Tag Archives: certificates

Pioneers winners: only you can save us

Post Syndicated from Erin Brindley original https://www.raspberrypi.org/blog/pioneers-winners-only-you-can-save-us/

She asked for help, and you came to her aid. Pioneers, the winners of the Only you can save us challenge have been picked!

Can you see me? Only YOU can save us!

I need your help. This is a call out for those between 11- and 16-years-old in the UK and Republic of Ireland. Something has gone very, very wrong and only you can save us. I’ve collected together as much information for you as I can. You’ll find it at http://www.raspberrypi.org/pioneers.

The challenge

In August we intercepted an emergency communication from a lonesome survivor. She seemed to be in quite a bit of trouble, and asked all you young people aged 11 to 16 to come up with something to help tackle the oncoming crisis, using whatever technology you had to hand. You had ten weeks to work in teams of two to five with an adult mentor to fulfil your mission.

The judges

We received your world-saving ideas, and our savvy survivor pulled together a ragtag bunch of apocalyptic experts to help us judge which ones would be the winning entries.

Dr Shini Somara

Dr Shini Somara is an advocate for STEM education and a mechanical engineer. She was host of The Health Show and has appeared in documentaries for the BBC, PBS Digital, and Sky. You can check out her work hosting Crash Course Physics on YouTube.

Prof Lewis Dartnell is an astrobiologist and author of the book The Knowledge: How to Rebuild Our World From Scratch.

Emma Stephenson has a background in aeronautical engineering and currently works in the Shell Foundation’s Access to Energy and Sustainable Mobility portfolio.

Currently sifting through the entries with the other judges of #makeyourideas with @raspberrypifoundation @_raspberrypi_

151 Likes, 3 Comments – Shini Somara (@drshinisomara) on Instagram: “Currently sifting through the entries with the other judges of #makeyourideas with…”

The winners

Our survivor is currently putting your entries to good use repairing, rebuilding, and defending her base. Our judges chose the following projects as outstanding examples of world-saving digital making.

Theme winner: Computatron

Raspberry Pioneers 2017 – Nerfus Dislikus Killer Robot

This is our entry to the pioneers ‘Only you can save us’ competition. Our team name is Computatrum. Hope you enjoy!

Are you facing an unknown enemy whose only weakness is Nerf bullets? Then this is the robot for you! We loved the especially apocalyptic feel of the Computatron’s cleverly hacked and repurposed elements. The team even used an old floppy disc mechanism to help fire their bullets!

Technically brilliant: Robot Apocalypse Committee

Pioneers Apocalypse 2017 – RationalPi

Thousands of lines of code… Many sheets of acrylic… A camera, touchscreen and fingerprint scanner… This is our entry into the Raspberry Pi Pioneers2017 ‘Only YOU can Save Us’ theme. When zombies or other survivors break into your base, you want a secure way of storing your crackers.

The Robot Apocalypse Committee is back, and this time they’ve brought cheese! The crew designed a cheese- and cracker-dispensing machine complete with face and fingerprint recognition to ensure those rations last until the next supply drop.

Best explanation: Pi Chasers

Tala – Raspberry Pi Pioneers Project

Hi! We are PiChasers and we entered the Raspberry Pi Pionners challenge last time when the theme was “Make it Outdoors!” but now we’ve been faced with another theme “Apocolypse”. We spent a while thinking of an original thing that would help in an apocolypse and decided upon a ‘text-only phone’ which uses local radio communication rather than cellular.

This text-based communication device encased in a tupperware container could be a lifesaver in a crisis! And luckily, the Pi Chasers produced an excellent video and amazing GitHub repo, ensuring that any and all survivors will be able to build their own in the safety of their base.

Most inspiring journey: Three Musketeers

Pioneers Entry – The Apocalypse

Pioneers Entry Team Name: The Three Musketeers Team Participants: James, Zach and Tom

We all know that zombies are terrible at geometry, and the Three Musketeers used this fact to their advantage when building their zombie security system. We were impressed to see the team working together to overcome the roadblocks they faced along the way.

We appreciate what you’re trying to do: Zombie Trolls

Zombie In The Middle

Uploaded by CDA Bodgers on 2017-12-01.

Playing piggy in the middle with zombies sure is a unique way of saving humankind from total extinction! We loved this project idea, and although the Zombie Trolls had a little trouble with their motors, we’re sure with a little more tinkering this zombie-fooling contraption could save us all.

Most awesome

Our judges also wanted to give a special commendation to the following teams for their equally awesome apocalypse-averting ideas:

  • PiRates, for their multifaceted zombie-proofing defence system and the high production value of their video
  • Byte them Pis, for their beautiful zombie-detecting doormat
  • Unatecxon, for their impressive bunker security system
  • Team Crompton, for their pressure-activated door system
  • Team Ernest, for their adventures in LEGO

The prizes

All our winning teams have secured exclusive digital maker boxes. These are jam-packed with tantalising tech to satisfy all tinkering needs, including:

Our theme winners have also secured themselves a place at Coolest Projects 2018 in Dublin, Ireland!

Thank you to everyone who got involved in this round of Pioneers. Look out for your awesome submission swag arriving in the mail!

The post Pioneers winners: only you can save us appeared first on Raspberry Pi.

Security updates for Monday

Post Syndicated from ris original https://lwn.net/Articles/741158/rss

Security updates have been issued by CentOS (postgresql), Debian (firefox-esr, kernel, libxcursor, optipng, thunderbird, wireshark, and xrdp), Fedora (borgbackup, ca-certificates, collectd, couchdb, curl, docker, erlang-jiffy, fedora-arm-installer, firefox, git, linux-firmware, mupdf, openssh, thunderbird, transfig, wildmidi, wireshark, xen, and xrdp), Mageia (firefox and optipng), openSUSE (erlang, libXfont, and OBS toolchain), Oracle (kernel), Slackware (openssl), and SUSE (kernel and OBS toolchain).

Let’s Encrypt looks forward to 2018

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/741019/rss

The Let’s Encrypt project, working
to encrypt as much web traffic as possible, looks
to the coming year. “First, we’re planning to introduce
an ACME v2 protocol API endpoint and support for wildcard certificates
along with it. Wildcard certificates will be free and available globally
just like our other certificates. We are planning to have a public test API
endpoint up by January 4, and we’ve set a date for the full launch:
Tuesday, February 27.

Security Vulnerabilities in Certificate Pinning

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/12/security_vulner_10.html

New research found that many banks offer certificate pinning as a security feature, but fail to authenticate the hostname. This leaves the systems open to man-in-the-middle attacks.

From the paper:

Abstract: Certificate verification is a crucial stage in the establishment of a TLS connection. A common security flaw in TLS implementations is the lack of certificate hostname verification but, in general, this is easy to detect. In security-sensitive applications, the usage of certificate pinning is on the rise. This paper shows that certificate pinning can (and often does) hide the lack of proper hostname verification, enabling MITM attacks. Dynamic (black-box) detection of this vulnerability would typically require the tester to own a high security certificate from the same issuer (and often same intermediate CA) as the one used by the app. We present Spinner, a new tool for black-box testing for this vulnerability at scale that does not require purchasing any certificates. By redirecting traffic to websites which use the relevant certificates and then analysing the (encrypted) network traffic we are able to determine whether the hostname check is correctly done, even in the presence of certificate pinning. We use Spinner to analyse 400 security-sensitive Android and iPhone apps. We found that 9 apps had this flaw, including two of the largest banks in the world: Bank of America and HSBC. We also found that TunnelBear, one of the most popular VPN apps was also vulnerable. These apps have a joint user base of tens of millions of users.

News article.

Looking Forward to 2018

Post Syndicated from Let's Encrypt - Free SSL/TLS Certificates original https://letsencrypt.org//2017/12/07/looking-forward-to-2018.html

Let’s Encrypt had a great year in 2017. We more than doubled the number of active (unexpired) certificates we service to 46 million, we just about tripled the number of unique domains we service to 61 million, and we did it all while maintaining a stellar security and compliance track record. Most importantly though, the Web went from 46% encrypted page loads to 67% according to statistics from Mozilla – a gain of 21% in a single year – incredible. We’re proud to have contributed to that, and we’d like to thank all of the other people and organizations who also worked hard to create a more secure and privacy-respecting Web.

While we’re proud of what we accomplished in 2017, we are spending most of the final quarter of the year looking forward rather than back. As we wrap up our own planning process for 2018, I’d like to share some of our plans with you, including both the things we’re excited about and the challenges we’ll face. We’ll cover service growth, new features, infrastructure, and finances.

Service Growth

We are planning to double the number of active certificates and unique domains we service in 2018, to 90 million and 120 million, respectively. This anticipated growth is due to continuing high expectations for HTTPS growth in general in 2018.

Let’s Encrypt helps to drive HTTPS adoption by offering a free, easy to use, and globally available option for obtaining the certificates required to enable HTTPS. HTTPS adoption on the Web took off at an unprecedented rate from the day Let’s Encrypt launched to the public.

One of the reasons Let’s Encrypt is so easy to use is that our community has done great work making client software that works well for a wide variety of platforms. We’d like to thank everyone involved in the development of over 60 client software options for Let’s Encrypt. We’re particularly excited that support for the ACME protocol and Let’s Encrypt is being added to the Apache httpd server.

Other organizations and communities are also doing great work to promote HTTPS adoption, and thus stimulate demand for our services. For example, browsers are starting to make their users more aware of the risks associated with unencrypted HTTP (e.g. Firefox, Chrome). Many hosting providers and CDNs are making it easier than ever for all of their customers to use HTTPS. Government agencies are waking up to the need for stronger security to protect constituents. The media community is working to Secure the News.

New Features

We’ve got some exciting features planned for 2018.

First, we’re planning to introduce an ACME v2 protocol API endpoint and support for wildcard certificates along with it. Wildcard certificates will be free and available globally just like our other certificates. We are planning to have a public test API endpoint up by January 4, and we’ve set a date for the full launch: Tuesday, February 27.

Later in 2018 we plan to introduce ECDSA root and intermediate certificates. ECDSA is generally considered to be the future of digital signature algorithms on the Web due to the fact that it is more efficient than RSA. Let’s Encrypt will currently sign ECDSA keys from subscribers, but we sign with the RSA key from one of our intermediate certificates. Once we have an ECDSA root and intermediates, our subscribers will be able to deploy certificate chains which are entirely ECDSA.


Our CA infrastructure is capable of issuing millions of certificates per day with multiple redundancy for stability and a wide variety of security safeguards, both physical and logical. Our infrastructure also generates and signs nearly 20 million OCSP responses daily, and serves those responses nearly 2 billion times per day. We expect issuance and OCSP numbers to double in 2018.

Our physical CA infrastructure currently occupies approximately 70 units of rack space, split between two datacenters, consisting primarily of compute servers, storage, HSMs, switches, and firewalls.

When we issue more certificates it puts the most stress on storage for our databases. We regularly invest in more and faster storage for our database servers, and that will continue in 2018.

We’ll need to add a few additional compute servers in 2018, and we’ll also start aging out hardware in 2018 for the first time since we launched. We’ll age out about ten 2u compute servers and replace them with new 1u servers, which will save space and be more energy efficient while providing better reliability and performance.

We’ll also add another infrastructure operations staff member, bringing that team to a total of six people. This is necessary in order to make sure we can keep up with demand while maintaining a high standard for security and compliance. Infrastructure operations staff are systems administrators responsible for building and maintaining all physical and logical CA infrastructure. The team also manages a 24/7/365 on-call schedule and they are primary participants in both security and compliance audits.


