications such as Active Directory, Exchange, and Systems Center Configuration Manager. Moving your Microsoft AD CS to AWS as part of your overall migration plan allows you to continue to use your existing investment in Windows certificate auto enrollment for users and devices without disrupting existing workflows or requiring new certificates to be issued. However, when you migrate an on-premises infrastructure to the cloud, your security team may determine that storing private keys on the AD CS server’s disk is insufficient for protecting the private key that signs the certificates issued by the CA. Moving from storing private keys on the AD CS server’s disk to a hardware security module (HSM) can provide the added security required to maintain trust of the private keys.

This walkthrough shows you how to migrate your existing AD CS CA private key to the HSM in your CloudHSM cluster. The resulting configuration avoids the security concerns of using keys stored on your AD CS server, and uses the HSM to perform the cryptographic signing operations.

Prerequisites

For this walkthrough, you should have the following in place:

Migrating a domain

In this section, you will walk through migrating your AD CS environment to AWS by using your existing CA certificate and private key that will be secured in CloudHSM. In order to securely migrate the private key into the HSM, you will install the CloudHSM client and import the keys directly from the existing CA server.

This walkthrough includes the following steps:

  1. Create a crypto user (CU) account
  2. Import the CA private key into CloudHSM
  3. Export the CA certificate and database
  4. Configure and import the certificate into the new Windows CA server
  5. Install AD CS on the new server

The operations you perform on the HSM require the credentials of an HSM user. Each HSM user has a type that determines the operations you can perform when authenticated as that user. Next, you will create a crypto user (CU) account to use with your CA servers, to manage keys and to perform cryptographic operations.

To create the CU account

  1. From the on-premises CA server, use the following command to log in with the crypto officer (CO) account that you created when you activated the cluster. Be sure to replace <co_password> with your CO password.
    loginHSM CO admin <co_password>
    

  2. Use the following command to create the CU account. Replace <cu_user> and <cu_password> with the username and password you want to use for the CU.
    createUser CU <cu_user> <cu_password>
    

  3. Use the following command to set the login credentials for the HSM on your system and enable the AWS CloudHSM client for Windows to use key storage providers (KSPs) and Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) providers. Replace <cu_user> and <cu_password> with the username and password of the CU.
    set_cloudhsm_credentials.exe --username <cu_user> password <cu_password>
    

Now that you have the CloudHSM client installed and configured on the on-premises CA server, you can import the CA private key from the local server into your CloudHSM cluster.

To import the CA private key into CloudHSM

  1. Open an administrative command prompt and navigate to C:\Program Files\Amazon\CloudHSM.
  2. To identify the unique container name for your CA’s private key, enter certutil -store my to list all certificates stored in the local machine store. The CA certificate will be shown as follows:
    ================ Certificate 0 ================
    Serial Number: <certificate_serial_number>
    Issuer: CN=example-CA, DC=example, DC=com
     NotBefore: 6/25/2021 5:04 PM
     NotAfter: 6/25/2022 5:14 PM
    Subject: CN=example-CA-test3, DC=example, DC=com
    Certificate Template Name (Certificate Type): CA
    CA Version: V0.0
    Signature matches Public Key
    Root Certificate: Subject matches Issuer
    Template: CA, Root Certification Authority
    Cert Hash(sha1): cb7c09cd6c76d69d9682a31fbdbbe01c29cebd82
      Key Container = example-CA-test3
      Unique container name: <unique_container_name>
      Provider = Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider
    Signature test passed
    

  3. Verify that the key is backed by the Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider and make note of the <unique_container_name> from the output, to use it in the following steps.
  4. Use the following command to set the environment variable n3fips_password. Replace <cu_user> and <cu_password> with the username and password for the CU you created earlier for the CloudHSM cluster. This variable will be used by the import_key command in the next step.
    set n3fips_password=<cu_user>:<cu_password>
    

  5. Use the following import_key command to import the private key into the HSM. Replace <unique_container_name> with the value you noted earlier.
    import_key.exe -RSA "<unique_container_name>

The import_key command will report that the import was successful. At this point, your private key has been imported into the HSM, but the on-premises CA server will continue to run using the key stored locally.

