Martin Lau gave a talk in the BPF track of the 2025 Linux Storage, Filesystem,
Memory-Management, and BPF Summit about a performance problem
plaguing the networking subsystem, and some potential ways to fix it. He works on
BPF programs that need to store socket-local data; amid other improvements to
the networking and BPF subsystems, retrieving that data has become a noticeable
bottleneck for his use case. His proposed fix prompted a good deal of discussion
about how the data should be laid out.
Security updates have been issued by AlmaLinux (thunderbird), Debian (distro-info-data, imagemagick, kernel, libsoup2.4, and poppler), Fedora (chromium, java-1.8.0-openjdk, java-1.8.0-openjdk-portable, java-17-openjdk, java-17-openjdk-portable, java-latest-openjdk, pgadmin4, thunderbird, and xz), Mageia (haproxy and libxml2), Oracle (bluez, firefox, gnutls, libtasn1, libxslt, mod_auth_openidc:2.3, ruby:3.1, thunderbird, and xmlrpc-c), Red Hat (delve and golang, glibc, mod_auth_openidc, mod_auth_openidc:2.3, and thunderbird), SUSE (augeas, chromedriver, cifs-utils, govulncheck-vulndb, java-11-openjdk, java-21-openjdk, kyverno, libraw, opentofu, runc, subfinder, and valkey), and Ubuntu (jupyter-notebook and libxml2).
Cybersecurity threats are evolving at an unprecedented pace, making it imperative for organizations to stay ahead of attackers with proactive security measures. To help organizations navigate this rapidly changing threat landscape, we are excited to introduce the Exposure Assessment Platform (EAP) Buyer’s Guide. This comprehensive guide is designed to help security professionals understand the critical role of EAPs in modern security programs, evaluate potential solutions, and implement the right tool for their organization.
Why you need an EAP
Exposure Assessment Platforms (EAPs) continuously identify and prioritize exposures, such as vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, across a broad range of asset classes. EAPs go beyond traditional vulnerability management by offering real-time visibility into an organization’s entire IT environment, enabling security teams to proactively mitigate risks and prioritize remediation efforts effectively.
An EAP is a critical component of a Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) program. With this in mind, our buyer’s guide provides essential insights into:
The importance of EAPs in modern security strategies
How EAPs support a CTEM framework
Key criteria to consider when evaluating an EAP solution
Best practices for implementing continuous risk management
How to evaluate and find the right EAP
Not all EAPs are created equal. When assessing potential solutions, organizations should prioritize platforms that offer:
Comprehensive visibility across all digital assets, including cloud environments, third-party integrations, and IoT devices.
Real-time continuous monitoring to detect new vulnerabilities and attack vectors.
Automated security testing and validation to assess real-world exploitability.
Seamless integration with existing security tools to enhance threat intelligence and remediation workflows.
How Rapid7’s EAP can help strengthen your security
For organizations looking to gain complete control over their attack surface, Rapid7’s Exposure Command offers unparalleled visibility and risk assessment capabilities. By aggregating insights from native exposure detection and third-party sources, Exposure Command enables security teams to:
Identify and prioritize vulnerabilities based on real-world threat intelligence to reduce blind spots and misconfigurations.
Integrate with existing security ecosystems, reducing operational overhead.
Increase ROI by tracking the impact of reducing risk exposure across the business in real time.
With Rapid7 Exposure Command, organizations can reduce manual efforts, optimize security workflows, and proactively mitigate risks before they escalate into breaches. And by leveraging the insights and best practices outlined in this guide, organizations can make informed decisions to enhance their security posture, mitigate risk, and stay ahead of emerging threats.
On Thursday, April 24, enterprise resource planning company SAP published a CVE (and a day later, an advisory behind login) for CVE-2025-31324, a zero-day vulnerability in NetWeaver Visual Composer that carries a CVSSv3 score of 10. The vulnerability arises from a missing authorization check in Visual Composer’s Metadata Uploader component that, when successfully exploited, allows unauthenticated attackers to send specially crafted POST requests to the /developmentserver/metadatauploader endpoint, resulting in unrestricted malicious file upload.
While the vulnerable component is not installed in NetWeaver’s default configuration, SAP security firm Onapsis notes that it is widely enabled.
Per SAP’s docs, Visual Composer “operates on top of the SAP NetWeaver Portal, utilizing the portal’s connector-framework interfaces to enable access to a range of data services, including SAP and third-party enterprise systems. In addition to accessing SAP Business Suite systems, users can access SAP NetWeaver Business Warehouse and any open/JDBC stored procedures.”
