Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/09/long-analysis-of-the-m-209.html
Really interesting analysis of the American M-209 encryption device and its security.
Tag Archives: reports
The State of Ransomware
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/08/the-state-of-ransomware.html
Palo Alto Networks published its semi-annual report on ransomware. From the Executive Summary:
Unit 42 monitors ransomware and extortion leak sites closely to keep tabs on threat activity. We reviewed compromise announcements from 53 dedicated leak sites in the first half of 2024 and found 1,762 new posts. This averages to approximately 294 posts a month and almost 68 posts a week. Of the 53 ransomware groups whose leak sites we monitored, six of the groups accounted for more than half of the compromises observed.
In February, we reported a 49% increase year-over-year in alleged victims posted on ransomware leak sites. So far, in 2024, comparing the first half of 2023 to the first half of 2024, we see an even further increase of 4.3%. The higher level of activity observed in 2023 was no fluke.
Activity from groups like Ambitious Scorpius (distributors of BlackCat) and Flighty Scorpius (distributors of LockBit) has largely fallen off due to law enforcement operations. However, other threat groups we track such as Spoiled Scorpius (distributors of RansomHub) and Slippery Scorpius (distributors of DragonForce) have joined the fray to fill the void.
People-Search Site Removal Services Largely Ineffective
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/08/people-search-site-removal-services-largely-ineffective.html
Consumer Reports has a new study of people-search site removal services, concluding that they don’t really work:
As a whole, people-search removal services are largely ineffective. Private information about each participant on the people-search sites decreased after using the people-search removal services. And, not surprisingly, the removal services did save time compared with manually opting out. But, without exception, information about each participant still appeared on some of the 13 people-search sites at the one-week, one-month, and four-month intervals. We initially found 332 instances of information about the 28 participants who would later be signed up for removal services (that does not include the four participants who were opted out manually). Of those 332 instances, only 117, or 35%, were removed within four months.
Rapid7’s Ransomware Radar Report Shows Threat Actors are Evolving …Fast.
Post Syndicated from Tom Caiazza original https://blog.rapid7.com/2024/08/06/rapid7s-ransomware-radar-report-shows-threat-actors-are-evolving-fast/
Few issues keep cybersecurity professionals up at night more than the threat of ransomware. The ubiquity of targets, the relative organization of threat actors, and their multiple paths of entry make combating ransomware particularly formidable.
But there is one more facet to this threat that makes ransomware a vexing problem across all organizations: it’s evolving, constantly.
In a new report released today by Rapid7 Labs, researchers, threat intelligence experts, and detection & response teams have put together the latest state-of-play in the ransomware space. The Ransomware Radar Report offers some startling insights into who ransomware threat actors are and how they’ve been operating in the first half of 2024.
The fact of the matter is, ransomware as a business is booming. Over the first half of 2024, Rapid7 researchers found an increase of 23% in the number of posts ransomware groups were making to their leak sites. This correlates with the amount of extortion attempts these groups are attempting as they are rarely quiet about who they infiltrate. Surprisingly, one of the newest groups, RansomHub, made the second-most number of posts among the groups studied, with 181 over that six-month period. But, to put that into perspective, the leader, well-established LockBit, made 474 posts over the same time period.
This leads us to another intriguing finding: the number of new (or revamped) ransomware groups. We found that among a total of 68 unique groups posting extortion attempts, some 21 were either net new or rebranded from previous groups. The rebranded groups may indicate a bit of a silver lining as they are potentially due to the success of some recent law enforcement actions against ransomware threat actors.
However, threat actors are only half of the equation. The report also notes that the ransomware ecosystem may be moving away from the attacks on “big fish” we had seen in the past and toward smaller organizations as juicier targets. For instance, organizations with $5 million in annual revenue were five times more likely to be targeted than their larger counterparts. This could be for a lot of reasons, not the least of which is that these smaller organizations contain many of the same data threat actors are after, but they often have less mature security precautions in place.
Ransomware actors are also getting more sophisticated as businesses. They have their own marketplaces, sell their own products, and in some cases have 24/7 support. They also seem to be creating an ecosystem of collaboration and consolidation in the kinds of ransomware they deploy. Rapid7 researchers looked at different ransomware variants and found three distinct clusters of similarities. Essentially, many of these ransomware strains resemble one another. This could indicate collaboration among groups, reuse of source code, or the use of common builders. Other research avenues indicated that the number of ransomware families is going down — potentially showing that threat actors are focusing their efforts on more effective or specialized approaches.
