Tag Archives: reports

The 2021 OWASP Top 10 Have Evolved: Here’s What You Should Know

Post Syndicated from Bria Grangard original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/09/30/the-2021-owasp-top-10-have-evolved-heres-what-you-should-know/

The 2021 OWASP Top 10 Have Evolved: Here's What You Should Know

Late last week, the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) released its top 10 list of critical web application security risks. The last OWASP Top 10 came out in 2017, and in the intervening 4 years, we’ve seen a fundamental shift in application security that includes greater emphasis on securing web applications during the ever-evolving development process.

In this post, we’re going to discuss the 2021 OWASP Top 10, how the list is evolving alongside the web application security discussion, and what you should take away from this year’s Top 10. And if you want to learn more, stay tuned in the coming weeks for deeper dives into several of the main recommendations this year’s OWASP team has identified.

What is the OWASP Top 10?

The OWASP Top 10 is an awareness document that highlights the top 10 most critical web application security risks. The risks are in a ranked order based on frequency, severity, and magnitude for impact.

OWASP has maintained this list since 2003, and every few years, they update the list based on advancements in both application development and application security. Many organizations look to the OWASP Top 10 as a guide for minimizing risk.

So, what’s changed?

As mentioned above, OWASP and their Top 10 have evolved to focus more on helping developers build secure applications and work with security teams. After partnering with organizations and once again taking into consideration frequency, severity, and magnitude for risk that these vulnerabilities introduce, OWASP recently released their new OWASP Top 10 for 2021. Check out the changes below:

The 2021 OWASP Top 10 Have Evolved: Here's What You Should Know

Some of the notable changes include the introduction of new categories, consolidation, and scope changes to categories. Examples of these changes include:

  • The introduction of insecure design — We’ve seen this repeatedly highlighted as an area to watch, as the pressure mounts to continuously deliver new apps and features. An application’s architecture must take thoughtful security principles into account from the very beginning of the design process.
  • Broadened focus of injections — The new injection vulnerability category now includes 33 CWEs and many common injection types, such as SQL and NoSQL. The notable consolidation that took place this year was the inclusion of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) into the injection category.
  • Vulnerable and outdated components replace “using components with known vulnerabilities” This is an example of an expanded scope of category to include using outdated open-source libraries and their associated vulnerabilities.

What do these changes mean?

The changes to the OWASP Top 10 reflect the shifts we’ve witnessed in application development and security. As the pressure mounts for teams to deliver high-quality products faster than ever, and we see the introduction of many cloud-native technologies to facilitate the acceleration of development cycles, developers must focus on scalable security from the start.

The 2021 OWASP Top 10 highlights a strategic approach to security that includes the architecture that supports the application, as well as the APIs, data, and so much more. The methodologies for testing and monitoring your applications through development to production are also critical in this framework. The 2021 OWASP Top 10 highlights many of these changes with the adoption of best-in-class tools and practices such as shifting left, DevSecOps, and a focus on preventing risk through a combination of both testing and monitoring.

Want to learn more? Stay tuned for our follow-up blogs, where we’ll take a deeper dive into some of the OWASP Top 10 to discuss what’s changed and why these updates are important.

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SANS 2021 Threat Hunting Survey: How Organizations’ Security Postures Have Evolved in the New Normal

Post Syndicated from Margaret Wei original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/09/17/sans-2021-threat-hunting-survey-how-organizations-security-postures-have-evolved-in-the-new-normal/

SANS 2021 Threat Hunting Survey: How Organizations' Security Postures Have Evolved in the New Normal

It’s that time of year once again: The SANS Institute — the most trusted resource for cybersecurity research — has conducted its sixth annual Threat Hunting Survey, sponsored by Rapid7. The goal of this survey is to better understand the current threat hunting landscape and the benefits provided to an organization’s security posture as a result of threat hunting.

