Sometimes I cache: implementing lock-free probabilistic caching

Post Syndicated from Thibault Meunier original https://blog.cloudflare.com/sometimes-i-cache/

HTTP caching is conceptually simple: if the response to a request is in the cache, serve it, and if not, pull it from your origin, put it in the cache, and return it. When the response is old, you repeat the process. If you are worried about too many requests going to your origin at once, you protect it with a cache lock: a small program, possibly distinct from your cache, that indicates if a request is already going to your origin. This is called cache revalidation.

In this blog post, we dive into how cache revalidation works, and present a new approach based on probability. For every request going to the origin, we simulate a die roll. If it’s 6, the request can go to the origin. Otherwise, it stays stale to protect our origin from being overloaded. To see how this is built and optimised, read on.

Background

Let’s take the example of an online image library. When a client requests an image, the service first checks its cache to see if the resource is present. If it is, it returns it. If it is not, the image server processes the request, places the response into the cache for a day, and returns it. When the cache expires, the process is repeated.


Figure 1: Uncached request goes to the origin


Figure 2: Cached request stops at the cache

And this is where things get complex. The image of a cat might be quite popular. Let’s say it’s requested 10 times per second. Let’s also assume the image server cannot handle more than 1 request per second. After a day, the cache expires. 10 requests hit the service. Given there are no up-to-date items in cache, these 10 requests are going to go directly to the image server. This problem is known as cache stampede. When the image server sees these 10 requests all happening at the same time, it gets overloaded.


Figure 3: Image server overloaded upon cache expiration. This can happen to one or multiple users, across locations.

This all stops if the cache gets populated, as it can handle a lot more requests than the origin.


Figure 4: Cache is populated and can handle the load. The image server is healthy again.

In the following sections, we build this image service, see how it can prevent cache stampede with a cache lock, then dive into probabilistic cache revalidation, and its optimisation.

Setup

Let’s write this image service. We need an image, a server, and a cache. For the image we’re going to use a picture of my cat, Cloudflare Workers for the server, and the Cloudflare Cache API for caching.

Note to the reader: On purpose, we aren’t using Cloudflare KV or Cloudflare CDN Cache, because they already solve our cache validation problem by using a cache lock.

let cache = caches.default
const CACHE_KEY = new Request('https://cache.local/')
const CACHE_AGE_IN_S = 86_400 // 1 day

function cacheExpirationDate() {
  return new Date(Date.now() + 1000*CACHE_AGE_IN_S)
}

function fetchAndCache(ctx) {
  let response = await fetch('https://files.research.cloudflare.com/images/cat.jpg')
  response = new Response(
	await response.arrayBuffer(),
	{
  	  headers: {
  	    'Content-Type': response.headers.get('Content-Type'),
  	    'Expires': cacheExpirationDate().toUTCString(),
  	  },
	},
  )
  ctx.waitUntil(cache.put(CACHE_KEY, response.clone()))
  return response
}

export default {
  async fetch(request, env, ctx) {
	let cachedResponse = await cache.match(CACHE_KEY)
	if (cachedResponse) {
  	  return cachedResponse
	}
	return fetchAndCache(ctx)
  }
}

Codeblock 1: Image server with a non-collapsing cache

Expectation about cache revalidation

The image service is receiving 10 requests per second, and it caches images for a day. It’s reasonable to assume we would like to start revalidating the cache 5 minutes before it expires. The code evolves as follows:

let cache = caches.default
const CACHE_KEY = new Request('https://cache.local/')
const CACHE_AGE_IN_S = 86_400 // 1 day
const CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S = 300

function cacheExpirationDate() {
  // Date constructor in workers takes Unix time in milliseconds
  // Date.now() returns time in milliseconds as well
  return new Date(Date.now() + 1000*CACHE_AGE_IN_S)
}

async function fetchAndCache(ctx) {
  let response = await fetch('https://files.research.cloudflare.com/images/cat.jpg')
  response = new Response(
	await response.arrayBuffer(),
	{
  	  headers: {
  	    'Content-Type': response.headers.get('Content-Type'),
  	    'Expires': cacheExpirationDate().toUTCString(),
  	  },
	},
  )
  ctx.waitUntil(cache.put(CACHE_KEY, response.clone()))
  return response
}

