Tag Archives: policies

Federate Database User Authentication Easily with IAM and Amazon Redshift

Post Syndicated from Thiyagarajan Arumugam original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/federate-database-user-authentication-easily-with-iam-and-amazon-redshift/

Managing database users though federation allows you to manage authentication and authorization procedures centrally. Amazon Redshift now supports database authentication with IAM, enabling user authentication though enterprise federation. No need to manage separate database users and passwords to further ease the database administration. You can now manage users outside of AWS and authenticate them for access to an Amazon Redshift data warehouse. Do this by integrating IAM authentication and a third-party SAML-2.0 identity provider (IdP), such as AD FS, PingFederate, or Okta. In addition, database users can also be automatically created at their first login based on corporate permissions.

In this post, I demonstrate how you can extend the federation to enable single sign-on (SSO) to the Amazon Redshift data warehouse.

SAML and Amazon Redshift

AWS supports Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0, which is an open standard for identity federation used by many IdPs. SAML enables federated SSO, which enables your users to sign in to the AWS Management Console. Users can also make programmatic calls to AWS API actions by using assertions from a SAML-compliant IdP. For example, if you use Microsoft Active Directory for corporate directories, you may be familiar with how Active Directory and AD FS work together to enable federation. For more information, see the Enabling Federation to AWS Using Windows Active Directory, AD FS, and SAML 2.0 AWS Security Blog post.

Amazon Redshift now provides the GetClusterCredentials API operation that allows you to generate temporary database user credentials for authentication. You can set up an IAM permissions policy that generates these credentials for connecting to Amazon Redshift. Extending the IAM authentication, you can configure the federation of AWS access though a SAML 2.0–compliant IdP. An IAM role can be configured to permit the federated users call the GetClusterCredentials action and generate temporary credentials to log in to Amazon Redshift databases. You can also set up policies to restrict access to Amazon Redshift clusters, databases, database user names, and user group.

Amazon Redshift federation workflow

In this post, I demonstrate how you can use a JDBC– or ODBC-based SQL client to log in to the Amazon Redshift cluster using this feature. The SQL clients used with Amazon Redshift JDBC or ODBC drivers automatically manage the process of calling the GetClusterCredentials action, retrieving the database user credentials, and establishing a connection to your Amazon Redshift database. You can also use your database application to programmatically call the GetClusterCredentials action, retrieve database user credentials, and connect to the database. I demonstrate these features using an example company to show how different database users accounts can be managed easily using federation.

The following diagram shows how the SSO process works:

  1. JDBC/ODBC
  2. Authenticate using Corp Username/Password
  3. IdP sends SAML assertion
  4. Call STS to assume role with SAML
  5. STS Returns Temp Credentials
  6. Use Temp Credentials to get Temp cluster credentials
  7. Connect to Amazon Redshift using temp credentials

Walkthrough

Example Corp. is using Active Directory (idp host:demo.examplecorp.com) to manage federated access for users in its organization. It has an AWS account: 123456789012 and currently manages an Amazon Redshift cluster with the cluster ID “examplecorp-dw”, database “analytics” in us-west-2 region for its Sales and Data Science teams. It wants the following access:

  • Sales users can access the examplecorp-dw cluster using the sales_grp database group
  • Sales users access examplecorp-dw through a JDBC-based SQL client
  • Sales users access examplecorp-dw through an ODBC connection, for their reporting tools
  • Data Science users access the examplecorp-dw cluster using the data_science_grp database group.
  • Partners access the examplecorp-dw cluster and query using the partner_grp database group.
  • Partners are not federated through Active Directory and are provided with separate IAM user credentials (with IAM user name examplecorpsalespartner).
  • Partners can connect to the examplecorp-dw cluster programmatically, using language such as Python.
  • All users are automatically created in Amazon Redshift when they log in for the first time.
  • (Optional) Internal users do not specify database user or group information in their connection string. It is automatically assigned.
  • Data warehouse users can use SSO for the Amazon Redshift data warehouse using the preceding permissions.

Step 1:  Set up IdPs and federation

The Enabling Federation to AWS Using Windows Active Directory post demonstrated how to prepare Active Directory and enable federation to AWS. Using those instructions, you can establish trust between your AWS account and the IdP and enable user access to AWS using SSO.  For more information, see Identity Providers and Federation.

For this walkthrough, assume that this company has already configured SSO to their AWS account: 123456789012 for their Active Directory domain demo.examplecorp.com. The Sales and Data Science teams are not required to specify database user and group information in the connection string. The connection string can be configured by adding SAML Attribute elements to your IdP. Configuring these optional attributes enables internal users to conveniently avoid providing the DbUser and DbGroup parameters when they log in to Amazon Redshift.

The user-name attribute can be set up as follows, with a user ID (for example, nancy) or an email address (for example. [email protected]):

<Attribute Name="https://redshift.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/DbUser">  
  <AttributeValue>user-name</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>

The AutoCreate attribute can be defined as follows:

<Attribute Name="https://redshift.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/AutoCreate">
    <AttributeValue>true</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>

The sales_grp database group can be included as follows:

<Attribute Name="https://redshift.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/DbGroups">
    <AttributeValue>sales_grp</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>

For more information about attribute element configuration, see Configure SAML Assertions for Your IdP.

Step 2: Create IAM roles for access to the Amazon Redshift cluster

The next step is to create IAM policies with permissions to call GetClusterCredentials and provide authorization for Amazon Redshift resources. To grant a SQL client the ability to retrieve the cluster endpoint, region, and port automatically, include the redshift:DescribeClusters action with the Amazon Redshift cluster resource in the IAM role.  For example, users can connect to the Amazon Redshift cluster using a JDBC URL without the need to hardcode the Amazon Redshift endpoint:

Previous:  jdbc:redshift://endpoint:port/database

Current:  jdbc:redshift:iam://clustername:region/dbname

Use IAM to create the following policies. You can also use an existing user or role and assign these policies. For example, if you already created an IAM role for IdP access, you can attach the necessary policies to that role. Here is the policy created for sales users for this example:

Sales_DW_IAM_Policy

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "redshift:DescribeClusters"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:cluster:examplecorp-dw"
            ]
        },
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "redshift:GetClusterCredentials"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:cluster:examplecorp-dw",
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbuser:examplecorp-dw/${redshift:DbUser}"
            ],
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "aws:userid": "AIDIODR4TAW7CSEXAMPLE:${redshift:DbUser}@examplecorp.com"
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "redshift:CreateClusterUser"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbuser:examplecorp-dw/${redshift:DbUser}"
            ]
        },
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "redshift:JoinGroup"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbgroup:examplecorp-dw/sales_grp"
            ]
        }
    ]
}

The policy uses the following parameter values:

  • Region: us-west-2
  • AWS Account: 123456789012
  • Cluster name: examplecorp-dw
  • Database group: sales_grp
  • IAM role: AIDIODR4TAW7CSEXAMPLE
Policy Statement Description
{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":[
"redshift:DescribeClusters"
],
"Resource":[
"arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:cluster:examplecorp-dw"
]
}

Allow users to retrieve the cluster endpoint, region, and port automatically for the Amazon Redshift cluster examplecorp-dw. This specification uses the resource format arn:aws:redshift:region:account-id:cluster:clustername. For example, the SQL client JDBC can be specified in the format jdbc:redshift:iam://clustername:region/dbname.

For more information, see Amazon Resource Names.

{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":[
"redshift:GetClusterCredentials"
],
"Resource":[
"arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:cluster:examplecorp-dw",
"arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbuser:examplecorp-dw/${redshift:DbUser}"
],
"Condition":{
"StringEquals":{
"aws:userid":"AIDIODR4TAW7CSEXAMPLE:${redshift:DbUser}@examplecorp.com"
}
}
}

Generates a temporary token to authenticate into the examplecorp-dw cluster. “arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbuser:examplecorp-dw/${redshift:DbUser}” restricts the corporate user name to the database user name for that user. This resource is specified using the format: arn:aws:redshift:region:account-id:dbuser:clustername/dbusername.

The Condition block enforces that the AWS user ID should match “AIDIODR4TAW7CSEXAMPLE:${redshift:DbUser}@examplecorp.com”, so that individual users can authenticate only as themselves. The AIDIODR4TAW7CSEXAMPLE role has the Sales_DW_IAM_Policy policy attached.

{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":[
"redshift:CreateClusterUser"
],
"Resource":[
"arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbuser:examplecorp-dw/${redshift:DbUser}"
]
}
Automatically creates database users in examplecorp-dw, when they log in for the first time. Subsequent logins reuse the existing database user.
{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":[
"redshift:JoinGroup"
],
"Resource":[
"arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbgroup:examplecorp-dw/sales_grp"
]
}
Allows sales users to join the sales_grp database group through the resource “arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbgroup:examplecorp-dw/sales_grp” that is specified in the format arn:aws:redshift:region:account-id:dbgroup:clustername/dbgroupname.

Similar policies can be created for Data Science users with access to join the data_science_grp group in examplecorp-dw. You can now attach the Sales_DW_IAM_Policy policy to the role that is mapped to IdP application for SSO.
 For more information about how to define the claim rules, see Configuring SAML Assertions for the Authentication Response.

Because partners are not authorized using Active Directory, they are provided with IAM credentials and added to the partner_grp database group. The Partner_DW_IAM_Policy is attached to the IAM users for partners. The following policy allows partners to log in using the IAM user name as the database user name.

Partner_DW_IAM_Policy

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "redshift:DescribeClusters"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:cluster:examplecorp-dw"
            ]
        },
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "redshift:GetClusterCredentials"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:cluster:examplecorp-dw",
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbuser:examplecorp-dw/${redshift:DbUser}"
            ],
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "redshift:DbUser": "${aws:username}"
                }
            }
        },
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "redshift:CreateClusterUser"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbuser:examplecorp-dw/${redshift:DbUser}"
            ]
        },
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "redshift:JoinGroup"
            ],
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:redshift:us-west-2:123456789012:dbgroup:examplecorp-dw/partner_grp"
            ]
        }
    ]
}

redshift:DbUser“: “${aws:username}” forces an IAM user to use the IAM user name as the database user name.

With the previous steps configured, you can now establish the connection to Amazon Redshift through JDBC– or ODBC-supported clients.

Step 3: Set up database user access

Before you start connecting to Amazon Redshift using the SQL client, set up the database groups for appropriate data access. Log in to your Amazon Redshift database as superuser to create a database group, using CREATE GROUP.

Log in to examplecorp-dw/analytics as superuser and create the following groups and users:

CREATE GROUP sales_grp;
CREATE GROUP datascience_grp;
CREATE GROUP partner_grp;

Use the GRANT command to define access permissions to database objects (tables/views) for the preceding groups.

Step 4: Connect to Amazon Redshift using the JDBC SQL client

Assume that sales user “nancy” is using the SQL Workbench client and JDBC driver to log in to the Amazon Redshift data warehouse. The following steps help set up the client and establish the connection:

  1. Download the latest Amazon Redshift JDBC driver from the Configure a JDBC Connection page
  2. Build the JDBC URL with the IAM option in the following format:
    jdbc:redshift:iam://examplecorp-dw:us-west-2/sales_db

Because the redshift:DescribeClusters action is assigned to the preceding IAM roles, it automatically resolves the cluster endpoints and the port. Otherwise, you can specify the endpoint and port information in the JDBC URL, as described in Configure a JDBC Connection.

Identify the following JDBC options for providing the IAM credentials (see the “Prepare your environment” section) and configure in the SQL Workbench Connection Profile:

plugin_name=com.amazon.redshift.plugin.AdfsCredentialsProvider 
idp_host=demo.examplecorp.com (The name of the corporate identity provider host)
idp_port=443  (The port of the corporate identity provider host)
user=examplecorp\nancy(corporate user name)
password=***(corporate user password)

The SQL workbench configuration looks similar to the following screenshot:

Now, “nancy” can connect to examplecorp-dw by authenticating using the corporate Active Directory. Because the SAML attributes elements are already configured for nancy, she logs in as database user nancy and is assigned the sales_grp. Similarly, other Sales and Data Science users can connect to the examplecorp-dw cluster. A custom Amazon Redshift ODBC driver can also be used to connect using a SQL client. For more information, see Configure an ODBC Connection.

Step 5: Connecting to Amazon Redshift using JDBC SQL Client and IAM Credentials

This optional step is necessary only when you want to enable users that are not authenticated with Active Directory. Partners are provided with IAM credentials that they can use to connect to the examplecorp-dw Amazon Redshift clusters. These IAM users are attached to Partner_DW_IAM_Policy that assigns them to be assigned to the public database group in Amazon Redshift. The following JDBC URLs enable them to connect to the Amazon Redshift cluster:

jdbc:redshift:iam//examplecorp-dw/analytics?AccessKeyID=XXX&SecretAccessKey=YYY&DbUser=examplecorpsalespartner&DbGroup= partner_grp&AutoCreate=true

The AutoCreate option automatically creates a new database user the first time the partner logs in. There are several other options available to conveniently specify the IAM user credentials. For more information, see Options for providing IAM credentials.

Step 6: Connecting to Amazon Redshift using an ODBC client for Microsoft Windows

Assume that another sales user “uma” is using an ODBC-based client to log in to the Amazon Redshift data warehouse using Example Corp Active Directory. The following steps help set up the ODBC client and establish the Amazon Redshift connection in a Microsoft Windows operating system connected to your corporate network:

  1. Download and install the latest Amazon Redshift ODBC driver.
  2. Create a system DSN entry.
    1. In the Start menu, locate the driver folder or folders:
      • Amazon Redshift ODBC Driver (32-bit)
      • Amazon Redshift ODBC Driver (64-bit)
      • If you installed both drivers, you have a folder for each driver.
    2. Choose ODBC Administrator, and then type your administrator credentials.
    3. To configure the driver for all users on the computer, choose System DSN. To configure the driver for your user account only, choose User DSN.
    4. Choose Add.
  3. Select the Amazon Redshift ODBC driver, and choose Finish. Configure the following attributes:
    Data Source Name =any friendly name to identify the ODBC connection 
    Database=analytics
    user=uma(corporate user name)
    Auth Type-Identity Provider: AD FS
    password=leave blank (Windows automatically authenticates)
    Cluster ID: examplecorp-dw
    idp_host=demo.examplecorp.com (The name of the corporate IdP host)

This configuration looks like the following:

  1. Choose OK to save the ODBC connection.
  2. Verify that uma is set up with the SAML attributes, as described in the “Set up IdPs and federation” section.

The user uma can now use this ODBC connection to establish the connection to the Amazon Redshift cluster using any ODBC-based tools or reporting tools such as Tableau. Internally, uma authenticates using the Sales_DW_IAM_Policy  IAM role and is assigned the sales_grp database group.

Step 7: Connecting to Amazon Redshift using Python and IAM credentials

To enable partners, connect to the examplecorp-dw cluster programmatically, using Python on a computer such as Amazon EC2 instance. Reuse the IAM users that are attached to the Partner_DW_IAM_Policy policy defined in Step 2.

