Tag Archives: forgery

New SHA-1 Attack

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/01/new_sha-1_attac.html

There’s a new, practical, collision attack against SHA-1:

In this paper, we report the first practical implementation of this attack, and its impact on real-world security with a PGP/GnuPG impersonation attack. We managed to significantly reduce the complexity of collisions attack against SHA-1: on an Nvidia GTX 970, identical-prefix collisions can now be computed with a complexity of 261.2rather than264.7, and chosen-prefix collisions with a complexity of263.4rather than267.1. When renting cheap GPUs, this translates to a cost of 11k US$ for a collision,and 45k US$ for a chosen-prefix collision, within the means of academic researchers.Our actual attack required two months of computations using 900 Nvidia GTX 1060GPUs (we paid 75k US$ because GPU prices were higher, and we wasted some time preparing the attack).

It has practical applications:

We chose the PGP/GnuPG Web of Trust as demonstration of our chosen-prefix collision attack against SHA-1. The Web of Trust is a trust model used for PGP that relies on users signing each other’s identity certificate, instead of using a central PKI. For compatibility reasons the legacy branch of GnuPG (version 1.4) still uses SHA-1 by default for identity certification.

Using our SHA-1 chosen-prefix collision, we have created two PGP keys with different UserIDs and colliding certificates: key B is a legitimate key for Bob (to be signed by the Web of Trust), but the signature can be transferred to key A which is a forged key with Alice’s ID. The signature will still be valid because of the collision, but Bob controls key A with the name of Alice, and signed by a third party. Therefore, he can impersonate Alice and sign any document in her name.

From a news article:

The new attack is significant. While SHA1 has been slowly phased out over the past five years, it remains far from being fully deprecated. It’s still the default hash function for certifying PGP keys in the legacy 1.4 version branch of GnuPG, the open-source successor to PGP application for encrypting email and files. Those SHA1-generated signatures were accepted by the modern GnuPG branch until recently, and were only rejected after the researchers behind the new collision privately reported their results.

Git, the world’s most widely used system for managing software development among multiple people, still relies on SHA1 to ensure data integrity. And many non-Web applications that rely on HTTPS encryption still accept SHA1 certificates. SHA1 is also still allowed for in-protocol signatures in the Transport Layer Security and Secure Shell protocols.

Signed Malware

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/02/signed_malware.html

Stuxnet famously used legitimate digital certificates to sign its malware. A research paper from last year found that the practice is much more common than previously thought.

Now, researchers have presented proof that digitally signed malware is much more common than previously believed. What’s more, it predated Stuxnet, with the first known instance occurring in 2003. The researchers said they found 189 malware samples bearing valid digital signatures that were created using compromised certificates issued by recognized certificate authorities and used to sign legitimate software. In total, 109 of those abused certificates remain valid. The researchers, who presented their findings Wednesday at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, found another 136 malware samples signed by legitimate CA-issued certificates, although the signatures were malformed.

The results are significant because digitally signed software is often able to bypass User Account Control and other Windows measures designed to prevent malicious code from being installed. Forged signatures also represent a significant breach of trust because certificates provide what’s supposed to be an unassailable assurance to end users that the software was developed by the company named in the certificate and hasn’t been modified by anyone else. The forgeries also allow malware to evade antivirus protections. Surprisingly, weaknesses in the majority of available AV programs prevented them from detecting known malware that was digitally signed even though the signatures weren’t valid.

Daphne Caruana Galizia’s Murder and the Security of WhatsApp

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/11/daphne_caruana_.html

Daphne Caruana Galizia was a Maltese journalist whose anti-corruption investigations exposed powerful people. She was murdered in October by a car bomb.

Galizia used WhatsApp to communicate securely with her sources. Now that she is dead, the Maltese police want to break into her phone or the app, and find out who those sources were.

One journalist reports:

Part of Daphne’s destroyed smart phone was elevated from the scene.

Investigators say that Caruana Galizia had not taken her laptop with her on that particular trip. If she had done so, the forensic experts would have found evidence on the ground.

