Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/security-vulnerabilities-in-snipping-tools.html
Both Google’s Pixel’s Markup Tool and the Windows Snipping Tool have vulnerabilities that allow people to partially recover content that was edited out of images.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/hacks-at-pwn2own-vancouver-2023.html
An impressive array of hacks were demonstrated at the first day of the Pwn2Own conference in Vancouver:
On the first day of Pwn2Own Vancouver 2023, security researchers successfully demoed Tesla Model 3, Windows 11, and macOS zero-day exploits and exploit chains to win $375,000 and a Tesla Model 3.
The first to fall was Adobe Reader in the enterprise applications category after Haboob SA’s Abdul Aziz Hariri (@abdhariri) used an exploit chain targeting a 6-bug logic chain abusing multiple failed patches which escaped the sandbox and bypassed a banned API list on macOS to earn $50,000.
The STAR Labs team (@starlabs_sg) demoed a zero-day exploit chain targeting Microsoft’s SharePoint team collaboration platform that brought them a $100,000 reward and successfully hacked Ubuntu Desktop with a previously known exploit for $15,000.
Synacktiv (@Synacktiv) took home $100,000 and a Tesla Model 3 after successfully executing a TOCTOU (time-of-check to time-of-use) attack against the Tesla-Gateway in the Automotive category. They also used a TOCTOU zero-day vulnerability to escalate privileges on Apple macOS and earned $40,000.
Oracle VirtualBox was hacked using an OOB Read and a stacked-based buffer overflow exploit chain (worth $40,000) by Qrious Security’s Bien Pham (@bienpnn).
Last but not least, Marcin Wiązowski elevated privileges on Windows 11 using an improper input validation zero-day that came with a $30,000 prize.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/friday-squid-blogging-creating-batteries-out-of-squid-cells.html
This is fascinating:
“When a squid ends up chipping what’s called its ring tooth, which is the nail underneath its tentacle, it needs to regrow that tooth very rapidly, otherwise it can’t claw its prey,” he explains.
This was intriguing news and it sparked an idea in Hopkins lab where he’d been trying to figure out how to store and transmit heat.
“It diffuses in all directions. There’s no way to capture the heat and move it the way that you would electricity. It’s just not a fundamental law of physics.”
[…]
The tiny brown batteries he mentions are about the size of a chiclet, and Hopkins says it will take a decade or more to create larger batteries that could have commercial value.
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.
Read my blog posting guidelines here.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/a-hackers-mind-news-2.html
My latest book continues to sell well. Its ranking hovers between 1,500 and 2,000 on Amazon. It’s been spied in airports.
Reviews are consistently good. I have been enjoying giving podcast interviews. It all feels pretty good right now.
You can order a signed book from me here.
For those of you in New York, I’m giving at book talk at the Ford Foundation on Thursday, April 6. Admission is free, but you have to register.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/exploding-usb-sticks.html
In case you don’t have enough to worry about, people are hiding explosives—actual ones—in USB sticks:
In the port city of Guayaquil, journalist Lenin Artieda of the Ecuavisa private TV station received an envelope containing a pen drive which exploded when he inserted it into a computer, his employer said.
Artieda sustained slight injuries to one hand and his face, said police official Xavier Chango. No one else was hurt.
Chango said the USB drive sent to Artieda could have been loaded with RDX, a military-type explosive.
More:
According to police official Xavier Chango, the flash drive that went off had a 5-volt explosive charge and is thought to have used RDX. Also known as T4, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (PDF), militaries, including the US’s, use RDX, which “can be used alone as a base charge for detonators or mixed with other explosives, such as TNT.” Chango said it comes in capsules measuring about 1 cm, but only half of it was activated in the drive that Artieda plugged in, which likely saved him some harm.
Reminds me of assassination by cell phone.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/mass-ransomware-attack.html
A vulnerability in a popular data transfer tool has resulted in a mass ransomware attack:
TechCrunch has learned of dozens of organizations that used the affected GoAnywhere file transfer software at the time of the ransomware attack, suggesting more victims are likely to come forward.
However, while the number of victims of the mass-hack is widening, the known impact is murky at best.
Since the attack in late January or early February—the exact date is not known—Clop has disclosed less than half of the 130 organizations it claimed to have compromised via GoAnywhere, a system that can be hosted in the cloud or on an organization’s network that allows companies to securely transfer huge sets of data and other large files.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/chatgpt-privacy-flaw.html
OpenAI has disabled ChatGPT’s privacy history, almost certainly because they had a security flaw where users were seeing each others’ histories.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/us-citizen-hacked-by-spyware.html
The New York Times is reporting that a US citizen’s phone was hacked by the Predator spyware.
A U.S. and Greek national who worked on Meta’s security and trust team while based in Greece was placed under a yearlong wiretap by the Greek national intelligence service and hacked with a powerful cyberespionage tool, according to documents obtained by The New York Times and officials with knowledge of the case.