The Active Directory Certificate Services Migration Guide for Windows Server 2012 R2 uses the Certification Authority snap-in to migrate the CA database, as well as the certificate and private key. Because you have already imported your private key into the HSM, next you will need to make a slight modification to this process and export the certificate manually, without its private key.

To export the CA certificate and database

  1. To open the Microsoft Management Console (MMC), open the Start menu and in the search field, enter MMC, and choose Enter.
  2. From the File menu, select Add/Remove Snapin.
  3. Select Certificates and choose Add.
  4. You will be prompted to select which certificate store to manage. Select Computer account and choose Next.
  5. Select Local Computer, choose Finish, then choose OK.
  6. In the left pane, choose Personal, then choose Certificates. In the center pane, locate your CA certificate, as shown in Figure 1.
     
    The MMC Certificates snap-in displays the Certificates directories for the local computer. The Personal Certificates location is open displaying the example-CA-test3 certificate.

    Figure 1: Microsoft Management Console Certificates snap-in

  7. Open the context (right-click) menu for the certificate, choose All Tasks, then choose Export.
  8. In the Certificate Export Wizard, choose Next, then choose No, do not export the private key.
  9. Under Select the format you want to use, select Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard – PKCS #7 format file (.p7b) and select Include all certificates in the certification path if possible, as shown in Figure 2.
     
    The Certificate Export Wizard window is displayed.  This windows is prompting for the selection of an export format.  The toggle is selected for Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard – PKCS #7 Certificates (.P7B) and the check box is marked to Include all certificates in the certification path if possible.

    Figure 2: Certificate Export Wizard

  10. Save the file in a location where you’ll be able to locate it later, so you will be able to copy it to the new CA server.
  11. From the Start menu, browse to Administrative Tools, then choose Certificate Authority.
  12. Open the context (right-click) menu for your CA and choose All Tasks, then choose Back up CA.
  13. In the Certificate Authority Backup Wizard, choose Next. For items to back up, select only Certificate database and certificate database log. Leave all other options unselected.
  14. Under Back up to this location, choose Browse and select a new empty folder to hold the backup files, which you will move to the new CA later.
  15. After the backup is complete, in the MMC, open the context (right-click) menu for your CA, choose All Tasks, then choose Stop service.

At this point, until you complete the migration, your CA will no longer be issuing new certificates.

To configure and import the certificate into the new Windows CA server

  1. Open a Remote Desktop session to the EC2 instance that you created in the prerequisite steps, which will serve as your new AD CS certificate authority.
  2. Copy the certificate (.p7b file) backup from the on-premises CA server to the EC2 instance.
  3. On your EC2 instance, locate the certificate you just copied, as shown in Figure 3. Open the certificate to start the import process.
     
    The Certificate Manager tool window shows the Certificates directory for the p7b file that was opened. The main window for this location is displaying the example-CA-test3 certificate.

    Figure 3: Certificate Manager tool

  4. Select Install Certificate. For Store Location, select Local Machine.
  5. Select Place the Certificates in the following store. Allowing Windows to place the certificate automatically will install it as a trusted root certificate, rather than a server certificate.
  6. Select Browse, select the Personal store, and then choose OK.
  7. Choose Next, then choose Finish to complete the certificate installation.

At this point, you’ve installed the public key and certificate from the on-premises CA server to your EC2-based Windows CA server. Next, you need to link this installed certificate with the private key, which is now stored on the CloudHSM cluster, in order to make it functional for signing issued certificates and CRLs.

To link the certificate with the private key

  1. Open an administrative command prompt and navigate to C:\Program Files\Amazon\CloudHSM.
  2. Use the following command to set the environment variable n3fips_password. Replace <cu_user> and <cu_password> with the username and password for the CU that you created earlier for the CloudHSM cluster. This variable will be used by the import_key command in the next step.
    set n3fips_password=<cu_user>:<cu_password>
    

  3. Use the following import_key command to represent all keys stored on the HSM in a new key container in the key storage provider. This step is necessary to allow the cryptography tools to see the CA private key that is stored on the HSM.
    import_key -from HSM -all
    

  4. Use the following Windows certutil command to find your certificate’s unique serial number.
    certutil -store my
    

    Take note of the CA certificate’s serial number.

