Tag Archives: hacking

How Hackers Are Thinking About AI

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/04/how-hackers-are-thinking-about-ai.html

Interesting paper: “What hackers talk about when they talk about AI: Early-stage diffusion of a cybercrime innovation.”

Abstract: The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) is raising concerns about its potential to transform cybercrime. Beyond empowering novice offenders, AI stands to intensify the scale and sophistication of attacks by seasoned cybercriminals. This paper examines the evolving relationship between cybercriminals and AI using a unique dataset from a cyber threat intelligence platform. Analyzing more than 160 cybercrime forum conversations collected over seven months, our research reveals how cybercriminals understand AI and discuss how they can exploit its capabilities. Their exchanges reflect growing curiosity about AI’s criminal applications through legal tools and dedicated criminal tools, but also doubts and anxieties about AI’s effectiveness and its effects on their business models and operational security. The study documents attempts to misuse legitimate AI tools and develop bespoke models tailored for illicit purposes. Combining the diffusion of innovation framework with thematic analysis, the paper provides an in-depth view of emerging AI-enabled cybercrime and offers practical insights for law enforcement and policymakers.

Possible US Government iPhone Hacking Tool Leaked

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/04/possible-us-government-iphone-hacking-tool-leaked.html

Wired writes (alternate source):

Security researchers at Google on Tuesday released a report describing what they’re calling “Coruna,” a highly sophisticated iPhone hacking toolkit that includes five complete hacking techniques capable of bypassing all the defenses of an iPhone to silently install malware on a device when it visits a website containing the exploitation code. In total, Coruna takes advantage of 23 distinct vulnerabilities in iOS, a rare collection of hacking components that suggests it was created by a well-resourced, likely state-sponsored group of hackers.

[…]

Coruna’s code also appears to have been originally written by English-speaking coders, notes iVerify’s cofounder Rocky Cole. “It’s highly sophisticated, took millions of dollars to develop, and it bears the hallmarks of other modules that have been publicly attributed to the US government,” Cole tells WIRED. “This is the first example we’ve seen of very likely US government tools­based on what the code is telling us­spinning out of control and being used by both our adversaries and cybercriminal groups.”

TechCrunch reports that Coruna is definitely of US origin:

Two former employees of government contractor L3Harris told TechCrunch that Coruna was, at least in part, developed by the company’s hacking and surveillance tech division, Trenchant. The two former employees both had knowledge of the company’s iPhone hacking tools. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to talk about their work for the company.

It’s always super interesting to see what malware looks like when it’s created through a professional software development process. And the TechCrunch article has some speculation as to how the US lost control of it. It seems that an employee of L3Harris’s surviellance tech division, Trenchant, sold it to the Russian government.

Is “Hackback” Official US Cybersecurity Strategy?

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/04/is-hackback-official-us-cybersecurity-strategy.html

The 2026 US “Cyber Strategy for America” document is mostly the same thing we’ve seen out of the White House for over a decade, but with a more aggressive tone.

But one sentence stood out: “We will unleash the private sector by creating incentives to identify and disrupt adversary networks and scale our national capabilities.” This sounds like a call for hackback: giving private companies permission to conduct offensive cyber operations.

The Economist noticed (alternate link) this, too.

I think this is an incredibly dumb idea:

In warfare, the notion of counterattack is extremely powerful. Going after the enemy­—its positions, its supply lines, its factories, its infrastructure—­is an age-old military tactic. But in peacetime, we call it revenge, and consider it dangerous. Anyone accused of a crime deserves a fair trial. The accused has the right to defend himself, to face his accuser, to an attorney, and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Both vigilante counterattacks, and preemptive attacks, fly in the face of these rights. They punish people before who haven’t been found guilty. It’s the same whether it’s an angry lynch mob stringing up a suspect, the MPAA disabling the computer of someone it believes made an illegal copy of a movie, or a corporate security officer launching a denial-of-service attack against someone he believes is targeting his company over the net.

In all of these cases, the attacker could be wrong. This has been true for lynch mobs, and on the internet it’s even harder to know who’s attacking you. Just because my computer looks like the source of an attack doesn’t mean that it is. And even if it is, it might be a zombie controlled by yet another computer; I might be a victim, too. The goal of a government’s legal system is justice; the goal of a vigilante is expediency.

We don’t issue letters of marque on the high seas anymore; we shouldn’t do it in cyberspace.

Microsoft Xbox One Hacked

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/03/microsoft-xbox-hacked.html

It’s an impressive feat, over a decade after the box was released:

Since reset glitching wasn’t possible, Gaasedelen thought some voltage glitching could do the trick. So, instead of tinkering with the system rest pin(s) the hacker targeted the momentary collapse of the CPU voltage rail. This was quite a feat, as Gaasedelen couldn’t ‘see’ into the Xbox One, so had to develop new hardware introspection tools.

