The exploit works by targeting the installer for the Zoom application, which needs to run with special user permissions in order to install or remove the main Zoom application from a computer. Though the installer requires a user to enter their password on first adding the application to the system, Wardle found that an auto-update function then continually ran in the background with superuser privileges.
When Zoom issued an update, the updater function would install the new package after checking that it had been cryptographically signed by Zoom. But a bug in how the checking method was implemented meant that giving the updater any file with the same name as Zoom’s signing certificate would be enough to pass the test—so an attacker could substitute any kind of malware program and have it be run by the updater with elevated privilege.
It seems that it’s not entirely fixed:
Following responsible disclosure protocols, Wardle informed Zoom about the vulnerability in December of last year. To his frustration, he says an initial fix from Zoom contained another bug that meant the vulnerability was still exploitable in a slightly more roundabout way, so he disclosed this second bug to Zoom and waited eight months before publishing the research.
EDITED TO ADD: Disclosure works. The vulnerability seems to be patched now.
I haven’t written about Apple’s Lockdown Mode yet, mostly because I haven’t delved into the details. This is how Apple describes it:
Lockdown Mode offers an extreme, optional level of security for the very few users who, because of who they are or what they do, may be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats, such as those from NSO Group and other private companies developing state-sponsored mercenary spyware. Turning on Lockdown Mode in iOS 16, iPadOS 16, and macOS Ventura further hardens device defenses and strictly limits certain functionalities, sharply reducing the attack surface that potentially could be exploited by highly targeted mercenary spyware.
At launch, Lockdown Mode includes the following protections:
Messages: Most message attachment types other than images are blocked. Some features, like link previews, are disabled.
Apple services: Incoming invitations and service requests, including FaceTime calls, are blocked if the user has not previously sent the initiator a call or request.
Wired connections with a computer or accessory are blocked when iPhone is locked.
Configuration profiles cannot be installed, and the device cannot enroll into mobile device management (MDM), while Lockdown Mode is turned on.
What Apple has done here is really interesting. It’s common to trade security off for usability, and the results of that are all over Apple’s operating systems—and everywhere else on the Internet. What they’re doing with Lockdown Mode is the reverse: they’re trading usability for security. The result is a user experience with fewer features, but a much smaller attack surface. And they aren’t just removing random features; they’re removing features that are common attack vectors.
There aren’t a lot of people who need Lockdown Mode, but it’s an excellent option for those who do.
One of the foundations of Zero Trust is determining if a user’s device is “healthy” — that it has its operating system up-to-date with the latest security patches, that it’s not jailbroken, that it doesn’t have malware installed, and so on. Traditionally, determining this has required installing software directly onto a user’s device.
Earlier this month, Cloudflare participated in the announcement of an open source standard called a Private Attestation Token. Device manufacturers who support the standard can now supply a Private Attestation Token with any request made by one of their devices. On the IT Administration side, Private Attestation Tokens means that security teams can verify a user’s device before they access a sensitive application — without the need to install any software or collect a user’s device data.
At WWDC 2022, Apple announced Private Attestation Tokens. Today, we’re announcing that Cloudflare Access will support verifying a Private Attestation token. This means that security teams that rely on Cloudflare Access can verify a user’s Apple device before they access a sensitive application — no additional software required.
Determining a “healthy” device
There are many solutions on the market that help security teams determine if a device is “healthy” and corporately managed. What the majority of these solutions have in common is that they require software to be installed directly on the user’s machine. This comes with challenges associated with client software including compatibility issues, version management, and end user support. Many companies have dedicated Mobile Device Management (MDM) tools to manage the software installed on employee machines.
MDM is a proven model, but it is also a challenge to manage — taking a dedicated team in many cases. What’s more, installing client or MDM software is not always possible for contractors, vendors or employees using personal machines. Security teams have to resort to VDI or VPN solutions for external users to securely access corporate applications.
How Private Attestation Tokens verify a device
Private Attestation Tokens leverage the Privacy Pass Protocol, which Cloudflare authored with major device manufacturers, to attest to a device’s health and integrity.
In order for Private Attestation Tokens to work, four parties agree to work in concert with a common framework to generate and exchange anonymous, unforgeable tokens. Without all four parties in the process, PATs won’t work.
An Origin. A website, application, or API that receives requests from a client. When a website receives a request to their origin, the origin must know to look for and request a token from the client making the request. For Cloudflare customers, Cloudflare acts as the origin (on behalf of customers) and handles the requesting and processing of tokens.