This year’s survey, “A SANS 2021 Survey: Threat Hunting in Uncertain Times,” has a unique focus, one that’s taken into consideration the impact of COVID-19 and how it’s affected organizations’ threat hunting. The findings indicate that the global pandemic has had a relatively mixed impact on the organizations surveyed, with many respondents unsure of what type of impact it’s had — and will have — on their threat hunting efforts.

Here’s a preview of the survey’s findings and its takeaways for organizations navigating today’s cybersecurity landscape.

Fewer organizations are performing threat hunting in 2021

According to the survey results, 12.6% fewer organizations are performing threat hunting in 2021 when compared to those surveyed in 2020. This is concerning, as threat hunting is an ever-evolving field, and organizations that don’t dedicate resources to it won’t be able to keep pace with the changes in tactics and techniques needed to find threat actors.

But what caused this dip? It seems to be a combination of organizations reducing their external spend with third parties and their overall internal staff in response to COVID-19. That said, this reduction cannot be fully accounted for by the pandemic.

Despite this decrease, there is good news: 93.1% of respondents indicated they have dedicated threat hunting staff, and the majority of respondents plan to increase spending on staffing and tools for threat hunting in the near future. Over the year to come, we’ll likely see an extended detection and response (XDR) approach leveraging tools like InsightIDR playing a key role in these efforts.

The threat hunting toolbox is evolving

The tools organizations are using to conduct threat hunting are evolving — but have they advanced enough to keep up with the modern cybersecurity landscape?

The output of threat hunting depends on three factors: visibility, skills, and threat intelligence. To achieve this output, threat hunters need the right tools. After asking respondents about their organizations’ tool chests, SANS found that over 75% of respondents are using a tool set that includes EDRs, SIEMs, and IDS/IPS.

It should come as no surprise that these tools are at the top — these are essential to establishing visibility. What is interesting, however, is the second-place spot taken by customizable tools, followed by threat intelligence platforms. This indicates there’s room for improvement for solutions vendors regarding threat hunting — and users are looking for deep insights. Tools like Rapid7’s cloud SIEM solution that cut through the noise and surface the threats that really matter are key in today’s complex IT environments.

Overall security posture has improved — but there’s room to grow

The improvements seen in organizations’ overall security posture as a result of threat hunting continue to show steady numbers. According to the study, organizations have seen anywhere from a 10-25% improvement in their security posture from threat hunting over the last year. In addition, 72.3% of respondents claimed threat hunting had a positive improvement on their organization over time.

These are brilliant results to see, and they reinforce the positive impact threat hunting can have, even in the face of today’s extraordinary challenges.

That said, while there are clear benefits to threat hunting, there are some barriers to success for organizations, namely:

  • Over half (51.3%) of all respondents indicated the primary barrier for them as threat hunters is a lack of skilled staff and training.
  • This was closely followed (43%) by an even split of challenges between the limitations of tools or technologies and a lack of defined processes.

Organizations can start addressing these challenges in a variety of ways, including adopting best-in-class detection and response tooling and owning documentation, education, and maintenance at scale. These are manageable barriers that will come down with time, and despite a global pandemic, the overall outlook is good, as the general trend to more threat hunting appears to sustain with this year’s survey.

Hopefully, these numbers continue to increase next year, and more organizations will reap the benefits of threat hunting.

To take a deeper dive into the survey’s findings, download the full report: A SANS 2021 Survey: Threat Hunting in Uncertain Times.

Learn more about how Rapid7’s Incident Detection and Response solutions can help you protect your organization and boost your ability to swiftly thwart attackers.

Cloud Challenges in the Age of Remote Work: Rapid7’s 2021 Cloud Misconfigurations Report

Post Syndicated from Shelby Matthews original https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/09/09/cloud-challenges-in-the-age-of-remote-work-rapid7s-2021-cloud-misconfigurations-report/

Cloud Challenges in the Age of Remote Work: Rapid7’s 2021 Cloud Misconfigurations Report

A lot changed in 2020, and the way businesses use the cloud was no exception. According to one study, 90% of organizations plan to increase their use of cloud infrastructure following the COVID-19 pandemic, and 61% are planning to optimize the way they currently use the cloud. The move to the cloud has increased organizations’ ability to innovate, but it’s also significantly impacted security risks.