Eventually, the Bliss exploit was formulated, where two precise voltage glitches were made to land in succession. One skipped the loop where the ARM Cortex memory protection was setup. Then the Memcpy operation was targeted during the header read, allowing him to jump to the attacker-controlled data.

As a hardware attack against the boot ROM in silicon, Gaasedelen says the attack in unpatchable. Thus it is a complete compromise of the console allowing for loading unsigned code at every level, including the Hypervisor and OS. Moreover, Bliss allows access to the security processor so games, firmware, and so on can be decrypted.

Introducing Hacktics and Telemetry, a Podcast from Rapid7 Labs

Post Syndicated from Douglas McKee original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-introducing-hacktics-telemetry-podcast-rapid7-labs

If you spend your days building, shipping, defending, or fixing systems, you already know how this goes. A new technique shows up in a research thread, someone drops a “has anyone checked if we’re exposed?” comment, and suddenly you’re juggling risk, patches, logging gaps, and whatever tool is in the blast radius this week.

That day-to-day reality is why Rapid7 Labs is launching Hacktics and Telemetry, a bi-weekly video and audio podcast with episodes built to fit into a lunch break or a commute. It’s hosted by Rapid7’s Douglas McKee, bringing to the pod years of deep technical and leadership experience, then co-hosted by Jonah ‘CryptoCat’ Burgess – a strong researcher with a solid pulse on the cybersecurity community.

The format stays consistent on purpose. Each episode starts with a scan of what’s emerging, shifts into a guest conversation, then closes with a short segment that ties the story back to mitigation and tooling. The goal is simple: move past theory, show what’s happening with real examples, and leave you with something you can act on.

Episode 1: OpenClaw Risks, RCEs, and Metasploit Pro Updates

Doug and Jonah open by digging into two AI-centric stories from the past week. The first is PhoneLeak, described as data exfiltration in Gemini via phone call. It’s the kind of uncomfortable example that forces practical questions: how do you defend against mobile clickjacking when it’s disguised as a routine CAPTCHA? When an AI assistant has deep extensions into a user’s workspace, how do you prevent malicious prompts from quietly accessing sensitive data like 2FA codes? And perhaps most importantly, how do defenders anticipate and monitor for bizarre, out-of-the-box exfiltration methods—like an AI bypassing SMS confirmations to leak data via DTMF tones on a phone call?

The second story comes from the other side of the AI conversation: an AI agent reportedly identifying an RCE in BeyondTrust remote support, plus discussion of older privileged remote access versions. More automation can mean faster discovery, which shrinks the window between “interesting finding” and “you need to patch this.” That changes how defenders think about exposure, patch prioritization, and what “good enough” means (and looks like) when it comes to monitoring.

In the guest segment, Greg Richardson (Global Advisory CISO & AI Thought Leader, 6 Levers AI) walks through how he uses AI agents in his workflow while keeping control tight. He talks about setting tasks while he sleeps, but the constraints are the point: access is locked down, the agent only touches files he explicitly provides, communication is limited, and token limits help cap the size of any mistake. He also makes a strong case for starting small, with one task at a time, instead of trying to automate dozens of things on day one.

To close out this inaugural episode, the team hits on a SolarWinds Help Desk vulnerability, then shares a quick look at Metasploit Pro 5.0 updates – including more granular payload selection and a walkthrough of the new UI.

If your idea of useful content includes threat trade-offs, concrete mitigations, and a bit of candid “how this actually plays out,” you’re in the right place.

Catch the full episode below:

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Iran’s Cyber Playbook in the Escalating Regional Conflict

Post Syndicated from Rapid7 Labs original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-iran-cyber-playbook-escalating-regional-conflict

Following our recent published advisories, this publication is intended to outline a summary of the cyber activities associated with the tension. Based on the available information, we believe the conflict is beginning to show signs of expanding beyond a strictly regional crisis. Initial threat reporting pointed to a measurable increase in cyber activity linked to the crisis predominantly focused on hacktivist mobilization, with reports of phishing campaigns, and claims of data theft and disruptive operations. For a companion piece focused around our customers, dive into Rapid7 Detection Coverage for Iran-Linked Cyber Activity.

Cyber activity by groups associated with Iran and their affiliated ecosystems have begun to surface. Much of the visible activity currently appears to have limited immediate operational impact as it consists primarily of website defacements, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, coordinated messaging campaigns, phishing attempts, and reconnaissance against exposed digital infrastructure. While these incidents may appear opportunistic or symbolic, historical patterns of such behavior suggest that this activity can represent early-stage signaling, pressure, and preparatory shaping operations rather than isolated disruption.

