All posts by Bruce Schneier

Spyware Maker NSO Group Found Liable for Hacking WhatsApp

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/12/spyware-maker-nso-group-found-liable-for-hacking-whatsapp.html

A judge has found that NSO Group, maker of the Pegasus spyware, has violated the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by hacking WhatsApp in order to spy on people using it.

Jon Penney and I wrote a legal paper on the case.

Hacking Digital License Plates

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/12/hacking-digital-license-plates.html

Not everything needs to be digital and “smart.” License plates, for example:

Josep Rodriguez, a researcher at security firm IOActive, has revealed a technique to “jailbreak” digital license plates sold by Reviver, the leading vendor of those plates in the US with 65,000 plates already sold. By removing a sticker on the back of the plate and attaching a cable to its internal connectors, he’s able to rewrite a Reviver plate’s firmware in a matter of minutes. Then, with that custom firmware installed, the jailbroken license plate can receive commands via Bluetooth from a smartphone app to instantly change its display to show any characters or image.

[…]

Because the vulnerability that allowed him to rewrite the plates’ firmware exists at the hardware level­—in Reviver’s chips themselves—Rodriguez says there’s no way for Reviver to patch the issue with a mere software update. Instead, it would have to replace those chips in each display.

The whole point of a license plate is that it can’t be modified. Why in the world would anyone think that a digital version is a good idea?

Short-Lived Certificates Coming to Let’s Encrypt

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/12/short-lived-certificates-coming-to-lets-encrypt.html

Starting next year:

Our longstanding offering won’t fundamentally change next year, but we are going to introduce a new offering that’s a big shift from anything we’ve done before—short-lived certificates. Specifically, certificates with a lifetime of six days. This is a big upgrade for the security of the TLS ecosystem because it minimizes exposure time during a key compromise event.

Because we’ve done so much to encourage automation over the past decade, most of our subscribers aren’t going to have to do much in order to switch to shorter lived certificates. We, on the other hand, are going to have to think about the possibility that we will need to issue 20x as many certificates as we do now. It’s not inconceivable that at some point in our next decade we may need to be prepared to issue 100,000,000 certificates per day.

That sounds sort of nuts to me today, but issuing 5,000,000 certificates per day would have sounded crazy to me ten years ago.

This is an excellent idea.

Slashdot thread.

Ultralytics Supply-Chain Attack

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/12/ultralytics-supply-chain-attack.html

Last week, we saw a supply-chain attack against the Ultralytics AI library on GitHub. A quick summary:

On December 4, a malicious version 8.3.41 of the popular AI library ultralytics ­—which has almost 60 million downloads—was published to the Python Package Index (PyPI) package repository. The package contained downloader code that was downloading the XMRig coinminer. The compromise of the project’s build environment was achieved by exploiting a known and previously reported GitHub Actions script injection.

Lots more details at that link. Also here.

Seth Michael Larson—the security developer in residence with the Python Software Foundation, responsible for, among other things, securing PyPi—has a good summary of what should be done next:

From this story, we can see a few places where PyPI can help developers towards a secure configuration without infringing on existing use-cases.

  • API tokens are allowed to go unused alongside Trusted Publishers. It’s valid for a project to use a mix of API tokens and Trusted Publishers because Trusted Publishers aren’t universally supported by all platforms. However, API tokens that are being unused over a period of time despite releases continuing to be published via Trusted Publishing is a strong indicator that the API token is no longer needed and can be revoked.
  • GitHub Environments are optional, but recommended, when using a GitHub Trusted Publisher. However, PyPI doesn’t fail or warn users that are using a GitHub Environment that the corresponding Trusted Publisher isn’t configured to require the GitHub Environment. This fact didn’t end up mattering for this specific attack, but during the investigation it was noticed as something easy for project maintainers to miss.

There’s also a more general “What can you do as a publisher to the Python Package Index” list at the end of the blog post.

Trust Issues in AI

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/12/trust-issues-in-ai.html

This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders. It originally appeared as a response to Evgeny Morozov in Boston Review‘s forum, “The AI We Deserve.”

For a technology that seems startling in its modernity, AI sure has a long history. Google Translate, OpenAI chatbots, and Meta AI image generators are built on decades of advancements in linguistics, signal processing, statistics, and other fields going back to the early days of computing—and, often, on seed funding from the U.S. Department of Defense. But today’s tools are hardly the intentional product of the diverse generations of innovators that came before. We agree with Morozov that the “refuseniks,” as he calls them, are wrong to see AI as “irreparably tainted” by its origins. AI is better understood as a creative, global field of human endeavor that has been largely captured by U.S. venture capitalists, private equity, and Big Tech. But that was never the inevitable outcome, and it doesn’t need to stay that way.