// Revalidation function added here
// This is were we are going to focus our effort: should the request be revalidated ?
function shouldRevalidate(expirationDate) {
  let remainingCacheTimeInS = (expirationDate.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000

  return remainingCacheTimeInS <= CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S
}

export default {
  async fetch(request, env, ctx) {
	let cachedResponse = await cache.match(CACHE_KEY)
	if (cachedResponse) {
       // revalidation happens only if the request was cached. Otherwise, the resource is fetched anyway
  	  if (shouldRevalidate()) {
    	    ctx.waitUntil(fetchAndCache(ctx))
  	  }
  	  return cachedResponse
	}
	return fetchAndCache(ctx)
  }
}

Codeblock 2: Image server with early-revalidation and a non-collapsing cache

That code works, and we can now revalidate 5 minutes in advance of cache expiration. However, instead of fetching the image from the origin server at expiration time, all requests are going to be made 5 minutes in advance, and that does not solve our cache stampede problem. This happens no matter if requests are coming to a single location or not, given the code above does not collapse requests.

To solve our cache stampede problem, we need the revalidation process to not send too many requests at the same time. Ideally, we would like only one request to be sent between expiration - 5min and expiration.

The usual solution: a cache lock

To make sure there is only one request at a time going to the origin server, the solution that’s usually deployed is a cache lock. The idea is that for a specific item, a cat picture in our case, requests to the origin try to obtain a lock. The request obtaining the lock can go to the origin, the others will serve stale content.

The lock has two methods: try_lock() and unlock.
* try_lock if the lock is free, take it and return true. If not, return false.
* unlock releases the lock.

Such a lock can be implemented as a Cloudflare RPC service:

import { WorkerEntrypoint } from 'cloudflare:workers'

class Lock extends WorkerEntryPoint {
  async try_lock(key) {
	let value = await this.ctx.storage.get(key)
	if (!value) {
  	  await this.ctx.storage.put(key, true)
  	  return true
	}
	return false
  }

  unlock() {
	return this.ctx.storage.delete(key)
  }
}

Codeblock 3: Lock service implemented with a Durable Object

That service can then be used as a cache lock.

// CACHE_LOCK is an instantiation of the above binding
// Assuming the above is deployed as a worker with name `lock`
// It can be bound in wrangler.toml as follows
// services = [ { binding = "CACHE_LOCK", service = "lock" } ]

const LOCK_KEY = "cat_image_service"

async function fetchAndCache(env, ctx) {
  let response = await fetch('...')
  ctx.waitUntil(env.CACHE_LOCK.unlock(LOCK_KEY))
  ...
}

function shouldRevalidate(env, expirationDate) {
  let remainingCacheTimeInS = (expirationDate.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000

  // check if the expiry window is now, and then if the revalidation lock is available. if it is, take it
  return remainingCacheTimeInS <= CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S && env.CACHE_LOCK.try_lock(LOCK_KEY)
}

Codeblock 4: Image server with early-revalidation and a cache using a cache-lock

Now you might say “Et voilà. No need for probabilities and mathematics. Peak engineering has triumphed.” And you might be right, in most cases. That’s why cache locks are so predominant: they are conceptually simple, deterministic for the same key, and scale well with predictable resource usage.

On the other hand, cache locks add latency and fallibility. To take ownership of a lock, cache revalidation has to contact the lock service. This service is shared across different processes, possibly different machines in different locations. Requests therefore take time. In addition, this service might be unavailable. Probabilistic cache revalidation does not suffer from these, given it does not reach out to an external service but rolls a die with the local randomness generator. It does so at the cost of not guaranteeing the number of requests going to the origin server: maybe zero for an extended period, maybe more than one. On average, this is going to be fine. But there can be border cases, similar to how one can roll a die 10 times and get 10 sixes. It’s unlikely, but not unrealistic, and certain services need that certainty. In the following sections, we dissect this approach.