We pride ourselves on being an efficient organization. In 2018 Let’s Encrypt will secure a large portion of the Web with a budget of only $3.0M. For an overall increase in our budget of only 13%, we will be able to issue and service twice as many certificates as we did in 2017. We believe this represents an incredible value and that contributing to Let’s Encrypt is one of the most effective ways to help create a more secure and privacy-respecting Web.

Our 2018 fundraising efforts are off to a strong start with Platinum sponsorships from Mozilla, Akamai, OVH, Cisco, Google Chrome and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The Ford Foundation has renewed their grant to Let’s Encrypt as well. We are seeking additional sponsorship and grant assistance to meet our full needs for 2018.

We had originally budgeted $2.91M for 2017 but we’ll likely come in under budget for the year at around $2.65M. The difference between our 2017 expenses of $2.65M and the 2018 budget of $3.0M consists primarily of the additional infrastructure operations costs previously mentioned.

Support Let’s Encrypt

We depend on contributions from our community of users and supporters in order to provide our services. If your company or organization would like to sponsor Let’s Encrypt please email us at [email protected]. We ask that you make an individual contribution if it is within your means.

We’re grateful for the industry and community support that we receive, and we look forward to continuing to create a more secure and privacy-respecting Web!

About the Amazon Trust Services Migration

Post Syndicated from Brent Meyer original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/ses/669-2/

Amazon Web Services is moving the certificates for our services—including Amazon SES—to use our own certificate authority, Amazon Trust Services. We have carefully planned this change to minimize the impact it will have on your workflow. Most customers will not have to take any action during this migration.

About the Certificates

The Amazon Trust Services Certificate Authority (CA) uses the Starfield Services CA, which has been valid since 2005. The Amazon Trust Services certificates are available in most major operating systems released in the past 10 years, and are also trusted by all modern web browsers.

If you send email through the Amazon SES SMTP interface using a mail server that you operate, we recommend that you confirm that the appropriate certificates are installed. You can test whether your server trusts the Amazon Trust Services CAs by visiting the following URLs (for example, by using cURL):

If you see a message stating that the certificate issuer is not recognized, then you should install the appropriate root certificate. You can download individual certificates from https://www.amazontrust.com/repository. The process of adding a trusted certificate to your server varies depending on the operating system you use. For more information, see “Adding New Certificates,” below.


Recent versions of the AWS SDKs and the AWS CLI are not impacted by this change. If you use an AWS SDK or a version of the AWS CLI released prior to February 5, 2015, you should upgrade to the latest version.

Potential Issues

If your system is configured to use a very restricted list of root CAs (for example, if you use certificate pinning), you may be impacted by this migration. In this situation, you must update your pinned certificates to include the Amazon Trust Services CAs.

Adding New Root Certificates

The following sections list the steps you can take to install the Amazon Root CA certificates on your systems if they are not already present.


To install a new certificate on a macOS server

  1. Download the .pem file for the certificate you want to install from https://www.amazontrust.com/repository.
  2. Change the file extension for the file you downloaded from .pem to .crt.
  3. At the command prompt, type the following command to install the certificate: sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/certificatename.crt, replacing /path/to/certificatename.crt with the full path to the certificate file.

Windows Server

To install a new certificate on a Windows server

  1. Download the .pem file for the certificate you want to install from https://www.amazontrust.com/repository.
  2. Change the file extension for the file you downloaded from .pem to .crt.
  3. At the command prompt, type the following command to install the certificate: certutil -addstore -f "ROOT" c:\path\to\certificatename.crt, replacing c:\path\to\certificatename.crt with the full path to the certificate file.


To install a new certificate on an Ubuntu (or similar) server

  1. Download the .pem file for the certificate you want to install from https://www.amazontrust.com/repository.
  2. Change the file extension for the file you downloaded from .pem to .crt.
  3. Copy the certificate file to the directory /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/
  4. At the command prompt, type the following command to update the certificate authority store: sudo update-ca-certificates

Red Hat Enterprise Linux/Fedora/CentOS

To install a new certificate on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux (or similar) server

  1. Download the .pem file for the certificate you want to install from https://www.amazontrust.com/repository.
  2. Change the file extension for the file you downloaded from .pem to .crt.
  3. Copy the certificate file to the directory /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/
  4. At the command line, type the following command to enable dynamic certificate authority configuration: sudo update-ca-trust force-enable
  5. At the command line, type the following command to update the certificate authority store: sudo update-ca-trust extract

To learn more about this migration, see How to Prepare for AWS’s Move to Its Own Certificate Authority on the AWS Security Blog.

New- AWS IoT Device Management

Post Syndicated from Jeff Barr original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-iot-device-management/

AWS IoT and AWS Greengrass give you a solid foundation and programming environment for your IoT devices and applications.

The nature of IoT means that an at-scale device deployment often encompasses millions or even tens of millions of devices deployed at hundreds or thousands of locations. At that scale, treating each device individually is impossible. You need to be able to set up, monitor, update, and eventually retire devices in bulk, collective fashion while also retaining the flexibility to accommodate varying deployment configurations, device models, and so forth.

New AWS IoT Device Management
Today we are launching AWS IoT Device Management to help address this challenge. It will help you through each phase of the device lifecycle, from manufacturing to retirement. Here’s what you get:

Onboarding – Starting with devices in their as-manufactured state, you can control the provisioning workflow. You can use IoT Device Management templates to quickly onboard entire fleets of devices with a few clicks. The templates can include information about device certificates and access policies.

Organization – In order to deal with massive numbers of devices, AWS IoT Device Management extends the existing IoT Device Registry and allows you to create a hierarchical model of your fleet and to set policies on a hierarchical basis. You can drill-down through the hierarchy in order to locate individual devices. You can also query your fleet on attributes such as device type or firmware version.

Monitoring – Telemetry from the devices is used to gather real-time connection, authentication, and status metrics, which are published to Amazon CloudWatch. You can examine the metrics and locate outliers for further investigation. IoT Device Management lets you configure the log level for each device group, and you can also publish change events for the Registry and Jobs for monitoring purposes.

Remote ManagementAWS IoT Device Management lets you remotely manage your devices. You can push new software and firmware to them, reset to factory defaults, reboot, and set up bulk updates at the desired velocity.

Exploring AWS IoT Device Management
The AWS IoT Device Management Console took me on a tour and pointed out how to access each of the features of the service:

I already have a large set of devices (pressure gauges):

These gauges were created using the new template-driven bulk registration feature. Here’s how I create a template:

The gauges are organized into groups (by US state in this case):

Here are the gauges in Colorado:

AWS IoT group policies allow you to control access to specific IoT resources and actions for all members of a group. The policies are structured very much like IAM policies, and can be created in the console:

Jobs are used to selectively update devices. Here’s how I create one:

As indicated by the Job type above, jobs can run either once or continuously. Here’s how I choose the devices to be updated:

I can create custom authorizers that make use of a Lambda function:

I’ve shown you a medium-sized subset of AWS IoT Device Management in this post. Check it out for yourself to learn more!



GDPR – A Practical Guide For Developers

Post Syndicated from Bozho original https://techblog.bozho.net/gdpr-practical-guide-developers/

You’ve probably heard about GDPR. The new European data protection regulation that applies practically to everyone. Especially if you are working in a big company, it’s most likely that there’s already a process for gettign your systems in compliance with the regulation.

The regulation is basically a law that must be followed in all European countries (but also applies to non-EU companies that have users in the EU). In this particular case, it applies to companies that are not registered in Europe, but are having European customers. So that’s most companies. I will not go into yet another “12 facts about GDPR” or “7 myths about GDPR” posts/whitepapers, as they are often aimed at managers or legal people. Instead, I’ll focus on what GDPR means for developers.

Why am I qualified to do that? A few reasons – I was advisor to the deputy prime minister of a EU country, and because of that I’ve been both exposed and myself wrote some legislation. I’m familiar with the “legalese” and how the regulatory framework operates in general. I’m also a privacy advocate and I’ve been writing about GDPR-related stuff in the past, i.e. “before it was cool” (protecting sensitive data, the right to be forgotten). And finally, I’m currently working on a project that (among other things) aims to help with covering some GDPR aspects.

I’ll try to be a bit more comprehensive this time and cover as many aspects of the regulation that concern developers as I can. And while developers will mostly be concerned about how the systems they are working on have to change, it’s not unlikely that a less informed manager storms in in late spring, realizing GDPR is going to be in force tomorrow, asking “what should we do to get our system/website compliant”.

The rights of the user/client (referred to as “data subject” in the regulation) that I think are relevant for developers are: the right to erasure (the right to be forgotten/deleted from the system), right to restriction of processing (you still keep the data, but mark it as “restricted” and don’t touch it without further consent by the user), the right to data portability (the ability to export one’s data), the right to rectification (the ability to get personal data fixed), the right to be informed (getting human-readable information, rather than long terms and conditions), the right of access (the user should be able to see all the data you have about them), the right to data portability (the user should be able to get a machine-readable dump of their data).

Additionally, the relevant basic principles are: data minimization (one should not collect more data than necessary), integrity and confidentiality (all security measures to protect data that you can think of + measures to guarantee that the data has not been inappropriately modified).

Even further, the regulation requires certain processes to be in place within an organization (of more than 250 employees or if a significant amount of data is processed), and those include keeping a record of all types of processing activities carried out, including transfers to processors (3rd parties), which includes cloud service providers. None of the other requirements of the regulation have an exception depending on the organization size, so “I’m small, GDPR does not concern me” is a myth.

It is important to know what “personal data” is. Basically, it’s every piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a person or data that is about an already identified person. It’s data that the user has explicitly provided, but also data that you have collected about them from either 3rd parties or based on their activities on the site (what they’ve been looking at, what they’ve purchased, etc.)

Having said that, I’ll list a number of features that will have to be implemented and some hints on how to do that, followed by some do’s and don’t’s.