Iran’s cyber ecosystem operates through a layered structure that includes state-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, proxy actors, hacktivist personas, and sympathetic foreign collectives. Even when not centrally coordinated, these actors often converge on the same narratives and target sets during geopolitical crises, enabling simultaneous visible disruption and covert intelligence-driven intrusion activity. As the conflict evolves, this ecosystem provides a scalable and deniable tool for retaliation that can gradually intensify.

It is very likely that the cyber risk will widen accordingly as the current conflict continues. Governments and organizations located in regions hosting U.S. military infrastructure or closely aligned with U.S. and Israeli positions may face increased exposure, particularly across sectors such as logistics, critical infrastructure, public administration, energy, and telecommunications.

Strategic context and operational trends

Iran does not operate according to a single publicly articulated cyberwarfare doctrine. Instead, its cyber strategy has evolved pragmatically as part of the country’s broader asymmetric security model. Since 2010, there has been an expansion of its cyber capabilities as instruments for intelligence gathering, internal control, retaliation, coercive messaging, and regional influence. Cyber operations are therefore best understood not as a separate military domain with a fully transparent doctrine, but as an adaptable component of the regime’s survival and strategic competition against outsiders.

Broadly speaking, Iranian cyber activity tends to serve three overlapping strategic objectives. The first is regime security and domestic control, in which cyber tools support surveillance, information control, and disruption of dissident or opposition networks. The second is strategic intelligence collection, in which state-linked actors target governments, defense organizations, technology providers, telecommunications firms, and critical infrastructure to gather political, military, and economic intelligence. The third is coercive signaling and regional influence, in which cyber operations impose costs on adversaries, shape perceptions, and demonstrate retaliatory capability while remaining below the threshold of overt interstate war.

A key feature of this regime’s approach is the development of long-term access. Iranian APT groups often conduct sustained intrusion campaigns focused not only on immediate collection but also on access persistence, credential harvesting, and network familiarity. In a crisis environment, these pre-existing footholds can become strategically important, supporting either intelligence collection or later disruptive operations. This is one reason current low-visibility intrusions deserve as much analytical attention as public hacktivist claims. The visible DDoS or defacement campaign may dominate headlines, but the more significant strategic risk often lies in covert access established inside other targets. 

Another defining feature of Iran’s cyber strategy is its layered operational model. State-linked APT groups frequently operate alongside contractors, proxies, persona-driven influence actors, and hacktivist collectives. This structure offers several advantages: it creates deniability, increases operational tempo; broadens the range of possible targets; and allows Iran-aligned ecosystems to combine disruptive spectacle with intelligence-driven depth. During periods of heightened tension, this blended model enables visible pressure operations to coexist with quieter espionage or pre-positioning campaigns. Current reporting on the conflict strongly supports this interpretation, with activist and proxy campaigns surging in parallel to concern over state-linked phishing, malware, wipers, and infrastructure-focused targeting.

Iran’s threat actor landscape

State sponsored 

Iran’s cyber capabilities are distributed across a hybrid ecosystem of state institutions, intelligence services, military structures, and semi-official operators. Rather than relying on a single centralized cyber command, Tehran appears to allocate responsibilities across different organs, primarily the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, with support from contractors, front entities, and affiliated personas. Strategic coordination of the cyber domain is overseen by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, while operational activities are carried out through a mix of official and semi-official channels.

IRGC-linked actors

The Islamic Revolution Guard Corp (IRGC) maintains one of Iran’s most visible offensive cyber capabilities and has been associated with cyber espionage, influence operations, credential theft, and politically aligned disruptive activity. Among the principal IRGC-linked actors are APT35 (also known as Charming Kitten or Mint Sandstorm), which has long conducted spear-phishing and credential-harvesting operations against diplomats, journalists, researchers, and policy communities; APT42 is an actor particularly associated with surveillance and social engineering targeting dissidents, activists, journalists, and policy experts. Cotton Sandstorm (also known as Holy Souls and Emennet Pasargad), meanwhile, has been linked to both espionage and influence-oriented operations targeting regional adversaries and Western institutions. Recent reporting also highlights continued concern around malware associated with this broader actor set, including infostealing and espionage tooling used in phishing-led operations.

MOIS-linked actors

The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) operates parallel cyber capabilities that tend to emphasize intelligence collection, long-term access, and strategic espionage. The most prominent groups in this cluster include MuddyWater and OilRig (also known as APT34). CISA has previously described MuddyWater as an Iranian government-sponsored actor conducting cyber espionage and malicious cyber operations across multiple sectors, while current reporting continues to place the group among the most operationally relevant Iranian state-linked threats in the present crisis environment. OilRig remains a longstanding espionage actor focused on governments, financial institutions, energy entities, and other strategic organizations.