A Client. Whatever tool the visitor is using to attempt to access the Origin. This will usually be a web browser or mobile application. In our example, let’s say the client is a mobile Safari Browser.
An Attester. The Attester is who the client asks to prove something (i.e that a mobile device has a valid IMEI) before a token can be issued. In our example below, the Attester is Apple, the device vendor.
An Issuer. The issuer is the only one in the process that actually generates, or issues, a token. The Attester makes an API call to whatever Issuer the Origin has chosen to trust, instructing the Issuer to produce a token. In our case, Cloudflare will also be the Issuer.
We are then able to rely on the attestation from the device manufacturer as a form of validation that a device is in a “healthy” enough state to be allowed access to a sensitive application.
Checking device health without client software
Private Attestation Tokens do not require any additional software to be installed on the user’s device. This is because the “attestation” of device health and validity is attested directly by the device operating system’s manufacturer — in this case, Apple.
This means that a security team can use Cloudflare Access and Private Attestation Tokens to verify if a user is accessing from a “healthy” Apple device before allowing access to a sensitive corporate application. Some checks as part of the attestation include:
Is the device on the latest OS version?
Is the device jailbroken?
Is the window attempting to log in, in focus?
And much more.
Over time, we are working with other device manufacturers to expand device support and what is verified as part of the device attestation process. The attributes that are attested will also continue to expand over time, which means the device verification in Access will only strengthen.
In the next few months, we will move Private Attestation Support in Cloudflare Access to a closed beta. The first version will work for iOS devices and support will expand from there. The only change required will be an updated Access policy, no software will need to be installed. If you would like to be part of the beta program, sign up here today!
This is a new vulnerability against Apple’s M1 chip. Researchers say that it is unpatchable.
Researchers from MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, however, have created a novel hardware attack, which combines memory corruption and speculative execution attacks to sidestep the security feature. The attack shows that pointer authentication can be defeated without leaving a trace, and as it utilizes a hardware mechanism, no software patch can fix it.
The attack, appropriately called “Pacman,” works by “guessing” a pointer authentication code (PAC), a cryptographic signature that confirms that an app hasn’t been maliciously altered. This is done using speculative execution—a technique used by modern computer processors to speed up performance by speculatively guessing various lines of computation—to leak PAC verification results, while a hardware side-channel reveals whether or not the guess was correct.
What’s more, since there are only so many possible values for the PAC, the researchers found that it’s possible to try them all to find the right one.
It’s not obvious how to exploit this vulnerability in the wild, so I’m unsure how important this is. Also, I don’t know if it also applies to Apple’s new M2 chip.
Most email newsletters you get include an invisible “image,” typically a single white pixel, with a unique file name. The server keeps track of every time this “image” is opened and by which IP address. This quirk of internet history means that marketers can track exactly when you open an email and your IP address, which can be used to roughly work out your location.
So, how does Apple Mail stop this? By caching. Apple Mail downloads all images for all emails before you open them. Practically speaking, that means every message downloaded to Apple Mail is marked “read,” regardless of whether you open it. Apples also routes the download through two different proxies, meaning your precise location also can’t be tracked.
Crypto-Gram uses Mailchimp, which has these tracking pixels turned on by default. I turn them off. Normally, Mailchimp requires them to be left on for the first few mailings, presumably to prevent abuse. The company waived that requirement for me.
Ever since Apple introduced AirTags, security people have warned that they could be used for stalking. But while there have been a bunch of anecdotal stories, this is the first vaguely scientific survey:
Motherboard requested records mentioning AirTags in a recent eight month period from dozens of the country’s largest police departments. We obtained records from eight police departments.
Of the 150 total police reports mentioning AirTags, in 50 cases women called the police because they started getting notifications that their whereabouts were being tracked by an AirTag they didn’t own. Of those, 25 could identify a man in their lives — ex-partners, husbands, bosses — who they strongly suspected planted the AirTags on their cars in order to follow and harass them. Those women reported that current and former intimate partners — the most likely people to harm women overall — are using AirTags to stalk and harass them.
Eight police departments over eight months yielded fifty cases. And that’s only where the victim (1) realized they were being tracked by someone else’s AirTag, and (2) contacted the police. That’s going to multiply out to a lot of AirTag stalking in the country, and the world.
EDITED TO ADD (4/13): AirTags are being used by Ukrainians to track goods stolen by Russians and, as a nice side effect, to track the movements of Russian troops.
