Tag Archives: credentials

How to use AWS Secrets Manager to rotate credentials for all Amazon RDS database types, including Oracle

Post Syndicated from Apurv Awasthi original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-use-aws-secrets-manager-rotate-credentials-amazon-rds-database-types-oracle/

You can now use AWS Secrets Manager to rotate credentials for Oracle, Microsoft SQL Server, or MariaDB databases hosted on Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS) automatically. Previously, I showed how to rotate credentials for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS automatically with AWS Secrets Manager. With today’s launch, you can use Secrets Manager to automatically rotate credentials for all types of databases hosted on Amazon RDS.

In this post, I review the key features of Secrets Manager. You’ll then learn:

  1. How to store the database credential for the superuser of an Oracle database hosted on Amazon RDS
  2. How to store the Oracle database credential used by an application
  3. How to configure Secrets Manager to rotate both Oracle credentials automatically on a schedule that you define

Key features of Secrets Manager

AWS Secrets Manager makes it easier to rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials, API keys, and other secrets throughout their lifecycle. The key features of this service include the ability to:

  1. Secure and manage secrets centrally. You can store, view, and manage all your secrets centrally. By default, Secrets Manager encrypts these secrets with encryption keys that you own and control. You can use fine-grained IAM policies or resource-based policies to control access to your secrets. You can also tag secrets to help you discover, organize, and control access to secrets used throughout your organization.
  2. Rotate secrets safely. You can configure Secrets Manager to rotate secrets automatically without disrupting your applications. Secrets Manager offers built-in integrations for rotating credentials for all Amazon RDS databases (MySQL, PostgreSQL, Oracle, Microsoft SQL Server, MariaDB, and Amazon Aurora.) You can also extend Secrets Manager to meet your custom rotation requirements by creating an AWS Lambda function to rotate other types of secrets.
  3. Transmit securely. Secrets are transmitted securely over Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol 1.2. You can also use Secrets Manager with Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) endpoints powered by AWS Privatelink to keep this communication within the AWS network and help meet your compliance and regulatory requirements to limit public internet connectivity.
  4. Pay as you go. Pay for the secrets you store in Secrets Manager and for the use of these secrets; there are no long-term contracts, licensing fees, or infrastructure and personnel costs. For example, a typical production-scale web application will generate an estimated monthly bill of $6. If you follow along the instructions in this blog post, your estimated monthly bill for Secrets Manager will be $1. Note: you may incur additional charges for using Amazon RDS and Amazon Lambda, if you’ve already consumed the free tier for these services.

Now that you’re familiar with Secrets Manager features, I’ll show you how to store and automatically rotate credentials for an Oracle database hosted on Amazon RDS. I divided these instructions into three phases:

  1. Phase 1: Store and configure rotation for the superuser credential
  2. Phase 2: Store and configure rotation for the application credential
  3. Phase 3: Retrieve the credential from Secrets Manager programmatically

Prerequisites

To follow along, your AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) principal (user or role) requires the SecretsManagerReadWrite AWS managed policy to store the secrets. Your principal also requires the IAMFullAccess AWS managed policy to create and configure permissions for the IAM role used by Lambda for executing rotations. You can use IAM permissions boundaries to grant an employee the ability to configure rotation without also granting them full administrative access to your account.

Phase 1: Store and configure rotation for the superuser credential

From the Secrets Manager console, on the right side, select Store a new secret.

Since I’m storing credentials for database hosted on Amazon RDS, I select Credentials for RDS database. Next, I input the user name and password for the superuser. I start by securing the superuser because it’s the most powerful database credential and has full access to the database.
 

Figure 1: For "Select secret type," choose "Credentials for RDS database"

Figure 1: For “Select secret type,” choose “Credentials for RDS database”

For this example, I choose to use the default encryption settings. Secrets Manager will encrypt this secret using the Secrets Manager DefaultEncryptionKey in this account. Alternatively, I can choose to encrypt using a customer master key (CMK) that I have stored in AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS). To learn more, read the Using Your AWS KMS CMK documentation.
 

Figure 2: Choose either DefaultEncryptionKey or use a CMK

Figure 2: Choose either DefaultEncryptionKey or use a CMK

Next, I view the list of Amazon RDS instances in my account and select the database this credential accesses. For this example, I select the DB instance oracle-rds-database from the list, and then I select Next.

I then specify values for Secret name and Description. For this example, I use Database/Development/Oracle-Superuser as the name and enter a description of this secret, and then select Next.
 

Figure 3: Provide values for "Secret name" and "Description"

Figure 3: Provide values for “Secret name” and “Description”

Since this database is not yet being used, I choose to enable rotation. To do so, I select Enable automatic rotation, and then set the rotation interval to 60 days. Remember, if this database credential is currently being used, first update the application (see phase 3) to use Secrets Manager APIs to retrieve secrets before enabling rotation.
 

Figure 4: Select "Enable automatic rotation"

Figure 4: Select “Enable automatic rotation”

Next, Secrets Manager requires permissions to rotate this secret on my behalf. Because I’m storing the credentials for the superuser, Secrets Manager can use this credential to perform rotations. Therefore, on the same screen, I select Use a secret that I have previously stored in AWS Secrets Manager, and then select Next.

Finally, I review the information on the next screen. Everything looks correct, so I select Store. I have now successfully stored a secret in Secrets Manager.

Note: Secrets Manager will now create a Lambda function in the same VPC as my Oracle database and trigger this function periodically to change the password for the superuser. I can view the name of the Lambda function on the Rotation configuration section of the Secret Details page.

The banner on the next screen confirms that I’ve successfully configured rotation and the first rotation is in progress, which enables me to verify that rotation is functioning as expected. Secrets Manager will rotate this credential automatically every 60 days.
 

Figure 5: The confirmation notification

Figure 5: The confirmation notification

Phase 2: Store and configure rotation for the application credential

The superuser is a powerful credential that should be used only for administrative tasks. To enable your applications to access a database, create a unique database credential per application and grant these credentials limited permissions. You can use these database credentials to read or write to database tables required by the application. As a security best practice, deny the ability to perform management actions, such as creating new credentials.

In this phase, I will store the credential that my application will use to connect to the Oracle database. To get started, from the Secrets Manager console, on the right side, select Store a new secret.

Next, I select Credentials for RDS database, and input the user name and password for the application credential.

I continue to use the default encryption key. I select the DB instance oracle-rds-database, and then select Next.

I specify values for Secret Name and Description. For this example, I use Database/Development/Oracle-Application-User as the name and enter a description of this secret, and then select Next.

I now configure rotation. Once again, since my application is not using this database credential yet, I’ll configure rotation as part of storing this secret. I select Enable automatic rotation, and set the rotation interval to 60 days.

Next, Secrets Manager requires permissions to rotate this secret on behalf of my application. Earlier in the post, I mentioned that applications credentials have limited permissions and are unable to change their password. Therefore, I will use the superuser credential, Database/Development/Oracle-Superuser, that I stored in Phase 1 to rotate the application credential. With this configuration, Secrets Manager creates a clone application user.
 

Figure 6: Select the superuser credential

Figure 6: Select the superuser credential

Note: Creating a clone application user is the preferred mechanism of rotation because the old version of the secret continues to operate and handle service requests while the new version is prepared and tested. There’s no application downtime while changing between versions.

I review the information on the next screen. Everything looks correct, so I select Store. I have now successfully stored the application credential in Secrets Manager.

As mentioned in Phase 1, AWS Secrets Manager creates a Lambda function in the same VPC as the database and then triggers this function periodically to rotate the secret. Since I chose to use the existing superuser secret to rotate the application secret, I will grant the rotation Lambda function permissions to retrieve the superuser secret. To grant this permission, I first select role from the confirmation banner.
 

Figure 7: Select the "role" link that's in the confirmation notification

Figure 7: Select the “role” link that’s in the confirmation notification

Next, in the Permissions tab, I select SecretsManagerRDSMySQLRotationMultiUserRolePolicy0. Then I select Edit policy.
 

Figure 8: Edit the policy on the "Permissions" tab

Figure 8: Edit the policy on the “Permissions” tab

In this step, I update the policy (see below) and select Review policy. When following along, remember to replace the placeholder ARN-OF-SUPERUSER-SECRET with the ARN of the secret you stored in Phase 1.


{
  "Statement": [
    {
        "Effect": "Allow",
        "Action": [
            "ec2:CreateNetworkInterface",
			"ec2:DeleteNetworkInterface",
			"ec2:DescribeNetworkInterfaces",
			"ec2:DetachNetworkInterface"
		],
		"Resource": "*"
	},
	{
	    "Sid": "GrantPermissionToUse",
		"Effect": "Allow",
		"Action": [
            "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue"
        ],
		"Resource": "ARN-OF-SUPERUSER-SECRET"
	}
  ]
}

Here’s what it will look like:
 

Figure 9: Edit the policy

Figure 9: Edit the policy

Next, I select Save changes. I have now completed all the steps required to configure rotation for the application credential, Database/Development/Oracle-Application-User.