Rapid7-observed exploitation
CVE-2025-31324 is being actively exploited in the wild; Rapid7 MDR has observed exploitation in multiple customer environments dating back to at least March 27, 2025, nearly all of which has targeted manufacturing companies. Adversaries have exploited the vulnerability to drop webshells in the following directory: j2ee/cluster/apps/sap.com/irj/servlet_jsp/irj/root/
Public threat intelligence on CVE-2025-31324 exploitation has highlighted the use of webshells named helper.jsp and cache.jsp. With few exceptions (like helper.jsp), most webshells Rapid7 has observed had random 8-character names, e.g.: cglswdjp.jsp ijoatvey.jsp dkqgcoxe.jsp ylgxcsem.jsp cpyjljgo.jsp tgmzqnty.jsp
Rapid7 has not attributed this activity to a specific threat actor at time of writing.
Mitigation guidance
All SAP NetWeaver 7.xx versions and service packs (SPS) are affected.
SAP’s non-public guidance indicates that customers can check system info (http://host:port/nwa/sysinfo) for the Software Component VISUAL COMPOSER FRAMEWORK (VCFRAMEWORK.SCA). If this check returns no results, SAP has said the vulnerability is “not relevant for that system.”
Customers should update to the latest version of NetWeaver AS on an emergency basis, without waiting for a regular patch cycle to occur. Note that updating to a fixed version of NetWeaver will not address pre-existing compromises. Customers who are unable to update to a fixed version of the application should disable Visual Composer by following SAP’s directions here.
Customers should also restrict access to the affected endpoint (/developmentserver/metadatauploader) and investigate their environments for signs of compromise. SAP’s non-public advisory notes that the “most common targets for an attacking agent” are the following paths under the JAVA server file system — jsp, java, or class files present directly in these paths should be considered malicious: C:\usr\sap\<SID>\<InstanceID>\j2ee\cluster\apps\sap.com\irj\servlet_jsp\irj\rootC:\usr\sap\<SID>\<InstanceID>\j2ee\cluster\apps\sap.com\irj\servlet_jsp\irj\workC:\usr\sap\<SID>\<InstanceID>\j2ee\cluster\apps\sap.com\irj\servlet_jsp\irj\work\sync
For additional information and the latest guidance, please refer to SAP’s non-public materials or contact SAP support.
Rapid7 customers
InsightIDR and Managed Detection and Response customers have existing detection coverage through Rapid7’s expansive library of detection rules. Rapid7 recommends installing the Insight Agent on all applicable hosts to ensure visibility into suspicious processes and proper detection coverage.
For InsightVM and Nexpose customers, our vulnerability coverage engineering team is investigating options to help customers assess exposure to this threat. We will update this blog no later than 3 PM ET on Monday, April 28 with additional information and delivery timelines.
The 6.15-rc4 kernel prepatch is out for
testing. “So let’s see if this rc ends up avoiding any silly issues –
things certainly look pretty normal, and there were no hurried last-minute
changes this week due to system upgrades“.
Welcome to the 21st edition of the Cloudflare DDoS Threat Report. Published quarterly, this report offers a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat landscape of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on data from the Cloudflare network. In this edition, we focus on the first quarter of 2025. To view previous reports, visit www.ddosreport.com.
While this report primarily focuses on 2025 Q1, it also includes late-breaking data from a hyper-volumetric DDoS campaign observed in April 2025, featuring some of the largest attacks ever publicly disclosed. In a historic surge of activity, we blocked the most intense packet rate attack on record, peaking at 4.8 billion packets per second (Bpps), 52% higher than the previous benchmark, and separately defended against a massive 6.5 terabits-per-second (Tbps) flood, matching the highest bandwidth attacks ever reported.
Key DDoS insights
In the first quarter of 2025, Cloudflare blocked 20.5 million DDoS attacks. That represents a 358% year-over-year (YoY) increase and a 198% quarter-over-quarter (QoQ) increase.
Around one third of those, 6.6 million, targeted the Cloudflare network infrastructure directly, as part of an 18-day multi-vector attack campaign.
Furthermore, in the first quarter of 2025, Cloudflare blocked approximately 700 hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks that exceeded 1 Tbps or 1 Bpps — an average of around 8 attacks per day.
To learn more about DDoS attacks and other types of cyber threats, refer to our Learning Center. Visit Cloudflare Radar to view this report in its interactive version where you can drill down further. There’s a free API for those interested in investigating Internet trends. You can also learn more about the methodologies used in preparing these reports.
DDoS attacks in numbers
In the first quarter of 2025, we blocked 20.5 million DDoS attacks. For comparison, during the calendar year 2024, we blocked 21.3 million DDoS attacks. In just this past quarter, we blocked 96% of what we blocked in 2024.