The malicious uses of these technologies are scary:
Police reportedly arrived on the scene last week and found the man crouched beside the woman’s passenger side door. According to the police, the man had, at some point, wrapped his Apple Watch across the spokes of the woman’s passenger side front car wheel and then used the Watch to track her movements. When police eventually confronted him, he admitted the Watch was his. Now, he’s reportedly being charged with attaching an electronic tracking device to the woman’s vehicle.
iCloud Private Relay is a new Internet privacy service from Apple that allows users with iOS 15, iPadOS 15, or macOS Monterey on their devices and an iCloud+ subscription, to connect to the Internet and browse with Safari in a more secure and private way. Cloudflare is proud to work with Apple to operate portions of Private Relay infrastructure.
The design of the iCloud Private Relay system ensures that no single party handling user data has complete information on both who the user is and what they are trying to access.
To do this, Private Relay uses modern encryption and transport mechanisms to relay traffic from user devices through Apple and partner infrastructure before sending traffic to the destination website.
Here’s a diagram depicting what connection metadata is available to who when not using Private Relay to browse the Internet:
Let’s look at what happens when we add Private Relay to the mix:
By adding two “relays” (labeled “Ingress Proxy” and “Egress Proxy” above), connection metadata is split:
The user’s original IP address is visible to the access network (e.g. the coffee shop you’re sitting in, or your home ISP) and the first relay (operated by Apple), but the server or website name is encrypted and not visible to either.
The first relay hands encrypted data to a second relay (e.g. Cloudflare), but is unable to see “inside” the traffic to Cloudflare.
Cloudflare-operated relays know only that it is receiving traffic from a Private Relay user, but not specifically who or their client IP address. Cloudflare relays then forward traffic on to the destination server.
Splitting connections in this way prevents websites from seeing user IP addresses and minimizes how much information entities “on path” can collect on user behavior.
Much more extensive information on how Private Relay works is available from Apple, including in the whitepaper “iCloud Private Relay Overview” (pdf).
Cloudflare’s role as a ‘second relay’
As mentioned above, Cloudflare functions as a second relay in the iCloud Private Relay system. We’re well suited to the task — Cloudflare operates one of the largest, fastest networks in the world. Our infrastructure makes sure traffic reaches every network in the world quickly and reliably, no matter where in the world a user is connecting from.
We’re also adept at building and working with modern encryption and transport protocols, including TLS 1.3 and QUIC. QUIC, and closely related MASQUE, are the technologies that enable Private Relay to efficiently move data between multiple relay hops without incurring performance penalties.
The same building blocks that power Cloudflare products were used to build support for Private Relay: our network, 184.108.40.206, Cloudflare Workers, and software like quiche, our open-source QUIC (and now MASQUE) protocol handling library, which now includes proxy support.
I’m a website operator. What do I need to do to properly handle iCloud Private Relay traffic?
We’ve gone out of our way to ensure the use of iCloud Private Relay does not have any noticeable impact on your websites, APIs, and other content you serve on the web.
Ensuring geolocation accuracy
IP addresses are often used by website operators to “geolocate” users, with user locations being used to show content specific to certain locations (e.g. search results) or to otherwise customize user experiences. Private Relay is designed to preserve IP address to geolocation mapping accuracy, even while preventing tracking and fingerprinting.
Preserving the ability to derive rough user location ensures that users with Private Relay enabled are able to:
See place search and other locally relevant content when they interact with geography-specific content without precise location sharing enabled.
Consume content subject to licensing restrictions limiting which regions have access to it (e.g. live sports broadcasts and similar rights-restricted content).
One of the key “acceptance tests” we think about when thinking about geolocating users is the “local pizza test”: with location services disabled, are the results returned for the search term “pizza near me” geographically relevant? Because of the geography preserving and IP address management systems we operate, they are!
At a high-level, here’s how it works:
Apple relays geolocate user IP addresses and translate them into a “geohash”. Geohashes are compact representations of latitude and longitude. The system includes protections to ensure geohashes cannot be spoofed by clients, and operates with reduced precision to ensure user privacy is maintained. Apple relays do not send user IP addresses onward.
Cloudflare relays maintain a pool of IP addresses for exclusive use by Private Relay. These IP addresses have been registered with geolocation database providers to correspond to specific cities around the world. When a Private Relay user connects and presents the previously determined geohash, the closest matching IP address is selected.
Servers see an IP address that corresponds to the original user IP address’s location, without obtaining information that may be used to identify the specific user.
In most parts of the world, Private Relay supports geolocation to the nearest city by default. If users prefer to be located at more coarse location granularity, the option to locate based on country and timezone is available in Private Relay settings.
