Citizen Lab has uncovered a coordinated AI-enabled influence operation against the Iranian government, probably conducted by Israel.
Key Findings
A coordinated network of more than 50 inauthentic X profiles is conducting an AI-enabled influence operation. The network, which we refer to as “PRISONBREAK,” is spreading narratives inciting Iranian audiences to revolt against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
While the network was created in 2023, almost all of its activity was conducted starting in January 2025, and continues to the present day.
The profiles’ activity appears to have been synchronized, at least in part, with the military campaign that the Israel Defense Forces conducted against Iranian targets in June 2025.
While organic engagement with PRISONBREAK’s content appears to be limited, some of the posts achieved tens of thousands of views. The operation seeded such posts to large public communities on X, and possibly also paid for their promotion.
After systematically reviewing alternative explanations, we assess that the hypothesis most consistent with the available evidence is that an unidentified agency of the Israeli government, or a sub-contractor working under its close supervision, is directly conducting the operation.
Paragon is an Israeli spyware company, increasingly in the news (now that NSO Group seems to be waning). “Graphite” is the name of its product. Citizen Lab caught it spying on multiple European journalists with a zero-click iOS exploit:
On April 29, 2025, a select group of iOS users were notified by Apple that they were targeted with advanced spyware. Among the group were two journalists that consented for the technical analysis of their cases. The key findings from our forensic analysis of their devices are summarized below:
Our analysis finds forensic evidence confirming with high confidence that both a prominent European journalist (who requests anonymity), and Italian journalist Ciro Pellegrino, were targeted with Paragon’s Graphite mercenary spyware.
We identify an indicator linking both cases to the same Paragon operator.
Apple confirms to us that the zero-click attack deployed in these cases was mitigated as of iOS 18.3.1 and has assigned the vulnerability CVE-2025-43200.
Our analysis is ongoing.
The list of confirmed Italian cases is in the report’s appendix. Italy has recently admitted to using the spyware.
A jury has awarded WhatsApp $167 million in punitive damages in a case the company brought against Israel-based NSO Group for exploiting a software vulnerability that hijacked the phones of thousands of users.
Citizen Lab has a new report on Paragon’s spyware:
Key Findings:
Introducing Paragon Solutions. Paragon Solutions was founded in Israel in 2019 and sells spyware called Graphite. The company differentiates itself by claiming it has safeguards to prevent the kinds of spyware abuses that NSO Group and other vendors are notorious for.
Infrastructure Analysis of Paragon Spyware. Based on a tip from a collaborator, we mapped out server infrastructure that we attribute to Paragon’s Graphite spyware tool. We identified a subset of suspected Paragon deployments, including in Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Israel, and Singapore.
Identifying a Possible Canadian Paragon Customer. Our investigation surfaced potential links between Paragon Solutions and the Canadian Ontario Provincial Police, and found evidence of a growing ecosystem of spyware capability among Ontario-based police services.
Helping WhatsApp Catch a Zero-Click. We shared our analysis of Paragon’s infrastructure with Meta, who told us that the details were pivotal to their ongoing investigation into Paragon. WhatsApp discovered and mitigated an active Paragon zero-click exploit, and later notified over 90 individuals who it believed were targeted, including civil society members in Italy.
Android Forensic Analysis: Italian Cluster. We forensically analyzed multiple Android phones belonging to Paragon targets in Italy (an acknowledged Paragon user) who were notified by WhatsApp. We found clear indications that spyware had been loaded into WhatsApp, as well as other apps on their devices.
A Related Case of iPhone Spyware in Italy. We analyzed the iPhone of an individual who worked closely with confirmed Android Paragon targets. This person received an Apple threat notification in November 2024, but no WhatsApp notification. Our analysis showed an attempt to infect the device with novel spyware in June 2024. We shared details with Apple, who confirmed they had patched the attack in iOS 18.
Other Surveillance Tech Deployed Against The Same Italian Cluster. We also note 2024 warnings sent by Meta to several individuals in the same organizational cluster, including a Paragon victim, suggesting the need for further scrutiny into other surveillance technology deployed against these individuals.
A judge has found that NSO Group, maker of the Pegasus spyware, has violated the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by hacking WhatsApp in order to spy on people using it.
The Israeli company NSO Group sells Pegasus spyware to countries around the world (including countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, India, Mexico, Morocco and Rwanda). We assumed that those countries use the spyware themselves. Now we’ve learned that that’s not true: that NSO Group employees operate the spyware on behalf of their customers.
Legal documents released in ongoing US litigation between NSO Group and WhatsApp have revealed for the first time that the Israeli cyberweapons maker and not its government customers is the party that “installs and extracts” information from mobile phones targeted by the company’s hacking software.
The Washington Post has a long and detailed story about the operation that’s well worth reading (alternate version here).
The sales pitch came from a marketing official trusted by Hezbollah with links to Apollo. The marketing official, a woman whose identity and nationality officials declined to reveal, was a former Middle East sales representative for the Taiwanese firm who had established her own company and acquired a license to sell a line of pagers that bore the Apollo brand. Sometime in 2023, she offered Hezbollah a deal on one of the products her firm sold: the rugged and reliable AR924.
“She was the one in touch with Hezbollah, and explained to them why the bigger pager with the larger battery was better than the original model,” said an Israeli official briefed on details of the operation. One of the main selling points about the AR924 was that it was “possible to charge with a cable. And the batteries were longer lasting,” the official said.
