Tag Archives: credentials

Detect Stripe keys in S3 buckets with Amazon Macie

Post Syndicated from Koulick Ghosh original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/detect-stripe-keys-in-s3-buckets-with-amazon-macie/

Many customers building applications on Amazon Web Services (AWS) use Stripe global payment services to help get their product out faster and grow revenue, especially in the internet economy. It’s critical for customers to securely and properly handle the credentials used to authenticate with Stripe services. Much like your AWS API keys, which enable access to your AWS resources, Stripe API keys grant access to the Stripe account, which allows for the movement of real money. Therefore, you must keep Stripe’s API keys secret and well-controlled. And, much like AWS keys, it’s important to invalidate and re-issue Stripe API keys that have been inadvertently committed to GitHub, emitted in logs, or uploaded to Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3).

Customers have asked us for ways to reduce the risk of unintentionally exposing Stripe API keys, especially when code files and repositories are stored in Amazon S3. To help meet this need, we collaborated with Stripe to develop a new managed data identifier that you can use to help discover and protect Stripe API keys.

“I’m really glad we could collaborate with AWS to introduce a new managed data identifier in Amazon Macie. Mutual customers of AWS and Stripe can now scan S3 buckets to detect exposed Stripe API keys.”
Martin Pool, Staff Engineer in Cloud Security at Stripe

In this post, we will show you how to use the new managed data identifier in Amazon Macie to discover and protect copies of your Stripe API keys.

About Stripe API keys

Stripe provides payment processing software and services for businesses. Using Stripe’s technology, businesses can accept online payments from customers around the globe.

Stripe authenticates API requests by using API keys, which are included in the request. Stripe takes various measures to help customers keep their secret keys safe and secure. Stripe users can generate test-mode keys, which can only access simulated test data, and which doesn’t move real money. Stripe encourages its customers to use only test API keys for testing and development purposes to reduce the risk of inadvertent disclosure of live keys or of accidentally generating real charges.

Stripe also supports publishable keys, which you can make publicly accessible in your web or mobile app’s client-side code to collect payment information.

In this blog post, we focus on live-mode keys, which are the primary security concern because they can access your real data and cause money movement. These keys should be closely held within the production services that need to use them. Stripe allows keys to be restricted to read or write specific API resources, or used only from certain IP ranges, but even with these restrictions, you should still handle live mode keys with caution.

Stripe keys have distinctive prefixes to help you detect them such as sk_live_ for secret keys, and rk_live_ for restricted keys (which are also secret).

Amazon Macie

Amazon Macie is a fully managed service that uses machine learning (ML) and pattern matching to discover and help protect your sensitive data, such as personally identifiable information. Macie can also provide detailed visibility into your data and help you align with compliance requirements by identifying data that needs to be protected under various regulations, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

Macie supports a suite of managed data identifiers to make it simpler for you to configure and adopt. Managed data identifiers are prebuilt, customizable patterns that help automatically identify sensitive data, such as credit card numbers, social security numbers, and email addresses.

Now, Macie has a new managed data identifier STRIPE_CREDENTIALS that you can use to identify Stripe API secret keys.

Configure Amazon Macie to detect Stripe credentials

In this section, we show you how to use the managed data identifier STRIPE_CREDENTIALS to detect Stripe API secret keys. We recommend that you carry out these tutorial steps in an AWS account dedicated to experimentation and exploration before you move forward with detection in a production environment.


To follow along with this walkthrough, complete the following prerequisites.

Create example data

The first step is to create some example objects in an S3 bucket in the AWS account. The objects contain strings that resemble Stripe secret keys. You will use the example data later to demonstrate how Macie can detect Stripe secret keys.

To create the example data

  1. Open the S3 console and create an S3 bucket.
  2. Create four files locally, paste the following mock sensitive data into those files, and upload them to the bucket.
     stripe publishable key sk_live_cpegcLxKILlrXYNIuqYhGXoy
     stripe payment sk_live_ijklcLxKILlrXYNIuqYhGXoy
     stripe api key sk_live_abcdcLxKILlrXYNIuqYhGXoy
     stripe secret key sk_live_cpegcLxKILlrXYNIuqYhGXoy

Note: The keys mentioned in the preceding files are mock data and aren’t related to actual live Stripe keys.

Create a Macie job with the STRIPE_CREDENTIALS managed data identifier

Using Macie, you can scan your S3 buckets for sensitive data and security risks. In this step, you run a one-time Macie job to scan an S3 bucket and review the findings.