If your website relies on geolocation of client IP addresses to power or modify user experiences, please ensure your geolocation database is kept up to date. Apple and Cloudflare work directly with every major IP to geolocation provider to ensure they have an accurate mapping of Private Relay egress IP addresses (which present to your server as the client IP address) to geography. These mappings may change from time to time. Using the most up-to-date version of your provider’s database will ensure the most accurate geolocation results for all users, including those using Private Relay.
In addition to making sure your geolocation databases are up-to-date, even greater location accuracy and precision can be obtained by ensuring your origin is reachable via IPv6. Private Relay egress nodes prefer IPv6 whenever AAAA DNS records are available, and use IPv6 egress IP addresses that are geolocated with greater precision than their IPv4 equivalents. This means you can geolocate users to more specific locations (without compromising user privacy) and deliver more relevant content to users as a result.
If you’re a website operator using Cloudflare to protect and accelerate your site, no action is needed from you. Our geolocation feeds used to enrich client requests with location metadata are kept up-to-date and include the information needed to geolocate users using iCloud Private Relay.
Delivering high performance user experiences
One of the more counterintuitive things about performance on the Internet is that adding intermediate network “hops” between a user and a server can often speed up overall network performance, rather than slow it down, if those intermediate hops are well-connected and tuned for speed.
The networks that power iCloud Private Relay are exceptionally well-connected to other networks around the world, and we spend considerable effort squeezing every last ounce of performance out of our systems every day. We even have automated systems, like Argo Smart Routing, that take data on how the Internet is performing and find the best paths across it to ensure consistent performance even in the face of Internet congestion and other “weather”.
Using Private Relay to reach websites instead of going directly to the origin server can result in significant, measured decreases in page load time for clients using Private Relay vs those that are not. That’s pretty neat: increased privacy does not come at the price of reduced page load and render performance when using Private Relay.
Limiting reliance on IP addresses in fraud and bot management systems
To ensure that iCloud Private Relay users have good experiences interacting with your website, you should ensure that any systems that rely on IP address as a signal or way of indexing users properly accommodate many users originating from one or a handful of addresses.
Private Relay’s concentration of users behind a given IP address is similar to commonly deployed enterprise web gateways or carrier grade network address translation (CG-NAT) systems.
As explained in Apple technical documentation, “Private Relay is designed to ensure only valid Apple devices and accounts in good standing are allowed to use the service. Websites that use IP addresses to enforce fraud prevention and anti-abuse measures can trust that connections through Private Relay have been validated at the account and device level by Apple.” Because of these advanced device and user authorization steps, you might consider allowlisting Private Relay IP addresses explicitly. Should you wish to do so, Private Relay’s egress IP addresses are available in CSV form here.
If you as a server operator are interested in managing traffic from users using systems like iCloud Private Relay or similar NAT infrastructure, consider constructing rules using user level identifiers like cookies, and other metadata present including geography.
For Cloudflare customers, our rate limiting and bot management capabilities are well suited to handle traffic from systems like Private Relay. Cloudflare automatically detects when IP addresses are likely to be used by multiple users, tuning our machine learning and other security heuristics accordingly. Additionally, our WAF includes functionality specifically designed to manage traffic originating from shared IP addresses.
Understanding traffic flows
As discussed above, IP addresses used by iCloud Private Relay are specific to the service. However, network and server operators (including Cloudflare customers) studying their traffic and logs may notice large amounts of user traffic arriving from Cloudflare’s network, AS13335. These traffic flows originating from AS13335 include forward proxied traffic from iCloud Private Relay, our enterprise web gateway products, and other products including WARP, our consumer VPN.
In the case of Cloudflare customers, traffic traversing our network to reach your Cloudflare proxied property is included in all usage and billing metrics as traffic from any Internet user would be.
I operate a corporate or school network and I’d like to know more about iCloud Private Relay
CIOs and network administrators may have questions about how iCloud Private Relay interacts with their corporate networks, and how they might be able to use similar technologies to make their networks more secure. Apple’s document, “Prepare Your Network or Web Server for iCloud Private Relay” covers network operator scenarios in detail.
Most enterprise networks will not have to do anything to support Private Relay traffic. If the end-to-end encrypted nature of the system creates compliance challenges, local networks can block the use of Private Relay for devices connected to them.