The most significant increase was in network-layer DDoS attacks. In 2025 Q1, we blocked 16.8M network-layer DDoS attacks. That’s a 397% QoQ increase and a 509% YoY increase. HTTP DDoS attacks also increased — a 7% QoQ increase and a 118% YoY increase.
We count DDoS attacks based on unique real-time fingerprints generated by our systems. In some instances, a single attack or campaign may generate multiple fingerprints, particularly when different mitigation strategies are applied. While this can occasionally lead to higher counts, the metric offers a strong overall indicator of attack activity during a given period.
Attacks target the Cloudflare network and Internet infrastructure
Of the 20.5 million DDoS attacks blocked in Q1, 16.8 million were network-layer DDoS attacks, and of those, 6.6M targeted Cloudflare’s network infrastructure directly. Another 6.9 million targeted hosting providers and service providers protected by Cloudflare.
In the graph below, daily aggregates of attacks against Cloudflare are represented by the blue line, and the other colors represent the various hosting providers and Internet service providers using Cloudflare’s Magic Transit service that were attacked simultaneously.
Hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks
Hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks are attacks that exceed 1-2 Tbps or 1 Bpps. In 2025 Q1, we blocked over 700 of these attacks. Approximately 4 out of every 100,000 network-layer DDoS attacks were hyper-volumetric. Hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks tend to take place over UDP.
Hyper-volumetric attacks continue spill into Q2
While this report primarily focuses on 2025 Q1, we believe it is important to also highlight the significant hyper-volumetric record-breaking DDoS attacks that continued into Q2. As such, we have included initial insights from that campaign.
In the second half of April 2025, Cloudflare’s systems automatically detected and blocked dozens of hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks as part of an intense campaign. The largest attacks peaked at 4.8 Bpps and 6.5 Tbps, with these massive surges typically lasting between 35 and 45 seconds. At 6.5 Tbps, this attack matches the largest publicly disclosed DDoS attack to date. The 4.8 Bpps attack is the largest ever to be disclosed from the packet intensity perspective, approximately 52% larger than the previous 3.15 Bpps record.
The attacks originated from 147 countries and targeted multiple IP addresses and ports of a hosting provider that is protected by Cloudflare Magic Transit. All the attacks were successfully blocked by Cloudflare’s network.
Threat actors
When surveying Cloudflare customers that were targeted by DDoS attacks, the majority said they didn’t know who attacked them. The ones that did know reported their competitors as the number one threat actor behind the attacks (39%), which is similar to last quarter. This is quite common in the gaming and gambling industry.
Another 17% reported that a state-level or state-sponsored threat actor was behind the attack, and a similar percentage reported that a disgruntled user or customer was behind the attack.
Another 11% reported that they mistakenly inflicted the DDoS attack on themselves (self-DDoS) and a similar percentage said an extortionist was behind the attacks. 6% reported that the attacks were launched by disgruntled or former employees.
Anatomy of a DDoS attack
On the network-layer, SYN flood remains the most common Layer 3/4 DDoS attack vector, followed by DNS flood attacks. Mirai-launched DDoS attacks take the third place, replacing UDP flood attacks.
In the HTTP realm, over 60% of the attacks were identified and blocked as known botnets, 21% were attacks with suspicious HTTP attributes, another 10% were launched by botnets impersonating browsers, and the remaining 8% were generic floods, attacks of unusual request patterns, and cache busting attacks.
Emerging threats
In 2025 Q1, we saw a 3,488% QoQ increase in CLDAP reflection/amplification attacks. CLDAP (Connectionless Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) is a variant of LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol), used for querying and modifying directory services running over IP networks. CLDAP is connectionless, using UDP instead of TCP, making it faster but less reliable. Because it uses UDP, there’s no handshake requirement, which allows attackers to spoof the source IP address, thus allowing attackers to exploit it as a reflection vector. In these attacks, small queries are sent with a spoofed source IP address (the victim’s IP), causing servers to send large responses to the victim, overwhelming it. Mitigation involves filtering and monitoring unusual CLDAP traffic.
We also saw a 2,301% QoQ increase in ESP reflection/amplification attacks. The ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) protocol is part of IPsec and provides confidentiality, authentication, and integrity to network communications. However, it can be abused in DDoS attacks if malicious actors exploit misconfigured or vulnerable systems to reflect or amplify traffic towards a target, leading to service disruption. Like with other protocols, securing and properly configuring the systems using ESP is crucial to block the risks of DDoS attacks.