The takeaways in this blog post are only the tip of the iceberg. The Ransomware Radar Report goes deep into the kinds of encryption algorithms that are trending at the moment and why, details on prevailing coding languages, and the varied tactics threat actors use to infiltrate organizations. To get the latest on ransomware and ensure your organization is well-informed and prepared for the fight against these threat actors, download the report here.
New Research: The Proliferation of Cellular in IoT
Post Syndicated from Deral Heiland original https://blog.rapid7.com/2024/07/30/new-research-the-proliferation-of-cellular-in-iot/
Researchers explain the trend and argue for deeper understanding
Analysis of Cellular Based Internet of Things (IoT) Technology is a new whitepaper co-authored by Rapid7 principal security researcher Deral Heiland and Thermo Fisher Scientific lead product security researcher Carlota Bindner.
In this new research, the authors dive deep into the fairly recent uptick in the use of cellular communications in IoT-based devices like GPS trackers and certain types of medical equipment. Their main goal is to provide context into the pervasive nature of cellular technology embedded within modern devices all over the world.
They go on to demonstrate the importance of breaking open these IoT devices with the goal of penetration testing (pentesting) the strength of the security — or lack thereof — built into the onboard tech. Absent a Wi-Fi connection, they say, it’s critical these devices are able to leverage cellular as a back-up communications method, particularly in the category of potentially life-saving medical devices.
Testing the Tech
Indeed, 2022 saw shipments of IoT cellular modules grow a substantial 14% year-over-year, signalling the ubiquity of IoT in today’s devices as producers hope the daily-life conveniences the technology enables will continue to propel the significant growth of cellular module shipments.
When an industry is experiencing significant growth, it’s important that pentesting teams have the ability to appropriately test the technology for security vulnerabilities. This research helps the Rapid7 pentesting team and others continually examine the technology, test its boundaries, and learn how to keep it safe.
Let’s take a look at some key IoT security testing scenarios and takeaways from this whitepaper.
CAT-M and NB-IoT
Cellular technologies for IoT are often high-priced, despite being extremely common in 2024. CAT-M and NB-IoT have helped to facilitate cellular communications for IoT devices, bringing down costs at scale. Their primary areas of focus are to provide low-power wide area network (LPWAN) signals that bolster radio communications used for IoT devices.
According to the paper, CAT-M and NB-IoT are complementary standards that excel in different use cases, each helping enable IoT direct-cloud communications via cellular services. There are several subsets of these technologies — such as CAT-M1, CAT-NB1/CAT-NB2 — and it’s made clear in the research why it’s critical to comprehend how each of these enable cellular-based IoT communications so that practitioners can better secure the devices and tech.
Cellular Modules
The whitepaper then gets into the nitty gritty of reviewing how the researchers deconstructed several cellular module devices to test how they function and communicate with each other.
From discovering module-based GPS trackers to examining cellular modules in smart camera systems, this highly technical process weaves between looking at the orientation of cellular modules on circuit boards to how manufacturers can implement their own proprietary commands for use with their own cellular modules.
What’s Next
To reiterate, it’s vital that pentesting professionals understand as much of this cellular technology as possible in order to effectively test devices that leverage these capabilities. In this way, security is put at the forefront of these marvelous little gadgets that aim to make all of our lives just a little easier.
Ready to learn more? Dive into the deep technical details contained in the whitepaper now.
Lessons from a Ransomware Attack against the British Library
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/03/lessons-from-a-ransomware-attack-against-the-british-library.html
You might think that libraries are kind of boring, but this self-analysis of a 2023 ransomware and extortion attack against the British Library is anything but.
On Secure Voting Systems
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/03/on-secure-voting-systems.html
Andrew Appel shepherded a public comment—signed by twenty election cybersecurity experts, including myself—on best practices for ballot marking devices and vote tabulation. It was written for the Pennsylvania legislature, but it’s general in nature.
From the executive summary:
We believe that no system is perfect, with each having trade-offs. Hand-marked and hand-counted ballots remove the uncertainty introduced by use of electronic machinery and the ability of bad actors to exploit electronic vulnerabilities to remotely alter the results. However, some portion of voters mistakenly mark paper ballots in a manner that will not be counted in the way the voter intended, or which even voids the ballot. Hand-counts delay timely reporting of results, and introduce the possibility for human error, bias, or misinterpretation.
