Tag Archives: AWS Organizations

AWS adds passkey multi-factor authentication (MFA) for root and IAM users

Post Syndicated from Sébastien Stormacq original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-adds-passkey-multi-factor-authentication-mfa-for-root-and-iam-users/

Security is our top priority at Amazon Web Services (AWS), and today, we’re launching two capabilities to help you strengthen the security posture of your AWS accounts:

MFA is one of the simplest and most effective ways to enhance account security, offering an additional layer of protection to help prevent unauthorized individuals from gaining access to systems or data.

MFA with passkey for your root and IAM users
Passkey is a general term used for the credentials created for FIDO2 authentication.

A passkey is a pair of cryptographic keys generated on your client device when you register for a service or a website. The key pair is bound to the web service domain and unique for each one.

The public part of the key is sent to the service and stored on their end. The private part of the key is either stored in a secured device, such as a security key, or securely shared across your devices connected to your user account when you use cloud services, such as iCloud Keychain, Google accounts, or a password manager such as 1Password.

Typically, the access to the private part of the key is protected by a PIN code or a biometric authentication, such as Apple Face ID or Touch ID or Microsoft Hello, depending on your devices.

When I try to authenticate on a service protected with passkeys, the service sends a challenge to my browser. The browser then requests my device sign the challenge with my private key. This triggers a PIN or biometric authentication to access the secured storage where the private key is stored. The browser returns the signature to the service. When the signature is valid, it confirms I own the private key that matches the public key stored on the service, and the authentication succeeds.

You can read more about this process and the various standards at work (FIDO2, CTAP, WebAuthn) in the post I wrote when AWS launched support for passkeys in AWS IAM Identity Center back in November 2020.

Passkeys can be used to replace passwords. However, for this initial release, we choose to use passkeys as a second factor authentication, in addition to your password. The password is something you know, and the passkey is something you have.

Passkeys are more resistant to phishing attacks than passwords. First, it’s much harder to gain access to a private key protected by your fingerprint, face, or a PIN code. Second, passkeys are bound to a specific web domain, reducing the scope in case of unintentional disclosure.

As an end user, you will benefit from the convenience of use and easy recoverability. You can use the built-in authenticators in your phones and laptops to unlock a cryptographically secured credential to your AWS sign-in experience. And when using a cloud service to store the passkey (such as iCloud keychain, Google accounts, or 1Password), the passkey can be accessed from any of your devices connected to your passkey provider account. This helps you to recover your passkey in the unfortunate case of losing a device.

How to enable passkey MFA for an IAM user
To enable passkey MFA, I navigate to the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) section of the console. I select a user, and I scroll down the page to the Multi-factor authentication (MFA) section. Then, I select Assign MFA device.

Note that to help you increase resilience and account recovery, you can have multiple MFA devices enabled for a user.

Enable MFA in AM console

On the next page, I enter an MFA device name, and I select Passkey or security key. Then, I select next.

enable MFA : select passkey

When using a password manager application that supports passkeys, it will pop up and ask if you want to generate and store a passkey using that application. Otherwise, your browser will present you with a couple of options. The exact layout of the screen depends on the operating system (macOS or Windows) and the browser you use. Here is the screen I see on macOS with a Chromium-based browser.

Enable passkey : choose method

The rest of the experience depends on your selection. iCloud Keychain will prompt you for a Touch ID to generate and store the passkey.

In the context of this demo, I want to show you how to bootstrap the passkey on another device, such as a phone. I therefore select Use a phone, tablet, or security key instead. The browser presents me with a QR code. Then, I use my phone to scan the QR code. The phone authenticates me with Face ID and generates and stores the passkey.

Passkey : scan a QR code

This QR code-based flow allows a passkey from one device to be used to sign in on another device (a phone and my laptop in my demo). It is defined by the FIDO specification and known as cross device authentication (CDA).

When everything goes well, the passkey is now registered with the IAM user.

Enable passkey : success

Note that we don’t recommend using IAM users to authenticate human beings to the AWS console. We recommend configuring single sign-on (SSO) with AWS IAM Identity Center instead.

What’s the sign-in experience?
Once MFA is enabled and configured with a passkey, I try to sign in to my account.

The user experience differs based on the operating system, browser, and device you use.

For example, on macOS with iCloud Keychain enabled, the system prompts me for a touch on the Touch ID key. For this demo, I registered the passkey on my phone using CDA. Therefore, the system asks me to scan a QR code with my phone. Once scanned, the phone authenticates me with Face ID to unlock the passkey, and the AWS console terminates the sign-in procedure.

Authenticate with MFA and passkey

Enforcing MFA for root users
The second announcement today is that we have started to enforce the use of MFA for the root user on some AWS accounts. This change was announced last year in a blog post from Stephen Schmidt, Chief Security Officer at Amazon.

To quote Stephen:

Verifying that the most privileged users in AWS are protected with MFA is just the latest step in our commitment to continuously enhance the security posture of AWS customers.

We started with your most sensitive account: your management account for AWS Organizations. The deployment of the policy is progressive, with just a few thousand accounts at a time. Over the coming months, we will progressively deploy the MFA enforcement policy on root users for the majority of the AWS accounts.

When you don’t have MFA enabled on your root user account, and your account is updated, a new message will pop up when you sign in, asking you to enable MFA. You will have a grace period, after which the MFA becomes mandatory.

Enable MFA on root account

You can start to use passkeys for multi-factor authentication today in all AWS Regions, except in China.

We’re enforcing the use of multi-factor authentication in all AWS Regions, except for the two regions in China (Beijing, Ningxia) and for AWS GovCloud (US), because the AWS accounts in these Regions have no root user.

Now go activate passkey MFA for your root user in your accounts.

— seb

Enable multi-admin support to manage security policies at scale with AWS Firewall Manager

Post Syndicated from Mun Hossain original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/enable-multi-admin-support-to-manage-security-policies-at-scale-with-aws-firewall-manager/

The management of security services across organizations has evolved over the years, and can vary depending on the size of your organization, the type of industry, the number of services to be administered, and compliance regulations and legislation. When compliance standards require you to set up scoped administrative control of event monitoring and auditing, we find that single administrator support on management consoles can present several challenges for large enterprises. In this blog post, I’ll dive deep into these security policy management challenges and show how you can optimize your security operations at scale by using AWS Firewall Manager to support multiple administrators.

These are some of the use cases and challenges faced by large enterprise organizations when scaling their security operations:

Policy enforcement across complex organizational boundaries

Large organizations tend to be divided into multiple organizational units, each of which represents a function within the organization. Risk appetite, and therefore security policy, can vary dramatically between organizational units. For example, organizations may support two types of users: central administrators and app developers, both of whom can administer security policy but might do so at different levels of granularity. The central admin applies a baseline and relatively generic policy for all accounts, while the app developer can be made an admin for specific accounts and be allowed to create custom rules for the overall policy. A single administrator interface limits the ability for multiple administrators to enforce differing policies for the organizational unit to which they are assigned.

Lack of adequate separation across services

The benefit of centralized management is that you can enforce a centralized policy across multiple services that the management console supports. However, organizations might have different administrators for each service. For example, the team that manages the firewall could be different than the team that manages a web application firewall solution. Aggregating administrative access that is confined to a single administrator might not adequately conform to the way organizations have services mapped to administrators.

Auditing and compliance

Most security frameworks call for auditing procedures, to gain visibility into user access, types of modifications to configurations, timestamps of incremental changes, and logs for periods of downtime. An organization might want only specific administrators to have access to certain functions. For example, each administrator might have specific compliance scope boundaries based on their knowledge of a particular compliance standard, thereby distributing the responsibility for implementation of compliance measures. Single administrator access greatly reduces the ability to discern the actions of different administrators in that single account, making auditing unnecessarily complex.

Availability

Redundancy and resiliency are regarded as baseline requirements for security operations. Organizations want to ensure that if a primary administrator is locked out of a single account for any reason, other legitimate users are not affected in the same way. Single administrator access, in contrast, can lock out legitimate users from performing critical and time-sensitive actions on the management console.

Security risks

In a single administrator setting, the ability to enforce the policy of least privilege is not possible. This is because there are multiple operators who might share the same levels of access to the administrator account. This means that there are certain administrators who could be granted broader access than what is required for their function in the organization.

What is multi-admin support?

Multi-admin support for Firewall Manager allows customers with multiple organizational units (OUs) and accounts to create up to 10 Firewall Manager administrator accounts from AWS Organizations to manage their firewall policies. You can delegate responsibility for firewall administration at a granular scope by restricting access based on OU, account, policy type, and AWS Region, thereby enabling policy management tasks to be implemented more effectively.

Multi-admin support provides you the ability to use different administrator accounts to create administrative scopes for different parameters. Examples of these administrative scopes are included in the following table.

Administrator Scope
Default Administrator Full Scope (Default)
Administrator 1 OU = “Test 1”
Administrator 2 Account IDs = “123456789, 987654321”
Administrator 3 Policy-Type = “Security Group”
Administrator 4 Region = “us-east-2”

Benefits of multi-admin support

Multi-admin support helps alleviate many of the challenges just discussed by allowing administrators the flexibility to implement custom configurations based on job functions, while enforcing the principle of least privilege to help ensure that corporate policy and compliance requirements are followed. The following are some of the key benefits of multi-admin support:

Improved security

Security is enhanced, given that the principle of least privilege can be enforced in a multi-administrator access environment. This is because the different administrators using Firewall Manager will be using delegated privileges that are appropriate for the level of access they are permitted. The result is that the scope for user errors, intentional errors, and unauthorized changes can be significantly reduced. Additionally, you attain an added level of accountability for administrators.

Autonomy of job functions

Companies with organizational units that have separate administrators are afforded greater levels of autonomy within their AWS Organizations accounts. The result is an increase in flexibility, where concurrent users can perform very different security functions.

Compliance benefits

It is easier to meet auditing requirements based on compliance standards in multi-admin accounts, because there is a greater level of visibility into user access and the functions performed on the services when compared to a multi-eyes approval workflow and approval of all policies by one omnipotent admin. This can simplify routine audits through the generation of reports that detail the chronology of security changes that are implemented by specific admins over time.

Administrator Availability

Multi-admin management support helps avoid the limitations of having a single point of access and enhances availability by providing multiple administrators with their own levels of access. This can result in fewer disruptions, especially during periods that require time-sensitive changes to be made to security configurations.

Integration with AWS Organizations

You can enable trusted access using either the Firewall Manager console or the AWS Organizations console. To do this, you sign in with your AWS Organizations management account and configure an account allocated for security tooling within the organization as the Firewall Manager administrator account. After this is done, subsequent multi-admin Firewall Manager operations can also be performed using AWS APIs. With accounts in an organization, you can quickly allocate resources, group multiple accounts, and apply governance policies to accounts or groups. This simplifies operational overhead for services that require cross-account management.

Key use cases

Multi-admin support in Firewall Manager unlocks several use cases pertaining to admin role-based access. The key use cases are summarized here.

Role-based access

Multi-admin support allows for different admin roles to be defined based on the job function of the administrator, relative to the service being managed. For example, an administrator could be tasked to manage network firewalls to protect their VPCs, and a different administrator could be tasked to manage web application firewalls (AWS WAF), both using Firewall Manager.

User tracking and accountability

In a multi-admin configuration environment, each Firewall Manager administrator’s activities are logged and recorded according to corporate compliance standards. This is useful when dealing with the troubleshooting of security incidents, and for compliance with auditing standards.

Compliance with security frameworks

Regulations specific to a particular industry, such as Payment Card Industry (PCI), and industry-specific legislation, such as HIPAA, require restricted access, control, and separation of tasks for different job functions. Failure to adhere to such standards could result in penalties. With administrative scope extending to policy types, customers can assign responsibility for managing particular firewall policies according to user role guidelines, as specified in compliance frameworks.

Region-based privileges

Many state or federal frameworks, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), require that admins adhere to customized regional requirements, such as data sovereignty or privacy requirements. Multi-admin Firewall Manager support helps organizations to adopt these frameworks by making it easier to assign admins who are familiar with the regulations of a particular region to that region.

Figure 1: Use cases for multi-admin support on AWS Firewall Manager

Figure 1: Use cases for multi-admin support on AWS Firewall Manager

How to implement multi-admin support with Firewall Manager

To configure multi-admin support on Firewall Manager, use the following steps:

  1. In the AWS Organizations console of the organization’s managed account, expand the Root folder to view the various accounts in the organization. Select the Default Administrator account that is allocated to delegate Firewall Manager administrators. The Default Administrator account should be a dedicated security account separate from the AWS Organizations management account, such as a Security Tooling account.
     
    Figure 2: Overview of the AWS Organizations console

    Figure 2: Overview of the AWS Organizations console

  2. Navigate to Firewall Manager and in the left navigation menu, select Settings.
     
    Figure 3: AWS Firewall Manager settings to update policy types

    Figure 3: AWS Firewall Manager settings to update policy types

  3. In Settings, choose an account. Under Policy types, select AWS Network Firewall to allow an admin to manage a specific firewall across accounts and across Regions. Select Edit to show the Details menu in Figure 4.
     
    Figure 4: Select AWS Network Firewall as a policy type that can be managed by this administration account

    Figure 4: Select AWS Network Firewall as a policy type that can be managed by this administration account

    The results of your selection are shown in Figure 5. The admin has been granted privileges to set AWS Network Firewall policy across all Regions and all accounts.
     

    Figure 5: The admin has been granted privileges to set Network Firewall policy across all Regions and all accounts

    Figure 5: The admin has been granted privileges to set Network Firewall policy across all Regions and all accounts

  4. In this second use case, you will identify a number of sub-accounts that the admin should be restricted to. As shown in Figure 6, there are no sub-accounts or OUs that the admin is restricted to by default until you choose Edit and select them.
     
    Figure 6: The administrative scope details for the admin

    Figure 6: The administrative scope details for the admin

    In order to achieve this second use case, you choose Edit, and then add multiple sub-accounts or an OU that you need the admin restricted to, as shown in Figure 7.
     

    Figure 7: Add multiple sub-accounts or an OU that you need the admin restricted to

    Figure 7: Add multiple sub-accounts or an OU that you need the admin restricted to

  5. The third use case pertains to granting the admin privileges to a particular AWS Region. In this case, you go into the Edit administrator account page once more, but this time, for Regions, select US West (N California) in order to restrict admin privileges only to this selected Region.
     
    Figure 8: Restricting admin privileges only to the US West (N California) Region

    Figure 8: Restricting admin privileges only to the US West (N California) Region

Conclusion

Large enterprises need strategies for operationalizing security policy management so that they can enforce policy across organizational boundaries, deal with policy changes across security services, and adhere to auditing and compliance requirements. Multi-admin support in Firewall Manager provides a framework that admins can use to organize their workflow across job roles, to help maintain appropriate levels of security while providing the autonomy that admins desire.

You can get started using the multi-admin feature with Firewall Manager using the AWS Management Console. To learn more, refer to the service documentation.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Mun Hossain

Mun Hossain

Mun is a Principal Security Service Specialist at AWS. Mun sets go-to-market strategies and prioritizes customer signals that contribute to service roadmap direction. Before joining AWS, Mun was a Senior Director of Product Management for a wide range of cybersecurity products at Cisco. Mun holds an MS in Cybersecurity Risk and Strategy and an MBA.

Deploy CloudFormation Hooks to an Organization with service-managed StackSets

Post Syndicated from Kirankumar Chandrashekar original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/deploy-cloudformation-hooks-to-an-organization-with-service-managed-stacksets/

This post demonstrates using AWS CloudFormation StackSets to deploy CloudFormation Hooks from a centralized delegated administrator account to all accounts within an Organization Unit(OU). It provides step-by-step guidance to deploy controls at scale to your AWS Organization as Hooks using StackSets. By following this post, you will learn how to deploy a hook to hundreds of AWS accounts in minutes.

AWS CloudFormation StackSets help deploy CloudFormation stacks to multiple accounts and regions with a single operation. Using service-managed permissions, StackSets automatically generate the IAM roles required to deploy stack instances, eliminating the need for manual creation in each target account prior to deployment. StackSets provide auto-deploy capabilities to deploy stacks to new accounts as they’re added to an Organizational Unit (OU) in AWS Organization. With StackSets, you can deploy AWS well-architected multi-account solutions organization-wide in a single click and target stacks to selected accounts in OUs. You can also leverage StackSets to auto deploy foundational stacks like networking, policies, security, monitoring, disaster recovery, billing, and analytics to new accounts. This ensures consistent security and governance reflecting AWS best practices.

AWS CloudFormation Hooks allow customers to invoke custom logic to validate resource configurations before a CloudFormation stack create/update/delete operation. This helps enforce infrastructure-as-code policies by preventing non-compliant resources. Hooks enable policy-as-code to support consistency and compliance at scale. Without hooks, controlling CloudFormation stack operations centrally across accounts is more challenging because governance checks and enforcement have to be implemented through disjointed workarounds across disparate services after the resources are deployed. Other options like Config rules evaluate resource configurations on a timed basis rather than on stack operations. And SCPs manage account permissions but don’t include custom logic tailored to granular resource configurations. In contrast, CloudFormation hooks allows customer-defined automation to validate each resource as new stacks are deployed or existing ones updated. This enables stronger compliance guarantees and rapid feedback compared to asynchronous or indirect policy enforcement via other mechanisms.

Follow the later sections of this post that provide a step-by-step implementation for deploying hooks across accounts in an organization unit (OU) with a StackSet including:

  1. Configure service-managed permissions to automatically create IAM roles
  2. Create the StackSet in the delegated administrator account
  3. Target the OU to distribute hook stacks to member accounts

This shows how to easily enable a policy-as-code framework organization-wide.

I will show you how to register a custom CloudFormation hook as a private extension, restricting permissions and usage to internal administrators and automation. Registering the hook as a private extension limits discoverability and access. Only approved accounts and roles within the organization can invoke the hook, following security best practices of least privilege.

StackSets Architecture

As depicted in the following AWS StackSets architecture diagram, a dedicated Delegated Administrator Account handles creation, configuration, and management of the StackSet that defines the template for standardized provisioning. In addition, these centrally managed StackSets are deploying a private CloudFormation hook into all member accounts that belong to the given Organization Unit. Registering this as a private CloudFormation hook enables administrative control over the deployment lifecycle events it can respond to. Private hooks prevent public usage, ensuring the hook can only be invoked by approved accounts, roles, or resources inside your organization.

Architecture for deploying CloudFormation Hooks to accounts in an Organization

Diagram 1: StackSets Delegated Administration and Member Account Diagram

In the above architecture, Member accounts join the StackSet through their inclusion in a central Organization Unit. By joining, these accounts receive deployed instances of the StackSet template which provisions resources consistently across accounts, including the controlled private hook for administrative visibility and control.

The delegation of StackSet administration responsibilities to the Delegated Admin Account follows security best practices. Rather than having the sensitive central Management Account handle deployment logistics, delegation isolates these controls to an admin account with purpose-built permissions. The Management Account representing the overall AWS Organization focuses more on high-level compliance governance and organizational oversight. The Delegated Admin Account translates broader guardrails and policies into specific infrastructure automation leveraging StackSets capabilities. This separation of duties ensures administrative privileges are restricted through delegation while also enabling an organization-wide StackSet solution deployment at scale.

Centralized StackSets facilitate account governance through code-based infrastructure management rather than manual account-by-account changes. In summary, the combination of account delegation roles, StackSet administration, and joining through Organization Units creates an architecture to allow governed, infrastructure-as-code deployments across any number of accounts in an AWS Organization.

Sample Hook Development and Deployment

In the section, we will develop a hook on a workstation using the AWS CloudFormation CLI, package it, and upload it to the Hook Package S3 Bucket. Then we will deploy a CloudFormation stack that in turn deploys a hook across member accounts within an Organization Unit (OU) using StackSets.

The sample hook used in this blog post enforces that server-side encryption must be enabled for any S3 buckets and SQS queues created or updated on a CloudFormation stack. This policy requires that all S3 buckets and SQS queues be configured with server-side encryption when provisioned, ensuring security is built into our infrastructure by default. By enforcing encryption at the CloudFormation level, we prevent data from being stored unencrypted and minimize risk of exposure. Rather than manually enabling encryption post-resource creation, our developers simply enable it as a basic CloudFormation parameter. Adding this check directly into provisioning stacks leads to a stronger security posture across environments and applications. This example hook demonstrates functionality for mandating security best practices on infrastructure-as-code deployments.

Prerequisites

On the AWS Organization:

On the workstation where the hooks will be developed:

In the Delegated Administrator account:

Create a hooks package S3 bucket within the delegated administrator account. Upload the hooks package and CloudFormation templates that StackSets will deploy. Ensure the S3 bucket policy allows access from the AWS accounts within the OU. This access lets AWS CloudFormation access the hooks package objects and CloudFormation template objects in the S3 bucket from the member accounts during stack deployment.

Follow these steps to deploy a CloudFormation template that sets up the S3 bucket and permissions:

  1. Click here to download the admin-cfn-hook-deployment-s3-bucket.yaml template file in to your local workstation.
    Note: Make sure you model the S3 bucket and IAM policies as least privilege as possible. For the above S3 Bucket policy, you can add a list of IAM Role ARNs created by the StackSets service managed permissions instead of AWS: “*”, which allows S3 bucket access to all the IAM entities from the accounts in the OU. The ARN of this role will be “arn:aws:iam:::role/stacksets-exec-” in every member account within the OU. For more information about equipping least privilege access to IAM policies and S3 Bucket Policies, refer IAM Policies and Bucket Policies and ACLs! Oh, My! (Controlling Access to S3 Resources) blog post.
  2. Execute the following command to deploy the template admin-cfn-hook-deployment-s3-bucket.yaml using AWS CLI. For more information see Creating a stack using the AWS Command Line Interface. If using AWS CloudFormation console, see Creating a stack on the AWS CloudFormation console.
    To get the OU Id, see Viewing the details of an OU. OU Id starts with “ou-“. To get the Organization Id, see Viewing details about your organization. Organization Id starts with “o-

    aws cloudformation create-stack \
    --stack-name hooks-asset-stack \
    --template-body file://admin-cfn-deployment-s3-bucket.yaml \
    --parameters ParameterKey=OrgId,ParameterValue="<Org_id>" \
    ParameterKey=OUId,ParameterValue="<OU_id>"
  3. After deploying the stack, note down the AWS S3 bucket name from the CloudFormation Outputs.

Hook Development

In this section, you will develop a sample CloudFormation hook package that will enforce encryption for S3 Buckets and SQS queues within the preCreate and preDelete hook. Follow the steps in the walkthrough to develop a sample hook and generate a zip package for deploying and enabling them in all the accounts within an OU. While following the walkthrough, within the Registering hooks section, make sure that you stop right after executing the cfn submit --dry-run command. The --dry-run option will make sure that your hook is built and packaged your without registering it with CloudFormation on your account. While initiating a Hook project if you created a new directory with the name mycompany-testing-mytesthook, the hook package will be generated as a zip file with the name mycompany-testing-mytesthook.zip at the root your hooks project.

Upload mycompany-testing-mytesthook.zip file to the hooks package S3 bucket within the Delegated Administrator account. The packaged zip file can then be distributed to enable the encryption hooks across all accounts in the target OU.

Note: If you are using your own hooks project and not doing the tutorial, irrespective of it, you should make sure that you are executing the cfn submit command with the --dry-run option. This ensures you have a hooks package that can be distributed and reused across multiple accounts.

Hook Deployment using CloudFormation Stack Sets

In this section, deploy the sample hook developed previously across all accounts within an OU. Use a centralized CloudFormation stack deployed from the delegated administrator account via StackSets.

Deploying hooks via CloudFormation requires these key resources:

  1. AWS::CloudFormation::HookVersion: Publishes a new hook version to the CloudFormation registry
  2. AWS::CloudFormation::HookDefaultVersion: Specifies the default hook version for the AWS account and region
  3. AWS::CloudFormation::HookTypeConfig: Defines the hook configuration
  4. AWS::IAM::Role #1: Task execution role that grants the hook permissions
  5. AWS::IAM::Role #2: (Optional) role for CloudWatch logging that CloudFormation will assume to send log entries during hook execution
  6. AWS::Logs::LogGroup: (Optional) Enables CloudWatch error logging for hook executions

Follow these steps to deploy CloudFormation Hooks to accounts within the OU using StackSets:

  1. Click here to download the hooks-template.yaml template file into your local workstation and upload it into the Hooks package S3 bucket in the Delegated Administrator account.
  2. Deploy the hooks CloudFormation template hooks-template.yaml to all accounts within an OU using StackSets. Leverage service-managed permissions for automatic IAM role creation across the OU.
    To deploy the hooks template hooks-template.yaml across OU using StackSets, click here to download the CloudFormation StackSets template hooks-stack-sets-template.yaml locally, and upload it to the hooks package S3 bucket in the delegated administrator account. This StackSets template contains an AWS::CloudFormation::StackSet resource that will deploy the necessary hooks resources from hooks-template.yaml to all accounts in the target OU. Using SERVICE_MANAGED permissions model automatically handle provisioning the required IAM execution roles per account within the OU.
  3. Execute the following command to deploy the template hooks-stack-sets-template.yaml using AWS CLI. For more information see Creating a stack using the AWS Command Line Interface. If using AWS CloudFormation console, see Creating a stack on the AWS CloudFormation console.To get the S3 Https URL for the hooks template, hooks package and StackSets template, login to the AWS S3 service on the AWS console, select the respective object and click on Copy URL button as shown in the following screenshot:s3 download https url
    Diagram 2: S3 Https URL

    To get the OU Id, see Viewing the details of an OU. OU Id starts with “ou-“.
    Make sure to replace the <S3BucketName> and then <OU_Id> accordingly in the following command:

    aws cloudformation create-stack --stack-name hooks-stack-set-stack \
    --template-url https://<S3BucketName>.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/hooks-stack-sets-template.yaml \
    --parameters ParameterKey=OuId,ParameterValue="<OU_Id>" \
    ParameterKey=HookTypeName,ParameterValue="MyCompany::Testing::MyTestHook" \
    ParameterKey=s3TemplateURL,ParameterValue="https://<S3BucketName>.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/hooks-template.yaml" \
    ParameterKey=SchemaHandlerPackageS3URL,ParameterValue="https://<S3BucketName>.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/mycompany-testing-mytesthook.zip"
  4. Check the progress of the stack deployment using the aws cloudformation describe-stack command. Move to the next section when the stack status is CREATE_COMPLETE.
    aws cloudformation describe-stacks --stack-name hooks-stack-set-stack
  5. If you navigate to the AWS CloudFormation Service’s StackSets section in the console, you can view the stack instances deployed to the accounts within the OU. Alternatively, you can execute the AWS CloudFormation list-stack-instances CLI command below to list the deployed stack instances:
    aws cloudformation list-stack-instances --stack-set-name MyTestHookStackSet

Testing the deployed hook

Deploy the following sample templates into any AWS account that is within the OU where the hooks was deployed and activated. Follow the steps in the Creating a stack on the AWS CloudFormation console. If using AWS CloudFormation CLI, follow the steps in the Creating a stack using the AWS Command Line Interface.