  • “Forget me” – you should have a method that takes a userId and deletes all personal data about that user (in case they have been collected on the basis of consent, and not due to contract enforcement or legal obligation). It is actually useful for integration tests to have that feature (to cleanup after the test), but it may be hard to implement depending on the data model. In a regular data model, deleting a record may be easy, but some foreign keys may be violated. That means you have two options – either make sure you allow nullable foreign keys (for example an order usually has a reference to the user that made it, but when the user requests his data be deleted, you can set the userId to null), or make sure you delete all related data (e.g. via cascades). This may not be desirable, e.g. if the order is used to track available quantities or for accounting purposes. It’s a bit trickier for event-sourcing data models, or in extreme cases, ones that include some sort of blcokchain/hash chain/tamper-evident data structure. With event sourcing you should be able to remove a past event and re-generate intermediate snapshots. For blockchain-like structures – be careful what you put in there and avoid putting personal data of users. There is an option to use a chameleon hash function, but that’s suboptimal. Overall, you must constantly think of how you can delete the personal data. And “our data model doesn’t allow it” isn’t an excuse.
  • Notify 3rd parties for erasure – deleting things from your system may be one thing, but you are also obligated to inform all third parties that you have pushed that data to. So if you have sent personal data to, say, Salesforce, Hubspot, twitter, or any cloud service provider, you should call an API of theirs that allows for the deletion of personal data. If you are such a provider, obviously, your “forget me” endpoint should be exposed. Calling the 3rd party APIs to remove data is not the full story, though. You also have to make sure the information does not appear in search results. Now, that’s tricky, as Google doesn’t have an API for removal, only a manual process. Fortunately, it’s only about public profile pages that are crawlable by Google (and other search engines, okay…), but you still have to take measures. Ideally, you should make the personal data page return a 404 HTTP status, so that it can be removed.
  • Restrict processing – in your admin panel where there’s a list of users, there should be a button “restrict processing”. The user settings page should also have that button. When clicked (after reading the appropriate information), it should mark the profile as restricted. That means it should no longer be visible to the backoffice staff, or publicly. You can implement that with a simple “restricted” flag in the users table and a few if-clasues here and there.
  • Export data – there should be another button – “export data”. When clicked, the user should receive all the data that you hold about them. What exactly is that data – depends on the particular usecase. Usually it’s at least the data that you delete with the “forget me” functionality, but may include additional data (e.g. the orders the user has made may not be delete, but should be included in the dump). The structure of the dump is not strictly defined, but my recommendation would be to reuse schema.org definitions as much as possible, for either JSON or XML. If the data is simple enough, a CSV/XLS export would also be fine. Sometimes data export can take a long time, so the button can trigger a background process, which would then notify the user via email when his data is ready (twitter, for example, does that already – you can request all your tweets and you get them after a while).
  • Allow users to edit their profile – this seems an obvious rule, but it isn’t always followed. Users must be able to fix all data about them, including data that you have collected from other sources (e.g. using a “login with facebook” you may have fetched their name and address). Rule of thumb – all the fields in your “users” table should be editable via the UI. Technically, rectification can be done via a manual support process, but that’s normally more expensive for a business than just having the form to do it. There is one other scenario, however, when you’ve obtained the data from other sources (i.e. the user hasn’t provided their details to you directly). In that case there should still be a page where they can identify somehow (via email and/or sms confirmation) and get access to the data about them.
  • Consent checkboxes – this is in my opinion the biggest change that the regulation brings. “I accept the terms and conditions” would no longer be sufficient to claim that the user has given their consent for processing their data. So, for each particular processing activity there should be a separate checkbox on the registration (or user profile) screen. You should keep these consent checkboxes in separate columns in the database, and let the users withdraw their consent (by unchecking these checkboxes from their profile page – see the previous point). Ideally, these checkboxes should come directly from the register of processing activities (if you keep one). Note that the checkboxes should not be preselected, as this does not count as “consent”.
  • Re-request consent – if the consent users have given was not clear (e.g. if they simply agreed to terms & conditions), you’d have to re-obtain that consent. So prepare a functionality for mass-emailing your users to ask them to go to their profile page and check all the checkboxes for the personal data processing activities that you have.
  • “See all my data” – this is very similar to the “Export” button, except data should be displayed in the regular UI of the application rather than an XML/JSON format. For example, Google Maps shows you your location history – all the places that you’ve been to. It is a good implementation of the right to access. (Though Google is very far from perfect when privacy is concerned)
  • Age checks – you should ask for the user’s age, and if the user is a child (below 16), you should ask for parent permission. There’s no clear way how to do that, but my suggestion is to introduce a flow, where the child should specify the email of a parent, who can then confirm. Obviosuly, children will just cheat with their birthdate, or provide a fake parent email, but you will most likely have done your job according to the regulation (this is one of the “wishful thinking” aspects of the regulation).

Now some “do’s”, which are mostly about the technical measures needed to protect personal data. They may be more “ops” than “dev”, but often the application also has to be extended to support them. I’ve listed most of what I could think of in a previous post.

  • Encrypt the data in transit. That means that communication between your application layer and your database (or your message queue, or whatever component you have) should be over TLS. The certificates could be self-signed (and possibly pinned), or you could have an internal CA. Different databases have different configurations, just google “X encrypted connections. Some databases need gossiping among the nodes – that should also be configured to use encryption
  • Encrypt the data at rest – this again depends on the database (some offer table-level encryption), but can also be done on machine-level. E.g. using LUKS. The private key can be stored in your infrastructure, or in some cloud service like AWS KMS.
  • Encrypt your backups – kind of obvious
  • Implement pseudonymisation – the most obvious use-case is when you want to use production data for the test/staging servers. You should change the personal data to some “pseudonym”, so that the people cannot be identified. When you push data for machine learning purposes (to third parties or not), you can also do that. Technically, that could mean that your User object can have a “pseudonymize” method which applies hash+salt/bcrypt/PBKDF2 for some of the data that can be used to identify a person
  • Protect data integrity – this is a very broad thing, and could simply mean “have authentication mechanisms for modifying data”. But you can do something more, even as simple as a checksum, or a more complicated solution (like the one I’m working on). It depends on the stakes, on the way data is accessed, on the particular system, etc. The checksum can be in the form of a hash of all the data in a given database record, which should be updated each time the record is updated through the application. It isn’t a strong guarantee, but it is at least something.
  • Have your GDPR register of processing activities in something other than Excel – Article 30 says that you should keep a record of all the types of activities that you use personal data for. That sounds like bureaucracy, but it may be useful – you will be able to link certain aspects of your application with that register (e.g. the consent checkboxes, or your audit trail records). It wouldn’t take much time to implement a simple register, but the business requirements for that should come from whoever is responsible for the GDPR compliance. But you can advise them that having it in Excel won’t make it easy for you as a developer (imagine having to fetch the excel file internally, so that you can parse it and implement a feature). Such a register could be a microservice/small application deployed separately in your infrastructure.
  • Log access to personal data – every read operation on a personal data record should be logged, so that you know who accessed what and for what purpose
  • Register all API consumers – you shouldn’t allow anonymous API access to personal data. I’d say you should request the organization name and contact person for each API user upon registration, and add those to the data processing register. Note: some have treated article 30 as a requirement to keep an audit log. I don’t think it is saying that – instead it requires 250+ companies to keep a register of the types of processing activities (i.e. what you use the data for). There are other articles in the regulation that imply that keeping an audit log is a best practice (for protecting the integrity of the data as well as to make sure it hasn’t been processed without a valid reason)

Finally, some “don’t’s”.

  • Don’t use data for purposes that the user hasn’t agreed with – that’s supposed to be the spirit of the regulation. If you want to expose a new API to a new type of clients, or you want to use the data for some machine learning, or you decide to add ads to your site based on users’ behaviour, or sell your database to a 3rd party – think twice. I would imagine your register of processing activities could have a button to send notification emails to users to ask them for permission when a new processing activity is added (or if you use a 3rd party register, it should probably give you an API). So upon adding a new processing activity (and adding that to your register), mass email all users from whom you’d like consent.
  • Don’t log personal data – getting rid of the personal data from log files (especially if they are shipped to a 3rd party service) can be tedious or even impossible. So log just identifiers if needed. And make sure old logs files are cleaned up, just in case
  • Don’t put fields on the registration/profile form that you don’t need – it’s always tempting to just throw as many fields as the usability person/designer agrees on, but unless you absolutely need the data for delivering your service, you shouldn’t collect it. Names you should probably always collect, but unless you are delivering something, a home address or phone is unnecessary.
  • Don’t assume 3rd parties are compliant – you are responsible if there’s a data breach in one of the 3rd parties (e.g. “processors”) to which you send personal data. So before you send data via an API to another service, make sure they have at least a basic level of data protection. If they don’t, raise a flag with management.
  • Don’t assume having ISO XXX makes you compliant – information security standards and even personal data standards are a good start and they will probably 70% of what the regulation requires, but they are not sufficient – most of the things listed above are not covered in any of those standards

Overall, the purpose of the regulation is to make you take conscious decisions when processing personal data. It imposes best practices in a legal way. If you follow the above advice and design your data model, storage, data flow , API calls with data protection in mind, then you shouldn’t worry about the huge fines that the regulation prescribes – they are for extreme cases, like Equifax for example. Regulators (data protection authorities) will most likely have some checklists into which you’d have to somehow fit, but if you follow best practices, that shouldn’t be an issue.

I think all of the above features can be implemented in a few weeks by a small team. Be suspicious when a big vendor offers you a generic plug-and-play “GDPR compliance” solution. GDPR is not just about the technical aspects listed above – it does have organizational/process implications. But also be suspicious if a consultant claims GDPR is complicated. It’s not – it relies on a few basic principles that are in fact best practices anyway. Just don’t ignore them.

The post GDPR – A Practical Guide For Developers appeared first on Bozho's tech blog.

Easier Certificate Validation Using DNS with AWS Certificate Manager

Post Syndicated from Todd Cignetti original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/easier-certificate-validation-using-dns-with-aws-certificate-manager/

Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) certificates are used to secure network communications and establish the identity of websites over the internet. Before issuing a certificate for your website, Amazon must validate that you control the domain name for your site. You can now use AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) Domain Name System (DNS) validation to establish that you control a domain name when requesting SSL/TLS certificates with ACM. Previously ACM supported only email validation, which required the domain owner to receive an email for each certificate request and validate the information in the request before approving it.

With DNS validation, you write a CNAME record to your DNS configuration to establish control of your domain name. After you have configured the CNAME record, ACM can automatically renew DNS-validated certificates before they expire, as long as the DNS record has not changed. To make it even easier to validate your domain, ACM can update your DNS configuration for you if you manage your DNS records with Amazon Route 53. In this blog post, I demonstrate how to request a certificate for a website by using DNS validation. To perform the equivalent steps using the AWS CLI or AWS APIs and SDKs, see AWS Certificate Manager in the AWS CLI Reference and the ACM API Reference.

Requesting an SSL/TLS certificate by using DNS validation

In this section, I walk you through the four steps required to obtain an SSL/TLS certificate through ACM to identify your site over the internet. SSL/TLS provides encryption for sensitive data in transit and authentication by using certificates to establish the identity of your site and secure connections between browsers and applications and your site. DNS validation and SSL/TLS certificates provisioned through ACM are free.

Step 1: Request a certificate

To get started, sign in to the AWS Management Console and navigate to the ACM console. Choose Get started to request a certificate.

Screenshot of getting started in the ACM console

If you previously managed certificates in ACM, you will instead see a table with your certificates and a button to request a new certificate. Choose Request a certificate to request a new certificate.

Screenshot of choosing "Request a certificate"

Type the name of your domain in the Domain name box and choose Next. In this example, I type www.example.com. You must use a domain name that you control. Requesting certificates for domains that you don’t control violates the AWS Service Terms.

Screenshot of entering a domain name

Step 2: Select a validation method

With DNS validation, you write a CNAME record to your DNS configuration to establish control of your domain name. Choose DNS validation, and then choose Review.

Screenshot of selecting validation method

Step 3: Review your request

Review your request and choose Confirm and request to request the certificate.

Screenshot of reviewing request and confirming it

Step 4: Submit your request

After a brief delay while ACM populates your domain validation information, choose the down arrow (highlighted in the following screenshot) to display all the validation information for your domain.

Screenshot of validation information

ACM displays the CNAME record you must add to your DNS configuration to validate that you control the domain name in your certificate request. If you use a DNS provider other than Route 53 or if you use a different AWS account to manage DNS records in Route 53, copy the DNS CNAME information from the validation information, or export it to a file (choose Export DNS configuration to a file) and write it to your DNS configuration. For information about how to add or modify DNS records, check with your DNS provider. For more information about using DNS with Route 53 DNS, see the Route 53 documentation.

If you manage DNS records for your domain with Route 53 in the same AWS account, choose Create record in Route 53 to have ACM update your DNS configuration for you.

After updating your DNS configuration, choose Continue to return to the ACM table view.

ACM then displays a table that includes all your certificates. The certificate you requested is displayed so that you can see the status of your request. After you write the DNS record or have ACM write the record for you, it typically takes DNS 30 minutes to propagate the record, and it might take several hours for Amazon to validate it and issue the certificate. During this time, ACM shows the Validation status as Pending validation. After ACM validates the domain name, ACM updates the Validation status to Success. After the certificate is issued, the certificate status is updated to Issued. If ACM cannot validate your DNS record and issue the certificate after 72 hours, the request times out, and ACM displays a Timed out validation status. To recover, you must make a new request. Refer to the Troubleshooting Section of the ACM User Guide for instructions about troubleshooting validation or issuance failures.

