Tag Archives: encryption

Russia is Banning Telegram

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/04/russia_is_banni.html

Russia has banned the secure messaging app Telegram. It’s making an absolute mess of the ban — blocking 16 million IP addresses, many belonging to the Amazon and Google clouds — and it’s not even clear that it’s working. But, more importantly, I’m not convinced Telegram is secure in the first place.

Such a weird story. If you want secure messaging, use Signal. If you’re concerned that having Signal on your phone will itself arouse suspicion, use WhatsApp.

Announcing the new AWS Certified Security – Specialty exam

Post Syndicated from Janna Pellegrino original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/announcing-the-new-aws-certified-security-specialty-exam/

Good news for cloud security experts: following our most popular beta exam ever, the AWS Certified Security – Specialty exam is here. This new exam allows experienced cloud security professionals to demonstrate and validate their knowledge of how to secure the AWS platform.

About the exam
The security exam covers incident response, logging and monitoring, infrastructure security, identity and access management, and data protection. The exam is open to anyone who currently holds a Cloud Practitioner or Associate-level certification. We recommend candidates have five years of IT security experience designing and implementing security solutions, and at least two years of hands-on experience securing AWS workloads.

The exam validates:

  • An understanding of specialized data classifications and AWS data protection mechanisms.
  • An understanding of data encryption methods and AWS mechanisms to implement them.
  • An understanding of secure Internet protocols and AWS mechanisms to implement them.
  • A working knowledge of AWS security services and features of services to provide a secure production environment.
  • Competency gained from two or more years of production deployment experience using AWS security services and features.
  • Ability to make trade-off decisions with regard to cost, security, and deployment complexity given a set of application requirements.
  • An understanding of security operations and risk.

Learn more and register >>

How to prepare
We have training and other resources to help you prepare for the exam:

AWS Training (aws.amazon.com/training)

Additional Resources

Learn more and register >>

Please contact us if you have questions about exam registration.

Good luck!

Announcing the new AWS Certified Security – Specialty exam

Post Syndicated from Ozlem Yilmaz original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/announcing-the-new-aws-certified-security-specialty-exam/

Good news for cloud security experts: the AWS Certified Security — Specialty exam is here. This new exam allows experienced cloud security professionals to demonstrate and validate their knowledge of how to secure the AWS platform.

About the exam

The security exam covers incident response, logging and monitoring, infrastructure security, identity and access management, and data protection. The exam is open to anyone who currently holds a Cloud Practitioner or Associate-level certification. We recommend candidates have five years of IT security experience designing and implementing security solutions, and at least two years of hands-on experience securing AWS workloads.

The exam validates your understanding of:

  • Specialized data classifications and AWS data protection mechanisms
  • Data encryption methods and AWS mechanisms to implement them
  • Secure Internet protocols and AWS mechanisms to implement them
  • AWS security services and features of services to provide a secure production environment
  • Making tradeoff decisions with regard to cost, security, and deployment complexity given a set of application requirements
  • Security operations and risk

How to prepare

We have training and other resources to help you prepare for the exam.

AWS Training that includes:

Additional Resources

Learn more and register here, and please contact us if you have questions about exam registration.

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Oblivious DNS

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/04/oblivious_dns.html

Interesting idea:

…we present Oblivious DNS (ODNS), which is a new design of the DNS ecosystem that allows current DNS servers to remain unchanged and increases privacy for data in motion and at rest. In the ODNS system, both the client is modified with a local resolver, and there is a new authoritative name server for .odns. To prevent an eavesdropper from learning information, the DNS query must be encrypted; the client generates a request for www.foo.com, generates a session key k, encrypts the requested domain, and appends the TLD domain .odns, resulting in {www.foo.com}k.odns. The client forwards this, with the session key encrypted under the .odns authoritative server’s public key ({k}PK) in the “Additional Information” record of the DNS query to the recursive resolver, which then forwards it to the authoritative name server for .odns. The authoritative server decrypts the session key with his private key, and then subsequently decrypts the requested domain with the session key. The authoritative server then forwards the DNS request to the appropriate name server, acting as a recursive resolver. While the name servers see incoming DNS requests, they do not know which clients they are coming from; additionally, an eavesdropper cannot connect a client with her corresponding DNS queries.

News article.

Telegram Founder Pledges Millions in Bitcoin For VPNs and “Digital Resistance”

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/telegram-founder-pledges-millions-in-bitcoin-for-vpns-and-digital-resistance-180418/

Starting yesterday, Russia went to war with free cross-platform messaging app Telegram. Authorities including the FSB wanted access to Telegram’s encryption keys, but the service refused to hand them over.

As a result, the service – which serviced 200,000,000 people in March alone – came under massive attack. Supported by a court ruling obtained last Friday, authorities ordered ISPs to block huge numbers of IP addresses in an effort to shut Telegram down.

Amazon and Google, whose services Telegram uses, were both hit with censorship measures, with around 1.8 million IP addresses belonging to the Internet giants blocked in an initial wave of action. But the government was just getting warmed up.

In an updated posted by Pavel Durov to Twitter from Switzerland late last night, the Telegram founder confirmed that Russia had massively stepped up the fight against his encrypted messaging platform.

