Welcome to the 26th edition of Cloudflare's DDoS Threat Report. This edition covers the third quarter of 2026 — July, August, and September — and returns the series to its quarterly cadence following the combined H1 2026 volume. The analysis is produced by Cloudforce One, Cloudflare's Threat Intelligence organization, providing a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat landscape of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on data from the Cloudflare network.
Key insights
Short-burst, low-bandwidth attacks lasting under 10 minutes and 1 Gbps surged by 208%. Conversely, hyper-volumetric attacks exceeding 1 Tbps plummeted by nearly 69% from Q2, possibly a reflection of law enforcement actions against four major Internet of Things (IoT) botnets earlier in the year. However, variants continue to emerge, proving that IoT botnets remain a durable, high-volume threat to network infrastructure.
Threat actors dramatically shifted their reflection and amplification tactics, abruptly abandoning CLDAP floods, which collapsed by 99.5% quarter-over-quarter. Instead, attackers pivoted heavily toward other connectionless protocols, driving a 215% surge in DNS amplification and a 122% increase in general UDP floods.
Attack targets broadened significantly across both industries and geographies, with the United States reclaiming the most-attacked position from China. Canada and Israel experienced sharp spikes in targeted attacks — jumping 10 and 7 spots respectively — while juggling geopolitical tensions, trade disputes, and contentious domestic events. At the same time, the operational focus shifted away from media organizations toward a wider array of industry targets, including consumer services, Internet infrastructure, and adult entertainment.
Q3 by the numbers: 8,200 DDoS attacks every hour
Across its network in the third quarter of 2026, Cloudflare autonomously mitigated 18.2 million network-layer DDoS attacks and 14.4 trillion HTTP DDoS requests. That works out to approximately 8,226 network-layer DDoS attacks per hour, or about 197,400 per day — one attack every 0.44 seconds. The quarter's mitigated traffic totaled 272.6 PB at the network layer and 95.1 PB at the HTTP layer.
More swarms, fewer giants
Short-burst, mid-range, high-count attacks — the operational signature of DDoS-for-hire "booter" services — accelerated this quarter. These attacks primarily targeted computer software, gambling and casinos, and information technology industries. Cloudflare autonomously mitigated 18.2 million network-layer DDoS attacks in Q3 2026, a +208% increase from the same quarter in 2025:
96% ended in under 10 minutes
98% stayed under 1 Gbps, more than enough to overwhelm a server or website
On the other hand, network-level hyper-volumetric attacks (those exceeding 1 Tbps) reversed course, dropping to 251 attacks in Q3 from 805 in Q2 — coinciding with law enforcement action in early 2026 that dismantled four of the largest IoT DDoS botnets: Aisuru, KimWolf, JackSkid, and Mossad.
Still, IoT-based botnets remain a durable high-volume threat as the ecosystem churns through new variants such as Dysphoria and Evooo1Bot. Mirai-classified mitigation peaked in August at 57.23 PB, representing 46.5% of all mitigated network-layer bytes in Q3, including four days — August 16, 19, 23, and 25 — that each cleared three petabytes. The quarter's longest sustained Mirai attack ran 49.7 hours between August 19 and August 21.
Vector shifts: the collapse of CLDAP and rise of UDP
The most dramatic vector shift of the quarter was downward. CLDAP (Connectionless Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) attacks — where small queries with a forged victim IP address trick public domain controllers (UDP 389) into reflecting massive, amplified responses back at the target — experienced a dramatic +580% quarter-over-quarter surge in the first half of the year before collapsing to just 0.05% of attacks in Q3.
Meanwhile, DNS amplification surged 215% to account for 3.43% of all network-layer attacks, exploiting open DNS resolvers in a similar reflection-and-amplification pattern to CLDAP: small spoofed queries, large replies directed at the victim. Other UDP floods climbed from 14.06% to 31.31% of network-layer attacks. UDP is a connectionless transport protocol, which makes it a convenient vehicle for raw volumetric attacks: attackers send large numbers of UDP packets to random or specific ports on the target, forcing the target to check for a listening application and respond, consuming its network and compute resources.
Most-attacked industry
While Media, Production & Publishing remained the most-attacked industry in Q3 2026, its overall share is roughly a quarter of its Q2 level, and the focus has moved across a wider set of industries. Internet rose from outside the top 10 to #6; Consumer Services and Adult Entertainment also climbed in, reaching #8 and #9 respectively.
Most-attacked locations
Geographic surges: Canada and Israel climb the ranks
Adding to an already turbulent period of bilateral trade disputes, Canada jumped from #16 to #6, driven by attacks against its Retail, Telecommunications, Service providers & carriers, and Marketing & advertising industries.
Israel moved 7 spots to take #10 as a result of sustained DDoS activity in mid-September. While this period was marked by contentious decisions ahead of parliamentary elections and the Rosh Hashanah holiday, there was also a massive, documented surge in hostile cyber warfare targeting Israel this year.
Top 10
The United States was the most-attacked location in Q3 2026, while China was number #2 and Indonesia rose into the top three at 2.93% of total attacks. The U.S.-China pairing at the top is consistent with the first half of 2026, when China finished #1 and the U.S. #2; the countries have traded positions as attention and attacker preferences shift.
Strengthening global defenses and helping to defend the Internet
Cloudflare's network is designed to absorb this kind of growth in DDoS threats. Every service on our network is protected by free, unmetered DDoS protection that runs at every one of our 330+ cities globally, backed by 500 Tbps of network capacity. Autonomy is the point: our systems detect and mitigate attacks without human intervention. And they need to, because as this quarter's distributions make clear, most attacks end long before a human analyst could see the alert, and the largest attacks still regularly exceed 1 Tbps at a cadence measured in hundreds per quarter.
To help hosting providers, cloud computing platforms, and Internet service providers identify and take down the abusive IP addresses and accounts that launch these attacks, we leverage Cloudflare's unique vantage point on DDoS attacks to provide a free DDoS Botnet Threat Feed for Service Providers.
Over 800 networks worldwide have signed up for this feed, and we've already seen great collaboration across the community to take down botnet nodes. For a continuously-updated view of attack trends across the Internet, visit Cloudflare Radar.
About Cloudforce One
Driven by a mission to help defend the Internet, Cloudforce One draws on telemetry from Cloudflare's global network — which protects more than 20% of the web — to drive threat research and operational response, protecting critical systems for millions of organizations worldwide.
Welcome to the 25th edition of Cloudflare's DDoS Threat Report. This is the first half-year edition in the series: rather than publishing separate reports for the first and second quarters of 2026, we have combined our coverage of Q1 and Q2 into a single volume covering January through June 2026. The analysis is produced by Cloudforce One, Cloudflare’s Threat Intelligence organization, providing a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat landscape of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on data from the Cloudflare network.