The internet is a case in point. The fact that it originated in the military is a historical curiosity, not an indication of its essential capabilities or social significance. Yes, it was created to connect different, incompatible Department of Defense networks. Yes, it was designed to survive the sorts of physical damage expected from a nuclear war. And yes, back then it was a bureaucratically controlled space where frivolity was discouraged and commerce was forbidden.

Over the decades, the internet transformed from military project to academic tool to the corporate marketplace it is today. These forces, each in turn, shaped what the internet was and what it could do. For most of us billions online today, the only internet we have ever known has been corporate—because the internet didn’t flourish until the capitalists got hold of it.

AI followed a similar path. It was originally funded by the military, with the military’s goals in mind. But the Department of Defense didn’t design the modern ecosystem of AI any more than it did the modern internet. Arguably, its influence on AI was even less because AI simply didn’t work back then. While the internet exploded in usage, AI hit a series of dead ends. The research discipline went through multiple “winters” when funders of all kinds—military and corporate—were disillusioned and research money dried up for years at a time. Since the release of ChatGPT, AI has reached the same endpoint as the internet: it is thoroughly dominated by corporate power. Modern AI, with its deep reinforcement learning and large language models, is shaped by venture capitalists, not the military—nor even by idealistic academics anymore.

We agree with much of Morozov’s critique of corporate control, but it does not follow that we must reject the value of instrumental reason. Solving problems and pursuing goals is not a bad thing, and there is real cause to be excited about the uses of current AI. Morozov illustrates this from his own experience: he uses AI to pursue the explicit goal of language learning.

AI tools promise to increase our individual power, amplifying our capabilities and endowing us with skills, knowledge, and abilities we would not otherwise have. This is a peculiar form of assistive technology, kind of like our own personal minion. It might not be that smart or competent, and occasionally it might do something wrong or unwanted, but it will attempt to follow your every command and gives you more capability than you would have had without it.

Of course, for our AI minions to be valuable, they need to be good at their tasks. On this, at least, the corporate models have done pretty well. They have many flaws, but they are improving markedly on a timescale of mere months. ChatGPT’s initial November 2022 model, GPT-3.5, scored about 30 percent on a multiple-choice scientific reasoning benchmark called GPQA. Five months later, GPT-4 scored 36 percent; by May this year, GPT-4o scored about 50 percent, and the most recently released o1 model reached 78 percent, surpassing the level of experts with PhDs. There is no one singular measure of AI performance, to be sure, but other metrics also show improvement.

That’s not enough, though. Regardless of their smarts, we would never hire a human assistant for important tasks, or use an AI, unless we can trust them. And while we have millennia of experience dealing with potentially untrustworthy humans, we have practically none dealing with untrustworthy AI assistants. This is the area where the provenance of the AI matters most. A handful of for-profit companies—OpenAI, Google, Meta, Anthropic, among others—decide how to train the most celebrated AI models, what data to use, what sorts of values they embody, whose biases they are allowed to reflect, and even what questions they are allowed to answer. And they decide these things in secret, for their benefit.

It’s worth stressing just how closed, and thus untrustworthy, the corporate AI ecosystem is. Meta has earned a lot of press for its “open-source” family of LLaMa models, but there is virtually nothing open about them. For one, the data they are trained with is undisclosed. You’re not supposed to use LLaMa to infringe on someone else’s copyright, but Meta does not want to answer questions about whether it violated copyrights to build it. You’re not supposed to use it in Europe, because Meta has declined to meet the regulatory requirements anticipated from the EU’s AI Act. And you have no say in how Meta will build its next model.

The company may be giving away the use of LLaMa, but it’s still doing so because it thinks it will benefit from your using it. CEO Mark Zuckerberg has admitted that eventually, Meta will monetize its AI in all the usual ways: charging to use it at scale, fees for premium models, advertising. The problem with corporate AI is not that the companies are charging “a hefty entrance fee” to use these tools: as Morozov rightly points out, there are real costs to anyone building and operating them. It’s that they are built and operated for the purpose of enriching their proprietors, rather than because they enrich our lives, our wellbeing, or our society.

But some emerging models from outside the world of corporate AI are truly open, and may be more trustworthy as a result. In 2022 the research collaboration BigScience developed an LLM called BLOOM with freely licensed data and code as well as public compute infrastructure. The collaboration BigCode has continued in this spirit, developing LLMs focused on programming. The government of Singapore has built SEA-LION, an open-source LLM focused on Southeast Asian languages. If we imagine a future where we use AI models to benefit all of us—to make our lives easier, to help each other, to improve our public services—we will need more of this. These may not be “eolithic” pursuits of the kind Morozov imagines, but they are worthwhile goals. These use cases require trustworthy AI models, and that means models built under conditions that are transparent and with incentives aligned to the public interest.