Of course, 15 million IP addresses is a huge volume, particularly since ‘just’ 14 million of Telegram’s users are located in Russia – that’s more than one IP address for each of them. As a result, there are reports of completed unrelated services being affected by the ban, which is to be expected given its widespread nature. But Russia doesn’t want to stop there.

According to Reuters, local telecoms watchdog Rozcomnadzor asked both Google and Apple [Update: and APKMirror] to remove Telegram from their app stores, to prevent local citizens from gaining access to the software itself. It is unclear whether either company intends to comply but as yet, neither has responded publicly nor taken any noticeable action.

An announcement from Durov last night thanked the companies for not complying with the Russian government’s demands, noting that the efforts so far had proven mostly futile.

“Despite the ban, we haven’t seen a significant drop in user engagement so far, since Russians tend to bypass the ban with VPNs and proxies. We also have been relying on third-party cloud services to remain partly available for our users there,” Durov wrote on Telegram.

“Thank you for your support and loyalty, Russian users of Telegram. Thank you, Apple, Google, Amazon, Microsoft – for not taking part in political censorship.”

Durov noted that Russia accounts for around 7% of Telegram’s userbase, a figure that could be compensated for with organic growth in just a couple of months, even if Telegram lost access to the entire market. However, the action only appears to have lit a fire under the serial entrepreneur, who now has declared a war of his own against censorship.

“To support internet freedoms in Russia and elsewhere I started giving out bitcoin grants to individuals and companies who run socks5 proxies and VPN,” Durov said.

“I am happy to donate millions of dollars this year to this cause, and hope that other people will follow. I called this Digital Resistance – a decentralized movement standing for digital freedoms and progress globally.”

As founder of not only Telegram but also vKontakte, Russia’s answer to Facebook, Durov is a force to be reckoned with. As such, his promises are unlikely to be hollow ones. While Russia has drawn a line in the sand on encryption, it appears to have energized Durov to take a stand, one that could have a positive effect on anti-censorship measures both in Russia and further afield.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

Russia’s Encryption War: 1.8m Google & Amazon IPs Blocked to Silence Telegram

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/russias-encryption-war-1-8m-google-amazon-ips-blocked-to-silence-telegram-180417/

The rules in Russia are clear. Entities operating an encrypted messaging service need to register with the authorities. They also need to hand over their encryption keys so that if law enforcement sees fit, users can be spied on.

Free cross-platform messaging app Telegram isn’t playing ball. An impressive 200,000,000 people used the software in March (including a growing number for piracy purposes) and founder Pavel Durov says he will not compromise their security, despite losing a lawsuit against the Federal Security Service which compels him to do so.

“Telegram doesn’t have shareholders or advertisers to report to. We don’t do deals with marketers, data miners or government agencies. Since the day we launched in August 2013 we haven’t disclosed a single byte of our users’ private data to third parties,” Durov said.

“Above all, we at Telegram believe in people. We believe that humans are inherently intelligent and benevolent beings that deserve to be trusted; trusted with freedom to share their thoughts, freedom to communicate privately, freedom to create tools. This philosophy defines everything we do.”

But by not handing over its keys, Telegram is in trouble with Russia. The FSB says it needs access to Telegram messages to combat terrorism so, in response to its non-compliance, telecoms watchdog Rozcomnadzor filed a lawsuit to degrade Telegram via web-blocking. Last Friday, that process ended in the state’s favor.

After an 18-minute hearing, a Moscow court gave the go-ahead for Telegram to be banned in Russia. The hearing was scheduled just the day before, giving Telegram little time to prepare. In protest, its lawyers didn’t even turn up to argue the company’s position.

Instead, Durov took to his VKontakte account to announce that Telegram would take counter-measures.

“Telegram will use built-in methods to bypass blocks, which do not require actions from users, but 100% availability of the service without a VPN is not guaranteed,” Durov wrote.

Telegram can appeal the blocking decision but Russian authorities aren’t waiting around for a response. They are clearly prepared to match Durov’s efforts, no matter what the cost.

In instructions sent out yesterday nationwide, Rozomnadzor ordered ISPs to block Telegram. The response was immediate and massive. Telegram was using both Amazon and Google to provide service to its users so, within hours, huge numbers of IP addresses belonging to both companies were targeted.

Initially, 655,352 Amazon IP addresses were placed on Russia’s nationwide blacklist. It was later reported that a further 131,000 IP addresses were added to that total. But the Russians were just getting started.

Servers.ru reports that a further 1,048,574 IP addresses belonging to Google were also targeted Monday. Rozcomnadzor said the court ruling against Telegram compelled it to take whatever action is needed to take Telegram down but with at least 1,834,996 addresses now confirmed blocked, it remains unclear what effect it’s had on the service.

Friday’s court ruling states that restrictions against Telegram can be lifted provided that the service hands over its encryption keys to the FSB. However, Durov responded by insisting that “confidentiality is not for sale, and human rights should not be compromised because of fear or greed.”

But of course, money is still part of the Telegram equation. While its business model in terms of privacy stands in stark contrast to that of Facebook, Telegram is also involved in the world’s biggest initial coin offering (ICO). According to media reports, it has raised $1.7 billion in pre-sales thus far.