To create a Macie job with STRIPE_CREDENTIALS

  1. Open the Amazon Macie console, and in the left navigation pane, choose Jobs. On the top right, choose Create job.
    Figure 1: Create Macie Job

    Figure 1: Create Macie Job

  2. Select the bucket that you want Macie to scan or specify bucket criteria, and then choose Next.
    Figure 2: Select S3 bucket

    Figure 2: Select S3 bucket

  3. Review the details of the S3 bucket, such as estimated cost, and then choose Next.
    Figure 3: Review S3 bucket

    Figure 3: Review S3 bucket

  4. On the Refine the scope page, choose One-time job, and then choose Next.

    Note: After you successfully test, you can schedule the job to scan S3 buckets at the frequency that you choose.

    Figure 4: Select one-time job

    Figure 4: Select one-time job

  5. For Managed data identifier options, select Custom and then select Use specific managed data identifiers. For Select managed data identifiers, search for STRIPE_CREDENTIALS and then select it. Choose Next.
    Figure 5: Select managed data identifier

    Figure 5: Select managed data identifier

  6. Enter a name and an optional description for the job, and then choose Next.
    Figure 6: Enter job name

    Figure 6: Enter job name

  7. Review the job details and choose Submit. Macie will create and start the job immediately, and the job will run one time.
  8. When the Status of the job shows Complete, select the job, and from the Show results dropdown, select Show findings.
    Figure 7: Select the job and then select Show findings

    Figure 7: Select the job and then select Show findings

  9. You can now review the findings for sensitive data in your S3 bucket. As shown in Figure 8, Macie detected Stripe keys in each of the four files, and categorized the findings as High severity. You can review and manage the findings in the Macie console, retrieve them through the Macie API for further analysis, send them to Amazon EventBridge for automated processing, or publish them to AWS Security Hub for a comprehensive view of your security state.
    Figure 8: Review the findings

    Figure 8: Review the findings

Respond to unintended disclosure of Stripe API keys

If you discover Stripe live-mode keys (or other sensitive data) in an S3 bucket, then through the Stripe dashboard, you can roll your API keys to revoke access to the compromised key and generate a new one. This helps ensure that the key can’t be used to make malicious API requests. Make sure that you install the replacement key into the production services that need it. In the longer term, you can take steps to understand the path by which the key was disclosed and help prevent a recurrence.


In this post, you learned about the importance of safeguarding Stripe API keys on AWS. By using Amazon Macie with managed data identifiers, setting up regular reviews and restricted access to S3 buckets, training developers in security best practices, and monitoring logs and repositories, you can help mitigate the risk of key exposure and potential security breaches. By adhering to these practices, you can help ensure a robust security posture for your sensitive data on AWS.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on Amazon Macie re:Post.

Koulick Ghosh

Koulick Ghosh

Koulick is a Senior Product Manager in AWS Security based in Seattle, WA. He loves speaking with customers about how AWS Security services can help improve their security. In his free time, he enjoys playing the guitar, reading, and exploring the Pacific Northwest.

Sagar Gandha

Sagar Gandha

Sagar is an experienced Senior Technical Account Manager at AWS adept at assisting large customers in enterprise support. He offers expert guidance on best practices, facilitates access to subject matter experts, and delivers actionable insights on optimizing AWS spend, workloads, and events. Outside of work, Sagar loves spending time with his kids.

Mohan Musti

Mohan Musti

Mohan is a Senior Technical Account Manager at AWS based in Dallas. Mohan helps customers architect and optimize applications on AWS. In his spare time, he enjoys spending time with his family and camping.

Leaving Authentication Credentials in Public Code

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/11/leaving-authentication-credentials-in-public-code.html

Interesting article about a surprisingly common vulnerability: programmers leaving authentication credentials and other secrets in publicly accessible software code:

Researchers from security firm GitGuardian this week reported finding almost 4,000 unique secrets stashed inside a total of 450,000 projects submitted to PyPI, the official code repository for the Python programming language. Nearly 3,000 projects contained at least one unique secret. Many secrets were leaked more than once, bringing the total number of exposed secrets to almost 57,000.


The credentials exposed provided access to a range of resources, including Microsoft Active Directory servers that provision and manage accounts in enterprise networks, OAuth servers allowing single sign-on, SSH servers, and third-party services for customer communications and cryptocurrencies. Examples included:

  • Azure Active Directory API Keys
  • GitHub OAuth App Keys
  • Database credentials for providers such as MongoDB, MySQL, and PostgreSQL
  • Dropbox Key
  • Auth0 Keys
  • SSH Credentials
  • Coinbase Credentials
  • Twilio Master Credentials.

FBI (and Others) Shut Down Genesis Market

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/04/fbi-and-others-shut-down-genesis-market.html

Genesis Market is shut down:

Active since 2018, Genesis Market’s slogan was, “Our store sells bots with logs, cookies, and their real fingerprints.” Customers could search for infected systems with a variety of options, including by Internet address or by specific domain names associated with stolen credentials.