Technology introduces the means of efficient tabulation, but also introduces a manifold increase in complexity and sophistication of the process. This places the understanding of the process beyond the average person’s understanding, which can foster distrust. It also opens the door to human or machine error, as well as exploitation by sophisticated and malicious actors.
Rather than assert that each component of the process can be made perfectly secure on its own, we believe the goal of each component of the elections process is to validate every other component.
Consequently, we believe that the hallmarks of a reliable and optimal election process are hand-marked paper ballots, which are optically scanned, separately and securely stored, and rigorously audited after the election but before certification. We recommend state legislators adopt policies consistent with these guiding principles, which are further developed below.
Facebook’s Extensive Surveillance Network
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/02/facebooks-extensive-surveillance-network.html
Consumer Reports is reporting that Facebook has built a massive surveillance network:
Using a panel of 709 volunteers who shared archives of their Facebook data, Consumer Reports found that a total of 186,892 companies sent data about them to the social network. On average, each participant in the study had their data sent to Facebook by 2,230 companies. That number varied significantly, with some panelists’ data listing over 7,000 companies providing their data. The Markup helped Consumer Reports recruit participants for the study. Participants downloaded an archive of the previous three years of their data from their Facebook settings, then provided it to Consumer Reports.
This isn’t data about your use of Facebook. This data about your interactions with other companies, all of which is correlated and analyzed by Facebook. It constantly amazes me that we willingly allow these monopoly companies that kind of surveillance power.
Here’s the Consumer Reports study. It includes policy recommendations:
Many consumers will rightly be concerned about the extent to which their activity is tracked by Facebook and other companies, and may want to take action to counteract consistent surveillance. Based on our analysis of the sample data, consumers need interventions that will:
- Reduce the overall amount of tracking.
- Improve the ability for consumers to take advantage of their right to opt out under state privacy laws.
- Empower social media platform users and researchers to review who and what exactly is being advertised on Facebook.
- Improve the transparency of Facebook’s existing tools.
And then the report gives specifics.
Breaking Laptop Fingerprint Sensors
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/11/breaking-laptop-fingerprint-sensors.html
They’re not that good:
Security researchers Jesse D’Aguanno and Timo Teräs write that, with varying degrees of reverse-engineering and using some external hardware, they were able to fool the Goodix fingerprint sensor in a Dell Inspiron 15, the Synaptic sensor in a Lenovo ThinkPad T14, and the ELAN sensor in one of Microsoft’s own Surface Pro Type Covers. These are just three laptop models from the wide universe of PCs, but one of these three companies usually does make the fingerprint sensor in every laptop we’ve reviewed in the last few years. It’s likely that most Windows PCs with fingerprint readers will be vulnerable to similar exploits.
The Japanese Financial Services Attack Landscape
Post Syndicated from Tom Caiazza original https://blog.rapid7.com/2023/07/14/the-japanese-financial-services-attack-landscape/
Recently, we released a major report analyzing the threat landscape of Japan, the globe’s third largest economy. In that report we looked at the ways in which threat actors infiltrate Japanese companies (spoiler alert: it is often through foreign subsidiaries and affiliates) and some of the most pervasive threats those companies face such as ransomware and state-sponsored threat actors.
We also took a look at some of the hardest hit industries and it should come as no surprise that some of the most commonly attacked companies are in industries where Japan currently excels on a global scale. Think manufacturing and automotive, technology & media, and financial services.
In these blog posts we’re going to briefly discuss the findings for one of those industries, but rest assured, more information can be found in our one-page rundowns and the report itself.
Financial services companies are prime targets for attackers around the world but Japan’s robust and global financial industry makes it particularly attractive for cyber criminals and a major risk for millions of people. Attacks on financial services companies often come from two directions, seeking the personally identifiable information, or PII, of customers, and that of employees themselves.
When it comes to customer data, phishing was the most common way attackers sought to access it with 31% of all attacks coming in this form since 2021. Of note, English was the most frequently used language in these phishing attacks. The use of English rather than Japanese, a language that relatively few foreigners speak, highlights the degree to which language barriers impact the targeting of Japan.