This week’s action against Telegram is the latest in Russia’s war on ‘unauthorized’ encryption.

At the end of March, authorities suggested that around 15 million IP addresses (13.5 million belonging to Amazon) could be blocked to target chat software Zello. While those measures were averted, a further 500 domains belonging to Google were caught in the dragnet.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and more. We also have VPN reviews, discounts, offers and coupons.

Now You Can Create Encrypted Amazon EBS Volumes by Using Your Custom Encryption Keys When You Launch an Amazon EC2 Instance

Post Syndicated from Nishit Nagar original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/create-encrypted-amazon-ebs-volumes-custom-encryption-keys-launch-amazon-ec2-instance-2/

Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) offers an encryption solution for your Amazon EBS volumes so you don’t have to build, maintain, and secure your own infrastructure for managing encryption keys for block storage. Amazon EBS encryption uses AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) customer master keys (CMKs) when creating encrypted Amazon EBS volumes, providing you all the benefits associated with using AWS KMS. You can specify either an AWS managed CMK or a customer-managed CMK to encrypt your Amazon EBS volume. If you use a customer-managed CMK, you retain granular control over your encryption keys, such as having AWS KMS rotate your CMK every year. To learn more about creating CMKs, see Creating Keys.

In this post, we demonstrate how to create an encrypted Amazon EBS volume using a customer-managed CMK when you launch an EC2 instance from the EC2 console, AWS CLI, and AWS SDK.

Creating an encrypted Amazon EBS volume from the EC2 console

Follow these steps to launch an EC2 instance from the EC2 console with Amazon EBS volumes that are encrypted by customer-managed CMKs:

  1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and open the EC2 console.
  2. Select Launch instance, and then, in Step 1 of the wizard, select an Amazon Machine Image (AMI).
  3. In Step 2 of the wizard, select an instance type, and then provide additional configuration details in Step 3. For details about configuring your instances, see Launching an Instance.
  4. In Step 4 of the wizard, specify additional EBS volumes that you want to attach to your instances.
  5. To create an encrypted Amazon EBS volume, first add a new volume by selecting Add new volume. Leave the Snapshot column blank.
  6. In the Encrypted column, select your CMK from the drop-down menu. You can also paste the full Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of your custom CMK key ID in this box. To learn more about finding the ARN of a CMK, see Working with Keys.
  7. Select Review and Launch. Your instance will launch with an additional Amazon EBS volume with the key that you selected. To learn more about the launch wizard, see Launching an Instance with Launch Wizard.

Creating Amazon EBS encrypted volumes from the AWS CLI or SDK

You also can use RunInstances to launch an instance with additional encrypted Amazon EBS volumes by setting Encrypted to true and adding kmsKeyID along with the actual key ID in the BlockDeviceMapping object, as shown in the following command:

$> aws ec2 run-instances –image-id ami-b42209de –count 1 –instance-type m4.large –region us-east-1 –block-device-mappings file://mapping.json

In this example, mapping.json describes the properties of the EBS volume that you want to create:


{
"DeviceName": "/dev/sda1",
"Ebs": {
"DeleteOnTermination": true,
"VolumeSize": 100,
"VolumeType": "gp2",
"Encrypted": true,
"kmsKeyID": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:012345678910:key/abcd1234-a123-456a-a12b-a123b4cd56ef"
}
}

You can also launch instances with additional encrypted EBS data volumes via an Auto Scaling or Spot Fleet by creating a launch template with the above BlockDeviceMapping. For example:

$> aws ec2 create-launch-template –MyLTName –image-id ami-b42209de –count 1 –instance-type m4.large –region us-east-1 –block-device-mappings file://mapping.json

To learn more about launching an instance with the AWS CLI or SDK, see the AWS CLI Command Reference.

In this blog post, we’ve demonstrated a single-step, streamlined process for creating Amazon EBS volumes that are encrypted under your CMK when you launch your EC2 instance, thereby streamlining your instance launch workflow. To start using this functionality, navigate to the EC2 console.

If you have feedback about this blog post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this blog post, start a new thread on the Amazon EC2 forum or contact AWS Support.

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Rotate Amazon RDS database credentials automatically with AWS Secrets Manager

Post Syndicated from Apurv Awasthi original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/rotate-amazon-rds-database-credentials-automatically-with-aws-secrets-manager/

Recently, we launched AWS Secrets Manager, a service that makes it easier to rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials, API keys, and other secrets throughout their lifecycle. You can configure Secrets Manager to rotate secrets automatically, which can help you meet your security and compliance needs. Secrets Manager offers built-in integrations for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Amazon Aurora on Amazon RDS, and can rotate credentials for these databases natively. You can control access to your secrets by using fine-grained AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies. To retrieve secrets, employees replace plaintext secrets with a call to Secrets Manager APIs, eliminating the need to hard-code secrets in source code or update configuration files and redeploy code when secrets are rotated.

In this post, I introduce the key features of Secrets Manager. I then show you how to store a database credential for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS and how your applications can access this secret. Finally, I show you how to configure Secrets Manager to rotate this secret automatically.

