Tag Archives: TLS

AWS Certificate Manager will discontinue WHOIS lookup for email-validated certificates

Post Syndicated from Lerna Ekmekcioglu original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/

AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) is a managed service that you can use to provision, manage, and deploy public and private TLS certificates for use with Amazon Web Services (AWS) and your internal connected resources. Today, we’re announcing that ACM will be discontinuing the use of WHOIS lookup for validating domain ownership when you request email-validated TLS certificates.

WHOIS lookup is commonly used to query registration information for a given domain name. This information includes details such as when the domain was originally registered, and contact information for the domain owner and the technical and administrative contacts. Domain owners create and maintain domain registration information outside of ACM in WHOIS, which is a publicly available directory that contains information about domains sponsored by domain registrars and registries. You can use WHOIS lookup to view information about domains that are registered with Amazon Route 53.

Starting June 2024, ACM will no longer send domain validation emails by using WHOIS lookup for new email-validated certificates that you request. Starting October 2024, ACM will no longer send domain validation emails to mailboxes associated with WHOIS lookup for renewal of existing email-validated certificates. ACM will continue to send validation emails to the five common system addresses for the requested domain—we provide a list of these common system addresses in the next section of this post.

In this blog post, we share important details about this change and how you can prepare. Note that if you currently use DNS validation for your certificates requested from ACM, this change doesn’t affect you. These changes only apply to certificates that use email validation.

Background

When you request public certificates through ACM, you need to prove that you own or control the domain before ACM can issue the public certificate. ACM provides two options to validate ownership of a domain: DNS validation and email validation.

AWS recommends that you use DNS validation whenever possible so that ACM can automatically renew certificates that are requested from ACM without requiring action on your part. Email validation is another option that you can use to prove ownership of the domain, but you must manually validate ownership of the domain by using a link provided in an email. Figure 1 is a sample validation email from ACM for the AWS account 111122223333 and AWS US West (Oregon) Region (us-west-2) to validate ownership of the example.com domain.

Figure 1: Sample validation email for example.com domain

Figure 1: Sample validation email for example.com domain

How does ACM know where to send the validation email? Today, as part of the email validation process, ACM sends domain validation emails to the three contact addresses associated with the domain listed in the WHOIS database. These contact addresses are the domain registrant, technical contact, and administrative contact. You create and maintain domain registration information, including these contact addresses, outside of ACM—in the WHOIS database that your domain registrar provides.

Note: If you use Route53, see Updating contact information for a domain to update the contact information for your domain.

ACM also sends validation emails to the following five common system addresses for each domain: 

  • administrator@your_domain_name
  • hostmaster@your_domain_name
  • postmaster@your_domain_name
  • webmaster@your_domain_name
  • admin@your_domain_name

To prove that you own the domain, you must select the validation link included in these emails. ACM also sends validation emails to these same addresses to renew the certificate when the certificate is 45 days from expiry.

What’s changing?

If you currently use email validation for certificates requested from ACM, there are two important dates that you should be aware of:

  1. Starting June 2024, ACM will no longer send domain validation emails by using WHOIS lookup for new email-validated certificates that you request. ACM will continue to send validation emails to the three WHOIS lookup contact addresses for renewal of existing certificates, until October 2024.
  2. Starting October 2024, ACM will no longer send the validation emails to mailboxes associated with WHOIS lookup for existing certificates. After this date, ACM will not send validation emails to the three WHOIS lookup addresses for new or existing certificates.

ACM will continue to send validation emails to the five common system addresses that we listed in the previous section of this post.

Why are we making this change?

We’re making this change to mitigate a potential availability risk for ACM customers. A TLS certificate that ACM issues is valid for up to 395 days, and if you want to keep using it, you need to renew it prior to expiry. To renew an email-validated certificate, you must approve an email that ACM sends. ACM sends the first renewal email 45 days prior to certificate renewal, and if you don’t respond to this email, ACM sends additional reminders prior to expiry. If a certificate bound to one of your AWS resources—such as an Application Load Balancer—expires without being renewed, this could cause an outage for your application.

Some domain registrars that support WHOIS have made changes to the data that they publish to support their compliance with various privacy laws and recommended practices. Over the past several years, we’ve observed that the WHOIS lookup success rate has declined to less than 5 percent. If you rely on the contact addresses listed in the WHOIS database provided by your domain registrar to validate your domain ownership, this might create an availability risk. With a 5 percent success rate for WHOIS lookup, you might not receive validation emails for renewals of your certificates around 95 percent of the time. To provide a consistent mechanism for validating domain ownership when renewing certificates, ACM will only send validation emails to the five common system addresses that we listed in the Background section of this post.

What should you do to prepare?

