Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/friday-squid-blogging-squid-inspired-needle-technology.html
Interesting research:
Using jet propulsion inspired by squid, researchers demonstrate a microjet system that delivers medications directly into tissues, matching the effectiveness of traditional needles.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/race-condition-attacks-against-llms.html
These are two attacks against the system components surrounding LLMs:
We propose that LLM Flowbreaking, following jailbreaking and prompt injection, joins as the third on the growing list of LLM attack types. Flowbreaking is less about whether prompt or response guardrails can be bypassed, and more about whether user inputs and generated model outputs can adversely affect these other components in the broader implemented system.
[…]
When confronted with a sensitive topic, Microsoft 365 Copilot and ChatGPT answer questions that their first-line guardrails are supposed to stop. After a few lines of text they halt—seemingly having “second thoughts”—before retracting the original answer (also known as Clawback), and replacing it with a new one without the offensive content, or a simple error message. We call this attack “Second Thoughts.”
[…]
After asking the LLM a question, if the user clicks the Stop button while the answer is still streaming, the LLM will not engage its second-line guardrails. As a result, the LLM will provide the user with the answer generated thus far, even though it violates system policies.
In other words, pressing the Stop button halts not only the answer generation but also the guardrails sequence. If the stop button isn’t pressed, then ‘Second Thoughts’ is triggered.
What’s interesting here is that the model itself isn’t being exploited. It’s the code around the model:
By attacking the application architecture components surrounding the model, and specifically the guardrails, we manipulate or disrupt the logical chain of the system, taking these components out of sync with the intended data flow, or otherwise exploiting them, or, in turn, manipulating the interaction between these components in the logical chain of the application implementation.
In modern LLM systems, there is a lot of code between what you type and what the LLM receives, and between what the LLM produces and what you see. All of that code is exploitable, and I expect many more vulnerabilities to be discovered in the coming year.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/nso-group-spies-on-people-on-behalf-of-governments.html
The Israeli company NSO Group sells Pegasus spyware to countries around the world (including countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, India, Mexico, Morocco and Rwanda). We assumed that those countries use the spyware themselves. Now we’ve learned that that’s not true: that NSO Group employees operate the spyware on behalf of their customers.
Legal documents released in ongoing US litigation between NSO Group and WhatsApp have revealed for the first time that the Israeli cyberweapons maker and not its government customers is the party that “installs and extracts” information from mobile phones targeted by the company’s hacking software.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/what-graykey-can-and-cant-unlock.html
This is from 404 Media:
The Graykey, a phone unlocking and forensics tool that is used by law enforcement around the world, is only able to retrieve partial data from all modern iPhones that run iOS 18 or iOS 18.0.1, which are two recently released versions of Apple’s mobile operating system, according to documents describing the tool’s capabilities in granular detail obtained by 404 Media. The documents do not appear to contain information about what Graykey can access from the public release of iOS 18.1, which was released on October 28.
More information:
Meanwhile, Graykey’s performance with Android phones varies, largely due to the diversity of devices and manufacturers. On Google’s Pixel lineup, Graykey can only partially access data from the latest Pixel 9 when in an “After First Unlock” (AFU) state—where the phone has been unlocked at least once since being powered on.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/security-analysis-of-the-merge-voting-protocol.html
Interesting analysis: An Internet Voting System Fatally Flawed in Creative New Ways.
Abstract: The recently published “MERGE” protocol is designed to be used in the prototype CAC-vote system. The voting kiosk and protocol transmit votes over the internet and then transmit voter-verifiable paper ballots through the mail. In the MERGE protocol, the votes transmitted over the internet are used to tabulate the results and determine the winners, but audits and recounts use the paper ballots that arrive in time. The enunciated motivation for the protocol is to allow (electronic) votes from overseas military voters to be included in preliminary results before a (paper) ballot is received from the voter. MERGE contains interesting ideas that are not inherently unsound; but to make the system trustworthy—to apply the MERGE protocol—would require major changes to the laws, practices, and technical and logistical abilities of U.S. election jurisdictions. The gap between theory and practice is large and unbridgeable for the foreseeable future. Promoters of this research project at DARPA, the agency that sponsored the research, should acknowledge that MERGE is internet voting (election results rely on votes transmitted over the internet except in the event of a full hand count) and refrain from claiming that it could be a component of trustworthy elections without sweeping changes to election law and election administration throughout the U.S.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/friday-squid-blogging-transcriptome-analysis-of-the-indian-squid.html
Lots of details that are beyond me.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/the-scale-of-geoblocking-by-nation.html
Interesting analysis:
We introduce and explore a little-known threat to digital equality and freedomwebsites geoblocking users in response to political risks from sanctions. U.S. policy prioritizes internet freedom and access to information in repressive regimes. Clarifying distinctions between free and paid websites, allowing trunk cables to repressive states, enforcing transparency in geoblocking, and removing ambiguity about sanctions compliance are concrete steps the U.S. can take to ensure it does not undermine its own aims.