Cryptocurrency exchanges were also major targets as cyber attackers, specifically those that are state-sponsored (more on that in the report) seek out crypto due to its ability to operate outside of traditional financial institutions.
For more detail on the threat landscape of the financial services industry in Japan check out our report, or the handy one-page brief specifically looking at this industry.
The Japanese Automotive Industry Attack Landscape
Post Syndicated from Tom Caiazza original https://blog.rapid7.com/2023/07/06/the-japanese-automotive-industry-attack-landscape/
Recently, we released a major report analyzing the threat landscape of Japan, the globe’s third largest economy. In that report we looked at the ways in which threat actors infiltrate Japanese companies (spoiler alert: it is often through foreign subsidiaries and affiliates) and some of the most pervasive threats those companies face such as ransomware and state-sponsored threat actors.
We also took a look at some of the hardest hit industries and it should come as no surprise that some of the most commonly attacked companies are in industries where Japan currently excels on a global scale. Think manufacturing and automotive, technology & media, and financial services.
In these blog posts we’re going to briefly discuss the findings for one of those industries, but rest assured, more information can be found in our one-page rundowns and the report itself.
The Japanese automotive industry is massive in scale. Japanese car brands are ubiquitous the world over making them a major target for cyber criminals. The global nature of their business means many foreign entities affiliated with Japanese companies can be sources of infiltration by attackers. Product security is a major concern and car maker IP is valuable. Often these attacks come in the form of ransomware and they often impact the supply chain of automakers as foreign subsidiaries and partners are ripe targets. Vulnerabilities in product features such as keyless entry and diagnostic tools also make for lucrative bounties for ransomware groups.
But those are not the only data sets that attackers seek. Auto companies may have a great deal of personally identifiable information about their customers. This information can include customer addresses, names, email, and even VIN numbers. They can lead to increased identity theft by threat actors and even fraudulent financial actions.
Customers aren’t the only victims of identity theft as PII of employees at automotive industry companies is also prevalent. Business email attacks are common as these employees are high-valued targets. Phishing attacks can lead to fraudulent financial transactions framed as legitimate business practices.
For more detail on the threat landscape of the automotive industry in Japan check out our report, or the handy one-page brief specifically looking at this industry.
Chinese Hacking of US Critical Infrastructure
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/05/chinese-hacking-of-us-critical-infrastructure.html
Everyone is writing about an interagency and international report on Chinese hacking of US critical infrastructure.
Lots of interesting details about how the group, called Volt Typhoon, accesses target networks and evades detection.
Security Risks of AI
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/04/security-risks-of-ai.html
Stanford and Georgetown have a new report on the security risks of AI—particularly adversarial machine learning—based on a workshop they held on the topic.
Jim Dempsey, one of the workshop organizers, wrote a blog post on the report:
As a first step, our report recommends the inclusion of AI security concerns within the cybersecurity programs of developers and users. The understanding of how to secure AI systems, we concluded, lags far behind their widespread adoption. Many AI products are deployed without institutions fully understanding the security risks they pose. Organizations building or deploying AI models should incorporate AI concerns into their cybersecurity functions using a risk management framework that addresses security throughout the AI system life cycle. It will be necessary to grapple with the ways in which AI vulnerabilities are different from traditional cybersecurity bugs, but the starting point is to assume that AI security is a subset of cybersecurity and to begin applying vulnerability management practices to AI-based features. (Andy Grotto and I have vigorously argued against siloing AI security in its own governance and policy vertical.)
Our report also recommends more collaboration between cybersecurity practitioners, machine learning engineers, and adversarial machine learning researchers. Assessing AI vulnerabilities requires technical expertise that is distinct from the skill set of cybersecurity practitioners, and organizations should be cautioned against repurposing existing security teams without additional training and resources. We also note that AI security researchers and practitioners should consult with those addressing AI bias. AI fairness researchers have extensively studied how poor data, design choices, and risk decisions can produce biased outcomes. Since AI vulnerabilities may be more analogous to algorithmic bias than they are to traditional software vulnerabilities, it is important to cultivate greater engagement between the two communities.