The disclosure is the first known case of an American citizen being targeted in a European Union country by the advanced snooping technology, the use of which has been the subject of a widening scandal in Greece. It demonstrates that the illicit use of spyware is spreading beyond use by authoritarian governments against opposition figures and journalists, and has begun to creep into European democracies, even ensnaring a foreign national working for a major global corporation.
The simultaneous tapping of the target’s phone by the national intelligence service and the way she was hacked indicate that the spy service and whoever implanted the spyware, known as Predator, were working hand in hand.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/friday-squid-blogging-new-species-of-vampire-squid-lives-3000-feet-below-sea-level.html
At least, it seems to be a new species.
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.
Read my blog posting guidelines here.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/netwire-remote-access-trojan-maker-arrested.html
From Brian Krebs:
A Croatian national has been arrested for allegedly operating NetWire, a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) marketed on cybercrime forums since 2012 as a stealthy way to spy on infected systems and siphon passwords. The arrest coincided with a seizure of the NetWire sales website by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While the defendant in this case hasn’t yet been named publicly, the NetWire website has been leaking information about the likely true identity and location of its owner for the past 11 years.
The article details the mistakes that led to the person’s address.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/friday-squid-blogging-chinese-squid-fishing-in-the-southeast-pacific.html
Chinese squid fishing boats are overwhelming Ecuador and Peru.
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.
Read my blog posting guidelines here.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/elephant-hackers.html
An elephant uses its right-of-way privileges to stop sugar-cane trucks and grab food.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/another-malware-with-persistence.html
Here’s a piece of Chinese malware that infects SonicWall security appliances and survives firmware updates.
On Thursday, security firm Mandiant published a report that said threat actors with a suspected nexus to China were engaged in a campaign to maintain long-term persistence by running malware on unpatched SonicWall SMA appliances. The campaign was notable for the ability of the malware to remain on the devices even after its firmware received new firmware.
“The attackers put significant effort into the stability and persistence of their tooling,” Mandiant researchers Daniel Lee, Stephen Eckels, and Ben Read wrote. “This allows their access to the network to persist through firmware updates and maintain a foothold on the network through the SonicWall Device.”
To achieve this persistence, the malware checks for available firmware upgrades every 10 seconds. When an update becomes available, the malware copies the archived file for backup, unzips it, mounts it, and then copies the entire package of malicious files to it. The malware also adds a backdoor root user to the mounted file. Then, the malware rezips the file so it’s ready for installation.
“The technique is not especially sophisticated, but it does show considerable effort on the part of the attacker to understand the appliance update cycle, then develop and test a method for persistence,” the researchers wrote.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/blacklotus-malware-hijacks-windows-secure-boot-process.html
Researchers have discovered malware that “can hijack a computer’s boot process even when Secure Boot and other advanced protections are enabled and running on fully updated versions of Windows.”
Dubbed BlackLotus, the malware is what’s known as a UEFI bootkit. These sophisticated pieces of malware target the UEFI—short for Unified Extensible Firmware Interface—the low-level and complex chain of firmware responsible for booting up virtually every modern computer. As the mechanism that bridges a PC’s device firmware with its operating system, the UEFI is an OS in its own right. It’s located in an SPI-connected flash storage chip soldered onto the computer motherboard, making it difficult to inspect or patch. Previously discovered bootkits such as CosmicStrand, MosaicRegressor, and MoonBounce work by targeting the UEFI firmware stored in the flash storage chip. Others, including BlackLotus, target the software stored in the EFI system partition.
Because the UEFI is the first thing to run when a computer is turned on, it influences the OS, security apps, and all other software that follows. These traits make the UEFI the perfect place to launch malware. When successful, UEFI bootkits disable OS security mechanisms and ensure that a computer remains infected with stealthy malware that runs at the kernel mode or user mode, even after the operating system is reinstalled or a hard drive is replaced.
ESET has an analysis:
The number of UEFI vulnerabilities discovered in recent years and the failures in patching them or revoking vulnerable binaries within a reasonable time window hasn’t gone unnoticed by threat actors. As a result, the first publicly known UEFI bootkit bypassing the essential platform security feature—UEFI Secure Boot—is now a reality. In this blogpost we present the first public analysis of this UEFI bootkit, which is capable of running on even fully-up-to-date Windows 11 systems with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. Functionality of the bootkit and its individual features leads us to believe that we are dealing with a bootkit known as BlackLotus, the UEFI bootkit being sold on hacking forums for $5,000 since at least October 2022.
[…]
- It’s capable of running on the latest, fully patched Windows 11 systems with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
- It exploits a more than one year old vulnerability (CVE-2022-21894) to bypass UEFI Secure Boot and set up persistence for the bootkit. This is the first publicly known, in-the-wild abuse of this vulnerability.