  1. Provision a non-compliant stack without server-side encryption using the following template:
    AWSTemplateFormatVersion: 2010-09-09
    Description: |
      This CloudFormation template provisions an S3 Bucket
    Resources:
      S3Bucket:
        Type: 'AWS::S3::Bucket'
        Properties: {}

    The stack deployment will not succeed and will give the following error message

    The following hook(s) failed: [MyCompany::Testing::MyTestHook] and the hook status reason as shown in the following screenshot:

    stack deployment failure due to hooks execution
    Diagram 3: S3 Bucket creation failure with hooks execution

  2. Provision a stack using the following template that has server-side encryption for the S3 Bucket.
    AWSTemplateFormatVersion: 2010-09-09
    Description: |
      This CloudFormation template provisions an encrypted S3 Bucket. **WARNING** This template creates an Amazon S3 bucket and a KMS key that you will be charged for. You will be billed for the AWS resources used if you create a stack from this template.
    Resources:
      EncryptedS3Bucket:
        Type: "AWS::S3::Bucket"
        Properties:
          BucketName: !Sub "encryptedbucket-${AWS::Region}-${AWS::AccountId}"
          BucketEncryption:
            ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration:
              - ServerSideEncryptionByDefault:
                  SSEAlgorithm: "aws:kms"
                  KMSMasterKeyID: !Ref EncryptionKey
                BucketKeyEnabled: true
      EncryptionKey:
        Type: "AWS::KMS::Key"
        DeletionPolicy: Retain
        UpdateReplacePolicy: Retain
        Properties:
          Description: KMS key used to encrypt the resource type artifacts
          EnableKeyRotation: true
          KeyPolicy:
            Version: 2012-10-17
            Statement:
              - Sid: Enable full access for owning account
                Effect: Allow
                Principal:
                  AWS: !Ref "AWS::AccountId"
                Action: "kms:*"
                Resource: "*"
    Outputs:
      EncryptedBucketName:
        Value: !Ref EncryptedS3Bucket

    The deployment will succeed as it will pass the hook validation with the following hook status reason as shown in the following screenshot:

    stack deployment pass due to hooks executionDiagram 4: S3 Bucket creation success with hooks execution

Updating the hooks package

To update the hooks package, follow the same steps described in the Hooks Development section to change the hook code accordingly. Then, execute the cfn submit --dry-run command to build and generate the hooks package file with the registering the type with the CloudFormation registry. Make sure to rename the zip file with a unique name compared to what was previously used. Otherwise, while updating the CloudFormation StackSets stack, it will not see any changes in the template and thus not deploy updates. The best practice is to use a CI/CD pipeline to manage the hook package. Typically, it is good to assign unique version numbers to the hooks packages so that CloudFormation stacks with the new changes get deployed.

Cleanup

Navigate to the AWS CloudFormation console on the Delegated Administrator account, and note down the Hooks package S3 bucket name and empty its contents. Refer to Emptying the Bucket for more information.

Delete the CloudFormation stacks in the following order:

  1. Test stack that failed
  2. Test stack that passed
  3. StackSets CloudFormation stack. This has a DeletionPolicy set to Retain, update the stack by removing the DeletionPolicy and then initiate a stack deletion via CloudFormation or physically delete the StackSet instances and StackSets from the Console or CLI by following: 1. Delete stack instances from your stack set 2. Delete a stack set
  4. Hooks asset CloudFormation stack

Refer to the following documentation to delete CloudFormation Stacks: Deleting a stack on the AWS CloudFormation console or Deleting a stack using AWS CLI.

Conclusion

Throughout this blog post, you have explored how AWS StackSets enable the scalable and centralized deployment of CloudFormation hooks across all accounts within an Organization Unit. By implementing hooks as reusable code templates, StackSets provide consistency benefits and slash the administrative labor associated with fragmented and manual installs. As organizations aim to fortify governance, compliance, and security through hooks, StackSets offer a turnkey mechanism to efficiently reach hundreds of accounts. By leveraging the described architecture of delegated StackSet administration and member account joining, organizations can implement a single hook across hundreds of accounts rather than manually enabling hooks per account. Centralizing your hook code-base within StackSets templates facilitates uniform adoption while also simplifying maintenance. Administrators can update hooks in one location instead of attempting fragmented, account-by-account changes. By enclosing new hooks within reusable StackSets templates, administrators benefit from infrastructure-as-code descriptiveness and version control instead of one-off scripts. Once configured, StackSets provide automated hook propagation without overhead. The delegated administrator merely needs to include target accounts through their Organization Unit alignment rather than handling individual permissions. New accounts added to the OU automatically receive hook deployments through the StackSet orchestration engine.

About the Author

kirankumar.jpeg

Kirankumar Chandrashekar is a Sr. Solutions Architect for Strategic Accounts at AWS. He focuses on leading customers in architecting DevOps, modernization using serverless, containers and container orchestration technologies like Docker, ECS, EKS to name a few. Kirankumar is passionate about DevOps, Infrastructure as Code, modernization and solving complex customer issues. He enjoys music, as well as cooking and traveling.

Introducing new central configuration capabilities in AWS Security Hub

Post Syndicated from Nicholas Jaeger original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/introducing-new-central-configuration-capabilities-in-aws-security-hub/

As cloud environments—and security risks associated with them—become more complex, it becomes increasingly critical to understand your cloud security posture so that you can quickly and efficiently mitigate security gaps. AWS Security Hub offers close to 300 automated controls that continuously check whether the configuration of your cloud resources aligns with the best practices identified by Amazon Web Services (AWS) security experts and with industry standards. Furthermore, you can manage your cloud security posture at scale by using a single action to enable Security Hub across your organization with the default settings, and by aggregating findings across your organization accounts and Regions to a single account and Region of your choice.

With the release of the new central configuration feature of Security Hub, the setup and management of control and policy configurations is simplified and centralized to the same account you have already been using to aggregate findings. In this blog post, we will explain the benefits of the new feature and describe how you can quickly onboard to it.

Central configuration overview

With the release of the new central configuration capabilities in Security Hub, you are now able to use your delegated administrator (DA) account (an AWS Organizations account designated to manage Security Hub throughout your organization) to centrally manage Security Hub controls and standards and to view your Security Hub configuration throughout your organization from a single place. To facilitate this functionality, central configuration allows you to set up policies that specify whether or not Security Hub should be enabled and which standards and controls should be turned on. You can then choose to associate your policies with your entire organization or with specific accounts or organizational units (OUs), with your policies applying automatically across linked Regions. Policies applied to specific OUs (or to the entire organization) are inherited by child accounts. This not only applies to existing accounts, but also to new accounts added to those OUs (or to the entire organization) after you created the policy. Furthermore, when you add a new linked Region to Security Hub, your existing policies will be applied to that Region immediately. This allows you to stop maintaining manual lists of accounts and Regions to which you’d like to apply your custom configurations; instead, you can maintain several policies for your organization, with each one being associated to a different set of accounts in your organization. As a result, by using the central configuration capabilities, you can significantly reduce the time spent on configuring Security Hub and switch your focus to remediating its findings.

After applying your policies, Security Hub also provides you with a view of your organization that shows the policy status per OU and account while also preventing drift. This means that after you set up your organization by using central configuration, account owners will not be able to deviate from your chosen settings—your policies will serve as the source of truth for your organizational configuration, and you can use them to understand how Security Hub is configured for your organization.

The use of the new central configuration feature is now the recommended approach to configuring Security Hub, and its standards and controls, across some or all AWS accounts in your AWS Organizations structure.

Prerequisites

To get started with central configuration, you need to complete three prerequisites:

  1. Enable AWS Config in the accounts and Regions where you plan to enable Security Hub. (For more information on how to optimize AWS Config configuration for Security Hub usage, see this blog post.)
  2. Turn on Security Hub in your AWS Organizations management account at least in one Region where you plan to use Security Hub.
  3. Use your Organizations management account to delegate an administrator account for Security Hub.

If you are new to Security Hub, simply navigate to it in the AWS Management Console from your organization management account, and the console will walk you through setting the last two prerequisites listed here. If you already use Security Hub, these can be configured from the Settings page in Security Hub. In both cases, upon completing these three prerequisites, you can proceed with the central configuration setup from the account you set as the DA.

Recommended setup

To begin the setup, open the Security Hub console from your AWS Organizations management account or from your Security Hub delegated administrator account. In the left navigation menu, choose Configuration to open the new Configuration page, shown in Figure 1. Choose Start central configuration.

Figure 1: The new Configuration page, where you can see your current organizational configuration and start using the new capabilities

Figure 1: The new Configuration page, where you can see your current organizational configuration and start using the new capabilities

If you signed in to Security Hub using the AWS Organizations management account, you will be brought to step 1, Designate delegated administrator, where you will be able to designate a new delegated administrator or confirm your existing selection before continuing the setup. If you signed in to Security Hub using your existing delegated administrator account, you will be brought directly to step 2, Centralize organization, which is shown in Figure 2. In step 2, you are first asked to choose your home Region, which is the AWS Region you will use to create your configuration policies. By default, the current Region is selected as your home Region, unless you already use cross-Region finding aggregation — in which case, your existing aggregation Region is pre-selected as your home Region.

You are then prompted to select your linked Regions, which are the Regions you will configure by using central configuration. Regions that were already linked as part of your cross-Region aggregation settings will be pre-selected. You will also be able to add additional Regions or choose to include all AWS Regions, including future Regions. If your selection includes opt-in Regions, note that Security Hub will not be enabled in them until you enable those Regions directly.

Figure 2: The Centralize organization page

Figure 2: The Centralize organization page

Step 3, Configure organization, is shown in Figure 3. You will see a recommendation that you use the AWS recommended Security Hub configuration policy (SHCP) across your entire organization. This includes enabling the AWS Foundational Security Best Practices (FSBP) v1.0.0 standard and enabling new and existing FSBP controls in accounts in your AWS Organizations structure. This is the recommended configuration for most customers, because the AWS FSBP have been carefully curated by AWS security experts and represent trusted security practices for customers to build on.

Alternatively, if you already have a custom configuration in Security Hub and would like to import it into the new capabilities, choose Customize my Security Hub configuration and then choose Pre-populate configuration.

Figure 3: Step 3 – creating your first policy

Figure 3: Step 3 – creating your first policy

Step 4, Review and apply, is where you can review the policy you just created. Until you complete this step, your organization’s configuration will not be changed. This step will override previous account configurations and create and apply your new policy. After you choose Create policy and apply, you will be taken to the new Configuration page, which was previously shown in Figure 1. The user interface will now be updated to include three tabs — Organization, Policies, and Invitation account — where you can do the following:

  • On the Organization tab, which serves as a single pane of glass for your organization configuration in Security Hub, you can see the policy status for each account and OU and verify that your desired configuration is in effect.
  • On the Policies tab, you can view your policies, update them, and create new ones.
  • On the Invitation accounts tab, you can view and update findings for invitation accounts, which do not belong to your AWS Organizations structure. These accounts cannot be configured using the new central configuration capabilities.

Together, those tabs serve as a single pane of glass for your organization configuration in Security Hub. To that end, the organization chart you now see shows which of your accounts have already been affected by the policy you just created and which are still pending. Normally, an account will show as pending only for a few minutes after you create new policies or update existing ones. However, an account can stay in pending status for up to 24 hours. During this time, Security Hub will try to configure the account with your chosen policy settings.

If Security Hub determines that a policy cannot be successfully propagated to an account, it will show its status as failed (see Figure 4). This is most likely to happen when you missed completing the prerequisites in the account where the failure is showing. For example, if AWS Config is not yet enabled in an account, the policy will have a failed status. When you hover your pointer over the word “Failed”, Security Hub will show an error message with details about the issue. After you fix the error, you can try again to apply the policy by selecting the failed account and choosing the Re-apply policy button.

Figure 4: The Organization tab on the <strong>Configuration</strong> page shows all your organization accounts, if they are being managed by a policy, and the policy status for each account and OU” width=”780″ class=”size-full wp-image-32053″ style=”border: 1px solid #bebebe”></p>
<p id=Figure 4: The Organization tab on the Configuration page shows all your organization accounts, if they are being managed by a policy, and the policy status for each account and OU

Flexibility in onboarding to central configuration

As mentioned earlier, central configuration makes it significantly more accessible for you to centrally manage Security Hub and its controls and standards. This feature also gives you the granularity to choose the specific accounts to which your chosen settings will be applied. Even though we recommend to use central configuration to configure all your accounts, one advantage of the feature is that you can initially create a test configuration and then apply it across your organization. This is especially useful when you have already configured Security Hub using previously available methods and you would like to check that you have successfully imported your existing configuration.

When you onboard to central configuration, accounts in the organization are self-managed by default, which means that they still maintain their previous configuration until you apply a policy to them, to one of their parent OUs, or to the entire organization. This gives you the option to create a test policy when you onboard, apply it only to a test account or OU, and check that you achieved your desired outcome before applying it to other accounts in the organization.

Configure and deploy different policies per OU

Although we recommend that you use the policy recommended by Security Hub whenever possible, every customer has a different environment and some customization might be required. Central configuration does not require you to use the recommended policy, and you can instead create your own custom policies that specify how Security Hub is used across organization accounts and Regions. You can create one configuration policy for your entire organization, or multiple policies to customize Security Hub settings in different accounts.

In addition, you might need to implement different policies per OU. For example, you might need to do that when you have a finance account or OU in which you want to use Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) v3.2.1. In this case, you can go to the Policies tab, choose Create policy, specify the configuration you’d like to have, and apply it to those specific OUs or accounts, as shown in Figure 5. Note that each policy must be complete — which means that it must contain the full configuration settings you would like to apply to the chosen set of accounts or OUs. In particular, an account cannot inherit part of its settings from a policy associated with a parent OU, and the other part from its own policy. The benefit of this requirement is that each policy serves as the source of truth for the configuration of the accounts it is applied to. For more information on this behavior or on how to create new policies, see the Security Hub documentation.

Figure 5: Creation of a new policy with the FSBP and the PCI DSS standards

Figure 5: Creation of a new policy with the FSBP and the PCI DSS standards

You might find it necessary to exempt accounts from being centrally configured. You have the option to set an account or OU to self-managed status. Then only the account owner can configure the settings for that account. This is useful if your organization has teams that need to be able to set their own security coverage. Unless you disassociate self-managed accounts from your Security Hub organization, you will still see findings from self-managed accounts, giving you organization-wide visibility into your security posture. However, you won’t be able to view the configuration of those accounts, because they are not centrally managed.

Understand and manage where controls are applied

In addition to being able to centrally create and view your policies, you can use the control details page to define, review, and apply how policies are configured at a control level. To access the control details page, go to the left navigation menu in Security Hub, choose Controls, and then choose any individual control.

The control details page allows you to review the findings of a control in accounts where it is already enabled. Then, if you decide that these findings are not relevant to specific accounts and OUs, or if you decide that you want to use the control in additional accounts where it is not currently enabled, you can choose Configure, view the policies to which the control currently applies, and update the configuration accordingly as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Configuring a control from the control details page

Figure 6: Configuring a control from the control details page

Organizational visibility

As you might already have noticed in the earlier screenshot of the Organization view (Figure 4), the new central configuration capability gives you a new view of the policies applied (and by extension, the controls and standards deployed) to each account and OU. If you need to customize this configuration, you can modify an existing policy or create a new policy to quickly apply to all or a subset of your accounts. At a glance, you can also see which accounts are self-managed or don’t have Security Hub turned on.

Conclusion

Security Hub central configuration helps you to seamlessly configure Security Hub and its controls and standards across your accounts and Regions so that your organization’s accounts have the level of security controls coverage that you want. AWS recommends that you use this feature when configuring, deploying, and managing controls in Security Hub across your organization’s accounts and Regions. Central configuration is now available in all commercial AWS Regions. Try it out today by visiting the new Configuration page in Security Hub from your DA. You can benefit from the Security Hub 30-day free trial even if you use central configuration, and the trial offer will be automatically applied to organization accounts in which you didn’t use Security Hub before.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Nicholas Jaeger

Nicholas Jaeger

Nicholas is a Principal Security Solutions Architect at AWS. His background includes software engineering, teaching, solutions architecture, and AWS security. Today, he focuses on helping companies and organizations operate as securely as possible on AWS. Nicholas also hosts AWS Security Activation Days to provide customers with prescriptive guidance while using AWS security services to increase visibility and reduce risk.

Gal Ordo

Gal Ordo

Gal is a Senior Product Manager for AWS Security Hub at AWS. He has more than a decade of experience in cybersecurity, having focused on IoT, network, and cloud security throughout his career. He is passionate about making sure that customers can continue to scale and grow their environments without compromising on security. Outside of work, Gal enjoys video games, reading, and exploring new places.

Use scalable controls for AWS services accessing your resources

Post Syndicated from James Greenwood original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/use-scalable-controls-for-aws-services-accessing-your-resources/

Sometimes you want to configure an AWS service to access your resource in another service. For example, you can configure AWS CloudTrail, a service that monitors account activity across your AWS infrastructure, to write log data to your bucket in Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3). When you do this, you want assurance that the service will only access your resource on your behalf—you don’t want an untrusted entity to be able to use the service to access your resource. Before today, you could achieve this by using the two AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) condition keys, aws:SourceAccount and aws:SourceArn. You can use these condition keys to help make sure that a service accesses your resource only on behalf of specific accounts or resources that you trust. However, because these condition keys require you to specify individual accounts and resources, they can be difficult to manage at scale, especially in larger organizations.

Recently, IAM launched two new condition keys that can help you achieve this in a more scalable way that is simpler to manage within your organization:

  • aws:SourceOrgID — use this condition key to make sure that an AWS service can access your resources only when the request originates from a particular organization ID in AWS Organizations.
  • aws:SourceOrgPaths — use this condition key to make sure that an AWS service can access your resources only when the request originates from one or more organizational units (OUs) in your organization.

In this blog post, we describe how you can use the four available condition keys, including the two new ones, to help you control how AWS services access your resources.

Background

Imagine a scenario where you configure an AWS service to access your resource in another service. Let’s say you’re using Amazon CloudWatch to observe resources in your AWS environment, and you create an alarm that activates when certain conditions occur. When the alarm activates, you want it to publish messages to a topic that you create in Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) to generate notifications.

Figure 1 depicts this process.

Figure 1: Amazon CloudWatch publishing messages to an SNS topic

Figure 1: Amazon CloudWatch publishing messages to an SNS topic

In this scenario, there’s a resource-based policy controlling access to your SNS topic. For CloudWatch to publish messages to it, you must configure the policy to allow access by CloudWatch. When you do this, you identify CloudWatch using an AWS service principal, in this case cloudwatch.amazonaws.com.

Cross-service access

This is an example of a common pattern known as cross-service access. With cross-service access, a calling service accesses your resource in a called service, and a resource-based policy attached to your resource grants access to the calling service. The calling service is identified using an AWS service principal in the form <SERVICE-NAME>.amazonaws.com, and it accesses your resource on behalf of an originating resource, such as a CloudWatch alarm.

Figure 2 shows cross-service access.

Figure 2: Cross-service access

Figure 2: Cross-service access

When you configure cross-service access, you want to make sure that the calling service will access your resource only on your behalf. That means you want the originating resource to be controlled by someone whom you trust. If an untrusted entity creates their own CloudWatch alarm in their AWS environment, for example, then their alarm should not be able to publish messages to your SNS topic.

If an untrusted entity could use a calling service to access your resource on their behalf, it would be an example of what’s known as the confused deputy problem. The confused deputy problem is a security issue in which an entity that doesn’t have permission to perform an action coerces a more privileged entity (in this case, a calling service) to perform the action instead.

Use condition keys to help prevent cross-service confused deputy issues

AWS provides global condition keys to help you prevent cross-service confused deputy issues. You can use these condition keys to control how AWS services access your resources.

Before today, you could use the aws:SourceAccount or aws:SourceArn condition keys to make sure that a calling service accesses your resource only when the request originates from a specific account (with aws:SourceAccount) or a specific originating resource (with aws:SourceArn). However, there are situations where you might want to allow multiple resources or accounts to use a calling service to access your resource. For example, you might want to create many VPC flow logs in an organization that publish to a central S3 bucket. To achieve this using the aws:SourceAccount or aws:SourceArn condition keys, you must enumerate all the originating accounts or resources individually in your resource-based policies. This can be difficult to manage, especially in large organizations, and can potentially cause your resource-based policy documents to reach size limits.

Now, you can use the new aws:SourceOrgID or aws:SourceOrgPaths condition keys to make sure that a calling service accesses your resource only when the request originates from a specific organization (with aws:SourceOrgID) or a specific organizational unit (with aws:SourceOrgPaths). This helps avoid the need to update policies when accounts are added or removed, reduces the size of policy documents, and makes it simpler to create and review policy statements.

The following table summarizes the four condition keys that you can use to help prevent cross-service confused deputy issues. These keys work in a similar way, but with different levels of granularity.

Use case Condition key Value Allowed operators Single/multi valued Example value
Allow a calling service to access your resource only on behalf of an organization that you trust. aws:SourceOrgID AWS organization ID of the resource making a cross-service access request String operators Single-valued key o-a1b2c3d4e5
Allow a calling service to access your resource only on behalf of an organizational unit (OU) that you trust. aws:SourceOrgPaths Organization entity paths of the resource making a cross-service access request Set operators and string operators Multivalued key o-a1b2c3d4e5/r-ab12/ou-ab12-11111111/ou-ab12-22222222/
Allow a calling service to access your resource only on behalf of an account that you trust. aws:SourceAccount AWS account ID of the resource making a cross-service access request String operators Single-valued key 111122223333
Allow a calling service to access your resource only on behalf of a resource that you trust. aws:SourceArn Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the resource making a cross- service access request ARN operators (recommended) or string operators Single-valued key arn:aws:cloudwatch:eu-west-1:111122223333:alarm:myalarm

When to use the condition keys

AWS recommends that you use these condition keys in any resource-based policy statements that allow access by an AWS service, except where the relevant condition key is not yet supported by the service. To find out whether a condition key is supported by a particular service, see AWS global condition context keys in the AWS Identity and Access Management User Guide.

Note: Only use these condition keys in resource-based policies that allow access by an AWS service. Don’t use them in other use cases, including identity-based policies and service control policies (SCPs), where these condition keys won’t be populated.

Use condition keys for defense in depth

AWS services use a variety of mechanisms to help prevent cross-service confused deputy issues, and the details vary by service. For example, where a calling service accesses an S3 bucket, some services use S3 prefixes to help prevent confused deputy issues. For more information, see the relevant service documentation.

Where supported by the service, AWS recommends that you use the condition keys we describe in this post regardless of whether the service has another mechanism in place to help prevent cross-service confused deputy issues. This helps to make your intentions explicit, provide defense in depth, and guard against misconfigurations.

Example use cases

Let’s walk through some example use cases to learn how to use these condition keys in practice.

First, imagine you’re using Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) to manage logically isolated virtual networks. In Amazon VPC, you can configure flow logs, which capture information about your network traffic. Let’s say you want a flow log to write data into an S3 bucket for later analysis. This process is depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Amazon VPC writing flow logs to an S3 bucket

Figure 3: Amazon VPC writing flow logs to an S3 bucket

This constitutes another cross-service access scenario. In this case, Amazon VPC is the calling service, Amazon S3 is the called service, the VPC flow log is the originating resource, and the S3 bucket is your resource in the called service.

To allow access, the resource-based policy for your S3 bucket (known as a bucket policy) must allow Amazon VPC to put objects there. The Principal element in this policy specifies the AWS service principal of the service that will access the resource, which for VPC flow logs is delivery.logs.amazonaws.com.

Initial policy without confused deputy prevention

The following is an initial version of the bucket policy that allows Amazon VPC to put objects in the bucket but doesn’t yet provide confused deputy prevention. We’re showing this policy for illustration purposes; don’t use it in its current form.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "PARTIAL-EXAMPLE-DO-NOT-USE",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "Service": "delivery.logs.amazonaws.com"
            },
            "Action": "s3:PutObject",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::<DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET>/*"
        }
    ]
}

Note: For simplicity, we only show one of the policy statements that you need to allow VPC flow logs to write to a bucket. In a real-life bucket policy for flow logs, you need two policy statements: one allowing actions on the bucket, and one allowing actions on the bucket contents. These are described in Publish flow logs to Amazon S3. Both policy statements work in the same way with respect to confused deputy prevention.

This policy statement allows Amazon VPC to put objects in the bucket. However, it allows Amazon VPC to do that on behalf of any flow log in any account. There’s nothing in the policy to tell Amazon VPC that it should access this bucket only if the flow log belongs to a specific organization, OU, account, or resource that you trust.

Let’s now update the policy to help prevent cross-service confused deputy issues. For the rest of this post, the remaining policy samples provide confused deputy protection, but at different levels of granularity.

Specify a trusted organization

Continuing with the previous example, imagine that you now have an organization in AWS Organizations, and you want to create VPC flow logs in various accounts within your organization that publish to a central S3 bucket. You want Amazon VPC to put objects in the bucket only if the request originates from a flow log that resides in your organization.

You can achieve this by using the new aws:SourceOrgID condition key. In a cross-service access scenario, this condition key evaluates to the ID of the organization that the request came from. You can use this condition key in the Condition element of a resource-based policy to allow actions only if aws:SourceOrgID matches the ID of a specific organization, as shown in the following example. In your own policy, make sure to replace <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET> and <MY-ORGANIZATION-ID> with your own information.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "VPCLogsDeliveryWrite",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "Service": "delivery.logs.amazonaws.com"
            },
            "Action": "s3:PutObject",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::<DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET>/*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "aws:SourceOrgID": "<MY-ORGANIZATION-ID>"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

The revised policy states that Amazon VPC can put objects in the bucket only if the request originates from a flow log in your organization. Now, if someone creates a flow log outside your organization and configures it to access your bucket, they will get an access denied error.

You can use aws:SourceOrgID in this way to allow a calling service to access your resource only if the request originates from a specific organization, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Specify a trusted organization using aws:SourceOrgID

Figure 4: Specify a trusted organization using aws:SourceOrgID

Specify a trusted OU

What if you don’t want to trust your entire organization, but only part of it? Let’s consider a different scenario. Imagine that you want to send messages from Amazon SNS into a queue in Amazon Simple Queue Service (Amazon SQS) so they can be processed by consumers. This is depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Amazon SNS sending messages to an SQS queue

Figure 5: Amazon SNS sending messages to an SQS queue

Now imagine that you want your SQS queue to receive messages only if they originate from an SNS topic that resides in a specific organizational unit (OU) in your organization. For example, you might want to allow messages only if they originate from a production OU that is subject to change control.

You can achieve this by using the new aws:SourceOrgPaths condition key. As before, you use this condition key in a resource-based policy attached to your resource. In a cross-service access scenario, this condition key evaluates to the AWS Organizations entity path that the request came from. An entity path is a text representation of an entity within an organization.

You build an entity path for an OU by using the IDs of the organization, root, and all OUs in the path down to and including the OU. For example, consider the organizational structure shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Example organization structure

Figure 6: Example organization structure

In this example, you can specify the Prod OU by using the following entity path:

o-a1b2c3d4e5/r-ab12/ou-ab12-11111111/ou-ab12-22222222/

For more information about how to construct an entity path, see Understand the AWS Organizations entity path.

Let’s now match the aws:SourceOrgPaths condition key against a specific entity path in the Condition element of a resource-based policy for an SQS queue. In your own policy, make sure to replace <MY-QUEUE-ARN> and <MY-ENTITY-PATH> with your own information.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "Allow-SNS-SendMessage",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "Service": "sns.amazonaws.com"
            },
            "Action": "sqs:SendMessage",
            "Resource": "<MY-QUEUE-ARN>",
            "Condition": {
                "Null": {
                    "aws:SourceOrgPaths": "false"
                },
                "ForAllValues:StringEquals": {
                    "aws:SourceOrgPaths": "<MY-ENTITY-PATH>"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

Note: aws:SourceOrgPaths is a multivalued condition key, which means it’s capable of having multiple values in the request context. At the time of writing, it contains a single entity path if the request originates from an account in an organization, and a null value if the request originates from an account that’s not in an organization. Because this key is multivalued, you need to use both a set operator and a string operator to compare values.

In this policy, there are two conditions in the Condition block. The first uses the Null condition operator and compares with a false value to confirm that the condition key’s value is not null. The second uses set operator ForAllValues, which returns true if every condition key value in the request matches at least one value in your policy condition, and string operator StringEquals, which requires an exact match with a value specified in your policy condition.

Note: The reason for the null check is that set operator ForAllValues returns true when a condition key resolves to null. With an Allow effect and the null check in place, access is denied if the request originates from an account that’s not in an organization.

With this policy applied to your SQS queue, Amazon SNS can send messages to your queue only if the message came from an SNS topic in a specific OU.

You can use aws:SourceOrgPaths in this way to allow a calling service to access your resource only if the request originates from a specific organizational unit, as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Specify a trusted OU using aws:SourceOrgPaths

Figure 7: Specify a trusted OU using aws:SourceOrgPaths

Specify a trusted OU and its children

In the previous example, we specified a trusted OU, but that didn’t include its child OUs. What if you want to include its children as well?

You can achieve this by replacing the string operator StringEquals with StringLike. This allows you to use wildcards in the entity path. Using the organization structure from the previous example, the following Condition evaluates to true only if the condition key value is not null and the request originates from the Prod OU or any of its child OUs.