Another major recommendation calls for establishing some form of information sharing among AI developers and users. Right now, even if vulnerabilities are identified or malicious attacks are observed, this information is rarely transmitted to others, whether peer organizations, other companies in the supply chain, end users, or government or civil society observers. Bureaucratic, policy, and cultural barriers currently inhibit such sharing. This means that a compromise will likely remain mostly unnoticed until long after attackers have successfully exploited vulnerabilities. To avoid this outcome, we recommend that organizations developing AI models monitor for potential attacks on AI systems, create—formally or informally—a trusted forum for incident information sharing on a protected basis, and improve transparency.
Nick Weaver on Regulating Cryptocurrency
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/nick-weaver-on-regulating-cryptocurrency.html
Nicholas Weaver wrote an excellent paper on the problems of cryptocurrencies and the need to regulate the space—with all existing regulations. His conclusion:
Regulators, especially regulators in the United States, often fear accusations of stifling innovation. As such, the cryptocurrency space has grown over the past decade with very little regulatory oversight.
But fortunately for regulators, there is no actual innovation to stifle. Cryptocurrencies cannot revolutionize payments or finance, as the basic nature of all cryptocurrencies render them fundamentally unsuitable to revolutionize our financial system—which, by the way, already has decades of successful experience with digital payments and electronic money. The supposedly “decentralized” and “trustless” cryptocurrency systems, both technically and socially, fail to provide meaningful benefits to society—and indeed, necessarily also fail in their foundational claims of decentralization and trustlessness.
When regulating cryptocurrencies, the best starting point is history. Regulating various tokens is best done through the existing securities law framework, an area where the US has a near century of well-established law. It starts with regulating the issuance of new cryptocurrency tokens and related securities. This should substantially reduce the number of fraudulent offerings.
Similarly, active regulation of the cryptocurrency exchanges should offer substantial benefits, including eliminating significant consumer risk, blocking key money-laundering channels, and overall producing a far more regulated and far less manipulated market.
Finally, the stablecoins need basic regulation as money transmitters. Unless action is taken they risk becoming substantial conduits for money laundering, but requiring them to treat all users as customers should prevent this risk from developing further.
Read the whole thing.
Cyberwar Lessons from the War in Ukraine
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/02/cyberwar-lessons-from-the-war-in-ukraine.html
The Aspen Institute has published a good analysis of the successes, failures, and absences of cyberattacks as part of the current war in Ukraine: “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative Lessons from Ukraine.”
Its conclusion:
Cyber defense assistance in Ukraine is working. The Ukrainian government and Ukrainian critical infrastructure organizations have better defended themselves and achieved higher levels of resiliency due to the efforts of CDAC and many others. But this is not the end of the road—the ability to provide cyber defense assistance will be important in the future. As a result, it is timely to assess how to provide organized, effective cyber defense assistance to safeguard the post-war order from potential aggressors.
The conflict in Ukraine is resetting the table across the globe for geopolitics and international security. The US and its allies have an imperative to strengthen the capabilities necessary to deter and respond to aggression that is ever more present in cyberspace. Lessons learned from the ad hoc conduct of cyber defense assistance in Ukraine can be institutionalized and scaled to provide new approaches and tools for preventing and managing cyber conflicts going forward.
I am often asked why where weren’t more successful cyberattacks by Russia against Ukraine. I generally give four reasons: (1) Cyberattacks are more effective in the “grey zone” between peace and war, and there are better alternatives once the shooting and bombing starts. (2) Setting these attacks up takes time, and Putin was secretive about his plans. (3) Putin was concerned about attacks spilling outside the war zone, and affecting other countries. (4) Ukrainian defenses were good, aided by other countries and companies. This paper gives a fifth reasons: they were technically successful, but keeping them out of the news made them operationally unsuccessful.
NSA on Supply Chain Security
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/11/nsa-on-supply-chain-security.html
The NSA (together with CISA) has published a long report on supply-chain security: “Securing the Software Supply Chain: Recommended Practices Guide for Suppliers.“:
Prevention is often seen as the responsibility of the software developer, as they are required to securely develop and deliver code, verify third party components, and harden the build environment. But the supplier also holds a critical responsibility in ensuring the security and integrity of our software. After all, the software vendor is responsible for liaising between the customer and software developer. It is through this relationship that additional security features can be applied via contractual agreements, software releases and updates, notifications and mitigations of vulnerabilities.
Software suppliers will find guidance from NSA and our partners on preparing organizations by defining software security checks, protecting software, producing well-secured software, and responding to vulnerabilities on a continuous basis. Until all stakeholders seek to mitigate concerns specific to their area of responsibility, the software supply chain cycle will be vulnerable and at risk for potential compromise.