Her mobile phone is also being examined, as can be seen from her WhatsApp profile, which has registered activity since the murder. But it is understood that the data is safe.

Sources close to the newsroom said that as part of the investigation her sim card has been cloned. This is done with the help of mobile service providers in similar cases. Asked if her WhatsApp messages or any other messages that were stored in her phone will be retrieved, the source said that since the messaging application is encrypted, the messages cannot be seen. Therefore it is unlikely that any data can be retrieved.

I am less optimistic than that reporter. The FBI is providing “specific assistance.” The article doesn’t explain that, but I would not be surprised if they were helping crack the phone.

It will be interesting to see if WhatsApp’s security survives this. My guess is that it depends on how much of the phone was recovered from the bombed car.

EDITED TO ADD (11/7): The court-appointed IT expert on the case has a criminal record in the UK for theft and forgery.

New Techniques in Fake Reviews

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/new_techniques_.html

Research paper: “Automated Crowdturfing Attacks and Defenses in Online Review Systems.”

Abstract: Malicious crowdsourcing forums are gaining traction as sources of spreading misinformation online, but are limited by the costs of hiring and managing human workers. In this paper, we identify a new class of attacks that leverage deep learning language models (Recurrent Neural Networks or RNNs) to automate the generation of fake online reviews for products and services. Not only are these attacks cheap and therefore more scalable, but they can control rate of content output to eliminate the signature burstiness that makes crowdsourced campaigns easy to detect.

Using Yelp reviews as an example platform, we show how a two phased review generation and customization attack can produce reviews that are indistinguishable by state-of-the-art statistical detectors. We conduct a survey-based user study to show these reviews not only evade human detection, but also score high on “usefulness” metrics by users. Finally, we develop novel automated defenses against these attacks, by leveraging the lossy transformation introduced by the RNN training and generation cycle. We consider countermeasures against our mechanisms, show that they produce unattractive cost-benefit tradeoffs for attackers, and that they can be further curtailed by simple constraints imposed by online service providers.

The Future of Forgeries

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/07/the_future_of_f_1.html

This article argues that AI technologies will make image, audio, and video forgeries much easier in the future.

Combined, the trajectory of cheap, high-quality media forgeries is worrying. At the current pace of progress, it may be as little as two or three years before realistic audio forgeries are good enough to fool the untrained ear, and only five or 10 years before forgeries can fool at least some types of forensic analysis. When tools for producing fake video perform at higher quality than today’s CGI and are simultaneously available to untrained amateurs, these forgeries might comprise a large part of the information ecosystem. The growth in this technology will transform the meaning of evidence and truth in domains across journalism, government communications, testimony in criminal justice, and, of course, national security.

I am not worried about fooling the “untrained ear,” and more worried about fooling forensic analysis. But there’s an arms race here. Recording technologies will get more sophisticated, too, making their outputs harder to forge. Still, I agree that the advantage will go to the forgers and not the forgery detectors.

Prepare for the OWASP Top 10 Web Application Vulnerabilities Using AWS WAF and Our New White Paper

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/prepare-for-the-owasp-top-10-web-application-vulnerabilities-using-aws-waf-and-our-new-white-paper/

Are you aware of the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) and the work that they do to improve the security of web applications? Among many other things, they publish a list of the 10 most critical application security flaws, known as the OWASP Top 10. The release candidate for the 2017 version contains a consensus view of common vulnerabilities often found in web sites and web applications.

AWS WAF, as I described in my blog post, New – AWS WAF, helps to protect your application from application-layer attacks such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting. You can create custom rules to define the types of traffic that are accepted or rejected.

Our new white paper, Use AWS WAF to Mitigate OWASP’s Top 10 Web Application Vulnerabilities, shows you how to put AWS WAF to use. Going far beyond a simple recommendation to “use WAF,” it includes detailed, concrete mitigation strategies and implementation details for the most important items in the OWASP Top 10 (formally known as A1 through A10):

Download Today
The white paper provides background and context for each vulnerability, and then shows you how to create WAF rules to identify and block them. It also provides some defense-in-depth recommendations, including a very cool suggestion to use [email protected] to prevalidate the parameters supplied to HTTP requests.