Key insights
The 1 Tbps club grew. Cloudflare mitigated a combined 935 network-layer DDoS attacks exceeding 1 Tbps in the first half of 2026 and a +519% quarter-over-quarter surge between Q1 and Q2.
The attack-vector center of gravity shifted from botnet floods to reflection and amplification. DNS-based attacks accounted for 34.3% of all network-layer activity in the first half of 2026, with DNS Floods alone climbing from 25.7% to 40.0% of network-layer attacks quarter-over-quarter. CLDAP Floods surged +580% quarter-over-quarter to become the #3 vector in Q2.
Geopolitics and global events influence the landscape. Media, Production & Publishing held the #1 most-attacked industry crown in both quarters at 14.2% of all mitigated HTTP DDoS requests as coverage of Iran, Ukraine, and the World Cup drew sustained attention. In parallel, Turkey rose to the #3 most-attacked country amid the backdrop of the July NATO Summit in Ankara, and the Government sector jumped from #29 to #9 — the largest single sector movement of 2026 to date — during Operation Epic Fury.
H1 by the numbers: 5,300 DDoS attacks every hour
Midway through the year, Cloudflare has already mitigated 23.2 million network-layer and 29.64 trillion HTTP DDoS requests. That works out to approximately 5,343 network-layer DDoS attacks per hour, or about 128,000 per day.
April peak, and law enforcement takedowns
April 2026 was a peak month for DDoS activity and volume, hitting a high of 6.46 trillion requests and 165 petabytes (PB) respectively. For perspective, this is an enormous amount of traffic — equivalent to streaming 4K video continuously for years, or roughly the amount of data processed by major video platforms in a single day. Requests and volumes declined afterward, a possible reflection of Operation PowerOFF — a 21-country action that targeted over 75,000 DDoS-for-hire users, took down 53 domains, issued 25 search warrants, and resulted in four arrests.
Hyper-volumetric attacks see a more than 6x surge
Hyper-volumetric DDoS — attacks defined as exceeding 1 terabit per second (Tbps), 1 billion packets per second (Bpps), or 1 million requests per second (Mrps) — has been a growth category across Radar reporting. 2026 is proving to be no different. During the second quarter, Cloudflare mitigated 805 network-layer attacks exceeding 1 Tbps, representing a more than six-fold increase over the previous quarter.
Attack characteristics: low and slow
Despite the hyper-volumetric growth, the median DDoS attack Cloudflare mitigated in the first half of 2026 remained short and small with 96.62% of network-layer attacks remaining under 500 Mbps and 90.60% ending in under 10 minutes. It’s important to note, however, that ‘small’ is a relative term and most Internet properties wouldn’t be able to withstand even those small attacks. In practical terms:
A 100 Mbps attack is enough to overwhelm a server or website
A 100 Gbps attack can knock most unprotected data centers offline
A 1+ Tbps attack is among the largest ever recorded and stresses even major Internet infrastructure
Attackers sometimes mix layers — a high packet rate (Mpps/Gpps) with relatively low bandwidth (Gbps), or vice versa, to exploit different weaknesses in network gear versus bandwidth capacity.
Furthermore, most DDoS attacks are surprisingly short-lived, as highlighted in the chart below. Even the largest hyper-volumetric attacks can be measured in seconds rather than minutes — we have observed record-breaking assaults that lasted only 35 seconds from start to finish. Whether an attack lasts half a minute or ten minutes, there is no practical window for human intervention: by the time an alert reaches a security analyst, the attack has already completed. Manual mitigation and on-demand solutions are simply too slow for this reality. Yet while the attack itself may be brief, its aftershocks are not. The cascading effects of even a short burst can trigger routing instability, TCP retransmissions, application timeouts, and downstream service degradation that takes hours or days to fully resolve — all while services remain down or impaired. In this threat landscape, automated, always-on protection is not a convenience; it is a necessity.
Most-attacked industries
Operation Epic Fury and a spike in attacks on the government sector
On February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States launched Operation Epic Fury, a series of strikes against Iran’s leadership and infrastructure. Within 72 hours, the DDoS landscape responded, with security researchers recording 149 hacktivist DDoS claims against 110 distinct organizations across 16 countries. Nearly 47.8% of all targeted organizations globally belonged to the government sector.
As public reporting documented extensive government targeting during this period, the vertical surged 20 places, from #29 in Q1 to #9 in Q2 by share of mitigated HTTP DDoS requests. While outside the top 10 for most of this period, it represented one of the single largest industry-rank moves.
Media under siege: the most attacked industry
Amid warfare in Iran and Ukraine and the excitement of the World Cup, the Media, Production & Publishing industry was the most attacked in both quarters, taking 14.2% of all mitigated HTTP DDoS requests — nearly four times the runner-up.
Most-attacked locations
The DDoS landscape in H1 2026 saw both familiar names and reshuffling among the world's most-attacked locations. China ended H1 as the most attacked location, after absorbing 22.4% of all HTTP DDoS requests globally in Q2. The United States held firm at #2 (18.8%), demonstrating persistent appeal for attackers.
Turkey saw a rapid increase in attacks, more than doubling its share of global attack traffic to climb into the #3 most-attacked position by Q2. The surge coincided with the buildup to the 2026 Ankara NATO Summit in June and early July, when Turkish security forces conducted sweeping pre-summit raids across Ankara, arresting at least 209 people.
Top attack source countries
Brazil overtook the United States as the top DDoS source country in the first half of 2026, at 14.9% versus 13.4% — driven by a dramatic Q2 surge when Brazil became the source country for 21.4% of all mitigated DDoS request traffic. Indonesia remained locked at #3 in both quarters — extending its multi-quarter run as one of the top three global DDoS source countries.
Attack vectors
DNS floods dominate
DNS-based attacks (DNS Flood and DNS Amplification) accounted for 34.3% of network layer attacks in the first half of 2026. The two mechanisms are related but distinct: a DNS Flood aims a botnet's raw request volume directly at a victim's authoritative DNS servers to exhaust their query capacity — the "phonebook" for that domain becomes unreachable and every service depending on it goes dark. DNS Amplification instead sends small spoofed queries to open DNS resolvers, which reply with much larger records (often triggered by an ANY query) to the victim's spoofed IP.
CLDAP explodes: +580% surge in amplification
CLDAP Flood — a reflection and amplification vector that abuses exposed Active Directory LDAP-over-UDP endpoints — grew +580% quarter-over-quarter, becoming the #3 vector in Q2 alone. CLDAP (Connectionless Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) is a variant of LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol), used for querying and modifying directory services running over IP networks. CLDAP is connectionless, using UDP instead of TCP, making it faster but less reliable. Because it uses UDP, there’s no handshake requirement, which allows attackers to spoof the source IP address, thus allowing attackers to exploit it as a reflection vector. CLDAP attacks work by sending small spoofed queries to publicly reachable domain controllers on UDP port 389; the servers reply to the spoofed source (the victim) with responses tens to hundreds of times larger than the original query, thus overwhelming the victim host.