As it turned out, the actual production of the devices was outsourced and the marketing official had no knowledge of the operation and was unaware that the pagers were physically assembled in Israel under Mossad oversight, officials said. Mossad’s pagers, each weighing less than three ounces, included a unique feature: a battery pack that concealed a tiny amount of a powerful explosive, according to the officials familiar with the plot.
In a feat of engineering, the bomb component was so carefully hidden as to be virtually undetectable, even if the device was taken apart, the officials said. Israeli officials believe that Hezbollah did disassemble some of the pagers and may have even X-rayed them.
Also invisible was Mossad’s remote access to the devices. An electronic signal from the intelligence service could trigger the explosion of thousands of the devices at once. But, to ensure maximum damage, the blast could also be triggered by a special two-step procedure required for viewing secure messages that had been encrypted.
“You had to push two buttons to read the message,” an official said. In practice, that meant using both hands.
Also read Bunnie Huang’s essay on what it means to live in a world where people can turn IoT devices into bombs. His conclusion:
Not all things that could exist should exist, and some ideas are better left unimplemented. Technology alone has no ethics: the difference between a patch and an exploit is the method in which a technology is disclosed. Exploding batteries have probably been conceived of and tested by spy agencies around the world, but never deployed en masse because while it may achieve a tactical win, it is too easy for weaker adversaries to copy the idea and justify its re-deployment in an asymmetric and devastating retaliation.
However, now that I’ve seen it executed, I am left with the terrifying realization that not only is it feasible, it’s relatively easy for any modestly-funded entity to implement. Not just our allies can do this—a wide cast of adversaries have this capability in their reach, from nation-states to cartels and gangs, to shady copycat battery factories just looking for a big payday (if chemical suppliers can moonlight in illicit drugs, what stops battery factories from dealing in bespoke munitions?). Bottom line is: we should approach the public policy debate around this assuming that someday, we could be victims of exploding batteries, too. Turning everyday objects into fragmentation grenades should be a crime, as it blurs the line between civilian and military technologies.
I fear that if we do not universally and swiftly condemn the practice of turning everyday gadgets into bombs, we risk legitimizing a military technology that can literally bring the front line of every conflict into your pocket, purse or home.
(UPDATED on April 15, 2024, with information regarding the Palestinian territories.)
As news came on Saturday, April 13, 2024, that Iran was launching a coordinated retaliatory attack on Israel, we took a closer look at the potential impact on Internet traffic and attacks. So far, we have seen some traffic shifts in both Israel and Iran, but we haven’t seen a coordinated large cyberattack on Israeli domains protected by Cloudflare.
First, let’s discuss general Internet traffic patterns. Following reports of attacks with drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, confirmed by Israeli and US authorities, Internet traffic in Israel surged after 02:00 local time on Saturday, April 13 (23:00 UTC on April 12), peaking at 75% higher than in the previous week around 02:30 (23:30 UTC) as people sought news updates. This traffic spike was predominantly driven by mobile device usage, accounting for 62% of all traffic from Israel at that time. Traffic remained higher than usual during Sunday.
Around that time, at 02:00 local time (23:00 UTC), the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) posted on X that sirens were sounding across Israel because of an imminent attack from Iran.
(April 15 UPDATE: the Palestinian territories related part). At around the same time, 01:25 local time (22:45 UTC), when the sirens were sounding in Israel, we observed not an increase, but a clear drop in traffic in Palestinian territories. The noticeable drop was seen in all of the Palestinian governorates, although it was a bigger drop in the West Bank, than in the Gaza Strip.
Usually, based on our past observations, drops in traffic unrelated to connectivity issues can occur when people pause their online activities for some reason (an eclipse or war, for example) or turn to television for news updates instead of the Internet (common during election days when TVs broadcast the latest exit polls).
Here’s the noticeable HTTP requests drop in Hebron, one of the most populated states of the Palestinian territories, part of the West Bank. The noticeable drops in the blue line from the previous week are related to the Ramadan, and the Iftar, the first meal after sunset that breaks the fast and often also a family or community event. Ramadan ended on Tuesday, April 9, 2024.
Meanwhile, in Iran, there has been a noticeable decline in traffic over the past few days in the early morning hours, around 04:30 local time (01:00 UTC), as compared to the previous week. However, this decline appears to be linked to the conclusion of Ramadan, which ended April 9. As we have writtenbefore, during Ramadan, there is typically an increase in traffic around 04:00 in most Muslim countries for Suhur, the pre-dawn meal. Nevertheless, traffic was higher in Iran early in the morning of Sunday, April 14 than the previous day, between 02:30 local time (23:00 UTC on April 13) and 07:00 (03:30 UTC).
When analyzing application layer attacks, we haven’t observed any significant changes in those targeting Israel over the past few days. However, over the past month, the Government Administration sector emerged as the most targeted industry, with blocked DDoS requests accounting for 46% of all traffic directed towards it.
Based on Cloudflare data, we have not yet seen a coordinated cyberattack campaign targeting Israel. However, we saw a clear uptick in attacks back in October 2023, after the Israel-Hamas war started, as we noted in a blog post at that time.
Welcome to the sixteenth edition of Cloudflare’s DDoS Threat Report. This edition covers DDoS trends and key findings for the fourth and final quarter of the year 2023, complete with a review of major trends throughout the year.