The following steps show this set up on an EC2 instance:

  1. Launch a new EC2 instance with the Partner_DW_IAM_Policy role, as described in Using an IAM Role to Grant Permissions to Applications Running on Amazon EC2 Instances. Alternatively, you can attach an existing IAM role to an EC2 instance.
  2. This example uses Python PostgreSQL Driver (PyGreSQL) to connect to your Amazon Redshift clusters. To install PyGreSQL on Amazon Linux, use the following command as the ec2-user:
    sudo easy_install pip
    sudo yum install postgresql postgresql-devel gcc python-devel
    sudo pip install PyGreSQL

  1. The following code snippet demonstrates programmatic access to Amazon Redshift for partner users:
    #!/usr/bin/env python
    """
    Usage:
    python redshift-unload-copy.py <config file> <region>
    
    * Copyright 2014, Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
    *
    * Licensed under the Amazon Software License (the "License").
    * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
    * A copy of the License is located at
    *
    * http://aws.amazon.com/asl/
    *
    * or in the "license" file accompanying this file. This file is distributed
    * on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either
    * express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing
    * permissions and limitations under the License.
    """
    
    import sys
    import pg
    import boto3
    
    REGION = 'us-west-2'
    CLUSTER_IDENTIFIER = 'examplecorp-dw'
    DB_NAME = 'sales_db'
    DB_USER = 'examplecorpsalespartner'
    
    options = """keepalives=1 keepalives_idle=200 keepalives_interval=200
                 keepalives_count=6"""
    
    set_timeout_stmt = "set statement_timeout = 1200000"
    
    def conn_to_rs(host, port, db, usr, pwd, opt=options, timeout=set_timeout_stmt):
        rs_conn_string = """host=%s port=%s dbname=%s user=%s password=%s
                             %s""" % (host, port, db, usr, pwd, opt)
        print "Connecting to %s:%s:%s as %s" % (host, port, db, usr)
        rs_conn = pg.connect(dbname=rs_conn_string)
        rs_conn.query(timeout)
        return rs_conn
    
    def main():
        # describe the cluster and fetch the IAM temporary credentials
        global redshift_client
        redshift_client = boto3.client('redshift', region_name=REGION)
        response_cluster_details = redshift_client.describe_clusters(ClusterIdentifier=CLUSTER_IDENTIFIER)
        response_credentials = redshift_client.get_cluster_credentials(DbUser=DB_USER,DbName=DB_NAME,ClusterIdentifier=CLUSTER_IDENTIFIER,DurationSeconds=3600)
        rs_host = response_cluster_details['Clusters'][0]['Endpoint']['Address']
        rs_port = response_cluster_details['Clusters'][0]['Endpoint']['Port']
        rs_db = DB_NAME
        rs_iam_user = response_credentials['DbUser']
        rs_iam_pwd = response_credentials['DbPassword']
        # connect to the Amazon Redshift cluster
        conn = conn_to_rs(rs_host, rs_port, rs_db, rs_iam_user,rs_iam_pwd)
        # execute a query
        result = conn.query("SELECT sysdate as dt")
        # fetch results from the query
        for dt_val in result.getresult() :
            print dt_val
        # close the Amazon Redshift connection
        conn.close()
    
    if __name__ == "__main__":
        main()

You can save this Python program in a file (redshiftscript.py) and execute it at the command line as ec2-user:

python redshiftscript.py

Now partners can connect to the Amazon Redshift cluster using the Python script, and authentication is federated through the IAM user.

Summary

In this post, I demonstrated how to use federated access using Active Directory and IAM roles to enable single sign-on to an Amazon Redshift cluster. I also showed how partners outside an organization can be managed easily using IAM credentials.  Using the GetClusterCredentials API action, now supported by Amazon Redshift, lets you manage a large number of database users and have them use corporate credentials to log in. You don’t have to maintain separate database user accounts.

Although this post demonstrated the integration of IAM with AD FS and Active Directory, you can replicate this solution across with your choice of SAML 2.0 third-party identity providers (IdP), such as PingFederate or Okta. For the different supported federation options, see Configure SAML Assertions for Your IdP.

If you have questions or suggestions, please comment below.


Additional Reading

Learn how to establish federated access to your AWS resources by using Active Directory user attributes.


About the Author

Thiyagarajan Arumugam is a Big Data Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services and designs customer architectures to process data at scale. Prior to AWS, he built data warehouse solutions at Amazon.com. In his free time, he enjoys all outdoor sports and practices the Indian classical drum mridangam.

 

Amazon Elasticsearch Service now supports VPC

Post Syndicated from Randall Hunt original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/amazon-elasticsearch-service-now-supports-vpc/

Starting today, you can connect to your Amazon Elasticsearch Service domains from within an Amazon VPC without the need for NAT instances or Internet gateways. VPC support for Amazon ES is easy to configure, reliable, and offers an extra layer of security. With VPC support, traffic between other services and Amazon ES stays entirely within the AWS network, isolated from the public Internet. You can manage network access using existing VPC security groups, and you can use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies for additional protection. VPC support for Amazon ES domains is available at no additional charge.

Getting Started

Creating an Amazon Elasticsearch Service domain in your VPC is easy. Follow all the steps you would normally follow to create your cluster and then select “VPC access”.

That’s it. There are no additional steps. You can now access your domain from within your VPC!

Things To Know

To support VPCs, Amazon ES places an endpoint into at least one subnet of your VPC. Amazon ES places an Elastic Network Interface (ENI) into the VPC for each data node in the cluster. Each ENI uses a private IP address from the IPv4 range of your subnet and receives a public DNS hostname. If you enable zone awareness, Amazon ES creates endpoints in two subnets in different availability zones, which provides greater data durability.

You need to set aside three times the number of IP addresses as the number of nodes in your cluster. You can divide that number by two if Zone Awareness is enabled. Ideally, you would create separate subnets just for Amazon ES.

A few notes:

  • Currently, you cannot move existing domains to a VPC or vice-versa. To take advantage of VPC support, you must create a new domain and migrate your data.
  • Currently, Amazon ES does not support Amazon Kinesis Firehose integration for domains inside a VPC.

To learn more, see the Amazon ES documentation.

Randall

PureVPN Explains How it Helped the FBI Catch a Cyberstalker

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/purevpn-explains-how-it-helped-the-fbi-catch-a-cyberstalker-171016/

Early October, Ryan S. Lin, 24, of Newton, Massachusetts, was arrested on suspicion of conducting “an extensive cyberstalking campaign” against a 24-year-old Massachusetts woman, as well as her family members and friends.

The Department of Justice described Lin’s offenses as a “multi-faceted” computer hacking and cyberstalking campaign. Launched in April 2016 when he began hacking into the victim’s online accounts, Lin allegedly obtained personal photographs and sensitive information about her medical and sexual histories and distributed that information to hundreds of other people.

Details of what information the FBI compiled on Lin can be found in our earlier report but aside from his alleged crimes (which are both significant and repugnant), it was PureVPN’s involvement in the case that caused the most controversy.

In a report compiled by an FBI special agent, it was revealed that the Hong Kong-based company’s logs helped the authorities net the alleged criminal.

“Significantly, PureVPN was able to determine that their service was accessed by the same customer from two originating IP addresses: the RCN IP address from the home Lin was living in at the time, and the software company where Lin was employed at the time,” the agent’s affidavit reads.

Among many in the privacy community, this revelation was met with disappointment. On the PureVPN website the company claims to carry no logs and on a general basis, it’s expected that so-called “no-logging” VPN providers should provide people with some anonymity, at least as far as their service goes. Now, several days after the furor, the company has responded to its critics.

In a fairly lengthy statement, the company begins by confirming that it definitely doesn’t log what websites a user views or what content he or she downloads.

“PureVPN did not breach its Privacy Policy and certainly did not breach your trust. NO browsing logs, browsing habits or anything else was, or ever will be shared,” the company writes.

However, that’s only half the problem. While it doesn’t log user activity (what sites people visit or content they download), it does log the IP addresses that customers use to access the PureVPN service. These, given the right circumstances, can be matched to external activities thanks to logs carried by other web companies.

PureVPN talks about logs held by Google’s Gmail service to illustrate its point.

“A network log is automatically generated every time a user visits a website. For the sake of this example, let’s say a user logged into their Gmail account. Every time they accessed Gmail, the email provider created a network log,” the company explains.

“If you are using a VPN, Gmail’s network log would contain the IP provided by PureVPN. This is one half of the picture. Now, if someone asks Google who accessed the user’s account, Google would state that whoever was using this IP, accessed the account.

“If the user was connected to PureVPN, it would be a PureVPN IP. The inquirer [in the Lin case, the FBI] would then share timestamps and network logs acquired from Google and ask them to be compared with the network logs maintained by the VPN provider.”

Now, if PureVPN carried no logs – literally no logs – it would not be able to help with this kind of inquiry. That was the case last year when the FBI approached Private Internet Access for information and the company was unable to assist.

However, as is made pretty clear by PureVPN’s explanation, the company does log user IP addresses and timestamps which reveal when a user was logged on to the service. It doesn’t matter that PureVPN doesn’t log what the user allegedly did online, since the third-party service already knows that information to the precise second.

Following the example, GMail knows that a user sent an email at 10:22am on Monday October 16 from a PureVPN IP address. So, if PureVPN is approached by the FBI, the company can confirm that User X was using the same IP address at exactly the same time, and his home IP address was XXX.XX.XXX.XX. Effectively, the combined logs link one IP address to the other and the user is revealed. It’s that simple.

It is for this reason that in TorrentFreak’s annual summary of no-logging VPN providers, the very first question we ask every single company reads as follows:

Do you keep ANY logs which would allow you to match an IP-address and a time stamp to a user/users of your service? If so, what information do you hold and for how long?

Clearly, if a company says “yes we log incoming IP addresses and associated timestamps”, any claim to total user anonymity is ended right there and then.

While not completely useless (a logging service will still stop the prying eyes of ISPs and similar surveillance, while also defeating throttling and site-blocking), if you’re a whistle-blower with a job or even your life to protect, this level of protection is entirely inadequate.

The take-home points from this controversy are numerous, but perhaps the most important is for people to read and understand VPN provider logging policies.

Secondly, and just as importantly, VPN providers need to be extremely clear about the information they log. Not tracking browsing or downloading activities is all well and good, but if home IP addresses and timestamps are stored, this needs to be made clear to the customer.

Finally, VPN users should not be evil. There are plenty of good reasons to stay anonymous online but cyberstalking, death threats and ruining people’s lives are not included. Fortunately, the FBI have offline methods for catching this type of offender, and long may that continue.

PureVPN’s blog post is available here.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and ANONYMOUS VPN services.

Clean up Your Container Images with Amazon ECR Lifecycle Policies

Post Syndicated from Nathan Taber original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/clean-up-your-container-images-with-amazon-ecr-lifecycle-policies/

This post comes from the desk of Brent Langston.

Starting today, customers can keep their container image repositories tidy by automatically removing old or unused images using lifecycle policies, now available as part of Amazon E2 Container Repository (Amazon ECR).

Amazon ECR is a fully managed Docker container registry that makes it easy to store manage and deploy Docker container images without worrying about the typical challenges of scaling a service to handle pulling hundreds of images at one time. This scale means that development teams using Amazon ECR actively often find that their repositories fill up with many container image versions. This makes it difficult to find the code changes that matter and incurs unnecessary storage costs. Previously, cleaning up your repository meant spending time to manually delete old images, or writing and executing scripts.

Now, lifecycle policies allow you to define a set of rules to remove old container images automatically. You can also preview rules to see exactly which container images are affected when the rule runs. This allows repositories to be better organized, makes it easier to find the code revisions that matter, and lowers storage costs.

Look at how lifecycle policies work.

Ground Rules

One of the biggest benefits of deploying code in containers is the ability to quickly and easily roll back to a previous version. You can deploy with less risk because, if something goes wrong, it is easy to revert back to the previous container version and know that your application will run like it did before the failed deployment. Most people probably never roll back past a few versions. If your situation is similar, then one simple lifecycle rule might be to just keep the last 30 images.

Last 30 Images

In your ECR registry, choose Dry-Run Lifecycle Rules, Add.

  • For Image Status, select Untagged.
  • Under Match criteria, for Count Type, enter Image Count More Than.
  • For Count Number, enter 30.
  • For Rule action, choose expire.

Choose Save. To see which images would be cleaned up, Save and dry-run rules.

Of course, there are teams who, for compliance reasons, might prefer to keep certain images for a period of time, rather than keeping by count. For that situation, you can choose to clean up images older than 90 days.

Last 90 Days

Select the rule that you just created and choose Edit. Change the parameters to keep only 90 days of untagged images:

  • Under Match criteria, for Count Type, enter Since Image Pushed
  • For Count Number, enter 90.
  • For Count Unit, enter days.

Tags

Certainly 90 days is an arbitrary timeframe, and your team might have policies in place that would require a longer timeframe for certain kinds of images. If that’s the case, but you still want to continue with the spring cleaning, you can consider getting rid of images that are tag prefixed.

Here is the list of rules I came up with to groom untagged, development, staging, and production images:

  • Remove untagged images over 90 days old
  • Remove development tagged images over 90 days old
  • Remove staging tagged images over 180 days old
  • Remove production tagged images over 1 year old

As you can see, the new Amazon ECR lifecycle policies are powerful, and help you easily keep the images you need, while cleaning out images you may never use again. This feature is available starting today, in all regions where Amazon ECR is available, at no extra charge. For more information, see Amazon ECR Lifecycle Policies in the AWS technical documentation.

— Brent
@brentContained

"Responsible encryption" fallacies

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/10/responsible-encryption-fallacies.html

Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein gave a speech recently calling for “Responsible Encryption” (aka. “Crypto Backdoors”). It’s full of dangerous ideas that need to be debunked.

The importance of law enforcement

The first third of the speech talks about the importance of law enforcement, as if it’s the only thing standing between us and chaos. It cites the 2016 Mirai attacks as an example of the chaos that will only get worse without stricter law enforcement.

But the Mira case demonstrated the opposite, how law enforcement is not needed. They made no arrests in the case. A year later, they still haven’t a clue who did it.

Conversely, we technologists have fixed the major infrastructure issues. Specifically, those affected by the DNS outage have moved to multiple DNS providers, including a high-capacity DNS provider like Google and Amazon who can handle such large attacks easily.

In other words, we the people fixed the major Mirai problem, and law-enforcement didn’t.

Moreover, instead being a solution to cyber threats, law enforcement has become a threat itself. The DNC didn’t have the FBI investigate the attacks from Russia likely because they didn’t want the FBI reading all their files, finding wrongdoing by the DNC. It’s not that they did anything actually wrong, but it’s more like that famous quote from Richelieu “Give me six words written by the most honest of men and I’ll find something to hang him by”. Give all your internal emails over to the FBI and I’m certain they’ll find something to hang you by, if they want.
Or consider the case of Andrew Auernheimer. He found AT&T’s website made public user accounts of the first iPad, so he copied some down and posted them to a news site. AT&T had denied the problem, so making the problem public was the only way to force them to fix it. Such access to the website was legal, because AT&T had made the data public. However, prosecutors disagreed. In order to protect the powerful, they twisted and perverted the law to put Auernheimer in jail.