They previously published “Securing the Software Supply Chain: Recommended Practices Guide for Developers.” And they plan on publishing one focused on customers.
New Report on IoT Security
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/09/new-report-on-iot-security.html
The Atlantic Council has published a report on securing the Internet of Things: “Security in the Billions: Toward a Multinational Strategy to Better Secure the IoT Ecosystem.” The report examines the regulatory approaches taken by four countries—the US, the UK, Australia, and Singapore—to secure home, medical, and networking/telecommunications devices. The report recommends that regulators should 1) enforce minimum security standards for manufacturers of IoT devices, 2) incentivize higher levels of security through public contracting, and 3) try to align IoT standards internationally (for example, international guidance on handling connected devices that stop receiving security updates).
This report looks to existing security initiatives as much as possible—both to leverage existing work and to avoid counterproductively suggesting an entirely new approach to IoT security—while recommending changes and introducing more cohesion and coordination to regulatory approaches to IoT cybersecurity. It walks through the current state of risk in the ecosystem, analyzes challenges with the current policy model, and describes a synthesized IoT security framework. The report then lays out nine recommendations for government and industry actors to enhance IoT security, broken into three recommendation sets: setting a baseline of minimally acceptable security (or “Tier 1”), incentivizing above the baseline (or “Tier 2” and above), and pursuing international alignment on standards and implementation across the entire IoT product lifecycle (from design to sunsetting). It also includes implementation guidance for the United States, Australia, UK, and Singapore, providing a clearer roadmap for countries to operationalize the recommendations in their specific jurisdictions—and push towards a stronger, more cohesive multinational approach to securing the IoT worldwide.
Note: One of the authors of this report was a student of mine at Harvard Kennedy School, and did this work with the Atlantic Council under my supervision.
Prioritizing XDR in 2023: Stronger Detection and Response With Less Complexity
Post Syndicated from KJ McCann original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/09/21/prioritizing-xdr-in-2023-stronger-detection-and-response-with-less-complexity/
As we get closer to closing out 2022, the talk in the market continues to swirl around extended detection and response (XDR) solutions. What are they? What are the benefits? Should my team adopt XDR, and if yes, how do we evaluate vendors to determine the best approach?
While there continue to be many different definitions of XDR in the market, the common themes around this technology consistently are:
- Tightly integrated security products delivering common threat prevention, detection, and incident response capabilities
- Out-of-the-box operational efficiencies that require minimal customization
- Security orchestration and automation functions to streamline repetitive processes and accelerate response
- High-quality detection content with limited tuning required
- Advanced analytics that can correlate alerts from multiple sources into incidents
Simply put, XDR is an evolution of the security ecosystem in order to provide elevated and stronger security for resource-constrained security teams.
XDR for 2023
Why is XDR the preferred cybersecurity solution? With an ever-expanding attack surface and diverse and complex threats, security operations centers (SOCs) need more visibility and stronger threat coverage across their environment – without creating additional pockets of siloed data from point solutions.
A 2022 study of security leaders found that the average security team is now managing 76 different tools – with sprawl driven by a need to keep pace with cloud adoption and remote working requirements. Because of the exponential growth of tools, security teams are spending more than half their time manually producing reports, pulling in data from multiple siloed tools. An XDR solution offers significant operational efficiency benefits by centralizing all that data to form a cohesive picture of your environment.
Is XDR the right move for your organization?
When planning your security for the next year, consider what outcomes you want to achieve in 2023.
Security product and vendor consolidation
To combat increasing complexity, security and risk leaders are looking for effective ways to consolidate their security stack – without compromising the ability to detect threats across a growing attack surface. In fact, 75% of security professionals are pursuing a vendor consolidation strategy today, up from just 29% two years ago. An XDR approach can be an effective path for minimizing the number of tools your SOC needs to manage while still bringing together critical telemetry to power detection and response. For this reason, many teams are prioritizing XDR in 2023 to spearhead their consolidation movement. It’s predicted that by year-end 2027, XDR will be used by up to 40% of end-user organizations to reduce the number of security vendors they have in place.