What are DDoS attacks?
DDoS attacks, or distributed denial-of-service attacks, are a type of cyber attack that aims to disrupt websites and online services for users, making them unavailable by overwhelming them with more traffic than they can handle. They are similar to car gridlocks that jam roads, preventing drivers from getting to their destination.
There are three main types of DDoS attacks that we will cover in this report. The first is an HTTP request intensive DDoS attack that aims to overwhelm HTTP servers with more requests than they can handle to cause a denial of service event. The second is an IP packet intensive DDoS attack that aims to overwhelm in-line appliances such as routers, firewalls, and servers with more packets than they can handle. The third is a bit-intensive attack that aims to saturate and clog the Internet link causing that ‘gridlock’ that we discussed. In this report, we will highlight various techniques and insights on all three types of attacks.
Previous editions of the report can be found here, and are also available on our interactive hub, Cloudflare Radar. Cloudflare Radar showcases global Internet traffic, attacks, and technology trends and insights, with drill-down and filtering capabilities for zooming in on insights of specific countries, industries, and service providers. Cloudflare Radar also offers a free API allowing academics, data sleuths, and other web enthusiasts to investigate Internet usage across the globe.
To learn how we prepare this report, refer to our Methodologies.
Key findings
In Q4, we observed a 117% year-over-year increase in network-layer DDoS attacks, and overall increased DDoS activity targeting retail, shipment and public relations websites during and around Black Friday and the holiday season.
In Q4, DDoS attack traffic targeting Taiwan registered a 3,370% growth, compared to the previous year, amidst the upcoming general election and reported tensions with China. The percentage of DDoS attack traffic targeting Israeli websites grew by 27% quarter-over-quarter, and the percentage of DDoS attack traffic targeting Palestinian websites grew by 1,126% quarter-over-quarter — as the military conflict between Israel and Hamas continues.
In Q4, there was a staggering 61,839% surge in DDoS attack traffic targeting Environmental Services websites compared to the previous year, coinciding with the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 28).
For an in-depth analysis of these key findings and additional insights that could redefine your understanding of current cybersecurity challenges, read on!
Illustration of a DDoS attack
Hyper-volumetric HTTP DDoS attacks
2023 was the year of uncharted territories. DDoS attacks reached new heights — in size and sophistication. The wider Internet community, including Cloudflare, faced a persistent and deliberately engineered campaign of thousands of hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks at never before seen rates.
These attacks were highly complex and exploited an HTTP/2 vulnerability. Cloudflare developed purpose-built technology to mitigate the vulnerability’s effect and worked with others in the industry to responsibly disclose it.
As part of this DDoS campaign, in Q3 our systems mitigated the largest attack we’ve ever seen — 201 million requests per second (rps). That’s almost 8 times larger than our previous 2022 record of 26 million rps.
Largest HTTP DDoS attacks as seen by Cloudflare, by year
Growth in network-layer DDoS attacks
After the hyper-volumetric campaign subsided, we saw an unexpected drop in HTTP DDoS attacks. Overall in 2023, our automated defenses mitigated over 5.2 million HTTP DDoS attacks consisting of over 26 trillion requests. That averages at 594 HTTP DDoS attacks and 3 billion mitigated requests every hour.
Despite these astronomical figures, the amount of HTTP DDoS attack requests actually declined by 20% compared to 2022. This decline was not just annual but was also observed in 2023 Q4 where the number of HTTP DDoS attack requests decreased by 7% YoY and 18% QoQ.
On the network-layer, we saw a completely different trend. Our automated defenses mitigated 8.7 million network-layer DDoS attacks in 2023. This represents an 85% increase compared to 2022.
In 2023 Q4, Cloudflare’s automated defenses mitigated over 80 petabytes of network-layer attacks. On average, our systems auto-mitigated 996 network-layer DDoS attacks and 27 terabytes every hour. The number of network-layer DDoS attacks in 2023 Q4 increased by 175% YoY and 25% QoQ.
HTTP and Network-layer DDoS attacks by quarter
DDoS attacks increase during and around COP 28
In the final quarter of 2023, the landscape of cyber threats witnessed a significant shift. While the Cryptocurrency sector was initially leading in terms of the volume of HTTP DDoS attack requests, a new target emerged as a primary victim. The Environmental Services industry experienced an unprecedented surge in HTTP DDoS attacks, with these attacks constituting half of all its HTTP traffic. This marked a staggering 618-fold increase compared to the previous year, highlighting a disturbing trend in the cyber threat landscape.
This surge in cyber attacks coincided with COP 28, which ran from November 30th to December 12th, 2023. The conference was a pivotal event, signaling what many considered the ‘beginning of the end’ for the fossil fuel era. It was observed that in the period leading up to COP 28, there was a noticeable spike in HTTP attacks targeting Environmental Services websites. This pattern wasn’t isolated to this event alone.
Looking back at historical data, particularly during COP 26 and COP 27, as well as other UN environment-related resolutions or announcements, a similar pattern emerges. Each of these events was accompanied by a corresponding increase in cyber attacks aimed at Environmental Services websites.
In February and March 2023, significant environmental events like the UN’s resolution on climate justice and the launch of United Nations Environment Programme’s Freshwater Challenge potentially heightened the profile of environmental websites, possibly correlating with an increase in attacks on these sites.
This recurring pattern underscores the growing intersection between environmental issues and cyber security, a nexus that is increasingly becoming a focal point for attackers in the digital age.