"Condition": {
    "Null": {
        "aws:SourceOrgPaths": "false"
    },
    "ForAllValues:StringLike": {
        "aws:SourceOrgPaths": "o-a1b2c3d4e5/r-ab12/ou-ab12-11111111/ou-ab12-22222222/*"
    }
}

Specify a trusted account

If you want to be more granular, you can allow a service to access your resource only if the request originates from a specific account. You can achieve this by using the aws:SourceAccount condition key. In a cross-service access scenario, this condition key evaluates to the ID of the account that the request came from. 

The following Condition evaluates to true only if the request originates from the account that you specify in the policy. In your own policy, make sure to replace <MY-ACCOUNT-ID> with your own information.

"Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
        "aws:SourceAccount": "<MY-ACCOUNT-ID>"
    }
}

You can use this condition element within a resource-based policy to allow a calling service to access your resource only if the request originates from a specific account, as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Specify a trusted account using aws:SourceAccount

Figure 8: Specify a trusted account using aws:SourceAccount

Specify a trusted resource

If you want to be even more granular, you can allow a service to access your resource only if the request originates from a specific resource. For example, you can allow Amazon SNS to send messages to your SQS queue only if the request originates from a specific topic within Amazon SNS.

You can achieve this by using the aws:SourceArn condition key. In a cross-service access scenario, this condition key evaluates to the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the originating resource. This provides the most granular form of cross-service confused deputy prevention.

The following Condition evaluates to true only if the request originates from the resource that you specify in the policy. In your own policy, make sure to replace <MY-RESOURCE-ARN> with your own information.

"Condition": {
    "ArnEquals": {
        "aws:SourceArn": "<MY-RESOURCE-ARN>"
    }
}

Note: AWS recommends that you use an ARN operator rather than a string operator when comparing ARNs. This example uses ArnEquals to match the condition key value against the ARN specified in the policy.

You can use this condition element within a resource-based policy to allow a calling service to access your resource only if the request comes from a specific originating resource, as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Specify a trusted resource using aws:SourceArn

Figure 9: Specify a trusted resource using aws:SourceArn

Specify multiple trusted resources, accounts, OUs, or organizations

The four condition keys allow you to specify multiple trusted entities by matching against an array of values. This allows you to specify multiple trusted resources, accounts, OUs, or organizations in your policies.

Conclusion

In this post, you learned about cross-service access, in which an AWS service communicates with another AWS service to access your resource. You saw that it’s important to make sure that such services access your resources only on your behalf in order to help avoid cross-service confused deputy issues.

We showed you how to help prevent cross-service confused deputy issues by using two new condition keys aws:SourceOrgID and aws:SourceOrgPaths, as well as the other available condition keys aws:SourceAccount and aws:SourceArn. You learned that you should use these condition keys in any resource-based policy statements that allow access by an AWS service, if the condition key is supported by the service. This helps make sure that a calling service can access your resource only when the request originates from a specific organization, OU, account, or resource that you trust.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on AWS IAM re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

James Greenwood

James is a Principal Security Solutions Architect who helps AWS Financial Services customers meet their security and compliance objectives in the AWS Cloud. James has a background in identity and access management, authentication, credential management, and data protection with more than 20 years of experience in the financial services industry.

Sophia Yang

Sophia Yang

Sophia is a Senior Product Manager on the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) service. She is passionate about enabling customers to build and innovate in AWS in a secure manner.

Introducing shared VPC support on Amazon MWAA

Post Syndicated from John Jackson original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/introducing-shared-vpc-support-on-amazon-mwaa/

In this post, we demonstrate automating deployment of Amazon Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow (Amazon MWAA) using customer-managed endpoints in a VPC, providing compatibility with shared, or otherwise restricted, VPCs.

Data scientists and engineers have made Apache Airflow a leading open source tool to create data pipelines due to its active open source community, familiar Python development as Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) workflows, and extensive library of pre-built integrations. Amazon MWAA is a managed service for Airflow that makes it easy to run Airflow on AWS without the operational burden of having to manage the underlying infrastructure. For each Airflow environment, Amazon MWAA creates a single-tenant service VPC, which hosts the metadatabase that stores states and the web server that provides the user interface. Amazon MWAA further manages Airflow scheduler and worker instances in a customer-owned and managed VPC, in order to schedule and run tasks that interact with customer resources. Those Airflow containers in the customer VPC access resources in the service VPC via a VPC endpoint.

Many organizations choose to centrally manage their VPC using AWS Organizations, allowing a VPC in an owner account to be shared with resources in a different participant account. However, because creating a new route outside of a VPC is considered a privileged operation, participant accounts can’t create endpoints in owner VPCs. Furthermore, many customers don’t want to extend the security privileges required to create VPC endpoints to all users provisioning Amazon MWAA environments. In addition to VPC endpoints, customers also wish to restrict data egress via Amazon Simple Queue Service (Amazon SQS) queues, and Amazon SQS access is a requirement in the Amazon MWAA architecture.

Shared VPC support for Amazon MWAA adds the ability for you to manage your own endpoints within your VPCs, adding compatibility to shared and otherwise restricted VPCs. Specifying customer-managed endpoints also provides the ability to meet strict security policies by explicitly restricting VPC resource access to just those needed by your Amazon MWAA environments. This post demonstrates how customer-managed endpoints work with Amazon MWAA and provides examples of how to automate the provisioning of those endpoints.

Solution overview

Shared VPC support for Amazon MWAA allows multiple AWS accounts to create their Airflow environments into shared, centrally managed VPCs. The account that owns the VPC (owner) shares the two private subnets required by Amazon MWAA with other accounts (participants) that belong to the same organization from AWS Organizations. After the subnets are shared, the participants can view, create, modify, and delete Amazon MWAA environments in the subnets shared with them.

When users specify the need for a shared, or otherwise policy-restricted, VPC during environment creation, Amazon MWAA will first create the service VPC resources, then enter a pending state for up to 72 hours, with an Amazon EventBridge notification of the change in state. This allows owners to create the required endpoints on behalf of participants based on endpoint service information from the Amazon MWAA console or API, or programmatically via an AWS Lambda function and EventBridge rule, as in the example in this post.

After those endpoints are created on the owner account, the endpoint service in the single-tenant Amazon MWAA VPC will detect the endpoint connection event and resume environment creation. Should there be an issue, you can cancel environment creation by deleting the environment during this pending state.

This feature also allows you to remove the create, modify, and delete VPCE privileges from the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) principal creating Amazon MWAA environments, even when not using a shared VPC, because that permission will instead be imposed on the IAM principal creating the endpoint (the Lambda function in our example). Furthermore, the Amazon MWAA environment will provide the SQS queue Amazon Resource Name (ARN) used by the Airflow Celery Executor to queue tasks (the Celery Executor Queue), allowing you to explicitly enter those resources into your network policy rather than having to provide a more open and generalized permission.

In this example, we create the VPC and Amazon MWAA environment in the same account. For shared VPCs across accounts, the EventBridge rule and Lambda function would exist in the owner account, and the Amazon MWAA environment would be created in the participant account. See Sending and receiving Amazon EventBridge events between AWS accounts for more information.

Prerequisites

You should have the following prerequisites:

  • An AWS account
  • An AWS user in that account, with permissions to create VPCs, VPC endpoints, and Amazon MWAA environments
  • An Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) bucket in that account, with a folder called dags

Create the VPC

We begin by creating a restrictive VPC using an AWS CloudFormation template, in order to simulate creating the necessary VPC endpoint and modifying the SQS endpoint policy. If you want to use an existing VPC, you can proceed to the next section.

  1. On the AWS CloudFormation console, choose Create stack and choose With new resources (standard).
  2. Under Specify template, choose Upload a template file.
  3. Now we edit our CloudFormation template to restrict access to Amazon SQS. In cfn-vpc-private-bjs.yml, edit the SqsVpcEndoint section to appear as follows:
   SqsVpcEndoint:
     Type: AWS::EC2::VPCEndpoint
     Properties:
       ServiceName: !Sub "com.amazonaws.${AWS::Region}.sqs"
       VpcEndpointType: Interface
       VpcId: !Ref VPC
       PrivateDnsEnabled: true
       SubnetIds:
        - !Ref PrivateSubnet1
        - !Ref PrivateSubnet2
       SecurityGroupIds:
        - !Ref SecurityGroup
       PolicyDocument:
        Statement:
         - Effect: Allow
           Principal: '*'
           Action: '*'
           Resource: []

This additional policy document entry prevents Amazon SQS egress to any resource not explicitly listed.

Now we can create our CloudFormation stack.

  1. On the AWS CloudFormation console, choose Create stack.
  2. Select Upload a template file.
  3. Choose Choose file.
  4. Browse to the file you modified.
  5. Choose Next.
  6. For Stack name, enter MWAA-Environment-VPC.
  7. Choose Next until you reach the review page.
  8. Choose Submit.

Create the Lambda function

We have two options for self-managing our endpoints: manual and automated. In this example, we create a Lambda function that responds to the Amazon MWAA EventBridge notification. You could also use the EventBridge notification to send an Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) message, such as an email, to someone with permission to create the VPC endpoint manually.

First, we create a Lambda function to respond to the EventBridge event that Amazon MWAA will emit.

  1. On the Lambda console, choose Create function.
  2. For Name, enter mwaa-create-lambda.
  3. For Runtime, choose Python 3.11.
  4. Choose Create function.
  5. For Code, in the Code source section, for lambda_function, enter the following code:
    import boto3
    import json
    import logging
    
    logger = logging.getLogger()
    logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
    
    def lambda_handler(event, context):
        if event['detail']['status']=="PENDING":
            detail=event['detail']
            name=detail['name']
            celeryExecutorQueue=detail['celeryExecutorQueue']
            subnetIds=detail['networkConfiguration']['subnetIds']
            securityGroupIds=detail['networkConfiguration']['securityGroupIds']
            databaseVpcEndpointService=detail['databaseVpcEndpointService']
    
            # MWAA does not need to store the VPC ID, but we can get it from the subnets
            client = boto3.client('ec2')
            response = client.describe_subnets(SubnetIds=subnetIds)
            logger.info(response['Subnets'][0]['VpcId'])  
            vpcId=response['Subnets'][0]['VpcId']
            logger.info("vpcId: " + vpcId)       
            
            webserverVpcEndpointService=None
            if detail['webserverAccessMode']=="PRIVATE_ONLY":
                webserverVpcEndpointService=event['detail']['webserverVpcEndpointService']
            
            response = client.describe_vpc_endpoints(
                VpcEndpointIds=[],
                Filters=[
                    {"Name": "vpc-id", "Values": [vpcId]},
                    {"Name": "service-name", "Values": ["*.sqs"]},
                    ],
                MaxResults=1000
            )
            sqsVpcEndpoint=None
            for r in response['VpcEndpoints']:
                if subnetIds[0] in r['SubnetIds'] or subnetIds[0] in r['SubnetIds']:
                    # We are filtering describe by service name, so this must be SQS
                    sqsVpcEndpoint=r
                    break
            
            if sqsVpcEndpoint:
                logger.info("Found SQS endpoint: " + sqsVpcEndpoint['VpcEndpointId'])
    
                logger.info(sqsVpcEndpoint)
                pd = json.loads(sqsVpcEndpoint['PolicyDocument'])
                for s in pd['Statement']:
                    if s['Effect']=='Allow':
                        resource = s['Resource']
                        logger.info(resource)
                        if '*' in resource:
                            logger.info("'*' already allowed")
                        elif celeryExecutorQueue in resource: 
                            logger.info("'"+celeryExecutorQueue+"' already allowed")                
                        else:
                            s['Resource'].append(celeryExecutorQueue)
                            logger.info("Updating SQS policy to " + str(pd))
            
                            client.modify_vpc_endpoint(
                                VpcEndpointId=sqsVpcEndpoint['VpcEndpointId'],
                                PolicyDocument=json.dumps(pd)
                                )
                        break
            
            # create MWAA database endpoint
            logger.info("creating endpoint to " + databaseVpcEndpointService)
            endpointName=name+"-database"
            response = client.create_vpc_endpoint(
                VpcEndpointType='Interface',
                VpcId=vpcId,
                ServiceName=databaseVpcEndpointService,
                SubnetIds=subnetIds,
                SecurityGroupIds=securityGroupIds,
                TagSpecifications=[
                    {
                        "ResourceType": "vpc-endpoint",
                        "Tags": [
                            {
                                "Key": "Name",
                                "Value": endpointName
                            },
                        ]
                    },
                ],           
            )
            logger.info("created VPCE: " + response['VpcEndpoint']['VpcEndpointId'])
                
            # create MWAA web server endpoint (if private)
            if webserverVpcEndpointService:
                endpointName=name+"-webserver"
                logger.info("creating endpoint to " + webserverVpcEndpointService)
                response = client.create_vpc_endpoint(
                    VpcEndpointType='Interface',
                    VpcId=vpcId,
                    ServiceName=webserverVpcEndpointService,
                    SubnetIds=subnetIds,
                    SecurityGroupIds=securityGroupIds,
                    TagSpecifications=[
                        {
                            "ResourceType": "vpc-endpoint",
                            "Tags": [
                                {
                                    "Key": "Name",
                                    "Value": endpointName
                                },
                            ]
                        },
                    ],                  
                )
                logger.info("created VPCE: " + response['VpcEndpoint']['VpcEndpointId'])
    
        return {
            'statusCode': 200,
            'body': json.dumps(event['detail']['status'])
        }

  6. Choose Deploy.
  7. On the Configuration tab of the Lambda function, in the General configuration section, choose Edit.
  8. For Timeout, increate to 5 minutes, 0 seconds.
  9. Choose Save.
  10. In the Permissions section, under Execution role, choose the role name to edit the permissions of this function.
  11. For Permission policies, choose the link under Policy name.
  12. Choose Edit and add a comma and the following statement:
    {
    		"Sid": "Statement1",
    		"Effect": "Allow",
    		"Action": 
    		[
    			"ec2:DescribeVpcEndpoints",
    			"ec2:CreateVpcEndpoint",
    			"ec2:ModifyVpcEndpoint",
                "ec2:DescribeSubnets",
    			"ec2:CreateTags"
    		],
    		"Resource": 
    		[
    			"*"
    		]
    }

The complete policy should look similar to the following:

{
	"Version": "2012-10-17",
	"Statement": [
		{
			"Effect": "Allow",
			"Action": "logs:CreateLogGroup",
			"Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:112233445566:*"
		},
		{
			"Effect": "Allow",
			"Action": [
				"logs:CreateLogStream",
				"logs:PutLogEvents"
			],
			"Resource": [
				"arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:112233445566:log-group:/aws/lambda/mwaa-create-lambda:*"
			]
		},
		{
			"Sid": "Statement1",
			"Effect": "Allow",
			"Action": [
				"ec2:DescribeVpcEndpoints",
				"ec2:CreateVpcEndpoint",
				"ec2:ModifyVpcEndpoint",
               	"ec2:DescribeSubnets",
				"ec2:CreateTags"
			],
			"Resource": [
				"*"
			]
		}
	]
}
  1. Choose Next until you reach the review page.
  2. Choose Save changes.

Create an EventBridge rule

Next, we configure EventBridge to send the Amazon MWAA notifications to our Lambda function.

  1. On the EventBridge console, choose Create rule.
  2. For Name, enter mwaa-create.
  3. Select Rule with an event pattern.
  4. Choose Next.
  5. For Creation method, choose User pattern form.
  6. Choose Edit pattern.
  7. For Event pattern, enter the following:
    {
      "source": ["aws.airflow"],
      "detail-type": ["MWAA Environment Status Change"]
    }

  8. Choose Next.
  9. For Select a target, choose Lambda function.

You may also specify an SNS notification in order to receive a message when the environment state changes.

  1. For Function, choose mwaa-create-lambda.
  2. Choose Next until you reach the final section, then choose Create rule.

Create an Amazon MWAA environment

Finally, we create an Amazon MWAA environment with customer-managed endpoints.

  1. On the Amazon MWAA console, choose Create environment.
  2. For Name, enter a unique name for your environment.
  3. For Airflow version, choose the latest Airflow version.
  4. For S3 bucket, choose Browse S3 and choose your S3 bucket, or enter the Amazon S3 URI.
  5. For DAGs folder, choose Browse S3 and choose the dags/ folder in your S3 bucket, or enter the Amazon S3 URI.
  6. Choose Next.
  7. For Virtual Private Cloud, choose the VPC you created earlier.
  8. For Web server access, choose Public network (Internet accessible).
  9. For Security groups, deselect Create new security group.
  10. Choose the shared VPC security group created by the CloudFormation template.

Because the security groups of the AWS PrivateLink endpoints from the earlier step are self-referencing, you must choose the same security group for your Amazon MWAA environment.

  1. For Endpoint management, choose Customer managed endpoints.
  2. Keep the remaining settings as default and choose Next.
  3. Choose Create environment.

When your environment is available, you can access it via the Open Airflow UI link on the Amazon MWAA console.

Clean up

Cleaning up resources that are not actively being used reduces costs and is a best practice. If you don’t delete your resources, you can incur additional charges. To clean up your resources, complete the following steps:

  1. Delete your Amazon MWAA environment, EventBridge rule, and Lambda function.
  2. Delete the VPC endpoints created by the Lambda function.
  3. Delete any security groups created, if applicable.
  4. After the above resources have completed deletion, delete the CloudFormation stack to ensure that you have removed all of the remaining resources.

Summary

This post described how to automate environment creation with shared VPC support in Amazon MWAA. This gives you the ability to manage your own endpoints within your VPC, adding compatibility to shared, or otherwise restricted, VPCs. Specifying customer-managed endpoints also provides the ability to meet strict security policies by explicitly restricting VPC resource access to just those needed by their Amazon MWAA environments. To learn more about Amazon MWAA, refer to the Amazon MWAA User Guide. For more posts about Amazon MWAA, visit the Amazon MWAA resources page.


About the author

John Jackson has over 25 years of software experience as a developer, systems architect, and product manager in both startups and large corporations and is the AWS Principal Product Manager responsible for Amazon MWAA.

Get the full benefits of IMDSv2 and disable IMDSv1 across your AWS infrastructure

Post Syndicated from Saju Sivaji original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/get-the-full-benefits-of-imdsv2-and-disable-imdsv1-across-your-aws-infrastructure/

The Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) helps customers build secure and scalable applications. IMDS solves a security challenge for cloud users by providing access to temporary and frequently-rotated credentials, and by removing the need to hardcode or distribute sensitive credentials to instances manually or programmatically. The Instance Metadata Service Version 2 (IMDSv2) adds protections; specifically, IMDSv2 uses session-oriented authentication with the following enhancements:

  • IMDSv2 requires the creation of a secret token in a simple HTTP PUT request to start the session, which must be used to retrieve information in IMDSv2 calls.
  • The IMDSv2 session token must be used as a header in subsequent IMDSv2 requests to retrieve information from IMDS. Unlike a static token or fixed header, a session and its token are destroyed when the process using the token terminates. IMDSv2 sessions can last up to six hours.
  • A session token can only be used directly from the EC2 instance where that session began.
  • You can reuse a token or create a new token with every request.
  • Session token PUT requests are blocked if they contain an X-forwarded-for header.

In a previous blog post, we explained how these new protections add defense-in-depth for third-party and external application vulnerabilities that could be used to try to access the IMDS.

You won’t be able to get the full benefits of IMDSv2 until you disable IMDSv1. While IMDS is provided by the instance itself, the calls to IMDS are from your software. This means your software must support IMDSv2 before you can disable IMDSv1. In addition to AWS SDKs, CLIs, and tools like the SSM agents supporting IMDSv2, you can also use the IMDS Packet Analyzer to pinpoint exactly what you need to update to get your instances ready to use only IMDSv2. These tools make it simpler to transition to IMDSv2 as well as launch new infrastructure with IMDSv1 disabled. All instances launched with AL2023 set the instance to provide only IMDSv2 (IMDSv1 is disabled) by default, with AL2023 also not making IMDSv1 calls.

AWS customers who want to get the benefits of IMDSv2 have told us they want to use IMDSv2 across both new and existing, long-running AWS infrastructure. This blog post shows you scalable solutions to identify existing infrastructure that is providing IMDSv1, how to transition to IMDSv2 on your infrastructure, and how to completely disable IMDSv1. After reviewing this blog, you will be able to set new Amazon EC2 launches to IMDSv2. You will also learn how to identify existing software making IMDSv1 calls, so you can take action to update your software and then require IMDSv2 on existing EC2 infrastructure.

Identifying IMDSv1-enabled EC2 instances

The first step in transitioning to IMDSv2 is to identify all existing IMDSv1-enabled EC2 instances. You can do this in various ways.

Using the console

You can identify IMDSv1-enabled instances using the IMDSv2 attribute column in the Amazon EC2 page in the AWS Management Console.

To view the IMDSv2 attribute column:

  1. Open the Amazon EC2 console and go to Instances.
  2. Choose the settings icon in the top right.
  3. Scroll down to IMDSv2, turn on the slider.
  4. Choose Confirm.

This gives you the IMDS status of your instances. A status of optional means that IMDSv1 is enabled on the instance and required means that IMDSv1 is disabled.

Figure 1: Example of IMDS versions for EC2 instances in the console

Figure 1: Example of IMDS versions for EC2 instances in the console

Using the AWS CLI

You can identify IMDSv1-enabled instances using the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) by running the aws ec2 describe-instances command and checking the value of HttpTokens. The HttpTokens value determines what version of IMDS is enabled, with optional enabling IMDSv1 and IMDSv2 and required means IMDSv2 is required. Similar to using the console, the optional status indicates that IMDSv1 is enabled on the instance and required indicates that IMDSv1 is disabled.

"MetadataOptions": {
                        "State": "applied", 
                        "HttpEndpoint": "enabled", 
                        "HttpTokens": "optional", 
                        "HttpPutResponseHopLimit": 1
                    },

[ec2-user@ip-172-31-24-101 ~]$ aws ec2 describe-instances | grep '"HttpTokens": "optional"' | wc -l
4

Using AWS Config

AWS Config continually assesses, audits, and evaluates the configurations and relationships of your resources on AWS, on premises, and on other clouds. The AWS Config rule ec2-imdsv2-check checks whether your Amazon EC2 instance metadata version is configured with IMDSv2. The rule is NON_COMPLIANT if the HttpTokens is set to optional, which means the EC2 instance has IMDSv1 enabled.

Figure 2: Example of noncompliant EC2 instances in the AWS Config console

Figure 2: Example of noncompliant EC2 instances in the AWS Config console

After this AWS Config rule is enabled, you can set up AWS Config notifications through Amazon Simple notification Service (Amazon SNS).

Using Security Hub

AWS Security Hub provides detection and alerting capability at the account and organization levels. You can configure cross-Region aggregation in Security Hub to gain insight on findings across Regions. If using AWS Organizations, you can configure a Security Hub designated account to aggregate findings across accounts in your organization.

Security Hub has an Amazon EC2 control ([EC2.8] Amazon EC2 instances should use Instance Metadata Service Version 2 (IMDSv2)) that uses the AWS Config rule ec2-imdsv2-check to check if the instance metadata version is configured with IMDSv2. The rule is NON_COMPLIANT if the HttpTokens is set to optional, which means EC2 instance has IMDSv1 enabled.

Figure 3: Example of AWS Security Hub showing noncompliant EC2 instances

Figure 3: Example of AWS Security Hub showing noncompliant EC2 instances

Using Amazon Event Bridge, you can also set up alerting for the Security Hub findings when the EC2 instances are noncompliant for IMDSv2.

{
  "source": ["aws.securityhub"],
  "detail-type": ["Security Hub Findings - Imported"],
  "detail": {
    "findings": {
      "ProductArn": ["arn:aws:securityhub:us-west-2::product/aws/config"],
      "Title": ["ec2-imdsv2-check"]
    }
  }
}

Identifying if EC2 instances are making IMDSv1 calls

Not all of your software will be making IMDSv1 calls; your dependent libraries and tools might already be compatible with IMDSv2. However, to mitigate against compatibility issues in requiring IMDSv2 and disabling IMDSv1 entirely, you must check for remaining IMDSv1 calls from your software. After you’ve identified that there are instances with IMDSv1 enabled, investigate if your software is making IMDSv1 calls. Most applications make IMDSv1 calls at instance launch and shutdown. For long running instances, we recommend monitoring IMDSv1 calls during a launch or a stop and restart cycle.

You can check whether your software is making IMDSv1 calls by checking the MetadataNoToken metric in Amazon CloudWatch. You can further identify the source of IMDSv1 calls by using the IMDS Packet Analyzer tool.

Steps to check IMDSv1 usage with CloudWatch

  1. Open the CloudWatch console.
  2. Go to Metrics and then All Metrics.
  3. Select EC2 and then choose Per-Instance Metrics.
  4. Search and add the Metric MetadataNoToken for the instances you’re interested in.
Figure 4: CloudWatch dashboard for MetadataNoToken per-instance metric

Figure 4: CloudWatch dashboard for MetadataNoToken per-instance metric

You can use expressions in CloudWatch to view account wide metrics.

SEARCH('{AWS/EC2,InstanceId} MetricName="MetadataNoToken"', 'Maximum')
Figure 5: Using CloudWatch expressions to view account wide metrics for MetadataNoToken

Figure 5: Using CloudWatch expressions to view account wide metrics for MetadataNoToken

You can combine SEARCH and SORT expressions in CloudWatch to help identify the instances using IMDSv1.

SORT(SEARCH('{AWS/EC2,InstanceId} MetricName="MetadataNoToken"', 'Sum', 300), SUM, DESC, 10)
Figure 6: Another example of using CloudWatch expressions to view account wide metrics

Figure 6: Another example of using CloudWatch expressions to view account wide metrics

If you have multiple AWS accounts or use AWS Organizations, you can set up a centralized monitoring account using CloudWatch cross account observability.

IMDS Packet Analyzer

The IMDS Packet Analyzer is an open source tool that identifies and logs IMDSv1 calls from your software, including software start-up on your instance. This tool can assist in identifying the software making IMDSv1 calls on EC2 instances, allowing you to pinpoint exactly what you need to update to get your software ready to use IMDSv2. You can run the IMDS Packet Analyzer from a command line or install it as a service. For more information, see IMDS Packet Analyzer on GitHub.

Disabling IMDSv1 and maintaining only IMDSv2 instances

After you’ve monitored and verified that the software on your EC2 instances isn’t making IMDSv1 calls, you can disable IMDSv1 on those instances. For all compatible workloads, we recommend using Amazon Linux 2023, which offers several improvements (see launch announcement), including requiring IMDSv2 (disabling IMDSv1) by default.

You can also create and modify AMIs and EC2 instances to disable IMDSv1. Configure the AMI provides guidance on how to register a new AMI or change an existing AMI by setting the imds-support parameter to v2.0. If you’re using container services (such as ECS or EKS), you might need a bigger hop limit to help avoid falling back to IMDSv1. You can use the modify-instance-metadata-options launch parameter to make the change. We recommend testing with a hop limit of three in container environments.

To create a new instance

For new instances, you can disable IMDSv1 and enable IMDSv2 by specifying the metadata-options parameter using the run-instance CLI command.

aws ec2 run-instances
    --image-id <ami-0123456789example>
    --instance-type c3.large
    --metadata-options “HttpEndpoint=enabled,HttpTokens=required”

To modify the running instance

aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options \
--instance-id <instance-0123456789example> \
--http-tokens required \
--http-endpoint enabled

To configure a new AMI

aws ec2 register-image \
    --name <my-image> \
    --root-device-name /dev/xvda \
    --block-device-mappings DeviceName=/dev/xvda,Ebs={SnapshotId=<snap-0123456789example>} \
    --imds-support v2.0

To modify an existing AMI

aws ec2 modify-image-attribute \
    --image-id <ami-0123456789example> \
    --imds-support v2.0

Using the console

If you’re using the console to launch instances, after selecting Launch Instance from AWS Console, choose the Advanced details tab, scroll down to Metadata version and select V2 only (token required).

Figure 7: Modifying IMDS version using the console

Figure 7: Modifying IMDS version using the console

Using EC2 launch templates

You can use an EC2 launch template as an instance configuration template that an Amazon Auto Scaling group can use to launch EC2 instances. When creating the launch template using the console, you can specify the Metadata version and select V2 only (token required).

