Tag Archives: cryptocurrency

Some Claude Chats Are Searchable on Google

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/08/some-claude-chats-are-searchable-on-google.html

And it’s personal information (alternate link):

The exposed data includes an AI-powered therapy app that someone appears to have vibe-coded, notes on meetings, and a dashboard someone made apparently to analyze medical billing data. Exposed chats reportedly include private cryptocurrency wallet keys and personal information like peoples’ addresses.

What seems to be the issue is a user setting about data sharing. Anthropic’s position is that it’s not their problem:

“We give people control over sharing their Claude conversations publicly, and in keeping with our privacy principles, we do not share chat directories or sitemaps with search engines like Google,” the company said in a statement. “These shareable links are not guessable or discoverable unless people choose to share them themselves. When someone shares a conversation, they are making that content publicly accessible, and like other public web content, it may be archived by third-party services.”

Here’s how to fix it.

Critical Zcash Vulnerability Found and Fixed

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/06/critical-zcash-vulnerability-found-and-fixed.html

If you’re a user—owner?—of this cryptocurrency, this is important:

On May 29, the security researcher Taylor Hornby found a critical vulnerability in Zcash Orchard privacy pool using Claude Opus 4.8. The Zcash team hired Hornby specifically to look for this kind of issue. He found one fast enough to be embarrassing.

The Orchard pool is the newest and most advanced shielded transaction system in the cryptocurrency Zcash. Introduced in 2022, it allows users to send and receive ZEC while keeping transaction details private. It uses zero-knowledge proofs to validate transactions without revealing amounts or participants. The bug: a specific check that was supposed to validate transaction inputs wasn’t actually enforcing the rules it appeared to enforce. An attacker could have exploited the flaw to feed false inputs into that check and generate ZEC from nothing, with the zero-knowledge proof system blessing the fraudulent transaction as valid.

It’s fixed; that’s the good news. The bad news is that there’s no way of knowing if anyone exploited the vulnerability to steal money. And this fragility is the fundamental problem that makes blockchain such a bad idea.

Is “Satoshi Nakamoto” Really Adam Back?

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/04/is-satoshi-nakamoto-really-adam-back.html

The New York Times has a long article where the author lays out an impressive array of circumstantial evidence that the inventor of Bitcoin is the cypherpunk Adam Back.

I don’t know. The article is convincing, but it’s written to be convincing.

I can’t remember if I ever met Adam. I was a member of the Cypherpunks mailing list for a while, but I was never really an active participant. I spent more time on the Usenet newsgroup sci.crypt. I knew a bunch of the Cypherpunks, though, from various conferences around the world at the time. I really have no opinion about who Satoshi Nakamoto really is.

Possible US Government iPhone Hacking Tool Leaked

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/04/possible-us-government-iphone-hacking-tool-leaked.html

Wired writes (alternate source):

Security researchers at Google on Tuesday released a report describing what they’re calling “Coruna,” a highly sophisticated iPhone hacking toolkit that includes five complete hacking techniques capable of bypassing all the defenses of an iPhone to silently install malware on a device when it visits a website containing the exploitation code. In total, Coruna takes advantage of 23 distinct vulnerabilities in iOS, a rare collection of hacking components that suggests it was created by a well-resourced, likely state-sponsored group of hackers.

[…]

Coruna’s code also appears to have been originally written by English-speaking coders, notes iVerify’s cofounder Rocky Cole. “It’s highly sophisticated, took millions of dollars to develop, and it bears the hallmarks of other modules that have been publicly attributed to the US government,” Cole tells WIRED. “This is the first example we’ve seen of very likely US government tools­based on what the code is telling us­spinning out of control and being used by both our adversaries and cybercriminal groups.”

TechCrunch reports that Coruna is definitely of US origin:

Two former employees of government contractor L3Harris told TechCrunch that Coruna was, at least in part, developed by the company’s hacking and surveillance tech division, Trenchant. The two former employees both had knowledge of the company’s iPhone hacking tools. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to talk about their work for the company.