The white paper links to a companion AWS CloudFormation template that creates a Web ACL, along with the recommended condition types and rules. You can use this template as a starting point for your own work, adding more condition types and rules as desired.

AWSTemplateFormatVersion: '2010-09-09'
Description: AWS WAF Basic OWASP Example Rule Set

## Template parameters to be configured by user
    Type: String
    Description: The prefix to use when naming resources in this stack. Normally we would use the stack name, but since this template can be us\
ed as a resource in other stacks we want to keep the naming consistent. No symbols allowed.
    ConstraintDescription: Alphanumeric characters only, maximum 10 characters
    AllowedPattern: ^[a-zA-z0-9]+$
    MaxLength: 10
    Default: generic
    Type: String
    Description: You can deploy this stack at a regional level, for regional WAF targets like Application Load Balancers, or for global targets\
, such as Amazon CloudFront distributions.
      - Global
      - Regional
    Default: Regional

Attend our Webinar
If you would like to learn more about the topics discussed in this new white paper, please plan to attend our upcoming webinar, Secure Your Applications with AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF) and AWS Shield. On July 12, 2017, my colleagues Jeffrey Lyon and Sundar Jayashekar will show you how to secure your web applications and how to defend against the most common Layer 7 attacks.





RFD: the alien abduction prophecy protocol

Post Syndicated from Michal Zalewski original http://lcamtuf.blogspot.com/2017/05/rfd-alien-abduction-prophecy-protocol.html

“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”
– variously attributed to Yogi Berra and Niels Bohr

Right. So let’s say you are visited by transdimensional space aliens from outer space. There’s some old-fashioned probing, but eventually, they get to the point. They outline a series of apocalyptic prophecies, beginning with the surprise 2032 election of Dwayne Elizondo Mountain Dew Herbert Camacho as the President of the United States, followed by a limited-scale nuclear exchange with the Grand Duchy of Ruritania in 2036, and culminating with the extinction of all life due to a series of cascading Y2K38 failures that start at an Ohio pretzel reprocessing plan. Long story short, if you want to save mankind, you have to warn others of what’s to come.

But there’s a snag: when you wake up in a roadside ditch in Alabama, you realize that nobody is going to believe your story! If you come forward, your professional and social reputation will be instantly destroyed. If you’re lucky, the vindication of your claims will come fifteen years later; if not, it might turn out that you were pranked by some space alien frat boys who just wanted to have some cheap space laughs. The bottom line is, you need to be certain before you make your move. You figure this means staying mum until the Election Day of 2032.

But wait, this plan is also not very good! After all, how could your future self convince others that you knew about President Camacho all along? Well… if you work in information security, you are probably familiar with a neat solution: write down your account of events in a text file, calculate a cryptographic hash of this file, and publish the resulting value somewhere permanent. Fifteen years later, reveal the contents of your file and point people to your old announcement. Explain that you must have been in the possession of this very file back in 2017; otherwise, you would not have known its hash. Voila – a commitment scheme!

Although elegant, this approach can be risky: historically, the usable life of cryptographic hash functions seemed to hover at somewhere around 15 years – so even if you pick a very modern algorithm, there is a real risk that future advances in cryptanalysis could severely undermine the strength of your proof. No biggie, though! For extra safety, you could combine several independent hashing functions, or increase the computational complexity of the hash by running it in a loop. There are also some less-known hash functions, such as SPHINCS, that are designed with different trade-offs in mind and may offer longer-term security guarantees.

Of course, the computation of the hash is not enough; it needs to become an immutable part of the public record and remain easy to look up for years to come. There is no guarantee that any particular online publishing outlet is going to stay afloat that long and continue to operate in its current form. The survivability of more specialized and experimental platforms, such as blockchain-based notaries, seems even less clear. Thankfully, you can resort to another kludge: if you publish the hash through a large number of independent online venues, there is a good chance that at least one of them will be around in 2032.