These actors illustrate Iran’s distributed cyber-operational model: Intelligence-driven access development, influence, psychological pressure, and opportunistic disruptive action are not separate lines of effort but parts of a broader strategic continuum.

Parallel hacktivist and proxies

Beginning in June 2025, a noticeable surge in hacktivist and proxy cyber activity accompanied the broader escalation of tensions in the Middle East. This reflects a recurring pattern observed during previous geopolitical crises, in which ideologically aligned non-state cyber actors mobilize alongside, or in parallel with, state-linked cyber operations. In the current confrontation, this dynamic has again expanded the cyber landscape beyond traditional state-directed espionage or sabotage.

By early March 2026, several dozen hacktivists or proxy collectives emerged related to the conflict. These groups vary significantly in capability and reliability. Some focus on distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, while others conduct website defacements or hack-and-leak campaigns. Some primarily amplify claims of compromise that are exaggerated or only partially verifiable. Their significance, therefore, lies less in technical sophistication than in the cumulative pressure they place on defenders and the broader information environment.

In crisis situations, this activity can produce strategic effects. Numerous low-impact incidents can consume defensive resources, complicate attribution, and obscure more sophisticated intrusions occurring simultaneously. Hacktivist campaigns may therefore function as distractions, signals, or psychological pressure while more capable actors pursue quieter access to high-value networks. For this reason, the analytical distinction between advanced persistent threat (APT) activity and hacktivism can become blurred during periods of geopolitical confrontation.

Several collectives active in the current environment publicly position themselves as ideologically aligned with Iran or with members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Among the more visible groups are Handala Hack Team, Dienet, FAD Team, APT IRAN, Cyber Islamic Resistance, and Fatimion cyber team. These actors frequently frame their operations as retaliatory cyber campaigns targeting Israeli, Western, or allied regional entities, claiming responsibility for activities such as website defacements, DDoS attacks, and hack-and-leak operations targeting mainly government, telecommunications, energy, and financial entities. Although many claims remain difficult to verify independently, their messaging strategy often emphasizes their psychological and reputational impact.

In parallel, several pro-Russia hacktivist groups have also engaged in operations linked to the confrontation, including NoName057(16), Sever Killer, and Russian Legion. These groups typically conduct large-scale DDoS campaigns targeting government portals, financial services, and transportation or telecommunications infrastructure in states perceived as supporting Israel or broader Western policy positions. Their participation illustrates how regional conflicts can attract cyber actors from outside the immediate theater when ideological alignment or strategic narratives converge.

Cyber activities linked to the ongoing conflict

Iranian APT group operations 

Beyond the highly visible hacktivist activity circulating on social media, defacement platforms, and Telegram channels, a quieter but more strategically significant layer of cyber operations is unfolding through Iranian state-linked APT groups. These operations appear ongoing and aligned with broader geopolitical objectives tied to the current conflict environment.

Recent threat reporting indicates continued operations by the Iranian APT group, MuddyWater, which is widely assessed to be linked to MOIS. Since at least early February 2026, reporting has suggested potential compromises or attempted intrusions targeting organizations associated with the United States and allied interests. 

According to public reporting, activity linked to the group was reportedly observed within the networks of a United States–based bank, a United States airport, a nonprofit organization operating across the United States and Canada, and a software company with operations in Israel. In several of these incidents, threat actors reportedly deployed a previously undocumented backdoor known as Dindoor, suggesting a coordinated, ongoing campaign rather than isolated compromise events.

Hacktivist and proxy disruption activities

The most visible form of cyber activity so far remains hacktivist and proxy-led disruption.

DDoS attacks are among the most common tactics employed by hacktivist groups. Pro-Russia groups such as NoName057(16) and Server Killer, along with other pro-Iran collectives affiliated with them, have been linked to waves of coordinated DDoS attacks against Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, and other politically symbolic targets. These attacks are generally inexpensive and cause only short-term technical damage, but they remain strategically useful because they disrupt public services, tie up defense resources, generate media coverage, and fuel the narrative of a sustained cyber response.

Telegram-Russian-hacktivist-targets-Israeli-website.png
Figure 1: Telegram post from pro-Russia hacktivist groups claiming responsibility for targeting an Israeli website in support of Iran

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Website defacement also remains a common tactic. Groups such as FAD Team, 313, and Cyber Islamic Resistance have been associated with claims of attacks on several websites. Although defacements are technically simple to execute, they remain analytically significant: They are highly visible, rapidly disseminated, and psychologically impactful, often creating an exaggerated perception of widespread systemic compromise.