Cloud misconfigurations have been among the leading sources of attacks and data breaches in recent years. One report found the top causes of cloud misconfigurations were lack of awareness of cloud security and policies, lack of adequate controls and oversight, and the presence of too many APIs and interfaces. As employees started working from home, the problem only got worse. IBM’s 2021 Cost of a Data Breach report found the difference in cost of a data breach involving remote work was 24.2% higher than those involving non-remote work.

What’s causing misconfigurations?

Rapid7 researchers found and studied 121 publicly reported cases of data exposures in 2020 that were directly caused by a misconfiguration in the organization’s cloud environment. The good news is that 62% of these cases were discovered by independent researchers and not hackers. The bad news? There are likely many more data exposures that hackers have found but the impacted organizations still don’t know about.

Here are some of our key findings:

  • A lot of misconfigurations happen because an organization wants to make access to a resource easier
  • The top three industries impacted by data exposure incidents were information, entertainment, and healthcare.
  • AWS S3 and ElasticSearch databases accounted for 45% of the incidents.
  • On average, there were 10 reported incidents a month across 15 industries.
  • The median data exposure was 10 million records.

Traditionally, security has been at the end of the cycle, allowing for vulnerabilities to get missed — but we’re here to help. InsightCloudSec is a cloud-native security platform meant to help you shift your cloud security programs left to allow security to become an earlier part of the cycle along with increasing workflow automation and reducing noise in your cloud environment.

Check out our full report that goes deeper into how and why these data breaches are occurring.

Insurance and Ransomware

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/07/insurance-and-ransomware.html

As ransomware becomes more common, I’m seeing more discussions about the ethics of paying the ransom. Here’s one more contribution to that issue: a research paper that the insurance industry is hurting more than it’s helping.

However, the most pressing challenge currently facing the industry is ransomware. Although it is a societal problem, cyber insurers have received considerable criticism for facilitating ransom payments to cybercriminals. These add fuel to the fire by incentivising cybercriminals’ engagement in ransomware operations and enabling existing operators to invest in and expand their capabilities. Growing losses from ransomware attacks have also emphasised that the current reality is not sustainable for insurers either.

To overcome these challenges and champion the positive effects of cyber insurance, this paper calls for a series of interventions from government and industry. Some in the industry favour allowing the market to mature on its own, but it will not be possible to rely on changing market forces alone. To date, the UK government has taken a light-touch approach to the cyber insurance industry. With the market undergoing changes amid growing losses, more coordinated action by government and regulators is necessary to help the industry reach its full potential.

The interventions recommended here are still relatively light, and reflect the fact that cyber insurance is only a potential incentive for managing societal cyber risk.They include: developing guidance for minimum security standards for underwriting; expanding data collection and data sharing; mandating cyber insurance for government suppliers; and creating a new collaborative approach between insurers and intelligence and law enforcement agencies around ransomware.

Finally, although a well-functioning cyber insurance industry could improve cyber security practices on a societal scale, it is not a silver bullet for the cyber security challenge. It is important to remember that the primary purpose of cyber insurance is not to improve cyber security, but to transfer residual risk. As such, it should be one of many tools that governments and businesses can draw on to manage cyber risk more effectively.

Basically, the insurance industry incents companies to do the cheapest mitigation possible. Often, that’s paying the ransom.

News article.

Banning Surveillance-Based Advertising

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/06/banning-surveillance-based-advertising.html

The Norwegian Consumer Council just published a fantastic new report: “Time to Ban Surveillance-Based Advertising.” From the Introduction:

The challenges caused and entrenched by surveillance-based advertising include, but are not limited to:

  • privacy and data protection infringements
  • opaque business models
  • manipulation and discrimination at scale
  • fraud and other criminal activity
  • serious security risks

In the following chapters, we describe various aspects of these challenges and point out how today’s dominant model of online advertising is a threat to consumers, democratic societies, the media, and even to advertisers themselves. These issues are significant and serious enough that we believe that it is time to ban these detrimental practices.