It’s not that law enforcement is bad, it’s that it’s not the unalloyed good Rosenstein imagines. When law enforcement becomes the thing Rosenstein describes, it means we live in a police state.

Where law enforcement can’t go

Rosenstein repeats the frequent claim in the encryption debate:

Our society has never had a system where evidence of criminal wrongdoing was totally impervious to detection

Of course our society has places “impervious to detection”, protected by both legal and natural barriers.

An example of a legal barrier is how spouses can’t be forced to testify against each other. This barrier is impervious.

A better example, though, is how so much of government, intelligence, the military, and law enforcement itself is impervious. If prosecutors could gather evidence everywhere, then why isn’t Rosenstein prosecuting those guilty of CIA torture?

Oh, you say, government is a special exception. If that were the case, then why did Rosenstein dedicate a precious third of his speech discussing the “rule of law” and how it applies to everyone, “protecting people from abuse by the government”. It obviously doesn’t, there’s one rule of government and a different rule for the people, and the rule for government means there’s lots of places law enforcement can’t go to gather evidence.

Likewise, the crypto backdoor Rosenstein is demanding for citizens doesn’t apply to the President, Congress, the NSA, the Army, or Rosenstein himself.

Then there are the natural barriers. The police can’t read your mind. They can only get the evidence that is there, like partial fingerprints, which are far less reliable than full fingerprints. They can’t go backwards in time.

I mention this because encryption is a natural barrier. It’s their job to overcome this barrier if they can, to crack crypto and so forth. It’s not our job to do it for them.

It’s like the camera that increasingly comes with TVs for video conferencing, or the microphone on Alexa-style devices that are always recording. This suddenly creates evidence that the police want our help in gathering, such as having the camera turned on all the time, recording to disk, in case the police later gets a warrant, to peer backward in time what happened in our living rooms. The “nothing is impervious” argument applies here as well. And it’s equally bogus here. By not helping police by not recording our activities, we aren’t somehow breaking some long standing tradit

And this is the scary part. It’s not that we are breaking some ancient tradition that there’s no place the police can’t go (with a warrant). Instead, crypto backdoors breaking the tradition that never before have I been forced to help them eavesdrop on me, even before I’m a suspect, even before any crime has been committed. Sure, laws like CALEA force the phone companies to help the police against wrongdoers — but here Rosenstein is insisting I help the police against myself.

Balance between privacy and public safety

Rosenstein repeats the frequent claim that encryption upsets the balance between privacy/safety:

Warrant-proof encryption defeats the constitutional balance by elevating privacy above public safety.

This is laughable, because technology has swung the balance alarmingly in favor of law enforcement. Far from “Going Dark” as his side claims, the problem we are confronted with is “Going Light”, where the police state monitors our every action.

You are surrounded by recording devices. If you walk down the street in town, outdoor surveillance cameras feed police facial recognition systems. If you drive, automated license plate readers can track your route. If you make a phone call or use a credit card, the police get a record of the transaction. If you stay in a hotel, they demand your ID, for law enforcement purposes.

And that’s their stuff, which is nothing compared to your stuff. You are never far from a recording device you own, such as your mobile phone, TV, Alexa/Siri/OkGoogle device, laptop. Modern cars from the last few years increasingly have always-on cell connections and data recorders that record your every action (and location).

Even if you hike out into the country, when you get back, the FBI can subpoena your GPS device to track down your hidden weapon’s cache, or grab the photos from your camera.

And this is all offline. So much of what we do is now online. Of the photographs you own, fewer than 1% are printed out, the rest are on your computer or backed up to the cloud.

Your phone is also a GPS recorder of your exact position all the time, which if the government wins the Carpenter case, they police can grab without a warrant. Tagging all citizens with a recording device of their position is not “balance” but the premise for a novel more dystopic than 1984.

If suspected of a crime, which would you rather the police searched? Your person, houses, papers, and physical effects? Or your mobile phone, computer, email, and online/cloud accounts?

The balance of privacy and safety has swung so far in favor of law enforcement that rather than debating whether they should have crypto backdoors, we should be debating how to add more privacy protections.

“But it’s not conclusive”

Rosenstein defends the “going light” (“Golden Age of Surveillance”) by pointing out it’s not always enough for conviction. Nothing gives a conviction better than a person’s own words admitting to the crime that were captured by surveillance. This other data, while copious, often fails to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
This is nonsense. Police got along well enough before the digital age, before such widespread messaging. They solved terrorist and child abduction cases just fine in the 1980s. Sure, somebody’s GPS location isn’t by itself enough — until you go there and find all the buried bodies, which leads to a conviction. “Going dark” imagines that somehow, the evidence they’ve been gathering for centuries is going away. It isn’t. It’s still here, and matches up with even more digital evidence.
Conversely, a person’s own words are not as conclusive as you think. There’s always missing context. We quickly get back to the Richelieu “six words” problem, where captured communications are twisted to convict people, with defense lawyers trying to untwist them.

Rosenstein’s claim may be true, that a lot of criminals will go free because the other electronic data isn’t convincing enough. But I’d need to see that claim backed up with hard studies, not thrown out for emotional impact.

Terrorists and child molesters

You can always tell the lack of seriousness of law enforcement when they bring up terrorists and child molesters.
To be fair, sometimes we do need to talk about terrorists. There are things unique to terrorism where me may need to give government explicit powers to address those unique concerns. For example, the NSA buys mobile phone 0day exploits in order to hack terrorist leaders in tribal areas. This is a good thing.
But when terrorists use encryption the same way everyone else does, then it’s not a unique reason to sacrifice our freedoms to give the police extra powers. Either it’s a good idea for all crimes or no crimes — there’s nothing particular about terrorism that makes it an exceptional crime. Dead people are dead. Any rational view of the problem relegates terrorism to be a minor problem. More citizens have died since September 8, 2001 from their own furniture than from terrorism. According to studies, the hot water from the tap is more of a threat to you than terrorists.
Yes, government should do what they can to protect us from terrorists, but no, it’s not so bad of a threat that requires the imposition of a military/police state. When people use terrorism to justify their actions, it’s because they trying to form a military/police state.
A similar argument works with child porn. Here’s the thing: the pervs aren’t exchanging child porn using the services Rosenstein wants to backdoor, like Apple’s Facetime or Facebook’s WhatsApp. Instead, they are exchanging child porn using custom services they build themselves.
Again, I’m (mostly) on the side of the FBI. I support their idea of buying 0day exploits in order to hack the web browsers of visitors to the secret “PlayPen” site. This is something that’s narrow to this problem and doesn’t endanger the innocent. On the other hand, their calls for crypto backdoors endangers the innocent while doing effectively nothing to address child porn.
Terrorists and child molesters are a clichéd, non-serious excuse to appeal to our emotions to give up our rights. We should not give in to such emotions.

Definition of “backdoor”

Rosenstein claims that we shouldn’t call backdoors “backdoors”:

No one calls any of those functions [like key recovery] a “back door.”  In fact, those capabilities are marketed and sought out by many users.

He’s partly right in that we rarely refer to PGP’s key escrow feature as a “backdoor”.

But that’s because the term “backdoor” refers less to how it’s done and more to who is doing it. If I set up a recovery password with Apple, I’m the one doing it to myself, so we don’t call it a backdoor. If it’s the police, spies, hackers, or criminals, then we call it a “backdoor” — even it’s identical technology.

Wikipedia uses the key escrow feature of the 1990s Clipper Chip as a prime example of what everyone means by “backdoor“. By “no one”, Rosenstein is including Wikipedia, which is obviously incorrect.

Though in truth, it’s not going to be the same technology. The needs of law enforcement are different than my personal key escrow/backup needs. In particular, there are unsolvable problems, such as a backdoor that works for the “legitimate” law enforcement in the United States but not for the “illegitimate” police states like Russia and China.

I feel for Rosenstein, because the term “backdoor” does have a pejorative connotation, which can be considered unfair. But that’s like saying the word “murder” is a pejorative term for killing people, or “torture” is a pejorative term for torture. The bad connotation exists because we don’t like government surveillance. I mean, honestly calling this feature “government surveillance feature” is likewise pejorative, and likewise exactly what it is that we are talking about.

Providers

Rosenstein focuses his arguments on “providers”, like Snapchat or Apple. But this isn’t the question.

The question is whether a “provider” like Telegram, a Russian company beyond US law, provides this feature. Or, by extension, whether individuals should be free to install whatever software they want, regardless of provider.

Telegram is a Russian company that provides end-to-end encryption. Anybody can download their software in order to communicate so that American law enforcement can’t eavesdrop. They aren’t going to put in a backdoor for the U.S. If we succeed in putting backdoors in Apple and WhatsApp, all this means is that criminals are going to install Telegram.

If the, for some reason, the US is able to convince all such providers (including Telegram) to install a backdoor, then it still doesn’t solve the problem, as uses can just build their own end-to-end encryption app that has no provider. It’s like email: some use the major providers like GMail, others setup their own email server.

Ultimately, this means that any law mandating “crypto backdoors” is going to target users not providers. Rosenstein tries to make a comparison with what plain-old telephone companies have to do under old laws like CALEA, but that’s not what’s happening here. Instead, for such rules to have any effect, they have to punish users for what they install, not providers.

This continues the argument I made above. Government backdoors is not something that forces Internet services to eavesdrop on us — it forces us to help the government spy on ourselves.
Rosenstein tries to address this by pointing out that it’s still a win if major providers like Apple and Facetime are forced to add backdoors, because they are the most popular, and some terrorists/criminals won’t move to alternate platforms. This is false. People with good intentions, who are unfairly targeted by a police state, the ones where police abuse is rampant, are the ones who use the backdoored products. Those with bad intentions, who know they are guilty, will move to the safe products. Indeed, Telegram is already popular among terrorists because they believe American services are already all backdoored. 
Rosenstein is essentially demanding the innocent get backdoored while the guilty don’t. This seems backwards. This is backwards.

Apple is morally weak

The reason I’m writing this post is because Rosenstein makes a few claims that cannot be ignored. One of them is how he describes Apple’s response to government insistence on weakening encryption doing the opposite, strengthening encryption. He reasons this happens because:

Of course they [Apple] do. They are in the business of selling products and making money. 

We [the DoJ] use a different measure of success. We are in the business of preventing crime and saving lives. 

He swells in importance. His condescending tone ennobles himself while debasing others. But this isn’t how things work. He’s not some white knight above the peasantry, protecting us. He’s a beat cop, a civil servant, who serves us.

A better phrasing would have been:

They are in the business of giving customers what they want.

We are in the business of giving voters what they want.

Both sides are doing the same, giving people what they want. Yes, voters want safety, but they also want privacy. Rosenstein imagines that he’s free to ignore our demands for privacy as long has he’s fulfilling his duty to protect us. He has explicitly rejected what people want, “we use a different measure of success”. He imagines it’s his job to tell us where the balance between privacy and safety lies. That’s not his job, that’s our job. We, the people (and our representatives), make that decision, and it’s his job is to do what he’s told. His measure of success is how well he fulfills our wishes, not how well he satisfies his imagined criteria.

That’s why those of us on this side of the debate doubt the good intentions of those like Rosenstein. He criticizes Apple for wanting to protect our rights/freedoms, and declare they measure success differently.

They are willing to be vile

Rosenstein makes this argument:

Companies are willing to make accommodations when required by the government. Recent media reports suggest that a major American technology company developed a tool to suppress online posts in certain geographic areas in order to embrace a foreign government’s censorship policies. 

Let me translate this for you:

Companies are willing to acquiesce to vile requests made by police-states. Therefore, they should acquiesce to our vile police-state requests.

It’s Rosenstein who is admitting here is that his requests are those of a police-state.

Constitutional Rights

Rosenstein says:

There is no constitutional right to sell warrant-proof encryption.

Maybe. It’s something the courts will have to decide. There are many 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Amendment issues here.
The reason we have the Bill of Rights is because of the abuses of the British Government. For example, they quartered troops in our homes, as a way of punishing us, and as a way of forcing us to help in our own oppression. The troops weren’t there to defend us against the French, but to defend us against ourselves, to shoot us if we got out of line.

And that’s what crypto backdoors do. We are forced to be agents of our own oppression. The principles enumerated by Rosenstein apply to a wide range of even additional surveillance. With little change to his speech, it can equally argue why the constant TV video surveillance from 1984 should be made law.

Let’s go back and look at Apple. It is not some base company exploiting consumers for profit. Apple doesn’t have guns, they cannot make people buy their product. If Apple doesn’t provide customers what they want, then customers vote with their feet, and go buy an Android phone. Apple isn’t providing encryption/security in order to make a profit — it’s giving customers what they want in order to stay in business.
Conversely, if we citizens don’t like what the government does, tough luck, they’ve got the guns to enforce their edicts. We can’t easily vote with our feet and walk to another country. A “democracy” is far less democratic than capitalism. Apple is a minority, selling phones to 45% of the population, and that’s fine, the minority get the phones they want. In a Democracy, where citizens vote on the issue, those 45% are screwed, as the 55% impose their will unwanted onto the remainder.

That’s why we have the Bill of Rights, to protect the 49% against abuse by the 51%. Regardless whether the Supreme Court agrees the current Constitution, it is the sort right that might exist regardless of what the Constitution says. 

Obliged to speak the truth

Here is the another part of his speech that I feel cannot be ignored. We have to discuss this:

Those of us who swear to protect the rule of law have a different motivation.  We are obliged to speak the truth.

The truth is that “going dark” threatens to disable law enforcement and enable criminals and terrorists to operate with impunity.

This is not true. Sure, he’s obliged to say the absolute truth, in court. He’s also obliged to be truthful in general about facts in his personal life, such as not lying on his tax return (the sort of thing that can get lawyers disbarred).

But he’s not obliged to tell his spouse his honest opinion whether that new outfit makes them look fat. Likewise, Rosenstein knows his opinion on public policy doesn’t fall into this category. He can say with impunity that either global warming doesn’t exist, or that it’ll cause a biblical deluge within 5 years. Both are factually untrue, but it’s not going to get him fired.

And this particular claim is also exaggerated bunk. While everyone agrees encryption makes law enforcement’s job harder than with backdoors, nobody honestly believes it can “disable” law enforcement. While everyone agrees that encryption helps terrorists, nobody believes it can enable them to act with “impunity”.

I feel bad here. It’s a terrible thing to question your opponent’s character this way. But Rosenstein made this unavoidable when he clearly, with no ambiguity, put his integrity as Deputy Attorney General on the line behind the statement that “going dark threatens to disable law enforcement and enable criminals and terrorists to operate with impunity”. I feel it’s a bald face lie, but you don’t need to take my word for it. Read his own words yourself and judge his integrity.