It’s always super interesting to see what malware looks like when it’s created through a professional software development process. And the TechCrunch article has some speculation as to how the US lost control of it. It seems that an employee of L3Harris’s surviellance tech division, Trenchant, sold it to the Russian government.

South Korean Police Accidentally Post Cryptocurrency Wallet Password

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/03/south-korean-police-accidentally-post-cryptocurrency-wallet-password.html

An expensive mistake:

Someone jumped at the opportunity to steal $4.4 million in crypto assets after South Korea’s National Tax Service exposed publicly the mnemonic recovery phrase of a seized cryptocurrency wallet.

The funds were stored in a Ledger cold wallet seized in law enforcement raids at 124 high-value tax evaders that resulted in confiscating digital assets worth 8.1 billion won (currently approximately $5.6 million).

When announcing the success of the operation, the agency released photos of a Ledger device, a popular hardware wallet for crypto storage and management.

However, the images also showed a handwritten note of the wallet recovery phrase, which serves as the master key that allows restoring the assets to another device.

The authorities failed to redact that info, allowing anyone to transfer into their account the assets in the cold wallet.

Reportedly, shortly after the press release was published, 4 million Pre-Retogeum (PRTG) tokens, worth approximately $4.8 million at the time, were transferred out of the confiscated wallet to a new address.

Phishing Attacks Against People Seeking Programming Jobs

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/02/phishing-attacks-against-people-seeking-programming-jobs.html

This is new. North Korean hackers are posing as company recruiters, enticing job candidates to participate in coding challenges. When they run the code they are supposed to work on, it installs malware on their system.

News article.

Cryptocurrency ATMs

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2025/10/cryptocurrency-atms.html

CNN has a great piece about how cryptocurrency ATMs are used to scam people out of their money. The fees are usurious, and they’re a common place for scammers to send victims to buy cryptocurrency for them. The companies behind the ATMs, at best, do not care about the harm they cause; the profits are just too good.

North Korean Hackers Steal $1.5B in Cryptocurrency

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2025/02/north-korean-hackers-steal-1-5b-in-cryptocurrency.html

It looks like a very sophisticated attack against the Dubai-based exchange Bybit:

Bybit officials disclosed the theft of more than 400,000 ethereum and staked ethereum coins just hours after it occurred. The notification said the digital loot had been stored in a “Multisig Cold Wallet” when, somehow, it was transferred to one of the exchange’s hot wallets. From there, the cryptocurrency was transferred out of Bybit altogether and into wallets controlled by the unknown attackers.

[…]

…a subsequent investigation by Safe found no signs of unauthorized access to its infrastructure, no compromises of other Safe wallets, and no obvious vulnerabilities in the Safe codebase. As investigators continued to dig in, they finally settled on the true cause. Bybit ultimately said that the fraudulent transaction was “manipulated by a sophisticated attack that altered the smart contract logic and masked the signing interface, enabling the attacker to gain control of the ETH Cold Wallet.”

The announcement on the Bybit website is almost comical. This is the headline: “Incident Update: Unauthorized Activity Involving ETH Cold Wallet.”

More:

This hack sets a new precedent in crypto security by bypassing a multisig cold wallet without exploiting any smart contract vulnerability. Instead, it exploited human trust and UI deception:

  • Multisigs are no longer a security guarantee if signers can be compromised.
  • Cold wallets aren’t automatically safe if an attacker can manipulate what a signer sees.
  • Supply chain and UI manipulation attacks are becoming more sophisticated.

The Bybit hack has shattered long-held assumptions about crypto security. No matter how strong your smart contract logic or multisig protections are, the human element remains the weakest link. This attack proves that UI manipulation and social engineering can bypass even the most secure wallets. The industry needs to move to end to end prevention, each transaction must be validated.