(Offline notarization – whether of the pen-and-paper or the PKI-based variety – offers an interesting alternative. That said, in the absence of an immutable, public ledger, accusations of forgery or collusion would be very easy to make – especially if the fate of the entire planet is at stake.)

Even with this out of the way, there is yet another profound problem with the plan: a current-day scam artist could conceivably generate hundreds or thousands of political predictions, publish the hashes, and then simply discard or delete the ones that do not come true by 2032 – thus creating an illusion of prescience. To convince skeptics that you are not doing just that, you could incorporate a cryptographic proof of work into your approach, attaching a particular CPU time “price tag” to every hash. The future you could then claim that it would have been prohibitively expensive for the former you to attempt the “prediction spam” attack. But this argument seems iffy: a $1,000 proof may already be too costly for a lower middle class abductee, while a determined tech billionaire could easily spend $100,000 to pull off an elaborate prank on the entire world. Not to mention, massive CPU resources can be commandeered with little or no effort by the operators of large botnets and many other actors of this sort.

In the end, my best idea is to rely on an inherently low-bandwidth publication medium, rather than a high-cost one. For example, although a determined hoaxer could place thousands of hash-bearing classifieds in some of the largest-circulation newspapers, such sleigh-of-hand would be trivial for future sleuths to spot (at least compared to combing through the entire Internet for an abandoned hash). Or, as per an anonymous suggestion relayed by Thomas Ptacek: just tattoo the signature on your body, then post some post some pics; there are only so many places for a tattoo to go.

Still, what was supposed to be a nice, scientific proof devolved into a bunch of hand-wavy arguments and poorly-quantified probabilities. For the sake of future abductees: is there a better way?

Forging Voice

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/05/forging_voice.html

LyreBird is a system that can accurately reproduce the voice of someone, given a large amount of sample inputs. It’s pretty good — listen to the demo here — and will only get better over time.

The applications for recorded-voice forgeries are obvious, but I think the larger security risk will be real-time forgery. Imagine the social engineering implications of an attacker on the telephone being able to impersonate someone the victim knows.

I don’t think we’re ready for this. We use people’s voices to authenticate them all the time, in all sorts of different ways.

EDITED TO ADD (5/11): This is from 2003 on the topic.

Security advisories for Monday

Post Syndicated from ris original https://lwn.net/Articles/713770/rss

Arch Linux has updated gst-plugins-bad (two vulnerabilities), gst-plugins-base-libs (multiple vulnerabilities), gst-plugins-good (multiple vulnerabilities), gst-plugins-ugly (two vulnerabilities), and gstreamer (denial of service).

CentOS has updated ntp (C7; C6:
multiple vulnerabilities), spice (C7: two
vulnerabilities), and spice-server (C6: two vulnerabilities).

Debian has updated svgsalamander (server-side request forgery).

Debian-LTS has updated libphp-phpmailer (information disclosure).

Fedora has updated epiphany (F25:
multiple vulnerabilities), iio-sensor-proxy
(F25: unspecified), jasper (F24: code
execution), thunderbird (F25; F24: multiple vulnerabilities), and wavpack (F24: multiple vulnerabilities).

Gentoo has updated rtmpdump (multiple vulnerabilities).

Mageia has updated java-1.8.0-openjdk (multiple vulnerabilities),
openssl (three vulnerabilities), php (multiple vulnerabilities), phpmyadmin (two vulnerabilities), and thunderbird (multiple vulnerabilities).

openSUSE has updated cpio (42.2,
42.1: out-of-bounds write), gnutls (42.2,
42.1: multiple vulnerabilities), GraphicsMagick (42.2; 42.1:
multiple vulnerabilities), gstreamer-0_10-plugins-bad (42.2: code
execution), libgit2 (42.1: multiple
vulnerabilities), and virtualbox (42.2: multiple vulnerabilities).

Oracle has updated spice (OL7:
two vulnerabilities) and spice-server (OL6:
two vulnerabilities).

Red Hat has updated ntp (RHEL6,7:
multiple vulnerabilities), spice (RHEL7:
two vulnerabilities), and spice-server
(RHEL6: two vulnerabilities).