Phase 3: Retrieve the credential from Secrets Manager programmatically

Now that I have stored the secret in Secrets Manager, I add code to my application to retrieve the database credential from Secrets Manager. I use the sample code from Phase 2 above. This code sets up the client and retrieves and decrypts the secret Database/Development/Oracle-Application-User.

Remember, applications require permissions to retrieve the secret, Database/Development/Oracle-Application-User, from Secrets Manager. My application runs on Amazon EC2 and uses an IAM role to obtain access to AWS services. I attach the following policy to my IAM role. This policy uses the GetSecretValue action to grant my application permissions to read secret from Secrets Manager. This policy also uses the resource element to limit my application to read only the Database/Development/Oracle-Application-User secret from Secrets Manager. You can refer to the Secrets Manager Documentation to understand the minimum IAM permissions required to retrieve a secret.


{
 "Version": "2012-10-17",
 "Statement": {
    "Sid": "RetrieveDbCredentialFromSecretsManager",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
    "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:<AWS-REGION>:<ACCOUNT-NUMBER>:secret: Database/Development/Oracle-Application-User     
 }
}

In the above policy, remember to replace the placeholder <AWS-REGION> with the AWS region that you’re using and the placeholder <ACCOUNT-NUMBER> with the number of your AWS account.

Summary

I explained the key benefits of Secrets Manager as they relate to RDS and showed you how to help meet your compliance requirements by configuring Secrets Manager to rotate database credentials automatically on your behalf. Secrets Manager helps you protect access to your applications, services, and IT resources without the upfront investment and on-going maintenance costs of operating your own secrets management infrastructure. To get started, visit the Secrets Manager console. To learn more, visit Secrets Manager documentation.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the Comments section below. If you have questions about anything in this post, start a new thread on the Secrets Manager forum.

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Apurv Awasthi

Apurv is the product manager for credentials management services at AWS, including AWS Secrets Manager and IAM Roles. He enjoys the “Day 1” culture at Amazon because it aligns with his experience building startups in the sports and recruiting industries. Outside of work, Apurv enjoys hiking. He holds an MBA from UCLA and an MS in computer science from University of Kentucky.

How to connect to AWS Secrets Manager service within a Virtual Private Cloud

Post Syndicated from Divya Sridhar original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-connect-to-aws-secrets-manager-service-within-a-virtual-private-cloud/

You can now use AWS Secrets Manager with Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) endpoints powered by AWS Privatelink and keep traffic between your VPC and Secrets Manager within the AWS network.

AWS Secrets Manager is a secrets management service that helps you protect access to your applications, services, and IT resources. This service enables you to rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials, API keys, and other secrets throughout their lifecycle. When your application running within an Amazon VPC communicates with Secrets Manager, this communication traverses the public internet. By using Secrets Manager with Amazon VPC endpoints, you can now keep this communication within the AWS network and help meet your compliance and regulatory requirements to limit public internet connectivity. You can start using Secrets Manager with Amazon VPC endpoints by creating an Amazon VPC endpoint for Secrets Manager with a few clicks on the VPC console or via AWS CLI. Once you create the VPC endpoint, you can start using it without making any code or configuration changes in your application.

The diagram demonstrates how Secrets Manager works with Amazon VPC endpoints. It shows how I retrieve a secret stored in Secrets Manager from an Amazon EC2 instance. When the request is sent to Secrets Manager, the entire data flow is contained within the VPC and the AWS network.

Figure 1: How Secrets Manager works with Amazon VPC endpoints

Figure 1: How Secrets Manager works with Amazon VPC endpoints

Solution overview

In this post, I show you how to use Secrets Manager with an Amazon VPC endpoint. In this example, we have an application running on an EC2 instance in VPC named vpc-5ad42b3c. This application requires a database password to an RDS instance running in the same VPC. I have stored the database password in Secrets Manager. I will now show how to:

  1. Create an Amazon VPC endpoint for Secrets Manager using the VPC console.
  2. Use the Amazon VPC endpoint via AWS CLI to retrieve the RDS database secret stored in Secrets Manager from an application running on an EC2 instance.

Step 1: Create an Amazon VPC endpoint for Secrets Manager

  1. Open the Amazon VPC console, select Endpoints, and then select Create Endpoint.
  2. Select AWS Services as the Service category, and then, in the Service Name list, select the Secrets Manager endpoint service named com.amazonaws.us-west-2.secrets-manager.
     
    Figure 2: Options to select when creating an endpoint

    Figure 2: Options to select when creating an endpoint

  3. Specify the VPC you want to create the endpoint in. For this post, I chose the VPC named vpc-5ad42b3c where my RDS instance and application are running.
  4. To create a VPC endpoint, you need to specify the private IP address range in which the endpoint will be accessible. To do this, select the subnet for each Availability Zone (AZ). This restricts the VPC endpoint to the private IP address range specific to each AZ and also creates an AZ-specific VPC endpoint. Specifying more than one subnet-AZ combination helps improve fault tolerance and make the endpoint accessible from a different AZ in case of an AZ failure. Here, I specify subnet IDs for availability zones us-west-2a, us-west-2b, and us-west-2c:
     
    Figure 3: Specifying subnet IDs

    Figure 3: Specifying subnet IDs

  5. Select the Enable Private DNS Name checkbox for the VPC endpoint. Private DNS resolves the standard Secrets Manager DNS hostname https://secretsmanager.<region>.amazonaws.com. to the private IP addresses associated with the VPC endpoint specific DNS hostname. As a result, you can access the Secrets Manager VPC Endpoint via the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) or AWS SDKs without making any code or configuration changes to update the Secrets Manager endpoint URL.
     
    Figure 4: The "Enable Private DNS Name" checkbox

    Figure 4: The “Enable Private DNS Name” checkbox

  6. Associate a security group with this endpoint. The security group enables you to control the traffic to the endpoint from resources in your VPC. For this post, I chose to associate the security group named sg-07e4197d that I created earlier. This security group has been set up to allow all instances running within VPC vpc-5ad42b3c to access the Secrets Manager VPC endpoint. Select Create endpoint to finish creating the endpoint.
     
    Figure 5: Associate a security group and create the endpoint

    Figure 5: Associate a security group and create the endpoint

  7. To view the details of the endpoint you created, select the link on the console.
     
    Figure 6: Viewing the endpoint details

    Figure 6: Viewing the endpoint details

  8. The Details tab shows all the DNS hostnames generated while creating the Amazon VPC endpoint that can be used to connect to Secrets Manager. I can now use the standard endpoint secretsmanager.us-west-2.amazonaws.com or one of the VPC-specific endpoints to connect to Secrets Manager within vpc-5ad42b3c where my RDS instance and application also resides.
     
    Figure 7: The "Details" tab

    Figure 7: The “Details” tab

Step 2: Access Secrets Manager through the VPC endpoint

Now that I have created the VPC endpoint, all traffic between my application running on an EC2 instance hosted within VPC named vpc-5ad42b3c and Secrets Manager will be within the AWS network. This connection will use the VPC endpoint and I can use it to retrieve my RDS database secret stored in Secrets Manager. I can retrieve the secret via the AWS SDK or CLI. As an example, I can use the CLI command shown below to retrieve the current version of my RDS database secret:

$aws secretsmanager get-secret-value –secret-id MyDatabaseSecret –version-stage AWSCURRENT

Since my AWS CLI is configured for us-west-2 region, it uses the standard Secrets Manager endpoint URL https://secretsmanager.us-west-2.amazonaws.com. This standard endpoint automatically routes to the VPC endpoint since I enabled support for Private DNS hostname while creating the VPC endpoint. The above command will result in the following output:


{
  "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-west-2:123456789012:secret:MyDatabaseSecret-a1b2c3",
  "Name": "MyDatabaseSecret",
  "VersionId": "EXAMPLE1-90ab-cdef-fedc-ba987EXAMPLE",
  "SecretString": "{\n  \"username\":\"david\",\n  \"password\":\"BnQw&XDWgaEeT9XGTT29\"\n}\n",
  "VersionStages": [
    "AWSCURRENT"
  ],
  "CreatedDate": 1523477145.713
} 

Summary

I’ve shown you how to create a VPC endpoint for AWS Secrets Manager and retrieve an RDS database secret using the VPC endpoint. Secrets Manager VPC Endpoints help you meet compliance and regulatory requirements about limiting public internet connectivity within your VPC. It enables your applications running within a VPC to use Secrets Manager while keeping traffic between the VPC and Secrets Manager within the AWS network. You can start using Amazon VPC Endpoints for Secrets Manager by creating endpoints in the VPC console or AWS CLI. Once created, your applications that interact with Secrets Manager do not require any code or configuration changes.

To learn more about connecting to Secrets Manager through a VPC endpoint, read the Secrets Manager documentation. For guidance about your overall VPC network structure, see Practical VPC Design.