Perfectl Malware

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/10/perfectl-malware.html

Perfectl in an impressive piece of malware:

The malware has been circulating since at least 2021. It gets installed by exploiting more than 20,000 common misconfigurations, a capability that may make millions of machines connected to the Internet potential targets, researchers from Aqua Security said. It can also exploit CVE-2023-33246, a vulnerability with a severity rating of 10 out of 10 that was patched last year in Apache RocketMQ, a messaging and streaming platform that’s found on many Linux machines.

The researchers are calling the malware Perfctl, the name of a malicious component that surreptitiously mines cryptocurrency. The unknown developers of the malware gave the process a name that combines the perf Linux monitoring tool and ctl, an abbreviation commonly used with command line tools. A signature characteristic of Perfctl is its use of process and file names that are identical or similar to those commonly found in Linux environments. The naming convention is one of the many ways the malware attempts to escape notice of infected users.

Perfctl further cloaks itself using a host of other tricks. One is that it installs many of its components as rootkits, a special class of malware that hides its presence from the operating system and administrative tools. Other stealth mechanisms include:

  • Stopping activities that are easy to detect when a new user logs in
  • Using a Unix socket over TOR for external communications
  • Deleting its installation binary after execution and running as a background service thereafter
  • Manipulating the Linux process pcap_loop through a technique known as hooking to prevent admin tools from recording the malicious traffic
  • Suppressing mesg errors to avoid any visible warnings during execution.

The malware is designed to ensure persistence, meaning the ability to remain on the infected machine after reboots or attempts to delete core components. Two such techniques are (1) modifying the ~/.profile script, which sets up the environment during user login so the malware loads ahead of legitimate workloads expected to run on the server and (2) copying itself from memory to multiple disk locations. The hooking of pcap_loop can also provide persistence by allowing malicious activities to continue even after primary payloads are detected and removed.

Besides using the machine resources to mine cryptocurrency, Perfctl also turns the machine into a profit-making proxy that paying customers use to relay their Internet traffic. Aqua Security researchers have also observed the malware serving as a backdoor to install other families of malware.

Something this complex and impressive implies that a government is behind this. North Korea is the government we know that hacks cryptocurrency in order to fund its operations. But this feels too complex for that. I have no idea how to attribute this.

Criminal Gang Physically Assaulting People for Their Cryptocurrency

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/07/criminal-gang-physically-assaulting-people-for-their-cryptocurrency.html

This is pretty horrific:

…a group of men behind a violent crime spree designed to compel victims to hand over access to their cryptocurrency savings. That announcement and the criminal complaint laying out charges against St. Felix focused largely on a single theft of cryptocurrency from an elderly North Carolina couple, whose home St. Felix and one of his accomplices broke into before physically assaulting the two victims—­both in their seventies—­and forcing them to transfer more than $150,000 in Bitcoin and Ether to the thieves’ crypto wallets.

I think cryptocurrencies are more susceptible to this kind of real-world attack because they are largely outside the conventional banking system. Yet another reason to stay away from them.

Breaking a Password Manager

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/06/breaking-a-password-manager.html

Interesting story of breaking the security of the RoboForm password manager in order to recover a cryptocurrency wallet password.

Grand and Bruno spent months reverse engineering the version of the RoboForm program that they thought Michael had used in 2013 and found that the pseudo-random number generator used to generate passwords in that version—­and subsequent versions until 2015­—did indeed have a significant flaw that made the random number generator not so random. The RoboForm program unwisely tied the random passwords it generated to the date and time on the user’s computer­—it determined the computer’s date and time, and then generated passwords that were predictable. If you knew the date and time and other parameters, you could compute any password that would have been generated on a certain date and time in the past.

If Michael knew the day or general time frame in 2013 when he generated it, as well as the parameters he used to generate the password (for example, the number of characters in the password, including lower- and upper-case letters, figures, and special characters), this would narrow the possible password guesses to a manageable number. Then they could hijack the RoboForm function responsible for checking the date and time on a computer and get it to travel back in time, believing the current date was a day in the 2013 time frame when Michael generated his password. RoboForm would then spit out the same passwords it generated on the days in 2013.