Key features of Secrets Manager

These features include the ability to:

  • Rotate secrets safely. You can configure Secrets Manager to rotate secrets automatically without disrupting your applications. Secrets Manager offers built-in integrations for rotating credentials for Amazon RDS databases for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Amazon Aurora. You can extend Secrets Manager to meet your custom rotation requirements by creating an AWS Lambda function to rotate other types of secrets. For example, you can create an AWS Lambda function to rotate OAuth tokens used in a mobile application. Users and applications retrieve the secret from Secrets Manager, eliminating the need to email secrets to developers or update and redeploy applications after AWS Secrets Manager rotates a secret.
  • Secure and manage secrets centrally. You can store, view, and manage all your secrets. By default, Secrets Manager encrypts these secrets with encryption keys that you own and control. Using fine-grained IAM policies, you can control access to secrets. For example, you can require developers to provide a second factor of authentication when they attempt to retrieve a production database credential. You can also tag secrets to help you discover, organize, and control access to secrets used throughout your organization.
  • Monitor and audit easily. Secrets Manager integrates with AWS logging and monitoring services to enable you to meet your security and compliance requirements. For example, you can audit AWS CloudTrail logs to see when Secrets Manager rotated a secret or configure AWS CloudWatch Events to alert you when an administrator deletes a secret.
  • Pay as you go. Pay for the secrets you store in Secrets Manager and for the use of these secrets; there are no long-term contracts or licensing fees.

Get started with Secrets Manager

Now that you’re familiar with the key features, I’ll show you how to store the credential for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS. To demonstrate how to retrieve and use the secret, I use a python application running on Amazon EC2 that requires this database credential to access the MySQL instance. Finally, I show how to configure Secrets Manager to rotate this database credential automatically. Let’s get started.

Phase 1: Store a secret in Secrets Manager

  1. Open the Secrets Manager console and select Store a new secret.
     
    Secrets Manager console interface
     
  2. I select Credentials for RDS database because I’m storing credentials for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS. For this example, I store the credentials for the database superuser. I start by securing the superuser because it’s the most powerful database credential and has full access over the database.
     
    Store a new secret interface with Credentials for RDS database selected
     

    Note: For this example, you need permissions to store secrets in Secrets Manager. To grant these permissions, you can use the AWSSecretsManagerReadWriteAccess managed policy. Read the AWS Secrets Manager Documentation for more information about the minimum IAM permissions required to store a secret.

  3. Next, I review the encryption setting and choose to use the default encryption settings. Secrets Manager will encrypt this secret using the Secrets Manager DefaultEncryptionKeyDefaultEncryptionKey in this account. Alternatively, I can choose to encrypt using a customer master key (CMK) that I have stored in AWS KMS.
     
    Select the encryption key interface
     
  4. Next, I view the list of Amazon RDS instances in my account and select the database this credential accesses. For this example, I select the DB instance mysql-rds-database, and then I select Next.
     
    Select the RDS database interface
     
  5. In this step, I specify values for Secret Name and Description. For this example, I use Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database as the name and enter a description of this secret, and then select Next.
     
    Secret Name and description interface
     
  6. For the next step, I keep the default setting Disable automatic rotation because my secret is used by my application running on Amazon EC2. I’ll enable rotation after I’ve updated my application (see Phase 2 below) to use Secrets Manager APIs to retrieve secrets. I then select Next.

    Note: If you’re storing a secret that you’re not using in your application, select Enable automatic rotation. See our AWS Secrets Manager getting started guide on rotation for details.

     
    Configure automatic rotation interface
     

  7. Review the information on the next screen and, if everything looks correct, select Store. We’ve now successfully stored a secret in Secrets Manager.
  8. Next, I select See sample code.
     
    The See sample code button
     
  9. Take note of the code samples provided. I will use this code to update my application to retrieve the secret using Secrets Manager APIs.
     
    Python sample code
     

Phase 2: Update an application to retrieve secret from Secrets Manager

Now that I have stored the secret in Secrets Manager, I update my application to retrieve the database credential from Secrets Manager instead of hard coding this information in a configuration file or source code. For this example, I show how to configure a python application to retrieve this secret from Secrets Manager.

  1. I connect to my Amazon EC2 instance via Secure Shell (SSH).
  2. Previously, I configured my application to retrieve the database user name and password from the configuration file. Below is the source code for my application.
    import MySQLdb
    import config

    def no_secrets_manager_sample()

    # Get the user name, password, and database connection information from a config file.
    database = config.database
    user_name = config.user_name
    password = config.password

    # Use the user name, password, and database connection information to connect to the database
    db = MySQLdb.connect(database.endpoint, user_name, password, database.db_name, database.port)

  3. I use the sample code from Phase 1 above and update my application to retrieve the user name and password from Secrets Manager. This code sets up the client and retrieves and decrypts the secret Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database. I’ve added comments to the code to make the code easier to understand.
    # Use the code snippet provided by Secrets Manager.
    import boto3
    from botocore.exceptions import ClientError

    def get_secret():
    #Define the secret you want to retrieve
    secret_name = "Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database"
    #Define the Secrets mManager end-point your code should use.
    endpoint_url = "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
    region_name = "us-east-1"