- Although the vulnerability was fixed in Microsoft’s January 2022 update, its exploitation is still possible as the affected, validly signed binaries have still not been added to the UEFI revocation list. BlackLotus takes advantage of this, bringing its own copies of legitimate—but vulnerable—binaries to the system in order to exploit the vulnerability.
- It’s capable of disabling OS security mechanisms such as BitLocker, HVCI, and Windows Defender.
- Once installed, the bootkit’s main goal is to deploy a kernel driver (which, among other things, protects the bootkit from removal), and an HTTP downloader responsible for communication with the C&C and capable of loading additional user-mode or kernel-mode payloads.
This is impressive stuff.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/prompt-injection-attacks-on-large-language-models.html
This is a good survey on prompt injection attacks on large language models (like ChatGPT).
Abstract: We are currently witnessing dramatic advances in the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). They are already being adopted in practice and integrated into many systems, including integrated development environments (IDEs) and search engines. The functionalities of current LLMs can be modulated via natural language prompts, while their exact internal functionality remains implicit and unassessable. This property, which makes them adaptable to even unseen tasks, might also make them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting. Recently, several ways to misalign LLMs using Prompt Injection (PI) attacks have been introduced. In such attacks, an adversary can prompt the LLM to produce malicious content or override the original instructions and the employed filtering schemes. Recent work showed that these attacks are hard to mitigate, as state-of-the-art LLMs are instruction-following. So far, these attacks assumed that the adversary is directly prompting the LLM.
In this work, we show that augmenting LLMs with retrieval and API calling capabilities (so-called Application-Integrated LLMs) induces a whole new set of attack vectors. These LLMs might process poisoned content retrieved from the Web that contains malicious prompts pre-injected and selected by adversaries. We demonstrate that an attacker can indirectly perform such PI attacks. Based on this key insight, we systematically analyze the resulting threat landscape of Application-Integrated LLMs and discuss a variety of new attack vectors. To demonstrate the practical viability of our attacks, we implemented specific demonstrations of the proposed attacks within synthetic applications. In summary, our work calls for an urgent evaluation of current mitigation techniques and an investigation of whether new techniques are needed to defend LLMs against these threats.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/new-national-cybersecurity-strategy.html
Last week, the Biden administration released a new National Cybersecurity Strategy (summary here). There is lots of good commentary out there. It’s basically a smart strategy, but the hard parts are always the implementation details. It’s one thing to say that we need to secure our cloud infrastructure, and another to detail what the means technically, who pays for it, and who verifies that it’s been done.
One of the provisions getting the most attention is a move to shift liability to software vendors, something I’ve been advocating for since at least 2003.
Slashdot thread.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/friday-squid-blogging-were-almost-at-flying-squid-drones.html
Researchers are prototyping multi-segment shapeshifter drones, which are “the precursors to flying squid-bots.”
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.
Read my blog posting guidelines here.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/nick-weaver-on-regulating-cryptocurrency.html
Nicholas Weaver wrote an excellent paper on the problems of cryptocurrencies and the need to regulate the space—with all existing regulations. His conclusion:
Regulators, especially regulators in the United States, often fear accusations of stifling innovation. As such, the cryptocurrency space has grown over the past decade with very little regulatory oversight.
But fortunately for regulators, there is no actual innovation to stifle. Cryptocurrencies cannot revolutionize payments or finance, as the basic nature of all cryptocurrencies render them fundamentally unsuitable to revolutionize our financial system—which, by the way, already has decades of successful experience with digital payments and electronic money. The supposedly “decentralized” and “trustless” cryptocurrency systems, both technically and socially, fail to provide meaningful benefits to society—and indeed, necessarily also fail in their foundational claims of decentralization and trustlessness.
When regulating cryptocurrencies, the best starting point is history. Regulating various tokens is best done through the existing securities law framework, an area where the US has a near century of well-established law. It starts with regulating the issuance of new cryptocurrency tokens and related securities. This should substantially reduce the number of fraudulent offerings.
Similarly, active regulation of the cryptocurrency exchanges should offer substantial benefits, including eliminating significant consumer risk, blocking key money-laundering channels, and overall producing a far more regulated and far less manipulated market.
Finally, the stablecoins need basic regulation as money transmitters. Unless action is taken they risk becoming substantial conduits for money laundering, but requiring them to treat all users as customers should prevent this risk from developing further.
Read the whole thing.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/dumb-password-rules.html
Examples of dumb password rules.
There are some pretty bad disasters out there.
My worst experiences are with sites that have artificial complexity requirements that cause my personal password-generation systems to fail. Some of the systems on the list are even worse: when they fail they don’t tell you why, so you just have to guess until you get it right.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/fooling-a-voice-authentication-system-with-an-ai-generated-voice.html
A reporter used an AI synthesis of his own voice to fool the voice authentication system for Lloyd’s Bank.