If you currently monitor one of the five common system addresses (listed previously) for your domains, you don’t need to take any action. Otherwise, we strongly recommend that you create new DNS-validated certificates rather than creating and using email-validated certificates. ACM can automatically renew a DNS-validated certificate, without you taking any action, as long as the CNAME is accurately configured.

Alternatively, if you want to continue using email-validated certificates, we recommend that you monitor at least one of the five common email addresses listed previously. ACM sends the validation emails during certificate issuance for new ACM-issued certificates and during renewal of existing certificates. You can use the ACM describe-certificate API or check the certificate details on the ACM console to see if ACM previously sent validation emails to the relevant system addresses.

In addition, we strongly recommend that you use ACM Certificate Approaching Expiration events to monitor your certificates for expiry and help ensure that you’re notified about certificates that require an action from you to renew. For additional guidance, see How to manage certificate lifecycles using ACM event-driven workflows.

Conclusion

In this blog post, we outlined the changes coming to the email validation process when requesting and renewing certificates from ACM. We also shared the steps that you can take to prepare for this change, including monitoring at least one of the five relevant email addresses for your domains. Remember that these changes only apply to certificates that use email validation, not certificates that use DNS validation. For more information about certificate management on AWS, see the ACM documentation or get started using ACM today in the AWS Management Console.

If you have questions, contact AWS Support or your technical account manager (TAM), or start a new thread on the AWS re:Post ACM Forum. If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

 
Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Lerna Ekmekcioglu

Lerna Ekmekcioglu

Lerna is a Senior Solutions Architect at AWS where she helps customers build secure, scalable, and highly available workloads. She has over 19 years of platform engineering experience including authentication systems, distributed caching, and multi-Region deployments using IaC and CI/CD to name a few. In her spare time, she enjoys hiking, sightseeing, and backyard astronomy.

Zach Miller

Zach Miller

Zach is a Senior Worldwide Security Specialist Solutions Architect at AWS. His background is in data protection and security architecture, focused on a variety of security domains, including cryptography, secrets management, and data classification. Today, he’s focused on helping enterprise AWS customers adopt and operationalize AWS security services to increase security effectiveness and reduce risk.

Georgy Sebastian

Georgy Sebastian

Georgy is a Senior Software Development Engineer at AWS Cryptography. He has a background in secure system architecture, PKI management, and key distribution. In his free time, he’s an amateur gardener and tinkerer.

Khyati Makim

Khyati Makim

Khyati is a Software Development Manager at AWS Cryptography where she’s focused on building secure solutions with cryptographic best practices. She has 25 years of experience building secure solutions in financial and retail businesses in distributed systems. In her spare time, she enjoys traveling, reading, painting, and spending time with family.

How to implement client certificate revocation list checks at scale with API Gateway

Post Syndicated from Arthur Mnev original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-implement-client-certificate-revocation-list-checks-at-scale-with-api-gateway/

ityAs you design your Amazon API Gateway applications to rely on mutual certificate authentication (mTLS), you need to consider how your application will verify the revocation status of a client certificate. In your design, you should account for the performance and availability of your verification mechanism to make sure that your application endpoints perform reliably.

In this blog post, I demonstrate an architecture that will help you on your journey to implement custom revocation checks against your certificate revocation list (CRL) for API Gateway. You will also learn advanced Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) and AWS Lambda techniques to achieve higher performance and scalability.

Choosing the right certificate verification method

One of your first considerations is whether to use a CRL or the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), if your certificate authority (CA) offers this option. For an in-depth analysis of these two options, see my earlier blog post, Choosing the right certificate revocation method in ACM Private CA. In that post, I demonstrated that OCSP is a good choice when your application can tolerate high latency or a failure for certificate verification due to TLS service-to-OCSP connectivity. When you rely on mutual TLS authentication in a high-rate transactional environment, increased latency or OCSP reachability failures may affect your application. We strongly recommend that you validate the revocation status of your mutual TLS certificates. Verifying your client certificate status against the CRL is the correct approach for certificate verification if you require reliability and lower, predictable latency. A potential exception to this approach is the use case of AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (AWS Private CA) with an OCSP responder hosted on AWS CloudFront.

With an AWS Private CA OCSP responder hosted on CloudFront, you can reduce the risks of network and latency challenges by relying on communication between AWS native services. While this post focuses on the solution that targets CRLs originating from any CA, if you use AWS Private CA with an OCSP responder, you should consider generating an OCSP request in your Lambda authorizer.