If you have questions about this feature or anything else related to Secrets Manager, start a new thread in the Secrets Manager forum.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Storing Encrypted Credentials In Git

Post Syndicated from Bozho original https://techblog.bozho.net/storing-encrypted-credentials-in-git/

We all know that we should not commit any passwords or keys to the repo with our code (no matter if public or private). Yet, thousands of production passwords can be found on GitHub (and probably thousands more in internal company repositories). Some have tried to fix that by removing the passwords (once they learned it’s not a good idea to store them publicly), but passwords have remained in the git history.

Knowing what not to do is the first and very important step. But how do we store production credentials. Database credentials, system secrets (e.g. for HMACs), access keys for 3rd party services like payment providers or social networks. There doesn’t seem to be an agreed upon solution.

I’ve previously argued with the 12-factor app recommendation to use environment variables – if you have a few that might be okay, but when the number of variables grow (as in any real application), it becomes impractical. And you can set environment variables via a bash script, but you’d have to store it somewhere. And in fact, even separate environment variables should be stored somewhere.

This somewhere could be a local directory (risky), a shared storage, e.g. FTP or S3 bucket with limited access, or a separate git repository. I think I prefer the git repository as it allows versioning (Note: S3 also does, but is provider-specific). So you can store all your environment-specific properties files with all their credentials and environment-specific configurations in a git repo with limited access (only Ops people). And that’s not bad, as long as it’s not the same repo as the source code.

Such a repo would look like this:

project
└─── production
|   |   application.properites
|   |   keystore.jks
└─── staging
|   |   application.properites
|   |   keystore.jks
└─── on-premise-client1
|   |   application.properites
|   |   keystore.jks
└─── on-premise-client2
|   |   application.properites
|   |   keystore.jks

Since many companies are using GitHub or BitBucket for their repositories, storing production credentials on a public provider may still be risky. That’s why it’s a good idea to encrypt the files in the repository. A good way to do it is via git-crypt. It is “transparent” encryption because it supports diff and encryption and decryption on the fly. Once you set it up, you continue working with the repo as if it’s not encrypted. There’s even a fork that works on Windows.

You simply run git-crypt init (after you’ve put the git-crypt binary on your OS Path), which generates a key. Then you specify your .gitattributes, e.g. like that:

secretfile filter=git-crypt diff=git-crypt
*.key filter=git-crypt diff=git-crypt
*.properties filter=git-crypt diff=git-crypt
*.jks filter=git-crypt diff=git-crypt

And you’re done. Well, almost. If this is a fresh repo, everything is good. If it is an existing repo, you’d have to clean up your history which contains the unencrypted files. Following these steps will get you there, with one addition – before calling git commit, you should call git-crypt status -f so that the existing files are actually encrypted.

You’re almost done. We should somehow share and backup the keys. For the sharing part, it’s not a big issue to have a team of 2-3 Ops people share the same key, but you could also use the GPG option of git-crypt (as documented in the README). What’s left is to backup your secret key (that’s generated in the .git/git-crypt directory). You can store it (password-protected) in some other storage, be it a company shared folder, Dropbox/Google Drive, or even your email. Just make sure your computer is not the only place where it’s present and that it’s protected. I don’t think key rotation is necessary, but you can devise some rotation procedure.

git-crypt authors claim to shine when it comes to encrypting just a few files in an otherwise public repo. And recommend looking at git-remote-gcrypt. But as often there are non-sensitive parts of environment-specific configurations, you may not want to encrypt everything. And I think it’s perfectly fine to use git-crypt even in a separate repo scenario. And even though encryption is an okay approach to protect credentials in your source code repo, it’s still not necessarily a good idea to have the environment configurations in the same repo. Especially given that different people/teams manage these credentials. Even in small companies, maybe not all members have production access.

The outstanding questions in this case is – how do you sync the properties with code changes. Sometimes the code adds new properties that should be reflected in the environment configurations. There are two scenarios here – first, properties that could vary across environments, but can have default values (e.g. scheduled job periods), and second, properties that require explicit configuration (e.g. database credentials). The former can have the default values bundled in the code repo and therefore in the release artifact, allowing external files to override them. The latter should be announced to the people who do the deployment so that they can set the proper values.

The whole process of having versioned environment-speific configurations is actually quite simple and logical, even with the encryption added to the picture. And I think it’s a good security practice we should try to follow.

The post Storing Encrypted Credentials In Git appeared first on Bozho's tech blog.

Secure Build with AWS CodeBuild and LayeredInsight

Post Syndicated from Asif Khan original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/secure-build-with-aws-codebuild-and-layeredinsight/

This post is written by Asif Awan, Chief Technology Officer of Layered InsightSubin Mathew – Software Development Manager for AWS CodeBuild, and Asif Khan – Solutions Architect

Enterprises adopt containers because they recognize the benefits: speed, agility, portability, and high compute density. They understand how accelerating application delivery and deployment pipelines makes it possible to rapidly slipstream new features to customers. Although the benefits are indisputable, this acceleration raises concerns about security and corporate compliance with software governance. In this blog post, I provide a solution that shows how Layered Insight, the pioneer and global leader in container-native application protection, can be used with seamless application build and delivery pipelines like those available in AWS CodeBuild to address these concerns.

Layered Insight solutions

Layered Insight enables organizations to unify DevOps and SecOps by providing complete visibility and control of containerized applications. Using the industry’s first embedded security approach, Layered Insight solves the challenges of container performance and protection by providing accurate insight into container images, adaptive analysis of running containers, and automated enforcement of container behavior.

 

AWS CodeBuild

AWS CodeBuild is a fully managed build service that compiles source code, runs tests, and produces software packages that are ready to deploy. With CodeBuild, you don’t need to provision, manage, and scale your own build servers. CodeBuild scales continuously and processes multiple builds concurrently, so your builds are not left waiting in a queue. You can get started quickly by using prepackaged build environments, or you can create custom build environments that use your own build tools.

 

Problem Definition

Security and compliance concerns span the lifecycle of application containers. Common concerns include:

Visibility into the container images. You need to verify the software composition information of the container image to determine whether known vulnerabilities associated with any of the software packages and libraries are included in the container image.

Governance of container images is critical because only certain open source packages/libraries, of specific versions, should be included in the container images. You need support for mechanisms for blacklisting all container images that include a certain version of a software package/library, or only allowing open source software that come with a specific type of license (such as Apache, MIT, GPL, and so on). You need to be able to address challenges such as:

·       Defining the process for image compliance policies at the enterprise, department, and group levels.

·       Preventing the images that fail the compliance checks from being deployed in critical environments, such as staging, pre-prod, and production.

Visibility into running container instances is critical, including:

·       CPU and memory utilization.

·       Security of the build environment.

·       All activities (system, network, storage, and application layer) of the application code running in each container instance.

Protection of running container instances that is:

·       Zero-touch to the developers (not an SDK-based approach).

·       Zero touch to the DevOps team and doesn’t limit the portability of the containerized application.

·       This protection must retain the option to switch to a different container stack or orchestration layer, or even to a different Container as a Service (CaaS ).

·       And it must be a fully automated solution to SecOps, so that the SecOps team doesn’t have to manually analyze and define detailed blacklist and whitelist policies.

 

Solution Details

In AWS CodeCommit, we have three projects:
●     “Democode” is a simple Java application, with one buildspec to build the app into a Docker container (run by build-demo-image CodeBuild project), and another to instrument said container (instrument-image CodeBuild project). The resulting container is stored in ECR repo javatestasjavatest:20180415-layered. This instrumented container is running in AWS Fargate cluster demo-java-appand can be seen in the Layered Insight runtime console as the javatestapplication in us-east-1.
●     aws-codebuild-docker-imagesis a clone of the official aws-codebuild-docker-images repo on GitHub . This CodeCommit project is used by the build-python-builder CodeBuild project to build the python 3.3.6 codebuild image and is stored at the codebuild-python ECR repo. We then manually instructed the Layered Insight console to instrument the image.
●     scan-java-imagecontains just a buildspec.yml file. This file is used by the scan-java-image CodeBuild project to instruct Layered Assessment to perform a vulnerability scan of the javatest container image built previously, and then run the scan results through a compliance policy that states there should be no medium vulnerabilities. This build fails — but in this case that is a success: the scan completes successfully, but compliance fails as there are medium-level issues found in the scan.

This build is performed using the instrumented version of the Python 3.3.6 CodeBuild image, so the activity of the processes running within the build are recorded each time within the LI console.

Build container image

Create or use a CodeCommit project with your application. To build this image and store it in Amazon Elastic Container Registry (Amazon ECR), add a buildspec file to the project and build a container image and create a CodeBuild project.