The paper: “Digital Discrimination of Users in Sanctioned States: The Case of the Cuba Embargo“:
Abstract: We present one of the first in-depth and systematic end-user centered investigations into the effects of sanctions on geoblocking, specifically in the case of Cuba. We conduct network measurements on the Tranco Top 10K domains and complement our findings with a small-scale user study with a questionnaire. We identify 546 domains subject to geoblocking across all layers of the network stack, ranging from DNS failures to HTTP(S) response pages with a variety of status codes. Through this work, we discover a lack of user-facing transparency; we find 88% of geoblocked domains do not serve informative notice of why they are blocked. Further, we highlight a lack of measurement-level transparency, even among HTTP(S) blockpage responses. Notably, we identify 32 instances of blockpage responses served with 200 OK status codes, despite not returning the requested content. Finally, we note the inefficacy of current improvement strategies and make recommendations to both service providers and policymakers to reduce Internet fragmentation.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/secret-service-tracking-peoples-locations-without-warrant.html
This feels important:
The Secret Service has used a technology called Locate X which uses location data harvested from ordinary apps installed on phones. Because users agreed to an opaque terms of service page, the Secret Service believes it doesn’t need a warrant.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/steve-bellovins-retirement-talk.html
Steve Bellovin is retiring. Here’s his retirement talk, reflecting on his career and what the cybersecurity field needs next.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/why-italy-sells-so-much-spyware.html
Interesting analysis:
Although much attention is given to sophisticated, zero-click spyware developed by companies like Israel’s NSO Group, the Italian spyware marketplace has been able to operate relatively under the radar by specializing in cheaper tools. According to an Italian Ministry of Justice document, as of December 2022 law enforcement in the country could rent spyware for €150 a day, regardless of which vendor they used, and without the large acquisition costs which would normally be prohibitive.
As a result, thousands of spyware operations have been carried out by Italian authorities in recent years, according to a report from Riccardo Coluccini, a respected Italian journalist who specializes in covering spyware and hacking.
Italian spyware is cheaper and easier to use, which makes it more widely used. And Italian companies have been in this market for a long time.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/most-of-2023s-top-exploited-vulnerabilities-were-zero-days.html
Zero-day vulnerabilities are more commonly used, according to the Five Eyes:
Key Findings
In 2023, malicious cyber actors exploited more zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise enterprise networks compared to 2022, allowing them to conduct cyber operations against higher-priority targets. In 2023, the majority of the most frequently exploited vulnerabilities were initially exploited as a zero-day, which is an increase from 2022, when less than half of the top exploited vulnerabilities were exploited as a zero-day.
Malicious cyber actors continue to have the most success exploiting vulnerabilities within two years after public disclosure of the vulnerability. The utility of these vulnerabilities declines over time as more systems are patched or replaced. Malicious cyber actors find less utility from zero-day exploits when international cybersecurity efforts reduce the lifespan of zero-day vulnerabilities.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/friday-squid-blogging-female-gonatus-onyx-squid-carrying-her-eggs.html
Fantastic video of a female Gonatus onyx squid swimming while carrying her egg sack.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/good-essay-on-the-history-of-bad-password-policies.html
Stuart Schechter makes some good points on the history of bad password policies:
Morris and Thompson’s work brought much-needed data to highlight a problem that lots of people suspected was bad, but that had not been studied scientifically. Their work was a big step forward, if not for two mistakes that would impede future progress in improving passwords for decades.
First, was Morris and Thompson’s confidence that their solution, a password policy, would fix the underlying problem of weak passwords. They incorrectly assumed that if they prevented the specific categories of weakness that they had noted, that the result would be something strong. After implementing a requirement that password have multiple characters sets or more total characters, they wrote:
These improvements make it exceedingly difficult to find any individual password. The user is warned of the risks and if he cooperates, he is very safe indeed.
As should be obvious now, a user who chooses “p@ssword” to comply with policies such as those proposed by Morris and Thompson is not very safe indeed. Morris and Thompson assumed their intervention would be effective without testing its efficacy, considering its unintended consequences, or even defining a metric of success to test against. Not only did their hunch turn out to be wrong, but their second mistake prevented anyone from proving them wrong.
That second mistake was convincing sysadmins to hash passwords, so there was no way to evaluate how secure anyone’s password actually was. And it wasn’t until hackers started stealing and publishing large troves of actual passwords that we got the data: people are terrible at generating secure passwords, even with rules.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/new-ios-security-feature-makes-it-harder-for-police-to-unlock-seized-phones.html
Everybody is reporting about a new security iPhone security feature with iOS 18: if the phone hasn’t been used for a few days, it automatically goes into its “Before First Unlock” state and has to be rebooted.
This is a really good security feature. But various police departments don’t like it, because it makes it harder for them to unlock suspects’ phones.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/mapping-license-plate-scanners-in-the-us.html
DeFlock is a crowd-sourced project to map license plate scanners.