  5. Use the following Windows certutil command to link the installed certificate with the private key stored on the HSM. Replace <certificate_serial_number> with the value noted in the previous step.
    certutil -repairstore my <certificate_serial_number>
    

  6. Enter the command certutil -store my. The CA certificate will be shown as follows. Verify that the certificate is now linked with the HSM-backed private key. Note that the private key is using the Cavium Key Store Provider. Also note the message Encryption test passed, which means that the private key is usable for encryption.
    ================ Certificate 0 ================
    Serial Number: <certificate_serial_number>
    Issuer: CN=example-CA, DC=example, DC=com
     NotBefore: 6/25/2021 5:04 PM
     NotAfter: 6/25/2022 5:14 PM
    Subject: CN=example-CA, DC=example, DC=com
    Certificate Template Name (Certificate Type): CA
    CA Version: V0.0
    Signature matches Public Key
    Root Certificate: Subject matches Issuer
    Template: CA, Root Certification Authority
    Cert Hash(sha1): cb7c09cd6c76d69d9682a31fbdbbe01c29cebd82
      Key Container = PRV_KEY_IMPORT-6-9-7e5cde
      Provider = Cavium Key Storage Provider
    Private key is NOT exportable
    Encryption test passed
    

Now that your CA certificate and key materials are in place, you are ready to setup your EC2 instance as a CA server.

To install AD CS on the new server

  1. In Microsoft’s documentation to Install the Certificate Authority role on your new EC2 instance, follow steps 1-8. Do not complete the remaining steps, because you will be configuring the CA to use the existing HSM backed certificate and private-key instead of generating a new key.
  2. In Confirm installation selections, select Install.
  3. After your installation is complete, Server Manager will show a notification banner prompting you to configure AD CS. Select Configure Active Directory Certificate Services from this prompt.
  4. Select either Standalone or Enterprise CA installation, based upon the configuration of your on-premises CA.
  5. Select Use Existing Certificate and Private Key and browse to select the CA certificate imported from your on-premises CA server.
  6. Select Next and verify your location for the certificate database files.
  7. Select Finish to complete the wizard.
  8. To restore the CA database backup, from the Start menu, browse to Administrative Tools, then choose Certificate Authority.
  9. Open the context (right-click) menu for the certificate authority and choose All Tasks, then choose Restore CA. Browse to and select the database backup that you copied from the on-premises CA server.

Review the Active Directory Certificate Services Migration Guide for Windows Server 2012 R2 to complete migration of your remaining Microsoft Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) components. Depending on your existing CA environment, these steps may include establishing new CRL and AIA endpoints, configuring Windows Routing and Remote Access to use the new CA, or configuring certificate auto enrollment for Windows clients.

Conclusion

In this post, we walked you through migrating an on-premises Microsoft AD CS environment to an AWS environment that uses AWS CloudHSM to secure the CA private key. By migrating your existing Windows PKI backed by AWS CloudHSM, you can continue to use your Windows certificate auto enrollment for users and devices with your private key secured in a dedicated HSM.

For more information about setting up and managing CloudHSM, see Getting Started with AWS CloudHSM and the AWS Security Blog post CloudHSM best practices to maximize performance and avoid common configuration pitfalls.

If you have feedback about this blog post, submit comments in the Comments section below. You can also start a new thread on the AWS CloudHSM forum to get answers from the community.

Want more AWS Security how-to content, news, and feature announcements? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

Govindarajan Varadan

Govindarajan is a senior solutions architect at AWS based out of Silicon Valley in California. He works with AWS customers to help them achieve their business objectives by innovating at scale, modernizing their applications, and adopting game-changing technologies like AI/ML.

Author

Brian Benscoter

Brian is a senior solutions architect at AWS with a passion for governance at scale and is based in Charlotte, NC. Brian works with enterprise AWS customers to help them design, deploy, and scale applications to achieve their business goals.

Author

Axel Larsson

Axel is an enterprise solutions architect at AWS. He has helped several companies migrate to AWS and modernize their architecture. Axel is passionate about helping organizations establish a solid foundation in the cloud, enabled by security best practices.