A ban on surveillance-based practices should be complemented by stronger enforcement of existing legislation, including the General Data Protection Regulation, competition regulation, and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. However, enforcement currently consumes significant time and resources, and usually happens after the damage has already been done. Banning surveillance-based advertising in general will force structural changes to the advertising industry and alleviate a number of significant harms to consumers and to society at large.

A ban on surveillance-based advertising does not mean that one can no longer finance digital content using advertising. To illustrate this, we describe some possible ways forward for advertising-funded digital content, and point to alternative advertising technologies that may contribute to a safer and healthier digital economy for both consumers and businesses.

Press release. Press coverage.

I signed their open letter.

The Future of Machine Learning and Cybersecurity

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/06/the-future-of-machine-learning-and-cybersecurity.html

The Center for Security and Emerging Technology has a new report: “Machine Learning and Cybersecurity: Hype and Reality.” Here’s the bottom line:

The report offers four conclusions:

  • Machine learning can help defenders more accurately detect and triage potential attacks. However, in many cases these technologies are elaborations on long-standing methods — not fundamentally new approaches — that bring new attack surfaces of their own.
  • A wide range of specific tasks could be fully or partially automated with the use of machine learning, including some forms of vulnerability discovery, deception, and attack disruption. But many of the most transformative of these possibilities still require significant machine learning breakthroughs.
  • Overall, we anticipate that machine learning will provide incremental advances to cyber defenders, but it is unlikely to fundamentally transform the industry barring additional breakthroughs. Some of the most transformative impacts may come from making previously un- or under-utilized defensive strategies available to more organizations.
  • Although machine learning will be neither predominantly offense-biased nor defense-biased, it may subtly alter the threat landscape by making certain types of strategies more appealing to attackers or defenders.

The Problem with Treating Data as a Commodity

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/the-problem-with-treating-data-as-a-commodity.html

Excellent Brookings paper: “Why data ownership is the wrong approach to protecting privacy.”

From the introduction:

Treating data like it is property fails to recognize either the value that varieties of personal information serve or the abiding interest that individuals have in their personal information even if they choose to “sell” it. Data is not a commodity. It is information. Any system of information rights­ — whether patents, copyrights, and other intellectual property, or privacy rights — ­presents some tension with strong interest in the free flow of information that is reflected by the First Amendment. Our personal information is in demand precisely because it has value to others and to society across a myriad of uses.

From the conclusion:

Privacy legislation should empower individuals through more layered and meaningful transparency and individual rights to know, correct, and delete personal information in databases held by others. But relying entirely on individual control will not do enough to change a system that is failing individuals, and trying to reinforce control with a property interest is likely to fail society as well. Rather than trying to resolve whether personal information belongs to individuals or to the companies that collect it, a baseline federal privacy law should directly protect the abiding interest that individuals have in that information and also enable the social benefits that flow from sharing information.

On Chinese-Owned Technology Platforms

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/on-chinese-owned-technology-platforms.html

I am a co-author on a report published by the Hoover Institution: “Chinese Technology Platforms Operating in the United States.” From a blog post:

The report suggests a comprehensive framework for understanding and assessing the risks posed by Chinese technology platforms in the United States and developing tailored responses. It starts from the common view of the signatories — one reflected in numerous publicly available threat assessments — that China’s power is growing, that a large part of that power is in the digital sphere, and that China can and will wield that power in ways that adversely affect our national security. However, the specific threats and risks posed by different Chinese technologies vary, and effective policies must start with a targeted understanding of the nature of risks and an assessment of the impact US measures will have on national security and competitiveness. The goal of the paper is not to specifically quantify the risk of any particular technology, but rather to analyze the various threats, put them into context, and offer a framework for assessing proposed responses in ways that the signatories hope can aid those doing the risk analysis in individual cases.

Router Security

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/router-security.html

This report is six months old, and I don’t know anything about the organization that produced it, but it has some alarming data about router security.