Corporate customers of Cloudflare One services can put in place the name resolution blocks needed to disable Private Relay through their DNS filtering dashboard. Cloudflare One, Cloudflare’s corporate network security suite, includes Gateway, built on the same network and codebase that powers iCloud Private Relay.
iCloud Private Relay makes browsing the Internet more private and secure
iCloud Private Relay is an exciting step forward in preserving user privacy on the Internet, without forcing compromises in performance.
A Berlin-based company has developed an AirTag clone that bypasses Apple’s anti-stalker security systems. Source code for these AirTag clones is available online.
So now we have several problems with the system. Apple’s anti-stalker security only works with iPhones. (Apple wrote an Android app that can detect AirTags, but how many people are going to download it?) And now non-AirTags can piggyback on Apple’s system without triggering the alarms.
Apple didn’t think this through nearly as well as it claims to have. I think the general problem is one that I have written about before: designers just don’t have intimate threats in mind when building these systems.
There are two bills working their way through Congress that would force companies like Apple to allow competitive app stores. Apple hates this, since it would break its monopoly, and it’s making a variety of security arguments to bolster its argument. I have written a rebuttal:
I would like to address some of the unfounded security concerns raised about these bills. It’s simply not true that this legislation puts user privacy and security at risk. In fact, it’s fairer to say that this legislation puts those companies’ extractive business-models at risk. Their claims about risks to privacy and security are both false and disingenuous, and motivated by their own self-interest and not the public interest. App store monopolies cannot protect users from every risk, and they frequently prevent the distribution of important tools that actually enhance security. Furthermore, the alleged risks of third-party app stores and “side-loading” apps pale in comparison to their benefits. These bills will encourage competition, prevent monopolist extortion, and guarantee users a new right to digital self-determination.
A German activist is trying to track down a secret government intelligence agency. One of her research techniques is to mail Apple AirTags to see where they actually end up:
Wittmann says that everyone she spoke to denied being part of this intelligence agency. But what she describes as a “good indicator,” would be if she could prove that the postal address for this “federal authority” actually leads to the intelligence service’s apparent offices.
“To understand where mail ends up,” she writes (in translation), “[you can do] a lot of manual research. Or you can simply send a small device that regularly transmits its current position (a so-called AirTag) and see where it lands.”
She sent a parcel with an AirTag and watched through Apple’s Find My system as it was delivered via the Berlin sorting center to a sorting office in Cologne-Ehrenfeld. And then appears at the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Cologne.
So an AirTag addressed to a telecommunications authority based in one part of Germany, ends up in the offices of an intelligence agency based in another part of the country.
Wittmann’s research is also now detailed in the German Wikipedia entry for the federal telecommunications service. It recounts how following her original discovery in December 2021, subsequent government press conferences have denied that there is such a federal telecommunications service at all.
We’ll dissect the iOS system and show how it’s possible to alter a shutdown event, tricking a user that got infected into thinking that the phone has been powered off, but in fact, it’s still running. The “NoReboot” approach simulates a real shutdown. The user cannot feel a difference between a real shutdown and a “fake shutdown.” There is no user-interface or any button feedback until the user turns the phone back “on.”
Historically, when malware infects an iOS device, it can be removed simply by restarting the device, which clears the malware from memory.
However, this technique hooks the shutdown and reboot routines to prevent them from ever happening, allowing malware to achieve persistence as the device is never actually turned off.
I see this as another manifestation of the security problems that stem from all controls becoming software controls. Back when the physical buttons actually did things — like turn the power, the Wi-Fi, or the camera on and off — you could actually know that something was on or off. Now that software controls those functions, you can never be sure.
Researchers now believe AirTags, which are equipped with Bluetooth technology, could be revealing a more widespread problem of tech-enabled tracking. They emit a digital signal that can be detected by devices running Apple’s mobile operating system. Those devices then report where an AirTag has last been seen. Unlike similar tracking products from competitors such as Tile, Apple added features to prevent abuse, including notifications like the one Ms. Estrada received and automatic beeping. (Tile plans to release a feature to prevent the tracking of people next year, a spokeswoman for that company said.)
A person who doesn’t own an iPhone might have a harder time detecting an unwanted AirTag. AirTags aren’t compatible with Android smartphones. Earlier this month, Apple released an Android app that can scan for AirTags — but you have to be vigilant enough to download it and proactively use it.
Apple declined to say if it was working with Google on technology that would allow Android phones to automatically detect its trackers.
People who said they have been tracked have called Apple’s safeguards insufficient. Ms. Estrada said she was notified four hours after her phone first noticed the rogue gadget. Others said it took days before they were made aware of an unknown AirTag. According to Apple, the timing of the alerts can vary depending on the iPhone’s operating system and location settings.