Conclusion

Rosenstein’s speech includes repeated references to ideas like “oath”, “honor”, and “duty”. It reminds me of Col. Jessup’s speech in the movie “A Few Good Men”.

If you’ll recall, it was rousing speech, “you want me on that wall” and “you use words like honor as a punchline”. Of course, since he was violating his oath and sending two privates to death row in order to avoid being held accountable, it was Jessup himself who was crapping on the concepts of “honor”, “oath”, and “duty”.

And so is Rosenstein. He imagines himself on that wall, doing albeit terrible things, justified by his duty to protect citizens. He imagines that it’s he who is honorable, while the rest of us not, even has he utters bald faced lies to further his own power and authority.

We activists oppose crypto backdoors not because we lack honor, or because we are criminals, or because we support terrorists and child molesters. It’s because we value privacy and government officials who get corrupted by power. It’s not that we fear Trump becoming a dictator, it’s that we fear bureaucrats at Rosenstein’s level becoming drunk on authority — which Rosenstein demonstrably has. His speech is a long train of corrupt ideas pursuing the same object of despotism — a despotism we oppose.

In other words, we oppose crypto backdoors because it’s not a tool of law enforcement, but a tool of despotism.

How to Automatically Revert and Receive Notifications About Changes to Your Amazon VPC Security Groups

Post Syndicated from Rob Barnes original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-automatically-revert-and-receive-notifications-about-changes-to-your-amazon-vpc-security-groups/

In a previous AWS Security Blog post, Jeff Levine showed how you can monitor changes to your Amazon EC2 security groups. The methods he describes in that post are examples of detective controls, which can help you determine when changes are made to security controls on your AWS resources.

In this post, I take that approach a step further by introducing an example of a responsive control, which you can use to automatically respond to a detected security event by applying a chosen security mitigation. I demonstrate a solution that continuously monitors changes made to an Amazon VPC security group, and if a new ingress rule (the same as an inbound rule) is added to that security group, the solution removes the rule and then sends you a notification after the changes have been automatically reverted.

The scenario

Let’s say you want to reduce your infrastructure complexity by replacing your Secure Shell (SSH) bastion hosts with Amazon EC2 Systems Manager (SSM). SSM allows you to run commands on your hosts remotely, removing the need to manage bastion hosts or rely on SSH to execute commands. To support this objective, you must prevent your staff members from opening SSH ports to your web server’s Amazon VPC security group. If one of your staff members does modify the VPC security group to allow SSH access, you want the change to be automatically reverted and then receive a notification that the change to the security group was automatically reverted. If you are not yet familiar with security groups, see Security Groups for Your VPC before reading the rest of this post.

Solution overview

This solution begins with a directive control to mandate that no web server should be accessible using SSH. The directive control is enforced using a preventive control, which is implemented using a security group rule that prevents ingress from port 22 (typically used for SSH). The detective control is a “listener” that identifies any changes made to your security group. Finally, the responsive control reverts changes made to the security group and then sends a notification of this security mitigation.

The detective control, in this case, is an Amazon CloudWatch event that detects changes to your security group and triggers the responsive control, which in this case is an AWS Lambda function. I use AWS CloudFormation to simplify the deployment.

The following diagram shows the architecture of this solution.

Solution architecture diagram

Here is how the process works:

  1. Someone on your staff adds a new ingress rule to your security group.
  2. A CloudWatch event that continually monitors changes to your security groups detects the new ingress rule and invokes a designated Lambda function (with Lambda, you can run code without provisioning or managing servers).
  3. The Lambda function evaluates the event to determine whether you are monitoring this security group and reverts the new security group ingress rule.
  4. Finally, the Lambda function sends you an email to let you know what the change was, who made it, and that the change was reverted.

Deploy the solution by using CloudFormation

In this section, you will click the Launch Stack button shown below to launch the CloudFormation stack and deploy the solution.

Prerequisites

  • You must have AWS CloudTrail already enabled in the AWS Region where you will be deploying the solution. CloudTrail lets you log, continuously monitor, and retain events related to API calls across your AWS infrastructure. See Getting Started with CloudTrail for more information.
  • You must have a default VPC in the region in which you will be deploying the solution. AWS accounts have one default VPC per AWS Region. If you’ve deleted your VPC, see Creating a Default VPC to recreate it.

Resources that this solution creates

When you launch the CloudFormation stack, it creates the following resources:

  • A sample VPC security group in your default VPC, which is used as the target for reverting ingress rule changes.
  • A CloudWatch event rule that monitors changes to your AWS infrastructure.
  • A Lambda function that reverts changes to the security group and sends you email notifications.
  • A permission that allows CloudWatch to invoke your Lambda function.
  • An AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role with limited privileges that the Lambda function assumes when it is executed.
  • An Amazon SNS topic to which the Lambda function publishes notifications.

Launch the CloudFormation stack

The link in this section uses the us-east-1 Region (the US East [N. Virginia] Region). Change the region if you want to use this solution in a different region. See Selecting a Region for more information about changing the region.

To deploy the solution, click the following Launch Stack button to launch the stack. After you click the button, you must sign in to the AWS Management Console if you have not already done so.

Click this "Launch Stack" button

Then:

  1. Choose Next to proceed to the Specify Details page.
  2. On the Specify Details page, type your email address in the Send notifications to box. This is the email address to which change notifications will be sent. (After the stack is launched, you will receive a confirmation email that you must accept before you can receive notifications.)
  3. Choose Next until you get to the Review page, and then choose the I acknowledge that AWS CloudFormation might create IAM resources check box. This confirms that you are aware that the CloudFormation template includes an IAM resource.
  4. Choose Create. CloudFormation displays the stack status, CREATE_COMPLETE, when the stack has launched completely, which should take less than two minutes.Screenshot showing that the stack has launched completely

Testing the solution

  1. Check your email for the SNS confirmation email. You must confirm this subscription to receive future notification emails. If you don’t confirm the subscription, your security group ingress rules still will be automatically reverted, but you will not receive notification emails.
  2. Navigate to the EC2 console and choose Security Groups in the navigation pane.
  3. Choose the security group created by CloudFormation. Its name is Web Server Security Group.
  4. Choose the Inbound tab in the bottom pane of the page. Note that only one rule allows HTTPS ingress on port 443 from 0.0.0.0/0 (from anywhere).Screenshot showing the "Inbound" tab in the bottom pane of the page
  1. Choose Edit to display the Edit inbound rules dialog box (again, an inbound rule and an ingress rule are the same thing).
  2. Choose Add Rule.
  3. Choose SSH from the Type drop-down list.
  4. Choose My IP from the Source drop-down list. Your IP address is populated for you. By adding this rule, you are simulating one of your staff members violating your organization’s policy (in this blog post’s hypothetical example) against allowing SSH access to your EC2 servers. You are testing the solution created when you launched the CloudFormation stack in the previous section. The solution should remove this newly created SSH rule automatically.
    Screenshot of editing inbound rules
  5. Choose Save.

Adding this rule creates an EC2 AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress service event, which triggers the Lambda function created in the CloudFormation stack. After a few moments, choose the refresh button ( The "refresh" icon ) to see that the new SSH ingress rule that you just created has been removed by the solution you deployed earlier with the CloudFormation stack. If the rule is still there, wait a few more moments and choose the refresh button again.

Screenshot of refreshing the page to see that the SSH ingress rule has been removed

You should also receive an email to notify you that the ingress rule was added and subsequently reverted.

Screenshot of the notification email

Cleaning up

If you want to remove the resources created by this CloudFormation stack, you can delete the CloudFormation stack:

  1. Navigate to the CloudFormation console.
  2. Choose the stack that you created earlier.
  3. Choose the Actions drop-down list.
  4. Choose Delete Stack, and then choose Yes, Delete.
  5. CloudFormation will display a status of DELETE_IN_PROGRESS while it deletes the resources created with the stack. After a few moments, the stack should no longer appear in the list of completed stacks.
    Screenshot of stack "DELETE_IN_PROGRESS"

Other applications of this solution

I have shown one way to use multiple AWS services to help continuously ensure that your security controls haven’t deviated from your security baseline. However, you also could use the CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmarks, for example, to establish a governance baseline across your AWS accounts and then use the principles in this blog post to automatically mitigate changes to that baseline.

To scale this solution, you can create a framework that uses resource tags to identify particular resources for monitoring. You also can use a consolidated monitoring approach by using cross-account event delivery. See Sending and Receiving Events Between AWS Accounts for more information. You also can extend the principle of automatic mitigation to detect and revert changes to other resources such as IAM policies and Amazon S3 bucket policies.

Summary

In this blog post, I demonstrated how you can automatically revert changes to a VPC security group and have a notification sent about the changes. You can use this solution in your own AWS accounts to enforce your security requirements continuously.

If you have comments about this blog post or other ideas for ways to use this solution, submit a comment in the “Comments” section below. If you have implementation questions, start a new thread in the EC2 forum or contact AWS Support.

– Rob

Morris: Linux Security Summit 2017 Roundup

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/735224/rss

James Morris has posted a
summary
of the recently concluded Linux Security Summit.
I was particularly interested in the topic of better integrating LSM
with containers, as there is an increasingly common requirement for nesting
of security policies, where each container may run its own apparently
independent security policy, and also a potentially independent security
model. I proposed the approach of introducing a security namespace, where
all security interfaces within the kernel are namespaced, including LSM.
It would potentially solve the container use-cases, and also the full LSM
stacking case championed by Casey Schaufler (which would allow entirely
arbitrary stacking of security modules).

‘Daily Stormer’ Termination Haunts Cloudflare in Online Piracy Case

Post Syndicated from Ernesto original https://torrentfreak.com/daily-stormer-termination-haunts-cloudflare-in-online-piracy-case-170929/

Last month Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince decided to terminate the account of controversial neo-Nazi site Daily Stormer.

“I woke up this morning in a bad mood and decided to kick them off the Internet,” he announced.

While the decision is understandable from an emotional point of view, it’s quite a statement to make as the CEO of one of the largest Internet infrastructure companies. Not least because it goes directly against what many saw as Cloudflare’s core values.

For years on end, Cloudflare has been asked to remove terrorist propaganda, pirate sites, and other controversial content. Each time, Cloudflare replied that it doesn’t take action without a court order. No exceptions.

In addition, Cloudflare repeatedly stressed that it was impossible for them to remove a website from the Internet, at least not permanently. It would only require a simple DNS reconfiguration to get it back up and running.

While the Daily Stormer case has nothing to do with piracy or copyright infringement, it’s now being brought up as important evidence in an ongoing piracy liability case. Adult entertainment publisher ALS Scan views Prince as a “key witness” in the case and wants to depose Cloudflare’s CEO to find out more about his decision.

“Mr. Prince’s statement to the public that Cloudflare kicked neo-Nazis off the internet stand in sharp contrast to Cloudflare’s testimony in this case, where it claims it is powerless to remove content from the Internet,” ALS Scan writes.

The above is part of a recent submission where both parties argue over whether Prince can be deposed or not. Cloudflare wants to prevent this from happening and claims it’s unnecessary, but the adult publisher disagrees.

“By his own admissions, Mr. Prince’s decision to terminate certain users’ accounts was ‘arbitrary,’ the result of him waking up ‘in a bad mood,’ and a decision he made unilaterally as ‘CEO of a major Internet infrastructure corporation’.

“Mr. Prince has made it clear that he is the one who determines the circumstances under which Cloudflare will terminate a user’s account,” ALS Scan adds.

For its part, Cloudflare says that the CEO’s deposition is not needed. This is backed up by a declaration where Prince emphasizes that he has no unique knowledge on the company’s DMCA and repeat infringer policies, issues that directly relate to the case at hand.

“I have no unique personal knowledge regarding Cloudflare’s DMCA policy and procedure, including its repeat infringer policies, or Cloudflare’s published Terms of Service,” Prince informs the court

Prince’s declaration

The adult publisher, however, harps on the fact that the CEO arbitrarily decided to remove one site from the service, while requiring court orders in other instances. They quote from a Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article he wrote and highlight the ‘kick off the internet’ claim, which contradicts earlier statements.

Cloudflare’s lawyers contend that the WSJ article in question was meant to kick off a conversation and shouldn’t be taken literally.

“The WSJ Article was intended as an intellectual exercise to start a conversation regarding censorship and free speech on the internet. The WSJ Article had nothing to do with copyright infringement issues or Cloudflare’s DMCA policy and procedure.

“When Mr. Prince stated in the WSJ Article that ‘[he] helped kick a group of neo-Nazis off the internet last week,’ his comments were intended to illustrate a point – not to be taken literally,” Cloudflare’s legal team adds.

The deposition of Trey Guinn, a technical employee at Cloudflare, confirms that the company doesn’t have the power to cut a site off the Internet. It further suggests that the entire removal of Daily Stormer was in essence a provocation to start a conversation around freedom of speech.

From Guinn’s deposition

Still, since the lawsuit in question revolves around terminating customers, ALS Scan wants to depose Price to find out exactly when clients are terminated, and why he decided to go beyond Couldflare’s usual policy.

“No other employee can testify to Mr. Prince’s decision-making process when it comes to terminating a user’s access. No other employee can offer an explanation as to why The Daily Stormer’s account was terminated while repeat infringers’ accounts are allowed to remain.

“In a case where Mr. Prince’s personal judgment appears to govern even over Cloudflare’s own policies and procedures, Cloudflare cannot meet its heavy burden of demonstrating why he should not be deposed,” ALS Scan’s lawyers add.

To be continued.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and ANONYMOUS VPN services.

How to Enable LDAPS for Your AWS Microsoft AD Directory

Post Syndicated from Vijay Sharma original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-enable-ldaps-for-your-aws-microsoft-ad-directory/

Starting today, you can encrypt the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) communications between your applications and AWS Directory Service for Microsoft Active Directory, also known as AWS Microsoft AD. Many Windows and Linux applications use Active Directory’s (AD) LDAP service to read and write sensitive information about users and devices, including personally identifiable information (PII). Now, you can encrypt your AWS Microsoft AD LDAP communications end to end to protect this information by using LDAP Over Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS), also called LDAPS. This helps you protect PII and other sensitive information exchanged with AWS Microsoft AD over untrusted networks.

To enable LDAPS, you need to add a Microsoft enterprise Certificate Authority (CA) server to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and configure certificate templates for your domain controllers. After you have enabled LDAPS, AWS Microsoft AD encrypts communications with LDAPS-enabled Windows applications, Linux computers that use Secure Shell (SSH) authentication, and applications such as Jira and Jenkins.

In this blog post, I show how to enable LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory in six steps: 1) Delegate permissions to CA administrators, 2) Add a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD directory, 3) Create a certificate template, 4) Configure AWS security group rules, 5) AWS Microsoft AD enables LDAPS, and 6) Test LDAPS access using the LDP tool.