DDoS attacks and Iron Swords
It’s not just UN resolutions that trigger DDoS attacks. Cyber attacks, and particularly DDoS attacks, have long been a tool of war and disruption. We witnessed an increase in DDoS attack activity in the Ukraine-Russia war, and now we’re also witnessing it in the Israel-Hamas war. We first reported the cyber activity in our report Cyber attacks in the Israel-Hamas war, and we continued to monitor the activity throughout Q4.
DDoS attacks targeting Israeli and Palestinian websites, by industry
Relative to each region’s traffic, the Palestinian territories was the second most attacked region by HTTP DDoS attacks in Q4. Over 10% of all HTTP requests towards Palestinian websites were DDoS attacks, a total of 1.3 billion DDoS requests — representing a 1,126% increase in QoQ. 90% of these DDoS attacks targeted Palestinian Banking websites. Another 8% targeted Information Technology and Internet platforms.
Top attacked Palestinian industries
Similarly, our systems automatically mitigated over 2.2 billion HTTP DDoS requests targeting Israeli websites. While 2.2 billion represents a decrease compared to the previous quarter and year, it did amount to a larger percentage out of the total Israel-bound traffic. This normalized figure represents a 27% increase QoQ but a 92% decrease YoY. Notwithstanding the larger amount of attack traffic, Israel was the 77th most attacked region relative to its own traffic. It was also the 33rd most attacked by total volume of attacks, whereas the Palestinian territories was 42nd.
Of those Israeli websites attacked, Newspaper & Media were the main target — receiving almost 40% of all Israel-bound HTTP DDoS attacks. The second most attacked industry was the Computer Software industry. The Banking, Financial Institutions, and Insurance (BFSI) industry came in third.
Top attacked Israeli industries
On the network layer, we see the same trend. Palestinian networks were targeted by 470 terabytes of attack traffic — accounting for over 68% of all traffic towards Palestinian networks. Surpassed only by China, this figure placed the Palestinian territories as the second most attacked region in the world, by network-layer DDoS attack, relative to all Palestinian territories-bound traffic. By absolute volume of traffic, it came in third. Those 470 terabytes accounted for approximately 1% of all DDoS traffic that Cloudflare mitigated.
Israeli networks, though, were targeted by only 2.4 terabytes of attack traffic, placing it as the 8th most attacked country by network-layer DDoS attacks (normalized). Those 2.4 terabytes accounted for almost 10% of all traffic towards Israeli networks.
Top attacked countries
When we turned the picture around, we saw that 3% of all bytes that were ingested in our Israeli-based data centers were network-layer DDoS attacks. In our Palestinian-based data centers, that figure was significantly higher — approximately 17% of all bytes.
On the application layer, we saw that 4% of HTTP requests originating from Palestinian IP addresses were DDoS attacks, and almost 2% of HTTP requests originating from Israeli IP addresses were DDoS attacks as well.
Main sources of DDoS attacks
In the third quarter of 2022, China was the largest source of HTTP DDoS attack traffic. However, since the fourth quarter of 2022, the US took the first place as the largest source of HTTP DDoS attacks and has maintained that undesirable position for five consecutive quarters. Similarly, our data centers in the US are the ones ingesting the most network-layer DDoS attack traffic — over 38% of all attack bytes.
HTTP DDoS attacks originating from China and the US by quarter
Together, China and the US account for a little over a quarter of all HTTP DDoS attack traffic in the world. Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, and Argentina account for the next twenty-five percent.
Top source of HTTP DDoS attacks
These large figures usually correspond to large markets. For this reason, we also normalize the attack traffic originating from each country by comparing their outbound traffic. When we do this, we often get small island nations or smaller market countries that a disproportionate amount of attack traffic originates from. In Q4, 40% of Saint Helena’s outbound traffic were HTTP DDoS attacks — placing it at the top. Following the ‘remote volcanic tropical island’, Libya came in second, Swaziland (also known as Eswatini) in third. Argentina and Egypt follow in fourth and fifth place.
Top source of HTTP DDoS attacks with respect to each country’s traffic
On the network layer, Zimbabwe came in first place. Almost 80% of all traffic we ingested in our Zimbabwe-based data center was malicious. In second place, Paraguay, and Madagascar in third.
Top source of Network-layer DDoS attacks with respect to each country’s traffic
Most attacked industries
By volume of attack traffic, Cryptocurrency was the most attacked industry in Q4. Over 330 billion HTTP requests targeted it. This figure accounts for over 4% of all HTTP DDoS traffic for the quarter. The second most attacked industry was Gaming & Gambling. These industries are known for being coveted targets and attract a lot of traffic and attacks.
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks
On the network layer, the Information Technology and Internet industry was the most attacked — over 45% of all network-layer DDoS attack traffic was aimed at it. Following far behind were the Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI), Gaming & Gambling, and Telecommunications industries.
Top industries targeted by Network-layer DDoS attacks
To change perspectives, here too, we normalized the attack traffic by the total traffic for a specific industry. When we do that, we get a different picture.
Top attacked industries by HTTP DDoS attacks, by region
We already mentioned in the beginning of this report that the Environmental Services industry was the most attacked relative to its own traffic. In second place was the Packaging and Freight Delivery industry, which is interesting because of its timely correlation with online shopping during Black Friday and the winter holiday season. Purchased gifts and goods need to get to their destination somehow, and it seems as though attackers tried to interfere with that. On a similar note, DDoS attacks on retail companies increased by 23% compared to the previous year.