    #Setup the client
    session = boto3.session.Session()
    client = session.client(
    service_name='secretsmanager',
    region_name=region_name,
    endpoint_url=endpoint_url
    )

    #Use the client to retrieve the secret
    try:
    get_secret_value_response = client.get_secret_value(
    SecretId=secret_name
    )
    #Error handling to make it easier for your code to tolerate faults
    except ClientError as e:
    if e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'ResourceNotFoundException':
    print("The requested secret " + secret_name + " was not found")
    elif e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'InvalidRequestException':
    print("The request was invalid due to:", e)
    elif e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'InvalidParameterException':
    print("The request had invalid params:", e)
    else:
    # Decrypted secret using the associated KMS CMK
    # Depending on whether the secret was a string or binary, one of these fields will be populated
    if 'SecretString' in get_secret_value_response:
    secret = get_secret_value_response['SecretString']
    else:
    binary_secret_data = get_secret_value_response['SecretBinary']

    # Your code goes here.

  4. Applications require permissions to access Secrets Manager. My application runs on Amazon EC2 and uses an IAM role to obtain access to AWS services. I will attach the following policy to my IAM role. This policy uses the GetSecretValue action to grant my application permissions to read secret from Secrets Manager. This policy also uses the resource element to limit my application to read only the Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database secret from Secrets Manager. You can visit the AWS Secrets Manager Documentation to understand the minimum IAM permissions required to retrieve a secret.
    {
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": {
    "Sid": "RetrieveDbCredentialFromSecretsManager",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
    "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:::secret:Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database"
    }
    }

Phase 3: Enable Rotation for Your Secret

Rotating secrets periodically is a security best practice because it reduces the risk of misuse of secrets. Secrets Manager makes it easy to follow this security best practice and offers built-in integrations for rotating credentials for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Amazon Aurora databases hosted on Amazon RDS. When you enable rotation, Secrets Manager creates a Lambda function and attaches an IAM role to this function to execute rotations on a schedule you define.

Note: Configuring rotation is a privileged action that requires several IAM permissions and you should only grant this access to trusted individuals. To grant these permissions, you can use the AWS IAMFullAccess managed policy.

Next, I show you how to configure Secrets Manager to rotate the secret Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database automatically.

  1. From the Secrets Manager console, I go to the list of secrets and choose the secret I created in the first step Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database.
     
    List of secrets in the Secrets Manager console
     
  2. I scroll to Rotation configuration, and then select Edit rotation.
     
    Rotation configuration interface
     
  3. To enable rotation, I select Enable automatic rotation. I then choose how frequently I want Secrets Manager to rotate this secret. For this example, I set the rotation interval to 60 days.
     
    Edit rotation configuration interface
     
  4. Next, Secrets Manager requires permissions to rotate this secret on your behalf. Because I’m storing the superuser database credential, Secrets Manager can use this credential to perform rotations. Therefore, I select Use the secret that I provided in step 1, and then select Next.
     
    Select which secret to use in the Edit rotation configuration interface
     
  5. The banner on the next screen confirms that I have successfully configured rotation and the first rotation is in progress, which enables you to verify that rotation is functioning as expected. Secrets Manager will rotate this credential automatically every 60 days.
     
    Confirmation banner message
     

Summary

I introduced AWS Secrets Manager, explained the key benefits, and showed you how to help meet your compliance requirements by configuring AWS Secrets Manager to rotate database credentials automatically on your behalf. Secrets Manager helps you protect access to your applications, services, and IT resources without the upfront investment and on-going maintenance costs of operating your own secrets management infrastructure. To get started, visit the Secrets Manager console. To learn more, visit Secrets Manager documentation.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the Comments section below. If you have questions about anything in this post, start a new thread on the Secrets Manager forum.

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New – Encryption of Data in Transit for Amazon EFS

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-encryption-of-data-in-transit-for-amazon-efs/

Amazon Elastic File System was designed to be the file system of choice for cloud-native applications that require shared access to file-based storage. We launched EFS in mid-2016 and have added several important features since then including on-premises access via Direct Connect and encryption of data at rest. We have also made EFS available in additional AWS Regions, most recently US West (Northern California). As was the case with EFS itself, these enhancements were made in response to customer feedback, and reflect our desire to serve an ever-widening customer base.

Encryption in Transit
Today we are making EFS even more useful with the addition of support for encryption of data in transit. When used in conjunction with the existing support for encryption of data at rest, you now have the ability to protect your stored files using a defense-in-depth security strategy.

In order to make it easy for you to implement encryption in transit, we are also releasing an EFS mount helper. The helper (available in source code and RPM form) takes care of setting up a TLS tunnel to EFS, and also allows you to mount file systems by ID. The two features are independent; you can use the helper to mount file systems by ID even if you don’t make use of encryption in transit. The helper also supplies a recommended set of default options to the actual mount command.

Setting up Encryption
I start by installing the EFS mount helper on my Amazon Linux instance:

$ sudo yum install -y amazon-efs-utils

Next, I visit the EFS Console and capture the file system ID:

Then I specify the ID (and the TLS option) to mount the file system:

$ sudo mount -t efs fs-92758f7b -o tls /mnt/efs

And that’s it! The encryption is transparent and has an almost negligible impact on data transfer speed.