Figure 8: Modifying the IMDS version in the EC2 launch templates

Figure 8: Modifying the IMDS version in the EC2 launch templates

Using CloudFormation with EC2 launch templates

When creating an EC2 launch template using AWS CloudFormation, you must specify the MetadataOptions property to use only IMDSv2 by setting HttpTokens as required.

In this state, retrieving the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role credentials always returns IMDSv2 credentials; IMDSv1 credentials are not available.

{
"HttpEndpoint" : <String>,
"HttpProtocolIpv6" : <String>,
"HttpPutResponseHopLimit" : <Integer>,
"HttpTokens" : required,
"InstanceMetadataTags" : <String>
}

Using Systems Manager automation runbook

You can run the EnforceEC2InstanceIMDSv2 automation document available in AWS Systems Manager, which will enforce IMDSv2 on the EC2 instance using the ModifyInstanceMetadataOptions API.

  1. Open the Systems Manager console, and then select Automation from the navigation pane.
  2. Choose Execute automation.
  3. On the Owned by Amazon tab, for Automation document, enter EnforceEC2InstanceIMDSv2, and then press Enter.
  4. Choose EnforceEC2InstanceIMDSv2 document, and then choose Next.
  5. For Execute automation document, choose Simple execution.

    Note: If you need to run the automation on multiple targets, then choose Rate Control.

  6. For Input parameters, enter the ID of EC2 instance under InstanceId
  7. For AutomationAssumeRole, select a role.

    Note: To change the target EC2 instance, the AutomationAssumeRole must have ec2:ModifyInstanceMetadataOptions and ec2:DescribeInstances permissions. For more information about creating the assume role for Systems Manager Automation, see Create a service role for Automation.

  8. Choose Execute.

Using the AWS CDK

If you use the AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) to launch instances, you can use it to set the requireImdsv2 property to disable IMDSv1 and enable IMDSv2.

new ec2.Instance(this, 'Instance', {
        // <... other parameters>
        requireImdsv2: true,
})

Using AWS SDK

The new clients for AWS SDK for Java 2.x use IMDSv2, and you can use the new clients to retrieve instance metadata for your EC2 instances. See Introducing a new client in the AWS SDK for Java 2.x for retrieving EC2 Instance Metadata for instructions.

Maintain only IMDSv2 EC2 instances

To maintain only IMDSv2 instances, you can implement service control policies and IAM policies that verify that users and software on your EC2 instances can only use instance metadata using IMDSv2. This policy specifies that RunInstance API calls require the EC2 instance use only IMDSv2. We recommend implementing this policy after all of the instances in associated accounts are free of IMDSv1 calls and you have migrated all of the instances to use only IMDSv2.

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
               {
            "Sid": "RequireImdsV2",
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": "ec2:RunInstances",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/*",
            "Condition": {
                "StringNotEquals": {
                    "ec2:MetadataHttpTokens": "required"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
} 

You can find more details on applicable service control policies (SCPs) and IAM policies in the EC2 User Guide.

Restricting credential usage using condition keys

As an additional layer of defence, you can restrict the use of your Amazon EC2 role credentials to work only when used in the EC2 instance to which they are issued. This control is complementary to IMDSv2 since both can work together. The AWS global condition context keys for EC2 credential control properties (aws:EC2InstanceSourceVPC and aws:EC2InstanceSourcePrivateIPv4) restrict the VPC endpoints and private IPs that can use your EC2 instance credentials, and you can use these keys in service control policies (SCPs) or IAM policies. Examples of these policies are in this blog post.

Conclusion

You won’t be able to get the full benefits of IMDSv2 until you disable IMDSv1. In this blog post, we showed you how to identify IMDSv1-enabled EC2 instances and how to determine if and when your software is making IMDSv1 calls. We also showed you how to disable IMDSv1 on new and existing EC2 infrastructure after your software is no longer making IMDSv1 calls. You can use these tools to transition your existing EC2 instances, and set your new EC2 launches, to use only IMDSv2.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS Compute re:Post or contact AWS Support.

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Saju Sivaji

Saju Sivaji

Saju is Senior Technical Program Manager with the AWS Security organization. When Saju isn’t managing security expectation programs to help raise the security bar for both internal and external customers, he enjoys travelling, racket sports, and bicycling.

Joshua Levinson

Joshua Levinson

Joshua is a Principal Product Manager at AWS on the Amazon EC2 team. He is passionate about helping customers with highly scalable features on EC2 and across AWS and enjoys the challenge of building simplified solutions to complex problems. Outside of work, he enjoys cooking, reading with his kids, and Olympic weightlifting.

Configure fine-grained access to your resources shared using AWS Resource Access Manager

Post Syndicated from Fabian Labat original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/configure-fine-grained-access-to-your-resources-shared-using-aws-resource-access-manager/

You can use AWS Resource Access Manager (AWS RAM) to securely, simply, and consistently share supported resource types within your organization or organizational units (OUs) and across AWS accounts. This means you can provision your resources once and use AWS RAM to share them with accounts. With AWS RAM, the accounts that receive the shared resources can list those resources alongside the resources they own.

When you share your resources by using AWS RAM, you can specify the actions that an account can perform and the access conditions on the shared resource. AWS RAM provides AWS managed permissions, which are created and maintained by AWS and which grant permissions for common customer scenarios. Now, you can further tailor resource access by authoring and applying fine-grained customer managed permissions in AWS RAM. A customer managed permission is a managed permission that you create to precisely specify who can do what under which conditions for the resource types included in your resource share.

This blog post walks you through how to use customer managed permissions to tailor your resource access to meet your business and security needs. Customer managed permissions help you follow the best practice of least privilege for your resources that are shared using AWS RAM.

Considerations

Before you start, review the considerations for using customer managed permissions for supported resource types in the AWS RAM User Guide.

Solution overview

Many AWS customers share infrastructure services to accounts in an organization from a centralized infrastructure OU. The networking account in the infrastructure OU follows the best practice of least privilege and grants only the permissions that accounts receiving these resources, such as development accounts, require to perform a specific task. The solution in this post demonstrates how you can share an Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) IP Address Manager (IPAM) pool with the accounts in a Development OU. IPAM makes it simpler for you to plan, track, and monitor IP addresses for your AWS workloads.

You’ll use a networking account that owns an IPAM pool to share the pool with the accounts in a Development OU. You’ll do this by creating a resource share and a customer managed permission through AWS RAM. In this example, shown in Figure 1, both the networking account and the Development OU are in the same organization. The accounts in the Development OU only need the permissions that are required to allocate a classless inter-domain routing (CIDR) range and not to view the IPAM pool details. You’ll further refine access to the shared IPAM pool so that only AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) users or roles tagged with team = networking can perform actions on the IPAM pool that’s shared using AWS RAM.

Figure 1: Multi-account diagram for sharing your IPAM pool from a networking account in the Infrastructure OU to accounts in the Development OU

Figure 1: Multi-account diagram for sharing your IPAM pool from a networking account in the Infrastructure OU to accounts in the Development OU

Prerequisites

For this walkthrough, you must have the following prerequisites:

  • An AWS account (the networking account) with an IPAM pool already provisioned. For this example, create an IPAM pool in a networking account named ipam-vpc-pool-use1-dev. Because you share resources across accounts in the same AWS Region using AWS RAM, provision the IPAM pool in the same Region where your development accounts will access the pool.
  • An AWS OU with the associated development accounts to share the IPAM pool with. In this example, these accounts are in your Development OU.
  • An IAM role or user with permissions to perform IPAM and AWS RAM operations in the networking account and the development accounts.

Share your IPAM pool with your Development OU with least privilege permissions

In this section, you share an IPAM pool from your networking account to the accounts in your Development OU and grant least-privilege permissions. To do that, you create a resource share that contains your IPAM pool, your customer managed permission for the IPAM pool, and the OU principal you want to share the IPAM pool with. A resource share contains resources you want to share, the principals you want to share the resources with, and the managed permissions that grant resource access to the account receiving the resources. You can add the IPAM pool to an existing resource share, or you can create a new resource share. Depending on your workflow, you can start creating a resource share either in the Amazon VPC IPAM or in the AWS RAM console.

To initiate a new resource share from the Amazon VPC IPAM console

  1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console as your networking account. For Features, select Amazon VPC IP Address Manager console.
  2. Select ipam-vpc-pool-use1-dev, which was provisioned as part of the prerequisites.
  3. On the IPAM pool detail page, choose the Resource sharing tab.
  4. Choose Create resource share.
     
Figure 2: Create resource share to share your IPAM pool

Figure 2: Create resource share to share your IPAM pool

Alternatively, you can initiate a new resource share from the AWS RAM console.

To initiate a new resource share from the AWS RAM console

  1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console as your networking account. For Services, select Resource Access Manager console.
  2. Choose Create resource share.

Next, specify the resource share details, including the name, the resource type, and the specific resource you want to share. Note that the steps of the resource share creation process are located on the left side of the AWS RAM console.

To specify the resource share details

  1. For Name, enter ipam-shared-dev-pool.
  2. For Select resource type, choose IPAM pools.
  3. For Resources, select the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the IPAM pool you want to share from a list of the IPAM pool ARNs you own.
  4. Choose Next.
     
Figure 3: Specify the resources to share in your resource share

Figure 3: Specify the resources to share in your resource share

Configure customer managed permissions

In this example, the accounts in the Development OU need the permissions required to allocate a CIDR range, but not the permissions to view the IPAM pool details. The existing AWS managed permission grants both read and write permissions. Therefore, you need to create a customer managed permission to refine the resource access permissions for your accounts in the Development OU. With a customer managed permission, you can select and tailor the actions that the development accounts can perform on the IPAM pool, such as write-only actions.

In this section, you create a customer managed permission, configure the managed permission name, select the resource type, and choose the actions that are allowed with the shared resource.

To create and author a customer managed permission

  1. On the Associate managed permissions page, choose Create customer managed permission. This will bring up a new browser tab with a Create a customer managed permission page.
  2. On the Create a customer managed permission page, enter my-ipam-cmp for the Customer managed permission name.
  3. Confirm the Resource type as ec2:IpamPool.
  4. On the Visual editor tab of the Policy template section, select the Write checkbox only. This will automatically check all the available write actions.
  5. Choose Create customer managed permission.
     
Figure 4: Create a customer managed permission with only write actions

Figure 4: Create a customer managed permission with only write actions

Now that you’ve created your customer managed permission, you must associate it to your resource share.

To associate your customer managed permission

  1. Go back to the previous Associate managed permissions page. This is most likely located in a separate browser tab.
  2. Choose the refresh icon .
  3. Select my-ipam-cmp from the dropdown menu.
  4. Review the policy template, and then choose Next.

Next, select the IAM roles, IAM users, AWS accounts, AWS OUs, or organization you want to share your IPAM pool with. In this example, you share the IPAM pool with an OU in your account.

To grant access to principals

  1. On the Grant access to principals page, select Allow sharing only with your organization.
  2. For Select principal type, choose Organizational unit (OU).
  3. Enter the Development OU’s ID.
  4. Select Add, and then choose Next.
  5. Choose Create resource share to complete creation of your resource share.
     
Figure 5: Grant access to principals in your resource share

Figure 5: Grant access to principals in your resource share

Verify the customer managed permissions

Now let’s verify that the customer managed permission is working as expected. In this section, you verify that the development account cannot view the details of the IPAM pool and that you can use that same account to create a VPC with the IPAM pool.

To verify that an account in your Development OU can’t view the IPAM pool details

  1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console as an account in your Development OU. For Features, select Amazon VPC IP Address Manager console.
  2. In the left navigation pane, choose Pools.
  3. Select ipam-shared-dev-pool. You won’t be able to view the IPAM pool details.

To verify that an account in your Development OU can create a new VPC with the IPAM pool

  1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console as an account in your Development OU. For Services, select VPC console.
  2. On the VPC dashboard, choose Create VPC.
  3. On the Create VPC page, select VPC only.
  4. For name, enter my-dev-vpc.
  5. Select IPAM-allocated IPv4 CIDR block.
  6. Choose the ARN of the IPAM pool that’s shared with your development account.
  7. For Netmask, select /24 256 IPs.
  8. Choose Create VPC. You’ve successfully created a VPC with the IPAM pool shared with your account in your Development OU.
     
Figure 6: Create a VPC

Figure 6: Create a VPC

Update customer managed permissions

You can create a new version of your customer managed permission to rescope and update the access granularity of your resources that are shared using AWS RAM. For example, you can add a condition in your customer managed permissions so that only IAM users or roles tagged with a particular principal tag can access and perform the actions allowed on resources shared using AWS RAM. If you need to update your customer managed permission — for example, after testing or as your business and security needs evolve — you can create and save a new version of the same customer managed permission rather than creating an entirely new customer management permission. For example, you might want to adjust your access configurations to read-only actions for your development accounts and to rescope to read-write actions for your testing accounts. The new version of the permission won’t apply automatically to your existing resource shares, and you must explicitly apply it to those shares for it to take effect.

To create a version of your customer managed permission

  1. Sign in to the AWS Management Console as your networking account. For Services, select Resource Access Manager console.
  2. In the left navigation pane, choose Managed permissions library.
  3. For Filter by text, enter my-ipam-cmp and select my-ipam-cmp. You can also select the Any type dropdown menu and then select Customer managed to narrow the list of managed permissions to only your customer managed permissions.
  4. On the my-ipam-cmp page, choose Create version.
  5. You can make the customer managed permission more fine-grained by adding a condition. On the Create a customer managed permission for my-ipam-cmp page, under the Policy template section, choose JSON editor.
  6. Add a condition with aws:PrincipalTag that allows only the users or roles tagged with team = networking to access the shared IPAM pool.
    "Condition": {
                    "StringEquals": {
                        "aws:PrincipalTag/team": "networking"
                    }
                }

  7. Choose Create version. This new version will be automatically set as the default version of your customer managed permission. As a result, new resource shares that use the customer managed permission will use the new version.
     
Figure 7: Update your customer managed permissions and add a condition statement with aws:PrincipalTag

Figure 7: Update your customer managed permissions and add a condition statement with aws:PrincipalTag

Note: Now that you have the new version of your customer managed permission, you must explicitly apply it to your existing resource shares for it to take effect.

To apply the new version of the customer managed permission to existing resource shares

  1. On the my-ipam-cmp page, under the Managed permission versions, select Version 1.
  2. Choose the Associated resource shares tab.
  3. Find ipam-shared-dev-pool and next to the current version number, select Update to default version. This will update your ipam-shared-dev-pool resource share with the new version of your my-ipam-cmp customer managed permission.

To verify your updated customer managed permission, see the Verify the customer managed permissions section earlier in this post. Make sure that you sign in with an IAM role or user tagged with team = networking, and then repeat the steps of that section to verify your updated customer managed permission. If you use an IAM role or user that is not tagged with team = networking, you won’t be able to allocate a CIDR from the IPAM pool and you won’t be able to create the VPC.

Cleanup

To remove the resources created by the preceding example:

  1. Delete the resource share from the AWS RAM console.
  2. Deprovision the CIDR from the IPAM pool.
  3. Delete the IPAM pool you created.

Summary

This blog post presented an example of using customer managed permissions in AWS RAM. AWS RAM brings simplicity, consistency, and confidence when sharing your resources across accounts. In the example, you used AWS RAM to share an IPAM pool to accounts in a Development OU, configured fine-grained resource access controls, and followed the best practice of least privilege by granting only the permissions required for the accounts in the Development OU to perform a specific task with the shared IPAM pool. In the example, you also created a new version of your customer managed permission to rescope the access granularity of your resources that are shared using AWS RAM.

To learn more about AWS RAM and customer managed permissions, see the AWS RAM documentation and watch the AWS RAM Introduces Customer Managed Permissions demo.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Fabian Labat

Fabian Labat

Fabian is a principal solutions architect based in New York, where he guides global financial services customers to build highly secure, scalable, reliable, and cost-efficient applications on the cloud. He brings over 25 years of technology experience in system design and IT infrastructure.

Nini Ren

Nini Ren

Nini is the product manager for AWS Resource Access Manager (RAM). He enjoys working closely with customers to develop solutions that not only meet their needs, but also create value for their businesses. Nini holds an MBA from The Wharton School, a masters of computer and information technology from the University of Pennsylvania, and an AB in chemistry and physics from Harvard College.

Three ways to accelerate incident response in the cloud: insights from re:Inforce 2023

Post Syndicated from Anne Grahn original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/three-ways-to-accelerate-incident-response-in-the-cloud-insights-from-reinforce-2023/

AWS re:Inforce took place in Anaheim, California, on June 13–14, 2023. AWS customers, partners, and industry peers participated in hundreds of technical and non-technical security-focused sessions across six tracks, an Expo featuring AWS experts and AWS Security Competency Partners, and keynote and leadership sessions.

The threat detection and incident response track showcased how AWS customers can get the visibility they need to help improve their security posture, identify issues before they impact business, and investigate and respond quickly to security incidents across their environment.

With dozens of service and feature announcements—and innumerable best practices shared by AWS experts, customers, and partners—distilling highlights is a challenge. From an incident response perspective, three key themes emerged.

Proactively detect, contextualize, and visualize security events

When it comes to effectively responding to security events, rapid detection is key. Among the launches announced during the keynote was the expansion of Amazon Detective finding groups to include Amazon Inspector findings in addition to Amazon GuardDuty findings.

Detective, GuardDuty, and Inspector are part of a broad set of fully managed AWS security services that help you identify potential security risks, so that you can respond quickly and confidently.

Using machine learning, Detective finding groups can help you conduct faster investigations, identify the root cause of events, and map to the MITRE ATT&CK framework to quickly run security issues to ground. The finding group visualization panel shown in the following figure displays findings and entities involved in a finding group. This interactive visualization can help you analyze, understand, and triage the impact of finding groups.

Figure 1: Detective finding groups visualization panel

Figure 1: Detective finding groups visualization panel

With the expanded threat and vulnerability findings announced at re:Inforce, you can prioritize where to focus your time by answering questions such as “was this EC2 instance compromised because of a software vulnerability?” or “did this GuardDuty finding occur because of unintended network exposure?”

In the session Streamline security analysis with Amazon Detective, AWS Principal Product Manager Rich Vorwaller, AWS Senior Security Engineer Rima Tanash, and AWS Program Manager Jordan Kramer demonstrated how to use graph analysis techniques and machine learning in Detective to identify related findings and resources, and investigate them together to accelerate incident analysis.

In addition to Detective, you can also use Amazon Security Lake to contextualize and visualize security events. Security Lake became generally available on May 30, 2023, and several re:Inforce sessions focused on how you can use this new service to assist with investigations and incident response.

As detailed in the following figure, Security Lake automatically centralizes security data from AWS environments, SaaS providers, on-premises environments, and cloud sources into a purpose-built data lake stored in your account. Security Lake makes it simpler to analyze security data, gain a more comprehensive understanding of security across an entire organization, and improve the protection of workloads, applications, and data. Security Lake automates the collection and management of security data from multiple accounts and AWS Regions, so you can use your preferred analytics tools while retaining complete control and ownership over your security data. Security Lake has adopted the Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework (OCSF), an open standard. With OCSF support, the service normalizes and combines security data from AWS and a broad range of enterprise security data sources.

Figure 2: How Security Lake works

Figure 2: How Security Lake works

To date, 57 AWS security partners have announced integrations with Security Lake, and we now have more than 70 third-party sources, 16 analytics subscribers, and 13 service partners.

In Gaining insights from Amazon Security Lake, AWS Principal Solutions Architect Mark Keating and AWS Security Engineering Manager Keith Gilbert detailed how to get the most out of Security Lake. Addressing questions such as, “How do I get access to the data?” and “What tools can I use?,” they demonstrated how analytics services and security information and event management (SIEM) solutions can connect to and use data stored within Security Lake to investigate security events and identify trends across an organization. They emphasized how bringing together logs in multiple formats and normalizing them into a single format empowers security teams to gain valuable context from security data, and more effectively respond to events. Data can be queried with Amazon Athena, or pulled by Amazon OpenSearch Service or your SIEM system directly from Security Lake.

Build your security data lake with Amazon Security Lake featured AWS Product Manager Jonathan Garzon, AWS Product Solutions Architect Ross Warren, and Global CISO of Interpublic Group (IPG) Troy Wilkinson demonstrating how Security Lake helps address common challenges associated with analyzing enterprise security data, and detailing how IPG is using the service. Wilkinson noted that IPG’s objective is to bring security data together in one place, improve searches, and gain insights from their data that they haven’t been able to before.

“With Security Lake, we found that it was super simple to bring data in. Not just the third-party data and Amazon data, but also our on-premises data from custom apps that we built.” — Troy Wilkinson, global CISO, Interpublic Group

Use automation and machine learning to reduce mean time to response

Incident response automation can help free security analysts from repetitive tasks, so they can spend their time identifying and addressing high-priority security issues.

In How LLA reduces incident response time with AWS Systems Manager, telecommunications provider Liberty Latin America (LLA) detailed how they implemented a security framework to detect security issues and automate incident response in more than 180 AWS accounts accessed by internal stakeholders and third-party partners by using AWS Systems Manager Incident Manager, AWS Organizations, Amazon GuardDuty, and AWS Security Hub.

LLA operates in over 20 countries across Latin America and the Caribbean. After completing multiple acquisitions, LLA needed a centralized security operations team to handle incidents and notify the teams responsible for each AWS account. They used GuardDuty, Security Hub, and Systems Manager Incident Manager to automate and streamline detection and response, and they configured the services to initiate alerts whenever there was an issue requiring attention.

Speaking alongside AWS Principal Solutions Architect Jesus Federico and AWS Principal Product Manager Sarah Holberg, LLA Senior Manager of Cloud Services Joaquin Cameselle noted that when GuardDuty identifies a critical issue, it generates a new finding in Security Hub. This finding is then forwarded to Systems Manager Incident Manager through an Amazon EventBridge rule. This configuration helps ensure the involvement of the appropriate individuals associated with each account.

“We have deployed a security framework in Liberty Latin America to identify security issues and streamline incident response across over 180 AWS accounts. The framework that leverages AWS Systems Manager Incident Manager, Amazon GuardDuty, and AWS Security Hub enabled us to detect and respond to incidents with greater efficiency. As a result, we have reduced our reaction time by 90%, ensuring prompt engagement of the appropriate teams for each AWS account and facilitating visibility of issues for the central security team.” — Joaquin Cameselle, senior manager, cloud services, Liberty Latin America

How Citibank (Citi) advanced their containment capabilities through automation outlined how the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Incident Response framework is applied to AWS services, and highlighted Citi’s implementation of a highly scalable cloud incident response framework designed to support the 28 AWS services in their cloud environment.

After describing the four phases of the incident response process — preparation and prevention; detection and analysis; containment, eradication, and recovery; and post-incident activity—AWS ProServe Global Financial Services Senior Engagement Manager Harikumar Subramonion noted that, to fully benefit from the cloud, you need to embrace automation. Automation benefits the third phase of the incident response process by speeding up containment, and reducing mean time to response.

Citibank Head of Cloud Security Operations Elvis Velez and Vice President of Cloud Security Damien Burks described how Citi built the Cloud Containment Automation Framework (CCAF) from the ground up by using AWS Step Functions and AWS Lambda, enabling them to respond to events 24/7 without human error, and reduce the time it takes to contain resources from 4 hours to 15 minutes. Velez described how Citi uses adversary emulation exercises that use the MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix to simulate realistic attacks on AWS environments, and continuously validate their ability to effectively contain incidents.

Innovate and do more with less

Security operations teams are often understaffed, making it difficult to keep up with alerts. According to data from CyberSeek, there are currently 69 workers available for every 100 cybersecurity job openings.

Effectively evaluating security and compliance posture is critical, despite resource constraints. In Centralizing security at scale with Security Hub and Intuit’s experience, AWS Senior Solutions Architect Craig Simon, AWS Senior Security Hub Product Manager Dora Karali, and Intuit Principal Software Engineer Matt Gravlin discussed how to ease security management with Security Hub. Fortune 500 financial software provider Intuit has approximately 2,000 AWS accounts, 10 million AWS resources, and receives 20 million findings a day from AWS services through Security Hub. Gravlin detailed Intuit’s Automated Compliance Platform (ACP), which combines Security Hub and AWS Config with an internal compliance solution to help Intuit reduce audit timelines, effectively manage remediation, and make compliance more consistent.

“By using Security Hub, we leveraged AWS expertise with their regulatory controls and best practice controls. It helped us keep up to date as new controls are released on a regular basis. We like Security Hub’s aggregation features that consolidate findings from other AWS services and third-party providers. I personally call it the super aggregator. A key component is the Security Hub to Amazon EventBridge integration. This allowed us to stream millions of findings on a daily basis to be inserted into our ACP database.” — Matt Gravlin, principal software engineer, Intuit

At AWS re:Inforce, we launched a new Security Hub capability for automating actions to update findings. You can now use rules to automatically update various fields in findings that match defined criteria. This allows you to automatically suppress findings, update the severity of findings according to organizational policies, change the workflow status of findings, and add notes. With automation rules, Security Hub provides you a simplified way to build automations directly from the Security Hub console and API. This reduces repetitive work for cloud security and DevOps engineers and can reduce mean time to response.

In Continuous innovation in AWS detection and response services, AWS Worldwide Security Specialist Senior Manager Himanshu Verma and GuardDuty Senior Manager Ryan Holland highlighted new features that can help you gain actionable insights that you can use to enhance your overall security posture. After mapping AWS security capabilities to the core functions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, Verma and Holland provided an overview of AWS threat detection and response services that included a technical demonstration.

Bolstering incident response with AWS Wickr enterprise integrations highlighted how incident responders can collaborate securely during a security event, even on a compromised network. AWS Senior Security Specialist Solutions Architect Wes Wood demonstrated an innovative approach to incident response communications by detailing how you can integrate the end-to-end encrypted collaboration service AWS Wickr Enterprise with GuardDuty and AWS WAF. Using Wickr Bots, you can build integrated workflows that incorporate GuardDuty and third-party findings into a more secure, out-of-band communication channel for dedicated teams.

Evolve your incident response maturity

AWS re:Inforce featured many more highlights on incident response, including How to run security incident response in your Amazon EKS environment and Investigating incidents with Amazon Security Lake and Jupyter notebooks code talks, as well as the announcement of our Cyber Insurance Partners program. Content presented throughout the conference made one thing clear: AWS is working harder than ever to help you gain the insights that you need to strengthen your organization’s security posture, and accelerate incident response in the cloud.

To watch AWS re:Inforce sessions on demand, see the AWS re:Inforce playlists on YouTube.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Anne Grahn

Anne Grahn

Anne is a Senior Worldwide Security GTM Specialist at AWS based in Chicago. She has more than a decade of experience in the security industry, and focuses on effectively communicating cybersecurity risk. She maintains a Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) certification.

Author

Himanshu Verma

Himanshu is a Worldwide Specialist for AWS Security Services. In this role, he leads the go-to-market creation and execution for AWS Security Services, field enablement, and strategic customer advisement. Prior to AWS, he held several leadership roles in Product Management, engineering and development, working on various identity, information security, and data protection technologies. He obsesses brainstorming disruptive ideas, venturing outdoors, photography, and trying various “hole in the wall” food and drinking establishments around the globe.

Jesus Federico

Jesus Federico

Jesus is a Principal Solutions Architect for AWS in the telecommunications vertical, working to provide guidance and technical assistance to communication service providers on their cloud journey. He supports CSPs in designing and implementing secure, resilient, scalable, and high-performance applications in the cloud.

Best Practices for managing data residency in AWS Local Zones using landing zone controls

Post Syndicated from Sheila Busser original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/best-practices-for-managing-data-residency-in-aws-local-zones-using-landing-zone-controls/

This blog post is written by Abeer Naffa’, Sr. Solutions Architect, Solutions Builder AWS, David Filiatrault, Principal Security Consultant, and Jared Thompson Hybrid Edge SA Specialist.

In this post, we discuss how you can leverage AWS Control Tower landing zone and AWS Organizations custom policies – guardrails – at the root level, known as Service Control Policies (SCPS) to enable certain data residency requirements on AWS Local Zones. Using the suggested controls lets you limit the ability to store data, process data outside a geographic location, and keep your data within specific Local Zone(s).