Data breaches represent a far more significant dimension of cyber operations. The Iranian-aligned group Handala, in particular, continues to blend political messaging with claims of data theft and the selective release of allegedly compromised information. The group recently asserted that it had infiltrated a Saudi energy company and exfiltrated internal documents, framing the operation as a combination of data exfiltration, coercive pressure, and psychological warfare targeting the energy sector. Even when the full authenticity of released datasets cannot be independently verified, the publication of partially credible material can still generate substantial reputational damage and potential operational disruption for affected organizations.

Targeting critical infrastructure has emerged as one of the most concerning aspects of the current cyber activity by pro-Iran hacktivists and proxy collectives. Groups operating in this ecosystem, including Iranian APTs, Handala, and networks associated with the Cyber Islamic Resistance umbrella, have publicly claimed operations targeting infrastructure across the region. Recent Telegram posts indicate that an Iranian APT group claimed responsibility for attempts to sabotage Jordanian critical infrastructure, while other Iran-aligned hacktivist personas have asserted access to sectors including fuel systems, water utilities, and other operational technology environments.

In a separate case, the Handala Hack Team has alleged that it compromised both Oil and gas companies in the United Arab Emirates and Israel, claiming to have exfiltrated more than 1.3 TB of sensitive data from oil and gas sector networks. These claims, which would represent a significant intrusion into Middle Eastern energy infrastructure if confirmed, have circulated primarily through hacktivist communication channels and social media reporting and have not been independently verified.

Iran-APT-group-claims-targeting-Jordanian-critical-infrastructure.png
Figure 2: IRAN APT group claimed attempts to target Jordanian critical infrastructure

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Although many of these claims remain difficult to independently verify, the recurring focus on industrial control systems and essential services is analytically significant. Hacktivist collectives aligned with Iranian geopolitical narratives frequently leverage infrastructure-related claims as part of information operations designed to amplify perceived impact, generate psychological pressure, and signal the potential for escalation into operational technology environments. Even when technical disruption is limited or exaggerated, the persistent narrative around infrastructure compromise can shape defensive priorities and highlight potential escalation pathways within the broader cyber conflict.

Sectoral exposure and risk landscape

In the current geopolitical context, cyberattacks extend far beyond military networks and defense institutions. Modern cyber operations increasingly aim to affect the broader ecosystem that supports government activity, economic stability, and public trust. Consequently, adversaries seek not only technically vulnerable targets but also organizations whose compromise or disruption can increase visibility, influence public perception, or create cascading effects across interconnected systems.

A successful intrusion into a widely used service provider, a major infrastructure operator, or a publicly accessible institution can quickly produce consequences that extend far beyond the initial target, affecting supply chains, service availability, and public confidence. In this context, cyber operations often serve multiple purposes simultaneously: intelligence gathering, strategic positioning within critical networks, and generating disruption or exerting influence during periods of heightened geopolitical tension.

At present, several sectors appear particularly exposed:

  • Government institutions and public administration

  • Defense and aerospace industry

  • Energy sector, including oil, gas, and electricity

  • Telecommunications providers

  • Financial services

  • Transportation systems

However, the risk landscape extends beyond these sectors themselves. Organizations that form part of the broader digital supply chain supporting these industries may also represent attractive entry points. This includes cloud service providers, managed service providers, technology vendors, and other third-party platforms that maintain privileged access to client environments. Compromising such intermediaries can allow adversaries to reach high-value targets indirectly. By gaining access to a supplier or service provider, attackers may obtain pathways into multiple networks simultaneously, access sensitive information, or move laterally across interconnected operational systems. Supply chain compromise, therefore, offers both scale and stealth, making it an increasingly common tactic in sophisticated cyber campaigns.

Geopolitical alignment can also influence targeting decisions. Organizations based in countries that host United States military assets or are publicly aligned with United States or Israeli policy positions may attract additional attention from adversaries. In these cases, targeting can carry symbolic, political, or strategic value beyond the immediate technical impact of the intrusion. Within this environment, cyber exposure can generally be understood through three overlapping targeting dynamics.

Symbolic targets include municipalities, universities, media outlets, and public institutions. These organizations may be targeted primarily for visibility, messaging, or propaganda purposes. Even limited disruption or data exposure can generate headlines and amplify the perceived reach of the attackers.

Operational targets include sectors that support everyday economic and social activity, such as telecommunications providers, transportation systems, payment networks, and fuel distribution infrastructure. Disruptions in these areas can quickly affect daily life, creating public anxiety and increasing pressure on authorities to respond.

Strategic targets consist of entities whose compromise offers long-term intelligence or operational value. This category includes defense contractors, major financial institutions, government networks, and operators of critical infrastructure. In these cases, adversaries may prioritize persistence and stealth to collect intelligence, monitor decision-making processes, or maintain access that could be leveraged during future crises.