Scan container image

Once the image is built, create a new buildspec in the same project or a new one that looks similar to below (update ECR URL as necessary):

version: 0.2
phases:
  pre_build:
    commands:
      - echo Pulling down LI Scan API client scripts
      - git clone https://github.com/LayeredInsight/scan-api-example-python.git
      - echo Setting up LI Scan API client
      - cd scan-api-example-python
      - pip install layint_scan_api
      - pip install -r requirements.txt
  build:
    commands:
      - echo Scanning container started on `date`
      - IMAGEID=$(./li_add_image --name <aws-region>.amazonaws.com/javatest:20180415)
      - ./li_wait_for_scan -v --imageid $IMAGEID
      - ./li_run_image_compliance -v --imageid $IMAGEID --policyid PB15260f1acb6b2aa5b597e9d22feffb538256a01fbb4e5a95

Add the buildspec file to the git repo, push it, and then build a CodeBuild project using with the instrumented Python 3.3.6 CodeBuild image at <aws-region>.amazonaws.com/codebuild-python:3.3.6-layered. Set the following environment variables in the CodeBuild project:
●     LI_APPLICATIONNAME – name of the build to display
●     LI_LOCATION – location of the build project to display
●     LI_API_KEY – ApiKey:<key-name>:<api-key>
●     LI_API_HOST – location of the Layered Insight API service

Instrument container image

Next, to instrument the new container image:

  1. In the Layered Insight runtime console, ensure that the ECR registry and credentials are defined (click the Setup icon and the ‘+’ sign on the top right of the screen to add a new container registry). Note the name given to the registry in the console, as this needs to be referenced in the li_add_imagecommand in the script, below.
  2. Next, add a new buildspec (with a new name) to the CodeCommit project, such as the one shown below. This code will download the Layered Insight runtime client, and use it to instruct the Layered Insight service to instrument the image that was just built:
    version: 0.2
    phases:
    pre_build:
    commands:
    echo Pulling down LI API Runtime client scripts
    git clone https://github.com/LayeredInsight/runtime-api-example-python
    echo Setting up LI API client
    cd runtime-api-example-python
    pip install layint-runtime-api
    pip install -r requirements.txt
    build:
    commands:
    echo Instrumentation started on `date`
    ./li_add_image --registry "Javatest ECR" --name IMAGE_NAME:TAG --description "IMAGE DESCRIPTION" --policy "Default Policy" --instrument --wait --verbose
  3. Commit and push the new buildspec file.
  4. Going back to CodeBuild, create a new project, with the same CodeCommit repo, but this time select the new buildspec file. Use a Python 3.3.6 builder – either the AWS or LI Instrumented version.
  5. Click Continue
  6. Click Save
  7. Run the build, again on the master branch.
  8. If everything runs successfully, a new image should appear in the ECR registry with a -layered suffix. This is the instrumented image.

Run instrumented container image

When the instrumented container is now run — in ECS, Fargate, or elsewhere — it will log data back to the Layered Insight runtime console. It’s appearance in the console can be modified by setting the LI_APPLICATIONNAME and LI_LOCATION environment variables when running the container.

Conclusion

In the above blog we have provided you steps needed to embed governance and runtime security in your build pipelines running on AWS CodeBuild using Layered Insight.

 

 

 

Ransomware Update: Viruses Targeting Business IT Servers

Post Syndicated from Roderick Bauer original https://www.backblaze.com/blog/ransomware-update-viruses-targeting-business-it-servers/

Ransomware warning message on computer

As ransomware attacks have grown in number in recent months, the tactics and attack vectors also have evolved. While the primary method of attack used to be to target individual computer users within organizations with phishing emails and infected attachments, we’re increasingly seeing attacks that target weaknesses in businesses’ IT infrastructure.

How Ransomware Attacks Typically Work

In our previous posts on ransomware, we described the common vehicles used by hackers to infect organizations with ransomware viruses. Most often, downloaders distribute trojan horses through malicious downloads and spam emails. The emails contain a variety of file attachments, which if opened, will download and run one of the many ransomware variants. Once a user’s computer is infected with a malicious downloader, it will retrieve additional malware, which frequently includes crypto-ransomware. After the files have been encrypted, a ransom payment is demanded of the victim in order to decrypt the files.

What’s Changed With the Latest Ransomware Attacks?

In 2016, a customized ransomware strain called SamSam began attacking the servers in primarily health care institutions. SamSam, unlike more conventional ransomware, is not delivered through downloads or phishing emails. Instead, the attackers behind SamSam use tools to identify unpatched servers running Red Hat’s JBoss enterprise products. Once the attackers have successfully gained entry into one of these servers by exploiting vulnerabilities in JBoss, they use other freely available tools and scripts to collect credentials and gather information on networked computers. Then they deploy their ransomware to encrypt files on these systems before demanding a ransom. Gaining entry to an organization through its IT center rather than its endpoints makes this approach scalable and especially unsettling.

SamSam’s methodology is to scour the Internet searching for accessible and vulnerable JBoss application servers, especially ones used by hospitals. It’s not unlike a burglar rattling doorknobs in a neighborhood to find unlocked homes. When SamSam finds an unlocked home (unpatched server), the software infiltrates the system. It is then free to spread across the company’s network by stealing passwords. As it transverses the network and systems, it encrypts files, preventing access until the victims pay the hackers a ransom, typically between $10,000 and $15,000. The low ransom amount has encouraged some victimized organizations to pay the ransom rather than incur the downtime required to wipe and reinitialize their IT systems.

The success of SamSam is due to its effectiveness rather than its sophistication. SamSam can enter and transverse a network without human intervention. Some organizations are learning too late that securing internet-facing services in their data center from attack is just as important as securing endpoints.

The typical steps in a SamSam ransomware attack are:

1
Attackers gain access to vulnerable server
Attackers exploit vulnerable software or weak/stolen credentials.
2
Attack spreads via remote access tools
Attackers harvest credentials, create SOCKS proxies to tunnel traffic, and abuse RDP to install SamSam on more computers in the network.
3
Ransomware payload deployed
Attackers run batch scripts to execute ransomware on compromised machines.
4
Ransomware demand delivered requiring payment to decrypt files
Demand amounts vary from victim to victim. Relatively low ransom amounts appear to be designed to encourage quick payment decisions.

What all the organizations successfully exploited by SamSam have in common is that they were running unpatched servers that made them vulnerable to SamSam. Some organizations had their endpoints and servers backed up, while others did not. Some of those without backups they could use to recover their systems chose to pay the ransom money.

Timeline of SamSam History and Exploits

Since its appearance in 2016, SamSam has been in the news with many successful incursions into healthcare, business, and government institutions.

March 2016
SamSam appears

SamSam campaign targets vulnerable JBoss servers
Attackers hone in on healthcare organizations specifically, as they’re more likely to have unpatched JBoss machines.

April 2016
SamSam finds new targets

SamSam begins targeting schools and government.
After initial success targeting healthcare, attackers branch out to other sectors.

April 2017
New tactics include RDP

Attackers shift to targeting organizations with exposed RDP connections, and maintain focus on healthcare.
An attack on Erie County Medical Center costs the hospital $10 million over three months of recovery.
Erie County Medical Center attacked by SamSam ransomware virus

January 2018
Municipalities attacked

• Attack on Municipality of Farmington, NM.
• Attack on Hancock Health.
Hancock Regional Hospital notice following SamSam attack
• Attack on Adams Memorial Hospital
• Attack on Allscripts (Electronic Health Records), which includes 180,000 physicians, 2,500 hospitals, and 7.2 million patients’ health records.

February 2018
Attack volume increases

• Attack on Davidson County, NC.
• Attack on Colorado Department of Transportation.
SamSam virus notification

March 2018
SamSam shuts down Atlanta

• Second attack on Colorado Department of Transportation.
• City of Atlanta suffers a devastating attack by SamSam.
The attack has far-reaching impacts — crippling the court system, keeping residents from paying their water bills, limiting vital communications like sewer infrastructure requests, and pushing the Atlanta Police Department to file paper reports.
Atlanta Ransomware outage alert
• SamSam campaign nets $325,000 in 4 weeks.
Infections spike as attackers launch new campaigns. Healthcare and government organizations are once again the primary targets.

How to Defend Against SamSam and Other Ransomware Attacks

The best way to respond to a ransomware attack is to avoid having one in the first place. If you are attacked, making sure your valuable data is backed up and unreachable by ransomware infection will ensure that your downtime and data loss will be minimal or none if you ever suffer an attack.

In our previous post, How to Recover From Ransomware, we listed the ten ways to protect your organization from ransomware.

  1. Use anti-virus and anti-malware software or other security policies to block known payloads from launching.
  2. Make frequent, comprehensive backups of all important files and isolate them from local and open networks. Cybersecurity professionals view data backup and recovery (74% in a recent survey) by far as the most effective solution to respond to a successful ransomware attack.
  3. Keep offline backups of data stored in locations inaccessible from any potentially infected computer, such as disconnected external storage drives or the cloud, which prevents them from being accessed by the ransomware.
  4. Install the latest security updates issued by software vendors of your OS and applications. Remember to patch early and patch often to close known vulnerabilities in operating systems, server software, browsers, and web plugins.
  5. Consider deploying security software to protect endpoints, email servers, and network systems from infection.
  6. Exercise cyber hygiene, such as using caution when opening email attachments and links.
  7. Segment your networks to keep critical computers isolated and to prevent the spread of malware in case of attack. Turn off unneeded network shares.
  8. Turn off admin rights for users who don’t require them. Give users the lowest system permissions they need to do their work.
  9. Restrict write permissions on file servers as much as possible.
  10. Educate yourself, your employees, and your family in best practices to keep malware out of your systems. Update everyone on the latest email phishing scams and human engineering aimed at turning victims into abettors.