Scientific Linux has updated ntp
(SL6,7: multiple vulnerabilities), spice
(SL7: two vulnerabilities), and spice-server (SL6: two vulnerabilities).

SUSE has updated spice (SLE12-SP2; SLE12-SP1; SLES12; SLE11-SP4: two vulnerabilities).

Friday’s security updates

Post Syndicated from jake original https://lwn.net/Articles/713554/rss

Arch Linux has updated qt5-webengine (multiple vulnerabilities) and tcpdump (multiple vulnerabilities).

CentOS has updated thunderbird (C7; C6; C5: multiple vulnerabilities).

Debian-LTS has updated ntfs-3g
(privilege escalation) and svgsalamander
(server-side request forgery).

Fedora has updated openldap (F25:
unintended cipher usage from 2015), and wavpack (F25: multiple vulnerabilities).

Mageia has updated openafs
(information leak) and pdns-recursor
(denial of service).

openSUSE has updated java-1_8_0-openjdk (42.2, 42.1: multiple vulnerabilities),
mupdf (42.2; 42.1: three vulnerabilities), phpMyAdmin (42.2, 42.1: multiple vulnerabilities, one from 2015),
and Wireshark (42.2: two denial of service flaws).

Oracle has updated thunderbird (OL7; OL6: multiple vulnerabilities).

Scientific Linux has updated libtiff (SL7&6: multiple vulnerabilities, one from 2015) and thunderbird (multiple vulnerabilities).

Ubuntu has updated kernel (16.10; 14.04;
12.04: multiple vulnerabilities), kernel, linux-raspi2, linux-snapdragon (16.04:
two vulnerabilities), linux-lts-trusty
(12.04: code execution), linux-lts-xenial
(14.04: two vulnerabilities), and tomcat
(14.04, 12.04: regression in previous update).

The Future of Faking Audio and Video

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/12/the_future_of_f.html

This Verge article isn’t great, but we are certainly moving into a future where audio and video will be easy to fake, and easier to fake undetectably. This is going to make propaganda easier, with all of the ill effects we’ve already seen turned up to eleven.

I don’t have a good solution for this.

Security updates for Friday

Post Syndicated from jake original http://lwn.net/Articles/707996/rss

Arch Linux has updated firefox
(two vulnerabilities) and thunderbird (code execution).

CentOS has updated thunderbird (C6; C5: code execution).

Debian-LTS has updated firefox-esr (multiple vulnerabilities), imagemagick (multiple vulnerabilities, many from 2014 and 2015), monit (cross-site request forgery), tomcat6 (multiple vulnerabilities), and tomcat7 (multiple vulnerabilities).

Fedora has updated calamares (F25; F24:
encryption bypass), jenkins (F25: code execution), jenkins-remoting (F25: code execution), moin (F25; F24; F23: cross-site scripting flaws), mujs (F23: multiple vulnerabilities), and zathura-pdf-mupdf (F23: multiple vulnerabilities).

Gentoo has updated davfs2
(privilege escalation from 2013) and gnupg
(flawed random number generation).

openSUSE has updated libtcnative-1-0 (42.2, 42.1: SSL improvements)
and pacemaker (42.2: two vulnerabilities).

Oracle has updated firefox (OL7; OL6; OL5: code execution).

Red Hat has updated firefox (code

SUSE has updated kernel (SLE11: multiple vulnerabilities, some from 2013 and 2015)
and ImageMagick
(SLE11: multiple vulnerabilities, some from 2014 and 2015).

Ubuntu has updated ghostscript
(multiple vulnerabilities, one from 2013) and oxide-qt (16.10,
16.04, 14.04: multiple vulnerabilities).

Security advisories for Monday

Post Syndicated from ris original http://lwn.net/Articles/706396/rss

CentOS has updated java-1.7.0-openjdk (C6: multiple
vulnerabilities), libgcrypt (C6: flawed
random number generation), and pacemaker
(C6: privilege escalation).