Assumptions

For this post, I assume you are familiar with following:

Solution overview

Before going into specific deployment steps, I will provide a high-level overview of deploying LDAPS. I cover how you enable LDAPS on AWS Microsoft AD. In addition, I provide some general background about CA deployment models and explain how to apply these models when deploying Microsoft CA to enable LDAPS on AWS Microsoft AD.

How you enable LDAPS on AWS Microsoft AD

LDAP-aware applications (LDAP clients) typically access LDAP servers using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) on port 389. By default, LDAP communications on port 389 are unencrypted. However, many LDAP clients use one of two standards to encrypt LDAP communications: LDAP over SSL on port 636, and LDAP with StartTLS on port 389. If an LDAP client uses port 636, the LDAP server encrypts all traffic unconditionally with SSL. If an LDAP client issues a StartTLS command when setting up the LDAP session on port 389, the LDAP server encrypts all traffic to that client with TLS. AWS Microsoft AD now supports both encryption standards when you enable LDAPS on your AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers.

You enable LDAPS on your AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers by installing a digital certificate that a CA issued. Though Windows servers have different methods for installing certificates, LDAPS with AWS Microsoft AD requires you to add a Microsoft CA to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and deploy the certificate through autoenrollment from the Microsoft CA. The installed certificate enables the LDAP service running on domain controllers to listen for and negotiate LDAP encryption on port 636 (LDAP over SSL) and port 389 (LDAP with StartTLS).

Background of CA deployment models

You can deploy CAs as part of a single-level or multi-level CA hierarchy. In a single-level hierarchy, all certificates come from the root of the hierarchy. In a multi-level hierarchy, you organize a collection of CAs in a hierarchy and the certificates sent to computers and users come from subordinate CAs in the hierarchy (not the root).

Certificates issued by a CA identify the hierarchy to which the CA belongs. When a computer sends its certificate to another computer for verification, the receiving computer must have the public certificate from the CAs in the same hierarchy as the sender. If the CA that issued the certificate is part of a single-level hierarchy, the receiver must obtain the public certificate of the CA that issued the certificate. If the CA that issued the certificate is part of a multi-level hierarchy, the receiver can obtain a public certificate for all the CAs that are in the same hierarchy as the CA that issued the certificate. If the receiver can verify that the certificate came from a CA that is in the hierarchy of the receiver’s “trusted” public CA certificates, the receiver trusts the sender. Otherwise, the receiver rejects the sender.

Deploying Microsoft CA to enable LDAPS on AWS Microsoft AD

Microsoft offers a standalone CA and an enterprise CA. Though you can configure either as single-level or multi-level hierarchies, only the enterprise CA integrates with AD and offers autoenrollment for certificate deployment. Because you cannot sign in to run commands on your AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers, an automatic certificate enrollment model is required. Therefore, AWS Microsoft AD requires the certificate to come from a Microsoft enterprise CA that you configure to work in your AD domain. When you install the Microsoft enterprise CA, you can configure it to be part of a single-level hierarchy or a multi-level hierarchy. As a best practice, AWS recommends a multi-level Microsoft CA trust hierarchy consisting of a root CA and a subordinate CA. I cover only a multi-level hierarchy in this post.

In a multi-level hierarchy, you configure your subordinate CA by importing a certificate from the root CA. You must issue a certificate from the root CA such that the certificate gives your subordinate CA the right to issue certificates on behalf of the root. This makes your subordinate CA part of the root CA hierarchy. You also deploy the root CA’s public certificate on all of your computers, which tells all your computers to trust certificates that your root CA issues and to trust certificates from any authorized subordinate CA.

In such a hierarchy, you typically leave your root CA offline (inaccessible to other computers in the network) to protect the root of your hierarchy. You leave the subordinate CA online so that it can issue certificates on behalf of the root CA. This multi-level hierarchy increases security because if someone compromises your subordinate CA, you can revoke all certificates it issued and set up a new subordinate CA from your offline root CA. To learn more about setting up a secure CA hierarchy, see Securing PKI: Planning a CA Hierarchy.

When a Microsoft CA is part of your AD domain, you can configure certificate templates that you publish. These templates become visible to client computers through AD. If a client’s profile matches a template, the client requests a certificate from the Microsoft CA that matches the template. Microsoft calls this process autoenrollment, and it simplifies certificate deployment. To enable LDAPS on your AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers, you create a certificate template in the Microsoft CA that generates SSL and TLS-compatible certificates. The domain controllers see the template and automatically import a certificate of that type from the Microsoft CA. The imported certificate enables LDAP encryption.

Steps to enable LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory

The rest of this post is composed of the steps for enabling LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory. First, though, I explain which components you must have running to deploy this solution successfully. I also explain how this solution works and include an architecture diagram.

Prerequisites

The instructions in this post assume that you already have the following components running:

  1. An active AWS Microsoft AD directory – To create a directory, follow the steps in Create an AWS Microsoft AD directory.
  2. An Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instance for managing users and groups in your directory – This instance needs to be joined to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and have Active Directory Administration Tools installed. Active Directory Administration Tools installs Active Directory Administrative Center and the LDP tool.
  3. An existing root Microsoft CA or a multi-level Microsoft CA hierarchy – You might already have a root CA or a multi-level CA hierarchy in your on-premises network. If you plan to use your on-premises CA hierarchy, you must have administrative permissions to issue certificates to subordinate CAs. If you do not have an existing Microsoft CA hierarchy, you can set up a new standalone Microsoft root CA by creating an Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instance and installing a standalone root certification authority. You also must create a local user account on this instance and add this user to the local administrator group so that the user has permissions to issue a certificate to a subordinate CA.

The solution setup

The following diagram illustrates the setup with the steps you need to follow to enable LDAPS for AWS Microsoft AD. You will learn how to set up a subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA (in this case, SubordinateCA) and join it to your AWS Microsoft AD domain (in this case, corp.example.com). You also will learn how to create a certificate template on SubordinateCA and configure AWS security group rules to enable LDAPS for your directory.

As a prerequisite, I already created a standalone Microsoft root CA (in this case RootCA) for creating SubordinateCA. RootCA also has a local user account called RootAdmin that has administrative permissions to issue certificates to SubordinateCA. Note that you may already have a root CA or a multi-level CA hierarchy in your on-premises network that you can use for creating SubordinateCA instead of creating a new root CA. If you choose to use your existing on-premises CA hierarchy, you must have administrative permissions on your on-premises CA to issue a certificate to SubordinateCA.

Lastly, I also already created an Amazon EC2 instance (in this case, Management) that I use to manage users, configure AWS security groups, and test the LDAPS connection. I join this instance to the AWS Microsoft AD directory domain.

Diagram showing the process discussed in this post

Here is how the process works:

  1. Delegate permissions to CA administrators (in this case, CAAdmin) so that they can join a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and configure it as a subordinate CA.
  2. Add a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD domain (in this case, SubordinateCA) so that it can issue certificates to your directory domain controllers to enable LDAPS. This step includes joining SubordinateCA to your directory domain, installing the Microsoft enterprise CA, and obtaining a certificate from RootCA that grants SubordinateCA permissions to issue certificates.
  3. Create a certificate template (in this case, ServerAuthentication) with server authentication and autoenrollment enabled so that your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain controllers can obtain certificates through autoenrollment to enable LDAPS.
  4. Configure AWS security group rules so that AWS Microsoft AD directory domain controllers can connect to the subordinate CA to request certificates.
  5. AWS Microsoft AD enables LDAPS through the following process:
    1. AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers request a certificate from SubordinateCA.
    2. SubordinateCA issues a certificate to AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers.
    3. AWS Microsoft AD enables LDAPS for the directory by installing certificates on the directory domain controllers.
  6. Test LDAPS access by using the LDP tool.

I now will show you these steps in detail. I use the names of components—such as RootCA, SubordinateCA, and Management—and refer to users—such as Admin, RootAdmin, and CAAdmin—to illustrate who performs these steps. All component names and user names in this post are used for illustrative purposes only.

Deploy the solution

Step 1: Delegate permissions to CA administrators


In this step, you delegate permissions to your users who manage your CAs. Your users then can join a subordinate CA to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and create the certificate template in your CA.

To enable use with a Microsoft enterprise CA, AWS added a new built-in AD security group called AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators that has delegated permissions to install and administer a Microsoft enterprise CA. By default, your directory Admin is part of the new group and can add other users or groups in your AWS Microsoft AD directory to this security group. If you have trust with your on-premises AD directory, you can also delegate CA administrative permissions to your on-premises users by adding on-premises AD users or global groups to this new AD security group.

To create a new user (in this case CAAdmin) in your directory and add this user to the AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators security group, follow these steps:

  1. Sign in to the Management instance using RDP with the user name admin and the password that you set for the admin user when you created your directory.
  2. Launch the Microsoft Windows Server Manager on the Management instance and navigate to Tools > Active Directory Users and Computers.
    Screnshot of the menu including the "Active Directory Users and Computers" choice
  3. Switch to the tree view and navigate to corp.example.com > CORP > Users. Right-click Users and choose New > User.
    Screenshot of choosing New > User
  4. Add a new user with the First name CA, Last name Admin, and User logon name CAAdmin.
    Screenshot of completing the "New Object - User" boxes
  5. In the Active Directory Users and Computers tool, navigate to corp.example.com > AWS Delegated Groups. In the right pane, right-click AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators and choose Properties.
    Screenshot of navigating to AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators > Properties
  6. In the AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators window, switch to the Members tab and choose Add.
    Screenshot of the "Members" tab of the "AWS Delegate Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators" window
  7. In the Enter the object names to select box, type CAAdmin and choose OK.
    Screenshot showing the "Enter the object names to select" box
  8. In the next window, choose OK to add CAAdmin to the AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators security group.
    Screenshot of adding "CA Admin" to the "AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators" security group
  9. Also add CAAdmin to the AWS Delegated Server Administrators security group so that CAAdmin can RDP in to the Microsoft enterprise CA machine.
    Screenshot of adding "CAAdmin" to the "AWS Delegated Server Administrators" security group also so that "CAAdmin" can RDP in to the Microsoft enterprise CA machine

 You have granted CAAdmin permissions to join a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain.

Step 2: Add a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD directory


In this step, you set up a subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA and join it to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain. I will summarize the process first and then walk through the steps.

First, you create an Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instance called SubordinateCA and join it to the domain, corp.example.com. You then publish RootCA’s public certificate and certificate revocation list (CRL) to SubordinateCA’s local trusted store. You also publish RootCA’s public certificate to your directory domain. Doing so enables SubordinateCA and your directory domain controllers to trust RootCA. You then install the Microsoft enterprise CA service on SubordinateCA and request a certificate from RootCA to make SubordinateCA a subordinate Microsoft CA. After RootCA issues the certificate, SubordinateCA is ready to issue certificates to your directory domain controllers.

Note that you can use an Amazon S3 bucket to pass the certificates between RootCA and SubordinateCA.

In detail, here is how the process works, as illustrated in the preceding diagram:

  1. Set up an Amazon EC2 instance joined to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain – Create an Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instance to use as a subordinate CA, and join it to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain. For this example, the machine name is SubordinateCA and the domain is corp.example.com.
  2. Share RootCA’s public certificate with SubordinateCA – Log in to RootCA as RootAdmin and start Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges. Run the following commands to copy RootCA’s public certificate and CRL to the folder c:\rootcerts on RootCA.
    New-Item c:\rootcerts -type directory
    copy C:\Windows\system32\certsrv\certenroll\*.cr* c:\rootcerts

    Upload RootCA’s public certificate and CRL from c:\rootcerts to an S3 bucket by following the steps in How Do I Upload Files and Folders to an S3 Bucket.

The following screenshot shows RootCA’s public certificate and CRL uploaded to an S3 bucket.
Screenshot of RootCA’s public certificate and CRL uploaded to the S3 bucket

  1. Publish RootCA’s public certificate to your directory domain – Log in to SubordinateCA as the CAAdmin. Download RootCA’s public certificate and CRL from the S3 bucket by following the instructions in How Do I Download an Object from an S3 Bucket? Save the certificate and CRL to the C:\rootcerts folder on SubordinateCA. Add RootCA’s public certificate and the CRL to the local store of SubordinateCA and publish RootCA’s public certificate to your directory domain by running the following commands using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges.
    certutil –addstore –f root <path to the RootCA public certificate file>
    certutil –addstore –f root <path to the RootCA CRL file>
    certutil –dspublish –f <path to the RootCA public certificate file> RootCA
  2. Install the subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA – Install the subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA on SubordinateCA by following the instructions in Install a Subordinate Certification Authority. Ensure that you choose Enterprise CA for Setup Type to install an enterprise CA.

For the CA Type, choose Subordinate CA.

  1. Request a certificate from RootCA – Next, copy the certificate request on SubordinateCA to a folder called c:\CARequest by running the following commands using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges.
    New-Item c:\CARequest -type directory
    Copy c:\*.req C:\CARequest

    Upload the certificate request to the S3 bucket.
    Screenshot of uploading the certificate request to the S3 bucket

  1. Approve SubordinateCA’s certificate request – Log in to RootCA as RootAdmin and download the certificate request from the S3 bucket to a folder called CARequest. Submit the request by running the following command using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges.
    certreq -submit <path to certificate request file>

    In the Certification Authority List window, choose OK.
    Screenshot of the Certification Authority List window

Navigate to Server Manager > Tools > Certification Authority on RootCA.
Screenshot of "Certification Authority" in the drop-down menu

In the Certification Authority window, expand the ROOTCA tree in the left pane and choose Pending Requests. In the right pane, note the value in the Request ID column. Right-click the request and choose All Tasks > Issue.
Screenshot of noting the value in the "Request ID" column

  1. Retrieve the SubordinateCA certificate – Retrieve the SubordinateCA certificate by running following command using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges. The command includes the <RequestId> that you noted in the previous step.
    certreq –retrieve <RequestId> <drive>:\subordinateCA.crt

    Upload SubordinateCA.crt to the S3 bucket.

  1. Install the SubordinateCA certificate – Log in to SubordinateCA as the CAAdmin and download SubordinateCA.crt from the S3 bucket. Install the certificate by running following commands using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges.
    certutil –installcert c:\subordinateCA.crt
    start-service certsvc
  2. Delete the content that you uploaded to S3  As a security best practice, delete all the certificates and CRLs that you uploaded to the S3 bucket in the previous steps because you already have installed them on SubordinateCA.

You have finished setting up the subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA that is joined to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain. Now you can use your subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA to create a certificate template so that your directory domain controllers can request a certificate to enable LDAPS for your directory.

Step 3: Create a certificate template


In this step, you create a certificate template with server authentication and autoenrollment enabled on SubordinateCA. You create this new template (in this case, ServerAuthentication) by duplicating an existing certificate template (in this case, Domain Controller template) and adding server authentication and autoenrollment to the template.