First dive into probabilities given a stable request rate

A first approach is to reduce the number of requests going to the origin server. Instead of always sending a request to revalidate, we are going to send 1 out of 10. This means that instead of sending 10 requests per second when the cache is invalidated, we send 1 per second.

Because we don’t have a lock, we do that with probabilities. We set the probability of sending a request to the origin to be $p=\frac{1}{10}$. With a rate of 10 requests per second, after 1 second, the expectancy of a request being sent to the origin is $1-(1-p)^10=65\%$. We draw the evolution of the function $E(r, t)=1-(1-p)^{r \times t}$ representing the expectancy of a request being sent to the server over time. $r = 10$ and is the request rate.


Figure 5: Revalidation time $E(t)$ with $r=10$ and $p=\frac{1}{10}$. At time $t$, $E(t)$ is the probability that an early revalidation occurred.

The graph moves very quickly towards $1$. This means we might still have space to reduce the number of requests going to our origin server. We can set a lower probability, such as $p_2=\frac{1}{500}$ (1 request every 5 seconds on average). The graph looks as follows:


Figure 6: Revalidation time $E(t)$ with $r=10$ and $p=\frac{1}{500}$.

This looks great. Let’s implement it.

const CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S = 300
const CACHE_REVALIDATION_PROBABILITY = 1/500

function shouldRevalidate(expirationDate) {
  let remainingCacheTimeInS = (expirationDate.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000

  if (remainingCacheTimeInS > CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S) {
	return false
  }
  if (remainingCacheTimeInS <= 0) {
	return true
  }
  return Math.random() < CACHE_REVALIDATION_PROBABILITY
}

Codeblock 5: Image server with early-revalidation and a probabilistic cache using uniform distribution

That’s it. If the cache is not close to expiration, we don’t revalidate. If the cache is expired, we revalidate. Otherwise, we revalidate based on a probability.

Adaptive cache revalidation

Until now, we assumed the picture of the cat received a stable request rate. However, for a real service, this does not necessarily hold. For instance, if instead of 10 requests per second, imagine the service receives only 1. The expectancy function does not look as good. After 5 minutes (300s), $E(r=1, t=300)=45\%$. On the other hand, if the image service is receiving 10,000 requests per second, $E(r=10000, t = 300) \approx 100\%$, but our server receives on average $10000 \times \frac{1}{500} = 20$ requests per second. It would be ideal to design a probability function that would adapt to the request rate.

That function would return a low probability when expiration time is far in the future, and increase over time such that the cache is revalidated before it expires. It would cap the request rate going to the origin server.

Let’s design the variation of probability $p$ over 5 minutes. When far from the expiration, the probability to revalidate should be low. This should help match the high request rate. For example, with a request rate of 10k requests per second, we would like the revalidation probability $p$ to be $\frac{1}{100000}$. This ensures the request rates seen by our server are going to be low on average, at about 1 request every 10 seconds. As time passes, we increase this probability to allow for revalidation even at a lower request rate.

Time to expiration $t$ (in s)

Revalidation probability $p$

Target request rate $r$ (in rps)

300

1/100000

10000

240

1/10000

1000

180

1/1000

100

120

1/100

10

60

1/10

1

0

1

Table 1: Variation of revalidation probability over time

For each of these intervals, there is a high likelihood that a request rate $r$ will trigger a cache revalidation, and low likelihood that a lower request rate will trigger it. If it does, it’s ok.