Conclusion: Our analysis showed that Linux is the most used OS running on more than 90% of the devices. However, many routers are powered by very old versions of Linux. Most devices are still powered with a 2.6 Linux kernel, which is no longer maintained for many years. This leads to a high number of critical and high severity CVEs affecting these devices.

Since Linux is the most used OS, exploit mitigation techniques could be enabled very easily. Anyhow, they are used quite rarely by most vendors except the NX feature.

A published private key provides no security at all. Nonetheless, all but one vendor spread several private keys in almost all firmware images.

Mirai used hard-coded login credentials to infect thousands of embedded devices in the last years. However, hard-coded credentials can be found in many of the devices and some of them are well known or at least easy crackable.

However, we can tell for sure that the vendors prioritize security differently. AVM does better job than the other vendors regarding most aspects. ASUS and Netgear do a better job in some aspects than D-Link, Linksys, TP-Link and Zyxel.

Additionally, our evaluation showed that large scale automated security analysis of embedded devices is possible today utilizing just open source software. To sum it up, our analysis shows that there is no router without flaws and there is no vendor who does a perfect job regarding all security aspects. Much more effort is needed to make home routers as secure as current desktop of server systems.

One comment on the report:

One-third ship with Linux kernel version 2.6.36 was released in October 2010. You can walk into a store today and buy a brand new router powered by software that’s almost 10 years out of date! This outdated version of the Linux kernel has 233 known security vulnerabilities registered in the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) database. The average router contains 26 critically-rated security vulnerabilities, according to the study.

We know the reasons for this. Most routers are designed offshore, by third parties, and then private labeled and sold by the vendors you’ve heard of. Engineering teams come together, design and build the router, and then disperse. There’s often no one around to write patches, and most of the time router firmware isn’t even patchable. The way to update your home router is to throw it away and buy a new one.

And this paper demonstrates that even the new ones aren’t likely to be secure.

Chinese Supply-Chain Attack on Computer Systems

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/chinese-supply-chain-attack-on-computer-systems.html

Bloomberg News has a major story about the Chinese hacking computer motherboards made by Supermicro, Levono, and others. It’s been going on since at least 2008. The US government has known about it for almost as long, and has tried to keep the attack secret:

China’s exploitation of products made by Supermicro, as the U.S. company is known, has been under federal scrutiny for much of the past decade, according to 14 former law enforcement and intelligence officials familiar with the matter. That included an FBI counterintelligence investigation that began around 2012, when agents started monitoring the communications of a small group of Supermicro workers, using warrants obtained under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, according to five of the officials.

There’s lots of detail in the article, and I recommend that you read it through.

This is a follow on, with a lot more detail, to a story Bloomberg reported on in fall 2018. I didn’t believe the story back then, writing:

I don’t think it’s real. Yes, it’s plausible. But first of all, if someone actually surreptitiously put malicious chips onto motherboards en masse, we would have seen a photo of the alleged chip already. And second, there are easier, more effective, and less obvious ways of adding backdoors to networking equipment.

I seem to have been wrong. From the current Bloomberg story:

Mike Quinn, a cybersecurity executive who served in senior roles at Cisco Systems Inc. and Microsoft Corp., said he was briefed about added chips on Supermicro motherboards by officials from the U.S. Air Force. Quinn was working for a company that was a potential bidder for Air Force contracts, and the officials wanted to ensure that any work would not include Supermicro equipment, he said. Bloomberg agreed not to specify when Quinn received the briefing or identify the company he was working for at the time.

“This wasn’t a case of a guy stealing a board and soldering a chip on in his hotel room; it was architected onto the final device,” Quinn said, recalling details provided by Air Force officials. The chip “was blended into the trace on a multilayered board,” he said.

“The attackers knew how that board was designed so it would pass” quality assurance tests, Quinn said.