Follow these steps to create a certificate template:

  1. Log in to SubordinateCA as CAAdmin.
  2. Launch Microsoft Windows Server Manager. Select Tools > Certification Authority.
  3. In the Certificate Authority window, expand the SubordinateCA tree in the left pane. Right-click Certificate Templates, and choose Manage.
    Screenshot of choosing "Manage" under "Certificate Template"
  4. In the Certificate Templates Console window, right-click Domain Controller and choose Duplicate Template.
    Screenshot of the Certificate Templates Console window
  5. In the Properties of New Template window, switch to the General tab and change the Template display name to ServerAuthentication.
    Screenshot of the "Properties of New Template" window
  6. Switch to the Security tab, and choose Domain Controllers in the Group or user names section. Select the Allow check box for Autoenroll in the Permissions for Domain Controllers section.
    Screenshot of the "Permissions for Domain Controllers" section of the "Properties of New Template" window
  7. Switch to the Extensions tab, choose Application Policies in the Extensions included in this template section, and choose Edit
    Screenshot of the "Extensions" tab of the "Properties of New Template" window
  8. In the Edit Application Policies Extension window, choose Client Authentication and choose Remove. Choose OK to create the ServerAuthentication certificate template. Close the Certificate Templates Console window.
    Screenshot of the "Edit Application Policies Extension" window
  9. In the Certificate Authority window, right-click Certificate Templates, and choose New > Certificate Template to Issue.
    Screenshot of choosing "New" > "Certificate Template to Issue"
  10. In the Enable Certificate Templates window, choose ServerAuthentication and choose OK.
    Screenshot of the "Enable Certificate Templates" window

You have finished creating a certificate template with server authentication and autoenrollment enabled on SubordinateCA. Your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain controllers can now obtain a certificate through autoenrollment to enable LDAPS.

Step 4: Configure AWS security group rules


In this step, you configure AWS security group rules so that your directory domain controllers can connect to the subordinate CA to request a certificate. To do this, you must add outbound rules to your directory’s AWS security group (in this case, sg-4ba7682d) to allow all outbound traffic to SubordinateCA’s AWS security group (in this case, sg-6fbe7109) so that your directory domain controllers can connect to SubordinateCA for requesting a certificate. You also must add inbound rules to SubordinateCA’s AWS security group to allow all incoming traffic from your directory’s AWS security group so that the subordinate CA can accept incoming traffic from your directory domain controllers.

Follow these steps to configure AWS security group rules:

  1. Log in to the Management instance as Admin.
  2. Navigate to the EC2 console.
  3. In the left pane, choose Network & Security > Security Groups.
  4. In the right pane, choose the AWS security group (in this case, sg-6fbe7109) of SubordinateCA.
  5. Switch to the Inbound tab and choose Edit.
  6. Choose Add Rule. Choose All traffic for Type and Custom for Source. Enter your directory’s AWS security group (in this case, sg-4ba7682d) in the Source box. Choose Save.
    Screenshot of adding an inbound rule
  7. Now choose the AWS security group (in this case, sg-4ba7682d) of your AWS Microsoft AD directory, switch to the Outbound tab, and choose Edit.
  8. Choose Add Rule. Choose All traffic for Type and Custom for Destination. Enter your directory’s AWS security group (in this case, sg-6fbe7109) in the Destination box. Choose Save.

You have completed the configuration of AWS security group rules to allow traffic between your directory domain controllers and SubordinateCA.

Step 5: AWS Microsoft AD enables LDAPS


The AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers perform this step automatically by recognizing the published template and requesting a certificate from the subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA. The subordinate CA can take up to 180 minutes to issue certificates to the directory domain controllers. The directory imports these certificates into the directory domain controllers and enables LDAPS for your directory automatically. This completes the setup of LDAPS for the AWS Microsoft AD directory. The LDAP service on the directory is now ready to accept LDAPS connections!

Step 6: Test LDAPS access by using the LDP tool


In this step, you test the LDAPS connection to the AWS Microsoft AD directory by using the LDP tool. The LDP tool is available on the Management machine where you installed Active Directory Administration Tools. Before you test the LDAPS connection, you must wait up to 180 minutes for the subordinate CA to issue a certificate to your directory domain controllers.

To test LDAPS, you connect to one of the domain controllers using port 636. Here are the steps to test the LDAPS connection:

  1. Log in to Management as Admin.
  2. Launch the Microsoft Windows Server Manager on Management and navigate to Tools > Active Directory Users and Computers.
  3. Switch to the tree view and navigate to corp.example.com > CORP > Domain Controllers. In the right pane, right-click on one of the domain controllers and choose Properties. Copy the DNS name of the domain controller.
    Screenshot of copying the DNS name of the domain controller
  4. Launch the LDP.exe tool by launching Windows PowerShell and running the LDP.exe command.
  5. In the LDP tool, choose Connection > Connect.
    Screenshot of choosing "Connnection" > "Connect" in the LDP tool
  6. In the Server box, paste the DNS name you copied in the previous step. Type 636 in the Port box. Choose OK to test the LDAPS connection to port 636 of your directory.
    Screenshot of completing the boxes in the "Connect" window
  7. You should see the following message to confirm that your LDAPS connection is now open.

You have completed the setup of LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory! You can now encrypt LDAP communications between your Windows and Linux applications and your AWS Microsoft AD directory using LDAPS.

Summary

In this blog post, I walked through the process of enabling LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory. Enabling LDAPS helps you protect PII and other sensitive information exchanged over untrusted networks between your Windows and Linux applications and your AWS Microsoft AD. To learn more about how to use AWS Microsoft AD, see the Directory Service documentation. For general information and pricing, see the Directory Service home page.

If you have comments about this blog post, submit a comment in the “Comments” section below. If you have implementation or troubleshooting questions, start a new thread on the Directory Service forum.

– Vijay

Now Use AWS IAM to Delete a Service-Linked Role When You No Longer Require an AWS Service to Perform Actions on Your Behalf

Post Syndicated from Ujjwal Pugalia original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/now-use-aws-iam-to-delete-a-service-linked-role-when-you-no-longer-require-an-aws-service-to-perform-actions-on-your-behalf/

Earlier this year, AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) introduced service-linked roles, which provide you an easy and secure way to delegate permissions to AWS services. Each service-linked role delegates permissions to an AWS service, which is called its linked service. Service-linked roles help with monitoring and auditing requirements by providing a transparent way to understand all actions performed on your behalf because AWS CloudTrail logs all actions performed by the linked service using service-linked roles. For information about which services support service-linked roles, see AWS Services That Work with IAM. Over time, more AWS services will support service-linked roles.

Today, IAM added support for the deletion of service-linked roles through the IAM console and the IAM API/CLI. This means you now can revoke permissions from the linked service to create and manage AWS resources in your account. When you delete a service-linked role, the linked service no longer has the permissions to perform actions on your behalf. To ensure your AWS services continue to function as expected when you delete a service-linked role, IAM validates that you no longer have resources that require the service-linked role to function properly. This prevents you from inadvertently revoking permissions required by an AWS service to manage your existing AWS resources and helps you maintain your resources in a consistent state. If there are any resources in your account that require the service-linked role, you will receive an error when you attempt to delete the service-linked role, and the service-linked role will remain in your account. If you do not have any resources that require the service-linked role, you can delete the service-linked role and IAM will remove the service-linked role from your account.

In this blog post, I show how to delete a service-linked role by using the IAM console. To learn more about how to delete service-linked roles by using the IAM API/CLI, see the DeleteServiceLinkedRole API documentation.

Note: The IAM console does not currently support service-linked role deletion for Amazon Lex, but you can delete your service-linked role by using the Amazon Lex console. To learn more, see Service Permissions.

How to delete a service-linked role by using the IAM console

If you no longer need to use an AWS service that uses a service-linked role, you can remove permissions from that service by deleting the service-linked role through the IAM console. To delete a service-linked role, you must have permissions for the iam:DeleteServiceLinkedRole action. For example, the following IAM policy grants the permission to delete service-linked roles used by Amazon Redshift. To learn more about working with IAM policies, see Working with Policies.

{ 
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "AllowDeletionOfServiceLinkedRolesForRedshift",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": ["iam:DeleteServiceLinkedRole"],
            "Resource": ["arn:aws:iam::*:role/aws-service-role/redshift.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRedshift*"]
	 }
    ]
}

To delete a service-linked role by using the IAM console:

  1. Navigate to the IAM console and choose Roles from the navigation pane.

Screenshot of the Roles page in the IAM console

  1. Choose the service-linked role you want to delete and then choose Delete role. In this example, I choose the  AWSServiceRoleForRedshift service-linked role.

Screenshot of the AWSServiceRoleForRedshift service-linked role

  1. A dialog box asks you to confirm that you want to delete the service-linked role you have chosen. In the Last activity column, you can see when the AWS service last used the service-linked role, which tells you when the linked service last used the service-linked role to perform an action on your behalf. If you want to continue to delete the service-linked role, choose Yes, delete to delete the service-linked role.

Screenshot of the "Delete role" window

  1. IAM then checks whether you have any resources that require the service-linked role you are trying to delete. While IAM checks, you will see the status message, Deletion in progress, below the role name. Screenshot showing "Deletion in progress"
  1. If no resources require the service-linked role, IAM deletes the role from your account and displays a success message on the console.

Screenshot of the success message

  1. If there are AWS resources that require the service-linked role you are trying to delete, you will see the status message, Deletion failed, below the role name.

Screenshot showing the "Deletion failed"

  1. If you choose View details, you will see a message that explains the deletion failed because there are resources that use the service-linked role.
    Screenshot showing details about why the role deletion failed
  2. Choose View Resources to view the Amazon Resource Names (ARNs) of the first five resources that require the service-linked role. You can delete the service-linked role only after you delete all resources that require the service-linked role. In this example, only one resource requires the service-linked role.

Conclusion

Service-linked roles make it easier for you to delegate permissions to AWS services to create and manage AWS resources on your behalf and to understand all actions the service will perform on your behalf. If you no longer need to use an AWS service that uses a service-linked role, you can remove permissions from that service by deleting the service-linked role through the IAM console. However, before you delete a service-linked role, you must delete all the resources associated with that role to ensure that your resources remain in a consistent state.

If you have any questions, submit a comment in the “Comments” section below. If you need help working with service-linked roles, start a new thread on the IAM forum or contact AWS Support.

– Ujjwal

Greater Transparency into Actions AWS Services Perform on Your Behalf by Using AWS CloudTrail

Post Syndicated from Ujjwal Pugalia original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/get-greater-transparency-into-actions-aws-services-perform-on-your-behalf-by-using-aws-cloudtrail/

To make managing your AWS account easier, some AWS services perform actions on your behalf, including the creation and management of AWS resources. For example, AWS Elastic Beanstalk automatically handles the deployment details of capacity provisioning, load balancing, auto-scaling, and application health monitoring. To make these AWS actions more transparent, AWS adds an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) service-linked roles to your account for each linked service you use. Service-linked roles let you view all actions an AWS service performs on your behalf by using AWS CloudTrail logs. This helps you monitor and audit the actions AWS services perform on your behalf. No additional actions are required from you and you can continue using AWS services the way you do today.

To learn more about which AWS services use service-linked roles and log actions on your behalf to CloudTrail, see AWS Services That Work with IAM. Over time, more AWS services will support service-linked roles. For more information about service-linked roles, see Role Terms and Concepts.

In this blog post, I demonstrate how to view CloudTrail logs so that you can more easily monitor and audit AWS services performing actions on your behalf. First, I show how AWS creates a service-linked role in your account automatically when you configure an AWS service that supports service-linked roles. Next, I show how you can view the policies of a service-linked role that grants an AWS service permission to perform actions on your behalf. Finally, I  use the configured AWS service to perform an action and show you how the action appears in your CloudTrail logs.

How AWS creates a service-linked role in your account automatically

I will use Amazon Lex as the AWS service that performs actions on your behalf for this post. You can use Amazon Lex to create chatbots that allow for highly engaging conversational experiences through voice and text. You also can use chatbots on mobile devices, web browsers, and popular chat platform channels such as Slack. Amazon Lex uses Amazon Polly on your behalf to synthesize speech that sounds like a human voice.

Amazon Lex uses two IAM service-linked roles:

  • AWSServiceRoleForLexBots — Amazon Lex uses this service-linked role to invoke Amazon Polly to synthesize speech responses for your chatbot.
  • AWSServiceRoleForLexChannels — Amazon Lex uses this service-linked role to post text to your chatbot when managing channels such as Slack.

You don’t need to create either of these roles manually. When you create your first chatbot using the Amazon Lex console, Amazon Lex creates the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots role for you. When you first associate a chatbot with a messaging channel, Amazon Lex creates the AWSServiceRoleForLexChannels role in your account.

1. Start configuring the AWS service that supports service-linked roles

Navigate to the Amazon Lex console, and choose Get Started to navigate to the Create your Lex bot page. For this example, I choose a sample chatbot called OrderFlowers. To learn how to create a custom chatbot, see Create a Custom Amazon Lex Bot.

Screenshot of making the choice to create an OrderFlowers chatbot

2. Complete the configuration for the AWS service

When you scroll down, you will see the settings for the OrderFlowers chatbot. Notice the field for the IAM role with the value, AWSServiceRoleForLexBots. This service-linked role is “Automatically created on your behalf.” After you have entered all details, choose Create to build your sample chatbot.

Screenshot of the automatically created service-linked role

AWS has created the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role in your account. I will return to using the chatbot later in this post when I discuss how Amazon Lex performs actions on your behalf and how CloudTrail logs these actions. First, I will show how you can view the permissions for the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role by using the IAM console.

How to view actions in the IAM console that AWS services perform on your behalf

When you configure an AWS service that supports service-linked roles, AWS creates a service-linked role in your account automatically. You can view the service-linked role by using the IAM console.

1. View the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role on the IAM console

Go to the IAM console, and choose AWSServiceRoleForLexBots on the Roles page. You can confirm that this role is a service-linked role by viewing the Trusted entities column.

Screenshot of the service-linked role

2.View the trusted entities that can assume the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role

Choose the Trust relationships tab on the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots role page. You can view the trusted entities that can assume the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role to perform actions on your behalf. In this example, the trusted entity is lex.amazonaws.com.

Screenshot of the trusted entities that can assume the service-linked role

3. View the policy attached to the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role

Choose AmazonLexBotPolicy on the Permissions tab to view the policy attached to the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role. You can view the policy summary to see that AmazonLexBotPolicy grants permission to Amazon Lex to use Amazon Polly.

Screenshot showing that AmazonLexBotPolicy grants permission to Amazon Lex to use Amazon Polly

4. View the actions that the service-linked role grants permissions to use

Choose Polly to view the action, SynthesizeSpeech, that the AmazonLexBotPolicy grants permission to Amazon Lex to perform on your behalf. Amazon Lex uses this permission to synthesize speech responses for your chatbot. I show later in this post how you can monitor this SynthesizeSpeech action in your CloudTrail logs.