Using Hacked LastPass Keys to Steal Cryptocurrency

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/09/using-hacked-lastpass-keys-to-steal-cryptocurrency.html

Remember last November, when hackers broke into the network for LastPass—a password database—and stole password vaults with both encrypted and plaintext data for over 25 million users?

Well, they’re now using that data break into crypto wallets and drain them: $35 million and counting, all going into a single wallet.

That’s a really profitable hack. (It’s also bad opsec. The hackers need to move and launder all that money quickly.)

Look, I know that online password databases are more convenient. But they’re also risky. This is why my Password Safe is local only. (I know this sounds like a commercial, but Password Safe is not a commercial product.)

Cryptocurrency Startup Loses Encryption Key for Electronic Wallet

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/09/cryptocurrency-startup-loses-encryption-key-for-electronic-wallet.html

The cryptocurrency fintech startup Prime Trust lost the encryption key to its hardware wallet—and the recovery key—and therefore $38.9 million. It is now in bankruptcy.

I can’t understand why anyone thinks these technologies are a good idea.

Cryptographic Flaw in Libbitcoin Explorer Cryptocurrency Wallet

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/08/cryptographic-flaw-in-libbitcoin-explorer-cryptocurrency-wallet.html

Cryptographic flaws still matter. Here’s a flaw in the random-number generator used to create private keys. The seed has only 32 bits of entropy.

Seems like this flaw is being exploited in the wild.

EDITED TO ADD (8/14): A good explainer.

North Korea Hacking Cryptocurrency Sites with 3CX Exploit

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/04/north-korea-hacking-cryptocurrency-sites-with-3cx-exploit.html

News:

Researchers at Russian cybersecurity firm Kaspersky today revealed that they identified a small number of cryptocurrency-focused firms as at least some of the victims of the 3CX software supply-chain attack that’s unfolded over the past week. Kaspersky declined to name any of those victim companies, but it notes that they’re based in “western Asia.”

Security firms CrowdStrike and SentinelOne last week pinned the operation on North Korean hackers, who compromised 3CX installer software that’s used by 600,000 organizations worldwide, according to the vendor. Despite the potentially massive breadth of that attack, which SentinelOne dubbed “Smooth Operator,” Kaspersky has now found that the hackers combed through the victims infected with its corrupted software to ultimately target fewer than 10 machines­—at least as far as Kaspersky could observe so far—­and that they seemed to be focusing on cryptocurrency firms with “surgical precision.”

Nick Weaver on Regulating Cryptocurrency

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/03/nick-weaver-on-regulating-cryptocurrency.html

Nicholas Weaver wrote an excellent paper on the problems of cryptocurrencies and the need to regulate the space—with all existing regulations. His conclusion:

Regulators, especially regulators in the United States, often fear accusations of stifling innovation. As such, the cryptocurrency space has grown over the past decade with very little regulatory oversight.

But fortunately for regulators, there is no actual innovation to stifle. Cryptocurrencies cannot revolutionize payments or finance, as the basic nature of all cryptocurrencies render them fundamentally unsuitable to revolutionize our financial system—which, by the way, already has decades of successful experience with digital payments and electronic money. The supposedly “decentralized” and “trustless” cryptocurrency systems, both technically and socially, fail to provide meaningful benefits to society—and indeed, necessarily also fail in their foundational claims of decentralization and trustlessness.

When regulating cryptocurrencies, the best starting point is history. Regulating various tokens is best done through the existing securities law framework, an area where the US has a near century of well-established law. It starts with regulating the issuance of new cryptocurrency tokens and related securities. This should substantially reduce the number of fraudulent offerings.

Similarly, active regulation of the cryptocurrency exchanges should offer substantial benefits, including eliminating significant consumer risk, blocking key money-laundering channels, and overall producing a far more regulated and far less manipulated market.

Finally, the stablecoins need basic regulation as money transmitters. Unless action is taken they risk becoming substantial conduits for money laundering, but requiring them to treat all users as customers should prevent this risk from developing further.

Read the whole thing.