Available Now
You can start using encryption in transit today in all AWS Regions where EFS is available.

The mount helper is available for Amazon Linux. If you are running another distribution of Linux you will need to clone the GitHub repo and build your own RPM, as described in the README.

Jeff;

Amazon S3 Update: New Storage Class and General Availability of S3 Select

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/amazon-s3-update-new-storage-class-general-availability-of-s3-select/

I’ve got two big pieces of news for anyone who stores and retrieves data in Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3):

New S3 One Zone-IA Storage Class – This new storage class is 20% less expensive than the existing Standard-IA storage class. It is designed to be used to store data that does not need the extra level of protection provided by geographic redundancy.

General Availability of S3 Select – This unique retrieval option lets you retrieve subsets of data from S3 objects using simple SQL expressions, with the possibility for a 400% performance improvement in the process.

Let’s take a look at both!

S3 One Zone-IA (Infrequent Access) Storage Class
This new storage class stores data in a single AWS Availability Zone and is designed to provide eleven 9’s (99.99999999%) of data durability, just like the other S3 storage classes. Unlike those other classes, it is not designed to be resilient to the physical loss of an AZ due to major event such as an earthquake or a flood, and data could be lost in the unlikely event that an AZ is destroyed. S3 One Zone-IA storage gives you a lower cost option for secondary backups of on-premises data and for data that can be easily re-created. You can also use it as the target of S3 Cross-Region Replication from another AWS region.

You can specify the use of S3 One Zone-IA storage when you upload a new object to S3:

You can also make use of it as part of an S3 lifecycle rule:

You can set up a lifecycle rule that moves previous versions of an object to S3 One Zone-IA after 30 or more days:

And you can modify the storage class of an existing object:

You can also manage storage classes using the S3 API, CLI, and CloudFormation templates.

The S3 One Zone-IA storage class can be used in all public AWS regions. As I noted earlier, pricing is 20% lower than for the S3 Standard-IA storage class (see the S3 Pricing page for more info). There’s a 30 day minimum retention period, and a 128 KB minimum object size.

General Availability of S3 Select
Randall wrote a detailed introduction to S3 Select last year and showed you how you can use it to retrieve selected data from within S3 objects. During the preview we added support for server-side encryption and the ability to run queries from the S3 Console.

I used a CSV file of airport codes to exercise the new console functionality:

This file contains listings for over 9100 airports, so it makes for useful test data but it definitely does not test the limits of S3 Select in any way. I select the file, open the More menu, and choose Select from:

The console sets the file format and compression according to the file name and the encryption status. I set delimiter and click Show file preview to verify that my settings are correct. Then I click Next to proceed:

I type SQL expressions in the SQL editor and click Run SQL to issue the query:

Or:

I can also issue queries from the AWS SDKs. I initiate the select operation:

s3 = boto3.client('s3', region_name='us-west-2')

r = s3.select_object_content(
        Bucket='jbarr-us-west-2',
        Key='sample-data/airportCodes.csv',
        ExpressionType='SQL',
        Expression="select * from s3object s where s.\"Country (Name)\" like '%United States%'",
        InputSerialization = {'CSV': {"FileHeaderInfo": "Use"}},
        OutputSerialization = {'CSV': {}},
)

And then I process the stream of results:

for event in r['Payload']:
    if 'Records' in event:
        records = event['Records']['Payload'].decode('utf-8')
        print(records)
    elif 'Stats' in event:
        statsDetails = event['Stats']['Details']
        print("Stats details bytesScanned: ")
        print(statsDetails['BytesScanned'])
        print("Stats details bytesProcessed: ")
        print(statsDetails['BytesProcessed'])

S3 Select is available in all public regions and you can start using it today. Pricing is based on the amount of data scanned and the amount of data returned.

Jeff;

Subverting Backdoored Encryption

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/04/subverting_back.html

This is a really interesting research result. This paper proves that two parties can create a secure communications channel using a communications system with a backdoor. It’s a theoretical result, so it doesn’t talk about how easy that channel is to create. And the assumptions on the adversary are pretty reasonable: that each party can create his own randomness, and that the government isn’t literally eavesdropping on every single part of the network at all times.

This result reminds me a lot of the work about subliminal channels from the 1980s and 1990s, and the notions of how to build an anonymous communications system on top of an identified system. Basically, it’s always possible to overlay a system around and outside any closed system.

How to Subvert Backdoored Encryption: Security Against Adversaries that Decrypt All Ciphertexts,” by Thibaut Horel and Sunoo Park and Silas Richelson and Vinod Vaikuntanathan.

Abstract: In this work, we examine the feasibility of secure and undetectable point-to-point communication in a world where governments can read all the encrypted communications of their citizens. We consider a world where the only permitted method of communication is via a government-mandated encryption scheme, instantiated with government-mandated keys. Parties cannot simply encrypt ciphertexts of some other encryption scheme, because citizens caught trying to communicate outside the government’s knowledge (e.g., by encrypting strings which do not appear to be natural language plaintexts) will be arrested. The one guarantee we suppose is that the government mandates an encryption scheme which is semantically secure against outsiders: a perhaps reasonable supposition when a government might consider it advantageous to secure its people’s communication against foreign entities. But then, what good is semantic security against an adversary that holds all the keys and has the power to decrypt?