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks with respect to each industry’s traffic
On the network layer, Public Relations and Communications was the most targeted industry — 36% of its traffic was malicious. This too is very interesting given its timing. Public Relations and Communications companies are usually linked to managing public perception and communication. Disrupting their operations can have immediate and widespread reputational impacts which becomes even more critical during the Q4 holiday season. This quarter often sees increased PR and communication activities due to holidays, end-of-year summaries, and preparation for the new year, making it a critical operational period — one that some may want to disrupt.
Top industries targeted by Network-layer DDoS attacks with respect to each industry’s traffic
Most attacked countries and regions
Singapore was the main target of HTTP DDoS attacks in Q4. Over 317 billion HTTP requests, 4% of all global DDoS traffic, were aimed at Singaporean websites. The US followed closely in second and Canada in third. Taiwan came in as the fourth most attacked region — amidst the upcoming general elections and the tensions with China. Taiwan-bound attacks in Q4 traffic increased by 847% compared to the previous year, and 2,858% compared to the previous quarter. This increase is not limited to the absolute values. When normalized, the percentage of HTTP DDoS attack traffic targeting Taiwan relative to all Taiwan-bound traffic also significantly increased. It increased by 624% quarter-over-quarter and 3,370% year-over-year.
Top targeted countries by HTTP DDoS attacks
While China came in as the ninth most attacked country by HTTP DDoS attacks, it’s the number one most attacked country by network-layer attacks. 45% of all network-layer DDoS traffic that Cloudflare mitigated globally was China-bound. The rest of the countries were so far behind that it is almost negligible.
Top targeted countries by Network-layer DDoS attacks
When normalizing the data, Iraq, Palestinian territories, and Morocco take the lead as the most attacked regions with respect to their total inbound traffic. What’s interesting is that Singapore comes up as fourth. So not only did Singapore face the largest amount of HTTP DDoS attack traffic, but that traffic also made up a significant amount of the total Singapore-bound traffic. By contrast, the US was second most attacked by volume (per the application-layer graph above), but came in the fiftieth place with respect to the total US-bound traffic.
Top targeted countries by HTTP DDoS attacks with respect to each country’s traffic
Similar to Singapore, but arguably more dramatic, China is both the number one most attacked country by network-layer DDoS attack traffic, and also with respect to all China-bound traffic. Almost 86% of all China-bound traffic was mitigated by Cloudflare as network-layer DDoS attacks. The Palestinian territories, Brazil, Norway, and again Singapore followed with large percentages of attack traffic.
Top targeted countries by Network-layer DDoS attacks with respect to each country’s traffic
Attack vectors and attributes
The majority of DDoS attacks are short and small relative to Cloudflare’s scale. However, unprotected websites and networks can still suffer disruption from short and small attacks without proper inline automated protection — underscoring the need for organizations to be proactive in adopting a robust security posture.
In 2023 Q4, 91% of attacks ended within 10 minutes, 97% peaked below 500 megabits per second (mbps), and 88% never exceeded 50 thousand packets per second (pps).
Two out of every 100 network-layer DDoS attacks lasted more than an hour, and exceeded 1 gigabit per second (gbps). One out of every 100 attacks exceeded 1 million packets per second. Furthermore, the amount of network-layer DDoS attacks exceeding 100 million packets per second increased by 15% quarter-over-quarter.
DDoS attack stats you should know
One of those large attacks was a Mirai-botnet attack that peaked at 160 million packets per second. The packet per second rate was not the largest we’ve ever seen. The largest we’ve ever seen was 754 million packets per second. That attack occurred in 2020, and we have yet to see anything larger.
This more recent attack, though, was unique in its bits per second rate. This was the largest network-layer DDoS attack we’ve seen in Q4. It peaked at 1.9 terabits per second and originated from a Mirai botnet. It was a multi-vector attack, meaning it combined multiple attack methods. Some of those methods included UDP fragments flood, UDP/Echo flood, SYN Flood, ACK Flood, and TCP malformed flags.
This attack targeted a known European Cloud Provider and originated from over 18 thousand unique IP addresses that are assumed to be spoofed. It was automatically detected and mitigated by Cloudflare’s defenses.
This goes to show that even the largest attacks end very quickly. Previous large attacks we’ve seen ended within seconds — underlining the need for an in-line automated defense system. Though still rare, attacks in the terabit range are becoming more and more prominent.
1.9 Terabit per second Mirai DDoS attacks
The use of Mirai-variant botnets is still very common. In Q4, almost 3% of all attacks originate from Mirai. Though, of all attack methods, DNS-based attacks remain the attackers’ favorite. Together, DNS Floods and DNS Amplification attacks account for almost 53% of all attacks in Q4. SYN Flood follows in second and UDP floods in third. We’ll cover the two DNS attack types here, and you can visit the hyperlinks to learn more about UDP and SYN floods in our Learning Center.
DNS floods and amplification attacks
DNS floods and DNS amplification attacks both exploit the Domain Name System (DNS), but they operate differently. DNS is like a phone book for the Internet, translating human-friendly domain names like “www.cloudfare.com” into numerical IP addresses that computers use to identify each other on the network.