But earlier today, multiple domains associated with Genesis had their homepages replaced with a seizure notice from the FBI, which said the domains were seized pursuant to a warrant issued by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Wisconsin did not respond to requests for comment. The FBI declined to comment.

But sources close to the investigation tell KrebsOnSecurity that law enforcement agencies in the United States, Canada and across Europe are currently serving arrest warrants on dozens of individuals thought to support Genesis, either by maintaining the site or selling the service bot logs from infected systems.

The seizure notice includes the seals of law enforcement entities from several countries, including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

Slashdot story.

You can now assign multiple MFA devices in IAM

Post Syndicated from Liam Wadman original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/you-can-now-assign-multiple-mfa-devices-in-iam/

At Amazon Web Services (AWS), security is our top priority, and configuring multi-factor authentication (MFA) on accounts is an important step in securing your organization.

Now, you can add multiple MFA devices to AWS account root users and AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) users in your AWS accounts. This helps you to raise the security bar in your accounts and limit access management to highly privileged principals, such as root users. Previously, you could only have one MFA device associated with root users or IAM users, but now you can associate up to eight MFA devices of the currently supported types with root users and IAM users.

In this blog post, we review the current MFA features for IAM, share use cases for multiple MFA devices, and show you how to manage and sign in with the additional MFA devices for better resiliency and flexibility.

Overview of MFA for IAM

First, let’s recap some of the benefits and available MFA configurations for IAM.

The use of MFA is an important security best practice on AWS. With MFA, you have an additional layer of protection to help prevent unauthorized individuals from gaining access to your systems and data. MFA can help protect your AWS environments if a password associated with your root user or IAM user became compromised.

As a security best practice, AWS recommends that you avoid using root users or IAM users to manage access to your accounts. Instead, you should use AWS IAM Identity Center (successor to AWS Single Sign-On) to manage access to your accounts. You should only use root users for tasks that they are required for.

To help meet different customer needs, AWS supports three types of MFA devices for IAM, including FIDO security keys, virtual authenticator applications, and time-based one-time password (TOTP) hardware tokens. You should select the device type that aligns with your security and operational requirements. You can associate different types of MFA devices with an IAM principal.

Use cases for multiple MFA devices

There are several use cases in which associating multiple MFA devices with an IAM principal is beneficial to the security and operational efficiency of your organization, such as the following:

  • In the event of a lost, stolen, or inaccessible MFA device, you can use one of the remaining MFA devices to access the account without performing the AWS account recovery procedure. If an MFA device is lost or stolen, it’s best practice to disassociate the lost or stolen device from the root users or IAM users that it’s associated with.
  • Geographically dispersed teams, or teams working remotely, can use hardware-based MFA to access AWS, without shipping a single hardware device or coordinating a physical exchange of a single hardware device between team members.
  • If the holder of an MFA device isn’t available, you can maintain access to your root users and IAM users by using a different MFA device associated with an IAM principal.
  • You can store additional MFA devices in a secure physical location, such as a vault or safe, while retaining physical access to another MFA device for redundancy.

How to manage multiple MFA devices in IAM

You can register up to eight MFA devices, in any combination of the currently supported MFA types, with your root users and IAM users.

To register an MFA device

  1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console and do the following:
    • For a root user, choose My Security Credentials.
    • For an IAM user, choose Security credentials.
  2. For Multi-factor authentication (MFA), choose Assign MFA device.
  3. Select the type of MFA device that you want to use and then choose Next.

With multiple MFA devices, you only need one MFA device to sign in to the console or to create a session through the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) as that principal.

You don’t need to make permissions changes in order for your organization to start taking advantage of multiple MFA devices. The root users and IAM users in your accounts that manage MFA devices today can use their existing IAM permissions to enable additional MFA devices.

Changes to Cloudtrail log entries

In support of this new feature, the identifier of the MFA device used will now be added to the console sign-in events of the root user and IAM user that use MFA. With these changes to AWS CloudTrail log entries, you can now view both the user and the MFA device used to authenticate to AWS. This provides better traceability and audibility for your accounts.

You can find this information in the MFAIdentifier field in CloudTrail, within additionalEventData. You don’t need to take action for this information to be logged. The following is a sample log from CloudTrail that includes the MFAIdentifier.

"additionalEventData": {
"LoginTo": "https://console.aws.amazon.com/console/home?state=hashArgs%23&isauthcode=true",
"MobileVersion": "No",
"MFAIdentifier": "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:mfa/root-account-mfa-device",
"MFAUsed": "YES"

The identifier of the MFA devices used for AWS CLI sessions with the sts:GetSessionToken action are logged in the requestParameters field.