Please Tell Us About Your Experiences with Ransomware

Have you endured a ransomware attack or have a strategy to avoid becoming a victim? Please tell us of your experiences in the comments.

The post Ransomware Update: Viruses Targeting Business IT Servers appeared first on Backblaze Blog | Cloud Storage & Cloud Backup.

StaCoAn – Mobile App Static Analysis Tool

Post Syndicated from Darknet original https://www.darknet.org.uk/2018/04/stacoan-mobile-app-static-analysis-tool/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=darknetfeed

StaCoAn – Mobile App Static Analysis Tool

StaCoAn is a cross-platform tool which aids developers, bug bounty hunters and ethical hackers performing mobile app static analysis on the code of the application for both native Android and iOS applications.

This tool will look for interesting lines in the code which can contain:

  • Hardcoded credentials
  • API keys
  • URL’s of API’s
  • Decryption keys
  • Major coding mistakes

This tool was created with a big focus on usability and graphical guidance in the user interface.

Read the rest of StaCoAn – Mobile App Static Analysis Tool now! Only available at Darknet.

The End of Google Cloud Messaging, and What it Means for Your Apps

Post Syndicated from Zach Barbitta original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/messaging-and-targeting/the-end-of-google-cloud-messaging-and-what-it-means-for-your-apps/

On April 10, 2018, Google announced the deprecation of its Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) platform. Specifically, the GCM server and client APIs are deprecated and will be removed as soon as April 11, 2019.  What does this mean for you and your applications that use Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) or Amazon Pinpoint?

First, nothing will break now or after April 11, 2019. GCM device tokens are completely interchangeable with the newer Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) device tokens. If you have existing GCM tokens, you’ll still be able to use them to send notifications. This statement is also true for GCM tokens that you generate in the future.

On the back end, we’ve already migrated Amazon SNS and Amazon Pinpoint to the server endpoint for FCM (https://fcm.googleapis.com/fcm/send). As a developer, you don’t need to make any changes as a result of this deprecation.

We created the following mini-FAQ to address some of the questions you may have as a developer who uses Amazon SNS or Amazon Pinpoint.

If I migrate to FCM from GCM, can I still use Amazon Pinpoint and Amazon SNS?

Yes. Your ability to connect to your applications and send messages through both Amazon SNS and Amazon Pinpoint doesn’t change. We’ll update the documentation for Amazon SNS and Amazon Pinpoint soon to reflect these changes.

If I don’t migrate to FCM from GCM, can I still use Amazon Pinpoint and Amazon SNS?

Yes. If you do nothing, your existing credentials and GCM tokens will still be valid. All applications that you previously set up to use Amazon Pinpoint or Amazon SNS will continue to work normally. When you call the API for Amazon Pinpoint or Amazon SNS, we initiate a request to the FCM server endpoint directly.

What are the differences between Amazon SNS and Amazon Pinpoint?

Amazon SNS makes it easy for developers to set up, operate, and send notifications at scale, affordably and with a high degree of flexibility. Amazon Pinpoint has many of the same messaging capabilities as Amazon SNS, with the same levels of scalability and flexibility.

The main difference between the two services is that Amazon Pinpoint provides both transactional and targeted messaging capabilities. By using Amazon Pinpoint, marketers and developers can not only send transactional messages to their customers, but can also segment their audiences, create campaigns, and analyze both application and message metrics.

How do I migrate from GCM to FCM?

For more information about migrating from GCM to FCM, see Migrate a GCM Client App for Android to Firebase Cloud Messaging on the Google Developers site.

If you have any questions, please post them in the comments section, or in the Amazon Pinpoint or Amazon SNS forums.

How to retain system tables’ data spanning multiple Amazon Redshift clusters and run cross-cluster diagnostic queries

Post Syndicated from Karthik Sonti original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/how-to-retain-system-tables-data-spanning-multiple-amazon-redshift-clusters-and-run-cross-cluster-diagnostic-queries/

Amazon Redshift is a data warehouse service that logs the history of the system in STL log tables. The STL log tables manage disk space by retaining only two to five days of log history, depending on log usage and available disk space.

To retain STL tables’ data for an extended period, you usually have to create a replica table for every system table. Then, for each you load the data from the system table into the replica at regular intervals. By maintaining replica tables for STL tables, you can run diagnostic queries on historical data from the STL tables. You then can derive insights from query execution times, query plans, and disk-spill patterns, and make better cluster-sizing decisions. However, refreshing replica tables with live data from STL tables at regular intervals requires schedulers such as Cron or AWS Data Pipeline. Also, these tables are specific to one cluster and they are not accessible after the cluster is terminated. This is especially true for transient Amazon Redshift clusters that last for only a finite period of ad hoc query execution.

In this blog post, I present a solution that exports system tables from multiple Amazon Redshift clusters into an Amazon S3 bucket. This solution is serverless, and you can schedule it as frequently as every five minutes. The AWS CloudFormation deployment template that I provide automates the solution setup in your environment. The system tables’ data in the Amazon S3 bucket is partitioned by cluster name and query execution date to enable efficient joins in cross-cluster diagnostic queries.

I also provide another CloudFormation template later in this post. This second template helps to automate the creation of tables in the AWS Glue Data Catalog for the system tables’ data stored in Amazon S3. After the system tables are exported to Amazon S3, you can run cross-cluster diagnostic queries on the system tables’ data and derive insights about query executions in each Amazon Redshift cluster. You can do this using Amazon QuickSight, Amazon Athena, Amazon EMR, or Amazon Redshift Spectrum.

You can find all the code examples in this post, including the CloudFormation templates, AWS Glue extract, transform, and load (ETL) scripts, and the resolution steps for common errors you might encounter in this GitHub repository.

Solution overview

The solution in this post uses AWS Glue to export system tables’ log data from Amazon Redshift clusters into Amazon S3. The AWS Glue ETL jobs are invoked at a scheduled interval by AWS Lambda. AWS Systems Manager, which provides secure, hierarchical storage for configuration data management and secrets management, maintains the details of Amazon Redshift clusters for which the solution is enabled. The last-fetched time stamp values for the respective cluster-table combination are maintained in an Amazon DynamoDB table.

The following diagram covers the key steps involved in this solution.

The solution as illustrated in the preceding diagram flows like this:

  1. The Lambda function, invoke_rs_stl_export_etl, is triggered at regular intervals, as controlled by Amazon CloudWatch. It’s triggered to look up the AWS Systems Manager parameter store to get the details of the Amazon Redshift clusters for which the system table export is enabled.
  2. The same Lambda function, based on the Amazon Redshift cluster details obtained in step 1, invokes the AWS Glue ETL job designated for the Amazon Redshift cluster. If an ETL job for the cluster is not found, the Lambda function creates one.
  3. The ETL job invoked for the Amazon Redshift cluster gets the cluster credentials from the parameter store. It gets from the DynamoDB table the last exported time stamp of when each of the system tables was exported from the respective Amazon Redshift cluster.
  4. The ETL job unloads the system tables’ data from the Amazon Redshift cluster into an Amazon S3 bucket.
  5. The ETL job updates the DynamoDB table with the last exported time stamp value for each system table exported from the Amazon Redshift cluster.
  6. The Amazon Redshift cluster system tables’ data is available in Amazon S3 and is partitioned by cluster name and date for running cross-cluster diagnostic queries.

Understanding the configuration data

This solution uses AWS Systems Manager parameter store to store the Amazon Redshift cluster credentials securely. The parameter store also securely stores other configuration information that the AWS Glue ETL job needs for extracting and storing system tables’ data in Amazon S3. Systems Manager comes with a default AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) key that it uses to encrypt the password component of the Amazon Redshift cluster credentials.

The following table explains the global parameters and cluster-specific parameters required in this solution. The global parameters are defined once and applicable at the overall solution level. The cluster-specific parameters are specific to an Amazon Redshift cluster and repeat for each cluster for which you enable this post’s solution. The CloudFormation template explained later in this post creates these parameters as part of the deployment process.