Attack size & duration
Despite the increase in hyper-volumetric attacks, most DDoS attacks are small. In 2025 Q1, 99% of Layer 3/4 DDoS attacks were under 1 Gbps and 1 Mpps. Similarly, 94% of HTTP DDoS attacks were 1 million requests per second (rps). However, ‘small’ is a relative term and most Internet properties wouldn’t be able to withstand even those small attacks. They can easily saturate unprotected Internet links and crash unprotected servers.
Furthermore, most attacks are very short-lived. 89% of Layer 3/4 DDoS attacks and 75% of HTTP DDoS attacks end within 10 minutes. Even the largest, record-breaking, hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks can be very short, such as the 35-second attack seen in the examples above. 35 seconds, or even 10 minutes, is not a sufficient time for manual mitigation or activating an on-demand solution: by the time a security analyst receives the alert, and analyzes the attack, it’s already over. And while the attacks may be very short, the trickle effect of attack leads to network and applications failures that can take days to recover from — all whilst services are down or degraded. The current threat landscape leaves no time for human intervention. Detection and mitigation should be always-on, in-line and automated — with sufficient capacity and global coverage to handle the attack traffic along with legitimate peak time traffic.
On the other hand, hyper-volumetric HTTP DDoS attacks that exceed 1 Mrps doubled their share. In 2025 Q1, 6 out of every 100 HTTP DDoS attacks exceeded 1 Mrps. On the network-layer, 1 out of every 100,000 attacks exceeded 1 Tbps or 1 Bpps.
Attack example
One example of such an attack targeted a Cloudflare Magic Transit customer. The customer itself is a US-based hosting provider that offers web servers, Voice over IP (VoIP) servers, and game servers amongst its solutions. This specific attack targeted port 27015. This port is most commonly associated with multiplayer gaming servers, especially Valve’s Source engine games, such as Counter-Strike: Global Offensive (CS:GO), Team Fortress 2, Garry’s Mod, Left 4 Dead, and Half-Life 2: Deathmatch.
It’s used for the game server connection, letting clients connect to the server to play online. In many cases, this port is open for both UDP and TCP, depending on the game and what kind of communication it’s doing. This customer was targeted with multiple hyper-volumetric attacks that were autonomously blocked by Cloudflare.
Top attacked locations
The first quarter of 2025 saw a significant shift in the top 10 most attacked locations globally. Germany made a notable jump, climbing four spots — making it the most attacked country. In second place, Turkey also experienced a surge of 11 spots. In third, China, on the other hand, slipped two spots compared to the previous quarter, while Hong Kong remained unchanged. India rose four spots, and Brazil stayed the same. Taiwan dropped four positions. The Philippines experienced the largest decline, falling 6 spots. South Korea and Indonesia, however, both jumped up by two spots each.
Top attacked industries
The top 10 most attacked industries in 2025 Q1 saw some notable changes. The Gambling & Casinos industry jumped up four spots as the most attacked industry, while the Telecommunications, Service Providers and Carriers industry slid down one spot. The Information Technology & Services and Internet industries both saw minor fluctuations, moving up one and down two spots, respectively. The Gaming and Banking & Financial Services industries both saw a one-spot increase, while the Cyber Security industry made a massive leap of 37 spots compared to the previous quarter. Retail saw a slight decline of one spot, while the Manufacturing, Machinery, Technology & Engineering industry surged 28 spots. The Airlines, Aviation & Aerospace industry had the biggest jump of all, moving up 40 spots making it the tenth most attacked industry.
Top attack sources
The ranking of the top 10 largest sources of DDoS attacks in 2025 Q1 also shifted notably. Hong Kong soared to the number one position, climbing three spots from the previous quarter. Indonesia edged down to second place, while Argentina rose two spots to third. Singapore slipped two spots to fourth, and Ukraine dropped one to fifth. Brazil made a striking leap, climbing seven places to land in sixth place, closely followed by Thailand, which also rose seven spots to seventh. Germany also increased, moving up two positions to eighth. Vietnam made the most dramatic climb, jumping 15 spots to claim ninth place, while Bulgaria rounded out the list, dipping two spots to tenth.
Top source ASNs
An ASN (Autonomous System Number) is a unique identifier assigned to a network or group of IP networks that operate under a single routing policy on the Internet. It’s used to exchange routing information between systems using protocols like BGP (Border Gateway Protocol).
When looking at where the DDoS attacks originate from, specifically HTTP DDoS attacks, there are a few autonomous systems that stand out. In 2025 Q1, the German-based Hetzner (AS24940) retained its position as the largest source of HTTP DDoS attacks. It was followed by the French-based OVH (AS16276) in second, the US-based DigitalOcean (AS14061) in third, and another German-based provider, Contabo (AS51167), in fourth.