Supply-chain attacks are the flavor of the moment, it seems. But they’re serious, and very hard to defend against in our deeply international IT industry. (I have repeatedly called this an “insurmountable problem.”) Here’s me in 2018:

Supply-chain security is an incredibly complex problem. US-only design and manufacturing isn’t an option; the tech world is far too internationally interdependent for that. We can’t trust anyone, yet we have no choice but to trust everyone. Our phones, computers, software and cloud systems are touched by citizens of dozens of different countries, any one of whom could subvert them at the demand of their government.

We need some fundamental security research here. I wrote this in 2019:

The other solution is to build a secure system, even though any of its parts can be subverted. This is what the former Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon meant in April when she said about 5G, “You have to presume a dirty network.” Or more precisely, can we solve this by building trustworthy systems out of untrustworthy parts?

It sounds ridiculous on its face, but the Internet itself was a solution to a similar problem: a reliable network built out of unreliable parts. This was the result of decades of research. That research continues today, and it’s how we can have highly resilient distributed systems like Google’s network even though none of the individual components are particularly good. It’s also the philosophy behind much of the cybersecurity industry today: systems watching one another, looking for vulnerabilities and signs of attack.

It seems that supply-chain attacks are constantly in the news right now. That’s good. They’ve been a serious problem for a long time, and we need to take the threat seriously. For further reading, I strongly recommend this Atlantic Council report from last summer: “Breaking trust: Shades of crisis across an insecure software supply chain.

A Cybersecurity Policy Agenda

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/12/a-cybersecurity-policy-agenda.html

The Aspen Institute’s Aspen Cybersecurity Group — I’m a member — has released its cybersecurity policy agenda for the next four years.

The next administration and Congress cannot simultaneously address the wide array of cybersecurity risks confronting modern society. Policymakers in the White House, federal agencies, and Congress should zero in on the most important and solvable problems. To that end, this report covers five priority areas where we believe cybersecurity policymakers should focus their attention and resources as they contend with a presidential transition, a new Congress, and massive staff turnover across our nation’s capital.

  • Education and Workforce Development
  • Public Core Resilience
  • Supply Chain Security
  • Measuring Cybersecurity
  • Promoting Operational Collaboration

Lots of detail in the 70-page report.

Ranking National Cyber Power

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/09/ranking-national-cyber-power.html

Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center published the “National Cyber Power Index 2020: Methodology and Analytical Considerations.” The rankings: 1. US, 2. China, 3. UK, 4. Russia, 5. Netherlands, 6. France, 7. Germany, 8. Canada, 9. Japan, 10. Australia, 11. Israel. More countries are in the document.

We could — and should — argue about the criteria and the methodology, but it’s good that someone is starting this conversation.

Executive Summary: The Belfer National Cyber Power Index (NCPI) measures 30 countries’ cyber capabilities in the context of seven national objectives, using 32 intent indicators and 27 capability indicators with evidence collected from publicly available data.

In contrast to existing cyber related indices, we believe there is no single measure of cyber power. Cyber Power is made up of multiple components and should be considered in the context of a country’s national objectives. We take an all-of-country approach to measuring cyber power. By considering “all-of-country” we include all aspects under the control of a government where possible. Within the NCPI we measure government strategies, capabilities for defense and offense, resource allocation, the private sector, workforce, and innovation. Our assessment is both a measurement of proven power and potential, where the final score assumes that the government of that country can wield these capabilities effectively.

The NCPI has identified seven national objectives that countries pursue using cyber means. The seven objectives are:

  1. Surveilling and Monitoring Domestic Groups;
  2. Strengthening and Enhancing National Cyber Defenses;
  3. Controlling and Manipulating the Information Environment;
  4. Foreign Intelligence Collection for National Security;
  5. Commercial Gain or Enhancing Domestic Industry Growth;
  6. Destroying or Disabling an Adversary’s Infrastructure and Capabilities; and,
  7. Defining International Cyber Norms and Technical Standards.

In contrast to the broadly held view that cyber power means destroying or disabling an adversary’s infrastructure (commonly referred to as offensive cyber operations), offense is only one of these seven objectives countries pursue using cyber means.