Debian has updated mariadb-10.0 (multiple vulnerabilities) and terminology (command execution).

Fedora has updated bind (F24:
denial of service), mingw-libwebp (F24:
integer overflows), sudo (F24: privilege escalation), and tomcat (F24; F23: multiple vulnerabilities).

Mageia has updated libwmf (denial of service), monit (cross-site request forgery), python-cryptography (returns empty byte-string), and quagga (stack overrun).

openSUSE has updated flash-player
(13.1: multiple vulnerabilities), mysql-community-server (Leap42.2: multiple vulnerabilities), and opera (Leap42.2; Leap42.1: multiple vulnerabilities).

Red Hat has updated policycoreutils (RHEL6,7: sandbox escape).

SUSE has updated flash-player
(SLE12-SP1: multiple vulnerabilities) and mysql (SLE11-SP4: three vulnerabilities).

Security advisories for Monday

Post Syndicated from ris original http://lwn.net/Articles/705814/rss

Debian has updated mysql-5.5 (multiple unspecified vulnerabilities).

Debian-LTS has updated libdatetime-timezone-perl (update tzdata), libxslt (code execution), memcached (multiple vulnerabilities, one from
2013), openjdk-7 (multiple
vulnerabilities), and tzdata (update tzdata).

Fedora has updated 389-ds-base
(F24: information leak), curl (F24:
multiple vulnerabilities), firefox (F24:
two vulnerabilities), and pacemaker (F24: privilege escalation).

Mageia has updated libtomcrypt (signature forgery), python-django (two vulnerabilities), and tomcat (multiple vulnerabilities).

openSUSE has updated chromium (SPH for SLE12; Leap42.1, 13.2: memory leak), dbus-1 (13.1: denial of service), jasper (13.1: multiple vulnerabilities), libraw (Leap42.1: memory leak), libxml2 (13.2: code execution), and firefox (13.1: two vulnerabilities).

Red Hat has updated java-1.6.0-ibm (RHEL5,6: multiple
vulnerabilities) and java-1.7.0-openjdk
(RHEL5,6,7: multiple vulnerabilities).

Security advisories for Monday

Post Syndicated from ris original http://lwn.net/Articles/704464/rss

Arch Linux has updated chromium (multiple vulnerabilities), kernel (privilege escalation), linux-lts (privilege escalation), python-django (cross-site request forgery), and python2-django (cross-site request forgery).

CentOS has updated bind (C6; C5: denial
of service) and bind97 (C5: denial of service).

Debian has updated kdepimlibs (HTML injection).

Debian-LTS has updated kdepimlibs (HTML injection).

Fedora has updated guile (F23: two vulnerabilities), kernel (F24; F23: privilege escalation), php (F24; F23: multiple vulnerabilities), and php-pecl-zip (F24; F23: multiple vulnerabilities).

Mageia has updated 389-ds-base (information disclosure), c-ares (code execution), guile (two vulnerabilities), openjpeg (denial of service), and php-ZendFramework (SQL injection).

openSUSE has updated Chromium
(Leap42.1, 13.2: multiple vulnerabilities), dbus-1 (Leap42.1: code execution), gd (13.2: denial of service), kdump (Leap42.1: denial of service), php5 (13.2: three vulnerabilities),
kernel (Leap42.1; 13.1: multiple vulnerabilities), tor (Leap42.1, 13.2: denial of service), and
X (Leap42.1: multiple vulnerabilities).

Oracle has updated bind (OL6; OL5:
denial of service), bind97 (OL5: multiple
vulnerabilities), and kernel 4.1.12 (OL7; OL6:
privilege escalation), kernel 3.8.13 (OL7; OL6:
privilege escalation), kernel 2.6.39 (OL6; OL5: privilege escalation).

Red Hat has updated kernel
(RHEL7: privilege escalation).

SUSE has updated Chromium
(SPH for SLE12: multiple vulnerabilities), qemu (SLE12-SP1: multiple vulnerabilities),
and kernel (SLE12-SP1; SLE12; SLE11-SP4; SLE11-SP3; SLE11-SP2: privilege escalation).