Strengthening global defenses and helping to defend the Internet
Cloudflare's network is designed to absorb this kind of growth in DDoS threats. Every service on our network is protected by free, unmetered DDoS protection that runs at every one of our 330+ cities globally, backed by 500 Tbps of network capacity. Autonomy is the point: our systems detect and mitigate attacks without human intervention, and they need to, because attackers now regularly deliver attacks above 1 Tbps at a cadence measured in hundreds per quarter.
To help hosting providers, cloud computing platforms and Internet service providers identify and take down the abusive IP addresses/accounts that launch these attacks, we leverage Cloudflare’s unique vantage point on DDoS attacks to provide a free DDoS Botnet Threat Feed for Service Providers.
Over 800 networks worldwide have signed up for this feed, and we’ve already seen great collaboration across the community to take down botnet nodes.
About Cloudforce One
Driven by a mission to help defend the Internet, Cloudforce One draws on telemetry from Cloudflare's global network — which protects more than 20% of the web — to drive threat research and operational response, protecting critical systems for millions of organizations worldwide.
Today’s threat landscape is more varied and chilling than ever: Sophisticated nation-state actors. Hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks. Deepfakes and fraudsters interviewing at your company. Even stealth attacks via trusted internal tools like Google Calendar, Dropbox, and GitHub.
After spending the last year translating trillions of network signals into actionable intelligence, Cloudforce One has identified a fundamental evolution in the threat landscape: the era of brute force entry is fading. In its place is a model of high-trust exploitation that prioritizes results at all costs. In order to equip defenders with a strategic roadmap for this new era, today we are releasing the inaugural 2026 Cloudflare Threat Report. This report provides the intelligence organizations need to navigate the rise of industrialized cyber threats.
The new barometer for risk: Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)
Cloudforce One has observed a broader shift in attacker psychology. To understand how these methods win, we have to look at the why behind them: the Measure of Effectiveness, or MOE.
In 2026, the modern adversary is trading the pursuit of “sophistication” (complex, expensive, one-off hacks) in favor of throughput. MOE is the metric attackers use to decide what to exploit next. It is a cold calculation of the ratio of effort to operational outcome.
Why use an expensive zero-day exploit when a stolen session token (Identity) has a higher MOE?
Why build a custom server when a reputation shield (LotX) provides free, nearly untraceable infrastructure with a high delivery rate?
Why write code manually when AI can automate the discovery of the connective tissue that links your most sensitive data?
In 2026, the most dangerous threat actors aren’t the ones with the most advanced code; it’s the ones who can integrate intelligence and technology into a single, continuous system that achieves their mission in the shortest time possible.
Key findings from the 2026 Cloudflare Threat Report
Eight key trends — all driven by their MOE — will define the threat landscape in 2026:
AI is automating high-velocity attacker operations. Threat actors use generative AI for real-time network mapping, exploit development, and the creation of deepfakes, enabling low-skill actors to conduct high-impact operations.
State-sponsored pre-positioning is compromising critical infrastructure resilience. Chinese threat actors, including Salt Typhoon and Linen Typhoon, are prioritizing North American telecommunications, commercial, government, and IT services, anchoring their presence now for long-term geopolitical leverage.
Over-privileged SaaS integrations are expanding the blast radius of attacks. As demonstrated by the GRUB1 breach of Salesloft, the connective tissue of third-party API integrations allows a single compromised API to cascade into a breach affecting hundreds of distinct corporate environments.
Adversaries are weaponizing trusted cloud tooling to mask attacks. Threat actors actively target legitimate SaaS, IaaS, and PaaS tools such as Google Calendar, Dropbox, and GitHub to camouflage malicious actions within benign enterprise activity.
Deepfake personas are embedding adversarial operatives within Western payrolls. North Korea has operationalized the remote IT worker scheme, using deepfakes and fraudulent identities to embed state-sponsored operatives directly into Western payrolls for espionage and illicit revenue.
Token theft is neutralizing multi-factor authentication. By weaponizing infostealers like LummaC2 to harvest active session tokens, attackers bypass traditional multi-factor authentication and move straight to post-authentication actions.
Relay blind spots are enabling internal brand spoofing. Phishing-as-a-service bots are exploiting a blind spot where mail servers fail to re-verify a sender’s identity, allowing high-trust brand impersonations delivered directly to user inboxes.
Hyper-volumetric strikes are exhausting infrastructure capacity. Hyper-volumetric distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, fueled by massive botnets like Aisuru, are breaking records on a regular basis, closing the window for human response.
Deep dive: How attackers are weaponizing cloud tooling
Now let’s take a deeper look at one high-MOE tactic we identified: weaponized cloud tooling. Instead of using known malicious servers, attackers are utilizing legitimate cloud ecosystems like Google Drive, Microsoft Teams, and Amazon S3 to mask their command-and-control (C2) traffic. This is known as “living off the land” (or off of anything-as-a-service): wearing the uniform of trusted providers, attackers make their activity nearly indistinguishable from benign corporate traffic.
SaaS platforms are also being used by threat actors to host, launch, redirect, or scale attacks. For instance, services like Amazon SES and SendGrid, designed for legitimate bulk email delivery, are frequently exploited to launch sophisticated phishing and malware distribution campaigns.
How some groups are applying these tactics
While the exploitation of cloud resources is an established tradecraft, 2025 investigations highlighted an accelerated maturation in nation-state strategy: actors are continuing to shift from mere infrastructure abuse toward pervasive living-off-the-land. We predict that for 2026, threat actors will attempt to standardize these techniques as a strategic aim for their operational playbooks.
Here are some of those threat actor groups, where they are based, and examples of their approaches.
Threat Actor
Country
Technique
Details
Example
FrumpyToad
China
Logic-based C2
Moving “inside the box” of reputable SaaS logic to evade detection.
Weaponizes Google Calendar for cloud-to-cloud C2 loop, reading and writing encrypted commands directly into event descriptions.
PunyToad
China
Encrypted tunneling
Utilizing legitimate developer tools to bypass egress filtering.
Uses tunneling capabilities and cloud computing to create resilient, living-off-the-cloud architectures, masking backend origin IPs and prioritizing long-term persistence.
NastyShrew
Russia
Paste site dead drop resolvers
Using public “paste” sites to coordinate shifting infrastructure.
Uses services like Teletype.in and Rentry.co as dead drop resolvers (DDR); infected hosts poll these sites to retrieve rotating C2 addresses.