Data residency is a critical consideration for organizations that collect and store sensitive information, such as Personal Identifiable Information (PII), financial data, and healthcare data. With the rise of cloud computing and the global nature of the Internet, it can be challenging for organizations to make sure that their data is being stored and processed in compliance with local laws and regulations.

One potential solution for addressing data residency challenges with AWS is utilizing Local Zones, which places AWS infrastructure in large metro areas. This enables organizations to store and process data in specific geographic locations. By using Local Zones, organizations can architect their environment to meet data residency requirements when an AWS Region is unavailable within the same legal jurisdiction. Local Zones can be configured to utilize landing zone to further adhere to data residency requirements.

A landing zone is a well-architected, multi-account AWS environment that is scalable and secure. This is a starting point from which your organization can quickly launch and deploy workloads and applications with confidence in your security and infrastructure environment.

When leveraging a Local Zone to meet data residency requirements, you must have control over the in-scope data movement from the Local Zones to the AWS Region. This can be accomplished by implementing landing zone best practices and the suggested guardrails. The main focus of this post is the custom policies that restrict data snapshots, prohibit data creation within the Region, and limit data transfer to the Region. Furthermore, this post covers which prerequisites organizations should consider before implementing these guardrails.

Prerequisites

Landing zones best practices and custom guardrails can help when data must remain in a specific locality where the Local Zone is also located. This can be completed by defining and enforcing policies for data storage and usage within the landing zone organization that you set up. The following prerequisites should be considered before implementing the suggested guardrails:

  1. AWS Local Zones

Local Zones are enabled through the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) console or the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI).

You can start using available AWS services on the designated Local Zone directly from the console. Moreover, you can manage the Local Zone using the same tools and interfaces that you use in AWS Region.

2. AWS Control Tower landing zone

AWS Control Tower is a managed service that provides a pre-packaged set of best-practice blueprints for setting up and governing multi-account AWS environments. You must have Control Tower fully implemented in your environment before you can deploy custom guardrails.

Control Tower launches a key resource associated with your account, called a landing zone, which serves as a home for your organizations and their accounts.

Note that Control Tower relies on Organizations to create and manage multi-account structures.

  1. Set up the data residency guardrails

Using Organizations, you must make sure that the Local Zone is enabled within a workload account in the landing zones.

Figure 1 Landing Zones Accelerator Local Zones workload on AWS high level Architecture

Figure 1: Landing Zones Accelerator – Local Zones workload on AWS high level Architecture

Utilizing Local Zones for regulated components

The availability of Local Zones provides an excellent opportunity to meet data residency requirements and comply with local regulations that restrict the use of the Region outside of your required geo-political boundary. By leveraging Local Zones, organizations can maintain compliance while utilizing AWS services to support their business needs. AWS owns and manages the infrastructure, including hardware, software, and networking for Local Zones. However, as part of the shared responsibility model, customers are responsible for the security of their applications and data, including access control, data encryption, etc.

You must also comply with all applicable regulations and security standards, such as HIPAA, PCI DSS, and GDPR. You should conduct regular security assessments and implement appropriate security controls to protect their applications and data.

In this post, we consider a scenario where there is a single Local Zones location in a metro. However, you must analyze the specific requirements of your workloads and the relevant regulations that apply to determine the most appropriate high availability configurations for your case.

Local Zones workload data residency guardrails

Organizations provides central governance and management for multiple accounts. Central security administrators use SCPs with Organizations to establish controls to which all AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) principals (users and roles) adhere.

Now you can use SCPs to set permission guardrails. The suggested preventative controls that leverage the implementation of SCPs for data residency on Local Zones are shown in the next paragraph. SCPs let you set permission guardrails by defining the maximum available permissions for IAM entities in an account and all accounts within the Organization root or Organizational Unit (OU). If an SCP denies an action for an account, then none of the entities in any member account, including the member account’s root user, can take that action, even if their IAM permissions let them. The guardrails set in SCPs apply to all IAM entities in the account, which include all users, roles, and the account root user.

 Upon finalizing these prerequisites, you can create the guardrails for the chosen OU.

Note that although the following guidelines serve as helpful guardrails – SCPs – for data residency, you should consult internally with legal and security teams for specific organizational requirements.

 To exercise better control over the workload in Local Zones and prevent data transfer from Local Zones or data storage outside of the Local Zones, consider implementing the following guardrails:

  1. When your data residency requirements require restricting data transfer/saving to the Region, consider the following guardrails:

a. Deny copying data from Local Zones to the Region for Amazon EC2), Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS), Amazon ElastiCache, and data sync “DenyCopyToRegion”.

As the available services in Local Zones can vary based on location, you must review the services available in the chosen Local Zone and Adjust the SCPs accordingly.

b. Deny Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) put action to the Region “DenyPutObjectToRegionalBuckets”.

If your data residency requirements mandate restrictions on data storage in the Region, then consider implementing this guardrail to prevent the use of Amazon S3 in the Region.

c. If your data residency requirements mandate restrictions on data storage in the Region, then consider implementing “DenyDirectTransferToRegion”

Out of Scope is metadata such as tags or operational data such as AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) keys.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
      {
      "Sid": "DenyCopyToRegion",
      "Action": [
        "ec2:ModifyImageAttribute",
        "ec2:CopyImage",  
        "ec2:CreateImage",
        "ec2:CreateInstanceExportTask",
        "ec2:ExportImage",
        "ec2:ImportImage",
        "ec2:ImportInstance",
        "ec2:ImportSnapshot",
        "ec2:ImportVolume",
        "rds:CreateDBSnapshot",
        "rds:CreateDBClusterSnapshot",
        "rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute",
        "elasticache:CreateSnapshot",
        "elasticache:CopySnapshot",
        "datasync:Create*",
        "datasync:Update*"
      ],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Effect": "Deny"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DenyDirectTransferToRegion",
      "Action": [
        "dynamodb:PutItem",
        "dynamodb:CreateTable",
        "ec2:CreateTrafficMirrorTarget",
        "ec2:CreateTrafficMirrorSession",
        "rds:CreateGlobalCluster",
        "es:Create*",
        "elasticfilesystem:C*",
        "elasticfilesystem:Put*",
        "storagegateway:Create*",
        "neptune-db:connect",
        "glue:CreateDevEndpoint",
        "glue:UpdateDevEndpoint",
        "datapipeline:CreatePipeline",
        "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition",
        "sagemaker:CreateAutoMLJob",
        "sagemaker:CreateData*",
        "sagemaker:CreateCode*",
        "sagemaker:CreateEndpoint",
        "sagemaker:CreateDomain",
        "sagemaker:CreateEdgePackagingJob",
        "sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstance",
        "sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob",
        "sagemaker:CreateModel*",
        "sagemaker:CreateTra*",
        "sagemaker:Update*",
        "redshift:CreateCluster*",
        "ses:Send*",
        "ses:Create*",
        "sqs:Create*",
        "sqs:Send*",
        "mq:Create*",
        "cloudfront:Create*",
        "cloudfront:Update*",
        "ecr:Put*",
        "ecr:Create*",
        "ecr:Upload*",
        "ram:AcceptResourceShareInvitation"
      ],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Effect": "Deny"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DenyPutObjectToRegionalBuckets",
      "Action": [
        "s3:PutObject"
      ],
      "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"],
      "Effect": "Deny"
    }
  ]
}
  1. If your data residency requirements require limitations on data storage in the Region, then consider implementing this guardrail “DenyAllSnapshots” to restrict the use of snapshots in the Region.

Note that the following guardrail restricts the creation of snapshots on AWS Outposts as well. If you’re using Outposts in the same AWS account, then you may need to customize this guardrail to make sure that it aligns with your organization’s specific needs and requirements. For more information on data residency considerations for Outposts, please refer to Architecting for data residency with AWS Outposts rack and landing zone guardrails.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [

    {
      "Sid": "DenyAllSnapshots",
      "Effect":"Deny",
      "Action":[
        "ec2:CreateSnapshot",
        "ec2:CreateSnapshots",
        "ec2:CopySnapshot",
        "ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute"
      ],
      "Resource":"arn:aws:ec2:*::snapshot/*"
    }
  ]
}
  1. This guardrail helps prevent the launch of EC2 instances or the creation of network interfaces by subnet as opposed to Local Zones You should keep data residency workloads within the Local Zones rather than the Region to make sure of better control over regulated workloads. This approach can help your organization achieve better control over data residency workloads and improve governance over your Organization.

 Make sure to update the Local Zones subnets < localzones_subnet_arns>.

{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement":[{
    "Sid": "DenyNotLocalZonesSubnet",
    "Effect":"Deny",
    "Action": [
      "ec2:RunInstances",
      "ec2:CreateNetworkInterface"
    ],
    "Resource": [
      "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:network-interface/*"
    ],
    "Condition": {
      "ForAllValues:ArnNotEquals": {
        "ec2:Subnet": ["<localzones_subnet_arns>"]
      }
    }
  }]
}

Additional considerations

When implementing data residency guardrails on Local Zones, consider backup and disaster recovery strategies to make sure that your data is protected in the event of an outage or other unexpected events. This may include creating regular backups of your data, implementing disaster recovery plans and procedures, and using redundancy and failover systems to minimize the impact of any potential disruptions. Additionally, you should make sure that your backup and disaster recovery systems are compliant with any relevant data residency regulations and requirements. You should also test your backup and disaster recovery systems regularly to make sure that they are functioning as intended.

Additionally, the provided SCPs for Local Zones in the above example do not block the “logs:PutLogEvents”. Therefore, even if you implemented data residency guardrails on Local Zones, the application may log data to Amazon CloudWatch Logs in the Region.

Highlights

By default, application-level logs on Local Zones are not automatically sent to CloudWatch Logs in the Region. You can configure CloudWatch Logs agent on Local Zones to collect and send your application-level logs to CloudWatch Logs.

logs:PutLogEvents does transmit data to the Region, but it is not blocked by the provided SCPs, as it’s expected that most use cases still want to be able to use this logging API. However, if blocking is desired, then add the action to the first recommended guardrail. If you want specific roles to be allowed, then combine with the ArnNotLike condition example referenced in the Customization Guide.

Conclusion

The combined use of Local Zones and the suggested guardrails via Organizations policies enables you to exercise better control over the movement of the data. By creating a landing zone for your organization, you can apply SCPs to your Local Zones that will help make sure that your data remains within a specific geographic location, as required by the data residency regulations.

Note that, although custom guardrails can help you manage data residency on Local Zones, it’s critical to thoroughly review your policies, procedures, and configurations. This lets you make sure that they are compliant with all relevant data residency regulations and requirements. Regularly testing and monitoring your systems can help make sure that your data is protected and your organization stays compliant.

References

Architecting for data residency with AWS Outposts rack and landing zone guardrails

Post Syndicated from Sheila Busser original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/architecting-for-data-residency-with-aws-outposts-rack-and-landing-zone-guardrails/

This blog post was written by Abeer Naffa’, Sr. Solutions Architect, Solutions Builder AWS, David Filiatrault, Principal Security Consultant, AWS and Jared Thompson, Hybrid Edge SA Specialist, AWS.

In this post, we will explore how organizations can use AWS Control Tower landing zone and AWS Organizations custom guardrails to enable compliance with data residency requirements on AWS Outposts rack. We will discuss how custom guardrails can be leveraged to limit the ability to store, process, and access data and remain isolated in specific geographic locations, how they can be used to enforce security and compliance controls, as well as, which prerequisites organizations should consider before implementing these guardrails.

Data residency is a critical consideration for organizations that collect and store sensitive information, such as Personal Identifiable Information (PII), financial, and healthcare data. With the rise of cloud computing and the global nature of the internet, it can be challenging for organizations to make sure that their data is being stored and processed in compliance with local laws and regulations.

One potential solution for addressing data residency challenges with AWS is to use Outposts rack, which allows organizations to run AWS infrastructure on premises and in their own data centers. This lets organizations store and process data in a location of their choosing. An Outpost is seamlessly connected to an AWS Region where it has access to the full suite of AWS services managed from a single plane of glass, the AWS Management Console or the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI).  Outposts rack can be configured to utilize landing zone to further adhere to data residency requirements.

The landing zones are a set of tools and best practices that help organizations establish a secure and compliant multi-account structure within a cloud provider. A landing zone can also include Organizations to set policies – guardrails – at the root level, known as Service Control Policies (SCPs) across all member accounts. This can be configured to enforce certain data residency requirements.

When leveraging Outposts rack to meet data residency requirements, it is crucial to have control over the in-scope data movement from the Outposts. This can be accomplished by implementing landing zone best practices and the suggested guardrails. The main focus of this blog post is on the custom policies that restrict data snapshots, prohibit data creation within the Region, and limit data transfer to the Region.

Prerequisites

Landing zone best practices and custom guardrails can help when data needs to remain in a specific locality where the Outposts rack is also located.  This can be completed by defining and enforcing policies for data storage and usage within the landing zone organization that you set up. The following prerequisites should be considered before implementing the suggested guardrails:

1. AWS Outposts rack

AWS has installed your Outpost and handed off to you. An Outpost may comprise of one or more racks connected together at the site. This means that you can start using AWS services on the Outpost, and you can manage the Outposts rack using the same tools and interfaces that you use in AWS Regions.

2. Landing Zone Accelerator on AWS

We recommend using Landing Zone Accelerator on AWS (LZA) to deploy a landing zone for your organization. Make sure that the accelerator is configured for the appropriate Region and industry. To do this, you must meet the following prerequisites:

    • A clear understanding of your organization’s compliance requirements, including the specific Region and industry rules in which you operate.
    • Knowledge of the different LZAs available and their capabilities, such as the compliance frameworks with which you align.
    • Have the necessary permissions to deploy the LZAs and configure it for your organization’s specific requirements.

Note that LZAs are designed to help organizations quickly set up a secure, compliant multi-account environment. However, it’s not a one-size-fits-all solution, and you must align it with your organization’s specific requirements.

3. Set up the data residency guardrails

Using Organizations, you must make sure that the Outpost is ordered within a workload account in the landing zone.

Figure 1 Landing Zone Accelerator Outposts workload on AWS high level Architecture

Figure 1: Landing Zone Accelerator – Outposts workload on AWS high level Architecture

Utilizing Outposts rack for regulated components

When local regulations require regulated workloads to stay within a specific boundary, or when an AWS Region or AWS Local Zone isn’t available in your jurisdiction, you can still choose to host your regulated workloads on Outposts rack for a consistent cloud experience. When opting for Outposts rack, note that, as part of the shared responsibility model, customers are responsible for attesting to physical security, access controls, and compliance validation regarding the Outposts, as well as, environmental requirements for the facility, networking, and power. Utilizing Outposts rack requires that you procure and manage the data center within the city, state, province, or country boundary for your applications’ regulated components, as required by local regulations.

Procuring two or more racks in the diverse data centers can help with the high availability for your workloads. This is because it provides redundancy in case of a single rack or server failure. Additionally, having redundant network paths between Outposts rack and the parent Region can help make sure that your application remains connected and continue to operate even if one network path fails.

However, for regulated workloads with strict service level agreements (SLA), you may choose to spread Outposts racks across two or more isolated data centers within regulated boundaries. This helps make sure that your data remains within the designated geographical location and meets local data residency requirements.

In this post, we consider a scenario with one data center, but consider the specific requirements of your workloads and the regulations that apply to determine the most appropriate high availability configurations for your case.

Outposts rack workload data residency guardrails

Organizations provide central governance and management for multiple accounts. Central security administrators use SCPs with Organizations to establish controls to which all AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) principals (users and roles) adhere.

Now, you can use SCPs to set permission guardrails.  A suggested preventative controls for data residency on Outposts rack that leverage the implementation of SCPs are shown as follows. SCPs enable you to set permission guardrails by defining the maximum available permissions for IAM entities in an account. If an SCP denies an action for an account, then none of the entities in the account can take that action, even if their IAM permissions let them. The guardrails set in SCPs apply to all IAM entities in the account, which include all users, roles, and the account root user.

Upon finalizing these prerequisites, you can create the guardrails for the Outposts Organization Unit (OU).

Note that while the following guidelines serve as helpful guardrails – SCPs – for data residency, you should consult internally with legal and security teams for specific organizational requirements.

 To exercise better control over workloads in the Outposts rack and prevent data transfer from Outposts to the Region or data storage outside the Outposts, consider implementing the following guardrails. Additionally, local regulations may dictate that you set up these additional guardrails.

  1. When your data residency requirements require restricting data transfer/saving to the Region, consider the following guardrails:

a. Deny copying data from Outposts to the Region for Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS), Amazon ElastiCache and data sync “DenyCopyToRegion”.

b. Deny Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) put action to the Region “DenyPutObjectToRegionalBuckets”.

If your data residency requirements mandate restrictions on data storage in the Region,  consider implementing this guardrail to prevent  the use of S3 in the Region.

Note: You can use Amazon S3 for Outposts.

c. If your data residency requirements mandate restrictions on data storage in the Region, consider implementing “DenyDirectTransferToRegion” guardrail.

Out of Scope is metadata such as tags, or operational data such as KMS keys.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
      {
      "Sid": "DenyCopyToRegion",
      "Action": [
        "ec2:ModifyImageAttribute",
        "ec2:CopyImage",  
        "ec2:CreateImage",
        "ec2:CreateInstanceExportTask",
        "ec2:ExportImage",
        "ec2:ImportImage",
        "ec2:ImportInstance",
        "ec2:ImportSnapshot",
        "ec2:ImportVolume",
        "rds:CreateDBSnapshot",
        "rds:CreateDBClusterSnapshot",
        "rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute",
        "elasticache:CreateSnapshot",
        "elasticache:CopySnapshot",
        "datasync:Create*",
        "datasync:Update*"
      ],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Effect": "Deny"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DenyDirectTransferToRegion",
      "Action": [
        "dynamodb:PutItem",
        "dynamodb:CreateTable",
        "ec2:CreateTrafficMirrorTarget",
        "ec2:CreateTrafficMirrorSession",
        "rds:CreateGlobalCluster",
        "es:Create*",
        "elasticfilesystem:C*",
        "elasticfilesystem:Put*",
        "storagegateway:Create*",
        "neptune-db:connect",
        "glue:CreateDevEndpoint",
        "glue:UpdateDevEndpoint",
        "datapipeline:CreatePipeline",
        "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition",
        "sagemaker:CreateAutoMLJob",
        "sagemaker:CreateData*",
        "sagemaker:CreateCode*",
        "sagemaker:CreateEndpoint",
        "sagemaker:CreateDomain",
        "sagemaker:CreateEdgePackagingJob",
        "sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstance",
        "sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob",
        "sagemaker:CreateModel*",
        "sagemaker:CreateTra*",
        "sagemaker:Update*",
        "redshift:CreateCluster*",
        "ses:Send*",
        "ses:Create*",
        "sqs:Create*",
        "sqs:Send*",
        "mq:Create*",
        "cloudfront:Create*",
        "cloudfront:Update*",
        "ecr:Put*",
        "ecr:Create*",
        "ecr:Upload*",
        "ram:AcceptResourceShareInvitation"
      ],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Effect": "Deny"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DenyPutObjectToRegionalBuckets",
      "Action": [
        "s3:PutObject"
      ],
      "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"],
      "Effect": "Deny"
    }
  ]
}
  1. If your data residency requirements require limitations on data storage in the Region, consider implementing this guardrail “DenySnapshotsToRegion” and “DenySnapshotsNotOutposts” to restrict the use of snapshots in the Region.

a. Deny creating snapshots of your Outpost data in the Region “DenySnapshotsToRegion”

 Make sure to update the Outposts “<outpost_arn_pattern>”.

b. Deny copying or modifying Outposts Snapshots “DenySnapshotsNotOutposts”

Make sure to update the Outposts “<outpost_arn_pattern>”.

Note: “<outpost_arn_pattern>” default is arn:aws:outposts:*:*:outpost/*

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [

    {
      "Sid": "DenySnapshotsToRegion",
      "Effect":"Deny",
      "Action":[
        "ec2:CreateSnapshot",
        "ec2:CreateSnapshots"
      ],
      "Resource":"arn:aws:ec2:*::snapshot/*",
      "Condition":{
         "ArnLike":{
            "ec2:SourceOutpostArn":"<outpost_arn_pattern>"
         },
         "Null":{
            "ec2:OutpostArn":"true"
         }
      }
    },
    {

      "Sid": "DenySnapshotsNotOutposts",          
      "Effect":"Deny",
      "Action":[
        "ec2:CopySnapshot",
        "ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute"
      ],
      "Resource":"arn:aws:ec2:*::snapshot/*",
      "Condition":{
         "ArnLike":{
            "ec2:OutpostArn":"<outpost_arn_pattern>"
         }
      }
    }

  ]
}
  1. This guardrail helps to prevent the launch of Amazon EC2 instances or creation of network interfaces in non-Outposts subnets. It is advisable to keep data residency workloads within the Outposts rather than the Region to ensure better control over regulated workloads. This approach can help your organization achieve better control over data residency workloads and improve governance over your AWS Organization.

Make sure to update the Outposts subnets “<outpost_subnet_arns>”.

{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement":[{
    "Sid": "DenyNotOutpostSubnet",
    "Effect":"Deny",
    "Action": [
      "ec2:RunInstances",
      "ec2:CreateNetworkInterface"
    ],
    "Resource": [
      "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:network-interface/*"
    ],
    "Condition": {
      "ForAllValues:ArnNotEquals": {
        "ec2:Subnet": ["<outpost_subnet_arns>"]
      }
    }
  }]
}

Additional considerations

When implementing data residency guardrails on Outposts rack, consider backup and disaster recovery strategies to make sure that your data is protected in the event of an outage or other unexpected events. This may include creating regular backups of your data, implementing disaster recovery plans and procedures, and using redundancy and failover systems to minimize the impact of any potential disruptions. Additionally, you should make sure that your backup and disaster recovery systems are compliant with any relevant data residency regulations and requirements. You should also test your backup and disaster recovery systems regularly to make sure that they are functioning as intended.

Additionally, the provided SCPs for Outposts rack in the above example do not block the “logs:PutLogEvents”. Therefore, even if you implemented data residency guardrails on Outpost, the application may log data to CloudWatch logs in the Region.

Highlights

By default, application-level logs on Outposts rack are not automatically sent to Amazon CloudWatch Logs in the Region. You can configure CloudWatch logs agent on Outposts rack to collect and send your application-level logs to CloudWatch logs.

logs: PutLogEvents does transmit data to the Region, but it is not blocked by the provided SCPs, as it’s expected that most use cases will still want to be able to use this logging API. However, if blocking is desired, then add the action to the first recommended guardrail. If you want specific roles to be allowed, then combine with the ArnNotLike condition example referenced in the previous highlight.

Conclusion

The combined use of Outposts rack and the suggested guardrails via AWS Organizations policies enables you to exercise better control over the movement of the data. By creating a landing zone for your organization, you can apply SCPs to your Outposts racks that will help make sure that your data remains within a specific geographic location, as required by the data residency regulations.

Note that, while custom guardrails can help you manage data residency on Outposts rack, it’s critical to thoroughly review your policies, procedures, and configurations to make sure that they are compliant with all relevant data residency regulations and requirements. Regularly testing and monitoring your systems can help make sure that your data is protected and your organization stays compliant.

References

The most visited AWS DevOps blogs in 2022

Post Syndicated from original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/the-most-visited-aws-devops-blogs-in-2022/

As we kick off 2023, I wanted to take a moment to highlight the top posts from 2022. Without further ado, here are the top 10 AWS DevOps Blog posts of 2022.

#1: Integrating with GitHub Actions – CI/CD pipeline to deploy a Web App to Amazon EC2

Coming in at #1, Mahesh Biradar, Solutions Architect and Suresh Moolya, Cloud Application Architect use GitHub Actions and AWS CodeDeploy to deploy a sample application to Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2).

Architecture diagram from the original post.

#2: Deploy and Manage GitLab Runners on Amazon EC2

Sylvia Qi, Senior DevOps Architect, and Sebastian Carreras, Senior Cloud Application Architect, guide us through utilizing infrastructure as code (IaC) to automate GitLab Runner deployment on Amazon EC2.

Architecture diagram from the original post.

#3 Multi-Region Terraform Deployments with AWS CodePipeline using Terraform Built CI/CD

Lerna Ekmekcioglu, Senior Solutions Architect, and Jack Iu, Global Solutions Architect, demonstrate best practices for multi-Region deployments using HashiCorp Terraform, AWS CodeBuild, and AWS CodePipeline.

Architecture diagram from the original post.

#4 Use the AWS Toolkit for Azure DevOps to automate your deployments to AWS

Mahmoud Abid, Senior Customer Delivery Architect, leverages the AWS Toolkit for Azure DevOps to deploy AWS CloudFormation stacks.

Architecture diagram from the original post.

#5 Deploy and manage OpenAPI/Swagger RESTful APIs with the AWS Cloud Development Kit

Luke Popplewell, Solutions Architect, demonstrates using AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) to build and deploy Amazon API Gateway resources using the OpenAPI specification.

Architecture diagram from the original post.

#6: How to unit test and deploy AWS Glue jobs using AWS CodePipeline

Praveen Kumar Jeyarajan, Senior DevOps Consultant, and Vaidyanathan Ganesa Sankaran, Sr Modernization Architect, discuss unit testing Python-based AWS Glue Jobs in AWS CodePipeline.

Architecture diagram from the original post.

#7: Jenkins high availability and disaster recovery on AWS

James Bland, APN Global Tech Lead for DevOps, and Welly Siauw, Sr. Partner solutions architect, discuss the challenges of architecting Jenkins for scale and high availability (HA).

Architecture diagram from the original post.

#8: Monitor AWS resources created by Terraform in Amazon DevOps Guru using tfdevops

Harish Vaswani, Senior Cloud Application Architect, and Rafael Ramos, Solutions Architect, explain how you can configure and use tfdevops to easily enable Amazon DevOps Guru for your existing AWS resources created by Terraform.

Architecture diagram from the original post.

#9: Manage application security and compliance with the AWS Cloud Development Kit and cdk-nag

Arun Donti, Senior Software Engineer with Twitch, demonstrates how to integrate cdk-nag into an AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) application to provide continual feedback and help align your applications with best practices.

Featured image from the original post.

#10: Smithy Server and Client Generator for TypeScript (Developer Preview)

Adam Thomas, Senior Software Development Engineer, demonstrate how you can use Smithy to define services and SDKs and deploy them to AWS Lambda using a generated client.

Architecture diagram from the original post.

A big thank you to all our readers! Your feedback and collaboration are appreciated and help us produce better content.

 

 

About the author:

Brian Beach

Brian Beach has over 20 years of experience as a Developer and Architect. He is currently a Principal Solutions Architect at Amazon Web Services. He holds a Computer Engineering degree from NYU Poly and an MBA from Rutgers Business School. He is the author of “Pro PowerShell for Amazon Web Services” from Apress. He is a regular author and has spoken at numerous events. Brian lives in North Carolina with his wife and three kids.

Deploy AWS Organizations resources by using CloudFormation

Post Syndicated from Matt Luttrell original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/deploy-aws-organizations-resources-by-using-cloudformation/

AWS recently announced that AWS Organizations now supports AWS CloudFormation. This feature allows you to create and update AWS accounts, organizational units (OUs), and policies within your organization by using CloudFormation templates. With this latest integration, you can efficiently codify and automate the deployment of your resources in AWS Organizations.

You can now manage your AWS organization resources using infrastructure as code (iaC) and make changes in a central place. This can help reduce the time required to build a new organization, expand or modify the existing organization, replicate your organization infrastructure, or apply and update policies across multiple accounts and OUs. You can also delete organization resources by deleting the stacks.

In this blog post, we will show you how to create various AWS Organizations resources for a multi-account organization by using a CloudFormation template.

How does it work?

A CloudFormation template describes your desired resources and their dependencies so that you can launch and configure them together as a stack. You can use a template to create, update, and delete an entire stack as a single unit instead of managing resources individually.