Screenshot showing the the action, SynthesizeSpeech, that the AmazonLexBotPolicy grants permission to Amazon Lex to perform on your behalf

Now that I know the trusted entity and the policy attached to the service-linked role, let’s go back to the chatbot I created earlier and see how CloudTrail logs the actions that Amazon Lex performs on my behalf.

How to use CloudTrail to view actions that AWS services perform on your behalf

As discussed already, I created an OrderFlowers chatbot on the Amazon Lex console. I will use the chatbot and display how the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role helps me track actions in CloudTrail. First, though, I must have an active CloudTrail trail created that stores the logs in an Amazon S3 bucket. I will use a trail called TestTrail and an S3 bucket called account-ids-slr.

1. Use the Amazon Lex chatbot via the Amazon Lex console

In Step 2 in the first section of this post, when I chose Create, Amazon Lex built the OrderFlowers chatbot. After the chatbot was built, the right pane showed that a Test Bot was created. Now, I choose the microphone symbol in the right pane and provide voice input to test the OrderFlowers chatbot. In this example, I tell the chatbot, “I would like to order some flowers.” The bot replies to me by asking, “What type of flowers would you like to order?”

Screenshot of voice input to test the OrderFlowers chatbot

When the chatbot replies using voice, Amazon Lex uses Amazon Polly to synthesize speech from text to voice. Amazon Lex assumes the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role to perform the SynthesizeSpeech action.

2. Check CloudTrail to view actions performed on your behalf

Now that I have created the chatbot, let’s see which actions were logged in CloudTrail. Choose CloudTrail from the Services drop-down menu to reach the CloudTrail console. Choose Trails and choose the S3 bucket in which you are storing your CloudTrail logs.

Screenshot of the TestTrail trail

In the S3 bucket, you will find log entries for the SynthesizeSpeech event. This means that CloudTrail logged the action when Amazon Lex assumed the AWSServiceRoleForLexBots service-linked role to invoke Amazon Polly to synthesize speech responses for your chatbot. You can monitor and audit this invocation, and it provides you with transparency into Amazon Polly’s SynthesizeSpeech action that Amazon Lex invoked on your behalf. The applicable CloudTrail log section follows and I have emphasized the key lines.

{  
         "eventVersion":"1.05",
         "userIdentity":{  
           "type":"AssumedRole",
            "principalId":"{principal-id}:OrderFlowers",
            "arn":"arn:aws:sts::{account-id}:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForLexBots/OrderFlowers",
            "accountId":"{account-id}",
            "accessKeyId":"{access-key-id}",
            "sessionContext":{  
               "attributes":{  
                  "mfaAuthenticated":"false",
                  "creationDate":"2017-09-17T17:30:05Z"
               },
               "sessionIssuer":{  
                  "type":"Role",
                  "principalId":"{principal-id}",
                  "arn":"arn:aws:iam:: {account-id}:role/aws-service-role/lex.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForLexBots",
                  "accountId":"{account-id",
                  "userName":"AWSServiceRoleForLexBots"
               }
            },
            "invokedBy":"lex.amazonaws.com"
         },
         "eventTime":"2017-09-17T17:30:05Z",
         "eventSource":"polly.amazonaws.com",
         "eventName":"SynthesizeSpeech",
         "awsRegion":"us-east-1",
         "sourceIPAddress":"lex.amazonaws.com",
         "userAgent":"lex.amazonaws.com",
         "requestParameters":{  
            "outputFormat":"mp3",
            "textType":"text",
            "voiceId":"Salli",
            "text":"**********"
         },
         "responseElements":{  
            "requestCharacters":45,
            "contentType":"audio/mpeg"
         },
         "requestID":"{request-id}",
         "eventID":"{event-id}",
         "eventType":"AwsApiCall",
         "recipientAccountId":"{account-id}"
      }

Conclusion

Service-linked roles make it easier for you to track and view actions that linked AWS services perform on your behalf by using CloudTrail. When an AWS service supports service-linked roles to enable this additional logging, you will see a service-linked role added to your account.

If you have comments about this post, submit a comment in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about working with service-linked roles, start a new thread on the IAM forum or contact AWS Support.

– Ujjwal

Another Chinese Developer Arrested For Selling VPN Access

Post Syndicated from Andy original https://torrentfreak.com/another-chinese-developer-arrested-for-selling-vpn-access-170920/

Early 2017, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology said that due to Internet technologies and services expanding in a “disorderly” fashion, regulation would be needed to restore order.

Announcing measures to strengthen network information security management, the government said it would begin a “nationwide Internet network access services clean-up.”

Months later, it became evident that authorities were taking an even more aggressive stance towards Virtual Private Networks, since these allow citizens to evade the so-called Great Firewall of China. The government said that in future, operating such a service without a corresponding telecommunications license would constitute an offense.

Now, according to local news reports, a citizen who apparently failed to heed the government’s warnings has fallen foul of the new rules.

The Nanjinger reports that a software developer, named as Mr. Zhao from Nanjing, was arrested August 21 for contravening the new laws on VPN licensing.

Zhao reportedly told authorities he’d initially set up the VPN for his own use in order to access content hosted abroad, which presumably involved circumventing China’s firewall. However, once he recognized there was a demand, the developer decided to let others use the service for a small fee.

The prices he asked were indeed small – just $1.50 per month or around $18 for two years’ service. Based on reported total revenues of just $164 for the entire business, it’s possible he had around 100 customers, or indeed far fewer.

What will happen to the man isn’t clear but he’ll be keen to avoid the fate of Deng Jiewei, who previously ran a small website through which he’d sold around $2,100 worth of VPN software.

Early September it was reported that the 26-year-old had been sentenced to nine months in prison for offering tools that enable people to “visit foreign websites that cannot be accessed via a domestic (mainland) IP address.”

These cases are part of an emerging pattern in China centered around the supply and sale of VPN products and services. Back in July, Apple began banning VPN applications from its iOS store in China. The company reported that the apps contained content that is illegal locally, thereby violating the company’s policies.

Source: TF, for the latest info on copyright, file-sharing, torrent sites and ANONYMOUS VPN services.

Automating Amazon EBS Snapshot Management with AWS Step Functions and Amazon CloudWatch Events

Post Syndicated from Andy Katz original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/automating-amazon-ebs-snapshot-management-with-aws-step-functions-and-amazon-cloudwatch-events/

Brittany Doncaster, Solutions Architect

Business continuity is important for building mission-critical workloads on AWS. As an AWS customer, you might define recovery point objectives (RPO) and recovery time objectives (RTO) for different tier applications in your business. After the RPO and RTO requirements are defined, it is up to your architects to determine how to meet those requirements.

You probably store persistent data in Amazon EBS volumes, which live within a single Availability Zone. And, following best practices, you take snapshots of your EBS volumes to back up the data on Amazon S3, which provides 11 9’s of durability. If you are following these best practices, then you’ve probably recognized the need to manage the number of snapshots you keep for a particular EBS volume and delete older, unneeded snapshots. Doing this cleanup helps save on storage costs.

Some customers also have policies stating that backups need to be stored a certain number of miles away as part of a disaster recovery (DR) plan. To meet these requirements, customers copy their EBS snapshots to the DR region. Then, the same snapshot management and cleanup has to also be done in the DR region.

All of this snapshot management logic consists of different components. You would first tag your snapshots so you could manage them. Then, determine how many snapshots you currently have for a particular EBS volume and assess that value against a retention rule. If the number of snapshots was greater than your retention value, then you would clean up old snapshots. And finally, you might copy the latest snapshot to your DR region. All these steps are just an example of a simple snapshot management workflow. But how do you automate something like this in AWS? How do you do it without servers?

One of the most powerful AWS services released in 2016 was Amazon CloudWatch Events. It enables you to build event-driven IT automation, based on events happening within your AWS infrastructure. CloudWatch Events integrates with AWS Lambda to let you execute your custom code when one of those events occurs. However, the actions to take based on those events aren’t always composed of a single Lambda function. Instead, your business logic may consist of multiple steps (like in the case of the example snapshot management flow described earlier). And you may want to run those steps in sequence or in parallel. You may also want to have retry logic or exception handling for each step.

AWS Step Functions serves just this purpose―to help you coordinate your functions and microservices. Step Functions enables you to simplify your effort and pull the error handling, retry logic, and workflow logic out of your Lambda code. Step Functions integrates with Lambda to provide a mechanism for building complex serverless applications. Now, you can kick off a Step Functions state machine based on a CloudWatch event.

In this post, I discuss how you can target Step Functions in a CloudWatch Events rule. This allows you to have event-driven snapshot management based on snapshot completion events firing in CloudWatch Event rules.

As an example of what you could do with Step Functions and CloudWatch Events, we’ve developed a reference architecture that performs management of your EBS snapshots.

Automating EBS Snapshot Management with Step Functions

This architecture assumes that you have already set up CloudWatch Events to create the snapshots on a schedule or that you are using some other means of creating snapshots according to your needs.

This architecture covers the pieces of the workflow that need to happen after a snapshot has been created.

  • It creates a CloudWatch Events rule to invoke a Step Functions state machine execution when an EBS snapshot is created.
  • The state machine then tags the snapshot, cleans up the oldest snapshots if the number of snapshots is greater than the defined number to retain, and copies the snapshot to a DR region.
  • When the DR region snapshot copy is completed, another state machine kicks off in the DR region. The new state machine has a similar flow and uses some of the same Lambda code to clean up the oldest snapshots that are greater than the defined number to retain.
  • Also, both state machines demonstrate how you can use Step Functions to handle errors within your workflow. Any errors that are caught during execution result in the execution of a Lambda function that writes a message to an SNS topic. Therefore, if any errors occur, you can subscribe to the SNS topic and get notified.

The following is an architecture diagram of the reference architecture:

Creating the Lambda functions and Step Functions state machines

First, pull the code from GitHub and use the AWS CLI to create S3 buckets for the Lambda code in the primary and DR regions. For this example, assume that the primary region is us-west-2 and the DR region is us-east-2. Run the following commands, replacing the italicized text in <> with your own unique bucket names.

git clone https://github.com/awslabs/aws-step-functions-ebs-snapshot-mgmt.git

cd aws-step-functions-ebs-snapshot-mgmt/

aws s3 mb s3://<primary region bucket name> --region us-west-2

aws s3 mb s3://<DR region bucket name> --region us-east-2

Next, use the Serverless Application Model (SAM), which uses AWS CloudFormation to deploy the Lambda functions and Step Functions state machines in the primary and DR regions. Replace the italicized text in <> with the S3 bucket names that you created earlier.

aws cloudformation package --template-file PrimaryRegionTemplate.yaml --s3-bucket <primary region bucket name>  --output-template-file tempPrimary.yaml --region us-west-2

aws cloudformation deploy --template-file tempPrimary.yaml --stack-name ebsSnapshotMgmtPrimary --capabilities CAPABILITY_IAM --region us-west-2

aws cloudformation package --template-file DR_RegionTemplate.yaml --s3-bucket <DR region bucket name> --output-template-file tempDR.yaml  --region us-east-2

aws cloudformation deploy --template-file tempDR.yaml --stack-name ebsSnapshotMgmtDR --capabilities CAPABILITY_IAM --region us-east-2

CloudWatch event rule verification

The CloudFormation templates deploy the following resources:

  • The Lambda functions that are coordinated by Step Functions
  • The Step Functions state machine
  • The SNS topic
  • The CloudWatch Events rules that trigger the state machine execution

So, all of the CloudWatch event rules have been created for you by performing the preceding commands. The next section demonstrates how you could create the CloudWatch event rule manually. To jump straight to testing the workflow, see the “Testing in your Account” section. Otherwise, you begin by setting up the CloudWatch event rule in the primary region for the createSnapshot event and also the CloudWatch event rule in the DR region for the copySnapshot command.

First, open the CloudWatch console in the primary region.

Choose Create Rule and create a rule for the createSnapshot command, with your newly created Step Function state machine as the target.

For Event Source, choose Event Pattern and specify the following values:

  • Service Name: EC2
  • Event Type: EBS Snapshot Notification
  • Specific Event: createSnapshot

For Target, choose Step Functions state machine, then choose the state machine created by the CloudFormation commands. Choose Create a new role for this specific resource. Your completed rule should look like the following:

Choose Configure Details and give the rule a name and description.

Choose Create Rule. You now have a CloudWatch Events rule that triggers a Step Functions state machine execution when the EBS snapshot creation is complete.

Now, set up the CloudWatch Events rule in the DR region as well. This looks almost same, but is based off the copySnapshot event instead of createSnapshot.

In the upper right corner in the console, switch to your DR region. Choose CloudWatch, Create Rule.

For Event Source, choose Event Pattern and specify the following values:

  • Service Name: EC2
  • Event Type: EBS Snapshot Notification
  • Specific Event: copySnapshot

For Target, choose Step Functions state machine, then select the state machine created by the CloudFormation commands. Choose Create a new role for this specific resource. Your completed rule should look like in the following:

As in the primary region, choose Configure Details and then give this rule a name and description. Complete the creation of the rule.

Testing in your account

To test this setup, open the EC2 console and choose Volumes. Select a volume to snapshot. Choose Actions, Create Snapshot, and then create a snapshot.

This results in a new execution of your state machine in the primary and DR regions. You can view these executions by going to the Step Functions console and selecting your state machine.

From there, you can see the execution of the state machine.

Primary region state machine:

DR region state machine:

I’ve also provided CloudFormation templates that perform all the earlier setup without using git clone and running the CloudFormation commands. Choose the Launch Stack buttons below to launch the primary and DR region stacks in Dublin and Ohio, respectively. From there, you can pick up at the Testing in Your Account section above to finish the example. All of the code for this example architecture is located in the aws-step-functions-ebs-snapshot-mgmt AWSLabs repo.

Launch EBS Snapshot Management into Ireland with CloudFormation
Primary Region eu-west-1 (Ireland)

Launch EBS Snapshot Management into Ohio with CloudFormation
DR Region us-east-2 (Ohio)

Summary

This reference architecture is just an example of how you can use Step Functions and CloudWatch Events to build event-driven IT automation. The possibilities are endless:

  • Use this pattern to perform other common cleanup type jobs such as managing Amazon RDS snapshots, old versions of Lambda functions, or old Amazon ECR images—all triggered by scheduled events.
  • Use Trusted Advisor events to identify unused EC2 instances or EBS volumes, then coordinate actions on them, such as alerting owners, stopping, or snapshotting.

Happy coding and please let me know what useful state machines you build!

Simplify Your Jenkins Builds with AWS CodeBuild

Post Syndicated from Paul Roberts original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/simplify-your-jenkins-builds-with-aws-codebuild/

Jeff Bezos famously said, “There’s a lot of undifferentiated heavy lifting that stands between your idea and that success.” He went on to say, “…70% of your time, energy, and dollars go into the undifferentiated heavy lifting and only 30% of your energy, time, and dollars gets to go into the core kernel of your idea.”