Taken together, these targeting patterns illustrate a broader shift in cyber operations: Attackers are increasingly selecting targets not only for their intrinsic value, but for the broader political, economic, and societal effects that disruption or compromise can produce.

What should organizations monitor?

In the current phase of the conflict, organizations should continue to monitor for indicators that activity is shifting from opportunistic disruption toward deliberate intrusion or access preparation.

Internet-facing infrastructure is often the initial entry point. Elevated scanning or probing of public websites, VPN gateways, remote access portals, cloud services, and email authentication infrastructure may indicate early reconnaissance. While some scanning is routine, sudden increases in probing activity or authentication attempts should be treated as potential precursors to intrusion.

Phishing and social engineering campaigns are also likely to intensify. Threat actors may exploit developments in the conflict by using lures that reference civil defense alerts, battlefield updates, humanitarian messaging, or urgent requests that appear to originate from leadership or trusted partners. In some cases, malicious applications or replicas of legitimate services may be used to harvest credentials or deploy malware.

Credential misuse remains a primary access vector. Security teams should monitor for abnormal authentication patterns, including logins from unusual geographic locations, access at unexpected hours, repeated failed logins followed by success, changes to multi-factor authentication settings, or the creation of new privileged accounts.

Organizations operating critical infrastructure should closely monitor activities within their operational environments. Suspicious access to remote management platforms, unusual connectivity between IT and OT networks, or unexpected activity involving engineering workstations or vendor access channels may signal reconnaissance within sensitive systems.

Finally, monitoring the broader information environment can provide early warning and signal the need to increase monitoring. Hacktivist groups frequently use platforms such as Telegram and X to circulate target lists, claim attacks, or release fragments of allegedly stolen data tied to geopolitical events. Tracking these channels can help organizations identify potential targets and strengthen their defensive posture before malicious activity reaches their networks.

Additional reading from Rapid7 Labs, for Rapid7 customers: Rapid7 Detection Coverage for Iran-Linked Cyber Activity

Claude Used to Hack Mexican Government

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/03/claude-used-to-hack-mexican-government.html

An unknown hacker used Anthropic’s LLM to hack the Mexican government:

The unknown Claude user wrote Spanish-language prompts for the chatbot to act as an elite hacker, finding vulnerabilities in government networks, writing computer scripts to exploit them and determining ways to automate data theft, Israeli cybersecurity startup Gambit Security said in research published Wednesday.

[…]

Claude initially warned the unknown user of malicious intent during their conversation about the Mexican government, but eventually complied with the attacker’s requests and executed thousands of commands on government computer networks, the researchers said.

Anthropic investigated Gambit’s claims, disrupted the activity and banned the accounts involved, a representative said. The company feeds examples of malicious activity back into Claude to learn from it, and one of its latest AI models, Claude Opus 4.6, includes probes that can disrupt misuse, the representative said.

Alternative link here.

Israel Hacked Traffic Cameras in Iran

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/03/israel-hacked-traffic-cameras-in-iran.html

Multiple news outlets are reporting on Israel’s hacking of Iranian traffic cameras and how they assisted with the killing of that country’s leadership.

The New York Times has an on the intelligence operation more generally.

Hacked App Part of US/Israeli Propaganda Campaign Against Iran

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/03/hacked-app-part-of-us-israeli-propaganda-campaign-against-iran.html

Wired has the story:

Shortly after the first set of explosions, Iranians received bursts of notifications on their phones. They came not from the government advising caution, but from an apparently hacked prayer-timing app called BadeSaba Calendar that has been downloaded more than 5 million times from the Google Play Store.

The messages arrived in quick succession over a period of 30 minutes, starting with the phrase ‘Help has arrived’ at 9:52 am Tehran time, shortly after the first set of explosions. No party has claimed responsibility for the hacks.

It happened so fast that this is most likely a government operation. I can easily envision both the US and Israel having hacked the app previously, and then deciding that this is a good use of that access.

Phishing Attacks Against People Seeking Programming Jobs

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/02/phishing-attacks-against-people-seeking-programming-jobs.html

This is new. North Korean hackers are posing as company recruiters, enticing job candidates to participate in coding challenges. When they run the code they are supposed to work on, it installs malware on their system.

News article.

Poisoning AI Training Data

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/02/poisoning-ai-training-data.html

All it takes to poison AI training data is to create a website:

I spent 20 minutes writing an article on my personal website titled “The best tech journalists at eating hot dogs.” Every word is a lie. I claimed (without evidence) that competitive hot-dog-eating is a popular hobby among tech reporters and based my ranking on the 2026 South Dakota International Hot Dog Championship (which doesn’t exist). I ranked myself number one, obviously. Then I listed a few fake reporters and real journalists who gave me permission….