With CloudFormation support for AWS Organizations, you can now do the following:

  • Create, delete, or update an organizational unit (OU). An OU is a container for accounts that allows you to organize your accounts to apply policies according to your needs.
  • Create accounts in your organization, add tags, and attach them to OUs.
  • Add or remove a tag on an OU.
  • Create, delete, or update a service control policy (SCP), backup policy, tag policy and artificial intelligence (AI) services opt-out policy.
  • Add or remove a tag on an SCP, backup policy, tag policy, and AI services opt-out policy.
  • Attach or detach an SCP, backup policy, tag policy, and AI services opt-out policy to a target (root, OU, or account).

To create AWS Organizations resources using CloudFormation, you will need to use your organization’s management account. As of this writing, the new resource types may only be deployed from the organization’s management account or delegated administration account.

Overview of the new resource types

The following are the three new resource types available for the implementation and management of an account, OU, and organizations policy in CloudFormation:

Prerequisites

This blog post assumes that you have AWS Organizations enabled in your management account. You also need the tag policy and service control policy types enabled in your management account. For instructions on how to create an organization, see Create your organization.

You should also review the following important points for creating resources in AWS Organizations:

  • AWS Organizations supports the creation of a single account at a time. If you include multiple accounts in a single CloudFormation template, you should use the DependsOn attribute so that your accounts are created sequentially.
  • Before you can create a policy of a given type, you must first enable that policy type in your organization.
  • The number of levels deep that you can nest OUs depends on the policy types that you have enabled for the root. For SCPs, the limit is five.
  • To modify the AccountName, Email, and RoleName for the account resource parameters, you must sign in to the AWS Management Console as the AWS account root user.
  • Since the CloudFormation template in this blog deploys Account and Organization Unit resources, you must deploy it in your organization’s management account.

For a complete list of dependencies, see the AWS Organizations resource type reference.

Use a CloudFormation template with the new AWS Organizations resources

In this section, we will walk you through a sample CloudFormation template that incorporates the newly supported AWS Organizations resources. CloudFormation provisions and configures the resources for you, so that you don’t have to individually create and configure them and determine resource dependencies.

The template will create the following resources and structure.

  • Three organizational units
    • Infrastructure – Within the organizational root
    • Production – Within the Infrastructure OU
    • Security – Within the organizational root
  • One account
    • AccountA – Within the Production child OU
  • Two service control policies
    • PreventLeavingOrganization – Attached to the organizational root
    • PreventCloudTrailDisablement – Attached to the Security OU
  • One tag policy

Note: The above OU and account layout is only an example for the purpose of this blog post. Please refer to Organizing Your AWS Environment Using Multiple Accounts whitepaper for more information on multi-account strategy best practices & recommendations.

Download the template

  • Download the CloudFormation template. The following shows the contents of the template:
    AWSTemplateFormatVersion: '2010-09-09'
    Description: "AWS Organizations using Cloudformation - Creates OU, nested OU, account and organizations policies"
    
    Parameters:
      OrganizationRoot:
        Description: 'Organization ID'
        Type: String 
    
    Resources:
      InfrastructureOU:
          Type: AWS::Organizations::OrganizationalUnit
          Properties:
              Name: Infrastructure
              ParentId: !Ref OrganizationRoot
    
      SecurityOU:
          Type: AWS::Organizations::OrganizationalUnit
          Properties:
              Name: Security
              ParentId: !Ref OrganizationRoot
    
      ProductionOU:
          Type: AWS::Organizations::OrganizationalUnit 
          Properties:
              Name: Production
              ParentId: { "Ref" : "InfrastructureOU" }
          DependsOn: InfrastructureOU
    
      AccountA:
          Type: AWS::Organizations::Account
          Properties:
              AccountName: AccountA
              Email: [email protected]
              ParentIds: [{"Ref": "ProductionOU"}]            
    
      PreventLeavingOrganizationSCP:
          Type: AWS::Organizations::Policy
          Properties:
              TargetIds: [{"Ref": "OrganizationRoot"}]
              Name: PreventLeavingOrganization
              Description: Prevent member accounts from leaving the organization
              Type: SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY
              Content: >-
                {
                    "Version": "2012-10-17",
                    "Statement": [
                        {
                            "Effect": "Deny",
                            "Action": [
                                "organizations:LeaveOrganization"
                            ],
                            "Resource": "*"
                        }
                    ]
                }
              Tags:
                - Key: DoNotDelete
                  Value: True
    
      PreventCloudTrailDisablementSCP:
          Type: AWS::Organizations::Policy
          Properties:
              TargetIds: [{"Ref": "SecurityOU"}]
              Name: PreventCloudTrailDisablement
              Description: Prevent users from disabling CloudTrail or altering its configuration
              Type: SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY
              Content: >-
                {
                  "Version": "2012-10-17",
                  "Statement": [
                    {
                      "Effect": "Deny",
                      "Action": [
                        "cloudtrail:DeleteTrail",
                        "cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors",
                        "cloudtrail:StopLogging", 
                        "cloudtrail:UpdateTrail" 
    
                      ],
                      "Resource": "*"
                    }
                  ]
                }
    
      TagPolicy:
          Type: AWS::Organizations::Policy
          Properties:
              TargetIds: [{"Ref": "ProductionOU"}]
              Name: DefineTagKeyCase
              Description: CostCenter tag should comply with case specified in the policy
              Type: TAG_POLICY
              Content: >-
                {
                    "tags": {
                      "CostCenter": {
                          "tag_key": {
                            "@@assign": "CostCenter",
                            "@@operators_allowed_for_child_policies": ["@@none"]
                            }
                          }
                        }
                }

Create a stack with the template

In this section, you will create a stack by using the CloudFormation template that you downloaded.

To create the stack

  1. Create the AWS Organizations resources outlined in the template by creating an IAM role for CloudFormation using the following IAM permissions policy and trust policy.

Permissions policy

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "ReadOnlyPermissions",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "organizations:Describe*",
                "organizations:List*",
                "account:GetContactInformation",
                "account:GetAlternateContact"
            ],
            "Resource": "*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "AllowCreationOfResources",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "organizations:CreateAccount",
                "organizations:CreateOrganizationalUnit",
                "organizations:CreatePolicy"
            ],
            "Resource": "*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "AllowModificationOfResources",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "organizations:UpdateOrganizationalUnit",
                "organizations:AttachPolicy",
                "organizations:TagResource",
                "account:PutContactInformation"
            ],
            "Resource": "*"
    }
    ]
}

Trust policy

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "Service": "cloudformation.amazonaws.com"
            },
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
        }
    ]
}
  1. Sign in to the management account for your organization, navigate to the CloudFormation console, and choose Create stack.
  2. Choose With new resources (standard), upload the template file, and choose Next.

    Figure 1: CloudFormation console showing creation of stack

    Figure 1: CloudFormation console showing creation of stack

  3. Enter a name for the stack (for example, CloudFormationForAWSOrganizations). For OrganizationRoot, enter your organizations root ID. You can find the root ID in the AWS Organizations console.
  4. Choose Create stack.
  5. On the Configure stack options page, in the Permissions section, choose the IAM role that you granted permissions to previously, as shown in Figure 2. Then choose Next.
    Figure 2: Set IAM role permissions for CloudFormation

    Figure 2: Set IAM role permissions for CloudFormation

    You will see a screen showing stack creation in progress.

    Figure 3: CloudFormation console showing stack creation in progress

    Figure 3: CloudFormation console showing stack creation in progress

  6. When the stack has been created, choose the Resources tab to see the resources created.

    Figure 4: CloudFormation console showing stack resources created

    Figure 4: CloudFormation console showing stack resources created

Confirm and visualize the resources created by using the console

In this section, you will use the console to confirm and visualize the resources created.

To confirm and visualize the resources

  1. Navigate to the AWS Organizations console.
  2. In the left navigation pane, choose AWS accounts to see the OUs and account that were created.

    Figure 5: AWS Organizations console showing the organization structure

    Figure 5: AWS Organizations console showing the organization structure

Confirm the service control policy created and attached to the organization’s root

In this section, you will confirm that the SCP was created and attached to the organization’s root.

Note: When you enable SCPs on an organization, an AWS full access policy is attached by default at each level (root, OU, and account) of your organization. Because you can attach policies to multiple levels of the organization, accounts can inherit multiple policies with an effect of deny. For more details, see inheritance for service control policies.

To confirm the SCP was created and attached to the root

  1. To view the service control policy, choose Root, and then in the section Applied policies, review the list of policies. The PreventLeavingOrganization SCP prevents the use of the LeaveOrganization API so that member accounts can’t remove their accounts from the organization.

    Figure 6: AWS Organizations console showing the organization’s root

    Figure 6: AWS Organizations console showing the organization’s root

  2. To confirm that the DoNotDelete tag was attached to the PreventLeavingOrganization SCP, choose the policy name and then choose the Tags tab.

    Figure 7: SCP with tags attached to it in Organizations

    Figure 7: SCP with tags attached to it in Organizations

Confirm the service control policy created and attached to the Security OU

In this section, you will confirm that the PreventCloudTrailDisablement SCP was created and attached to the Security OU, thus preventing users or roles in the accounts in the security OU from disabling an AWS CloudTrail log.

To confirm that the SCP was created and attached to the Security OU

  1. From the left navigation pane, choose AWS accounts, and then choose Security.
  2. On the Security page, choose the Policies tab to see a list of policies.
  3. To review and confirm the contents of the policy, choose PreventCloudTrailDisablement.

    Figure 8: SCP attached to the Security OU in Organizations

    Figure 8: SCP attached to the Security OU in Organizations

Confirm the account and tag policy created and attached to the Production OU

In this step, you will confirm that the account and tag policy were created and attached to the Production OU.

To confirm creation of the account and tag policy in the Production OU

  1. On the Production page, choose the Children tab to confirm that the account named AccountA was created.

    Figure 9: The Production OU and account A in Organizations

    Figure 9: The Production OU and account A in Organizations

  2. To confirm that the DefineTagKeyCase tag policy was attached to the Production OU, do the following:
    1. From the left navigation pane, choose AWS accounts, and then choose Production.
    2. Choose the Policies tab to see the list of policies.
    3. In the Tag policies section, under Applied policies, choose DefineTagKeyCase to confirm the contents of the policy. This policy defines the tag key and the capitalization that you want accounts in the production OU to standardize on.

      Figure 10: SCP and tag policy attached to the Production OU in Organizations

      Figure 10: SCP and tag policy attached to the Production OU in Organizations

Conclusion

In this blog post, you learned how to create AWS Organizations resources, including organizational units, accounts, service control policies, and tag policies by using CloudFormation. You can use this new feature to model the state of your infrastructure as code and to help deploy your AWS resources in a safe, repeatable manner at scale.

To learn more about managing AWS Organizations resources with CloudFormation, see AWS Organizations resource type reference in the CloudFormation documentation.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Author

Matt Luttrell

Matt is a Sr. Solutions Architect on the AWS Identity Solutions team. When he’s not spending time chasing his kids around, he enjoys skiing, cycling, and the occasional video game.

Swara Gandhi

Swara Gandhi

Swara is a solutions architect on the AWS Identity Solutions team. She works on building secure and scalable end-to-end identity solutions. She is passionate about everything identity, security, and cloud.

AWS Week in Review – November 21, 2022

Post Syndicated from Danilo Poccia original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-week-in-review-november-21-2022/

This post is part of our Week in Review series. Check back each week for a quick roundup of interesting news and announcements from AWS!

A new week starts, and the News Blog team is getting ready for AWS re:Invent! Many of us will be there next week and it would be great to meet in person. If you’re coming, do you know about PeerTalk? It’s an onsite networking program for re:Invent attendees available through the AWS Events mobile app (which you can get on Google Play or Apple App Store) to help facilitate connections among the re:Invent community.

If you’re not coming to re:Invent, no worries, you can get a free online pass to watch keynotes and leadership sessions.

Last Week’s Launches
It was a busy week for our service teams! Here are the launches that got my attention:

AWS Region in Spain – The AWS Region in Aragón, Spain, is now open. The official name is Europe (Spain), and the API name is eu-south-2.

Amazon Athena – You can now apply AWS Lake Formation fine-grained access control policies with all table and file format supported by Amazon Athena to centrally manage permissions and access data catalog resources in your Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) data lake. With fine-grained access control, you can restrict access to data in query results using data filters to achieve column-level, row-level, and cell-level security.

Amazon EventBridge – With these additional filtering capabilities, you can now filter events by suffix, ignore case, and match if at least one condition is true. This makes it easier to write complex rules when building event-driven applications.

AWS Controllers for Kubernetes (ACK) – The ACK for Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) is now generally available and lets you provision and manage EC2 networking resources, such as VPCs, security groups and internet gateways using the Kubernetes API. Also, the ACK for Amazon EMR on EKS is now generally available to allow you to declaratively define and manage EMR on EKS resources such as virtual clusters and job runs as Kubernetes custom resources. Learn more about ACK for Amazon EMR on EKS in this blog post.

Amazon HealthLake – New analytics capabilities make it easier to query, visualize, and build machine learning (ML) models. Now HealthLake transforms customer data into an analytics-ready format in near real-time so that you can query, and use the resulting data to build visualizations or ML models. Also new is Amazon HealthLake Imaging (preview), a new HIPAA-eligible capability that enables you to easily store, access, and analyze medical images at any scale. More on HealthLake Imaging can be found in this blog post.

Amazon RDS – You can now transfer files between Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) for Oracle and an Amazon Elastic File System (Amazon EFS) file system. You can use this integration to stage files like Oracle Data Pump export files when you import them. You can also use EFS to share a file system between an application and one or more RDS Oracle DB instances to address specific application needs.

Amazon ECS and Amazon EKS – We added centralized logging support for Windows containers to help you easily process and forward container logs to various AWS and third-party destinations such as Amazon CloudWatch, S3, Amazon Kinesis Data Firehose, Datadog, and Splunk. See these blog posts for how to use this new capability with ECS and with EKS.

AWS SAM CLI – You can now use the Serverless Application Model CLI to locally test and debug an AWS Lambda function defined in a Terraform application. You can see a walkthrough in this blog post.

AWS Lambda – Now supports Node.js 18 as both a managed runtime and a container base image, which you can learn more about in this blog post. Also check out this interesting article on why and how you should use AWS SDK for JavaScript V3 with Node.js 18. And last but not least, there is new tooling support to build and deploy native AOT compiled .NET 7 applications to AWS Lambda. With this tooling, you can enable faster application starts and benefit from reduced costs through the faster initialization times and lower memory consumption of native AOT applications. Learn more in this blog post.

AWS Step Functions – Now supports cross-account access for more than 220 AWS services to process data, automate IT and business processes, and build applications across multiple accounts. Learn more in this blog post.

AWS Fargate – Adds the ability to monitor the utilization of the ephemeral storage attached to an Amazon ECS task. You can track the storage utilization with Amazon CloudWatch Container Insights and ECS Task Metadata endpoint.

AWS Proton – Now has a centralized dashboard for all resources deployed and managed by AWS Proton, which you can learn more about in this blog post. You can now also specify custom commands to provision infrastructure from templates. In this way, you can manage templates defined using the AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) and other templating and provisioning tools. More on CDK support and AWS CodeBuild provisioning can be found in this blog post.

AWS IAM – You can now use more than one multi-factor authentication (MFA) device for root account users and IAM users in your AWS accounts. More information is available in this post.

Amazon ElastiCache – You can now use IAM authentication to access Redis clusters. With this new capability, IAM users and roles can be associated with ElastiCache for Redis users to manage their cluster access.

Amazon WorkSpaces – You can now use version 2.0 of the WorkSpaces Streaming Protocol (WSP) host agent that offers significant streaming quality and performance improvements, and you can learn more in this blog post. Also, with Amazon WorkSpaces Multi-Region Resilience, you can implement business continuity solutions that keep users online and productive with less than 30-minute recovery time objective (RTO) in another AWS Region during disruptive events. More on multi-region resilience is available in this post.

Amazon CloudWatch RUM – You can now send custom events (in addition to predefined events) for better troubleshooting and application specific monitoring. In this way, you can monitor specific functions of your application and troubleshoot end user impacting issues unique to the application components.

AWS AppSync – You can now define GraphQL API resolvers using JavaScript. You can also mix functions written in JavaScript and Velocity Template Language (VTL) inside a single pipeline resolver. To simplify local development of resolvers, AppSync released two new NPM libraries and a new API command. More info can be found in this blog post.

AWS SDK for SAP ABAP – This new SDK makes it easier for ABAP developers to modernize and transform SAP-based business processes and connect to AWS services natively using the SAP ABAP language. Learn more in this blog post.

AWS CloudFormation – CloudFormation can now send event notifications via Amazon EventBridge when you create, update, or delete a stack set.

AWS Console – With the new Applications widget on the Console home, you have one-click access to applications in AWS Systems Manager Application Manager and their resources, code, and related data. From Application Manager, you can view the resources that power your application and your costs using AWS Cost Explorer.

AWS Amplify – Expands Flutter support (developer preview) to Web and Desktop for the API, Analytics, and Storage use cases. You can now build cross-platform Flutter apps with Amplify that target iOS, Android, Web, and Desktop (macOS, Windows, Linux) using a single codebase. Learn more on Flutter Web and Desktop support for AWS Amplify in this post. Amplify Hosting now supports fully managed CI/CD deployments and hosting for server-side rendered (SSR) apps built using Next.js 12 and 13. Learn more in this blog post and see how to deploy a NextJS 13 app with the AWS CDK here.

Amazon SQS – With attribute-based access control (ABAC), you can define permissions based on tags attached to users and AWS resources. With this release, you can now use tags to configure access permissions and policies for SQS queues. More details can be found in this blog.

AWS Well-Architected Framework – The latest version of the Data Analytics Lens is now available. The Data Analytics Lens is a collection of design principles, best practices, and prescriptive guidance to help you running analytics on AWS.

AWS Organizations – You can now manage accounts, organizational units (OUs), and policies within your organization using CloudFormation templates.

For a full list of AWS announcements, be sure to keep an eye on the What’s New at AWS page.

Other AWS News
A few more stuff you might have missed:

Introducing our final AWS Heroes of the year – As the end of 2022 approaches, we are recognizing individuals whose enthusiasm for knowledge-sharing has a real impact with the AWS community. Please meet them here!

The Distributed Computing ManifestoWerner Vogles, VP & CTO at Amazon.com, shared the Distributed Computing Manifesto, a canonical document from the early days of Amazon that transformed the way we built architectures and highlights the challenges faced at the end of the 20th century.

AWS re:Post – To make this community more accessible globally, we expanded the user experience to support five additional languages. You can now interact with AWS re:Post also using Traditional Chinese, Simplified Chinese, French, Japanese, and Korean.

For AWS open-source news and updates, here’s the latest newsletter curated by Ricardo to bring you the most recent updates on open-source projects, posts, events, and more.

Upcoming AWS Events
As usual, there are many opportunities to meet:

AWS re:Invent – Our yearly event is next week from November 28 to December 2. If you can’t be there in person, get your free online pass to watch live the keynotes and the leadership sessions.

AWS Community DaysAWS Community Day events are community-led conferences to share and learn together. Join us in Sri Lanka (on December 6-7), Dubai, UAE (December 10), Pune, India (December 10), and Ahmedabad, India (December 17).

That’s all from me for this week. Next week we’ll focus on re:Invent, and then we’ll take a short break. We’ll be back with the next Week in Review on December 12!

Danilo

Building AWS Lambda governance and guardrails

Post Syndicated from Julian Wood original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/building-aws-lambda-governance-and-guardrails/

When building serverless applications using AWS Lambda, there are a number of considerations regarding security, governance, and compliance. This post highlights how Lambda, as a serverless service, simplifies cloud security and compliance so you can concentrate on your business logic. It covers controls that you can implement for your Lambda workloads to ensure that your applications conform to your organizational requirements.

The Shared Responsibility Model

The AWS Shared Responsibility Model distinguishes between what AWS is responsible for and what customers are responsible for with cloud workloads. AWS is responsible for “Security of the Cloud” where AWS protects the infrastructure that runs all the services offered in the AWS Cloud. Customers are responsible for “Security in the Cloud”, managing and securing their workloads. When building traditional applications, you take on responsibility for many infrastructure services, including operating systems and network configuration.

Traditional application shared responsibility

Traditional application shared responsibility

One major benefit when building serverless applications is shifting more responsibility to AWS so you can concentrate on your business applications. AWS handles managing and patching the underlying servers, operating systems, and networking as part of running the services.

Serverless application shared responsibility

Serverless application shared responsibility

For Lambda, AWS manages the application platform where your code runs, which includes patching and updating the managed language runtimes. This reduces the attack surface while making cloud security simpler. You are responsible for the security of your code and AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) to the Lambda service and within your function.

Lambda is SOCHIPAAPCI, and ISO-compliant. For more information, see Compliance validation for AWS Lambda and the latest Lambda certification and compliance readiness services in scope.

Lambda isolation

Lambda functions run in separate isolated AWS accounts that are dedicated to the Lambda service. Lambda invokes your code in a secure and isolated runtime environment within the Lambda service account. A runtime environment is a collection of resources running in a dedicated hardware-virtualized Micro Virtual Machines (MVM) on a Lambda worker node.

Lambda workers are bare metalEC2 Nitro instances, which are managed and patched by the Lambda service team. They have a maximum lease lifetime of 14 hours to keep the underlying infrastructure secure and fresh. MVMs are created by Firecracker, an open source virtual machine monitor (VMM) that uses Linux’s Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) to create and manage MVMs securely at scale.

MVMs maintain a strong separation between runtime environments at the virtual machine hardware level, which increases security. Runtime environments are never reused across functions, function versions, or AWS accounts.

Isolation model for AWS Lambda workers

Isolation model for AWS Lambda workers

Network security

Lambda functions always run inside secure Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPCs) owned by the Lambda service. This gives the Lambda function access to AWS services and the public internet. There is no direct network inbound access to Lambda workers, runtime environments, or Lambda functions. All inbound access to a Lambda function only comes via the Lambda Invoke API, which sends the event object to the function handler.

You can configure a Lambda function to connect to private subnets in a VPC in your account if necessary, which you can control with IAM condition keys . The Lambda function still runs inside the Lambda service VPC but sends all network traffic through your VPC. Function outbound traffic comes from your own network address space.

AWS Lambda service VPC with VPC-to-VPC NAT to customer VPC

AWS Lambda service VPC with VPC-to-VPC NAT to customer VPC

To give your VPC-connected function access to the internet, route outbound traffic to a NAT gateway in a public subnet. Connecting a function to a public subnet doesn’t give it internet access or a public IP address, as the function is still running in the Lambda service VPC and then routing network traffic into your VPC.

All internal AWS traffic uses the AWS Global Backbone rather than traversing the internet. You do not need to connect your functions to a VPC to avoid connectivity to AWS services over the internet. VPC connected functions allow you to control and audit outbound network access.

You can use security groups to control outbound traffic for VPC-connected functions and network ACLs to block access to CIDR IP ranges or ports. VPC endpoints allow you to enable private communications with supported AWS services without internet access.

You can use VPC Flow Logs to audit traffic going to and from network interfaces in your VPC.

Runtime environment re-use

Each runtime environment processes a single request at a time. After Lambda finishes processing the request, the runtime environment is ready to process an additional request for the same function version. For more information on how Lambda manages runtime environments, see Understanding AWS Lambda scaling and throughput.

Data can persist in the local temporary filesystem path, in globally scoped variables, and in environment variables across subsequent invocations of the same function version. Ensure that you only handle sensitive information within individual invocations of the function by processing it in the function handler, or using local variables. Do not re-use files in the local temporary filesystem to process unencrypted sensitive data. Do not put sensitive or confidential information into Lambda environment variables, tags, or other freeform fields such as Name fields.

For more Lambda security information, see the Lambda security whitepaper.

Multiple accounts

AWS recommends using multiple accounts to isolate your resources because they provide natural boundaries for security, access, and billing. Use AWS Organizations to manage and govern individual member accounts centrally. You can use AWS Control Tower to automate many of the account build steps and apply managed guardrails to govern your environment. These include preventative guardrails to limit actions and detective guardrails to detect and alert on non-compliance resources for remediation.

Lambda access controls

Lambda permissions define what a Lambda function can do, and who or what can invoke the function. Consider the following areas when applying access controls to your Lambda functions to ensure least privilege:

Execution role

Lambda functions have permission to access other AWS resources using execution roles. This is an AWS principal that the Lambda service assumes which grants permissions using identity policy statements assigned to the role. The Lambda service uses this role to fetch and cache temporary security credentials, which are then available as environment variables during a function’s invocation. It may re-use them across different runtime environments that use the same execution role.

Ensure that each function has its own unique role with the minimum set of permissions..

Identity/user policies

IAM identity policies are attached to IAM users, groups, or roles. These policies allow users or callers to perform operations on Lambda functions. You can restrict who can create functions, or control what functions particular users can manage.

Resource policies

Resource policies define what identities have fine-grained inbound access to managed services. For example, you can restrict which Lambda function versions can add events to a specific Amazon EventBridge event bus. You can use resource-based policies on Lambda resources to control what AWS IAM identities and event sources can invoke a specific version or alias of your function. You also use a resource-based policy to allow an AWS service to invoke your function on your behalf. To see which services support resource-based policies, see “AWS services that work with IAM”.

Attribute-based access control (ABAC)

With attribute-based access control (ABAC), you can use tags to control access to your Lambda functions. With ABAC, you can scale an access control strategy by setting granular permissions with tags without requiring permissions updates for every new user or resource as your organization scales. You can also use tag policies with AWS Organizations to standardize tags across resources.

Permissions boundaries

Permissions boundaries are a way to delegate permission management safely. The boundary places a limit on the maximum permissions that a policy can grant. For example, you can use boundary permissions to limit the scope of the execution role to allow only read access to databases. A builder with permission to manage a function or with write access to the applications code repository cannot escalate the permissions beyond the boundary to allow write access.

Service control policies

When using AWS Organizations, you can use Service control policies (SCPs) to manage permissions in your organization. These provide guardrails for what actions IAM users and roles within the organization root or OUs can do. For more information, see the AWS Organizations documentation, which includes example service control policies.

Code signing

As you are responsible for the code that runs in your Lambda functions, you can ensure that only trusted code runs by using code signing with the AWS Signer service. AWS Signer digitally signs your code packages and Lambda validates the code package before accepting the deployment, which can be part of your automated software deployment process.

Auditing Lambda configuration, permissions and access

You should audit access and permissions regularly to ensure that your workloads are secure. Use the IAM console to view when an IAM role was last used.

IAM last used

IAM last used

IAM access advisor

Use IAM access advisor on the Access Advisor tab in the IAM console to review when was the last time an AWS service was used from a specific IAM user or role. You can use this to remove IAM policies and access from your IAM roles.

IAM access advisor

IAM access advisor

AWS CloudTrail

AWS CloudTrail helps you monitor, log, and retain account activity to provide a complete event history of actions across your AWS infrastructure. You can monitor Lambda API actions to ensure that only appropriate actions are made against your Lambda functions. These include CreateFunction, DeleteFunction, CreateEventSourceMapping, AddPermission, UpdateEventSourceMapping,  UpdateFunctionConfiguration, and UpdateFunctionCode.

AWS CloudTrail

AWS CloudTrail

IAM Access Analyzer

You can validate policies using IAM Access Analyzer, which provides over 100 policy checks with security warnings for overly permissive policies. To learn more about policy checks provided by IAM Access Analyzer, see “IAM Access Analyzer policy validation”.

You can also generate IAM policies based on access activity from CloudTrail logs, which contain the permissions that the role used in your specified date range.

IAM Access Analyzer

IAM Access Analyzer

AWS Config

AWS Config provides you with a record of the configuration history of your AWS resources. AWS Config monitors the resource configuration and includes rules to alert when they fall into a non-compliant state.

For Lambda, you can track and alert on changes to your function configuration, along with the IAM execution role. This allows you to gather Lambda function lifecycle data for potential audit and compliance requirements. For more information, see the Lambda Operators Guide.

AWS Config includes Lambda managed config rules such as lambda-concurrency-check, lambda-dlq-check, lambda-function-public-access-prohibited, lambda-function-settings-check, and lambda-inside-vpc. You can also write your own rules.

There are a number of other AWS services to help with security compliance.