PatheticSlug
North Korea
PaaS-ing the perimeter
Exploiting the “reputation shield” of cloud ecosystems to mask malicious delivery.
Used Google Drive and Dropbox to host XenoRAT payloads, leveraging GitHub for covert C2, successfully blending into legitimate enterprise traffic.
CrustyKrill
Iran
SaaS-hosted phishing
Blending credential harvesting into common cloud hosting.
Hosts C2 pages on Azure Web Apps (.azurewebsites.net) and uses ONLYOFFICE to host payloads, giving their operations a veneer of legitimacy.
How Cloudforce One unmasked the 2026 landscape
Establishing MOE requires more than just high-level observation. To truly unmask the 2026 landscape, this report details how Cloudforce One leverages a unique blend of internal expertise and global telemetry to uncover insights that traditional security models miss.
Our methodology is varied. For example:
As part of our AI-driven defense research, we tasked an AI coding agent with a self-vulnerability analysis, using the agent to uncover its own security gaps. This “dogfooding” uncovered CVE-2026-22813 (9.4 CVSS), a critical flaw in markdown rendering pipelines allowing for unauthenticated Remote Code Execution.
Our deep dives into Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) reveal that the barrier to entry has a vanished barrier to entry. Analysts observed attackers leveraging high-reputation domains (Google Drive, Azure, etc.) to bypass filters. Email telemetry found an identity gap, where nearly 46% of analyzed emails failed DMARC (an email authentication protocol), revealing a large surface area that PhaaS bots are rapidly exploiting.
We tracked the transition from stealthy exploitation to attempted blackout, uncovering a 31.4 Tbps baseline for DDoS. Our telemetry also showed that, in the past 3 months, 63% of all logins involve credentials already compromised elsewhere and that 94% of all login attempts now originate from bots.
Through every stage of this research, Cloudforce One has leveraged our massive global telemetry and frontline threat intelligence to connect the dots across seemingly isolated incidents. Whether we are dogfooding our own AI agents to preempt zero-day exploits or tracking attacks launched by millions of bot-infected hosts tunneling through residential proxies, this unified visibility allows us to see the throughline between a single phished credential and a multi-terabit blackout.
The path forward: Drive MOE to zero with autonomous defense
Identifying these throughlines is only the first step. When threats move at machine speed, human-centric defense is no longer a viable shield. To counter “offense by the system,” defenders across the industry must pivot to a model of autonomous defense in order to drive the adversary’s MOE to zero.
This shift toward autonomous defense requires moving beyond manual checklists and fragmented alerts. Organizations must harden the connective tissue of their networks, using real-time visibility and automated response capabilities. In this new era, the goal isn’t just to build a better wall — it’s to ensure your system can act faster than the attacker, even when no one is watching.
Through our unmatched threat visibility and the expertise of our Cloudforce One researchers, we provide the intelligence you need to outpace industrialized cyber threats. To explore the full data set, deep-dive case studies, and tactical recommendations, read the complete 2026 Cloudflare Threat Report.
And if you’re interested in learning more about our threat intelligence, managed defense, or incident response offerings, contact Cloudforce One experts.
On December 3, 2025, immediately following the public disclosure of the critical, maximum-severity React2Shell vulnerability (CVE-2025-55182), the Cloudforce One Threat Intelligence team began monitoring for early signs of exploitation. Within hours, we observed scanning and active exploitation attempts, including traffic originating from infrastructure associated with Asian-nexus threat groups.
Early activity indicates that threat actors quickly integrated this vulnerability into their scanning and reconnaissance routines. We observed systematic probing of exposed systems, testing for the flaw at scale, and incorporating it into broader sweeps of Internet‑facing assets. The identified behavior reveals the actors relied on a combination of tools, such as standard vulnerability scanners and publicly accessible Internet asset discovery platforms, to find potentially vulnerable React Server Components (RSC) deployments exposed to the Internet.
Patterns in observed threat activity also suggest that the actors focused on identifying specific application metadata — such as icon hashes, SSL certificate details, or geographic region identifiers — to refine their candidate target lists before attempting exploitation.
In addition to React2Shell, two additional vulnerabilities affecting specific RSC implementations were disclosed: CVE-2025-55183 and CVE-2025-55184. Both vulnerabilities, while distinct from React2Shell, also relate to RSC payload handling and Server Function semantics, and are described in more detail below.
On December 3, 2025, the React Team disclosed a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting servers using the React Server Components (RSC) Flight protocol. The vulnerability, CVE-2025-55182, received a CVSS score of 10.0 and has been informally referred to as React2Shell.
The underlying cause of the vulnerability is an unsafe deserialization flaw in the RSC Flight data-handling logic. When a server processes attacker-controlled payloads without proper validation, it becomes possible to influence server-side execution flow. In this case, crafted input allows an attacker to inject logic that the server interprets in a privileged context.
Exploitation is straightforward. A single, specially crafted HTTP request is sufficient; there is no authentication requirement, user interaction, or elevated permissions involved. Once successful, the attacker can execute arbitrary, privileged JavaScript on the affected server.
This combination of authenticated access, trivial exploitation, and full code execution is what places CVE-2025-55182 at the highest severity level and makes it significant for organizations relying on vulnerable versions of React Server Components.
In response, Cloudflare has deployed new rules across its network, with the default action set to Block. These new protections are included in both the Cloudflare Free Managed Ruleset (available to all Free customers) and the standard Cloudflare Managed Ruleset (available to all paying customers), as detailed below. More information about the different rulesets can be found in our documentation.
CVE
Description
Cloudflare WAF Rule ID
CVE-2025-55182
React – RCE
Rules to mitigate React2Shell Exploit
Paid: 33aa8a8a948b48b28d40450c5fb92fba
Free: 2b5d06e34a814a889bee9a0699702280
CVE-2025-55182 – 2
React – RCE Bypass
Additional rules to mitigate exploit bypass
Paid: bc1aee59731c488ca8b5314615fce168
Free: cbdd3f48396e4b7389d6efd174746aff
CVE-2025-55182
Scanner Detection
Additional paid WAF rule to catch React2Shell scanning attempts
Paid: 1d54691cb822465183cb49e2f562cf5c
Recently disclosed RSC vulnerabilities
In addition to React2Shell, two additional vulnerabilities affecting specific RSC implementations were disclosed. The two vulnerabilities, while distinct from React2Shell, also relate to RSC payload handling and Server Function semantics, with corresponding Cloudflare protections noted below:
CVE
Description
Cloudflare WAF Rule ID
CVE-2025-55183
Leaking Server Functions
In deployments where Server Function identifiers are insufficiently validated, an attacker may force the server into returning the source body of a referenced function
Paid: 17c5123f1ac049818765ebf2fefb4e9b
Free: 3114709a3c3b4e3685052c7b251e86aa
CVE-2025-55184
React Function DoS
A crafted RSC Flight Payload containing cyclical Promise references can trigger unbounded recursion or event-loop lockups under certain server configurations, resulting in denial-of-service conditions
Paid: 2694f1610c0b471393b21aef102ec699
Investigation of early scanning and exploitation
The following analysis details the initial wave of activity observed by Cloudforce One, focusing on threat actor attempts to scan for and exploit the React2Shell vulnerability. While these findings represent activity immediately following the vulnerability’s release, and were focused on known threat actors, it is critical to note that the volume and scope of related threat activity have expanded dramatically since these first observations.