Perhaps corporate AI will never satisfy those goals; perhaps it will always be exploitative and extractive by design. But AI does not have to be solely a profit-generating industry. We should invest in these models as a public good, part of the basic infrastructure of the twenty-first century. Democratic governments and civil society organizations can develop AI to offer a counterbalance to corporate tools. And the technology they build, for all the flaws it may have, will enjoy a superpower that corporate AI never will: it will be accountable to the public interest and subject to public will in the transparency, openness, and trustworthiness of its development.

Friday Squid Blogging: Safe Quick Undercarriage Immobilization Device

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/12/friday-squid-blogging-safe-quick-undercarriage-immobilization-device.html

Fifteen years ago I blogged about a different SQUID. Here’s an update:

Fleeing drivers are a common problem for law enforcement. They just won’t stop unless persuaded­—persuaded by bullets, barriers, spikes, or snares. Each option is risky business. Shooting up a fugitive’s car is one possibility. But what if children or hostages are in it? Lay down barriers, and the driver might swerve into a school bus. Spike his tires, and he might fishtail into a van­—if the spikes stop him at all. Existing traps, made from elastic, may halt a Hyundai, but they’re no match for a Hummer. In addition, officers put themselves at risk of being run down while setting up the traps.

But what if an officer could lay down a road trap in seconds, then activate it from a nearby hiding place? What if—­like sea monsters of ancient lore­—the trap could reach up from below to ensnare anything from a MINI Cooper to a Ford Expedition? What if this trap were as small as a spare tire, as light as a tire jack, and cost under a grand?

Thanks to imaginative design and engineering funded by the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Office of the U. S. Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), such a trap may be stopping brigands by 2010. It’s called the Safe Quick Undercarriage Immobilization Device, or SQUID. When closed, the current prototype resembles a cheese wheel full of holes. When open (deployed), it becomes a mass of tentacles entangling the axles. By stopping the axles instead of the wheels, SQUID may change how fleeing drivers are, quite literally, caught.

Blog moderation policy.

Detecting Pegasus Infections

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/12/detecting-pegasus-infections.html

This tool seems to do a pretty good job.

The company’s Mobile Threat Hunting feature uses a combination of malware signature-based detection, heuristics, and machine learning to look for anomalies in iOS and Android device activity or telltale signs of spyware infection. For paying iVerify customers, the tool regularly checks devices for potential compromise. But the company also offers a free version of the feature for anyone who downloads the iVerify Basics app for $1. These users can walk through steps to generate and send a special diagnostic utility file to iVerify and receive analysis within hours. Free users can use the tool once a month. iVerify’s infrastructure is built to be privacy-preserving, but to run the Mobile Threat Hunting feature, users must enter an email address so the company has a way to contact them if a scan turns up spyware—as it did in the seven recent Pegasus discoveries.

Algorithms Are Coming for Democracy—but It’s Not All Bad

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/12/algorithms-are-coming-for-democracy-but-its-not-all-bad.html

In 2025, AI is poised to change every aspect of democratic politics—but it won’t necessarily be for the worse.

India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, has used AI to translate his speeches for his multilingual electorate in real time, demonstrating how AI can help diverse democracies to be more inclusive. AI avatars were used by presidential candidates in South Korea in electioneering, enabling them to provide answers to thousands of voters’ questions simultaneously. We are also starting to see AI tools aid fundraising and get-out-the-vote efforts. AI techniques are starting to augment more traditional polling methods, helping campaigns get cheaper and faster data. And congressional candidates have started using AI robocallers to engage voters on issues. In 2025, these trends will continue. AI doesn’t need to be superior to human experts to augment the labor of an overworked canvasser, or to write ad copy similar to that of a junior campaign staffer or volunteer. Politics is competitive, and any technology that can bestow an advantage, or even just garner attention, will be used.

Most politics is local, and AI tools promise to make democracy more equitable. The typical candidate has few resources, so the choice may be between getting help from AI tools or getting no help at all. In 2024, a US presidential candidate with virtually zero name recognition, Jason Palmer, beat Joe Biden in a very small electorate, the American Samoan primary, by using AI-generated messaging and an online AI avatar.

At the national level, AI tools are more likely to make the already powerful even more powerful. Human + AI generally beats AI only: The more human talent you have, the more you can effectively make use of AI assistance. The richest campaigns will not put AIs in charge, but they will race to exploit AI where it can give them an advantage.