Simply put, DNS-based DDoS attacks comprise the method computers and servers used to identify one another to cause an outage or disruption, without actually ‘taking down’ a server. For example, a server may be up and running, but the DNS server is down. So clients won’t be able to connect to it and will experience it as an outage.
A DNS flood attack bombards a DNS server with an overwhelming number of DNS queries. This is usually done using a DDoS botnet. The sheer volume of queries can overwhelm the DNS server, making it difficult or impossible for it to respond to legitimate queries. This can result in the aforementioned service disruptions, delays or even an outage for those trying to access the websites or services that rely on the targeted DNS server.
On the other hand, a DNS amplification attack involves sending a small query with a spoofed IP address (the address of the victim) to a DNS server. The trick here is that the DNS response is significantly larger than the request. The server then sends this large response to the victim’s IP address. By exploiting open DNS resolvers, the attacker can amplify the volume of traffic sent to the victim, leading to a much more significant impact. This type of attack not only disrupts the victim but also can congest entire networks.
In both cases, the attacks exploit the critical role of DNS in network operations. Mitigation strategies typically include securing DNS servers against misuse, implementing rate limiting to manage traffic, and filtering DNS traffic to identify and block malicious requests.
Top attack vectors
Amongst the emerging threats we track, we recorded a 1,161% increase in ACK-RST Floods as well as a 515% increase in CLDAP floods, and a 243% increase in SPSS floods, in each case as compared to last quarter. Let’s walk through some of these attacks and how they’re meant to cause disruption.
Top emerging attack vectors
ACK-RST floods
An ACK-RST Flood exploits the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) by sending numerous ACK and RST packets to the victim. This overwhelms the victim’s ability to process and respond to these packets, leading to service disruption. The attack is effective because each ACK or RST packet prompts a response from the victim’s system, consuming its resources. ACK-RST Floods are often difficult to filter since they mimic legitimate traffic, making detection and mitigation challenging.
CLDAP floods
CLDAP (Connectionless Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) is a variant of LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol). It’s used for querying and modifying directory services running over IP networks. CLDAP is connectionless, using UDP instead of TCP, making it faster but less reliable. Because it uses UDP, there’s no handshake requirement which allows attackers to spoof the IP address thus allowing attackers to exploit it as a reflection vector. In these attacks, small queries are sent with a spoofed source IP address (the victim’s IP), causing servers to send large responses to the victim, overwhelming it. Mitigation involves filtering and monitoring unusual CLDAP traffic.
SPSS floods
Floods abusing the SPSS (Source Port Service Sweep) protocol is a network attack method that involves sending packets from numerous random or spoofed source ports to various destination ports on a targeted system or network. The aim of this attack is two-fold: first, to overwhelm the victim’s processing capabilities, causing service disruptions or network outages, and second, it can be used to scan for open ports and identify vulnerable services. The flood is achieved by sending a large volume of packets, which can saturate the victim’s network resources and exhaust the capacities of its firewalls and intrusion detection systems. To mitigate such attacks, it’s essential to leverage in-line automated detection capabilities.
Cloudflare is here to help – no matter the attack type, size, or duration
Cloudflare’s mission is to help build a better Internet, and we believe that a better Internet is one that is secure, performant, and available to all. No matter the attack type, the attack size, the attack duration or the motivation behind the attack, Cloudflare’s defenses stand strong. Since we pioneered unmetered DDoS Protection in 2017, we’ve made and kept our commitment to make enterprise-grade DDoS protection free for all organizations alike — and of course, without compromising performance. This is made possible by our unique technology and robust network architecture.
It’s important to remember that security is a process, not a single product or flip of a switch. Atop of our automated DDoS protection systems, we offer comprehensive bundled features such as firewall, bot detection, API protection, and caching to bolster your defenses. Our multi-layered approach optimizes your security posture and minimizes potential impact. We’ve also put together a list of recommendations to help you optimize your defenses against DDoS attacks, and you can follow our step-by-step wizards to secure your applications and prevent DDoS attacks. And, if you’d like to benefit from our easy to use, best-in-class protection against DDoS and other attacks on the Internet, you can sign up — for free! — at cloudflare.com. If you’re under attack, register or call the cyber emergency hotline number shown here for a rapid response.
Paragon Solutions is yet another Israeli spyware company. Their product is called “Graphite,” and is a lot like NSO Group’s Pegasus. And Paragon is working with what seems to be US approval:
American approval, even if indirect, has been at the heart of Paragon’s strategy. The company sought a list of allied nations that the US wouldn’t object to seeing deploy Graphite. People with knowledge of the matter suggested 35 countries are on that list, though the exact nations involved could not be determined. Most were in the EU and some in Asia, the people said.
Remember when NSO Group was banned in the US a year and a half ago? The Drug Enforcement Agency uses Graphite.
We’re never going to reduce the power of these cyberweapons arms merchants by going after them one by one. We need to deal with the whole industry. And we’re not going to do it as long as the democracies of the world use their products as well.
Based on an analysis of samples shared with us by Microsoft Threat Intelligence, we developed indicators that enabled us to identify at least five civil society victims of QuaDream’s spyware and exploits in North America, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Victims include journalists, political opposition figures, and an NGO worker. We are not naming the victims at this time.
We also identify traces of a suspected iOS 14 zero-click exploit used to deploy QuaDream’s spyware. The exploit was deployed as a zero-day against iOS versions 14.4 and 14.4.2, and possibly other versions. The suspected exploit, which we call ENDOFDAYS, appears to make use of invisible iCloud calendar invitations sent from the spyware’s operator to victims.