Tactics
Unsurprisingly, the threat actors were relying heavily on publicly available, commercial, and a variety of other tools to identify vulnerable servers:
Vulnerability intelligence: The actors leveraged vulnerability intelligence databases that aggregated CVEs, advisories, and exploits for tracking and prioritization.
Vulnerability reconnaissance: The actors conducted searches using large-scale reconnaissance services, indicating they are relying on Internet-wide scanning and asset discovery platforms to find exposed systems running React App or RSC components. They also made use of tools that identify the software stack and technologies used by websites.
Vulnerability scanning: Activity included use of Nuclei (User-Agent: Nuclei – CVE-2025-55182), a popular rapid scanning tool used to deploy YAML-based templates to check for vulnerabilities. The actors were also observed using a highly likely React2Shell scanner associated with the User-Agent “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36 React2ShellScanner/1.0.0“.
Vulnerability exploitation: The actors made use of Burp Suite, a web application security testing platform for identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities in HTTP/S traffic.
Techniques
Recon via Internet-wide scanning and asset discovery platform
To enumerate potential React2Shell targets, the actors leveraged an Internet-wide scanning and asset-discovery platform commonly used to fingerprint web technologies at scale. Their queries demonstrated a targeted effort to isolate React and Next.js applications — two frameworks directly relevant to the vulnerability — by searching for React-specific icon hashes, framework-associated metadata, and page titles containing React-related keywords. This approach likely allowed them to rapidly build an inventory of exploitable hosts before initiating more direct probing.
Targeting enumeration and filtering
During their reconnaissance phase, the operators applied additional filtering logic to refine their target set and minimize noise. Notably, they excluded Chinese IP space from their searches, indicating that their enumeration workflow intentionally avoided collecting data on possibly domestic infrastructure. They also constrained scanning to specific geographic regions and national networks to identify likely high-value hosts. Beyond basic fingerprinting, the actors leveraged SSL certificate attributes — including issuer details, subject fields, and top-level domains — to surface entities of interest, such as government or critical-infrastructure systems using .gov or other restricted TLDs. This combination of geographic filtering and certificate-based pivoting enabled a more precise enumeration process that prioritized strategically relevant and potentially vulnerable high-value targets.
Preliminary target analysis
Observed activity reflected a clear focus on strategically significant organizations across multiple regions. Their highest-density probing occurred against networks in Taiwan, Xinjiang Uygur, Vietnam, Japan, and New Zealand — regions frequently associated with geopolitical intelligence collection priorities. Other selective targeting was also observed against entities across the globe, including government (.gov) websites, academic research institutions, and critical‑infrastructure operators. These infrastructure operators specifically included a national authority responsible for the import and export of uranium, rare metals, and nuclear fuel.
The actors also prioritized high‑sensitivity technology targets such as enterprise password managers and secure‑vault services, likely due to their potential to provide downstream access to broader organizational credentials and secrets.
Additionally, the campaign targeted edge‑facing SSL VPN appliances whose administrative interfaces may incorporate React-based components, suggesting the actor sought to exploit React2Shell against both traditional web applications and embedded web management frameworks in order to maximize access opportunities.
Early threat actor observations
Cloudforce One analysis confirms that early scanning and exploitation attempts originated from IP addresses previously associated with multiple Asia-affiliated threat actor clusters. While not all observed IP addresses belong to a single operator, the simultaneous activity suggests shared tooling, infrastructure, or experimentation in parallel among groups with a common purpose and shared targeting objectives. Observed targeting enumeration and filtering (e.g. a focus on Taiwan and Xinjiang Uygur, but exclusion of China), as well as heavy use of certain scanning and asset discovery platforms, suggest general attribution to Asia-linked threat actors.
Overall trends
Cloudflare’s Managed Rulesets for React2Shell began detecting significant activity within hours of the vulnerability’s disclosure. The graph below shows the daily hit count across the two exploit-related React2Shell WAF rules.
Aggregate rule hit volume over time
The React2Shell disclosure triggered a surge of opportunistic scanning and exploit behavior. In total, from 2025-12-03 00:00 UTC to 2025-12-11 17:00UTC, we received 582.10M hits. That equates to an average of 3.49M hits per hour, with a maximum number of hits in a single hour reaching 12.72M. The average unique IP count per hour was 3,598, with the maximum number of IPs in an hour being 16,585.
Hourly count of unique IPs sending React2Shell-related probes
Our data also shows distinct peaks above 6,387 User-Agents per hour, indicating a heterogeneous mix of tools and frameworks in use, with the average number of unique User-Agents per hour being 2,255. The below graph shows exploit attempts based on WAF rules (Free and Managed) triggering on matching payloads:
Unique User-Agent strings used in React2Shell-related requests
To better understand the types of automated tools probing for React2Shell exposure, Cloudflare analyzed the User-Agent strings associated with React2Shell-related requests since December 3, 2025. The data shows a wide variety of scanning tools suggesting broad Internet-wide reconnaissance:
Top 10 User Agent strings by exploit attempts
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36 Assetnote/1.0.0
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36 (GIS – AppSec Team – Project Vision)
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
python-requests/2.32.5
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36 Assetnote/1.0.0 (ExposureScan)
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.124 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/142.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/18.1 Safari/605.1.1
Payload variation and experimentation
Cloudflare analyzed the payload sizes associated with requests triggering React2Shell-related detection rules. The long-tailed distribution — dominated by sub-kilobyte probes, but punctured by extremely large outliers — suggest actors are testing a wide range of payload sizes:
Metric
Value
Maximum payload size
375 MB
Average payload size
3.2 KB
p25 (25th Percentile)
703 B
p75 (75th Percentile)
818 B
p90 (90th Percentile)
2.7 KB
p99 (99th Percentile)
66.5 KB
Standard deviation
330 KB
Additional React vulnerabilities identified
In parallel with our ongoing analysis of the React2Shell vulnerability, two additional vulnerabilities affecting React Server Components (RSC) implementations have been identified:
1. React function DoS
The vulnerability CVE-2025-55184 was recently disclosed, revealing that React Server Component frameworks can be forced into a Node.js state where the runtime unwraps an infinite recursion of nested Promises.