Survey of Supply Chain Attacks

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/07/survey_of_suppl.html

The Atlantic Council has a released a report that looks at the history of computer supply chain attacks.

Key trends from their summary:

  1. Deep Impact from State Actors: There were at least 27 different state attacks against the software supply chain including from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran as well as India, Egypt, the United States, and Vietnam.States have targeted software supply chains with great effect as the majority of cases surveyed here did, or could have, resulted in remote code execution. Examples: CCleaner, NotPetya, Kingslayer, SimDisk, and ShadowPad.
  2. Abusing Trust in Code Signing: These attacks undermine public key cryptography and certificates used to ensure the integrity of code. Overcoming these protections is a critical step to enabling everything from simple alterations of open-source code to complex nation-state espionage campaigns. Examples: ShadowHammer, Naid/McRAT, and BlackEnergy 3.

  3. Hijacking Software Updates: 27% of these attacks targeted software updates to insert malicious code against sometimes millions of targets. These attacks are generally carried out by extremely capable actors and poison updates from legitimate vendors. Examples: Flame, CCleaner 1 & 2, NotPetya, and Adobe pwdum7v71.

  4. Poisoning Open-Source Code: These incidents saw attackers either modify open-source code by gaining account access or post their own packages with names similar to common examples. Attacks targeted some of the most widely used open source tools on the internet. Examples: Cdorked/Darkleech, RubyGems Backdoor, Colourama, and JavaScript 2018 Backdoor.

  5. Targeting App Stores: 22% of these attacks targeted app stores like the Google Play Store, Apple’s App Store, and other third-party app hubs to spread malware to mobile devices. Some attacks even targeted developer tools ­ meaning every app later built using that tool was potentially compromised. Examples: ExpensiveWall, BankBot, Gooligan, Sandworm’s Android attack, and XcodeGhost.

Recommendations included in the report. The entirely open and freely available dataset is here.

Nation-State Espionage Campaigns against Middle East Defense Contractors

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/06/nation-state_es.html

Report on espionage attacks using LinkedIn as a vector for malware, with details and screenshots. They talk about “several hints suggesting a possible link” to the Lazarus group (aka North Korea), but that’s by no means definite.

As part of the initial compromise phase, the Operation In(ter)ception attackers had created fake LinkedIn accounts posing as HR representatives of well-known companies in the aerospace and defense industries. In our investigation, we’ve seen profiles impersonating Collins Aerospace (formerly Rockwell Collins) and General Dynamics, both major US corporations in the field.

Detailed report.

New Hacking-for-Hire Company in India

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/06/new_hacking-for.html

Citizen Lab has a new report on Dark Basin, a large hacking-for-hire company in India.

Key Findings:

  • Dark Basin is a hack-for-hire group that has targeted thousands of individuals and hundreds of institutions on six continents. Targets include advocacy groups and journalists, elected and senior government officials, hedge funds, and multiple industries.
  • Dark Basin extensively targeted American nonprofits, including organisations working on a campaign called #ExxonKnew, which asserted that ExxonMobil hid information about climate change for decades.

  • We also identify Dark Basin as the group behind the phishing of organizations working on net neutrality advocacy, previously reported by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

  • We link Dark Basin with high confidence to an Indian company, BellTroX InfoTech Services, and related entities.

  • Citizen Lab has notified hundreds of targeted individuals and institutions and, where possible, provided them with assistance in tracking and identifying the campaign. At the request of several targets, Citizen Lab shared information about their targeting with the US Department of Justice (DOJ). We are in the process of notifying additional targets.

BellTroX InfoTech Services has assisted clients in spying on over 10,000 email accounts around the world, including accounts of politicians, investors, journalists and activists.

News article. Boing Boing post

Theft of CIA’s "Vault Seven" Hacking Tools Due to Its Own Lousy Security

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/06/theft_of_cias_v.html

The Washington Post is reporting on an internal CIA report about its “Vault 7” security breach:

The breach — allegedly committed by a CIA employee — was discovered a year after it happened, when the information was published by WikiLeaks, in March 2017. The anti-secrecy group dubbed the release “Vault 7,” and U.S. officials have said it was the biggest unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the CIA’s history, causing the agency to shut down some intelligence operations and alerting foreign adversaries to the spy agency’s techniques.