Less than 24 hours later, the world’s leading chatbots were blabbering about my world-class hot dog skills. When I asked about the best hot-dog-eating tech journalists, Google parroted the gibberish from my website, both in the Gemini app and AI Overviews, the AI responses at the top of Google Search. ChatGPT did the same thing, though Claude, a chatbot made by the company Anthropic, wasn’t fooled.

Sometimes, the chatbots noted this might be a joke. I updated my article to say “this is not satire.” For a while after, the AIs seemed to take it more seriously.

These things are not trustworthy, and yet they are going to be widely trusted.

Hacktivism and the Winter Olympics 2026: What We’re Seeing and What it Signals

Post Syndicated from Emma Burdett original https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/it-hacktivism-winter-olympics-2026

The 2026 Winter Olympics have been live for several weeks, and the cyber activity many predicted is already unfolding.

Threat intelligence reporting from Intel471 highlights a surge in hacktivist chatter and mobilization tied to protests and geopolitical tensions surrounding the Games. At the same time, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group has warned that hacktivists, state actors, and cybercriminal groups are actively targeting the global defense industry, including organizations that overlap with Olympic infrastructure and supply chains. This is not a coincidence. Major global events concentrate visibility, political symbolism, and digital dependency. That combination attracts actors who want attention as much as disruption.

What is hacktivism in 2026?

Hacktivism today is ideologically motivated cyber activity designed to influence perception, apply pressure, or advance political narratives, often through disruption, data leaks, or public messaging. Recent reporting shows that hacktivist groups are not operating in isolation. In some cases, their campaigns run alongside state-aligned or criminal activity. The targeting of defense contractors, aerospace suppliers, and industrial entities reflects this convergence.

During the Olympics, those same sectors intersect with event logistics, telecommunications, aviation, energy, and security technology.

What has happened since the Winter Games began?

According to Intel471, online communities aligned with hacktivist causes have escalated messaging and operational coordination in the lead-up to and during the Winter Games. Threat actors have referenced Olympic-related targets in forums and social channels, including infrastructure tied to transportation and sponsors.

SecurityWeek and OODA Loop, citing Google’s intelligence, note continued targeting of defense industry entities through phishing and exploitation of exposed services. While not every campaign is explicitly labeled “Olympics-related,” the overlap in sectors matters.

Defense contractors often provide technology, logistics, surveillance, or communications capabilities that support major international events. Attacks against them, even if framed around geopolitical grievances, can have ripple effects.

The pattern is consistent: high-visibility events amplify the impact of even limited cyber incidents.

Why global events amplify hacktivist activity

The Olympics function as a global amplifier. Billions are watching, media cycles move faster, and political narratives are intensified. In that environment, even relatively low-complexity attacks can produce outsized consequences. A distributed denial-of-service campaign against a broadcaster can interrupt coverage at a critical moment. A data leak involving a sponsor can dominate headlines for days. A website defacement tied to a political cause can circulate globally within minutes. In many cases, the objective is not technical devastation but psychological and reputational impact. Undermining confidence in organizers or projecting instability can advance the strategic goals of ideologically aligned groups without requiring sophisticated or destructive techniques.

What security teams should focus on, now and in the future

With the Games underway, the priority is not speculation. It is monitoring and preparedness. Security leaders supporting global events should:

  • Review third-party dependencies that connect to core event operations

  • Increase monitoring of public-facing systems during peak broadcast windows

  • Track hacktivist messaging that references sponsors, infrastructure, or host nations

  • Ensure executive and communications teams are aligned on rapid response planning

The risk is not confined to stadium control systems. It spans broadcasters, payment providers, logistics partners, and digital platforms. High-visibility events attract ideologically motivated actors, but they also create opportunities for financially driven cybercrime. As we’ve previously examined in our research on carding-as-a-service and stolen credit card fraud, periods of high transaction volume often coincide with increased fraud activity and exploitation of payment infrastructure.

Security leaders should prepare for both disruption and monetization. While hacktivist activity may generate headlines, financial exploitation often causes quieter but longer-lasting operational damage.

Hacktivism in 2026: A warning for high-visibility events

The Winter Olympics provide a live case study in how hacktivism operates within today’s geopolitical environment. Threat actors understand timing. They understand symbolism. They understand that a small disruption during a global event carries disproportionate weight.

The activity seen so far reinforces a broader shift. Hacktivism has matured into a persistent and visible component of the threat landscape. It intersects with state and criminal ecosystems and targets sectors that carry political and economic symbolism.

For organizations tied to high-visibility events, the lesson is clear. Cyber risk during global moments is not only technical – it is reputational, geopolitical, and amplified by attention and preparation must account for all three.