This behavior:
Freezes the server indefinitely
Prevents yielding back to the event loop
Effectively takes the server offline
Does not require any specific Server Action usage — merely the presence of a server capable of processing an RSC Server Action payload
The trigger condition is a cyclic promise reference inside the RSC payload.
2. Leaking server functions
Another vulnerability, CVE-2025-55183, was also recently disclosed, revealing that certain React Server Component frameworks can leak server-only source code under specific conditions.
If an attacker gains access to a Server Function that:
Accepts an argument that undergoes string coercion, and
Does not validate that the argument is of an expected primitive type
then the attacker can coerce that argument into a reference to a different Server Function. The coerced value’s toString() output causes the server to return the source code of the referenced Server Function.
How Cloudflare is protecting customers
Cloudflare’s protection strategy is multi-layered, relying on both the inherent security model of its platform and immediate, proactive updates to its Web Application Firewall (WAF).
Cloudflare Workers: React-based applications and frameworks deployed on Cloudflare Workers are inherently immune. The Workers security model prevents exploits from succeeding at the runtime layer, regardless of the malicious payload.
Proactive WAF deployment: Cloudflare urgently deployed WAF rules to detect and block traffic proxied through its network related to React2Shell and the recently disclosed RSC vulnerabilities.
The Cloudflare security team continues to monitor for additional attack variations and will update protections as necessary to maintain continuous security for all proxied traffic.
Continuous monitoring
While Cloudflare’s emergency actions — the WAF limit increase and immediate rule deployment — have successfully mitigated the current wave of exploitation attempts, this vulnerability represents a persistent and evolving threat. The immediate weaponization of CVE-2025-55182 by sophisticated threat actors underscores the need for continuous defense.
Cloudflare remains committed to continuous surveillance for emerging exploit variants and refinement of WAF rules to detect evasive techniques. However, network-level protection is not a substitute for remediation at the source. Organizations must prioritize immediate patching of all affected React and Next.js assets. This combination of platform-level WAF defense and immediate application patching remains the only reliable strategy against this critical threat.
Indicators of Compromise
Tool/Scanner
User Agent String
Observation/Purpose
Nuclei
Nuclei – CVE-2025-55182
User-Agent for rapid, template-based scanning for React2Shell vulnerability
React2ShellScanner
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36 React2ShellScanner/1.0.0
User-Agent for a likely custom React2Shell vulnerability scanner
Cloudforce One is publishing the results of our investigation and real-time effort to detect, deny, degrade, disrupt, and delay threat activity by the Russia-aligned threat actor FlyingYeti during their latest phishing campaign targeting Ukraine. At the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Ukraine introduced a moratorium on evictions and termination of utility services for unpaid debt. The moratorium ended in January 2024, resulting in significant debt liability and increased financial stress for Ukrainian citizens. The FlyingYeti campaign capitalized on anxiety over the potential loss of access to housing and utilities by enticing targets to open malicious files via debt-themed lures. If opened, the files would result in infection with the PowerShell malware known as COOKBOX, allowing FlyingYeti to support follow-on objectives, such as installation of additional payloads and control over the victim’s system.
Since April 26, 2024, Cloudforce One has taken measures to prevent FlyingYeti from launching their phishing campaign – a campaign involving the use of Cloudflare Workers and GitHub, as well as exploitation of the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831. Our countermeasures included internal actions, such as detections and code takedowns, as well as external collaboration with third parties to remove the actor’s cloud-hosted malware. Our effectiveness against this actor prolonged their operational timeline from days to weeks. For example, in a single instance, FlyingYeti spent almost eight hours debugging their code as a result of our mitigations. By employing proactive defense measures, we successfully stopped this determined threat actor from achieving their objectives.
Executive Summary
On April 18, 2024, Cloudforce One detected the Russia-aligned threat actor FlyingYeti preparing to launch a phishing espionage campaign targeting individuals in Ukraine.
From mid-April to mid-May, we observed FlyingYeti conduct reconnaissance activity, create lure content for use in their phishing campaign, and develop various iterations of their malware. We assessed that the threat actor intended to launch their campaign in early May, likely following Orthodox Easter.
After several weeks of monitoring actor reconnaissance and weaponization activity (Cyber Kill Chain Stages 1 and 2), we successfully disrupted FlyingYeti’s operation moments after the final COOKBOX payload was built.
The payload included an exploit for the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831, which FlyingYeti will likely continue to use in their phishing campaigns to infect targets with malware.
We offer steps users can take to defend themselves against FlyingYeti phishing operations, and also provide recommendations, detections, and indicators of compromise.
Who is FlyingYeti?
FlyingYeti is the cryptonym given by Cloudforce One to the threat group behind this phishing campaign, which overlaps with UAC-0149 activity tracked by CERT-UA in February and April 2024. The threat actor uses dynamic DNS (DDNS) for their infrastructure and leverages cloud-based platforms for hosting malicious content and for malware command and control (C2). Our investigation of FlyingYeti TTPs suggests this is likely a Russia-aligned threat group. The actor appears to primarily focus on targeting Ukrainian military entities. Additionally, we observed Russian-language comments in FlyingYeti’s code, and the actor’s operational hours falling within the UTC+3 time zone.
Campaign background
In the days leading up to the start of the campaign, Cloudforce One observed FlyingYeti conducting reconnaissance on payment processes for Ukrainian communal housing and utility services:
April 22, 2024 – research into changes made in 2016 that introduced the use of QR codes in payment notices
April 22, 2024 – research on current developments concerning housing and utility debt in Ukraine
April 25, 2024 – research on the legal basis for restructuring housing debt in Ukraine as well as debt involving utilities, such as gas and electricity
Cloudforce One judges that the observed reconnaissance is likely due to the Ukrainian government’s payment moratorium introduced at the start of the full-fledged invasion in February 2022. Under this moratorium, outstanding debt would not lead to evictions or termination of provision of utility services. However, on January 9, 2024, the government lifted this ban, resulting in increased pressure on Ukrainian citizens with outstanding debt. FlyingYeti sought to capitalize on that pressure, leveraging debt restructuring and payment-related lures in an attempt to increase their chances of successfully targeting Ukrainian individuals.
Analysis of the Komunalka-themed phishing site
The disrupted phishing campaign would have directed FlyingYeti targets to an actor-controlled GitHub page at hxxps[:]//komunalka[.]github[.]io, which is a spoofed version of the Kyiv Komunalka communal housing site https://www.komunalka.ua. Komunalka functions as a payment processor for residents in the Kyiv region and allows for payment of utilities, such as gas, electricity, telephone, and Internet. Additionally, users can pay other fees and fines, and even donate to Ukraine’s defense forces.