Parameter name Type Description
Global parametersdefined once and applied to all jobs
redshift_query_logs.global.s3_prefix String The Amazon S3 path where the query logs are exported. Under this path, each exported table is partitioned by cluster name and date.
redshift_query_logs.global.tempdir String The Amazon S3 path that AWS Glue ETL jobs use for temporarily staging the data.
redshift_query_logs.global.role> String The name of the role that the AWS Glue ETL jobs assume. Just the role name is sufficient. The complete Amazon Resource Name (ARN) is not required.
redshift_query_logs.global.enabled_cluster_list StringList A comma-separated list of cluster names for which system tables’ data export is enabled. This gives flexibility for a user to exclude certain clusters.
Cluster-specific parametersfor each cluster specified in the enabled_cluster_list parameter
redshift_query_logs.<<cluster_name>>.connection String The name of the AWS Glue Data Catalog connection to the Amazon Redshift cluster. For example, if the cluster name is product_warehouse, the entry is redshift_query_logs.product_warehouse.connection.
redshift_query_logs.<<cluster_name>>.user String The user name that AWS Glue uses to connect to the Amazon Redshift cluster.
redshift_query_logs.<<cluster_name>>.password Secure String The password that AWS Glue uses to connect the Amazon Redshift cluster’s encrypted-by key that is managed in AWS KMS.

For example, suppose that you have two Amazon Redshift clusters, product-warehouse and category-management, for which the solution described in this post is enabled. In this case, the parameters shown in the following screenshot are created by the solution deployment CloudFormation template in the AWS Systems Manager parameter store.

Solution deployment

To make it easier for you to get started, I created a CloudFormation template that automatically configures and deploys the solution—only one step is required after deployment.

Prerequisites

To deploy the solution, you must have one or more Amazon Redshift clusters in a private subnet. This subnet must have a network address translation (NAT) gateway or a NAT instance configured, and also a security group with a self-referencing inbound rule for all TCP ports. For more information about why AWS Glue ETL needs the configuration it does, described previously, see Connecting to a JDBC Data Store in a VPC in the AWS Glue documentation.

To start the deployment, launch the CloudFormation template:

CloudFormation stack parameters

The following table lists and describes the parameters for deploying the solution to export query logs from multiple Amazon Redshift clusters.

Property Default Description
S3Bucket mybucket The bucket this solution uses to store the exported query logs, stage code artifacts, and perform unloads from Amazon Redshift. For example, the mybucket/extract_rs_logs/data bucket is used for storing all the exported query logs for each system table partitioned by the cluster. The mybucket/extract_rs_logs/temp/ bucket is used for temporarily staging the unloaded data from Amazon Redshift. The mybucket/extract_rs_logs/code bucket is used for storing all the code artifacts required for Lambda and the AWS Glue ETL jobs.
ExportEnabledRedshiftClusters Requires Input A comma-separated list of cluster names from which the system table logs need to be exported.
DataStoreSecurityGroups Requires Input A list of security groups with an inbound rule to the Amazon Redshift clusters provided in the parameter, ExportEnabledClusters. These security groups should also have a self-referencing inbound rule on all TCP ports, as explained on Connecting to a JDBC Data Store in a VPC.

After you launch the template and create the stack, you see that the following resources have been created:

  1. AWS Glue connections for each Amazon Redshift cluster you provided in the CloudFormation stack parameter, ExportEnabledRedshiftClusters.
  2. All parameters required for this solution created in the parameter store.
  3. The Lambda function that invokes the AWS Glue ETL jobs for each configured Amazon Redshift cluster at a regular interval of five minutes.
  4. The DynamoDB table that captures the last exported time stamps for each exported cluster-table combination.
  5. The AWS Glue ETL jobs to export query logs from each Amazon Redshift cluster provided in the CloudFormation stack parameter, ExportEnabledRedshiftClusters.
  6. The IAM roles and policies required for the Lambda function and AWS Glue ETL jobs.

After the deployment

For each Amazon Redshift cluster for which you enabled the solution through the CloudFormation stack parameter, ExportEnabledRedshiftClusters, the automated deployment includes temporary credentials that you must update after the deployment:

  1. Go to the parameter store.
  2. Note the parameters <<cluster_name>>.user and redshift_query_logs.<<cluster_name>>.password that correspond to each Amazon Redshift cluster for which you enabled this solution. Edit these parameters to replace the placeholder values with the right credentials.

For example, if product-warehouse is one of the clusters for which you enabled system table export, you edit these two parameters with the right user name and password and choose Save parameter.

Querying the exported system tables

Within a few minutes after the solution deployment, you should see Amazon Redshift query logs being exported to the Amazon S3 location, <<S3Bucket_you_provided>>/extract_redshift_query_logs/data/. In that bucket, you should see the eight system tables partitioned by customer name and date: stl_alert_event_log, stl_dlltext, stl_explain, stl_query, stl_querytext, stl_scan, stl_utilitytext, and stl_wlm_query.

To run cross-cluster diagnostic queries on the exported system tables, create external tables in the AWS Glue Data Catalog. To make it easier for you to get started, I provide a CloudFormation template that creates an AWS Glue crawler, which crawls the exported system tables stored in Amazon S3 and builds the external tables in the AWS Glue Data Catalog.

Launch this CloudFormation template to create external tables that correspond to the Amazon Redshift system tables. S3Bucket is the only input parameter required for this stack deployment. Provide the same Amazon S3 bucket name where the system tables’ data is being exported. After you successfully create the stack, you can see the eight tables in the database, redshift_query_logs_db, as shown in the following screenshot.

Now, navigate to the Athena console to run cross-cluster diagnostic queries. The following screenshot shows a diagnostic query executed in Athena that retrieves query alerts logged across multiple Amazon Redshift clusters.

You can build the following example Amazon QuickSight dashboard by running cross-cluster diagnostic queries on Athena to identify the hourly query count and the key query alert events across multiple Amazon Redshift clusters.

How to extend the solution

You can extend this post’s solution in two ways:

  • Add any new Amazon Redshift clusters that you spin up after you deploy the solution.
  • Add other system tables or custom query results to the list of exports from an Amazon Redshift cluster.

Extend the solution to other Amazon Redshift clusters

To extend the solution to more Amazon Redshift clusters, add the three cluster-specific parameters in the AWS Systems Manager parameter store following the guidelines earlier in this post. Modify the redshift_query_logs.global.enabled_cluster_list parameter to append the new cluster to the comma-separated string.

Extend the solution to add other tables or custom queries to an Amazon Redshift cluster

The current solution ships with the export functionality for the following Amazon Redshift system tables:

  • stl_alert_event_log
  • stl_dlltext
  • stl_explain
  • stl_query
  • stl_querytext
  • stl_scan
  • stl_utilitytext
  • stl_wlm_query

You can easily add another system table or custom query by adding a few lines of code to the AWS Glue ETL job, <<cluster-name>_extract_rs_query_logs. For example, suppose that from the product-warehouse Amazon Redshift cluster you want to export orders greater than $2,000. To do so, add the following five lines of code to the AWS Glue ETL job product-warehouse_extract_rs_query_logs, where product-warehouse is your cluster name:

  1. Get the last-processed time-stamp value. The function creates a value if it doesn’t already exist.

salesLastProcessTSValue = functions.getLastProcessedTSValue(trackingEntry=”mydb.sales_2000",job_configs=job_configs)

  1. Run the custom query with the time stamp.

returnDF=functions.runQuery(query="select * from sales s join order o where o.order_amnt > 2000 and sale_timestamp > '{}'".format (salesLastProcessTSValue) ,tableName="mydb.sales_2000",job_configs=job_configs)

  1. Save the results to Amazon S3.

functions.saveToS3(dataframe=returnDF,s3Prefix=s3Prefix,tableName="mydb.sales_2000",partitionColumns=["sale_date"],job_configs=job_configs)

  1. Get the latest time-stamp value from the returned data frame in Step 2.

latestTimestampVal=functions.getMaxValue(returnDF,"sale_timestamp",job_configs)

  1. Update the last-processed time-stamp value in the DynamoDB table.

functions.updateLastProcessedTSValue(“mydb.sales_2000",latestTimestampVal[0],job_configs)

Conclusion

In this post, I demonstrate a serverless solution to retain the system tables’ log data across multiple Amazon Redshift clusters. By using this solution, you can incrementally export the data from system tables into Amazon S3. By performing this export, you can build cross-cluster diagnostic queries, build audit dashboards, and derive insights into capacity planning by using services such as Athena. I also demonstrate how you can extend this solution to other ad hoc query use cases or tables other than system tables by adding a few lines of code.


Additional Reading

If you found this post useful, be sure to check out Using Amazon Redshift Spectrum, Amazon Athena, and AWS Glue with Node.js in Production and Amazon Redshift – 2017 Recap.


About the Author

Karthik Sonti is a senior big data architect at Amazon Web Services. He helps AWS customers build big data and analytical solutions and provides guidance on architecture and best practices.

 

 

 

 

User Authentication Best Practices Checklist

Post Syndicated from Bozho original https://techblog.bozho.net/user-authentication-best-practices-checklist/

User authentication is the functionality that every web application shared. We should have perfected that a long time ago, having implemented it so many times. And yet there are so many mistakes made all the time.

Part of the reason for that is that the list of things that can go wrong is long. You can store passwords incorrectly, you can have a vulnerably password reset functionality, you can expose your session to a CSRF attack, your session can be hijacked, etc. So I’ll try to compile a list of best practices regarding user authentication. OWASP top 10 is always something you should read, every year. But that might not be enough.