Since September 2021, officers have investigated five incidents where suspects have placed small tracking devices on high-end vehicles so they can later locate and steal them. Brand name “air tags” are placed in out-of-sight areas of the target vehicles when they are parked in public places like malls or parking lots. Thieves then track the targeted vehicles to the victim’s residence, where they are stolen from the driveway.
Thieves typically use tools like screwdrivers to enter the vehicles through the driver or passenger door, while ensuring not to set off alarms. Once inside, an electronic device, typically used by mechanics to reprogram the factory setting, is connected to the onboard diagnostics port below the dashboard and programs the vehicle to accept a key the thieves have brought with them. Once the new key is programmed, the vehicle will start and the thieves drive it away.
When Apple first released AirTags earlier this year, concerns immediately sprung up about nefarious use cases for the covert trackers. Apple responded with a slew of anti-stalking measures, but those are more intended for keeping people safe than cars. An AirTag away from its owner will sound an alarm, letting anyone nearby know that it’s been left behind, but it can take up to 24 hours for that alarm to go off — more than enough time to nab a car in the dead of night.
Piling more on NSO Group’s legal troubles, Apple is suing it:
The complaint provides new information on how NSO Group infected victims’ devices with its Pegasus spyware. To prevent further abuse and harm to its users, Apple is also seeking a permanent injunction to ban NSO Group from using any Apple software, services, or devices.
NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware is favored by totalitarian governments around the world, who use it to hack Apple phones and computers.
Apple’s legal complaint provides new information on NSO Group’s FORCEDENTRY, an exploit for a now-patched vulnerability previously used to break into a victim’s Apple device and install the latest version of NSO Group’s spyware product, Pegasus. The exploit was originally identified by the Citizen Lab, a research group at the University of Toronto.
The spyware was used to attack a small number of Apple users worldwide with dangerous malware and spyware. Apple’s lawsuit seeks to ban NSO Group from further harming individuals by using Apple’s products and services. The lawsuit also seeks redress for NSO Group’s flagrant violations of US federal and state law, arising out of its efforts to target and attack Apple and its users.
NSO Group and its clients devote the immense resources and capabilities of nation-states to conduct highly targeted cyberattacks, allowing them to access the microphone, camera, and other sensitive data on Apple and Android devices. To deliver FORCEDENTRY to Apple devices, attackers created Apple IDs to send malicious data to a victim’s device — allowing NSO Group or its clients to deliver and install Pegasus spyware without a victim’s knowledge. Though misused to deliver FORCEDENTRY, Apple servers were not hacked or compromised in the attacks.
This follows in the footsteps of Facebook, which is also suing NSO Group and demanding a similar prohibition. And while the idea of the intermediary suing the attacker, and not the victim, is somewhat novel, I think it makes a lot of sense. I have a law journal article about to be published with Jon Penney on the Facebook case.
Google researchers discovered a MacOS zero-day exploit being used against Hong Kong activists. It was a “watering hole” attack, which means the malware was hidden in a legitimate website. Users visiting that website would get infected.
Google’s researchers were able to trigger the exploits and study them by visiting the websites compromised by the hackers. The sites served both iOS and MacOS exploit chains, but the researchers were only able to retrieve the MacOS one. The zero-day exploit was similar to another in-the-wild vulnerability analyzed by another Google researcher in the past, according to the report.
In addition, the zero-day exploit used in this hacking campaign is “identical” to an exploit previously found by cybersecurity research group Pangu Lab, Huntley said. Pangu Lab’s researchers presented the exploit at a security conference in China in April of this year, a few months before hackers used it against Hong Kong users.
The exploit was discovered in August. Apple patched the vulnerability in September. China is, of course, the obvious suspect, given the victims.
Even before Apple made its announcement, law enforcement shifted their battle for backdoors to client-side scanning. The idea is that they wouldn’t touch the cryptography, but instead eavesdrop on communications and systems before encryption or after decryption. It’s not a cryptographic backdoor, but it’s still a backdoor — and brings with it all the insecurities of a backdoor.
I’m part of a group of cryptographers that has just published a paper discussing the security risks of such a system. (It’s substantially the same group that wrote a similar paper about key escrow in 1997, and other “exceptional access” proposals in 2015. We seem to have to do this every decade or so.) In our paper, we examine both the efficacy of such a system and its potential security failures, and conclude that it’s a really bad idea.
We had been working on the paper well before Apple’s announcement. And while we do talk about Apple’s system, our focus is really on the idea in general.
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