    "requestParameters": {
"serialNumber": "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:mfa/root-account-mfa-device"

experience with multiple MFA devices

In this section, we’ll show you how to sign in to the console as an IAM principal with multiple MFA devices associated with it.

To authenticate as an IAM principal with multiple MFA devices

  1. Sign in to the IAM console as an IAM principal.
  2. Authenticate with the principal’s password.
  3. For Additional verification required, select the type of MFA device that you want to use to continue authenticating, and then choose Next:
    Figure 1: MFA device selection when authenticating to the console as an IAM user or root user with different types of MFA devices available

    Figure 1: MFA device selection when authenticating to the console as an IAM user or root user with different types of MFA devices available

  4. You will then be prompted to authenticate with the type of device that you selected.
    Figure 2: Prompt to authenticate with a FIDO security key

    Figure 2: Prompt to authenticate with a FIDO security key


In this blog post, you learned about the new multiple MFA devices feature in IAM, and how to set up and manage multiple MFA devices in IAM. Associating multiple MFA devices with your root users and IAM users can make it simpler for you to manage access to them. This feature is available now for AWS customers, except for customers operating in AWS GovCloud (US) Regions or in the AWS China Regions. For more information about how to configure multiple MFA devices on your root users and IAM users, see the documentation on MFA in IAM. There is no extra charge to use MFA devices in IAM.

AWS offers a free MFA security key to eligible AWS account owners in the United States. To determine eligibility and order a key, see the ordering portal.

If you have questions, post them in the AWS Identity and Access Management re:Post topic or reach out to AWS Support.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Liam Wadman

Liam Wadman

Liam is a Solutions Architect with the Identity Solutions team. When he’s not building exciting solutions on AWS or helping customers, he’s often found in the hills of British Columbia on his Mountain Bike. Liam points out that you cannot spell LIAM without IAM.

Khaled Zaky

Khaled Zaky

Khaled is a Sr. Product Manager – Technical at Amazon Web Services. He is responsible for AWS Identity products related to user authentication such as sign-in security and multi-factor authentication products. Khaled has deep industry experience in cloud computing and product management. He is passionate about building customer-centric products that make it easier and more secure for customers to use the cloud. Outside of work interests include teaching product management, road cycling, Taekwondo (Martial Arts) and DIY home renovations.

NSA on Authentication Hacks (Related to SolarWinds Breach)

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/12/nsa-on-authentication-hacks-related-to-solarwinds-breach.html

The NSA has published an advisory outlining how “malicious cyber actors” are “are manipulating trust in federated authentication environments to access protected data in the cloud.” This is related to the SolarWinds hack I have previously written about, and represents one of the techniques the SVR is using once it has gained access to target networks.

From the summary:

Malicious cyberactors are abusing trust in federated authentication environments to access protected data. The exploitation occurs after the actors have gained initial access to a victim’s on-premises network. The actors leverage privileged access in the on-premises environment to subvert the mechanisms that the organization uses to grant access to cloud and on-premises resources and/or to compromise administrator credentials with the ability to manage cloud resources. The actors demonstrate two sets of tactics, techniques,and procedures (TTP) for gaining access to the victim network’s cloud resources, often with a particular focus on organizational email.

In the first TTP, the actors compromise on-premises components of a federated SSO infrastructure and steal the credential or private key that is used to sign Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) tokens(TA0006, T1552, T1552.004). Using the private keys, the actors then forge trusted authentication tokens to access cloud resources. A recent NSA Cybersecurity Advisory warned of actors exploiting a vulnerability in VMware Access and VMware Identity Manager that allowed them to perform this TTP and abuse federated SSO infrastructure.While that example of this TTP may have previously been attributed to nation-state actors, a wealth of actors could be leveraging this TTP for their objectives. This SAML forgery technique has been known and used by cyber actors since at least 2017.

In a variation of the first TTP, if the malicious cyber actors are unable to obtain anon-premises signing key, they would attempt to gain sufficient administrative privileges within the cloud tenant to add a malicious certificate trust relationship for forging SAML tokens.

In the second TTP, the actors leverage a compromised global administrator account to assign credentials to cloud application service principals (identities for cloud applications that allow the applications to be invoked to access other cloud resources). The actors then invoke the application’s credentials for automated access to cloud resources (often email in particular) that would otherwise be difficult for the actors to access or would more easily be noticed as suspicious (T1114, T1114.002).

This is an ongoing story, and I expect to see a lot more about TTP — nice acronym there — in coming weeks.

Related: Tom Bossert has a scathing op-ed on the breach. Jack Goldsmith’s essay is worth reading. So is Nick Weaver’s.