So, let’s start. I’ll try to be concise, but I’ll include as much of the related pitfalls as I can cover – e.g. what could go wrong with the user session after they login:

  • Store passwords with bcrypt/scrypt/PBKDF2. No MD5 or SHA, as they are not good for password storing. Long salt (per user) is mandatory (the aforementioned algorithms have it built in). If you don’t and someone gets hold of your database, they’ll be able to extract the passwords of all your users. And then try these passwords on other websites.
  • Use HTTPS. Period. (Otherwise user credentials can leak through unprotected networks). Force HTTPS if user opens a plain-text version.
  • Mark cookies as secure. Makes cookie theft harder.
  • Use CSRF protection (e.g. CSRF one-time tokens that are verified with each request). Frameworks have such functionality built-in.
  • Disallow framing (X-Frame-Options: DENY). Otherwise your website may be included in another website in a hidden iframe and “abused” through javascript.
  • Have a same-origin policy
  • Logout – let your users logout by deleting all cookies and invalidating the session. This makes usage of shared computers safer (yes, users should ideally use private browsing sessions, but not all of them are that savvy)
  • Session expiry – don’t have forever-lasting sessions. If the user closes your website, their session should expire after a while. “A while” may still be a big number depending on the service provided. For ajax-heavy website you can have regular ajax-polling that keeps the session alive while the page stays open.
  • Remember me – implementing “remember me” (on this machine) functionality is actually hard due to the risks of a stolen persistent cookie. Spring-security uses this approach, which I think should be followed if you wish to implement more persistent logins.
  • Forgotten password flow – the forgotten password flow should rely on sending a one-time (or expiring) link to the user and asking for a new password when it’s opened. 0Auth explain it in this post and Postmark gives some best pracitces. How the link is formed is a separate discussion and there are several approaches. Store a password-reset token in the user profile table and then send it as parameter in the link. Or do not store anything in the database, but send a few params: userId:expiresTimestamp:hmac(userId+expiresTimestamp). That way you have expiring links (rather than one-time links). The HMAC relies on a secret key, so the links can’t be spoofed. It seems there’s no consensus, as the OWASP guide has a bit different approach
  • One-time login links – this is an option used by Slack, which sends one-time login links instead of asking users for passwords. It relies on the fact that your email is well guarded and you have access to it all the time. If your service is not accessed to often, you can have that approach instead of (rather than in addition to) passwords.
  • Limit login attempts – brute-force through a web UI should not be possible; therefore you should block login attempts if they become too many. One approach is to just block them based on IP. The other one is to block them based on account attempted. (Spring example here). Which one is better – I don’t know. Both can actually be combined. Instead of fully blocking the attempts, you may add a captcha after, say, the 5th attempt. But don’t add the captcha for the first attempt – it is bad user experience.
  • Don’t leak information through error messages – you shouldn’t allow attackers to figure out if an email is registered or not. If an email is not found, upon login report just “Incorrect credentials”. On passwords reset, it may be something like “If your email is registered, you should have received a password reset email”. This is often at odds with usability – people don’t often remember the email they used to register, and the ability to check a number of them before getting in might be important. So this rule is not absolute, though it’s desirable, especially for more critical systems.
  • Make sure you use JWT only if it’s really necessary and be careful of the pitfalls.
  • Consider using a 3rd party authentication – OpenID Connect, OAuth by Google/Facebook/Twitter (but be careful with OAuth flaws as well). There’s an associated risk with relying on a 3rd party identity provider, and you still have to manage cookies, logout, etc., but some of the authentication aspects are simplified.
  • For high-risk or sensitive applications use 2-factor authentication. There’s a caveat with Google Authenticator though – if you lose your phone, you lose your accounts (unless there’s a manual process to restore it). That’s why Authy seems like a good solution for storing 2FA keys.

I’m sure I’m missing something. And you see it’s complicated. Sadly we’re still at the point where the most common functionality – authenticating users – is so tricky and cumbersome, that you almost always get at least some of it wrong.

The post User Authentication Best Practices Checklist appeared first on Bozho's tech blog.

Rotate Amazon RDS database credentials automatically with AWS Secrets Manager

Post Syndicated from Apurv Awasthi original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/rotate-amazon-rds-database-credentials-automatically-with-aws-secrets-manager/

Recently, we launched AWS Secrets Manager, a service that makes it easier to rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials, API keys, and other secrets throughout their lifecycle. You can configure Secrets Manager to rotate secrets automatically, which can help you meet your security and compliance needs. Secrets Manager offers built-in integrations for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Amazon Aurora on Amazon RDS, and can rotate credentials for these databases natively. You can control access to your secrets by using fine-grained AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies. To retrieve secrets, employees replace plaintext secrets with a call to Secrets Manager APIs, eliminating the need to hard-code secrets in source code or update configuration files and redeploy code when secrets are rotated.

In this post, I introduce the key features of Secrets Manager. I then show you how to store a database credential for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS and how your applications can access this secret. Finally, I show you how to configure Secrets Manager to rotate this secret automatically.

Key features of Secrets Manager

These features include the ability to:

  • Rotate secrets safely. You can configure Secrets Manager to rotate secrets automatically without disrupting your applications. Secrets Manager offers built-in integrations for rotating credentials for Amazon RDS databases for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Amazon Aurora. You can extend Secrets Manager to meet your custom rotation requirements by creating an AWS Lambda function to rotate other types of secrets. For example, you can create an AWS Lambda function to rotate OAuth tokens used in a mobile application. Users and applications retrieve the secret from Secrets Manager, eliminating the need to email secrets to developers or update and redeploy applications after AWS Secrets Manager rotates a secret.
  • Secure and manage secrets centrally. You can store, view, and manage all your secrets. By default, Secrets Manager encrypts these secrets with encryption keys that you own and control. Using fine-grained IAM policies, you can control access to secrets. For example, you can require developers to provide a second factor of authentication when they attempt to retrieve a production database credential. You can also tag secrets to help you discover, organize, and control access to secrets used throughout your organization.
  • Monitor and audit easily. Secrets Manager integrates with AWS logging and monitoring services to enable you to meet your security and compliance requirements. For example, you can audit AWS CloudTrail logs to see when Secrets Manager rotated a secret or configure AWS CloudWatch Events to alert you when an administrator deletes a secret.
  • Pay as you go. Pay for the secrets you store in Secrets Manager and for the use of these secrets; there are no long-term contracts or licensing fees.

Get started with Secrets Manager

Now that you’re familiar with the key features, I’ll show you how to store the credential for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS. To demonstrate how to retrieve and use the secret, I use a python application running on Amazon EC2 that requires this database credential to access the MySQL instance. Finally, I show how to configure Secrets Manager to rotate this database credential automatically. Let’s get started.

Phase 1: Store a secret in Secrets Manager

  1. Open the Secrets Manager console and select Store a new secret.
     
    Secrets Manager console interface
     
  2. I select Credentials for RDS database because I’m storing credentials for a MySQL database hosted on Amazon RDS. For this example, I store the credentials for the database superuser. I start by securing the superuser because it’s the most powerful database credential and has full access over the database.
     
    Store a new secret interface with Credentials for RDS database selected
     

    Note: For this example, you need permissions to store secrets in Secrets Manager. To grant these permissions, you can use the AWSSecretsManagerReadWriteAccess managed policy. Read the AWS Secrets Manager Documentation for more information about the minimum IAM permissions required to store a secret.

  3. Next, I review the encryption setting and choose to use the default encryption settings. Secrets Manager will encrypt this secret using the Secrets Manager DefaultEncryptionKeyDefaultEncryptionKey in this account. Alternatively, I can choose to encrypt using a customer master key (CMK) that I have stored in AWS KMS.
     
    Select the encryption key interface
     
  4. Next, I view the list of Amazon RDS instances in my account and select the database this credential accesses. For this example, I select the DB instance mysql-rds-database, and then I select Next.
     
    Select the RDS database interface
     
  5. In this step, I specify values for Secret Name and Description. For this example, I use Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database as the name and enter a description of this secret, and then select Next.
     
    Secret Name and description interface
     
  6. For the next step, I keep the default setting Disable automatic rotation because my secret is used by my application running on Amazon EC2. I’ll enable rotation after I’ve updated my application (see Phase 2 below) to use Secrets Manager APIs to retrieve secrets. I then select Next.

    Note: If you’re storing a secret that you’re not using in your application, select Enable automatic rotation. See our AWS Secrets Manager getting started guide on rotation for details.

     
    Configure automatic rotation interface
     

  7. Review the information on the next screen and, if everything looks correct, select Store. We’ve now successfully stored a secret in Secrets Manager.
  8. Next, I select See sample code.
     
    The See sample code button
     
  9. Take note of the code samples provided. I will use this code to update my application to retrieve the secret using Secrets Manager APIs.
     
    Python sample code
     

Phase 2: Update an application to retrieve secret from Secrets Manager

Now that I have stored the secret in Secrets Manager, I update my application to retrieve the database credential from Secrets Manager instead of hard coding this information in a configuration file or source code. For this example, I show how to configure a python application to retrieve this secret from Secrets Manager.