If you subscribe to this maxim, you should not be spending valuable time focusing on operational issues related to maintaining the Jenkins build infrastructure. Companies such as Riot Games have over 1.25 million builds per year and have written several lengthy blog posts about their experiences designing a complex, custom Docker-powered Jenkins build farm. Dealing with Jenkins slaves at scale is a job in itself and Riot has engineers focused on managing the build infrastructure.

Typical Jenkins Build Farm

 

As with all technology, the Jenkins build farm architectures have evolved. Today, instead of manually building your own container infrastructure, there are Jenkins Docker plugins available to help reduce the operational burden of maintaining these environments. There is also a community-contributed Amazon EC2 Container Service (Amazon ECS) plugin that helps remove some of the overhead, but you still need to configure and manage the overall Amazon ECS environment.

There are various ways to create and manage your Jenkins build farm, but there has to be a way that significantly reduces your operational overhead.

Introducing AWS CodeBuild

AWS CodeBuild is a fully managed build service that removes the undifferentiated heavy lifting of provisioning, managing, and scaling your own build servers. With CodeBuild, there is no software to install, patch, or update. CodeBuild scales up automatically to meet the needs of your development teams. In addition, CodeBuild is an on-demand service where you pay as you go. You are charged based only on the number of minutes it takes to complete your build.

One AWS customer, Recruiterbox, helps companies hire simply and predictably through their software platform. Two years ago, they began feeling the operational pain of maintaining their own Jenkins build farms. They briefly considered moving to Amazon ECS, but chose an even easier path forward instead. Recuiterbox transitioned to using Jenkins with CodeBuild and are very happy with the results. You can read more about their journey here.

Solution Overview: Jenkins and CodeBuild

To remove the heavy lifting from managing your Jenkins build farm, AWS has developed a Jenkins AWS CodeBuild plugin. After the plugin has been enabled, a developer can configure a Jenkins project to pick up new commits from their chosen source code repository and automatically run the associated builds. After the build is successful, it will create an artifact that is stored inside an S3 bucket that you have configured. If an error is detected somewhere, CodeBuild will capture the output and send it to Amazon CloudWatch logs. In addition to storing the logs on CloudWatch, Jenkins also captures the error so you do not have to go hunting for log files for your build.

 

AWS CodeBuild with Jenkins Plugin

 

The following example uses AWS CodeCommit (Git) as the source control management (SCM) and Amazon S3 for build artifact storage. Logs are stored in CloudWatch. A development pipeline that uses Jenkins with CodeBuild plugin architecture looks something like this:

 

AWS CodeBuild Diagram

Initial Solution Setup

To keep this blog post succinct, I assume that you are using the following components on AWS already and have applied the appropriate IAM policies:

·         AWS CodeCommit repo.

·         Amazon S3 bucket for CodeBuild artifacts.

·         SNS notification for text messaging of the Jenkins admin password.

·         IAM user’s key and secret.

·         A role that has a policy with these permissions. Be sure to edit the ARNs with your region, account, and resource name. Use this role in the AWS CloudFormation template referred to later in this post.

 

Jenkins Installation with CodeBuild Plugin Enabled

To make the integration with Jenkins as frictionless as possible, I have created an AWS CloudFormation template here: https://s3.amazonaws.com/proberts-public/jenkins.yaml. Download the template, sign in the AWS CloudFormation console, and then use the template to create a stack.

 

CloudFormation Inputs

Jenkins Project Configuration

After the stack is complete, log in to the Jenkins EC2 instance using the user name “admin” and the password sent to your mobile device. Now that you have logged in to Jenkins, you need to create your first project. Start with a Freestyle project and configure the parameters based on your CodeBuild and CodeCommit settings.

 

AWS CodeBuild Plugin Configuration in Jenkins

 

Additional Jenkins AWS CodeBuild Plugin Configuration

 

After you have configured the Jenkins project appropriately you should be able to check your build status on the Jenkins polling log under your project settings:

 

Jenkins Polling Log

 

Now that Jenkins is polling CodeCommit, you can check the CodeBuild dashboard under your Jenkins project to confirm your build was successful:

Jenkins AWS CodeBuild Dashboard

Wrapping Up

In a matter of minutes, you have been able to provision Jenkins with the AWS CodeBuild plugin. This will greatly simplify your build infrastructure management. Now kick back and relax while CodeBuild does all the heavy lifting!


About the Author

Paul Roberts is a Strategic Solutions Architect for Amazon Web Services. When he is not working on Serverless, DevOps, or Artificial Intelligence, he is often found in Lake Tahoe exploring the various mountain ranges with his family.

AWS IAM Policy Summaries Now Help You Identify Errors and Correct Permissions in Your IAM Policies

Post Syndicated from Joy Chatterjee original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/iam-policy-summaries-now-help-you-identify-errors-and-correct-permissions-in-your-iam-policies/

In March, we made it easier to view and understand the permissions in your AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies by using IAM policy summaries. Today, we updated policy summaries to help you identify and correct errors in your IAM policies. When you set permissions using IAM policies, for each action you specify, you must match that action to supported resources or conditions. Now, you will see a warning if these policy elements (Actions, Resources, and Conditions) defined in your IAM policy do not match.

When working with policies, you may find that although the policy has valid JSON syntax, it does not grant or deny the desired permissions because the Action element does not have an applicable Resource element or Condition element defined in the policy. For example, you may want to create a policy that allows users to view a specific Amazon EC2 instance. To do this, you create a policy that specifies ec2:DescribeInstances for the Action element and the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the instance for the Resource element. When testing this policy, you find AWS denies this access because ec2:DescribeInstances does not support resource-level permissions and requires access to list all instances. Therefore, to grant access to this Action element, you need to specify a wildcard (*) in the Resource element of your policy for this Action element in order for the policy to function correctly.

To help you identify and correct permissions, you will now see a warning in a policy summary if the policy has either of the following:

  • An action that does not support the resource specified in a policy.
  • An action that does not support the condition specified in a policy.

In this blog post, I walk through two examples of how you can use policy summaries to help identify and correct these types of errors in your IAM policies.

How to use IAM policy summaries to debug your policies

Example 1: An action does not support the resource specified in a policy

Let’s say a human resources (HR) representative, Casey, needs access to the personnel files stored in HR’s Amazon S3 bucket. To do this, I create the following policy to grant all actions that begin with s3:List. In addition, I grant access to s3:GetObject in the Action element of the policy. To ensure that Casey has access only to a specific bucket and not others, I specify the bucket ARN in the Resource element of the policy.

Note: This policy does not grant the desired permissions.

This policy does not work. Do not copy.
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "ThisPolicyDoesNotGrantAllListandGetActions",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": ["s3:List*",
                       "s3:GetObject"],
            "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::HumanResources"]
        }
    ]
}

After I create the policy, HRBucketPermissions, I select this policy from the Policies page to view the policy summary. From here, I check to see if there are any warnings or typos in the policy. I see a warning at the top of the policy detail page because the policy does not grant some permissions specified in the policy, which is caused by a mismatch among the actions, resources, or conditions.

Screenshot showing the warning at the top of the policy

To view more details about the warning, I choose Show remaining so that I can understand why the permissions do not appear in the policy summary. As shown in the following screenshot, I see no access to the services that are not granted by the IAM policy in the policy, which is expected. However, next to S3, I see a warning that one or more S3 actions do not have an applicable resource.

Screenshot showing that one or more S3 actions do not have an applicable resource

To understand why the specific actions do not have a supported resource, I choose S3 from the list of services and choose Show remaining. I type List in the filter to understand why some of the list actions are not granted by the policy. As shown in the following screenshot, I see these warnings:

  • This action does not support resource-level permissions. This means the action does not support resource-level permissions and requires a wildcard (*) in the Resource element of the policy.
  • This action does not have an applicable resource. This means the action supports resource-level permissions, but not the resource type defined in the policy. In this example, I specified an S3 bucket for an action that supports only an S3 object resource type.

From these warnings, I see that s3:ListAllMyBuckets, s3:ListBucketMultipartUploadsParts3:ListObjects , and s3:GetObject do not support an S3 bucket resource type, which results in Casey not having access to the S3 bucket. To correct the policy, I choose Edit policy and update the policy with three statements based on the resource that the S3 actions support. Because Casey needs access to view and read all of the objects in the HumanResources bucket, I add a wildcard (*) for the S3 object path in the Resource ARN.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "TheseActionsSupportBucketResourceType",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": ["s3:ListBucket",
                       "s3:ListBucketByTags",
                       "s3:ListBucketMultipartUploads",
                       "s3:ListBucketVersions"],
            "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::HumanResources"]
        },{
            "Sid": "TheseActionsRequireAllResources",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": ["s3:ListAllMyBuckets",
                       "s3:ListMultipartUploadParts",
                       "s3:ListObjects"],
            "Resource": [ "*"]
        },{
            "Sid": "TheseActionsRequireSupportsObjectResourceType",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
            "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::HumanResources/*"]
        }
    ]
}

After I make these changes, I see the updated policy summary and see that warnings are no longer displayed.

Screenshot of the updated policy summary that no longer shows warnings

In the previous example, I showed how to identify and correct permissions errors that include actions that do not support a specified resource. In the next example, I show how to use policy summaries to identify and correct a policy that includes actions that do not support a specified condition.

Example 2: An action does not support the condition specified in a policy

For this example, let’s assume Bob is a project manager who requires view and read access to all the code builds for his team. To grant him this access, I create the following JSON policy that specifies all list and read actions to AWS CodeBuild and defines a condition to limit access to resources in the us-west-2 Region in which Bob’s team develops.

This policy does not work. Do not copy. 
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "ListReadAccesstoCodeServices",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "codebuild:List*",
                "codebuild:BatchGet*"
            ],
            "Resource": ["*"], 
             "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "ec2:Region": "us-west-2"
                }
            }
        }
    ]	
}

After I create the policy, PMCodeBuildAccess, I select this policy from the Policies page to view the policy summary in the IAM console. From here, I check to see if the policy has any warnings or typos. I see an error at the top of the policy detail page because the policy does not grant any permissions.

Screenshot with an error showing the policy does not grant any permissions

To view more details about the error, I choose Show remaining to understand why no permissions result from the policy. I see this warning: One or more conditions do not have an applicable action. This means that the condition is not supported by any of the actions defined in the policy.

From the warning message (see preceding screenshot), I realize that ec2:Region is not a supported condition for any actions in CodeBuild. To correct the policy, I separate the list actions that do not support resource-level permissions into a separate Statement element and specify * as the resource. For the remaining CodeBuild actions that support resource-level permissions, I use the ARN to specify the us-west-2 Region in the project resource type.

CORRECT POLICY 
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "TheseActionsSupportAllResources",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "codebuild:ListBuilds",
                "codebuild:ListProjects",
                "codebuild:ListRepositories",
                "codebuild:ListCuratedEnvironmentImages",
                "codebuild:ListConnectedOAuthAccounts"
            ],
            "Resource": ["*"] 
        }, {
            "Sid": "TheseActionsSupportAResource",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "codebuild:ListBuildsForProject",
                "codebuild:BatchGet*"
            ],
            "Resource": ["arn:aws:codebuild:us-west-2:123456789012:project/*"] 
        }

    ]	
}

After I make the changes, I view the updated policy summary and see that no warnings are displayed.

Screenshot showing the updated policy summary with no warnings

When I choose CodeBuild from the list of services, I also see that for the actions that support resource-level permissions, the access is limited to the us-west-2 Region.

Screenshow showing that for the Actions that support resource-level permissions, the access is limited to the us-west-2 region.

Conclusion

Policy summaries make it easier to view and understand the permissions and resources in your IAM policies by displaying the permissions granted by the policies. As I’ve demonstrated in this post, you can also use policy summaries to help you identify and correct your IAM policies. To understand the types of warnings that policy summaries support, you can visit Troubleshoot IAM Policies. To view policy summaries in your AWS account, sign in to the IAM console and navigate to any policy on the Policies page of the IAM console or the Permissions tab on a user’s page.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about or suggestions for this solution, start a new thread on the IAM forum or contact AWS Support.

– Joy

[$] Signing programs for Linux

Post Syndicated from jake original https://lwn.net/Articles/733431/rss

At his 2017 Open
Source Summit North America
talk, Matthew Garrett looked at the state
of cryptographic signing and verification of programs for Linux. Allowing
policies that would restrict Linux from executing programs that are not
signed would provide a measure of security for those systems, but there is
work to be done to get there.
Garrett
started by talking about “binaries”, but programs come in other forms
(e.g. scripts) so any solution must look beyond simply binary executables.

AWS Earns Department of Defense Impact Level 5 Provisional Authorization

Post Syndicated from Chris Gile original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-earns-department-of-defense-impact-level-5-provisional-authorization/

AWS GovCloud (US) Region image

The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has granted the AWS GovCloud (US) Region an Impact Level 5 (IL5) Department of Defense (DoD) Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (CC SRG) Provisional Authorization (PA) for six core services. This means that AWS’s DoD customers and partners can now deploy workloads for Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) exceeding IL4 and for unclassified National Security Systems (NSS).

We have supported sensitive Defense community workloads in the cloud for more than four years, and this latest IL5 authorization is complementary to our FedRAMP High Provisional Authorization that covers 18 services in the AWS GovCloud (US) Region. Our customers now have the flexibility to deploy any range of IL 2, 4, or 5 workloads by leveraging AWS’s services, attestations, and certifications. For example, when the US Air Force needed compute scale to support the Next Generation GPS Operational Control System Program, they turned to AWS.

In partnership with a certified Third Party Assessment Organization (3PAO), an independent validation was conducted to assess both our technical and nontechnical security controls to confirm that they meet the DoD’s stringent CC SRG standards for IL5 workloads. Effective immediately, customers can begin leveraging the IL5 authorization for the following six services in the AWS GovCloud (US) Region:

AWS has been a long-standing industry partner with DoD, federal-agency customers, and private-sector customers to enhance cloud security and policy. We continue to collaborate on the DoD CC SRG, Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and other government requirements to ensure that policy makers enact policies to support next-generation security capabilities.

In an effort to reduce the authorization burden of our DoD customers, we’ve worked with DISA to port our assessment results into an easily ingestible format by the Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service (eMASS) system. Additionally, we undertook a separate effort to empower our industry partners and customers to efficiently solve their compliance, governance, and audit challenges by launching the AWS Customer Compliance Center, a portal providing a breadth of AWS-specific compliance and regulatory information.

We look forward to providing sustained cloud security and compliance support at scale for our DoD customers and adding additional services within the IL5 authorization boundary. See AWS Services in Scope by Compliance Program for updates. To request access to AWS’s DoD security and authorization documentation, contact AWS Sales and Business Development. For a list of frequently asked questions related to AWS DoD SRG compliance, see the AWS DoD SRG page.

To learn more about the announcement in this post, tune in for the AWS Automating DoD SRG Impact Level 5 Compliance in AWS GovCloud (US) webinar on October 11, 2017, at 11:00 A.M. Pacific Time.

– Chris Gile, Senior Manager, AWS Public Sector Risk & Compliance