We show that even in the pessimistic scenario described, citizens can communicate securely and undetectably. In our terminology, this translates to a positive statement: all semantically secure encryption schemes support subliminal communication. Informally, this means that there is a two-party protocol between Alice and Bob where the parties exchange ciphertexts of what appears to be a normal conversation even to someone who knows the secret keys and thus can read the corresponding plaintexts. And yet, at the end of the protocol, Alice will have transmitted her secret message to Bob. Our security definition requires that the adversary not be able to tell whether Alice and Bob are just having a normal conversation using the mandated encryption scheme, or they are using the mandated encryption scheme for subliminal communication.

Our topics may be thought to fall broadly within the realm of steganography: the science of hiding secret communication within innocent-looking messages, or cover objects. However, we deal with the non-standard setting of an adversarially chosen distribution of cover objects (i.e., a stronger-than-usual adversary), and we take advantage of the fact that our cover objects are ciphertexts of a semantically secure encryption scheme to bypass impossibility results which we show for broader classes of steganographic schemes. We give several constructions of subliminal communication schemes under the assumption that key exchange protocols with pseudorandom messages exist (such as Diffie-Hellman, which in fact has truly random messages). Each construction leverages the assumed semantic security of the adversarially chosen encryption scheme, in order to achieve subliminal communication.

Why the crypto-backdoor side is morally corrupt

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original https://blog.erratasec.com/2018/04/why-crypto-backdoor-side-is-morally.html

Crypto-backdoors for law enforcement is a reasonable position, but the side that argues for it adds things that are either outright lies or morally corrupt. Every year, the amount of digital evidence law enforcement has to solve crimes increases, yet they outrageously lie, claiming they are “going dark”, losing access to evidence. A weirder claim is that  those who oppose crypto-backdoors are nonetheless ethically required to make them work. This is morally corrupt.

That’s the point of this Lawfare post, which claims:

What I am saying is that those arguing that we should reject third-party access out of hand haven’t carried their research burden. … There are two reasons why I think there hasn’t been enough research to establish the no-third-party access position. First, research in this area is “taboo” among security researchers. … the second reason why I believe more research needs to be done: the fact that prominent non-government experts are publicly willing to try to build secure third-party-access solutions should make the information-security community question the consensus view. 

This is nonsense. It’s like claiming we haven’t cured the common cold because researchers haven’t spent enough effort at it. When researchers claim they’ve tried 10,000 ways to make something work, it’s like insisting they haven’t done enough because they haven’t tried 10,001 times.
Certainly, half the community doesn’t want to make such things work. Any solution for the “legitimate” law enforcement of the United States means a solution for illegitimate states like China and Russia which would use the feature to oppress their own people. Even if I believe it’s a net benefit to the United States, I would never attempt such research because of China and Russia.
But computer scientists notoriously ignore ethics in pursuit of developing technology. That describes the other half of the crypto community who would gladly work on the problem. The reason they haven’t come up with solutions is because the problem is hard, really hard.
The second reason the above argument is wrong: it says we should believe a solution is possible because some outsiders are willing to try. But as Yoda says, do or do not, there is no try. Our opinions on the difficulty of the problem don’t change simply because people are trying. Our opinions change when people are succeeding. People are always trying the impossible, that’s not evidence it’s possible.
The paper cherry picks things, like Intel CPU features, to make it seem like they are making forward progress. No. Intel’s SGX extensions are there for other reasons. Sure, it’s a new development, and new developments may change our opinion on the feasibility of law enforcement backdoors. But nowhere in talking about this new development have they actually proposes a solution to the backdoor problem. New developments happen all the time, and the pro-backdoor side is going to seize upon each and every one to claim that this, finally, solves the backdoor problem, without showing exactly how it solves the problem.

The Lawfare post does make one good argument, that there is no such thing as “absolute security”, and thus the argument is stupid that “crypto-backdoors would be less than absolute security”. Too often in the cybersecurity community we reject solutions that don’t provide “absolute security” while failing to acknowledge that “absolute security” is impossible.
But that’s not really what’s going on here. Cryptographers aren’t certain we’ve achieved even “adequate security” with current crypto regimes like SSL/TLS/HTTPS. Every few years we find horrible flaws in the old versions and have to develop new versions. If you steal somebody’s iPhone today, it’s so secure you can’t decrypt anything on it. But then if you hold it for 5 years, somebody will eventually figure out a hole and then you’ll be able to decrypt it — a hole that won’t affect Apple’s newer phones.
The reason we think we can’t get crypto-backdoors correct is simply because we can’t get crypto completely correct. It’s implausible that we can get the backdoors working securely when we still have so much trouble getting encryption working correctly in the first place.
Thus, we aren’t talking about “insignificantly less security”, we are talking about going from “barely adequate security” to “inadequate security”. Negotiating keys between you and a website is hard enough without simultaneously having to juggle keys with law enforcement organizations.