  1. I connect to my Amazon EC2 instance via Secure Shell (SSH).
  2. Previously, I configured my application to retrieve the database user name and password from the configuration file. Below is the source code for my application.
    import MySQLdb
    import config

    def no_secrets_manager_sample()

    # Get the user name, password, and database connection information from a config file.
    database = config.database
    user_name = config.user_name
    password = config.password

    # Use the user name, password, and database connection information to connect to the database
    db = MySQLdb.connect(database.endpoint, user_name, password, database.db_name, database.port)

  3. I use the sample code from Phase 1 above and update my application to retrieve the user name and password from Secrets Manager. This code sets up the client and retrieves and decrypts the secret Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database. I’ve added comments to the code to make the code easier to understand.
    # Use the code snippet provided by Secrets Manager.
    import boto3
    from botocore.exceptions import ClientError

    def get_secret():
    #Define the secret you want to retrieve
    secret_name = "Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database"
    #Define the Secrets mManager end-point your code should use.
    endpoint_url = "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
    region_name = "us-east-1"

    #Setup the client
    session = boto3.session.Session()
    client = session.client(
    service_name='secretsmanager',
    region_name=region_name,
    endpoint_url=endpoint_url
    )

    #Use the client to retrieve the secret
    try:
    get_secret_value_response = client.get_secret_value(
    SecretId=secret_name
    )
    #Error handling to make it easier for your code to tolerate faults
    except ClientError as e:
    if e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'ResourceNotFoundException':
    print("The requested secret " + secret_name + " was not found")
    elif e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'InvalidRequestException':
    print("The request was invalid due to:", e)
    elif e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'InvalidParameterException':
    print("The request had invalid params:", e)
    else:
    # Decrypted secret using the associated KMS CMK
    # Depending on whether the secret was a string or binary, one of these fields will be populated
    if 'SecretString' in get_secret_value_response:
    secret = get_secret_value_response['SecretString']
    else:
    binary_secret_data = get_secret_value_response['SecretBinary']

    # Your code goes here.

  4. Applications require permissions to access Secrets Manager. My application runs on Amazon EC2 and uses an IAM role to obtain access to AWS services. I will attach the following policy to my IAM role. This policy uses the GetSecretValue action to grant my application permissions to read secret from Secrets Manager. This policy also uses the resource element to limit my application to read only the Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database secret from Secrets Manager. You can visit the AWS Secrets Manager Documentation to understand the minimum IAM permissions required to retrieve a secret.
    {
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": {
    "Sid": "RetrieveDbCredentialFromSecretsManager",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
    "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:::secret:Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database"
    }
    }

Phase 3: Enable Rotation for Your Secret

Rotating secrets periodically is a security best practice because it reduces the risk of misuse of secrets. Secrets Manager makes it easy to follow this security best practice and offers built-in integrations for rotating credentials for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Amazon Aurora databases hosted on Amazon RDS. When you enable rotation, Secrets Manager creates a Lambda function and attaches an IAM role to this function to execute rotations on a schedule you define.

Note: Configuring rotation is a privileged action that requires several IAM permissions and you should only grant this access to trusted individuals. To grant these permissions, you can use the AWS IAMFullAccess managed policy.

Next, I show you how to configure Secrets Manager to rotate the secret Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database automatically.

  1. From the Secrets Manager console, I go to the list of secrets and choose the secret I created in the first step Applications/MyApp/MySQL-RDS-Database.
     
    List of secrets in the Secrets Manager console
     
  2. I scroll to Rotation configuration, and then select Edit rotation.
     
    Rotation configuration interface
     
  3. To enable rotation, I select Enable automatic rotation. I then choose how frequently I want Secrets Manager to rotate this secret. For this example, I set the rotation interval to 60 days.
     
    Edit rotation configuration interface
     
  4. Next, Secrets Manager requires permissions to rotate this secret on your behalf. Because I’m storing the superuser database credential, Secrets Manager can use this credential to perform rotations. Therefore, I select Use the secret that I provided in step 1, and then select Next.
     
    Select which secret to use in the Edit rotation configuration interface
     
  5. The banner on the next screen confirms that I have successfully configured rotation and the first rotation is in progress, which enables you to verify that rotation is functioning as expected. Secrets Manager will rotate this credential automatically every 60 days.
     
    Confirmation banner message
     

Summary

I introduced AWS Secrets Manager, explained the key benefits, and showed you how to help meet your compliance requirements by configuring AWS Secrets Manager to rotate database credentials automatically on your behalf. Secrets Manager helps you protect access to your applications, services, and IT resources without the upfront investment and on-going maintenance costs of operating your own secrets management infrastructure. To get started, visit the Secrets Manager console. To learn more, visit Secrets Manager documentation.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the Comments section below. If you have questions about anything in this post, start a new thread on the Secrets Manager forum.

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AWS Secrets Manager: Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely

Post Syndicated from Randall Hunt original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-secrets-manager-store-distribute-and-rotate-credentials-securely/

Today we’re launching AWS Secrets Manager which makes it easy to store and retrieve your secrets via API or the AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) and rotate your credentials with built-in or custom AWS Lambda functions. Managing application secrets like database credentials, passwords, or API Keys is easy when you’re working locally with one machine and one application. As you grow and scale to many distributed microservices, it becomes a daunting task to securely store, distribute, rotate, and consume secrets. Previously, customers needed to provision and maintain additional infrastructure solely for secrets management which could incur costs and introduce unneeded complexity into systems.

AWS Secrets Manager

Imagine that I have an application that takes incoming tweets from Twitter and stores them in an Amazon Aurora database. Previously, I would have had to request a username and password from my database administrator and embed those credentials in environment variables or, in my race to production, even in the application itself. I would also need to have our social media manager create the Twitter API credentials and figure out how to store those. This is a fairly manual process, involving multiple people, that I have to restart every time I want to rotate these credentials. With Secrets Manager my database administrator can provide the credentials in secrets manager once and subsequently rely on a Secrets Manager provided Lambda function to automatically update and rotate those credentials. My social media manager can put the Twitter API keys in Secrets Manager which I can then access with a simple API call and I can even rotate these programmatically with a custom lambda function calling out to the Twitter API. My secrets are encrypted with the KMS key of my choice, and each of these administrators can explicitly grant access to these secrets with with granular IAM policies for individual roles or users.

Let’s take a look at how I would store a secret using the AWS Secrets Manager console. First, I’ll click Store a new secret to get to the new secrets wizard. For my RDS Aurora instance it’s straightforward to simply select the instance and provide the initial username and password to connect to the database.

Next, I’ll fill in a quick description and a name to access my secret by. You can use whatever naming scheme you want here.

Next, we’ll configure rotation to use the Secrets Manager-provided Lambda function to rotate our password every 10 days.

Finally, we’ll review all the details and check out our sample code for storing and retrieving our secret!

Finally I can review the secrets in the console.

Now, if I needed to access these secrets I’d simply call the API.

import json
import boto3
secrets = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
rds = json.dumps(secrets.get_secrets_value("prod/TwitterApp/Database")['SecretString'])
print(rds)

Which would give me the following values:


{'engine': 'mysql',
 'host': 'twitterapp2.abcdefg.us-east-1.rds.amazonaws.com',
 'password': '-)Kw>THISISAFAKEPASSWORD:lg{&sad+Canr',
 'port': 3306,
 'username': 'ranman'}

More than passwords

AWS Secrets Manager works for more than just passwords. I can store OAuth credentials, binary data, and more. Let’s look at storing my Twitter OAuth application keys.

Now, I can define the rotation for these third-party OAuth credentials with a custom AWS Lambda function that can call out to Twitter whenever we need to rotate our credentials.

Custom Rotation

One of the niftiest features of AWS Secrets Manager is custom AWS Lambda functions for credential rotation. This allows you to define completely custom workflows for credentials. Secrets Manager will call your lambda with a payload that includes a Step which specifies which step of the rotation you’re in, a SecretId which specifies which secret the rotation is for, and importantly a ClientRequestToken which is used to ensure idempotency in any changes to the underlying secret.

When you’re rotating secrets you go through a few different steps:

  1. createSecret
  2. setSecret
  3. testSecret
  4. finishSecret

The advantage of these steps is that you can add any kind of approval steps you want for each phase of the rotation. For more details on custom rotation check out the documentation.

Available Now
AWS Secrets Manager is available today in US East (N. Virginia), US East (Ohio), US West (N. California), US West (Oregon), Asia Pacific (Mumbai), Asia Pacific (Seoul), Asia Pacific (Singapore), Asia Pacific (Sydney), Asia Pacific (Tokyo), Canada (Central), EU (Frankfurt), EU (Ireland), EU (London), and South America (São Paulo). Secrets are priced at $0.40 per month per secret and $0.05 per 10,000 API calls. I’m looking forward to seeing more users adopt rotating credentials to secure their applications!

Randall