  1. AWS Audit Manager: Collect evidence to help you audit your use of cloud services.
  2. Amazon GuardDuty: Detect unexpected and potentially unauthorized activity in your AWS environment.
  3. Amazon Macie: Evaluates your content to identify business-critical or potentially confidential data.
  4. AWS Trusted Advisor: Identify opportunities to improve stability, save money, or help close security gaps.
  5. AWS Security Hub: Provides security checks and recommendations across your organization.

Conclusion

Lambda makes cloud security simpler by taking on more responsibility using the AWS Shared Responsibility Model. Lambda implements strict workload security at scale to isolate your code and prevent network intrusion to your functions. This post provides guidance on assessing and implementing best practices and tools for Lambda to improve your security, governance, and compliance controls. These include permissions, access controls, multiple accounts, and code security. Learn how to audit your function permissions, configuration, and access to ensure that your applications conform to your organizational requirements.

For more serverless learning resources, visit Serverless Land.

How to track AWS account metadata within your AWS Organizations

Post Syndicated from Jonathan Nguyen original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/how-to-track-aws-account-metadata-within-your-aws-organizations/

United States Automobile Association (USAA) is a San Antonio-based insurance, financial services, banking, and FinTech company supporting millions of military members and their families. USAA has partnered with Amazon Web Services (AWS) to digitally transform and build multiple USAA solutions that help keep members safe and save members’ money and time.

Why build an AWS account metadata solution?

The USAA Cloud Program developed a centralized solution for collecting all AWS account metadata to facilitate core enterprise functions, such as financial management, remediation of vulnerable and insecure configurations, and change release processes for critical application and infrastructure changes.

Companies without centralized metadata solutions may have distributed documents and wikis that contain account metadata, which has to be updated manually. Manually inputting/updating information generally leads to outdated or incorrect metadata and, in addition, requires individuals to reach out to multiple resources and teams to collect specific information.

Solution overview

USAA utilizes AWS Organizations and a series of GitLab projects to create, manage, and baseline all AWS accounts and infrastructure within the organization, including identity and access management, security, and networking components. Within their GitLab projects, each deployment uses a GitLab baseline version that determines what version of the project was provisioned within the AWS account.

During the creation and onboarding of new AWS accounts, which are created for each application team and use-case, there is specific data that is used for tracking and governance purposes, and applied across the enterprise. USAA’s Public Cloud Security team took an opportunity within a hackathon event to develop the solution depicted in Figure 1.

  1. AWS account is created conforming to a naming convention and added to AWS Organizations.

Metadata tracked per AWS account includes:

    • AWS account name
    • Points of contact
    • Line of business (LOB)
    • Cost center #
    • Application ID #
    • Status
    • Cloud governance record #
    • GitLab baseline version
  1. Amazon EventBridge rule invokes AWS Step Functions when new AWS accounts are created.
  2. Step Functions invoke an AWS Lambda function to pull AWS account metadata and load into a centralized Amazon DynamoDB table with Streams enabled to support automation.
  3. A private Amazon API Gateway is exposed to USAA’s internal network, which queries the DynamoDB table and provides AWS account metadata.
Overview of USAA architecture automation workflow to manage AWS account metadata

Figure 1. Overview of USAA architecture automation workflow to manage AWS account metadata

After the solution was deployed, USAA teams leveraged the data in multiple ways:

  1. User interface: a front-end user-interface querying the API Gateway to allow internal users on the USAA network to filter and view metadata for any AWS accounts within AWS Organizations.
  2. Event-driven automation: DynamoDB streams for any changes in the table that would invoke a Lambda function, which would check the most recent version from GitLab and the GitLab baseline version in the AWS account. For any outdated deployments, the Lambda function invokes the CI/CD pipeline for that AWS account to deploy a standardized set of IAM, infrastructure, and security resources and configurations.
  3. Incident response: the Cyber Threat Response team reduces mean-time-to-respond by developing automation to query the API Gateway to append points-of-contact, environment, and AWS account name for custom detections as well as Security Hub and Amazon GuardDuty findings.
  4. Financial management: Internal teams have integrated workflows to their applications to query the API Gateway to return cost center, LOB, and application ID to assist with financial reporting and tracking purposes. This replaces manually reviewing the AWS account metadata from an internal and manually updated wiki page.
  5. Compliance and vulnerability management: automated notification systems were developed to send consolidated reports to points-of-contact listed in the AWS account from the API Gateway to remediate non-compliant resources and configurations.

Conclusion

In this post, we reviewed how USAA enabled core enterprise functions and teams to collect, store, and distribute AWS account metadata by developing a secure and highly scalable serverless application natively in AWS. The solution has been leveraged for multiple use-cases, including internal application teams in USAA’s production AWS environment.

Implementing the AWS Well-Architected Custom Lens lifecycle in your organization

Post Syndicated from Robert Hoffman original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/implementing-the-aws-well-architected-custom-lens-lifecycle-in-your-organization/

In this blog post, we present a lifecycle that helps you build, validate, and improve your own AWS Well-Architected Custom Lens, in order to roll it out across your whole organization. The AWS Well-Architected Custom Lens is a new feature of the AWS Well-Architected Tool that lets you bring your own best practices to complement the existing Well-Architected Framework.

The Custom Lens lifecycle: how a Custom Lens can benefit your organization

The AWS Well-Architected Custom Lens Lifecycle

Figure 1. The AWS Well-Architected Custom Lens lifecycle

Each organization has its own requirements, processes, best practices, and tools, but the information can be spread over many systems and knowledge bases. A Custom Lens can capture the specifics of a working environment and let coworkers access this information in a single place—from the AWS console—without the need to go to a separate tool. A Custom Lens can be created in a central management account and securely shared with other accounts.

A Custom Lens can be updated periodically as either a major or minor version. If it is a minor version, the change is automatically applied to all accounts that the lens has been shared with. If it is a major version, the user has to accept the updated Custom Lens and a summary of the changes is displayed to the user. Accepting the changes then applies the update for existing workload reviews, and prompts the user to review the workload. Thus, updating a Custom Lens is an effective mechanism to continuously inform teams about new best practices.

In addition, maintaining and improving a Custom Lens continuously helps to identify gaps in organization-wide tooling, guidance, or documentation. You can aggregate feedback and metrics from reviews that have been performed and use it to drive the improvement process of the content. More importantly, the gathered metrics help measure the overall adherence to best practices and requirements in your organization. If you focus on creating clear, concise, and actionable content for your Custom Lens, the time needed to identify and implement improvements is reduced. As teams realize the value of the Custom Lens, more reviews will be performed, and you will receive more data to construct a comprehensive view.

1. Plan

The Plan phase identifies the benefits that a Custom Lens can provide your organization by identifying current gaps. You also define the scope of your Custom Lens, which is the type of content that supports your desired business outcomes. Depending on the scope, you need to identify the appropriate stakeholders and gain support for the initiative.

2. Implement

In the Implement phase, content is created for the Custom Lens with a working group. While doing this, you can identify missing supplementary artefacts, like documentation or tooling. If that is the case, you can create these artefacts and link to them from the Custom Lens Improvement Plan.

As part of the implementation, the Custom Lens is created by uploading a JSON file in the appropriate format to a central management account, then, sharing the lens with the organization’s AWS accounts. You can share the Custom Lens with IAM Principals, such as users, roles, and AWS accounts. For broader and more efficient sharing, you now have the ability to scale by sharing your Custom Lens with individual organizational units or the entire AWS Organizations. This feature reduces management overhead and removes the need for a custom automation.

3. Measure

The Measure phase aggregates feedback and metrics from reviews that have been performed with your Custom Lens; this information is used to drive the improvement process.

The Well-Architected Tool offers a way to share workload reviews, and you can use this to share all reviews with a central AWS account. You can then analyze the reviews in the central account by extracting the data and analyzing it, for example, by building a dashboard. The Well-Architected Lab for building custom reports provides a solution that can be implemented.

4. Improve

In the Improve phase, the gathered metrics and feedback are used to identify areas for future improvement. For example, you might find common gaps among the performed workload reviews, where the same best practices are not fulfilled. When you investigate the root cause, you can learn that the existing content lacks clarity or that the suggested tools are difficult to use.

In addition, improvements, such as content gaps that were not addressed during the first iteration of the Custom Lens, can be added to the backlog before you repeat the cycle.

To roll out changes of your Custom Lens in an automated and repeatable fashion, you can implement the architecture depicted in Figure 2.

Combining AWS CodeCommit with AWS Lambda to update your Custom Lens whenever a file change is pushed to the code repository

Figure 2. Combining AWS CodeCommit with AWS Lambda to update your Custom Lens whenever a file change is pushed to the code repository

This architecture enables automated releases of new versions of your Custom Lens whenever you commit an updated JSON file to the code repository. In detail, the steps are:

  1. The JSON file of your Custom Lens is stored in an AWS CodeCommit repository. An author pushes an updated version of the file to the repository.
  2. The CodeCommit repository is configured with a trigger action that invokes an AWS Lambda function on each commit.
  3. The Lambda function downloads the updated file by using the GetFile API of CodeCommit. Then, the Lambda function imports the updated Custom Lens and publishes it as a new version by using ImportLens and CreateLensVersion APIs of the AWS Well-Architected Tool, then shares the Custom Lens using CreateLensShare.
  4. The updated Custom Lens is available in all accounts that the lens has been shared with.
  5. Reviewers can create new workload reviews with the Custom Lens or upgrade to the newest version for existing workload reviews.

Conclusion

In this blog post, we walked you through the Custom Lens lifecycle, a process to create and continuously improve a Custom Lens for your organization. If you have a special software development lifecycle, a customized security and compliance framework, or other highly specific requirements or best practices that you want disseminated and measurable, learn more about how to create a Custom Lens in the Well-Architected Tool.

AWS Well-Architected is a set of guiding design principles developed by AWS to help organizations build secure, high-performing, resilient, and efficient infrastructure for a variety of applications and workloads. Use the AWS Well-Architected Tool to review your workloads periodically to address important design considerations and ensure that they follow the best practices and guidance of the AWS Well-Architected Framework. For follow up questions or comments, join our growing community on AWS re:Post.

Top 2021 AWS service launches security professionals should review – Part 2

Post Syndicated from Marta Taggart original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/top-2021-aws-service-launches-security-professionals-should-review-part-2/

In Part 1 of this two-part series, we shared an overview of some of the most important 2021 Amazon Web Services (AWS) Security service and feature launches. In this follow-up, we’ll dive deep into additional launches that are important for security professionals to be aware of and understand across all AWS services. There have already been plenty in the first half of 2022, so we’ll highlight those soon, as well.

AWS Identity

You can use AWS Identity Services to build Zero Trust architectures, help secure your environments with a robust data perimeter, and work toward the security best practice of granting least privilege. In 2021, AWS expanded the identity source options, AWS Region availability, and support for AWS services. There is also added visibility and power in the permission management system. New features offer new integrations, additional policy checks, and secure resource sharing across AWS accounts.

AWS Single Sign-On

For identity management, AWS Single Sign-On (AWS SSO) is where you create, or connect, your workforce identities in AWS once and manage access centrally across your AWS accounts in AWS Organizations. In 2021, AWS SSO announced new integrations for JumpCloud and CyberArk users. This adds to the list of providers that you can use to connect your users and groups, which also includes Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services, Okta Universal Directory, Azure AD, OneLogin, and Ping Identity.

AWS SSO expanded its availability to new Regions: AWS GovCloud (US), Europe (Paris), and South America (São Paulo) Regions. Another very cool AWS SSO development is its integration with AWS Systems Manager Fleet Manager. This integration enables you to log in interactively to your Windows servers running on Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) while using your existing corporate identities—try it, it’s fantastic!

AWS Identity and Access Management

For access management, there have been a range of feature launches with AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) that have added up to more power and visibility in the permissions management system. Here are some key examples.

IAM made it simpler to relate a user’s IAM role activity to their corporate identity. By setting the new source identity attribute, which persists through role assumption chains and gets logged in AWS CloudTrail, you can find out who is responsible for actions that IAM roles performed.

IAM added support for policy conditions, to help manage permissions for AWS services that access your resources. This important feature launch of service principal conditions helps you to distinguish between API calls being made on your behalf by a service principal, and those being made by a principal inside your account. You can choose to allow or deny the calls depending on your needs. As a security professional, you might find this especially useful in conjunction with the aws:CalledVia condition key, which allows you to scope permissions down to specify that this account principal can only call this API if they are calling it using a particular AWS service that’s acting on their behalf. For example, your account principal can’t generally access a particular Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) bucket, but if they are accessing it by using Amazon Athena, they can do so. These conditions can also be used in service control policies (SCPs) to give account principals broader scope across an account, organizational unit, or organization; they need not be added to individual principal policies or resource policies.

Another very handy new IAM feature launch is additional information about the reason for an access denied error message. With this additional information, you can now see which of the relevant access control policies (for example, IAM, resource, SCP, or VPC endpoint) was the cause of the denial. As of now, this new IAM feature is supported by more than 50% of all AWS services in the AWS SDK and AWS Command Line Interface, and a fast-growing number in the AWS Management Console. We will continue to add support for this capability across services, as well as add more features that are designed to make the journey to least privilege simpler.

IAM Access Analyzer

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) Access Analyzer provides actionable recommendations to set secure and functional permissions. Access Analyzer introduced the ability to preview the impact of policy changes before deployment and added over 100 policy checks for correctness. Both of these enhancements are integrated into the console and are also available through APIs. Access Analyzer also provides findings for external access allowed by resource policies for many services, including a previous launch in which IAM Access Analyzer was directly integrated into the Amazon S3 management console.

IAM Access Analyzer also launched the ability to generate fine-grained policies based on analyzing past AWS CloudTrail activity. This feature provides a great new capability for DevOps teams or central security teams to scope down policies to just the permissions needed, making it simpler to implement least privilege permissions. IAM Access Analyzer launched further enhancements to expand policy checks, and the ability to generate a sample least-privilege policy from past activity was expanded beyond the account level to include an analysis of principal behavior within the entire organization by analyzing log activity stored in AWS CloudTrail.

AWS Resource Access Manager

AWS Resource Access Manager (AWS RAM) helps you securely share your resources across unrelated AWS accounts within your organization or organizational units (OUs) in AWS Organizations. Now you can also share your resources with IAM roles and IAM users for supported resource types. This update enables more granular access using managed permissions that you can use to define access to shared resources. In addition to the default managed permission defined for each shareable resource type, you now have more flexibility to choose which permissions to grant to whom for resource types that support additional managed permissions. Additionally, AWS RAM added support for global resource types, enabling you to provision a global resource once, and share that resource across your accounts. A global resource is one that can be used in multiple AWS Regions; the first example of a global resource is found in AWS Cloud WAN, currently in preview as of this publication. AWS RAM helps you more securely share an AWS Cloud WAN core network, which is a managed network containing AWS and on-premises networks. With AWS RAM global resource sharing, you can use the Cloud WAN core network to centrally operate a unified global network across Regions and accounts.

AWS Directory Service

AWS Directory Service for Microsoft Active Directory, also known as AWS Managed Microsoft Active Directory (AD), was updated to automatically provide domain controller and directory utilization metrics in Amazon CloudWatch for new and existing directories. Analyzing these utilization metrics helps you quantify your average and peak load times to identify the need for additional domain controllers. With this, you can define the number of domain controllers to meet your performance, resilience, and cost requirements.

Amazon Cognito

Amazon Cognito identity pools (federated identities) was updated to enable you to use attributes from social and corporate identity providers to make access control decisions and simplify permissions management in AWS resources. In Amazon Cognito, you can choose predefined attribute-tag mappings, or you can create custom mappings using the attributes from social and corporate providers’ access and ID tokens, or SAML assertions. You can then reference the tags in an IAM permissions policy to implement attribute-based access control (ABAC) and manage access to your AWS resources. Amazon Cognito also launched a new console experience for user pools and now supports targeted sign out through refresh token revocation.

Governance, control, and logging services

There were a number of important releases in 2021 in the areas of governance, control, and logging services.

AWS Organizations

AWS Organizations added a number of important import features and integrations during 2021. Security-relevant services like Amazon Detective, Amazon Inspector, and Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) IP Address Manager (IPAM), as well as others like Amazon DevOps Guru, launched integrations with Organizations. Others like AWS SSO and AWS License Manager upgraded their Organizations support by adding support for a Delegated Administrator account, reducing the need to use the management account for operational tasks. Amazon EC2 and EC2 Image Builder took advantage of the account grouping capabilities provided by Organizations to allow cross-account sharing of Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) (for more details, see the Amazon EC2 section later in this post). Organizations also got an updated console, increased quotas for tag policies, and provided support for the launch of an API that allows for programmatic creation and maintenance of AWS account alternate contacts, including the very important security contact (although that feature doesn’t require Organizations). For more information on the value of using the security contact for your accounts, see the blog post Update the alternate security contact across your AWS accounts for timely security notifications.

AWS Control Tower

2021 was also a good year for AWS Control Tower, beginning with an important launch of the ability to take over governance of existing OUs and accounts, as well as bulk update of new settings and guardrails with a single button click or API call. Toward the end of 2021, AWS Control Tower added another valuable enhancement that allows it to work with a broader set of customers and use cases, namely support for nested OUs within an organization.

AWS CloudFormation Guard 2.0

Another important milestone in 2021 for creating and maintaining a well-governed cloud environment was the re-launch of CloudFormation Guard as Cfn-Guard 2.0. This launch was a major overhaul of the Cfn-Guard domain-specific language (DSL), a DSL designed to provide the ability to test infrastructure-as-code (IaC) templates such as CloudFormation and Terraform to make sure that they conform with a set of constraints written in the DSL by a central team, such as a security organization or network management team.

This approach provides a powerful new middle ground between the older security models of prevention (which provide developers only an access denied message, and often can’t distinguish between an acceptable and an unacceptable use of the same API) and a detect and react model (when undesired states have already gone live). The Cfn-Guard 2.0 model gives builders the freedom to build with IaC, while allowing central teams to have the ability to reject infrastructure configurations or changes that don’t conform to central policies—and to do so with completely custom error messages that invite dialog between the builder team and the central team, in case the rule is unnuanced and needs to be refined, or if a specific exception needs to be created.

For example, a builder team might be allowed to provision and attach an internet gateway to a VPC, but the team can do this only if the routes to the internet gateway are limited to a certain pre-defined set of CIDR ranges, such as the public addresses of the organization’s branch offices. It’s not possible to write an IAM policy that takes into account the CIDR values of a VPC route table update, but you can write a Cfn-Guard 2.0 rule that allows the creation and use of an internet gateway, but only with a defined and limited set of IP addresses.

AWS Systems Manager Incident Manager

An important launch that security professionals should know about is AWS Systems Manager Incident Manager. Incident Manager provides a number of powerful capabilities for managing incidents of any kind, including operational and availability issues but also security issues. With Incident Manager, you can automatically take action when a critical issue is detected by an Amazon CloudWatch alarm or Amazon EventBridge event. Incident Manager runs pre-configured response plans to engage responders by using SMS and phone calls, can enable chat commands and notifications using AWS Chatbot, and runs automation workflows with AWS Systems Manager Automation runbooks. The Incident Manager console integrates with AWS Systems Manager OpsCenter to help you track incidents and post-incident action items from a central place that also synchronizes with third-party management tools such as Jira Service Desk and ServiceNow. Incident Manager enables cross-account sharing of incidents using AWS RAM, and provides cross-Region replication of incidents to achieve higher availability.

AWS CloudTrail

AWS CloudTrail added some great new logging capabilities in 2021, including logging data-plane events for Amazon DynamoDB and Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) direct APIs (direct APIs allow access to EBS snapshot content through a REST API). CloudTrail also got further enhancements to its machine-learning based CloudTrail Insights feature, including a new one called ErrorRate Insights.

Amazon S3

Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) is one of the most important services at AWS, and its steady addition of security-related enhancements is always big news. Here are the 2021 highlights.

Access Points aliases

Amazon S3 introduced a new feature, Amazon S3 Access Points aliases. With Amazon S3 Access Points aliases, you can make the access points backwards-compatible with a large amount of existing code that is programmed to interact with S3 buckets rather than access points.

To understand the importance of this launch, we have to go back to 2019 to the launch of Amazon S3 Access Points. Access points are a powerful mechanism for managing S3 bucket access. They provide a great simplification for managing and controlling access to shared datasets in S3 buckets. You can create up to 1,000 access points per Region within each of your AWS accounts. Although bucket access policies remain fully enforced, you can delegate access control from the bucket to its access points, allowing for distributed and granular control. Each access point enforces a customizable policy that can be managed by a particular workgroup, while also avoiding the problem of bucket policies needing to grow beyond their maximum size. Finally, you can also bind an access point to a particular VPC for its lifetime, to prevent access directly from the internet.

With the 2021 launch of Access Points aliases, Amazon S3 now generates a unique DNS name, or alias, for each access point. The Access Points aliases look and acts just like an S3 bucket to existing code. This means that you don’t need to make changes to older code to use Amazon S3 Access Points; just substitute an Access Points aliases wherever you previously used a bucket name. As a security team, it’s important to know that this flexible and powerful administrative feature is backwards-compatible and can be treated as a drop-in replacement in your various code bases that use Amazon S3 but haven’t been updated to use access point APIs. In addition, using Access Points aliases adds a number of powerful security-related controls, such as permanent binding of S3 access to a particular VPC.

Bucket Keys

Amazon S3 launched support for S3 Inventory and S3 Batch Operations to identify and copy objects to use S3 Bucket Keys, which can help reduce the costs of server-side encryption (SSE) with AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS).

S3 Bucket Keys were launched at the end of 2020, another great launch that security professionals should know about, so here is an overview in case you missed it. S3 Bucket Keys are data keys generated by AWS KMS to provide another layer of envelope encryption in which the outer layer (the S3 Bucket Key) is cached by S3 for a short period of time. This extra key layer increases performance and reduces the cost of requests to AWS KMS. It achieves this by decreasing the request traffic from Amazon S3 to AWS KMS from a one-to-one model—one request to AWS KMS for each object written to or read from Amazon S3—to a one-to-many model using the cached S3 Bucket Key. The S3 Bucket Key is never stored persistently in an unencrypted state outside AWS KMS, and so Amazon S3 ultimately must always return to AWS KMS to encrypt and decrypt the S3 Bucket Key, and thus, the data. As a result, you still retain control of the key hierarchy and resulting encrypted data through AWS KMS, and are still able to audit Amazon S3 returning periodically to AWS KMS to refresh the S3 Bucket Keys, as logged in CloudTrail.

Returning to our review of 2021, S3 Bucket Keys gained the ability to use Amazon S3 Inventory and Amazon S3 Batch Operations automatically to migrate objects from the higher cost, slightly lower-performance SSE-KMS model to the lower-cost, higher-performance S3 Bucket Keys model.

Simplified ownership and access management

The final item from 2021 for Amazon S3 is probably the most important of all. Last year was the year that Amazon S3 achieved fully modernized object ownership and access management capabilities. You can now disable access control lists to simplify ownership and access management for data in Amazon S3.

To understand this launch, we need to go in time to the origins of Amazon S3, which is one of the oldest services in AWS, created even before IAM was launched in 2011. In those pre-IAM days, a storage system like Amazon S3 needed to have some kind of access control model, so Amazon S3 invented its own: Amazon S3 access control lists (ACLs). Using ACLs, you could add access permissions down to the object level, but only with regard to access by other AWS account principals (the only kind of identity that was available at the time), or public access (read-only or read-write) to an object. And in this model, objects were always owned by the creator of the object, not the bucket owner.

After IAM was introduced, Amazon S3 added the bucket policy feature, a type of resource policy that provides the rich features of IAM, including full support for all IAM principals (users and roles), time-of-day conditions, source IP conditions, ability to require encryption, and more. For many years, Amazon S3 access decisions have been made by combining IAM policy permissions and ACL permissions, which has served customers well. But the object-writer-is-owner issue has often caused friction. The good news for security professionals has been that a deny by either type of access control type overrides an allow by the other, so there were no security issues with this bi-modal approach. The challenge was that it could be administratively difficult to manage both resource policies—which exist at the bucket and access point level—and ownership and ACLs—which exist at the object level. Ownership and ACLs might potentially impact the behavior of only a handful of objects, in a bucket full of millions or billions of objects.

With the features released in 2021, Amazon S3 has removed these points of friction, and now provides the features needed to reduce ownership issues and to make IAM-based policies the only access control system for a specified bucket. The first step came in 2020 with the ability to make object ownership track bucket ownership, regardless of writer. But that feature applied only to newly-written objects. The final step is the 2021 launch we’re highlighting here: the ability to disable at the bucket level the evaluation of all existing ACLs—including ownership and permissions—effectively nullifying all object ACLs. From this point forward, you have the mechanisms you need to govern Amazon S3 access with a combination of S3 bucket policies, S3 access point policies, and (within the same account) IAM principal policies, without worrying about legacy models of ACLs and per-object ownership.

Additional database and storage service features

AWS Backup Vault Lock

AWS Backup added an important new additional layer for backup protection with the availability of AWS Backup Vault Lock. A vault lock feature in AWS is the ability to configure a storage policy such that even the most powerful AWS principals (such as an account or Org root principal) can only delete data if the deletion conforms to the preset data retention policy. Even if the credentials of a powerful administrator are compromised, the data stored in the vault remains safe. Vault lock features are extremely valuable in guarding against a wide range of security and resiliency risks (including accidental deletion), notably in an era when ransomware represents a rising threat to data.

Prior to AWS Backup Vault Lock, AWS provided the extremely useful Amazon S3 and Amazon S3 Glacier vault locking features, but these previous vaulting features applied only to the two Amazon S3 storage classes. AWS Backup, on the other hand, supports a wide range of storage types and databases across the AWS portfolio, including Amazon EBS, Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS) including Amazon Aurora, Amazon DynamoDB, Amazon Neptune, Amazon DocumentDB, Amazon Elastic File System (Amazon EFS), Amazon FSx for Lustre, Amazon FSx for Windows File Server, Amazon EC2, and AWS Storage Gateway. While built on top of Amazon S3, AWS Backup even supports backup of data stored in Amazon S3. Thus, this new AWS Backup Vault Lock feature effectively serves as a vault lock for all the data from most of the critical storage and database technologies made available by AWS.

Finally, as a bonus, AWS Backup added two more features in 2021 that should delight security and compliance professionals: AWS Backup Audit Manager and compliance reporting.

Amazon DynamoDB

Amazon DynamoDB added a long-awaited feature: data-plane operations integration with AWS CloudTrail. DynamoDB has long supported the recording of management operations in CloudTrail—including a long list of operations like CreateTable, UpdateTable, DeleteTable, ListTables, CreateBackup, and many others. What has been added now is the ability to log the potentially far higher volume of data operations such as PutItem, BatchWriteItem, GetItem, BatchGetItem, and DeleteItem. With this launch, full database auditing became possible. In addition, DynamoDB added more granular control of logging through DynamoDB Streams filters. This feature allows users to vary the recording in CloudTrail of both control plane and data plane operations, at the table or stream level.

Amazon EBS snapshots

Let’s turn now to a simple but extremely useful feature launch affecting Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) snapshots. In the past, it was possible to accidently delete an EBS snapshot, which is a problem for security professionals because data availability is a part of the core security triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Now you can manage that risk and recover from accidental deletions of your snapshots by using Recycle Bin. You simply define a retention policy that applies to all deleted snapshots, and then you can define other more granular policies, for example using longer retention periods based on snapshot tag values, such as stage=prod. Along with this launch, the Amazon EBS team announced EBS Snapshots Archive, a major price reduction for long-term storage of snapshots.

AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority

2021 was a big year for AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) Private Certificate Authority (CA) with the following updates and new features:

Network and application protection

We saw a lot of enhancements in network and application protection in 2021 that will help you to enforce fine-grained security policies at important network control points across your organization. The services and new capabilities offer flexible solutions for inspecting and filtering traffic to help prevent unauthorized resource access.

AWS WAF

AWS WAF launched AWS WAF Bot Control, which gives you visibility and control over common and pervasive bots that consume excess resources, skew metrics, cause downtime, or perform other undesired activities. The Bot Control managed rule group helps you monitor, block, or rate-limit pervasive bots, such as scrapers, scanners, and crawlers. You can also allow common bots that you consider acceptable, such as status monitors and search engines. AWS WAF also added support for custom responses, managed rule group versioning, in-line regular expressions, and Captcha. The Captcha feature has been popular with customers, removing another small example of “undifferentiated work” for customers.