Screenshot of a certificate issued and validation successful

You now have an ACM certificate that you can use to secure your application or website. For information about how to deploy certificates with other AWS services, see the documentation for Amazon CloudFront, Amazon API Gateway, Application Load Balancers, and Classic Load Balancers. Note that your certificate must be in the US East (N. Virginia) Region to use the certificate with CloudFront.

ACM automatically renews certificates that are deployed and in use with other AWS services as long as the CNAME record remains in your DNS configuration. To learn more about ACM DNS validation, see the ACM FAQs and the ACM documentation.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about this blog post, start a new thread on the ACM forum or contact AWS Support.

– Todd

Building a Multi-region Serverless Application with Amazon API Gateway and AWS Lambda

Post Syndicated from Stefano Buliani original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/building-a-multi-region-serverless-application-with-amazon-api-gateway-and-aws-lambda/

This post written by: Magnus Bjorkman – Solutions Architect

Many customers are looking to run their services at global scale, deploying their backend to multiple regions. In this post, we describe how to deploy a Serverless API into multiple regions and how to leverage Amazon Route 53 to route the traffic between regions. We use latency-based routing and health checks to achieve an active-active setup that can fail over between regions in case of an issue. We leverage the new regional API endpoint feature in Amazon API Gateway to make this a seamless process for the API client making the requests. This post does not cover the replication of your data, which is another aspect to consider when deploying applications across regions.

Solution overview

Currently, the default API endpoint type in API Gateway is the edge-optimized API endpoint, which enables clients to access an API through an Amazon CloudFront distribution. This typically improves connection time for geographically diverse clients. By default, a custom domain name is globally unique and the edge-optimized API endpoint would invoke a Lambda function in a single region in the case of Lambda integration. You can’t use this type of endpoint with a Route 53 active-active setup and fail-over.

The new regional API endpoint in API Gateway moves the API endpoint into the region and the custom domain name is unique per region. This makes it possible to run a full copy of an API in each region and then use Route 53 to use an active-active setup and failover. The following diagram shows how you do this:

Active/active multi region architecture

  • Deploy your Rest API stack, consisting of API Gateway and Lambda, in two regions, such as us-east-1 and us-west-2.
  • Choose the regional API endpoint type for your API.
  • Create a custom domain name and choose the regional API endpoint type for that one as well. In both regions, you are configuring the custom domain name to be the same, for example, helloworldapi.replacewithyourcompanyname.com
  • Use the host name of the custom domain names from each region, for example, xxxxxx.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com and xxxxxx.execute-api.us-west-2.amazonaws.com, to configure record sets in Route 53 for your client-facing domain name, for example, helloworldapi.replacewithyourcompanyname.com

The above solution provides an active-active setup for your API across the two regions, but you are not doing failover yet. For that to work, set up a health check in Route 53:

Route 53 Health Check

A Route 53 health check must have an endpoint to call to check the health of a service. You could do a simple ping of your actual Rest API methods, but instead provide a specific method on your Rest API that does a deep ping. That is, it is a Lambda function that checks the status of all the dependencies.

In the case of the Hello World API, you don’t have any other dependencies. In a real-world scenario, you could check on dependencies as databases, other APIs, and external dependencies. Route 53 health checks themselves cannot use your custom domain name endpoint’s DNS address, so you are going to directly call the API endpoints via their region unique endpoint’s DNS address.


The following sections describe how to set up this solution. You can find the complete solution at the blog-multi-region-serverless-service GitHub repo. Clone or download the repository locally to be able to do the setup as described.


You need the following resources to set up the solution described in this post:

  • An S3 bucket in each region in which to deploy the solution, which can be used by the AWS Serverless Application Model (SAM). You can use the following CloudFormation templates to create buckets in us-east-1 and us-west-2:
    • us-east-1:
    • us-west-2:
  • A hosted zone registered in Amazon Route 53. This is used for defining the domain name of your API endpoint, for example, helloworldapi.replacewithyourcompanyname.com. You can use a third-party domain name registrar and then configure the DNS in Amazon Route 53, or you can purchase a domain directly from Amazon Route 53.

Deploy API with health checks in two regions

Start by creating a small “Hello World” Lambda function that sends back a message in the region in which it has been deployed.

"""Return message."""
import logging

logger = logging.getLogger()

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    """Lambda handler for getting the hello world message."""

    region = context.invoked_function_arn.split(':')[3]

    logger.info("message: " + "Hello from " + region)
    return {
		"message": "Hello from " + region

Also create a Lambda function for doing a health check that returns a value based on another environment variable (either “ok” or “fail”) to allow for ease of testing:

"""Return health."""
import logging
import os

logger = logging.getLogger()

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    """Lambda handler for getting the health."""

    logger.info("status: " + os.environ['STATUS'])
    return {
		"status": os.environ['STATUS']

Deploy both of these using an AWS Serverless Application Model (SAM) template. SAM is a CloudFormation extension that is optimized for serverless, and provides a standard way to create a complete serverless application. You can find the full helloworld-sam.yaml template in the blog-multi-region-serverless-service GitHub repo.

A few things to highlight:

  • You are using inline Swagger to define your API so you can substitute the current region in the x-amazon-apigateway-integration section.
  • Most of the Swagger template covers CORS to allow you to test this from a browser.
  • You are also using substitution to populate the environment variable used by the “Hello World” method with the region into which it is being deployed.

The Swagger allows you to use the same SAM template in both regions.

You can only use SAM from the AWS CLI, so do the following from the command prompt. First, deploy the SAM template in us-east-1 with the following commands, replacing “<your bucket in us-east-1>” with a bucket in your account:

> cd helloworld-api
> aws cloudformation package --template-file helloworld-sam.yaml --output-template-file /tmp/cf-helloworld-sam.yaml --s3-bucket <your bucket in us-east-1> --region us-east-1
> aws cloudformation deploy --template-file /tmp/cf-helloworld-sam.yaml --stack-name multiregionhelloworld --capabilities CAPABILITY_IAM --region us-east-1

Second, do the same in us-west-2:

> aws cloudformation package --template-file helloworld-sam.yaml --output-template-file /tmp/cf-helloworld-sam.yaml --s3-bucket <your bucket in us-west-2> --region us-west-2
> aws cloudformation deploy --template-file /tmp/cf-helloworld-sam.yaml --stack-name multiregionhelloworld --capabilities CAPABILITY_IAM --region us-west-2

The API was created with the default endpoint type of Edge Optimized. Switch it to Regional. In the Amazon API Gateway console, select the API that you just created and choose the wheel-icon to edit it.

API Gateway edit API settings

In the edit screen, select the Regional endpoint type and save the API. Do the same in both regions.

Grab the URL for the API in the console by navigating to the method in the prod stage.

API Gateway endpoint link

You can now test this with curl:

> curl https://2wkt1cxxxx.execute-api.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/prod/helloworld
{"message": "Hello from us-west-2"}

Write down the domain name for the URL in each region (for example, 2wkt1cxxxx.execute-api.us-west-2.amazonaws.com), as you need that later when you deploy the Route 53 setup.

Create the custom domain name

Next, create an Amazon API Gateway custom domain name endpoint. As part of using this feature, you must have a hosted zone and domain available to use in Route 53 as well as an SSL certificate that you use with your specific domain name.

You can create the SSL certificate by using AWS Certificate Manager. In the ACM console, choose Get started (if you have no existing certificates) or Request a certificate. Fill out the form with the domain name to use for the custom domain name endpoint, which is the same across the two regions:

Amazon Certificate Manager request new certificate

Go through the remaining steps and validate the certificate for each region before moving on.

You are now ready to create the endpoints. In the Amazon API Gateway console, choose Custom Domain Names, Create Custom Domain Name.

API Gateway create custom domain name

A few things to highlight:

  • The domain name is the same as what you requested earlier through ACM.
  • The endpoint configuration should be regional.
  • Select the ACM Certificate that you created earlier.
  • You need to create a base path mapping that connects back to your earlier API Gateway endpoint. Set the base path to v1 so you can version your API, and then select the API and the prod stage.

Choose Save. You should see your newly created custom domain name:

API Gateway custom domain setup

Note the value for Target Domain Name as you need that for the next step. Do this for both regions.

Deploy Route 53 setup

Use the global Route 53 service to provide DNS lookup for the Rest API, distributing the traffic in an active-active setup based on latency. You can find the full CloudFormation template in the blog-multi-region-serverless-service GitHub repo.

The template sets up health checks, for example, for us-east-1:

  Type: "AWS::Route53::HealthCheck"
      Port: "443"
      Type: "HTTPS_STR_MATCH"
      SearchString: "ok"
      ResourcePath: "/prod/healthcheck"
      FullyQualifiedDomainName: !Ref Region1HealthEndpoint
      RequestInterval: "30"
      FailureThreshold: "2"

Use the health check when you set up the record set and the latency routing, for example, for us-east-1:

  Type: AWS::Route53::RecordSet
    Region: us-east-1
    HealthCheckId: !Ref HealthcheckRegion1
    SetIdentifier: "endpoint-region1"
    HostedZoneId: !Ref HostedZoneId
    Name: !Ref MultiregionEndpoint
    Type: CNAME
    TTL: 60
      - !Ref Region1Endpoint

You can create the stack by using the following link, copying in the domain names from the previous section, your existing hosted zone name, and the main domain name that is created (for example, hellowordapi.replacewithyourcompanyname.com):

The following screenshot shows what the parameters might look like:
Serverless multi region Route 53 health check

Specifically, the domain names that you collected earlier would map according to following:

  • The domain names from the API Gateway “prod”-stage go into Region1HealthEndpoint and Region2HealthEndpoint.
  • The domain names from the custom domain name’s target domain name goes into Region1Endpoint and Region2Endpoint.

Using the Rest API from server-side applications

You are now ready to use your setup. First, demonstrate the use of the API from server-side clients. You can demonstrate this by using curl from the command line:

> curl https://hellowordapi.replacewithyourcompanyname.com/v1/helloworld/
{"message": "Hello from us-east-1"}

Testing failover of Rest API in browser

Here’s how you can use this from the browser and test the failover. Find all of the files for this test in the browser-client folder of the blog-multi-region-serverless-service GitHub repo.

Use this html file:

    <meta charset="utf-8"/>
    <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge"/>
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"/>
    <title>Multi-Region Client</title>
   <h1>Test Client</h1>

    <p id="client_result">


    <script src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.11.3/jquery.min.js"></script>
    <script src="settings.js"></script>
    <script src="client.js"></script>

The html file uses this JavaScript file to repeatedly call the API and print the history of messages:

var messageHistory = "";

(function call_service() {

      url: helloworldMultiregionendpoint+'v1/helloworld/',
      dataType: "json",
      cache: false,
      success: function(data) {
      complete: function() {
         // Schedule the next request when the current one's complete
         setTimeout(call_service, 10000);
      error: function(xhr, status, error) {
         $('#client_result').html('ERROR: '+status);


Also, make sure to update the settings in settings.js to match with the API Gateway endpoints for the DNS-proxy and the multi-regional endpoint for the Hello World API: var helloworldMultiregionendpoint = "https://hellowordapi.replacewithyourcompanyname.com/";

You can now open the HTML file in the browser (you can do this directly from the file system) and you should see something like the following screenshot:

Serverless multi region browser test

You can test failover by changing the environment variable in your health check Lambda function. In the Lambda console, select your health check function and scroll down to the Environment variables section. For the STATUS key, modify the value to fail.