We can update our revalidation function as follows:

const CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S = 300
const CACHE_REVALIDATION_PROBABILITY_PER_MIN = [1/100_000, 1/10_000, 1/1000, 1/100, 1/10, 1]

function shouldRevalidate(expirationDate) {
  let remainingCacheTimeInS = (expirationDate.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000

  if (remainingCacheTimeInS > CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S) {
	return false
  }
  if (remainingCacheTimeInS <= 0) {
	return true
  }
  let currentMinute = Math.floor(remainingCacheTimeInS/60)
  return Math.random() < CACHE_REVALIDATION_PROBABILITY_PER_MIN[currentMinute]
}

Codeblock 6: Image server with early-revalidation and a probabilistic cache using piecewise uniform distribution

Optimal cache stampede solution

There seems to be a lot of decisions going on here. To solve this, we can reference an academic paper written by A Vattani, T Chierichetti, and K Lowenstein in 2015 called Optimal Probabilistic Cache Stampede Prevention. If you read it, you’ll recognise that what we have been discussing until now is close to what the paper presents. For instance, both the cache revalidation algorithm structure and the early revalidation function look similar.


Figure 7: Probabilistic early expiration of a cache item as defined by Figure 2 of Optimal Probabilistic Cache Stampede Prevention paper. In our case, $\mathcal{D}=300$

One takeaway from the paper is that instead of discretization, with a probability from 0 to 60s, then from 60s to 120s, …, the probability function can be continuous. Instead of a fixed $p$, there is a function $p(t)$ of time $t$.

$p(t)=e^{-\lambda (expiry-t)}, \text{ with } expiry=300, \text{ and } t \in [0, 300]$

We call $\lambda$ the steepness parameter, and set it to $\frac{1}{300}$, $300$ being our early expiration gap.

The expectancy over time is $E(r, t)=1-e^{-rλt}$. This leads to the expectancy below for various request rates. You can note that when $r=1$, there is not a $100%$ chance that the request will be revalidated before expiry.


Figure 8: Revalidation time $E(t)$ for multiple $r$ with an exponential distribution.

This leads to the final code snippet:

const CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S = 300
const REVALIDATION_STEEPNESS = 1/300

function shouldRevalidate(expirationDate) {
  let remainingCacheTimeInS = (expirationDate.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000

  if (remainingCacheTimeInS > CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S) {
	return false
  }
  if (remainingCacheTimeInS <= 0) {
	return true
  }
  // p(t) is evaluated here
  return Math.random() < Math.exp(-REVALIDATION_STEEPNESS*(CACHE_REVALIDATION_INTERVAL_IN_S-remainingCacheTimeInS)
}

Codeblock 7: Image server with early-revalidation and a probabilistic cache using exponential distribution

And that’s it. Given Date.now() has a granularity, and is not continuous, it would also be possible to discretise these functions, even though the gains are minimal. This is what we have done in a production worker implementation, where the number of requests is important. It is a service that benefits from caching for performance consideration, and that cannot use built-in stale-while-revalidate from within Cloudflare workers. Probabilistic cache stampede prevention is well-suited here, as no new component has to be built, and it performs well at different request rates.

Conclusion

We have seen how to solve cache stampede without a lock, its implementation, and why it is optimal. In the real world, you likely will not encounter this issue: either because it’s good enough to optimize your origin service to serve more requests, or because you can leverage a CDN cache. In fact, most HTTP caches provide an API that follows Cache Control, and likely have all the tools you need. This primitive is also built into certain products, such as Cloudflare KV.

If you have not done so, you can go and experiment with all the code snippets presented in this blog on the Cloudflare Workers Playground at cloudflareworkers.com.

Embracing passwordless authentication with Grab’s Passkey

Post Syndicated from Grab Tech original https://engineering.grab.com/embracing-passwordless-authentication-with-passkey

Abstract

This blog post introduces Passkey — our latest addition to the Grab app — a step towards a secure, passwordless future. It provides an in-depth look at this innovative authentication method that allows users to have full control over their security, making authentication seamless and phishing-resistant. By the end of this piece, you will understand why we developed Passkey, how it works, the challenges we overcame, and the benefits brought to us post-launch. Whether you’re a tech enthusiast, a cybersecurity follower, or a Grab user, this piece offers valuable insights into the passwordless authentication sphere and Grab’s commitment to user safety and comfort.