We performed Internet scanning to identify QuaDream servers, and in some cases were able to identify operator locations for QuaDream systems. We detected systems operated from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ghana, Israel, Mexico, Romania, Singapore, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Uzbekistan.
I don’t know if they sold off their products before closing down. One presumes that they did, or will.
Today we mark the International Holocaust Remembrance Day. We commemorate the victims that were robbed of their possessions, stripped of their rights, deported, starved, dehumanized and murdered by the Nazis and their accomplices. During the Holocaust and in the events that led to it, the Nazis exterminated one third of the European Jewish population. Six million Jews, along with countless other members of minority and disability groups, were murdered because the Nazis believed they were inferior.
Seventy eight years later, after the liberation of the infamous Auschwitz death camp, antisemitism still burns with hatred. According to a study performed by the Campaign Against Antisemitism organization on data provided by the UK Home Office, Jews are 500% more likely to be targeted by hate crime than any other faith group per capita.
From Cloudflare’s vantage point we can point to distressing findings as well. In 2021, cyberattacks on Holocaust educational websites doubled year over year. In 2021, one out of every 100 HTTP requests sent to Holocaust educational websites behind Cloudflare was part of an attack. In 2022, the share of those cyber attacks grew again by 49% YoY. Cyberattacks represented 1.6% of all traffic to Holocaust educational websites (almost 1 out of every 50 HTTP requests), as can be seen in the chart below in 2022.
We’re representing cyberattacks as a percentage to normalize natural growth of traffic to websites, mitigation methods and other potential data biases. But even if we look at the raw numbers, between 2021 and 2022, the absolute cyberattack traffic (in HTTP requests) that targeted Holocaust education websites behind Cloudflare grew by 640% in contrast to the total growth of 397% in the number of all requests (attack and non-attack HTTP requests).
Share of cyberattack targeting Holocaust education websites
(Please note that the graph starts in 95% in order to provide better visibility into the share of attacks)
The threat that Holocaust educational websites face is one that many other non-profit organizations face. In fact, in our most recent DDoS Trends report, non-profit organizations were the sixth most targeted industry. Ten percent of all traffic to non-profit websites behind Cloudflare was DDoS attack traffic.
Top industries targeted by HTTP DDoS attacks in 2022 Q4
However, nonprofits such as Holocaust educational organizations might not always have the resources to fend off attacks. For this reason, we provide free protection to at-risk groups across the world. We do this through Project Galileo. It helps keep vulnerable websites online. It provides free cyber security services for groups working in the arts, human rights, civil society, journalism, or democracy. As detailed in our recent Impact Report, in 2022, through Project Galileo, we protected vulnerable websites from an average of 59M cyber threats every day.
If you’re representing a vulnerable public interest group and want to protect your website with Project Galileo, please follow the steps and apply here. While you wait to hear back, you can also get started with our Free plan.
At Cloudflare, we remember and never forget.
Here at Cloudflare, some of us are descendants of Holocaust survivors. My grandparents escaped Nazi-occupied Poland after the German invasion. Sadly, my grandparents — as other elderly survivors, have already passed. I grew up hearing about their stories of bravery — and of deep torment. It’s not always easy to hear these stories, but we must — especially in times like these when war in Europe has been ongoing for almost a year now. We have the responsibility to ensure the world remembers and never forgets the atrocities of the Holocaust and what antisemitism, racism and hatred in general can lead to.
To this extent, a few months ago, here at the Cloudflare London office, we had the honor of hosting Janine Webber, recipient of the British Empire Medal (BEM) in an event hosted by Judeoflare, Cloudflare’s Jewish employee resource group. The event was made possible due to our partnership with the Holocaust Education Trust. And so in a fully packed auditorium and an oversubscribed Zoom call, we listen to Janine’s story of survival and bravery first hand. We asked questions and we learned.
We’re privileged to be able to share her story here with all of you via Cloudflare TV.
The Greek journalist Thanasis Koukakis was spied on by his own government, with a commercial spyware product called “Predator.” That product is sold by a company in North Macedonia called Cytrox, which is in turn owned by an Israeli company called Intellexa.
The lawsuit filed by Koukakis takes aim at Intellexa and its executive, alleging a criminal breach of privacy and communication laws, reports Haaretz. The founder of Intellexa, a former Israeli intelligence commander named Taj Dilian, is listed as one of the defendants in the suit, as is another shareholder, Sara Hemo, and the firm itself. The objective of the suit, Koukakis says, is to spur an investigation to determine whether a criminal indictment should be brought against the defendants.
Why does it always seem to be Israel? The world would be a much safer place if that government stopped this cyberweapons arms trade from inside its borders.
Ronan Farrow has a long article in the New Yorker on NSO Group, which includes the news that someone — probably Spain — used the software to spy on domestic Catalonian separatists.
During the Holocaust, and in the events that led to it, the Nazis exterminated one third of the European Jewish population. Six million Jews, along with countless other members of minority and disability groups, were murdered because the Nazis believed they were inferior.
Cloudflare’s Project Galileo provides free protection to at-risk groups across the world including Holocaust educational and remembrance websites. During the past year alone, Cloudflare mitigated over a quarter of a million cyber threats launched against Holocaust-related websites.