Lambda update environment variable

You should see the region switch in the test client:

Serverless multi region broker test switchover

During an emulated failure like this, the browser might take some additional time to switch over due to connection keep-alive functionality. If you are using a browser like Chrome, you can kill all the connections to see a more immediate fail-over: chrome://net-internals/#sockets


You have implemented a simple way to do multi-regional serverless applications that fail over seamlessly between regions, either being accessed from the browser or from other applications/services. You achieved this by using the capabilities of Amazon Route 53 to do latency based routing and health checks for fail-over. You unlocked the use of these features in a serverless application by leveraging the new regional endpoint feature of Amazon API Gateway.

The setup was fully scripted using CloudFormation, the AWS Serverless Application Model (SAM), and the AWS CLI, and it can be integrated into deployment tools to push the code across the regions to make sure it is available in all the needed regions. For more information about cross-region deployments, see Building a Cross-Region/Cross-Account Code Deployment Solution on AWS on the AWS DevOps blog.

How to Prepare for AWS’s Move to Its Own Certificate Authority

Post Syndicated from Jonathan Kozolchyk original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-prepare-for-aws-move-to-its-own-certificate-authority/

AWS Certificate Manager image

Transport Layer Security (TLS, formerly called Secure Sockets Layer [SSL]) is essential for encrypting information that is exchanged on the internet. For example, Amazon.com uses TLS for all traffic on its website, and AWS uses it to secure calls to AWS services.

An electronic document called a certificate verifies the identity of the server when creating such an encrypted connection. The certificate helps establish proof that your web browser is communicating securely with the website that you typed in your browser’s address field. Certificate Authorities, also known as CAs, issue certificates to specific domains. When a domain presents a certificate that is issued by a trusted CA, your browser or application knows it’s safe to make the connection.

In January 2016, AWS launched AWS Certificate Manager (ACM), a service that lets you easily provision, manage, and deploy SSL/TLS certificates for use with AWS services. These certificates are available for no additional charge through Amazon’s own CA: Amazon Trust Services. For browsers and other applications to trust a certificate, the certificate’s issuer must be included in the browser’s trust store, which is a list of trusted CAs. If the issuing CA is not in the trust store, the browser will display an error message (see an example) and applications will show an application-specific error. To ensure the ubiquity of the Amazon Trust Services CA, AWS purchased the Starfield Services CA, a root found in most browsers and which has been valid since 2005. This means you shouldn’t have to take any action to use the certificates issued by Amazon Trust Services.

AWS has been offering free certificates to AWS customers from the Amazon Trust Services CA. Now, AWS is in the process of moving certificates for services such as Amazon EC2 and Amazon DynamoDB to use certificates from Amazon Trust Services as well. Most software doesn’t need to be changed to handle this transition, but there are exceptions. In this blog post, I show you how to verify that you are prepared to use the Amazon Trust Services CA.

How to tell if the Amazon Trust Services CAs are in your trust store

The following table lists the Amazon Trust Services certificates. To verify that these certificates are in your browser’s trust store, click each Test URL in the following table to verify that it works for you. When a Test URL does not work, it displays an error similar to this example.

Distinguished name SHA-256 hash of subject public key information Test URL
CN=Amazon Root CA 1,O=Amazon,C=US fbe3018031f9586bcbf41727e417b7d1c45c2f47f93be372a17b96b50757d5a2 Test URL
CN=Amazon Root CA 2,O=Amazon,C=US 7f4296fc5b6a4e3b35d3c369623e364ab1af381d8fa7121533c9d6c633ea2461 Test URL
CN=Amazon Root CA 3,O=Amazon,C=US 36abc32656acfc645c61b71613c4bf21c787f5cabbee48348d58597803d7abc9 Test URL
CN=Amazon Root CA 4,O=Amazon,C=US f7ecded5c66047d28ed6466b543c40e0743abe81d109254dcf845d4c2c7853c5 Test URL
CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority – G2,O=Starfield Technologies\, Inc.,L=Scottsdale,ST=Arizona,C=US 2b071c59a0a0ae76b0eadb2bad23bad4580b69c3601b630c2eaf0613afa83f92 Test URL
Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority 2ce1cb0bf9d2f9e102993fbe215152c3b2dd0cabde1c68e5319b839154dbb7f5 Test URL

What to do if the Amazon Trust Services CAs are not in your trust store

If your tests of any of the Test URLs failed, you must update your trust store. The easiest way to update your trust store is to upgrade the operating system or browser that you are using.

You will find the Amazon Trust Services CAs in the following operating systems (release dates are in parentheses):

  • Microsoft Windows versions that have January 2005 or later updates installed, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and newer versions
  • Mac OS X 10.4 with Java for Mac OS X 10.4 Release 5, Mac OS X 10.5 and newer versions
  • Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (March 2007), Linux 6, and Linux 7 and CentOS 5, CentOS 6, and CentOS 7
  • Ubuntu 8.10
  • Debian 5.0
  • Amazon Linux (all versions)
  • Java 1.4.2_12, Jave 5 update 2, and all newer versions, including Java 6, Java 7, and Java 8

All modern browsers trust Amazon’s CAs. You can update the certificate bundle in your browser simply by updating your browser. You can find instructions for updating the following browsers on their respective websites:

If your application is using a custom trust store, you must add the Amazon root CAs to your application’s trust store. The instructions for doing this vary based on the application or platform. Please refer to the documentation for the application or platform you are using.


Most AWS SDKs and CLIs are not impacted by the transition to the Amazon Trust Services CA. If you are using a version of the Python AWS SDK or CLI released before February 5, 2015, you must upgrade. The .NET, Java, PHP, Go, JavaScript, and C++ SDKs and CLIs do not bundle any certificates, so their certificates come from the underlying operating system. The Ruby SDK has included at least one of the required CAs since June 10, 2015. Before that date, the Ruby V2 SDK did not bundle certificates.

Certificate pinning

If you are using a technique called certificate pinning to lock down the CAs you trust on a domain-by-domain basis, you must adjust your pinning to include the Amazon Trust Services CAs. Certificate pinning helps defend you from an attacker using misissued certificates to fool an application into creating a connection to a spoofed host (an illegitimate host masquerading as a legitimate host). The restriction to a specific, pinned certificate is made by checking that the certificate issued is the expected certificate. This is done by checking that the hash of the certificate public key received from the server matches the expected hash stored in the application. If the hashes do not match, the code stops the connection.

AWS recommends against using certificate pinning because it introduces a potential availability risk. If the certificate to which you pin is replaced, your application will fail to connect. If your use case requires pinning, we recommend that you pin to a CA rather than to an individual certificate. If you are pinning to an Amazon Trust Services CA, you should pin to all CAs shown in the table earlier in this post.

If you have comments about this post, submit them in the “Comments” section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the ACM forum.

– Jonathan

Now You Can Use Amazon ElastiCache for Redis with In-Transit and At-Rest Encryption to Help Protect Sensitive Information

Post Syndicated from Manan Goel original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/amazon-elasticache-now-supports-encryption-for-elasticache-for-redis/

Amazon ElastiCache image

Amazon ElastiCache for Redis now supports encryption for secure internode communications to help keep personally identifiable information (PII) safe. Both encryption in transit and at rest are supported. The new encryption in-transit feature enables you to encrypt all communications between clients and Redis servers as well as between Redis servers (primary and read replica nodes). The encryption at-rest feature allows you to encrypt your ElastiCache for Redis backups on disk and in Amazon S3. Additionally, you can use the Redis AUTH command for an added level of authentication.

If you are in the Financial Services, Healthcare, and Telecommunications sectors, this new encryption functionality can help you protect your sensitive data sets and meet compliance requirements. You can start using the new functionality by enabling it at the time of cluster creation via the ElastiCache console or through the API. You don’t have to manage the lifecycle of your certificates because ElastiCache for Redis automatically manages the issuance, renewal, and expiration of your certificates. For more information, see Enabling In-Transit Encryption and Enabling At-Rest Encryption.

There is no additional charge to use this feature, and it is available in the US West (Oregon), US West (N. California), US East (Ohio), US East (N. Virginia), Canada (Central), EU (Ireland), and South America (São Paulo) Regions. We will make this feature available in other AWS Regions as well.

For more information about this feature and Amazon ElastiCache for Redis, see the ElastiCache for Redis FAQs.

– Manan

ACME Support in Apache HTTP Server Project

Post Syndicated from Let's Encrypt - Free SSL/TLS Certificates original https://letsencrypt.org//2017/10/17/acme-support-in-apache-httpd.html

We’re excited that support for getting and managing TLS certificates via the ACME protocol is coming to the Apache HTTP Server Project (httpd). ACME is the protocol used by Let’s Encrypt, and hopefully other Certificate Authorities in the future. We anticipate this feature will significantly aid the adoption of HTTPS for new and existing websites.

We created Let’s Encrypt in order to make getting and managing TLS certificates as simple as possible. For Let’s Encrypt subscribers, this usually means obtaining an ACME client and executing some simple commands. Ultimately though, we’d like for most Let’s Encrypt subscribers to have ACME clients built in to their server software so that obtaining an additional piece of software is not necessary. The less work people have to do to deploy HTTPS the better!

ACME support being built in to one of the world’s most popular Web servers, Apache httpd, is great because it means that deploying HTTPS will be even easier for millions of websites. It’s a huge step towards delivering the ideal certificate issuance and management experience to as many people as possible.

The Apache httpd ACME module is called mod_md. It’s currently in the development version of httpd and a plan is being formulated to backport it to an httpd 2.4.x stable release. The mod_md code is also available on GitHub.

It’s also worth mentioning that the development version of Apache httpd now includes support for an SSLPolicy directive. Properly configuring TLS has traditionally involved making a large number of complex choices. With the SSLPolicy directive, admins simply select a modern, intermediate, or old TLS configuration, and sensible choices will be made for them.

Development of mod_md and the SSLPolicy directive has been funded by Mozilla and carried out primarily by Stefan Eissing of greenbytes. Thank you Mozilla and Stefan!

Let’s Encrypt is currently providing certificates for more than 55 million websites. We look forward to being able to serve even more websites as efforts like this make deploying HTTPS with Let’s Encrypt even easier. If you’re as excited about the potential for a 100% HTTPS Web as we are, please consider getting involved, making a donation, or sponsoring Let’s Encrypt.

Some notes on the KRACK attack

Post Syndicated from Robert Graham original http://blog.erratasec.com/2017/10/some-notes-on-krack-attack.html

This is my interpretation of the KRACK attacks paper that describes a way of decrypting encrypted WiFi traffic with an active attack.

tl;dr: Wow. Everyone needs to be afraid. (Well, worried — not panicked.) It means in practice, attackers can decrypt a lot of wifi traffic, with varying levels of difficulty depending on your precise network setup. My post last July about the DEF CON network being safe was in error.


This is not a crypto bug but a protocol bug (a pretty obvious and trivial protocol bug).
When a client connects to the network, the access-point will at some point send a random “key” data to use for encryption. Because this packet may be lost in transmission, it can be repeated many times.
What the hacker does is just repeatedly sends this packet, potentially hours later. Each time it does so, it resets the “keystream” back to the starting conditions. The obvious patch that device vendors will make is to only accept the first such packet it receives, ignore all the duplicates.
At this point, the protocol bug becomes a crypto bug. We know how to break crypto when we have two keystreams from the same starting position. It’s not always reliable, but reliable enough that people need to be afraid.
Android, though, is the biggest danger. Rather than simply replaying the packet, a packet with key data of all zeroes can be sent. This allows attackers to setup a fake WiFi access-point and man-in-the-middle all traffic.
In a related case, the access-point/base-station can sometimes also be attacked, affecting the stream sent to the client.
Not only is sniffing possible, but in some limited cases, injection. This allows the traditional attack of adding bad code to the end of HTML pages in order to trick users into installing a virus.