Security updates for Tuesday

Post Syndicated from ris original http://lwn.net/Articles/703240/rss

Debian has updated icedove (multiple vulnerabilities).

Debian-LTS has updated graphicsmagick (multiple vulnerabilities), qemu (three vulnerabilities), and qemu-kvm (three vulnerabilities).

Fedora has updated c-ares (F23:
code execution), irssi (F24; F23: three vulnerabilities), mujs (F24; F23: two
vulnerabilities), nodejs (F24: improper
validation), python-django (F24; F23: cross-site request forgery), and
zathura-pdf-mupdf (F24; F23: two vulnerabilities).

Gentoo has updated mysql (multiple unspecified vulnerabilities) and subversion (multiple vulnerabilities).

openSUSE has updated thunderbird (Leap42.1, 13.2; SPH for SLE12: multiple vulnerabilities).

Oracle has updated kernel (OL7:
stack corruption), tomcat (OL7: two
vulnerabilities), and tomcat6 (OL6: multiple vulnerabilities).

Red Hat has updated kernel
(RHEL7: stack corruption), tomcat (RHEL7:
multiple vulnerabilities), and tomcat6
(RHEL6: multiple vulnerabilities).

Ubuntu has updated kernel (16.04; 14.04;
12.04: multiple vulnerabilities), linux-lts-trusty (12.04: multiple
vulnerabilities), linux-lts-xenial (14.04:
multiple vulnerabilities), linux-raspi2
(16.04: multiple vulnerabilities), and linux-snapdragon (16.04: multiple vulnerabilities).

Security advisories for Monday

Post Syndicated from ris original http://lwn.net/Articles/703097/rss

Arch Linux has updated imagemagick (two vulnerabilities), kcoreaddons (HTML injection), messagelib (two vulnerabilities), and wpa_supplicant (two vulnerabilities).

Debian has updated php5 (multiple vulnerabilities).

Debian-LTS has updated mat (information leak).

Fedora has updated libdwarf (F24:
two vulnerabilities), libXfixes (F24:
integer overflow), libXi (F24: insufficient
validation), libXrandr (F24: insufficient
validation), libXrender (F24: insufficient
validation), libXtst (F24: insufficient
validation), libXv (F24: insufficient
validation), libXvMC (F24: insufficient
validation), mingw-c-ares (F24; F23: code execution), mingw-openjpeg2
(F24; F23:
denial of service), openjpeg2 (F23: denial
of service), php-ZendFramework (F24;
F23: SQL injection), and python-pillow (F24: memory disclosure).

Gentoo has updated libgcrypt (multiple vulnerabilities) and quagga (code execution).

Mageia has updated graphicsmagick (multiple vulnerabilities).

Red Hat has updated python-django (RHELOSP7 for RHEL7; RHELOSP6 for RHEL7; RHELOSP5 for RHEL7; RHELOSP5 for RHEL6: cross-site request forgery).

SUSE has updated php5 (SLE12-SP1:
multiple vulnerabilities) and systemd (SLE12-SP1; SLE12: denial of service).

Security advisories for Friday

Post Syndicated from ris original http://lwn.net/Articles/702886/rss

Debian-LTS has updated c-ares (code execution) and python-django (cross-site request forgery).

Fedora has updated mongodb (F24:
information leak).

Gentoo has updated apache (multiple vulnerabilities) and groovy (code execution).

Mageia has updated thunderbird (code execution).

Oracle has updated kernel 4.1.12 (OL7; OL6: two
vulnerabilities), kernel 3.8.13 (OL7; OL6: two
vulnerabilities), kernel 2.6.39 (OL6; OL5: two

SUSE has updated compat-openssl098 (SLE12-SP1: multiple
vulnerabilities), nodejs4 (SLEM12: multiple
vulnerabilities), openssl1
(SLES11-SECURITY: multiple vulnerabilities), and xen (SLE12-SP1: multiple vulnerabilities).

Ubuntu has updated oxide-qt
(16.04, 14.04: multiple vulnerabilities).