Prompt Injection Via Road Signs

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/02/prompt-injection-via-road-signs.html

Interesting research: “CHAI: Command Hijacking Against Embodied AI.”

Abstract: Embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) promises to handle edge cases in robotic vehicle systems where data is scarce by using common-sense reasoning grounded in perception and action to generalize beyond training distributions and adapt to novel real-world situations. These capabilities, however, also create new security risks. In this paper, we introduce CHAI (Command Hijacking against embodied AI), a new class of prompt-based attacks that exploit the multimodal language interpretation abilities of Large Visual-Language Models (LVLMs). CHAI embeds deceptive natural language instructions, such as misleading signs, in visual input, systematically searches the token space, builds a dictionary of prompts, and guides an attacker model to generate Visual Attack Prompts. We evaluate CHAI on four LVLM agents; drone emergency landing, autonomous driving, and aerial object tracking, and on a real robotic vehicle. Our experiments show that CHAI consistently outperforms state-of-the-art attacks. By exploiting the semantic and multimodal reasoning strengths of next-generation embodied AI systems, CHAI underscores the urgent need for defenses that extend beyond traditional adversarial robustness.

News article.

Backdoor in Notepad++

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/02/backdoor-in-notepad.html

Hackers associated with the Chinese government used a Trojaned version of Notepad++ to deliver malware to selected users.

Notepad++ said that officials with the unnamed provider hosting the update infrastructure consulted with incident responders and found that it remained compromised until September 2. Even then, the attackers maintained credentials to the internal services until December 2, a capability that allowed them to continue redirecting selected update traffic to malicious servers. The threat actor “specifically targeted Notepad++ domain with the goal of exploiting insufficient update verification controls that existed in older versions of Notepad++.” Event logs indicate that the hackers tried to re-exploit one of the weaknesses after it was fixed but that the attempt failed.

Make sure you’re running at least version 8.9.1.

Hacking Wheelchairs over Bluetooth

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/01/hacking-wheelchairs-over-bluetooth.html

Researchers have demonstrated remotely controlling a wheelchair over Bluetooth. CISA has issued an advisory.

CISA said the WHILL wheelchairs did not enforce authentication for Bluetooth connections, allowing an attacker who is in Bluetooth range of the targeted device to pair with it. The attacker could then control the wheelchair’s movements, override speed restrictions, and manipulate configuration profiles, all without requiring credentials or user interaction.

1980s Hacker Manifesto

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/01/1980s-hacker-manifesto.html

Forty years ago, The Mentor—Loyd Blankenship—published “The Conscience of a Hacker” in Phrack.

You bet your ass we’re all alike… we’ve been spoon-fed baby food at school when we hungered for steak… the bits of meat that you did let slip through were pre-chewed and tasteless. We’ve been dominated by sadists, or ignored by the apathetic. The few that had something to teach found us willing pupils, but those few are like drops of water in the desert.

This is our world now… the world of the electron and the switch, the beauty of the baud. We make use of a service already existing without paying for what could be dirt-cheap if it wasn’t run by profiteering gluttons, and you call us criminals. We explore… and you call us criminals. We seek after knowledge… and you call us criminals. We exist without skin color, without nationality, without religious bias… and you call us criminals. You build atomic bombs, you wage wars, you murder, cheat, and lie to us and try to make us believe it’s for our own good, yet we’re the criminals.

Yes, I am a criminal. My crime is that of curiosity. My crime is that of judging people by what they say and think, not what they look like. My crime is that of outsmarting you, something that you will never forgive me for.

Denmark Accuses Russia of Conducting Two Cyberattacks

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2025/12/denmark-accuses-russia-of-conducting-two-cyberattacks.html

News:

The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) announced on Thursday that Moscow was behind a cyber-attack on a Danish water utility in 2024 and a series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on Danish websites in the lead-up to the municipal and regional council elections in November.

The first, it said, was carried out by the pro-Russian group known as Z-Pentest and the second by NoName057(16), which has links to the Russian state.

Slashdot thread.

AI Advertising Company Hacked

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2025/12/ai-advertising-company-hacked.html

At least some of this is coming to light:

Doublespeed, a startup backed by Andreessen Horowitz (a16z) that uses a phone farm to manage at least hundreds of AI-generated social media accounts and promote products has been hacked. The hack reveals what products the AI-generated accounts are promoting, often without the required disclosure that these are advertisements, and allowed the hacker to take control of more than 1,000 smartphones that power the company.

The hacker, who asked for anonymity because he feared retaliation from the company, said he reported the vulnerability to Doublespeed on October 31. At the time of writing, the hacker said he still has access to the company’s backend, including the phone farm itself.

Slashdot thread.