This is an active attack, not a passive attack, so in theory, it’s detectable.

Who is vulnerable?

Everyone, pretty much.
The hacker only needs to be within range of your WiFi. Your neighbor’s teenage kid is going to be downloading and running the tool in order to eavesdrop on your packets.
The hacker doesn’t need to be logged into your network.
It affects all WPA1/WPA2, the personal one with passwords that we use in home, and the enterprise version with certificates we use in enterprises.
It can’t defeat SSL/TLS or VPNs. Thus, if you feel your laptop is safe surfing the public WiFi at airports, then your laptop is still safe from this attack. With Android, it does allow running tools like sslstrip, which can fool many users.
Your home network is vulnerable. Many devices will be using SSL/TLS, so are fine, like your Amazon echo, which you can continue to use without worrying about this attack. Other devices, like your Phillips lightbulbs, may not be so protected.

How can I defend myself?

More to the point, measure your current vendors by how long it takes them to patch. Throw away gear by those vendors that took a long time to patch and replace it with vendors that took a short time.
High-end access-points that contains “WIPS” (WiFi Intrusion Prevention Systems) features should be able to detect this and block vulnerable clients from connecting to the network (once the vendor upgrades the systems, of course). Even low-end access-points, like the $30 ones you get for home, can easily be updated to prevent packet sequence numbers from going back to the start (i.e. from the keystream resetting back to the start).
At some point, you’ll need to run the attack against yourself, to make sure all your devices are secure. Since you’ll be constantly allowing random phones to connect to your network, you’ll need to check their vulnerability status before connecting them. You’ll need to continue doing this for several years.
Of course, if you are using SSL/TLS for everything, then your danger is mitigated. This is yet another reason why you should be using SSL/TLS for internal communications.
Most security vendors will add things to their products/services to defend you. While valuable in some cases, it’s not a defense. The defense is patching the devices you know about, and preventing vulnerable devices from attaching to your network.
If I remember correctly, DEF CON uses Aruba. Aruba contains WIPS functionality, which means by the time DEF CON roles around again next year, they should have the feature to deny vulnerable devices from connecting, and specifically to detect an attack in progress and prevent further communication.
However, for an attacker near an Android device using a low-powered WiFi, it’s likely they will be able to conduct man-in-the-middle without any WIPS preventing them.

Application Load Balancers Now Support Multiple TLS Certificates With Smart Selection Using SNI

Post Syndicated from Randall Hunt original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-application-load-balancer-sni/

Today we’re launching support for multiple TLS/SSL certificates on Application Load Balancers (ALB) using Server Name Indication (SNI). You can now host multiple TLS secured applications, each with its own TLS certificate, behind a single load balancer. In order to use SNI, all you need to do is bind multiple certificates to the same secure listener on your load balancer. ALB will automatically choose the optimal TLS certificate for each client. These new features are provided at no additional charge.

If you’re looking for a TL;DR on how to use this new feature just click here. If you’re like me and you’re a little rusty on the specifics of Transport Layer Security (TLS) then keep reading.


People tend to use the terms SSL and TLS interchangeably even though the two are technically different. SSL technically refers to a predecessor of the TLS protocol. To keep things simple I’ll be using the term TLS for the rest of this post.

TLS is a protocol for securely transmitting data like passwords, cookies, and credit card numbers. It enables privacy, authentication, and integrity of the data being transmitted. TLS uses certificate based authentication where certificates are like ID cards for your websites. You trust the person that signed and issued the certificate, the certificate authority (CA), so you trust that the data in the certificate is correct. When a browser connects to your TLS-enabled ALB, ALB presents a certificate that contains your site’s public key, which has been cryptographically signed by a CA. This way the client can be sure it’s getting the ‘real you’ and that it’s safe to use your site’s public key to establish a secure connection.

With SNI support we’re making it easy to use more than one certificate with the same ALB. The most common reason you might want to use multiple certificates is to handle different domains with the same load balancer. It’s always been possible to use wildcard and subject-alternate-name (SAN) certificates with ALB, but these come with limitations. Wildcard certificates only work for related subdomains that match a simple pattern and while SAN certificates can support many different domains, the same certificate authority has to authenticate each one. That means you have reauthenticate and reprovision your certificate everytime you add a new domain.

One of our most frequent requests on forums, reddit, and in my e-mail inbox has been to use the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension of TLS to choose a certificate for a client. Since TLS operates at the transport layer, below HTTP, it doesn’t see the hostname requested by a client. SNI works by having the client tell the server “This is the domain I expect to get a certificate for” when it first connects. The server can then choose the correct certificate to respond to the client. All modern web browsers and a large majority of other clients support SNI. In fact, today we see SNI supported by over 99.5% of clients connecting to CloudFront.

Smart Certificate Selection on ALB

ALB’s smart certificate selection goes beyond SNI. In addition to containing a list of valid domain names, certificates also describe the type of key exchange and cryptography that the server supports, as well as the signature algorithm (SHA2, SHA1, MD5) used to sign the certificate. To establish a TLS connection, a client starts a TLS handshake by sending a “ClientHello” message that outlines the capabilities of the client: the protocol versions, extensions, cipher suites, and compression methods. Based on what an individual client supports, ALB’s smart selection algorithm chooses a certificate for the connection and sends it to the client. ALB supports both the classic RSA algorithm and the newer, hipper, and faster Elliptic-curve based ECDSA algorithm. ECDSA support among clients isn’t as prevalent as SNI, but it is supported by all modern web browsers. Since it’s faster and requires less CPU, it can be particularly useful for ultra-low latency applications and for conserving the amount of battery used by mobile applications. Since ALB can see what each client supports from the TLS handshake, you can upload both RSA and ECDSA certificates for the same domains and ALB will automatically choose the best one for each client.

Using SNI with ALB

I’ll use a few example websites like VimIsBetterThanEmacs.com and VimIsTheBest.com. I’ve purchased and hosted these domains on Amazon Route 53, and provisioned two separate certificates for them in AWS Certificate Manager (ACM). If I want to securely serve both of these sites through a single ALB, I can quickly add both certificates in the console.

First, I’ll select my load balancer in the console, go to the listeners tab, and select “view/edit certificates”.

Next, I’ll use the “+” button in the top left corner to select some certificates then I’ll click the “Add” button.

There are no more steps. If you’re not really a GUI kind of person you’ll be pleased to know that it’s also simple to add new certificates via the AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) (or SDKs).

aws elbv2 add-listener-certificates --listener-arn <listener-arn> --certificates CertificateArn=<cert-arn>

Things to know

  • ALB Access Logs now include the client’s requested hostname and the certificate ARN used. If the “hostname” field is empty (represented by a “-“) the client did not use the SNI extension in their request.
  • You can use any of your certificates in ACM or IAM.
  • You can bind multiple certificates for the same domain(s) to a secure listener. Your ALB will choose the optimal certificate based on multiple factors including the capabilities of the client.
  • If the client does not support SNI your ALB will use the default certificate (the one you specified when you created the listener).
  • There are three new ELB API calls: AddListenerCertificates, RemoveListenerCertificates, and DescribeListenerCertificates.
  • You can bind up to 25 certificates per load balancer (not counting the default certificate).
  • These new features are supported by AWS CloudFormation at launch.

You can see an example of these new features in action with a set of websites created by my colleague Jon Zobrist: https://www.exampleloadbalancer.com/.

Overall, I will personally use this feature and I’m sure a ton of AWS users will benefit from it as well. I want to thank the Elastic Load Balancing team for all their hard work in getting this into the hands of our users.


Security updates for Monday

Post Syndicated from ris original https://lwn.net/Articles/735271/rss

Security updates have been issued by Arch Linux (dnsmasq), CentOS (firefox and nss), Debian (firefox-esr, ghostscript, libidn2-0, opencv, and otrs2), Fedora (moodle, php-horde-nag, php-horde-passwd, php-horde-wicked, php-symfony-security-acl, pkgconf, and xen), openSUSE (spice and weechat), Scientific Linux (firefox and nss), Slackware (openexr), SUSE (xen), and Ubuntu (ca-certificates, dnsmasq, and nss).

How to Enable LDAPS for Your AWS Microsoft AD Directory

Post Syndicated from Vijay Sharma original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-enable-ldaps-for-your-aws-microsoft-ad-directory/

Starting today, you can encrypt the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) communications between your applications and AWS Directory Service for Microsoft Active Directory, also known as AWS Microsoft AD. Many Windows and Linux applications use Active Directory’s (AD) LDAP service to read and write sensitive information about users and devices, including personally identifiable information (PII). Now, you can encrypt your AWS Microsoft AD LDAP communications end to end to protect this information by using LDAP Over Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS), also called LDAPS. This helps you protect PII and other sensitive information exchanged with AWS Microsoft AD over untrusted networks.

To enable LDAPS, you need to add a Microsoft enterprise Certificate Authority (CA) server to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and configure certificate templates for your domain controllers. After you have enabled LDAPS, AWS Microsoft AD encrypts communications with LDAPS-enabled Windows applications, Linux computers that use Secure Shell (SSH) authentication, and applications such as Jira and Jenkins.

In this blog post, I show how to enable LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory in six steps: 1) Delegate permissions to CA administrators, 2) Add a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD directory, 3) Create a certificate template, 4) Configure AWS security group rules, 5) AWS Microsoft AD enables LDAPS, and 6) Test LDAPS access using the LDP tool.


For this post, I assume you are familiar with following:

Solution overview

Before going into specific deployment steps, I will provide a high-level overview of deploying LDAPS. I cover how you enable LDAPS on AWS Microsoft AD. In addition, I provide some general background about CA deployment models and explain how to apply these models when deploying Microsoft CA to enable LDAPS on AWS Microsoft AD.

How you enable LDAPS on AWS Microsoft AD

LDAP-aware applications (LDAP clients) typically access LDAP servers using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) on port 389. By default, LDAP communications on port 389 are unencrypted. However, many LDAP clients use one of two standards to encrypt LDAP communications: LDAP over SSL on port 636, and LDAP with StartTLS on port 389. If an LDAP client uses port 636, the LDAP server encrypts all traffic unconditionally with SSL. If an LDAP client issues a StartTLS command when setting up the LDAP session on port 389, the LDAP server encrypts all traffic to that client with TLS. AWS Microsoft AD now supports both encryption standards when you enable LDAPS on your AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers.

You enable LDAPS on your AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers by installing a digital certificate that a CA issued. Though Windows servers have different methods for installing certificates, LDAPS with AWS Microsoft AD requires you to add a Microsoft CA to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and deploy the certificate through autoenrollment from the Microsoft CA. The installed certificate enables the LDAP service running on domain controllers to listen for and negotiate LDAP encryption on port 636 (LDAP over SSL) and port 389 (LDAP with StartTLS).

Background of CA deployment models

You can deploy CAs as part of a single-level or multi-level CA hierarchy. In a single-level hierarchy, all certificates come from the root of the hierarchy. In a multi-level hierarchy, you organize a collection of CAs in a hierarchy and the certificates sent to computers and users come from subordinate CAs in the hierarchy (not the root).

Certificates issued by a CA identify the hierarchy to which the CA belongs. When a computer sends its certificate to another computer for verification, the receiving computer must have the public certificate from the CAs in the same hierarchy as the sender. If the CA that issued the certificate is part of a single-level hierarchy, the receiver must obtain the public certificate of the CA that issued the certificate. If the CA that issued the certificate is part of a multi-level hierarchy, the receiver can obtain a public certificate for all the CAs that are in the same hierarchy as the CA that issued the certificate. If the receiver can verify that the certificate came from a CA that is in the hierarchy of the receiver’s “trusted” public CA certificates, the receiver trusts the sender. Otherwise, the receiver rejects the sender.