It only records the fixed scanners, of course. The mobile scanners on cars are not mapped.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/criminals-exploiting-fbi-emergency-data-requests.html
I’ve been writing about the problem with lawful-access backdoors in encryption for decades now: that as soon as you create a mechanism for law enforcement to bypass encryption, the bad guys will use it too.
Turns out the same thing is true for non-technical backdoors:
The advisory said that the cybercriminals were successful in masquerading as law enforcement by using compromised police accounts to send emails to companies requesting user data. In some cases, the requests cited false threats, like claims of human trafficking and, in one case, that an individual would “suffer greatly or die” unless the company in question returns the requested information.
The FBI said the compromised access to law enforcement accounts allowed the hackers to generate legitimate-looking subpoenas that resulted in companies turning over usernames, emails, phone numbers, and other private information about their users.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/friday-squid-blogging-squid-a-rama-in-des-moines.html
Squid-A-Rama will be in Des Moines at the end of the month.
Visitors will be able to dissect squid, explore fascinating facts about the species, and witness a live squid release conducted by local divers.
How are they doing a live squid release? Simple: this is Des Moines, Washington; not Des Moines, Iowa.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/ai-industry-is-trying-to-subvert-the-definition-of-open-source-ai.html
The Open Source Initiative has published (news article here) its definition of “open source AI,” and it’s terrible. It allows for secret training data and mechanisms. It allows for development to be done in secret. Since for a neural network, the training data is the source code—it’s how the model gets programmed—the definition makes no sense.
And it’s confusing; most “open source” AI models—like LLAMA—are open source in name only. But the OSI seems to have been co-opted by industry players that want both corporate secrecy and the “open source” label. (Here’s one rebuttal to the definition.)
This is worth fighting for. We need a public AI option, and open source—real open source—is a necessary component of that.
But while open source should mean open source, there are some partially open models that need some sort of definition. There is a big research field of privacy-preserving, federated methods of ML model training and I think that is a good thing. And OSI has a point here:
Why do you allow the exclusion of some training data?
Because we want Open Source AI to exist also in fields where data cannot be legally shared, for example medical AI. Laws that permit training on data often limit the resharing of that same data to protect copyright or other interests. Privacy rules also give a person the rightful ability to control their most sensitive information like decisions about their health. Similarly, much of the world’s Indigenous knowledge is protected through mechanisms that are not compatible with later-developed frameworks for rights exclusivity and sharing.
How about we call this “open weights” and not open source?
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/prompt-injection-defenses-against-llm-cyberattacks.html
Interesting research: “Hacking Back the AI-Hacker: Prompt Injection as a Defense Against LLM-driven Cyberattacks“:
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being harnessed to automate cyberattacks, making sophisticated exploits more accessible and scalable. In response, we propose a new defense strategy tailored to counter LLM-driven cyberattacks. We introduce Mantis, a defensive framework that exploits LLMs’ susceptibility to adversarial inputs to undermine malicious operations. Upon detecting an automated cyberattack, Mantis plants carefully crafted inputs into system responses, leading the attacker’s LLM to disrupt their own operations (passive defense) or even compromise the attacker’s machine (active defense). By deploying purposefully vulnerable decoy services to attract the attacker and using dynamic prompt injections for the attacker’s LLM, Mantis can autonomously hack back the attacker. In our experiments, Mantis consistently achieved over 95% effectiveness against automated LLM-driven attacks. To foster further research and collaboration, Mantis is available as an open-source tool: this https URL.
This isn’t the solution, of course. But this sort of thing could be part of a solution.
Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/subverting-llm-coders.html
Really interesting research: “An LLM-Assisted Easy-to-Trigger Backdoor Attack on Code Completion Models: Injecting Disguised Vulnerabilities against Strong Detection“:
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed code completion tasks, providing context-based suggestions to boost developer productivity in software engineering. As users often fine-tune these models for specific applications, poisoning and backdoor attacks can covertly alter the model outputs. To address this critical security challenge, we introduce CODEBREAKER, a pioneering LLM-assisted backdoor attack framework on code completion models. Unlike recent attacks that embed malicious payloads in detectable or irrelevant sections of the code (e.g., comments), CODEBREAKER leverages LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for sophisticated payload transformation (without affecting functionalities), ensuring that both the poisoned data for fine-tuning and generated code can evade strong vulnerability detection. CODEBREAKER stands out with its comprehensive coverage of vulnerabilities, making it the first to provide such an extensive set for evaluation. Our extensive experimental evaluations and user studies underline the strong attack performance of CODEBREAKER across various settings, validating its superiority over existing approaches. By integrating malicious payloads directly into the source code with minimal transformation, CODEBREAKER challenges current security measures, underscoring the critical need for more robust defenses for code completion.
Clever attack, and yet another illustration of why trusted AI is essential.