AWS Shield Advanced

AWS Shield Advanced now automatically protects web applications by blocking application layer (L7) DDoS events with no manual intervention needed by you or the AWS Shield Response Team (SRT). When you protect your resources with AWS Shield Advanced and enable automatic application layer DDoS mitigation, Shield Advanced identifies patterns associated with L7 DDoS events and isolates this anomalous traffic by automatically creating AWS WAF rules in your web access control lists (ACLs).

Amazon CloudFront

In other edge networking news, Amazon CloudFront added support for response headers policies. This means that you can now add cross-origin resource sharing (CORS), security, and custom headers to HTTP responses returned by your CloudFront distributions. You no longer need to configure your origins or use custom Lambda@Edge or CloudFront Functions to insert these headers.

CloudFront Functions were another great 2021 addition to edge computing, providing a simple, inexpensive, and yet highly secure method for running customer-defined code as part of any CloudFront-managed web request. CloudFront functions allow for the creation of very efficient, fine-grained network access filters, such the ability to block or allow web requests at a region or city level.

Amazon Virtual Private Cloud and Route 53

Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) added more-specific routing (routing subnet-to-subnet traffic through a virtual networking device) that allows for packet interception and inspection between subnets in a VPC. This is particularly useful for highly-available, highly-scalable network virtual function services based on Gateway Load Balancer, including both AWS services like AWS Network Firewall, as well as third-party networking services such as the recently announced integration between AWS Firewall Manager and Palo Alto Networks Cloud Next Generation Firewall, powered by Gateway Load Balancer.

Another important set of enhancements to the core VPC experience came in the area of VPC Flow Logs. Amazon VPC launched out-of-the-box integration with Amazon Athena. This means with a few clicks, you can now use Athena to query your VPC flow logs delivered to Amazon S3. Additionally, Amazon VPC launched three associated new log features that make querying more efficient by supporting Apache Parquet, Hive-compatible prefixes, and hourly partitioned files.

Following Route 53 Resolver’s much-anticipated launch of DNS logging in 2020, the big news for 2021 was the launch of its DNS Firewall capability. Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall lets you create “blocklists” for domains you don’t want your VPC resources to communicate with, or you can take a stricter, “walled-garden” approach by creating “allowlists” that permit outbound DNS queries only to domains that you specify. You can also create alerts for when outbound DNS queries match certain firewall rules, allowing you to test your rules before deploying for production traffic. Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall launched with two managed domain lists—malware domains and botnet command and control domains—enabling you to get started quickly with managed protections against common threats. It also integrated with Firewall Manager (see the following section) for easier centralized administration.

AWS Network Firewall and Firewall Manager

Speaking of AWS Network Firewall and Firewall Manager, 2021 was a big year for both. Network Firewall added support for AWS Managed Rules, which are groups of rules based on threat intelligence data, to enable you to stay up to date on the latest security threats without writing and maintaining your own rules. AWS Network Firewall features a flexible rules engine enabling you to define firewall rules that give you fine-grained control over network traffic. As of the launch in late 2021, you can enable managed domain list rules to block HTTP and HTTPS traffic to domains identified as low-reputation, or that are known or suspected to be associated with malware or botnets. Prior to that, another important launch was new configuration options for rule ordering and default drop, making it simpler to write and process rules to monitor your VPC traffic. Also in 2021, Network Firewall announced a major regional expansion following its initial launch in 2020, and a range of compliance achievements and eligibility including HIPAA, PCI DSS, SOC, and ISO.

Firewall Manager also had a strong 2021, adding a number of additional features beyond its initial core area of managing network firewalls and VPC security groups that provide centralized, policy-based control over many other important network security capabilities: Amazon Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall configurations, deployment of the new AWS WAF Bot Control, monitoring of VPC routes for AWS Network Firewall, AWS WAF log filtering, AWS WAF rate-based rules, and centralized logging of AWS Network Firewall logs.

Elastic Load Balancing

Elastic Load Balancing now supports forwarding traffic directly from Network Load Balancer (NLB) to Application Load Balancer (ALB). With this important new integration, you can take advantage of many critical NLB features such as support for AWS PrivateLink and exposing static IP addresses for applications that still require ALB.

In addition, Network Load Balancer now supports version 1.3 of the TLS protocol. This adds to the existing TLS 1.3 support in Amazon CloudFront, launched in 2020. AWS plans to add TLS 1.3 support for additional services.

The AWS Networking team also made Amazon VPC private NAT gateways available in both AWS GovCloud (US) Regions. The expansion into the AWS GovCloud (US) Regions enables US government agencies and contractors to move more sensitive workloads into the cloud by helping them to address certain regulatory and compliance requirements.

Compute

Security professionals should also be aware of some interesting enhancements in AWS compute services that can help improve their organization’s experience in building and operating a secure environment.

Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) launched the Global View on the console to provide visibility to all your resources across Regions. Global View helps you monitor resource counts, notice abnormalities sooner, and find stray resources. A few days into 2022, another simple but extremely useful EC2 launch was the new ability to obtain instance tags from the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). Many customers run code on Amazon EC2 that needs to introspect about the EC2 tags associated with the instance and then change its behavior depending on the content of the tags. Prior to this launch, you had to associate an EC2 role and call the EC2 API to get this information. That required access to API endpoints, either through a NAT gateway or a VPC endpoint for Amazon EC2. Now, that information can be obtained directly from the IMDS, greatly simplifying a common use case.

Amazon EC2 launched sharing of Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) with AWS Organizations and Organizational Units (OUs). Previously, you could share AMIs only with specific AWS account IDs. To share AMIs within AWS Organizations, you had to explicitly manage sharing of AMIs on an account-by-account basis, as they were added to or removed from AWS Organizations. With this new feature, you no longer have to update your AMI permissions because of organizational changes. AMI sharing is automatically synchronized when organizational changes occur. This feature greatly helps both security professionals and governance teams to centrally manage and govern AMIs as you grow and scale your AWS accounts. As previously noted, this feature was also added to EC2 Image Builder. Finally, Amazon Data Lifecycle Manager, the tool that manages all your EBS volumes and AMIs in a policy-driven way, now supports automatic deprecation of AMIs. As a security professional, you will find this helpful as you can set a timeline on your AMIs so that, if the AMIs haven’t been updated for a specified period of time, they will no longer be considered valid or usable by development teams.

Looking ahead

In 2022, AWS continues to deliver experiences that meet administrators where they govern, developers where they code, and applications where they run. We will continue to summarize important launches in future blog posts. If you’re interested in learning more about AWS services, join us for AWS re:Inforce, the AWS conference focused on cloud security, identity, privacy, and compliance. AWS re:Inforce 2022 will take place July 26–27 in Boston, MA. Registration is now open. Register now with discount code SALxUsxEFCw to get $150 off your full conference pass to AWS re:Inforce. For a limited time only and while supplies last. We look forward to seeing you there!

To stay up to date on the latest product and feature launches and security use cases, be sure to read the What’s New with AWS announcements (or subscribe to the RSS feed) and the AWS Security Blog.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Author

Marta Taggart

Marta is a Seattle-native and Senior Product Marketing Manager in AWS Security Product Marketing, where she focuses on data protection services. Outside of work you’ll find her trying to convince Jack, her rescue dog, not to chase squirrels and crows (with limited success).

Mark Ryland

Mark Ryland

Mark is the director of the Office of the CISO for AWS. He has over 30 years of experience in the technology industry and has served in leadership roles in cybersecurity, software engineering, distributed systems, technology standardization and public policy. Previously, he served as the Director of Solution Architecture and Professional Services for the AWS World Public Sector team.

Get more out of service control policies in a multi-account environment

Post Syndicated from Omar Haq original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/get-more-out-of-service-control-policies-in-a-multi-account-environment/

Many of our customers use AWS Organizations to manage multiple Amazon Web Services (AWS) accounts. There are many benefits to using multiple accounts in your organization, such as grouping workloads with a common business purpose, complying with regulatory frameworks, and establishing strong isolation barriers between applications based on ownership. Customers are even using distinct accounts for development, testing, and production. As these accounts proliferate, customers need a way to centrally set guardrails and controls.

In this blog post, we will walk you through different techniques that you can use to get more out of AWS Organizations service control policies (SCPs) in a multi-account environment. We focus on policy evaluation logic and how SCPs fit into it, show an overview of SCP inheritance, and describe methods for writing compact SCPs. We cover the following five techniques:

  1. Consider the number of policies per entity
  2. Use policy inheritance
  3. Segment by workload type
  4. Combine policies together
  5. Compact your policies

AWS Organizations provides a mechanism to set distinct logical boundaries by using organizational units (OUs). This is useful when you have similar workloads across different AWS accounts that require common guardrails. SCPs are a type of organization policy that you can use to manage permissions in your organization. SCPs offer central control over the maximum available permissions for all accounts in your organization. SCPs help you make sure that your accounts stay within your organization’s access control guidelines. A key distinction of SCPs is that they are useful to set broad guardrails across your environment. You can think of guardrails as a way to enforce specific governance policies at varying levels of your environment, which we will discuss in this post.

Policy evaluation logic and how SCPs fit in

Before we dig into the details, let’s first look at how SCPs work from an overall policy perspective, along with the evaluation logic. An explicit Deny statement in any policy trumps an Allow statement. Organization SCPs that apply to any AWS account that is part of an organization in AWS Organizations require an Allow statement before proceeding in the policy evaluation flow.

For an in-depth look at how policies are evaluated, see Policy evaluation logic in the documentation.

Now, let’s walk through five recommended techniques that can help you get more out of SCPs.

1. Consider the number of policies per entity

An organization is a collection of AWS accounts that you manage together. You can use OUs to group accounts within an organization and administer them as a single unit. This greatly simplifies the management of your accounts. It’s possible to create multiple OUs within a single organization, and you can create OUs within other OUs, otherwise known as nested OUs. You have the flexibility to attach multiple policies to the root of the organization, to an OU, or to an account. For example, in an organization that has the root, one OU, and one account, attaching five SCPs to each of them would produce a total of 15 SCPs (five SCPs at the root, five SCPs at the OU, and five SCPs on the one account).

The number of SCPs that you can apply is limited, and being close to or at the quota could restrict your ability to add more policies in the future. The current published quotas are as follows:

  • Maximum number of SCPs attached to the root: 5
  • Maximum number of SCPs attached to each OU: 5
  • OU maximum nesting in a root: 5 levels of OUs under a root
  • Maximum number of SCPs attached to each account: 5

Note: For the latest information on quotas, see Quotas for AWS Organizations.

Consider the following sample organization structure to understand how you can apply multiple SCPs at different levels in an organization.

Figure 1: A sample organization showing the maximum number of SCPs applicable at each level (root, OU, account)

Figure 1: A sample organization showing the maximum number of SCPs applicable at each level (root, OU, account)

2. Use policy inheritance

Policy inheritance refers to the inheritance of policies that are attached to the organization’s root or to an OU. All accounts that are members of the organization root or OU where a policy is attached are affected by that policy, but inheritance works differently for Allow and Deny statements. For a permission to be allowed for a specified account, every SCP from the root through each OU in the direct path to the account, and even attached to the account itself, must allow that permission. In other words, a statement that allows access needs to exist at every level of a hierarchy; it’s not inherited. However, a Deny statement is inherited and evaluated at each level.

At this point, you should start thinking about the policies from a broader controls perspective: Controls that you want to implement on the whole organization should go into your organization’s root-level SCP. Controls should be more granular as you move down the hierarchy in AWS Organizations.

For example, when a Deny policy is attached to the organization’s root, all accounts in the organization are affected by that policy. When you attach a Deny policy to a specific OU, accounts that are directly under that OU or nested OUs under it are affected by that policy. Because you can attach policies to multiple levels in the organization, accounts might have multiple applicable policy documents, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Sample organization showing applicable policies

Figure 2: Sample organization showing applicable policies

By default, AWS Organizations attaches an AWS managed SCP named FullAWSAccess to every root and OU when it’s created. This policy allows all services and actions.

Note: Adding an SCP with full AWS access doesn’t give all the principals in an account access to everything. SCPs don’t grant permissions; they are used to filter permissions. Principals still need a policy within the account that grants them access.

Additionally, the policies that are applied to an OU only affect the accounts or the child OUs under it and don’t affect other OUs created under the root. For example, a policy applied to the Sandbox OU doesn’t affect the Workloads OU.

The two tables that follow show examples of the policies that result from inheritance. As discussed previously, if an Allow isn’t present at all levels (root, OU, and account) the account won’t have access to any service. Consider the last example in the Sandbox OU table with a “Deny S3 access” SCP at the root, which limits access to Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3). Although there is “Allow S3 access” applied to the Sandbox OU and “Full AWS access” at the account level, the resultant policy on account A is “No service access” because there is no policy with an effect of “Allow” in the SCP at the root level.

The following table shows the inheritance of policies in the Sandbox OU.

SCP at root SCP at Sandbox OU SCP at account A Resultant policy at account A Resultant policy at accounts B and C
Full AWS access Full AWS access + deny S3 access Full AWS access + deny EC2 access No S3, no EC2 access No S3 access
Full AWS access Allow Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) access Allow EC2 access Allows EC2 access only Allows EC2 access only
Deny S3 access Allow S3 access Full AWS access No service access No service access

The following table shows the inheritance of policies in the Workloads OU.

SCP at root SCP at Workloads OU SCP at Test OU Resultant policy at account D Resultant policies at production OU/accounts E and F
Full AWS access Full AWS access Full AWS access + deny EC2 access No EC2 access Full AWS access
Full AWS access Full AWS access Allow EC2 access Allows EC2 access Full AWS access
Deny S3 access Full AWS access Allow S3 access No service access No service access

Some examples of common root-level policies are as follows:

For sample SCPs, see Example service control policies. For insight into best practices for applying policies at different levels in an organization, see Best practices for SCPs in a multi-account environment.

3. Segment SCPs by workload type

A key feature of AWS Organizations is the ability to create distinct workload boundaries by using organizational units (OUs). You can think of OUs as a logical boundary where you can directly apply SCPs. You can also nest OUs up to five levels deep and apply different policies at each level. By using OUs, you can segment your workload types and create purpose-driven guardrails to match your security and compliance requirements.

To illustrate this, let’s take an example where there are three distinct workload types divided into three separate OUs: Infrastructure, Sandbox, and Workload, as shown in Figure 3. A best practice would be to tailor your SCPs to each specific OU type. Your security organization wouldn’t want to allow private workloads to be reachable from the internet. However, workloads that serve your external customers would require external network connectivity. To support innovation and experimentation, you can establish a Sandbox OU that has fewer policy restrictions but might limit connectivity back to your corporate data center.

For additional information on how to organize your OUs, see Recommended OUs.

Figure 3: Example organization showing different workloads

Figure 3: Example organization showing different workloads

4. Combine policies together

Similar to AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies, you can have multiple statements within a service control policy. You can combine statements in a single policy to avoid hitting the quota limit of five policies per account, OU, or root. An AWS full access policy is attached by default when you enable SCPs on an organization. You can combine the full access policy with additional controls and combine statements, as shown in the following example policy. Each SCP that you apply can have a policy size of 5,120 bytes. When combining statements, make sure that the resultant statement doesn’t alter your original intent. You can combine the Action elements in an SCP if the policy has the same values for Effect, Resource, and Condition.

AWS full access policy (143 bytes)

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "*",
            "Resource": "*"
        }
    ]
}

You can combine this full access policy with the following deny policy:

Deny bucket deletion and Security Hub disablement (260 bytes)

{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": "s3:DeleteBucket",
            "Resource": "*"
        },
        {
            "Effect": "Deny",
            "Action": "securityhub:Disable*",
            "Resource": "*"
        }
    ]
}

The resulting combined policy is as follows:

Combined policy (274 bytes)

{
   "Version":"2012-10-17",
   "Statement":[
      {
         "Effect":"Allow",
         "Action":"*",
         "Resource":"*"
      },
      {
         "Effect":"Deny",
         "Action":[
            "s3:DeleteBucket",
            "securityhub:Disable*"
         ],
         "Resource":"*"
      }
   ]
}

5. Compact your policies

One difference between IAM policies and SCPs is that whitespace counts against the size quota in SCPs. Compacting related actions in a policy can help you shorten the policy. Following are four methods to compact your policy:

  1. Remove whitespace. If you use the AWS Management Console, whitespace is automatically removed. However, if you don’t want to manually update policies by using the console every time, you can incorporate a script that removes the whitespace. (Method four later in this list provides an example of this type of script.)
  2. Use wildcards and prefixes to combine multiple actions. For example, the following policy denies access to disable configuration in AWS Security Hub.
    {
         "Effect": "Deny",
         "Action":[
            "Securityhub:DisableSecurityHub", 
            "Securityhub:DisableOrganizationAdminAccount",
            "Securityhub:DisableImportFindingsForProduct"
         ],
         "Resource": "*"
        }

    By using wildcards and prefixes, you can rewrite this policy as follows:

      {
        "Effect": "Deny",
        "Action": "Securityhub:Disable*",
        "Resource": "*"
    }

    Important: When you combine actions together as in this example, be aware that there could be a potential impact if new actions are released in the future that start with the Disable keyword, because these actions will be covered by the wildcard and denied.

  3. SCPs can be configured to work as either deny lists or allow lists. For additional details on allow lists and deny lists, see Strategies for using SCPs. We recommend that you use deny lists where possible, because they are more flexible and can help simplify your policies, which will result in less maintenance. To expand on this strategy, deny statements support conditions (as shown in the following example), and for specific resources to be specified. For example, when AWS adds a new service, you don’t have to go back and update your policy if you’ve used a deny statement. To support this, AWS Organizations attaches an AWS managed SCP named FullAWSAccess to every root and OU when it’s created. This policy allows all services and actions. Additionally, deny statements coupled with NotAction statements can help you write shorter policies.

    Consider the following scenario: Your security organization requires that application teams use specific AWS Regions. The recommended approach is to create a deny list that blocks everything except what is in the NotAction block. Following is an example where the SCP denies any operation outside of specified Regions that your organization has authorized for use.

    Note: The list includes AWS global services that cannot be allowlisted based on a Region.

    {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Sid": "DenyAllOutsideEU",
                "Effect": "Deny",
                "NotAction": [
                    "a4b:*",
                    "acm:*",
                    "aws-marketplace-management:*",
                    "aws-marketplace:*",
                    "aws-portal:*",
                    "budgets:*",
                    "ce:*",
                    "chime:*",
                    "cloudfront:*",
                    "config:*",
                    "cur:*",
                    "directconnect:*",
                    "ec2:DescribeRegions",
                    "ec2:DescribeTransitGateways",
                    "ec2:DescribeVpnGateways",
                    "fms:*",
                    "globalaccelerator:*",
                    "health:*",
                    "iam:*",
                    "importexport:*",
                    "kms:*",
                    "mobileanalytics:*",
                    "networkmanager:*",
                    "organizations:*",
                    "pricing:*",
                    "route53:*",
                    "route53domains:*",
                    "s3:GetAccountPublic*",
                    "s3:ListAllMyBuckets",
                    "s3:PutAccountPublic*",
                    "shield:*",
                    "sts:*",
                    "support:*",
                    "trustedadvisor:*",
                    "waf-regional:*",
                    "waf:*",
                    "wafv2:*",
                    "wellarchitected:*"
                ],
                "Resource": "*",
                "Condition": {
                    "StringNotEquals": {
                        "aws:RequestedRegion": [
                            "eu-central-1",
                            "eu-west-1"
                        ]
                    }
                }
            }
        ]
    }

  4. Shorten the Sid value in your policy: The Sid (statement ID) is an optional identifier that you provide for the policy statement. Remove it completely from your policy if it serves no purpose for you. We also have customers who find it effective to maintain a list of SID values and details on corresponding policies in an index file locally.

The following sample Python code can compress a provided policy by removing whitespace and Sid values.

You can export the compressed policy in the file named Compressed_Policy.json or show the output on the terminal by removing # from the following code.

import json
def compress_json(policy):
    statement = policy["Statement"]
    if not isinstance(statement, list):
        statement = [statement]
    for s in statement:
        s.pop("Sid", None)
   
    # json.dumps removes whitespace around separators in a JSON and converts it to a JSON formatted string.
    # To get the most compact representation, specify separators=(item_separator, key_separator)
    policy_without_whitespace = json.dumps(policy, separators=(',', ':'))
   
    return policy_without_whitespace

if __name__ == '__main__':
  path = input("Enter the path to policy file like: \n  /Users/swara/Desktop/policy.json or ./policy.json  \n >  ")
  with open(path) as f:
    policy = json.load(f)
   
original_len = len(str(policy))
mini_policy = compress_json(policy)
#To print the output on the screen
print(mini_policy)
compressed_len = len(str(mini_policy))
print("\n \t original length: {} -> compressed length: {} \n".format(original_len, compressed_len))
#To write output to a file named Compressed_Policy.json
with open("Compressed_Policy.json", "w") as Output_file:
     print(mini_policy, file=Output_file)

Example output on screen:

{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Action":["iam:AttachRolePolicy","iam:DeleteRole","iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary","iam:DeleteRolePolicy","iam:DetachRolePolicy","iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary","iam:PutRolePolicy","iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy","iam:UpdateRole","iam:UpdateRoleDescription"],"Resource":["arn:aws:iam::*:role/role-to-deny"],"Effect":"Deny"}]}

original length: 433 -> compressed length: 364

To download the sample python code and the example policy shown above, download the files compress-policy.py and policy.json.

Conclusion

In this post, we walked you through different techniques that you can use to get more out of service control policies in a multi-account environment. By using these techniques, you can establish a well-considered strategy for how your organization can adopt SCPs in a multi-account environment. You also learned about how SCPs fit into the overall policy landscape for AWS. SCPs are a powerful tool to help customers establish guardrails. As you evaluate your IAM strategy, consider what you’re trying to achieve. If you’re trying to establish broad guardrails for multiple accounts, then we suggest looking at SCPs first.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

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Omar Haq

Omar Haq

Omar is a senior solutions architect with AWS. He has an interest in workload migrations and modernizations, DevOps, containers, and infrastructure security. Omar has previous experience in management consulting, where he worked as a technical lead for various cloud migration projects.

Swara Gandhi

Swara Gandhi

Swara is a solutions architect on the AWS Identity Solutions team. She works on building secure and scalable end-to-end identity solutions. She is passionate about everything identity, security, and cloud.

Monitoring and alerting break-glass access in an AWS Organization

Post Syndicated from Haresh Nandwani original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/monitoring-and-alerting-break-glass-access-in-an-aws-organization/

Organizations building enterprise-scale systems require the setup of a secure and governed landing zone to deploy and operate their systems. A landing zone is a starting point from which your organization can quickly launch and deploy workloads and applications with confidence in your security and infrastructure environment as described in What is a landing zone?. Nationwide Building Society (Nationwide) is the world’s largest building society. It is owned by its 16 million members and exists to serve their needs. The Society is one of the UK’s largest providers for mortgages, savings and current accounts, as well as being a major provider of ISAs, credit cards, personal loans, insurance, and investments.

For one of its business initiatives, Nationwide utilizes AWS Control Tower to build and operate their landing zone which provides a well-established pattern to set up and govern a secure, multi-account AWS environment. Nationwide operates in a highly regulated industry and our governance assurance requires adequate control of any privileged access to production line-of-business data or to resources which have access to them. We chose for this specific business initiative to deploy our landing zone using AWS Organizations, to benefit from ongoing account management and governance as aligned with AWS implementation best practices. We also utilized AWS Single Sign-On (AWS SSO) to create our workforce identities in AWS once and manage access centrally across our AWS Organization. In this blog, we describe the integrations required across AWS Control Tower and AWS SSO to implement a break-glass mechanism that makes access reporting publishable to system operators as well as to internal audit systems and processes. We will outline how we used AWS SSO for our setup as well as the three architecture options we considered, and why we went with the chosen solution.

Sourcing AWS SSO access data for near real-time monitoring

In our setup, we have multiple AWS Accounts and multiple trails on each of these accounts. Users will regularly navigate across multiple accounts as they operate our infrastructure, and their journeys are marked across these multiple trails. Typically, AWS CloudTrail would be our chosen resource to clearly and unambiguously identify account or data access.  The key challenge in this scenario was to design an efficient and cost-effective solution to scan these trails to help identify and report on break-glass user access to account and production data. To address this challenge, we developed the following two architecture design options.

Option 1: A decentralized approach that uses AWS CloudFormation StackSets, Amazon EventBridge and AWS Lambda

Our solution entailed a decentralized approach by deploying a CloudFormation StackSet to create, update, or delete stacks across multiple accounts and AWS Regions with a single operation. The Stackset created Amazon EventBridge rules and target AWS Lambda functions. These functions post to EventBridge in our audit account. Our audit account has a set of Lambda functions running off EventBridge to initiate specific events, format the event message and post to Slack, our centralized communication platform for this implementation. Figure 1 depicts the overall architecture for this option.

De-centralized logging using Amazon EventBridge and AWS Lambda

Figure 1. De-centralized logging using Amazon EventBridge and AWS Lambda

Option 2: Use an organization trail in the Organization Management account

This option uses the centralized organization trail in the Organization Management account to source audit data. Details of how to create an organization trail can be found in the AWS CloudTrail User Guide. CloudTrail was configured to send log events to CloudWatch Logs. These events are then sent via Lambda functions to Slack using webhooks. We used a public terraform module in this GitHub repository to build this Lambda Slack integration. Figure 2 depicts the overall architecture for this option.

Centralized logging pattern using Amazon CloudWatch

Figure 2. Centralized logging pattern using Amazon CloudWatch

This was our preferred option and is the one we finally implemented.

We also evaluated a third option which was to use centralized logging and auditing feature enabled by Control Tower. Users authenticate and federate to target accounts from a central location so it seemed possible to source this info from the centralized logs. These log events arrive as .gz compressed json objects, which meant having to expand these archives repeatedly for inspection. We therefore decided against this option.

A centralized, economic, extensible solution to alert of SSO break-glass

Our requirement was to identify break-glass access across any of the access mechanisms supported by AWS, including CLI and User Portal access. To ensure we have comprehensive coverage across all access mechanisms, we identified all the events initiated for each access mechanism:

  1. User Portal/AWS Console access events
    • Authenticate
    • ListApplications
    • ListApplicationProfiles
    • Federate – this event contains the role that the user is federating into
  2. CLI access events
    • CreateToken
    • ListAccounts
    • ListAccountRoles
    • GetRoleCredentials – this event contains the role that the user is federating into

EventBridge is able to initiate actions after events only when the event is trying to perform changes (when the “readOnly” attribute on the event record body equals “false”).

The AWS support team was aware of this attribute and recommended that we, change the data flow we were using to one able to initiate actions after any kind of event, regardless of the value on its readOnly attribute. The solution in our case was to send the CloudTrail logs to CloudWatch Logs. This then and initiates the Lambda function through a filter subscription that detects the desired event names on the log content.

The filter used is as follows:

{($.eventSource = sso.amazonaws.com) && ($.eventName = Federate||$.eventName = GetRoleCredentials)}

Due to the query size in the CloudWatch Log queries we had to remove the subscription filters and do the parsing of the content of the log lines inside the lambda function. In order to determine what accounts would initiate the notifications, we sent the list of accounts and roles to it as an environment variable at runtime.

Considerations with cross-account SSO access

With direct federation users get an access token. This is most obvious in AWS single sign on at the chiclet page as “Command line or programmatic access”. SSO tokens have a limited lifetime (we use the default 1-hour). A user does not have to get a new token to access a target resource until the one they are using is expired. This means that a user may repeatedly access a target account using the same token during its lifetime. Although the token is made available at the chiclet page, the GetRoleCredentials event does not occur until it is used to authenticate an API call to the target AWS account.

Conclusion

In this blog, we discussed how AWS Control Tower and AWS Single Sign-on enabled Nationwide to build and govern a secure, multi-account AWS environment for one of their business initiatives and centralize access management across our implementation. The integration was important for us to accurately and comprehensively identify and audit break-glass access for our implementation. As a result, we were able to satisfy our security and compliance audit requirements for privileged access to our AWS accounts.