Deploying Microsoft CA to enable LDAPS on AWS Microsoft AD

Microsoft offers a standalone CA and an enterprise CA. Though you can configure either as single-level or multi-level hierarchies, only the enterprise CA integrates with AD and offers autoenrollment for certificate deployment. Because you cannot sign in to run commands on your AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers, an automatic certificate enrollment model is required. Therefore, AWS Microsoft AD requires the certificate to come from a Microsoft enterprise CA that you configure to work in your AD domain. When you install the Microsoft enterprise CA, you can configure it to be part of a single-level hierarchy or a multi-level hierarchy. As a best practice, AWS recommends a multi-level Microsoft CA trust hierarchy consisting of a root CA and a subordinate CA. I cover only a multi-level hierarchy in this post.

In a multi-level hierarchy, you configure your subordinate CA by importing a certificate from the root CA. You must issue a certificate from the root CA such that the certificate gives your subordinate CA the right to issue certificates on behalf of the root. This makes your subordinate CA part of the root CA hierarchy. You also deploy the root CA’s public certificate on all of your computers, which tells all your computers to trust certificates that your root CA issues and to trust certificates from any authorized subordinate CA.

In such a hierarchy, you typically leave your root CA offline (inaccessible to other computers in the network) to protect the root of your hierarchy. You leave the subordinate CA online so that it can issue certificates on behalf of the root CA. This multi-level hierarchy increases security because if someone compromises your subordinate CA, you can revoke all certificates it issued and set up a new subordinate CA from your offline root CA. To learn more about setting up a secure CA hierarchy, see Securing PKI: Planning a CA Hierarchy.

When a Microsoft CA is part of your AD domain, you can configure certificate templates that you publish. These templates become visible to client computers through AD. If a client’s profile matches a template, the client requests a certificate from the Microsoft CA that matches the template. Microsoft calls this process autoenrollment, and it simplifies certificate deployment. To enable LDAPS on your AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers, you create a certificate template in the Microsoft CA that generates SSL and TLS-compatible certificates. The domain controllers see the template and automatically import a certificate of that type from the Microsoft CA. The imported certificate enables LDAP encryption.

Steps to enable LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory

The rest of this post is composed of the steps for enabling LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory. First, though, I explain which components you must have running to deploy this solution successfully. I also explain how this solution works and include an architecture diagram.


The instructions in this post assume that you already have the following components running:

  1. An active AWS Microsoft AD directory – To create a directory, follow the steps in Create an AWS Microsoft AD directory.
  2. An Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instance for managing users and groups in your directory – This instance needs to be joined to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and have Active Directory Administration Tools installed. Active Directory Administration Tools installs Active Directory Administrative Center and the LDP tool.
  3. An existing root Microsoft CA or a multi-level Microsoft CA hierarchy – You might already have a root CA or a multi-level CA hierarchy in your on-premises network. If you plan to use your on-premises CA hierarchy, you must have administrative permissions to issue certificates to subordinate CAs. If you do not have an existing Microsoft CA hierarchy, you can set up a new standalone Microsoft root CA by creating an Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instance and installing a standalone root certification authority. You also must create a local user account on this instance and add this user to the local administrator group so that the user has permissions to issue a certificate to a subordinate CA.

The solution setup

The following diagram illustrates the setup with the steps you need to follow to enable LDAPS for AWS Microsoft AD. You will learn how to set up a subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA (in this case, SubordinateCA) and join it to your AWS Microsoft AD domain (in this case, corp.example.com). You also will learn how to create a certificate template on SubordinateCA and configure AWS security group rules to enable LDAPS for your directory.

As a prerequisite, I already created a standalone Microsoft root CA (in this case RootCA) for creating SubordinateCA. RootCA also has a local user account called RootAdmin that has administrative permissions to issue certificates to SubordinateCA. Note that you may already have a root CA or a multi-level CA hierarchy in your on-premises network that you can use for creating SubordinateCA instead of creating a new root CA. If you choose to use your existing on-premises CA hierarchy, you must have administrative permissions on your on-premises CA to issue a certificate to SubordinateCA.

Lastly, I also already created an Amazon EC2 instance (in this case, Management) that I use to manage users, configure AWS security groups, and test the LDAPS connection. I join this instance to the AWS Microsoft AD directory domain.

Diagram showing the process discussed in this post

Here is how the process works:

  1. Delegate permissions to CA administrators (in this case, CAAdmin) so that they can join a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and configure it as a subordinate CA.
  2. Add a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD domain (in this case, SubordinateCA) so that it can issue certificates to your directory domain controllers to enable LDAPS. This step includes joining SubordinateCA to your directory domain, installing the Microsoft enterprise CA, and obtaining a certificate from RootCA that grants SubordinateCA permissions to issue certificates.
  3. Create a certificate template (in this case, ServerAuthentication) with server authentication and autoenrollment enabled so that your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain controllers can obtain certificates through autoenrollment to enable LDAPS.
  4. Configure AWS security group rules so that AWS Microsoft AD directory domain controllers can connect to the subordinate CA to request certificates.
  5. AWS Microsoft AD enables LDAPS through the following process:
    1. AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers request a certificate from SubordinateCA.
    2. SubordinateCA issues a certificate to AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers.
    3. AWS Microsoft AD enables LDAPS for the directory by installing certificates on the directory domain controllers.
  6. Test LDAPS access by using the LDP tool.

I now will show you these steps in detail. I use the names of components—such as RootCA, SubordinateCA, and Management—and refer to users—such as Admin, RootAdmin, and CAAdmin—to illustrate who performs these steps. All component names and user names in this post are used for illustrative purposes only.

Deploy the solution

Step 1: Delegate permissions to CA administrators

In this step, you delegate permissions to your users who manage your CAs. Your users then can join a subordinate CA to your AWS Microsoft AD domain and create the certificate template in your CA.

To enable use with a Microsoft enterprise CA, AWS added a new built-in AD security group called AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators that has delegated permissions to install and administer a Microsoft enterprise CA. By default, your directory Admin is part of the new group and can add other users or groups in your AWS Microsoft AD directory to this security group. If you have trust with your on-premises AD directory, you can also delegate CA administrative permissions to your on-premises users by adding on-premises AD users or global groups to this new AD security group.

To create a new user (in this case CAAdmin) in your directory and add this user to the AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators security group, follow these steps:

  1. Sign in to the Management instance using RDP with the user name admin and the password that you set for the admin user when you created your directory.
  2. Launch the Microsoft Windows Server Manager on the Management instance and navigate to Tools > Active Directory Users and Computers.
    Screnshot of the menu including the "Active Directory Users and Computers" choice
  3. Switch to the tree view and navigate to corp.example.com > CORP > Users. Right-click Users and choose New > User.
    Screenshot of choosing New > User
  4. Add a new user with the First name CA, Last name Admin, and User logon name CAAdmin.
    Screenshot of completing the "New Object - User" boxes
  5. In the Active Directory Users and Computers tool, navigate to corp.example.com > AWS Delegated Groups. In the right pane, right-click AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators and choose Properties.
    Screenshot of navigating to AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators > Properties
  6. In the AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators window, switch to the Members tab and choose Add.
    Screenshot of the "Members" tab of the "AWS Delegate Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators" window
  7. In the Enter the object names to select box, type CAAdmin and choose OK.
    Screenshot showing the "Enter the object names to select" box
  8. In the next window, choose OK to add CAAdmin to the AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators security group.
    Screenshot of adding "CA Admin" to the "AWS Delegated Enterprise Certificate Authority Administrators" security group
  9. Also add CAAdmin to the AWS Delegated Server Administrators security group so that CAAdmin can RDP in to the Microsoft enterprise CA machine.
    Screenshot of adding "CAAdmin" to the "AWS Delegated Server Administrators" security group also so that "CAAdmin" can RDP in to the Microsoft enterprise CA machine

 You have granted CAAdmin permissions to join a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain.

Step 2: Add a Microsoft enterprise CA to your AWS Microsoft AD directory

In this step, you set up a subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA and join it to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain. I will summarize the process first and then walk through the steps.

First, you create an Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instance called SubordinateCA and join it to the domain, corp.example.com. You then publish RootCA’s public certificate and certificate revocation list (CRL) to SubordinateCA’s local trusted store. You also publish RootCA’s public certificate to your directory domain. Doing so enables SubordinateCA and your directory domain controllers to trust RootCA. You then install the Microsoft enterprise CA service on SubordinateCA and request a certificate from RootCA to make SubordinateCA a subordinate Microsoft CA. After RootCA issues the certificate, SubordinateCA is ready to issue certificates to your directory domain controllers.

Note that you can use an Amazon S3 bucket to pass the certificates between RootCA and SubordinateCA.

In detail, here is how the process works, as illustrated in the preceding diagram:

  1. Set up an Amazon EC2 instance joined to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain – Create an Amazon EC2 for Windows Server instance to use as a subordinate CA, and join it to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain. For this example, the machine name is SubordinateCA and the domain is corp.example.com.
  2. Share RootCA’s public certificate with SubordinateCA – Log in to RootCA as RootAdmin and start Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges. Run the following commands to copy RootCA’s public certificate and CRL to the folder c:\rootcerts on RootCA.
    New-Item c:\rootcerts -type directory
    copy C:\Windows\system32\certsrv\certenroll\*.cr* c:\rootcerts

    Upload RootCA’s public certificate and CRL from c:\rootcerts to an S3 bucket by following the steps in How Do I Upload Files and Folders to an S3 Bucket.

The following screenshot shows RootCA’s public certificate and CRL uploaded to an S3 bucket.
Screenshot of RootCA’s public certificate and CRL uploaded to the S3 bucket

  1. Publish RootCA’s public certificate to your directory domain – Log in to SubordinateCA as the CAAdmin. Download RootCA’s public certificate and CRL from the S3 bucket by following the instructions in How Do I Download an Object from an S3 Bucket? Save the certificate and CRL to the C:\rootcerts folder on SubordinateCA. Add RootCA’s public certificate and the CRL to the local store of SubordinateCA and publish RootCA’s public certificate to your directory domain by running the following commands using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges.
    certutil –addstore –f root <path to the RootCA public certificate file>
    certutil –addstore –f root <path to the RootCA CRL file>
    certutil –dspublish –f <path to the RootCA public certificate file> RootCA
  2. Install the subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA – Install the subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA on SubordinateCA by following the instructions in Install a Subordinate Certification Authority. Ensure that you choose Enterprise CA for Setup Type to install an enterprise CA.

For the CA Type, choose Subordinate CA.

  1. Request a certificate from RootCA – Next, copy the certificate request on SubordinateCA to a folder called c:\CARequest by running the following commands using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges.
    New-Item c:\CARequest -type directory
    Copy c:\*.req C:\CARequest

    Upload the certificate request to the S3 bucket.
    Screenshot of uploading the certificate request to the S3 bucket

  1. Approve SubordinateCA’s certificate request – Log in to RootCA as RootAdmin and download the certificate request from the S3 bucket to a folder called CARequest. Submit the request by running the following command using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges.
    certreq -submit <path to certificate request file>

    In the Certification Authority List window, choose OK.
    Screenshot of the Certification Authority List window

Navigate to Server Manager > Tools > Certification Authority on RootCA.
Screenshot of "Certification Authority" in the drop-down menu

In the Certification Authority window, expand the ROOTCA tree in the left pane and choose Pending Requests. In the right pane, note the value in the Request ID column. Right-click the request and choose All Tasks > Issue.
Screenshot of noting the value in the "Request ID" column

  1. Retrieve the SubordinateCA certificate – Retrieve the SubordinateCA certificate by running following command using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges. The command includes the <RequestId> that you noted in the previous step.
    certreq –retrieve <RequestId> <drive>:\subordinateCA.crt

    Upload SubordinateCA.crt to the S3 bucket.