Based on past FlyingYeti operations, targets may be directed to the actor’s Github page via a link in a phishing email or an encrypted Signal message. If a target accesses the spoofed Komunalka platform at hxxps[:]//komunalka[.]github[.]io, the page displays a large green button with a prompt to download the document “Рахунок.docx” (“Invoice.docx”), as shown in Figure 1. This button masquerades as a link to an overdue payment invoice but actually results in the download of the malicious archive “Заборгованість по ЖКП.rar” (“Debt for housing and utility services.rar”).
Figure 1: Prompt to download malicious archive “Заборгованість по ЖКП.rar”
A series of steps must take place for the download to successfully occur:
The target clicks the green button on the actor’s GitHub page hxxps[:]//komunalka.github[.]io
The target’s device sends an HTTP POST request to the Cloudflare Worker worker-polished-union-f396[.]vqu89698[.]workers[.]dev with the HTTP request body set to “user=Iahhdr”
The Cloudflare Worker processes the request and evaluates the HTTP request body
If the request conditions are met, the Worker fetches the RAR file from hxxps[:]//raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/kudoc8989/project/main/Заборгованість по ЖКП.rar, which is then downloaded on the target’s device
Cloudforce One identified the infrastructure responsible for facilitating the download of the malicious RAR file and remediated the actor-associated Worker, preventing FlyingYeti from delivering its malicious tooling. In an effort to circumvent Cloudforce One’s mitigation measures, FlyingYeti later changed their malware delivery method. Instead of the Workers domain fetching the malicious RAR file, it was loaded directly from GitHub.
Analysis of the malicious RAR file
During remediation, Cloudforce One recovered the RAR file “Заборгованість по ЖКП.rar” and performed analysis of the malicious payload. The downloaded RAR archive contains multiple files, including a file with a name that contains the unicode character “U+201F”. This character appears as whitespace on Windows devices and can be used to “hide” file extensions by adding excessive whitespace between the filename and the file extension. As highlighted in blue in Figure 2, this cleverly named file within the RAR archive appears to be a PDF document but is actually a malicious CMD file (“Рахунок на оплату.pdf[unicode character U+201F].cmd”).
Figure 2: Files contained in the malicious RAR archive “Заборгованість по ЖКП.rar” (“Housing Debt.rar”)
FlyingYeti included a benign PDF in the archive with the same name as the CMD file but without the unicode character, “Рахунок на оплату.pdf” (“Invoice for payment.pdf”). Additionally, the directory name for the archive once decompressed also contained the name “Рахунок на оплату.pdf”. This overlap in names of the benign PDF and the directory allows the actor to exploit the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831. More specifically, when an archive includes a benign file with the same name as the directory, the entire contents of the directory are opened by the WinRAR application, resulting in the execution of the malicious CMD. In other words, when the target believes they are opening the benign PDF “Рахунок на оплату.pdf”, the malicious CMD file is executed.
The CMD file contains the FlyingYeti PowerShell malware known as COOKBOX. The malware is designed to persist on a host, serving as a foothold in the infected device. Once installed, this variant of COOKBOX will make requests to the DDNS domain postdock[.]serveftp[.]com for C2, awaiting PowerShell cmdlets that the malware will subsequently run.
Alongside COOKBOX, several decoy documents are opened, which contain hidden tracking links using the Canary Tokens service. The first document, shown in Figure 3 below, poses as an agreement under which debt for housing and utility services will be restructured.
Figure 3: Decoy document Реструктуризація боргу за житлово комунальні послуги.docx
The second document (Figure 4) is a user agreement outlining the terms and conditions for the usage of the payment platform komunalka[.]ua.
The use of relevant decoy documents as part of the phishing and delivery activity are likely an effort by FlyingYeti operators to increase the appearance of legitimacy of their activities.
The phishing theme we identified in this campaign is likely one of many themes leveraged by this actor in a larger operation to target Ukrainian entities, in particular their defense forces. In fact, the threat activity we detailed in this blog uses many of the same techniques outlined in a recent FlyingYeti campaign disclosed by CERT-UA in mid-April 2024, where the actor leveraged United Nations-themed lures involving Peace Support Operations to target Ukraine’s military. Due to Cloudforce One’s defensive actions covered in the next section, this latest FlyingYeti campaign was prevented as of the time of publication.
Mitigating FlyingYeti activity
Cloudforce One mitigated FlyingYeti’s campaign through a series of actions. Each action was taken to increase the actor’s cost of continuing their operations. When assessing which action to take and why, we carefully weighed the pros and cons in order to provide an effective active defense strategy against this actor. Our general goal was to increase the amount of time the threat actor spent trying to develop and weaponize their campaign.
We were able to successfully extend the timeline of the threat actor’s operations from hours to weeks. At each interdiction point, we assessed the impact of our mitigation to ensure the actor would spend more time attempting to launch their campaign. Our mitigation measures disrupted the actor’s activity, in one instance resulting in eight additional hours spent on debugging code.
Due to our proactive defense efforts, FlyingYeti operators adapted their tactics multiple times in their attempts to launch the campaign. The actor originally intended to have the Cloudflare Worker fetch the malicious RAR file from GitHub. After Cloudforce One interdiction of the Worker, the actor attempted to create additional Workers via a new account. In response, we disabled all Workers, leading the actor to load the RAR file directly from GitHub. Cloudforce One notified GitHub, resulting in the takedown of the RAR file, the GitHub project, and suspension of the account used to host the RAR file. In return, FlyingYeti began testing the option to host the RAR file on the file sharing sites pixeldrain and Filemail, where we observed the actor alternating the link on the Komunalka phishing site between the following:
We notified GitHub of the actor’s evolving tactics, and in response GitHub removed the Komunalka phishing site. After analyzing the files hosted on pixeldrain and Filemail, we determined the actor uploaded dummy payloads, likely to monitor access to their phishing infrastructure (FileMail logs IP addresses, and both file hosting sites provide view and download counts). At the time of publication, we did not observe FlyingYeti upload the malicious RAR file to either file hosting site, nor did we identify the use of alternative phishing or malware delivery methods.
A timeline of FlyingYeti’s activity and our corresponding mitigations can be found below.