To help hosting providers, cloud computing providers and any Internet service providers identify and take down the abusive accounts that launch these attacks, we leverage Cloudflare’s unique vantage point to provide a free DDoS Botnet Threat Feed for Service Providers. Over 600 organizations worldwide have already signed up for this feed. It gives service providers a list of offending IP addresses from within their ASN that we see launching HTTP DDoS attacks. It’s completely free and all it takes is opening a free Cloudflare account, authenticating the ASN via PeeringDB, and then fetching the threat intelligence via API.
Helping build a better Internet
At Cloudflare, our mission is to help build a better Internet. A key part of that commitment is offering free protection against DDoS attacks, as well as supporting the broader Internet community by providing free tools to help other networks detect and dismantle botnets operating within their infrastructure.
As the threat landscape continues to evolve, we see that many organizations still adopt DDoS protection only after experiencing an attack or rely on outdated, on-demand solutions. In contrast, our data shows that those with proactive security strategies are far more resilient. That’s why we focus on automation and a comprehensive, always-on, in-line security approach to stay ahead of both existing and emerging threats.
Backed by our global network with 348 Tbps of capacity spanning 335 cities, we remain dedicated to delivering unmetered, unlimited DDoS protection, regardless of the size, duration, or frequency of attacks.
Две истории от днес, донякъде свързани с националната конференция на “Да България”.
(за пръв път съм само като присъстващ, не като организиращ или инфраструктура. Странно усещане)
Системите за гласуване са криво нещо. Не стига, че има теорема на Arrow, ами и доста неща не са съвсем очевидни.
Да речем, че имате 4ма кандидати и трябва да изберете 2ма от тях. Някои опции са:
– По един глас от всеки гласуващ за 1 кандидат;
– По един глас от всеки гласуващ за възможна двойка кандидати;
– По един глас от всеки гласуващ за 2ма кандидати;
– Condorcet и взимане на първите двама.
Във хода на обсъждането някой каза за първите два варианта, че са еквивалентни като резултат. Стори ми се грешно, но нямах времето да си го разписвам, а и за конкретния случай нямаше да промени крайния резултат. Но контра-примерът е съвсем прост:
Кандидатите са ни A, B, C, D;
Взимаме N човека, които предпочитат кандидатите в ред (A, B, C, D) и M човека, които предпочитат (C, D, B, A). На първия метод първия вид хора ни дават N на брой A и M на брой C, а вторият ни дава N на брой (A, B) и M на брой (C,D), та при всяко N > M имаме съвсем различен резултат.
(и това дори не е особено патологичен случай на разпределение на предпочитания)
Вторият и третият вариант са по-близки, но съм почти сигурен, че и за тях може да се измисли някаква патология.
А последният, въпреки че би бил най-честен и точен, има проблемът, че трудно се обяснява и не се поддържа от “стандартните” софтуери за гласувания. Също, хората не обичат сложни избори, дори двойките кандидати бяха криво погледнати, какво остава ако трябва да ги степенуваш всичките…
(въпреки, че това трябва да е лесно, понеже точно така би трябвало да е в главите на хората)
Другата история всъщност беше по-големия разговор, за това колко лидера трябва да има. Аз в самото начало предложих да има трима, като възможност за избягване на deadlock-ове, и понеже това е нещо, което съм виждал да работи доста добре.
В дискусиите после имаше няколко човека, които споменаха римския триумвират и колко много не е проработил (толкова се повтаряше, че когато Христо Иванов се изказа, изрично каза, че не е строил Римската империя), а в един момент някой даде пример с триумвирата след смъртта на Сталин, как понеже него не е можел един човек да го замести били трима. Добре, че се усети да каже “Не сравнявам Христо със Сталин”…
И целия разговор ме върна 10 години в миналото, когато променяхме неща по устава на Фондация “Отворени проекти” и исках да направя така, че трима човека да можем да представляваме фондацията. Тогава имаше съпротива от някои хора, че “трябва един да носи отговорност” и други подобни доводи, които чух и сега на събранието.
В крайна сметка го направихме, и сработи страхотно – в годините, в които аз, Яна и Мариян се занимавахме, и тримата можехме да представляваме фондацията и да движим нещата. При добре сработен екип това се получава доста добре, а даже по законите на Паркинсън трима човека е доста добро число за управляващ орган…
(съдът всъщност отказа частта с представителството на тримата и го направихме с пълномощни)
От друга страна, в нашата държава все още има идеята, че има там един отгоре, дето казва какво става, и ще дойде, и ще ни оправи. Надявам се да го надрастнем някой ден.
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