  1. Install the SubordinateCA certificate – Log in to SubordinateCA as the CAAdmin and download SubordinateCA.crt from the S3 bucket. Install the certificate by running following commands using Windows PowerShell with administrative privileges.
    certutil –installcert c:\subordinateCA.crt
    start-service certsvc
  2. Delete the content that you uploaded to S3  As a security best practice, delete all the certificates and CRLs that you uploaded to the S3 bucket in the previous steps because you already have installed them on SubordinateCA.

You have finished setting up the subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA that is joined to your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain. Now you can use your subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA to create a certificate template so that your directory domain controllers can request a certificate to enable LDAPS for your directory.

Step 3: Create a certificate template

In this step, you create a certificate template with server authentication and autoenrollment enabled on SubordinateCA. You create this new template (in this case, ServerAuthentication) by duplicating an existing certificate template (in this case, Domain Controller template) and adding server authentication and autoenrollment to the template.

Follow these steps to create a certificate template:

  1. Log in to SubordinateCA as CAAdmin.
  2. Launch Microsoft Windows Server Manager. Select Tools > Certification Authority.
  3. In the Certificate Authority window, expand the SubordinateCA tree in the left pane. Right-click Certificate Templates, and choose Manage.
    Screenshot of choosing "Manage" under "Certificate Template"
  4. In the Certificate Templates Console window, right-click Domain Controller and choose Duplicate Template.
    Screenshot of the Certificate Templates Console window
  5. In the Properties of New Template window, switch to the General tab and change the Template display name to ServerAuthentication.
    Screenshot of the "Properties of New Template" window
  6. Switch to the Security tab, and choose Domain Controllers in the Group or user names section. Select the Allow check box for Autoenroll in the Permissions for Domain Controllers section.
    Screenshot of the "Permissions for Domain Controllers" section of the "Properties of New Template" window
  7. Switch to the Extensions tab, choose Application Policies in the Extensions included in this template section, and choose Edit
    Screenshot of the "Extensions" tab of the "Properties of New Template" window
  8. In the Edit Application Policies Extension window, choose Client Authentication and choose Remove. Choose OK to create the ServerAuthentication certificate template. Close the Certificate Templates Console window.
    Screenshot of the "Edit Application Policies Extension" window
  9. In the Certificate Authority window, right-click Certificate Templates, and choose New > Certificate Template to Issue.
    Screenshot of choosing "New" > "Certificate Template to Issue"
  10. In the Enable Certificate Templates window, choose ServerAuthentication and choose OK.
    Screenshot of the "Enable Certificate Templates" window

You have finished creating a certificate template with server authentication and autoenrollment enabled on SubordinateCA. Your AWS Microsoft AD directory domain controllers can now obtain a certificate through autoenrollment to enable LDAPS.

Step 4: Configure AWS security group rules

In this step, you configure AWS security group rules so that your directory domain controllers can connect to the subordinate CA to request a certificate. To do this, you must add outbound rules to your directory’s AWS security group (in this case, sg-4ba7682d) to allow all outbound traffic to SubordinateCA’s AWS security group (in this case, sg-6fbe7109) so that your directory domain controllers can connect to SubordinateCA for requesting a certificate. You also must add inbound rules to SubordinateCA’s AWS security group to allow all incoming traffic from your directory’s AWS security group so that the subordinate CA can accept incoming traffic from your directory domain controllers.

Follow these steps to configure AWS security group rules:

  1. Log in to the Management instance as Admin.
  2. Navigate to the EC2 console.
  3. In the left pane, choose Network & Security > Security Groups.
  4. In the right pane, choose the AWS security group (in this case, sg-6fbe7109) of SubordinateCA.
  5. Switch to the Inbound tab and choose Edit.
  6. Choose Add Rule. Choose All traffic for Type and Custom for Source. Enter your directory’s AWS security group (in this case, sg-4ba7682d) in the Source box. Choose Save.
    Screenshot of adding an inbound rule
  7. Now choose the AWS security group (in this case, sg-4ba7682d) of your AWS Microsoft AD directory, switch to the Outbound tab, and choose Edit.
  8. Choose Add Rule. Choose All traffic for Type and Custom for Destination. Enter your directory’s AWS security group (in this case, sg-6fbe7109) in the Destination box. Choose Save.

You have completed the configuration of AWS security group rules to allow traffic between your directory domain controllers and SubordinateCA.

Step 5: AWS Microsoft AD enables LDAPS

The AWS Microsoft AD domain controllers perform this step automatically by recognizing the published template and requesting a certificate from the subordinate Microsoft enterprise CA. The subordinate CA can take up to 180 minutes to issue certificates to the directory domain controllers. The directory imports these certificates into the directory domain controllers and enables LDAPS for your directory automatically. This completes the setup of LDAPS for the AWS Microsoft AD directory. The LDAP service on the directory is now ready to accept LDAPS connections!

Step 6: Test LDAPS access by using the LDP tool

In this step, you test the LDAPS connection to the AWS Microsoft AD directory by using the LDP tool. The LDP tool is available on the Management machine where you installed Active Directory Administration Tools. Before you test the LDAPS connection, you must wait up to 180 minutes for the subordinate CA to issue a certificate to your directory domain controllers.

To test LDAPS, you connect to one of the domain controllers using port 636. Here are the steps to test the LDAPS connection:

  1. Log in to Management as Admin.
  2. Launch the Microsoft Windows Server Manager on Management and navigate to Tools > Active Directory Users and Computers.
  3. Switch to the tree view and navigate to corp.example.com > CORP > Domain Controllers. In the right pane, right-click on one of the domain controllers and choose Properties. Copy the DNS name of the domain controller.
    Screenshot of copying the DNS name of the domain controller
  4. Launch the LDP.exe tool by launching Windows PowerShell and running the LDP.exe command.
  5. In the LDP tool, choose Connection > Connect.
    Screenshot of choosing "Connnection" > "Connect" in the LDP tool
  6. In the Server box, paste the DNS name you copied in the previous step. Type 636 in the Port box. Choose OK to test the LDAPS connection to port 636 of your directory.
    Screenshot of completing the boxes in the "Connect" window
  7. You should see the following message to confirm that your LDAPS connection is now open.

You have completed the setup of LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory! You can now encrypt LDAP communications between your Windows and Linux applications and your AWS Microsoft AD directory using LDAPS.


In this blog post, I walked through the process of enabling LDAPS for your AWS Microsoft AD directory. Enabling LDAPS helps you protect PII and other sensitive information exchanged over untrusted networks between your Windows and Linux applications and your AWS Microsoft AD. To learn more about how to use AWS Microsoft AD, see the Directory Service documentation. For general information and pricing, see the Directory Service home page.

If you have comments about this blog post, submit a comment in the “Comments” section below. If you have implementation or troubleshooting questions, start a new thread on the Directory Service forum.

– Vijay

timeShift(GrafanaBuzz, 1w) Issue 14

Post Syndicated from Blogs on Grafana Labs Blog original https://grafana.com/blog/2017/09/22/timeshiftgrafanabuzz-1w-issue-14/

Summer is officially in the rear-view mirror, but we at Grafana Labs are excited. Next week, the team will gather in Stockholm, Sweden where we’ll be discussing Grafana 5.0, GrafanaCon EU and setting other goals. If you’re attending Percona Live Europe 2017 in Dublin, be sure and catch Grafana developer, Daniel Lee on Tuesday, September 26. He’ll be showing off the new MySQL data source and a sneak peek of Grafana 5.0.

And with that – we hope you enjoy this issue of TimeShift!

Latest Release

Grafana 4.5.2 is now available! Various fixes to the Graphite data source, HTTP API, and templating.

To see details on what’s been fixed in the newest version, please see the release notes.

Download Grafana 4.5.2 Now

From the Blogosphere

A Monitoring Solution for Docker Hosts, Containers and Containerized Services: Stefan was searching for an open source, self-hosted monitoring solution. With an ever-growing number of open source TSDBs, Stefan outlines why he chose Prometheus and provides a rundown of how he’s monitoring his Docker hosts, containers and services.

Real-time API Performance Monitoring with ES, Beats, Logstash and Grafana: As APIs become a centerpiece for businesses, monitoring API performance is extremely important. Hiren recently configured real time API response time monitoring for a project and shares his implementation plan and configurations.

Monitoring SSL Certificate Expiry in GCP and Kubernetes: This article discusses how to use Prometheus and Grafana to automatically monitor SSL certificates in use by load balancers across GCP projects.

Node.js Performance Monitoring with Prometheus: This is a good primer for monitoring in general. It discusses what monitoring is, important signals to know, instrumentation, and things to consider when selecting a monitoring tool.

DIY Dashboard with Grafana and MariaDB: Mark was interested in testing out the new beta MySQL support in Grafana, so he wrote a short article on how he is using Grafana with MariaDB.

Collecting Temperature Data with Raspberry Pi Computers: Many of us use monitoring for tracking mission-critical systems, but setting up environment monitoring can be a fun way to improve your programming skills as well.

GrafanaCon EU CFP is Open

Have a big idea to share? A shorter talk or a demo you’d like to show off? We’re looking for technical and non-technical talks of all sizes. The proposals are rolling in, but we are happy to save a speaking slot for you!

I’d Like to Speak at GrafanaCon

Grafana Plugins

There were a lot of plugin updates to highlight this week, many of which were due to changes in Grafana 4.5. It’s important to keep your plugins up to date, since bug fixes and new features are added frequently. We’ve made the process of installing and updating plugins simple. On an on-prem instance, use the Grafana-cli, or on Hosted Grafana, install and update with 1-click.


Linksmart HDS Data Source – The LinkSmart Historical Data Store is a new Grafana data source plugin. LinkSmart is an open source IoT platform for developing IoT applications. IoT applications need to deal with large amounts of data produced by a growing number of sensors and other devices. The Historical Datastore is for storing, querying, and aggregating (time-series) sensor data.

Install Now


Simple JSON Data Source – This plugin received a bug fix for the query editor.

Update Now


Stagemonitor Elasticsearch App – Numerous small updates and the version updated to match the StageMonitor version number.

Update Now


Discrete Panel – Update to fix breaking change in Grafana 4.5.

Update Now


Status Dot Panel – Minor HTML Update in this version.

Update Now


Alarm Box Panel – This panel was updated to fix breaking changes in Grafana 4.5.

Update Now

This week’s MVC (Most Valuable Contributor)

Each week we highlight a contributor to Grafana or the surrounding ecosystem as a thank you for their participation in making open source software great.

Sven Klemm opened a PR for adding a new Postgres data source and has been very quick at implementing proposed changes. The Postgres data source is on our roadmap for Grafana 5.0 so this PR really helps. Thanks Sven!

Tweet of the Week

We scour Twitter each week to find an interesting/beautiful dashboard and show it off! #monitoringLove

Glad you’re finding Grafana useful! Curious about that annotation just before midnight 🙂

We Need Your Help

Last week we announced an experiment we were conducting, and need your help! Do you have a graph that you love because the data is beautiful or because the graph provides interesting information? Please get in touch. Tweet or send us an email with a screenshot, and we’ll tell you about this fun experiment.

I Want to Help

Grafana Labs is Hiring!

We are passionate about open source software and thrive on tackling complex challenges to build the future. We ship code from every corner of the globe and love working with the community. If this sounds exciting, you’re in luck – WE’RE HIRING!

Check out our Open Positions

What do you think?

What would you like to see here? Submit a comment on this article below, or post something at our community forum. Help us make these weekly roundups better!

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