Introduction

In the evolving world of digital security, Grab has always prioritised user account safety. A significant part of this involves exploring more secure and user-friendly authentication methods. Enter Grab’s Passkey — a major step towards passwordless authentication that leverages the Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) standard, giving users full control over their security, and making authentication seamless.

Background

Traditionally, the authentication process primarily relies on passwords — a precarious practice given the vulnerability to various security threats, such as phishing, keystroke logging, and brute-force attacks. This downside leads to the pursuit of safer, more user-friendly alternatives. Among these is the introduction of passwordless authentication.

A passwordless authentication method eliminates the need for users to enter traditional passwords during the verification process. Instead, it employs alternatives like:

  • Email link: A one-time clickable link sent via email.
  • One-Time Passcodes (OTPs): Temporary codes sent to users.
  • Social logins: Using existing profiles on platforms like Facebook or Google to sign in.
  • Authenticator apps: Software that generates time-sensitive codes.

Solution

Recognising the limitations and security issues of traditional password-based authentication, we turned to a more secure, user-friendly solution – the passwordless authentication system. Among other methods, we are also enabling Passkey, built on the FIDO standard. This global standard fosters wider adoption and support from consumer brands, making Passkey a secure and convenient choice.

Why Passkey?

Given the rapidly evolving security threats in the digital space, we selected Passkey for its unique benefits in providing both enhanced security and a seamless user experience. Passkey offers enhanced security as it is phishing-resistant and doesn’t require secrets to be stored in Grab’s database. Instead, secrets are securely kept within the user’s device, putting the control in their hands and significantly reducing the chances of exposure.

Fast-paced adoption of Passkey

Passkey technology is not only promising in theory but also successful in practice, as evidenced by its wider industry adoption. Consumers are adopting passkeys at a rapid pace in 2024. With large global consumer brands, such as Adobe, Amazon, Apple, Google, Hyatt, Nintendo, PayPal, Playstation, Shopify and TikTok enabling passkey technology for their users, more than 13 billion accounts can now leverage passkeys for sign-in.

In a recent FIDO Alliance independent study conducted on World Password Day 2024 across the U.S. and UK, findings reveal:

  • A majority of people are aware of passkey technology (62%).
  • Over half have enabled passkeys on at least one of their accounts (53%).
  • Once they adopt a passkey, nearly a quarter enable a passkey whenever possible (23%).
  • A large number believe passkeys are more secure (61%) and more convenient than passwords (58%).

These trends clearly illustrate why we chose to implement Passkey as our passwordless solution.

Architecture details

How do passkeys work?

There are three components of the passkey flow:

  • Backend: Holds the accounts database storing the public key and other metadata about the passkey.
  • Frontend: Communicates with the authenticator and sends requests to the backend.
  • Authenticator: The user’s authenticator creates and stores the passkey. This may be implemented in the operating system underlying the user agent, in external hardware, or a combination of both.
Figure 1. A high-level overview of the passkey authentication.

Supported environments

Google Password Manager: Stores, serves and synchronises passkeys on Android and Chrome. Passkeys are securely backed up and synced between Android devices where the user is signed using the same Google account, and available passkeys are listed.

iCloud Keychain: Synchronises the saved passkey to other Apple devices that run macOS, iOS, or iPadOS where the user is signed in using the same iCloud account.

Implementation

In this section, we illustrate the usage of passkeys in several scenarios.

Creating a new passkey

Figure 2. Passkey registration steps in Grab app.
  1. The user signs into the Grab app and selects Enable Passkey.
  2. Frontend requests user details and a challenge from Backend.
  3. Authenticator creates the user’s passkey upon their consent using their device’s screen lock.
  4. This passkey, along with other data, is sent back to Frontend.
  5. Frontend sends the public key credential to Backend for storage and future authentications.
Figure 3. Sequence diagram of Passkey registration.