As you explore prioritizing XDR in 2023, it’s important to remember that all XDR is not created equal. A hybrid XDR approach may enable you to select top products across categories but will still require significant deployment, configuration, and ongoing management to bring these products together (not to mention multiple vendor relationships and expenses to tackle). A native XDR approach delivers a more inclusive suite of capabilities from a single vendor. For resource-constrained teams, a native approach may be superior to hybrid as there is likely to be less work on behalf of the customer. A native XDR does much of the consolidation work for you, while a hybrid XDR helps you consolidate.
Improved security operations efficiency and productivity
“Efficiency” is a big promise of XDR, but this can look different for many teams. How do you measure efficiency today? What areas are currently inefficient and could be made faster or easier? Understanding this baseline and where your team is losing time today will help you know what to prioritize when you pursue an XDR strategy in 2023.
A strong XDR replaces existing tools and processes with alternative, more efficient working methods. Example processes to evaluate as you explore XDR:
- Data ingestion: As your organization grows, you want to be sure your XDR can grow with it. Cloud-native XDR platforms will be especially strong in this category, as they will have the elastic foundation necessary to keep pace with your environment. Consider also how you’ll add new event sources over time. This can be a critical area to improve efficiency.
- Dashboards and reporting: Is your team equipped to create and manage custom queries, reports, and dashboards? Creating and distributing reports can be extremely time-consuming – especially for newer analysts. If your team doesn’t have the time for constant dashboard creation, consider XDR approaches that offer prebuilt content and more intuitive experiences that will satisfy these use cases.
- Detections: With a constant evolution of threat actors and behaviors, it’s important to evaluate if your team has the time to bring together the necessary threat intelligence and detection rule creation to stay ahead of emergent threats. Effective XDR can greatly reduce or potentially eliminate the need for your team to manually create and manage detection rules by offering built-in detection libraries. It’s important to understand the breadth and fidelity of the detections library offered by your vendor and ensure that this content addresses the needs of your organization.
- Automation: Finding the right balance for your SOC between technology and human expertise will allow analysts to apply their skills and training in critical areas without having to maintain repetitive and mundane tasks additionally. Because different XDR solutions offer different instances of automation, prioritize workflows that will provide the most benefit to your team. Some example use cases would be connecting processes across your IT and security teams, automating incident response to common threats, or reducing any manual or repetitive tasks.
Accelerated investigations and response
While XDR solutions claim to host a variety of features that can accelerate your investigation and response process, it’s important to understand how your team currently functions. Start by identifying your mean time to respond (MTTR) at present, then what your goal MTTR is for the future. Once you lay that out, look back at how analysts currently investigate and respond to attacks and note any skill or knowledge gaps, so you can understand what capabilities will best assist your team. XDR aims to paint a fuller picture of attacker behavior, so security teams can better analyze and respond to it.
Some examples of questions that can build out the use cases you require to meet your target ROI for next year.
- During an investigation, where is your team spending the majority of their time?
- What established processes are currently in place for threat response?
- How adaptable is your team when faced with new and unknown threat techniques?
- Do you have established playbooks for specific threats? Does your team know what to do when these fire?
Again, having a baseline of where your organization is today will help you define more realistic goals and requirements going forward. When evaluating XDR products, dig into how they will shorten the window for attackers to succeed and drive a more effective response for your team. For a resource-constrained team, you may especially want to consider how an XDR approach can:
- Reduce the amount of noise that your team needs to triage and ensure analysts zero in on top priority threats
- Shorten the time for effective investigation by providing relevant events, evidence, and intelligence around a specific attack
- Provide effective playbooks that maximize autonomy for analysts, enabling them to respond to threats confidently without the need to escalate or do excessive investigation
- Deliver one-click automation that analysts can leverage to accelerate a response after they have accessed the situation
Unlock the potential of XDR with Rapid7
If you and your team prioritize XDR in 2023, we’d love to help. Rapid7’s native XDR approach unlocks advanced threat detection and accelerated response for resource-constrained teams. With 360-degree attack surface coverage, teams have a sophisticated view across both the internal – and external – threat landscape. Rapid7 Threat Intelligence and Detection Engineering curate an always up-to-date library of threat detections – vetted in the field by our MDR SOC experts to ensure high-fidelity, actionable alerts. And with recommended response playbooks and pre-built workflows, your team will always be ready to respond to threats quickly and confidently.
To learn more about the current market for XDR and receive additional perspectives, check out Gartner’s Market Guide for Extended Detection and Response.