How US federal agencies can use AWS to encrypt data at rest and in transit

Post Syndicated from Robert George original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-us-federal-agencies-can-use-aws-to-encrypt-data-at-rest-and-in-transit/

This post is part of a series about how Amazon Web Services (AWS) can help your US federal agency meet the requirements of the President’s Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity. You will learn how you can use AWS information security practices to meet the requirement to encrypt your data at rest and in transit, to the maximum extent possible.

Encrypt your data at rest in AWS

Data at rest represents any data that you persist in non-volatile storage for any duration in your workload. This includes block storage, object storage, databases, archives, IoT devices, and any other storage medium on which data is persisted. Protecting your data at rest reduces the risk of unauthorized access when encryption and appropriate access controls are implemented.

AWS KMS provides a streamlined way to manage keys used for at-rest encryption. It integrates with AWS services to simplify using your keys to encrypt data across your AWS workloads. It uses hardware security modules that have been validated under FIPS 140-2 to protect your keys. You choose the level of access control that you need, including the ability to share encrypted resources between accounts and services. AWS KMS logs key usage to AWS CloudTrail to provide an independent view of who accessed encrypted data, including AWS services that are using keys on your behalf. As of this writing, AWS KMS integrates with 81 different AWS services. Here are details on recommended encryption for workloads using some key services:

You can use AWS KMS to encrypt other data types including application data with client-side encryption. A client-side application or JavaScript encrypts data before uploading it to S3 or other storage resources. As a result, uploaded data is protected in transit and at rest. Customer options for client-side encryption include the AWS SDK for KMS, the AWS Encryption SDK, and use of third-party encryption tools.

You can also use AWS Secrets Manager to encrypt application passwords, connection strings, and other secrets. Database credentials, resource names, and other sensitive data used in AWS Lambda functions can be encrypted and accessed at run time. This increases the security of these secrets and allows for easier credential rotation.

KMS HSMs are FIPS 140-2 validated and accessible using FIPS validated endpoints. Agencies with additional requirements that require a FIPS 140-3 validated hardware security module (HSM) (for example, for securing third-party secrets managers) can use AWS CloudHSM.

For more information about AWS KMS and key management best practices, visit these resources:

Encrypt your data in transit in AWS

In addition to encrypting data at rest, agencies must also encrypt data in transit. AWS provides a variety of solutions to help agencies encrypt data in transit and enforce this requirement.

First, all network traffic between AWS data centers is transparently encrypted at the physical layer. This data-link layer encryption includes traffic within an AWS Region as well as between Regions. Additionally, all traffic within a virtual private cloud (VPC) and between peered VPCs is transparently encrypted at the network layer when you are using supported Amazon EC2 instance types. Customers can choose to enable Transport Layer Security (TLS) for the applications they build on AWS using a variety of services. All AWS service endpoints support TLS to create a secure HTTPS connection to make API requests.

AWS offers several options for agency-managed infrastructure within the AWS Cloud that needs to terminate TLS. These options include load balancing services (for example, Elastic Load Balancing, Network Load Balancer, and Application Load Balancer), Amazon CloudFront (a content delivery network), and Amazon API Gateway. Each of these endpoint services enable customers to upload their digital certificates for the TLS connection. Digital certificates then need to be managed appropriately to account for expiration and rotation requirements. AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) simplifies generating, distributing, and rotating digital certificates. ACM offers publicly trusted certificates that can be used in AWS services that require certificates to terminate TLS connections to the internet. ACM also provides the ability to create a private certificate authority (CA) hierarchy that can integrate with existing on-premises CAs to automatically generate, distribute, and rotate certificates to secure internal communication among customer-managed infrastructure.

Finally, you can encrypt communications between your EC2 instances and other AWS resources that are connected to your VPC, such as Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS) databasesAmazon Elastic File System (Amazon EFS) file systemsAmazon S3Amazon DynamoDBAmazon Redshift, Amazon EMR, Amazon OpenSearch Service, Amazon ElasticCache for RedisAmazon FSx Windows File Server, AWS Direct Connect (DX) MACsec, and more.