Antisemitism and the Final Solution
In the Second World War and the years leading up to it, antisemitism served as the foundation of racist laws and fueled violent Pogroms against Jews. The tipping point was a night of violence known as the Kristallnacht (“Night of Broken Glass”). Jews and other minority groups were outlawed, dehumanized, persecuted and killed. Jewish businesses were boycotted, Jewish books burned and synagogues destroyed. Jews, Roma and other “enemies of the Reich” were forced into closed ghettos and concentration camps. Finally, as part of the Final Solution for the Jewish Question, Germany outlined a policy to deliberately and systematically exterminate the Jewish race in what came to be known as the Holocaust.
As part of the Final Solution, the Nazis deployed mobile killing units. Jews were taken to forests near their villages, forced to dig mass graves, undress, and then shot — falling into the mass graves they dug. This was the first step. However, this was “inefficient”. More “efficient” solutions were engineered using deadly gas. Eventually, six main extermination camps were established. They were extremely “efficient” at exterminating humans. Initially, the Nazis experimented with gas vans for mass extermination. Later, they built and operated gas chambers which could kill more humans and do it faster. After being gassed, prisoners would load the bodies into ovens in crematoriums to be burned. In one of the larger death camps, Auschwitz-Birkenau, more than one million Jews were murdered — some 865,000 were gassed and burned on arrival.
It is through education that we will defeat bigotry and racism, and we will do our part at Cloudflare — through education and by supporting Holocaust educational organizations.
“Our response to ignorance must be education” – United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres
Supporting Holocaust educational organizations with Project Galileo
As part of Project Galileo, we currently provide free security and performance products to more than 1,500 organizations in 111 countries. These organizations are targeted by cyber attacks due to their critical work. These groups include human rights defenders, independent media and journalists, and organizations that work in strengthening democracy. Among them are organizations dedicated to educating about the horrors of the Holocaust, and preserving and telling the stories of the victims and survivors of the Holocaust to younger and future generations.
Cyber attacks on Holocaust-related websites
Over the past year, we’ve seen cyber attacks on Holocaust-related websites gradually increase throughout the year. These attacks include mostly application-layer attacks that were automatically detected and mitigated by Cloudflare’s Web Application Firewall and DDoS Protection systems.
In May 2021, cyber attacks on Holocaust-related websites peaked as they increased by 263% compared to their monthly average.
Applying to Project Galileo
Cloudflare’s mission is to help build a better Internet. Part of this mission includes protecting free expression online for vulnerable groups.
The Internet can be a powerful tool in this matter. However, organizations often face attacks from powerful and entrenched opponents, yet operate on limited budgets and lack the resources to secure themselves against malicious traffic intended to silence them. If they are silenced, the Internet stops fulfilling its promise.
To combat the threats, Cloudflare’s Project Galileo provides robust security and performance products for at-risk public interest websites at no cost. Application to Project Galileo is open to any vulnerable public interest website. You can apply via our partners or apply directly to Project Galileo if you don’t have any affiliation with our trusted partners.
A note from Cloudflare’s Jewish employees
Many of us, like myself, are descendants of Holocaust survivors. My grandparents fled from Nazi-occupied Poland to survive. Sadly, my grandparents — as other elderly survivors, are no longer with us. Many of us have faced antisemitism in various forms. Together, we are part of Cloudflare’s Employee Resource Group for Cloudflare’s Jewish community: Judeoflare. We have a responsibility to make sure the world remembers and never forgets the atrocities of the Holocaust and what racism and antisemitism can lead to.
NSO Group’s descent into Internet pariah status continues. Its Pegasus spyware was used against nine US State Department employees. We don’t know which NSO Group customer trained the spyware on the US. But the company does:
NSO Group said in a statement on Thursday that it did not have any indication their tools were used but canceled access for the relevant customers and would investigate based on the Reuters inquiry.
“If our investigation shall show these actions indeed happened with NSO’s tools, such customer will be terminated permanently and legal actions will take place,” said an NSO spokesperson, who added that NSO will also “cooperate with any relevant government authority and present the full information we will have.”
Candiru is a secretive Israel-based company that sells spyware exclusively to governments. Reportedly, their spyware can infect and monitor iPhones, Androids, Macs, PCs, and cloud accounts.
Using Internet scanning we identified more than 750 websites linked to Candiru’s spyware infrastructure. We found many domains masquerading as advocacy organizations such as Amnesty International, the Black Lives Matter movement, as well as media companies, and other civil-society themed entities.
We identified a politically active victim in Western Europe and recovered a copy of Candiru’s Windows spyware.
Working with Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) we analyzed the spyware, resulting in the discovery of CVE-2021-31979 and CVE-2021-33771 by Microsoft, two privilege escalation vulnerabilities exploited by Candiru. Microsoft patched both vulnerabilities on July 13th, 2021.
As part of their investigation, Microsoft observed at least 100 victims in Palestine, Israel, Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, Spain, United Kingdom, Turkey, Armenia, and Singapore. Victims include human rights defenders, dissidents, journalists, activists, and politicians.
We provide a brief technical overview of the Candiru spyware’s persistence mechanism and some details about the spyware’s functionality.
Candiru has made efforts to obscure its ownership structure, staffing, and investment partners. Nevertheless, we have been able to shed some light on those areas in this report.
We’re not going to be able to secure the Internet until we deal with the companies that engage in the international cyber-arms trade.
The collective thoughts of the interwebz
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