Event timeline
Date
Event Description
2024-04-18 12:18
Threat Actor (TA) creates a Worker to handle requests from a phishing site
2024-04-18 14:16
TA creates phishing site komunalka[.]github[.]io on GitHub
2024-04-25 12:25
TA creates a GitHub repo to host a RAR file
2024-04-26 07:46
TA updates the first Worker to handle requests from users visiting komunalka[.]github[.]io
2024-04-26 08:24
TA uploads a benign test RAR to the GitHub repo
2024-04-26 13:38
Cloudforce One identifies a Worker receiving requests from users visiting komunalka[.]github[.]io, observes its use as a phishing page
2024-04-26 13:46
Cloudforce One identifies that the Worker fetches a RAR file from GitHub (the malicious RAR payload is not yet hosted on the site)
2024-04-26 19:22
Cloudforce One creates a detection to identify the Worker that fetches the RAR
2024-04-26 21:13
Cloudforce One deploys real-time monitoring of the RAR file on GitHub
2024-05-02 06:35
TA deploys a weaponized RAR (CVE-2023-38831) to GitHub with their COOKBOX malware packaged in the archive
2024-05-06 10:03
TA attempts to update the Worker with link to weaponized RAR, the Worker is immediately blocked
2024-05-06 10:38
TA creates a new Worker, the Worker is immediately blocked
2024-05-06 11:04
TA creates a new account (#2) on Cloudflare
2024-05-06 11:06
TA creates a new Worker on account #2 (blocked)
2024-05-06 11:50
TA creates a new Worker on account #2 (blocked)
2024-05-06 12:22
TA creates a new modified Worker on account #2
2024-05-06 16:05
Cloudforce One disables the running Worker on account #2
2024-05-07 22:16
TA notices the Worker is blocked, ceases all operations
2024-05-07 22:18
TA deletes original Worker first created to fetch the RAR file from the GitHub phishing page
2024-05-09 19:28
Cloudforce One adds phishing page komunalka[.]github[.]io to real-time monitoring
2024-05-13 07:36
TA updates the github.io phishing site to point directly to the GitHub RAR link
2024-05-13 17:47
Cloudforce One adds COOKBOX C2 postdock[.]serveftp[.]com to real-time monitoring for DNS resolution
2024-05-14 00:04
Cloudforce One notifies GitHub to take down the RAR file
2024-05-15 09:00
GitHub user, project, and link for RAR are no longer accessible
2024-05-21 08:23
TA updates Komunalka phishing site on github.io to link to pixeldrain URL for dummy payload (pixeldrain only tracks view and download counts)
2024-05-21 08:25
TA updates Komunalka phishing site to link to FileMail URL for dummy payload (FileMail tracks not only view and download counts, but also IP addresses)
2024-05-21 12:21
Cloudforce One downloads PixelDrain document to evaluate payload
2024-05-21 12:47
Cloudforce One downloads FileMail document to evaluate payload
2024-05-29 23:59
GitHub takes down Komunalka phishing site
2024-05-30 13:00
Cloudforce One publishes the results of this investigation
Coordinating our FlyingYeti response
Cloudforce One leveraged industry relationships to provide advanced warning and to mitigate the actor’s activity. To further protect the intended targets from this phishing threat, Cloudforce One notified and collaborated closely with GitHub’s Threat Intelligence and Trust and Safety Teams. We also notified CERT-UA and Cloudflare industry partners such as CrowdStrike, Mandiant/Google Threat Intelligence, and Microsoft Threat Intelligence.
Hunting FlyingYeti operations
There are several ways to hunt FlyingYeti in your environment. These include using PowerShell to hunt for WinRAR files, deploying Microsoft Sentinel analytics rules, and running Splunk scripts as detailed below. Note that these detections may identify activity related to this threat, but may also trigger unrelated threat activity.
PowerShell hunting
Consider running a PowerShell script such as this one in your environment to identify exploitation of CVE-2023-38831. This script will interrogate WinRAR files for evidence of the exploit.
CVE-2023-38831
Description:winrar exploit detection
open suspios (.tar / .zip / .rar) and run this script to check it
function winrar-exploit-detect(){
$targetExtensions = @(".cmd" , ".ps1" , ".bat")
$tempDir = [System.Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable("TEMP")
$dirsToCheck = Get-ChildItem -Path $tempDir -Directory -Filter "Rar*"
foreach ($dir in $dirsToCheck) {
$files = Get-ChildItem -Path $dir.FullName -File
foreach ($file in $files) {
$fileName = $file.Name
$fileExtension = [System.IO.Path]::GetExtension($fileName)
if ($targetExtensions -contains $fileExtension) {
$fileWithoutExtension = [System.IO.Path]::GetFileNameWithoutExtension($fileName); $filename.TrimEnd() -replace '\.$'
$cmdFileName = "$fileWithoutExtension"
$secondFile = Join-Path -Path $dir.FullName -ChildPath $cmdFileName
if (Test-Path $secondFile -PathType Leaf) {
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious pair detected "
Write-Host "[*] Original File:$($secondFile)" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host "[*] Suspicious File:$($file.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
# Read and display the content of the command file
$cmdFileContent = Get-Content -Path $($file.FullName)
Write-Host "[+] Command File Content:$cmdFileContent"
}
}
}
}
}
winrar-exploit-detect
Microsoft Sentinel
In Microsoft Sentinel, consider deploying the rule provided below, which identifies WinRAR execution via cmd.exe. Results generated by this rule may be indicative of attack activity on the endpoint and should be analyzed.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName has @"winrar.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has @"cmd.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| sort by Timestamp desc
Splunk
Consider using this script in your Splunk environment to look for WinRAR CVE-2023-38831 execution on your Microsoft endpoints. Results generated by this script may be indicative of attack activity on the endpoint and should be analyzed.
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winrar.exe `windows_shells` OR Processes.process_name IN ("certutil.exe","mshta.exe","bitsadmin.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `winrar_spawning_shell_application_filter`
Cloudflare product detections
Cloudflare Email Security
Cloudflare Email Security (CES) customers can identify FlyingYeti threat activity with the following detections.
CVE-2023-38831
FLYINGYETI.COOKBOX
FLYINGYETI.COOKBOX.Launcher
FLYINGYETI.Rar
Recommendations
Cloudflare recommends taking the following steps to mitigate this type of activity:
Implement Zero Trust architecture foundations:
Deploy Cloud Email Security to ensure that email services are protected against phishing, BEC and other threats
Leverage browser isolation to separate messaging applications like LinkedIn, email, and Signal from your main network
Scan, monitor and/or enforce controls on specific or sensitive data moving through your network environment with data loss prevention policies
Ensure your systems have the latest WinRAR and Microsoft security updates installed
Consider preventing WinRAR files from entering your environment, both at your Cloud Email Security solution and your Internet Traffic Gateway
Run an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool such as CrowdStrike or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to get visibility into binary execution on hosts
Search your environment for the FlyingYeti indicators of compromise (IOCs) shown below to identify potential actor activity within your network.
If you’re looking to uncover additional Threat Intelligence insights for your organization or need bespoke Threat Intelligence information for an incident, consider engaging with Cloudforce One by contacting your Customer Success manager or filling out this form.
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