Additional reading:
The 2022 SANS Top New Attacks and Threats Report Is In, and It’s Required Reading
Post Syndicated from Tom Caiazza original https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/09/14/the-2022-sans-top-new-attacks-and-threats-report-is-in-and-its-required-reading/
The latest Top New Attacks and Threat Report from the cybersecurity experts at SANS is here — and the findings around cyberthreats, attacks, and best practices to defend against them are as critical for security teams as they’ve ever been.
If you’re unfamiliar with the SysAdmin, Audit, Network, and Security Institute, or SANS, they’re among the leading cybersecurity research organizations in the world, and their annual Top New Attacks and Threat Report is required reading for every security professional operating today.
What’s new for 2022
This year’s report is a little different from previous years. Rather than focusing on threat statistics from the year before (i.e., 2021 data for the 2022 report), SANS opted to focus on data from the first quarter of 2022, providing a more recent snapshot of the state of play in the threat landscape. The reason for this is probably something you could have guessed: the pandemic.
Typically, the TNAT report (we love coming up with acronyms!) is built out of a highly anticipated presentation from SANS experts at the annual RSA conference. Since the pandemic delayed the start of the RSA event this year, the folks at SANS thought it better to focus on more up-to-the-minute data for their report.
What they found is interesting — if a little concerning.
Smaller breaches, bigger risks?
In the first quarter of 2022, the average breach size was down one-third from the overall breach size in 2021 (even adjusted for seasonal shifts in breach sizes). What’s more, there are signs of a trend in breach size decline, as 2021’s overall breach size average was 5% lower than that of 2020. SANS believes this is indicative of attackers focusing on smaller targets than in previous years, particularly in the healthcare sector and in state and local government agencies.
A lower average breach size is good news, no doubt, but what it says about the intentions of attackers should have many on edge. Going after smaller — but potentially more vulnerable — organizations means those groups are less likely to have the resources to repel those attackers that larger groups would, and they pose dangers as partner organizations.
The SANS experts suggest shoring up supplier compliance by following two well-established security frameworks: the Supply Chain Risk Management Reporting Framework provided by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST’s) updated SP 800-161 Supply Chain Risk Framework.
Other key trends
The SANS report also provided telling and important data around the ways in which attackers enter your environment (phishing was the root of 51% of all breaches), as well as the success rate of multi-factor authentication — 99% — in combating phishing attacks.
The RSA panel discussion (and the subsequent report we’re sharing) also look into specific trends and best practices from some of SANS’s experts. In years past, they’ve looked at some key takeaways from the SolarWinds breach, ransomware, and machine learning vulnerabilities. This year, they’ve turned their attention to multi-factor authentication, stalkerware, and the evolution of “living off the land” attacks as they pertain to cloud infrastructure. Each of these sections is worth reading in its own right and can provide some thought-provoking resources as your security team continues to grapple with what comes next in the cloud and attacker spaces.
One space where the SANS experts chose to focus has particular importance to those seeking to mitigate ransomware: attacks on backups. Backups have long been considered your best defense against ransomware attacks because they allow your organization to securely resume use of your data should your environment become compromised (and your data be locked down). However, as backup infrastructure moves into the cloud, SANS experts believe unique attacks against these backups will become more common, because backup solutions are often quite complex and are vulnerable to specific types of threats, such as living-off-the-land attacks.
The annual SANS report is a reliable and instrumental resource for security teams which is why we are proud to be a sponsor of it (and offer it to the security community). You can dive into the full report here.
Additional reading:
New UFEI Rootkit
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/07/new-ufei-rootkit.html
Kaspersky is reporting on a new UFEI rootkit that survives reinstalling the operating system and replacing the hard drive. From an article:
The firmware compromises the UEFI, the low-level and highly opaque chain of firmware required to boot up nearly every modern computer. As the software that bridges a PC’s device firmware with its operating system, the UEFI—short for Unified Extensible Firmware Interface—is an OS in its own right. It’s located in an SPI-connected flash storage chip soldered onto the computer motherboard, making it difficult to inspect or patch the code. Because it’s the first thing to run when a computer is turned on, it influences the OS, security apps, and all other software that follows.
Both links have lots of technical details; the second contains a list of previously discovered UFEI rootkits. Also relevant are the NSA’s capabilities—now a decade old—in this area.