Creating a passkey – notable Webauthn parameters

  1. When the user selects Enable Passkey, Frontend fetches the following information to call navigator.credentials.create() from Backend:
    • challenge: server-generated challenge.
    • user.id: user’s unique ID, stored as ArrayBuffer.
    • user.name: unique username or email for account recognition.
    • user.displayName: user-friendly name for the account.
    • excludeCredentials: to prevent registering the same device multiple times.
    • rp.id: Domain or a registrable suffix of an RP’s origin.
    • rp.name: Name of the RP.
    • pubKeyCredParams: Specifies RP’s public-key algorithms.
    • authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment: Indicates type of authenticator attachment desired.
    • authenticatorSelection.requireResidentKey: Indicates if resident key is needed.
    • authenticatorSelection.userVerification: Indicates if user verification is required, preferred, or discouraged.
  2. Frontend invokes WebAuthn API to create a passkey.

     const publicKeyCredentialCreationOptions = {
       challenge: *****,
       rp: {
         name: "Example",
         id: "example.com",
       },
       user: {
         id: *****,
         name: "john78",
         displayName: "John",
       },
       pubKeyCredParams: [{alg: -7, type: "public-key"},{alg: -257, type: "public-key"}],
       excludeCredentials: [{
         id: *****,
         type: 'public-key',
         transports: ['internal'],
       }],
       authenticatorSelection: {
         authenticatorAttachment: "platform",
         requireResidentKey: true,
       }
     };
    
     const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({
       publicKey: publicKeyCredentialCreationOptions
     });
    
     // Encode and send the credential to the server for verification.
    
  3. Post user consent, passkey is created and returned along with relevant data to the frontend.
  4. Frontend sends the public key credential to Backend where it gets stored for future authentication.
  5. Backend receives and processes the object, and information is stored in the database for future use.

Signing in with a passkey

Figure 4. Passkey authentication steps in Grab app.
  1. The user launches the Grab app and opts to login using their passkey.
  2. Frontend requests a challenge from Backend for passkey authentication.
  3. The user is shown their available passkeys.
  4. Upon choosing a passkey, the user consents to using their device’s lock screen.
  5. Frontend receives the public key credential and some data.
  6. Frontend forwards these to the backend, which verifies them against the database and logs the user in.

Thus, Passkey enhances the login experience, providing an optimal blend of security and seamless usability.

Figure 5. Sequence diagram of the Passkey authentication.

Signing in with a passkey – notable Webauthn parameters

  1. Frontend fetches a challenge from Backend.
    • challenge: server-generated challenge, crucial to prevent replay attacks.
    • allowCredentials: array of acceptable credentials for authentication.
    • userVerification: indicates whether user verification is required, preferred, or discouraged.
  2. Frontend calls navigator.credentials.get() to initiate user authentication.

     // To abort a WebAuthn call, instantiate an `AbortController`.
    
     const abortController = new AbortController();
    
     const publicKeyCredentialRequestOptions = {
       // Server generated challenge
       challenge: ****,
       // The same RP ID as used during registration
       rpId: 'example.com',
     };
    
     const credential = await navigator.credentials.get({
       publicKey: publicKeyCredentialRequestOptions,
       signal: abortController.signal,
       // Specify 'conditional' to activate conditional UI
       mediation: 'conditional'
     });
    
  3. Post user consent through their device’s screen lock, a PublicKeyCredential object is returned to Frontend.
  4. The returned PublicKeyCredential is sent to Backend for verification. Backend looks up matching credential ID and verifies the signature against the stored public key.

Impact

A frictionless login paints a positive picture for our users. No more waiting for OTPs or struggling with cumbersome two-factor authentication. With the implementation of Passkey, users will enjoy a smoother, faster, and more secure login process.

In addition to delivering a frictionless user experience, passkeys provide heightened security compared to conventional authentication methods such as OTPs and passwords, which demand active credential management.

Using passkeys for authentication can lead to cost savings by cutting down or eliminating fees related to third-party authentication services, communication expenses, and messaging platforms. This strategy not only boosts security and user experience but also enhances the financial efficiency of the authentication process.