But while the promise of AI assistance will drive adoption, the risks are considerable. When computers get involved in any process, that process changes. Scalable automation, for example, can transform political advertising from one-size-fits-all into personalized demagoguing—candidates can tell each of us what they think we want to hear. Introducing new dependencies can also lead to brittleness: Exploiting gains from automation can mean dropping human oversight, and chaos results when critical computer systems go down.

Politics is adversarial. Any time AI is used by one candidate or party, it invites hacking by those associated with their opponents, perhaps to modify their behavior, eavesdrop on their output, or to simply shut them down. The kinds of disinformation weaponized by entities like Russia on social media will be increasingly targeted toward machines, too.

AI is different from traditional computer systems in that it tries to encode common sense and judgment that goes beyond simple rules; yet humans have no single ethical system, or even a single definition of fairness. We will see AI systems optimized for different parties and ideologies; for one faction not to trust the AIs of a rival faction; for everyone to have a healthy suspicion of corporate for-profit AI systems with hidden biases.

This is just the beginning of a trend that will spread through democracies around the world, and probably accelerate, for years to come. Everyone, especially AI skeptics and those concerned about its potential to exacerbate bias and discrimination, should recognize that AI is coming for every aspect of democracy. The transformations won’t come from the top down; they will come from the bottom up. Politicians and campaigns will start using AI tools when they are useful. So will lawyers, and political advocacy groups. Judges will use AI to help draft their decisions because it will save time. News organizations will use AI because it will justify budget cuts. Bureaucracies and regulators will add AI to their already algorithmic systems for determining all sorts of benefits and penalties.

Whether this results in a better democracy, or a more just world, remains to be seen. Keep watching how those in power uses these tools, and also how they empower the currently powerless. Those of us who are constituents of democracies should advocate tirelessly to ensure that we use AI systems to better democratize democracy, and not to further its worst tendencies.

This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in Wired.

Details about the iOS Inactivity Reboot Feature

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/12/details-about-the-ios-inactivity-reboot-feature.html

I recently wrote about the new iOS feature that forces an iPhone to reboot after it’s been inactive for a longish period of time.

Here are the technical details, discovered through reverse engineering. The feature triggers after seventy-two hours of inactivity, even it is remains connected to Wi-Fi.

Race Condition Attacks against LLMs

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/race-condition-attacks-against-llms.html

These are two attacks against the system components surrounding LLMs:

We propose that LLM Flowbreaking, following jailbreaking and prompt injection, joins as the third on the growing list of LLM attack types. Flowbreaking is less about whether prompt or response guardrails can be bypassed, and more about whether user inputs and generated model outputs can adversely affect these other components in the broader implemented system.

[…]

When confronted with a sensitive topic, Microsoft 365 Copilot and ChatGPT answer questions that their first-line guardrails are supposed to stop. After a few lines of text they halt—seemingly having “second thoughts”—before retracting the original answer (also known as Clawback), and replacing it with a new one without the offensive content, or a simple error message. We call this attack “Second Thoughts.”

[…]

After asking the LLM a question, if the user clicks the Stop button while the answer is still streaming, the LLM will not engage its second-line guardrails. As a result, the LLM will provide the user with the answer generated thus far, even though it violates system policies.

In other words, pressing the Stop button halts not only the answer generation but also the guardrails sequence. If the stop button isn’t pressed, then ‘Second Thoughts’ is triggered.

What’s interesting here is that the model itself isn’t being exploited. It’s the code around the model:

By attacking the application architecture components surrounding the model, and specifically the guardrails, we manipulate or disrupt the logical chain of the system, taking these components out of sync with the intended data flow, or otherwise exploiting them, or, in turn, manipulating the interaction between these components in the logical chain of the application implementation.

In modern LLM systems, there is a lot of code between what you type and what the LLM receives, and between what the LLM produces and what you see. All of that code is exploitable, and I expect many more vulnerabilities to be discovered in the coming year.

NSO Group Spies on People on Behalf of Governments

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/11/nso-group-spies-on-people-on-behalf-of-governments.html

The Israeli company NSO Group sells Pegasus spyware to countries around the world (including countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, India, Mexico, Morocco and Rwanda). We assumed that those countries use the spyware themselves. Now we’ve learned that that’s not true: that NSO Group employees operate the spyware on behalf of their customers.

Legal documents released in ongoing US litigation between NSO Group and WhatsApp have revealed for the first time that the Israeli cyberweapons maker ­ and not its government customers ­ is the party that “installs and extracts” information from mobile phones targeted by the company’s hacking software.