And finally, even if cryptographers do everything correctly law enforcement themselves haven’t proven themselves reliable. The NSA exposed its exploits (like the infamous ETERNALBLUE), and OPM lost all its security clearance records. If they can’t keep those secrets, it’s unreasonable to believe they can hold onto backdoor secrets. One of the problems cryptographers are expected to solve is partly this, to make it work in a such way that makes it unlikely law enforcement will lose its secrets.

Summary

This argument by the pro-backdoor side, that we in the crypto-community should do more to solve backdoors, it simply wrong. We’ve spent a lot of effort at this already. Many continue to work on this problem — the reason you haven’t heard much from them is because they haven’t had much success. It’s like blaming doctors for not doing more to work on interrogation drugs (truth serums). Sure, a lot of doctors won’t work on this because it’s distasteful, but at the same time, there are many drug companies who would love to profit by them. The reason they don’t exist is not because they aren’t spending enough money researching them, it’s because there is no plausible solution in sight.
Crypto-backdoors designed for law-enforcement will significantly harm your security. This may change in the future, but that’s the state of crypto today. You should trust the crypto experts on this, not lawyers.

Another Branch Prediction Attack

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/03/another_branch_.html

When Spectre and Meltdown were first announced earlier this year, pretty much everyone predicted that there would be many more attacks targeting branch prediction in microprocessors. Here’s another one:

In the new attack, an attacker primes the PHT and running branch instructions so that the PHT will always assume a particular branch is taken or not taken. The victim code then runs and makes a branch, which is potentially disturbing the PHT. The attacker then runs more branch instructions of its own to detect that disturbance to the PHT; the attacker knows that some branches should be predicted in a particular direction and tests to see if the victim’s code has changed that prediction.

The researchers looked only at Intel processors, using the attacks to leak information protected using Intel’s SGX (Software Guard Extensions), a feature found on certain chips to carve out small sections of encrypted code and data such that even the operating system (or virtualization software) cannot access it. They also described ways the attack could be used against address space layout randomization and to infer data in encryption and image libraries.

Research paper.

Security of Cloud HSMBackups

Post Syndicated from Balaji Iyer original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/security-of-cloud-hsmbackups/

Today, our customers use AWS CloudHSM to meet corporate, contractual and regulatory compliance requirements for data security by using dedicated Hardware Security Module (HSM) instances within the AWS cloud. CloudHSM delivers all the benefits of traditional HSMs including secure generation, storage, and management of cryptographic keys used for data encryption that are controlled and accessible only by you.

As a managed service, it automates time-consuming administrative tasks such as hardware provisioning, software patching, high availability, backups and scaling for your sensitive and regulated workloads in a cost-effective manner. Backup and restore functionality is the core building block enabling scalability, reliability and high availability in CloudHSM.

You should consider using AWS CloudHSM if you require:

  • Keys stored in dedicated, third-party validated hardware security modules under your exclusive control
  • FIPS 140-2 compliance
  • Integration with applications using PKCS#11, Java JCE, or Microsoft CNG interfaces
  • High-performance in-VPC cryptographic acceleration (bulk crypto)
  • Financial applications subject to PCI regulations
  • Healthcare applications subject to HIPAA regulations
  • Streaming video solutions subject to contractual DRM requirements

We recently released a whitepaper, “Security of CloudHSM Backups” that provides in-depth information on how backups are protected in all three phases of the CloudHSM backup lifecycle process: Creation, Archive, and Restore.

About the Author

Balaji Iyer is a senior consultant in the Professional Services team at Amazon Web Services. In this role, he has helped several customers successfully navigate their journey to AWS. His specialties include architecting and implementing highly-scalable distributed systems, operational security, large scale migrations, and leading strategic AWS initiatives.

Leveraging AWS Marketplace Partner Storage Solutions for Microsoft

Post Syndicated from islawson original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/leveraging-aws-marketplace-partner-storage-solutions-for-microsoft/

Designing a cloud storage solution to accommodate traditional enterprise software such as Microsoft SharePoint can be challenging. Microsoft SharePoint is complex and demands a lot of the underlying storage that’s used for its many databases and content repositories. To ensure that the selected storage platform can accommodate the availability, connectivity, and performance requirements recommended by Microsoft you need to use third-party storage solutions that build on and extend the functionality and performance of AWS storage services.

An appropriate storage solution for Microsoft SharePoint needs to provide data redundancy, high availability, fault tolerance, strong encryption, standard connectivity protocols, point-in-time data recovery, compression, ease of management, directory integration, and support.

AWS Marketplace is uniquely positioned as a procurement channel to find a third-party storage product that provides the additional technology layered on top of AWS storage services. The third-party storage products are provided and maintained by industry newcomers with born-in-the-cloud solutions as well as existing industry leaders. They include many mainstream storage products that are already familiar and commonly deployed in enterprises.

We recently released the “Leveraging AWS Marketplace Storage Solutions for Microsoft SharePoint” whitepaper to walk through the deployment and configuration of SoftNAS Cloud NAS, an AWS Marketplace third-party storage product that provides secure, highly available, redundant, and fault-tolerant storage to the Microsoft SharePoint collaboration suite.

About the Author

Israel Lawson is a senior solutions architect on the AWS Marketplace team.