Moving forward, our focus is on enhancing, streamlining, and extending the capabilities of Passkey. We are enthusiastic about the evolution of passwordless authentication and are dedicated to ongoing investments in technologies that deliver the utmost user satisfaction and experience.

Conclusion

Leveraging passkeys for authentication provides heightened security, enhanced user experience, cost-effectiveness, decreased vulnerabilities, multi-factor authentication support, and simplified credential management. The future direction involves enhancing and broadening Passkey capabilities, with a dedication to investing in user-centric technologies that advance passwordless authentication. This commitment underscores the focus on delivering secure, efficient, and user-friendly authentication solutions for both existing and prospective users.

What’s next

Looking ahead, based on the user adoption of Passkey and its anticipated impact on improving login convenience, we aim to explore the expansion of this feature to web login as well. We envision a scenario where users can leverage the power of their existing phone Passkey, no matter the operating system, thereby creating a truly seamless and secure login experience.
As we gather user feedback, analyse usage data, and delve into Passkey’s impact, we aim to identify growth opportunities and further enhance our understanding of this innovative feature’s transformative effect on app security. Stay tuned for updates on how we are revolutionising our approach to authentication, with a continuous focus on enhancing user convenience and security.

References

Join us

Grab is the leading superapp platform in Southeast Asia, providing everyday services that matter to consumers. More than just a ride-hailing and food delivery app, Grab offers a wide range of on-demand services in the region, including mobility, food, package and grocery delivery services, mobile payments, and financial services across 700 cities in eight countries.

Powered by technology and driven by heart, our mission is to drive Southeast Asia forward by creating economic empowerment for everyone. If this mission speaks to you, join our team today!

[$] A 2024 retrospective

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1002368/

It is often said that the definition of insanity is repeating the same
action and expecting different results. Be that as it may, LWN has
repeatedly started a new year with a set of predictions, only to have to
review how badly they went at the end. There was no break in that pattern
this year, so there is no help for it; the time has come to review
our 2024 predictions in the hope that they
came out better this time around.

[$] Systemd improves image features and adds varlink API

Post Syndicated from jzb original https://lwn.net/Articles/1002398/

The systemd v257 release brings a number of incremental
enhancements to various components and utilities for working with
Linux systems. This includes more support for varlink, automated
downloading of disk images at boot time, and a number of improvements
to the secure-boot process for unified kernel images (UKIs), which we
have covered in a separate
article
.

Security updates for Tuesday

Post Syndicated from corbet original https://lwn.net/Articles/1003381/

Security updates have been issued by AlmaLinux (containernetworking-plugins, edk2:20240524, gstreamer1-plugins-base, gstreamer1-plugins-good, kernel, libsndfile:1.0.31, mpg123:1.32.9, pam, php:8.1, php:8.2, python3.11, python3.11-urllib3, python3.12, python3.9:3.9.21, skopeo, and unbound:1.16.2), Debian (intel-microcode), Fedora (python3-docs and python3.12), Mageia (emacs), Red Hat (podman), and SUSE (gdb, govulncheck-vulndb, libparaview5_12, mozjs115, mozjs78, and vhostmd).

[$] Systemd takes steps toward a more secure boot process

Post Syndicated from daroc original https://lwn.net/Articles/1001730/

The systemd project has been working for some time on

promoting


unified kernel
images
(UKIs), a format that bundles a kernel, initial disk image, kernel command line, and
other associated data into a single file. The advantage of the format is the ability to
authenticate the entire collection with secure boot, which makes it easier for
end users to know that their operating system hasn’t been tampered with. The
downside is the lack of flexibility and increase in disk usage, since all of the
things packaged in a UKI must be updated together. But the

recent systemd 257 release
(along with other changes to be covered in

a future article
) includes some
major changes to the UKI format, and the rest of the boot process, that
partially mitigate those downsides. The release also includes improvements for
hardware-locked disk encryption, which may also help secure some computers.

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