Conclusion

This post has reviewed services that are used to encrypt data at rest and in transit, following the Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity. I discussed the use of AWS KMS to manage encryption keys that handle the management of keys for at-rest encryption, as well as the use of ACM to manage certificates that protect data in transit.

Next steps

To learn more about how AWS can help you meet the requirements of the executive order, see the other posts in this series:

Subscribe to the AWS Public Sector Blog newsletter to get the latest in AWS tools, solutions, and innovations from the public sector delivered to your inbox, or contact us.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

Want more AWS Security how-to content, news, and feature announcements? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

Robert George

Robert is a Solutions Architect on the Worldwide Public Sector (WWPS) team who works with customers to design secure, high-performing, and cost-effective systems in the AWS Cloud. He has previously worked in cybersecurity roles focused on designing security architectures, securing enterprise systems, and leading incident response teams for highly regulated environments.

Zoom Lied about End-to-End Encryption

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/08/zoom-lied-about-end-to-end-encryption.html

The facts aren’t news, but Zoom will pay $85M — to the class-action attorneys, and to users — for lying to users about end-to-end encryption, and for giving user data to Facebook and Google without consent.

The proposed settlement would generally give Zoom users $15 or $25 each and was filed Saturday at US District Court for the Northern District of California. It came nine months after Zoom agreed to security improvements and a “prohibition on privacy and security misrepresentations” in a settlement with the Federal Trade Commission, but the FTC settlement didn’t include compensation for users.

Paragon: Yet Another Cyberweapons Arms Manufacturer

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/08/paragon-yet-another-cyberweapons-arms-manufacturer.html

Forbes has the story:

Paragon’s product will also likely get spyware critics and surveillance experts alike rubbernecking: It claims to give police the power to remotely break into encrypted instant messaging communications, whether that’s WhatsApp, Signal, Facebook Messenger or Gmail, the industry sources said. One other spyware industry executive said it also promises to get longer-lasting access to a device, even when it’s rebooted.

[…]

Two industry sources said they believed Paragon was trying to set itself apart further by promising to get access to the instant messaging applications on a device, rather than taking complete control of everything on a phone. One of the sources said they understood that Paragon’s spyware exploits the protocols of end-to-end encrypted apps, meaning it would hack into messages via vulnerabilities in the core ways in which the software operates.

Read that last sentence again: Paragon uses unpatched zero-day exploits in the software to hack messaging apps.

The European Space Agency Launches Hackable Satellite

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/08/the-european-space-agency-launches-hackable-satellite.html

Of course this is hackable:

A sophisticated telecommunications satellite that can be completely repurposed while in space has launched.

[…]

Because the satellite can be reprogrammed in orbit, it can respond to changing demands during its lifetime.

[…]

The satellite can detect and characterise any rogue emissions, enabling it to respond dynamically to accidental interference or intentional jamming.

We can assume strong encryption, and good key management. Still, seems like a juicy target for other governments.

Storing Encrypted Photos in Google’s Cloud

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/07/storing-encrypted-photos-in-googles-cloud.html

New paper: “Encrypted Cloud Photo Storage Using Google Photos“:

Abstract: Cloud photo services are widely used for persistent, convenient, and often free photo storage, which is especially useful for mobile devices. As users store more and more photos in the cloud, significant privacy concerns arise because even a single compromise of a user’s credentials give attackers unfettered access to all of the user’s photos. We have created Easy Secure Photos (ESP) to enable users to protect their photos on cloud photo services such as Google Photos. ESP introduces a new client-side encryption architecture that includes a novel format-preserving image encryption algorithm, an encrypted thumbnail display mechanism, and a usable key management system. ESP encrypts image data such that the result is still a standard format image like JPEG that is compatible with cloud photo services. ESP efficiently generates and displays encrypted thumbnails for fast and easy browsing of photo galleries from trusted user devices. ESP’s key management makes it simple to authorize multiple user devices to view encrypted image content via a process similar to device pairing, but using the cloud photo service as a QR code communication channel. We have implemented ESP in a popular Android photos app for use with Google Photos and demonstrate that it is easy to use and provides encryption functionality transparently to users, maintains good interactive performance and image quality while providing strong privacy guarantees, and retains the sharing and storage benefits of Google Photos without any changes to the cloud service