The October 2017 report by the CIA’s WikiLeaks Task Force, several pages of which were missing or redacted, portrays an agency more concerned with bulking up its cyber arsenal than keeping those tools secure. Security procedures were “woefully lax” within the special unit that designed and built the tools, the report said.

Without the WikiLeaks disclosure, the CIA might never have known the tools had been stolen, according to the report. “Had the data been stolen for the benefit of a state adversary and not published, we might still be unaware of the loss,” the task force concluded.

The task force report was provided to The Washington Post by the office of Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who has pressed for stronger cybersecurity in the intelligence community. He obtained the redacted, incomplete copy from the Justice Department.

It’s all still up on WikiLeaks.

The DoD Isn’t Fixing Its Security Problems

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/04/the_dod_isnt_fi.html

It has produced several reports outlining what’s wrong and what needs to be fixed. It’s not fixing them:

GAO looked at three DoD-designed initiatives to see whether the Pentagon is following through on its own goals. In a majority of cases, DoD has not completed the cybersecurity training and awareness tasks it set out to. The status of various efforts is simply unknown because no one has tracked their progress. While an assessment of “cybersecurity hygiene” like this doesn’t directly analyze a network’s hardware and software vulnerabilities, it does underscore the need for people who use digital systems to interact with them in secure ways. Especially when those people work on national defense.

[…]

The report focuses on three ongoing DoD cybersecurity hygiene initiatives. The 2015 Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance Initiative outlined 11 education-related goals for 2016; the GAO found that the Pentagon completed only four of them. Similarly, the 2015 Cyber Discipline plan outlined 17 goals related to detecting and eliminating preventable vulnerabilities from DoD’s networks by the end of 2018. GAO found that DoD has met only six of those. Four are still pending, and the status of the seven others is unknown, because no one at DoD has kept track of the progress.

GAO repeatedly identified lack of status updates and accountability as core issues within DoD’s cybersecurity awareness and education efforts. It was unclear in many cases who had completed which training modules. There were even DoD departments lacking information on which users should have their network access revoked for failure to complete trainings.

The report.

Bug Bounty Programs Are Being Used to Buy Silence

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/04/bug_bounty_prog.html

Investigative report on how commercial bug-bounty programs like HackerOne, Bugcrowd, and SynAck are being used to silence researchers:

Used properly, bug bounty platforms connect security researchers with organizations wanting extra scrutiny. In exchange for reporting a security flaw, the researcher receives payment (a bounty) as a thank you for doing the right thing. However, CSO’s investigation shows that the bug bounty platforms have turned bug reporting and disclosure on its head, what multiple expert sources, including HackerOne’s former chief policy officer, Katie Moussouris, call a “perversion.”

[…]

Silence is the commodity the market appears to be demanding, and the bug bounty platforms have pivoted to sell what willing buyers want to pay for.

“Bug bounties are best when transparent and open. The more you try to close them down and place NDAs on them, the less effective they are, the more they become about marketing rather than security,” Robert Graham of Errata Security tells CSO.

Leitschuh, the Zoom bug finder, agrees. “This is part of the problem with the bug bounty platforms as they are right now. They aren’t holding companies to a 90-day disclosure deadline,” he says. “A lot of these programs are structured on this idea of non-disclosure. What I end up feeling like is that they are trying to buy researcher silence.”

The bug bounty platforms’ NDAs prohibit even mentioning the existence of a private bug bounty. Tweeting something like “Company X has a private bounty program over at Bugcrowd” would be enough to get a hacker kicked off their platform.

The carrot for researcher silence is the money — bounties can range from a few hundred to tens of thousands of dollars — but the stick to enforce silence is “safe harbor,” an organization’s public promise not to sue or criminally prosecute a security researcher attempting to report a bug in good faith.