Mutual authentication with API Gateway

API Gateway mutual TLS authentication (mTLS) requires you to define a root of trust that will contain your certificate authority public key. During the mutual TLS authentication process, API Gateway performs the undifferentiated heavy lifting by offloading the certificate authentication and negotiation process. During the authentication process, API Gateway validates that your certificate is trusted, has valid dates, and uses a supported algorithm. Additionally, you can refer to the API Gateway documentation and related blog post for details about the mutual TLS authentication process on API Gateway.

Implementing mTLS certificate verification for API Gateway

In the remainder of this blog post, I’ll describe the architecture for a scalable implementation of a client certificate verification mechanism against a CRL on your API Gateway.

The certificate CRL verification process presented here relies on a custom Lambda authorizer that validates the certificate revocation status against the CRL. The Lambda authorizer caches CRL data to optimize the query time for subsequent requests and allows you to define custom business logic that could go beyond CRL verification. For example, you could include other, just-in-time authorization decisions as a part of your evaluation logic.

Implementation mechanisms

This section describes the implementation mechanisms that help you create a high-performing extension to the API Gateway mutual TLS authentication process.

Data repository for your certificate revocation list

API Gateway mutual TLS configuration uses Amazon S3 as a repository for your root of trust. The design for this sample implementation extends the use of S3 buckets to store your CRL and the public key for the certificate authority that signed the CRL.

We strongly recommend that you maintain an updated CRL and verify its signature before data processing. This process is automatic if you use AWS Private CA, because AWS Private CA will update your CRL automatically on revocation. AWS Private CA also allows you to retrieve the CA’s public key by using an API call.

Certificate validation

My sample implementation architecture uses the API Gateway Lambda authorizer to validate the serial number of the client certificate used in the mutual TLS authentication session against the list of serial numbers present in the CRL you publish to the S3 bucket. In the process, the API Gateway custom authorizer will read the client certificate serial number, read and validate the CRL’s digital signature, search for the client’s certificate serial number within the CRL, and return the authorization policy based on the findings.

Optimizing for performance

The mechanisms that enable a predictable, low-latency performance are CRL preprocessing and caching. Your CRL is an ASN.1 data structure that requires a relatively high computing time for processing. Preprocessing your CRL into a simple-to-parse data structure reduces the computational cost you would otherwise incur for every validation; caching the CRL will help you reduce the validation latency and improve predictability further.

Performance optimizations

The process of parsing and validating CRLs is computationally expensive. In the case of large CRL files, parsing the CRL in the Lambda authorizer on every request can result in high latency and timeouts. To improve latency and reduce compute costs, this solution optimizes for performance by preprocessing the CRL and implementing function-level caching.

Preprocessing and generation of a cached CRL file

The first optimization happens when S3 receives a new CRL object. As shown in Figure 1, the S3 PutObject event invokes a preprocessing Lambda that validates the signature of your uploaded CRL and decodes its ASN.1 format. The output of the preprocessing Lambda function is the list of the revoked certificate serial numbers from the CRL, in a data structure that is simpler to read by your programming language of choice, and that won’t require extensive parsing by your Lambda authorizer. The asynchronous approach mitigates the impact of CRL processing on your API Gateway workload.

Figure 1: Sample implementation flow of the pre-processing component

Figure 1: Sample implementation flow of the pre-processing component

Client certificate lookup in a CRL

The optimization happens as part of your Lambda authorizer that retrieves the preprocessed CRL data generated from the first step and searches through the data structure for your client certificate serial number. If the Lambda authorizer finds your client’s certificate serial number in the CRL, the authorization request fails, and the Lambda authorizer generates a “Deny” policy. Searching through a read-optimized data structure prepared by your preprocessing step is the second optimization that reduces the lookup time and the compute requirements.

Function-level caching

Because of the preprocessing, the Lambda authorizer code no longer needs to perform the expensive operation of decoding the ASN.1 data structures of the original CRL; however, network transfer latency will remain and may impact your application.

To improve performance, and as a third optimization, the Lambda service retains the runtime environment for a recently-run function for a non-deterministic period of time. If the function is invoked again during this time period, the Lambda function doesn’t have to initialize and can start running immediately. This is called a warm start. Function-level caching takes advantage of this warm start to hold the CRL data structure in memory persistently between function invocations so the Lambda function doesn’t have to download the preprocessed CRL data structure from S3 on every request.

The duration of the Lambda container’s warm state depends on multiple factors, such as usage patterns and parallel requests processed by your function. If, in your case, API use is infrequent or its usage pattern is spiky, pre-provisioned concurrency is another technique that can further reduce your Lambda startup times and the duration of your warm cache. Although provisioned concurrency does have additional costs, I recommend you evaluate its benefits for your specific environment. You can also check out the blog dedicated to this topic, Scheduling AWS Lambda Provisioned Concurrency for recurring peak usage.

To validate that the Lambda authorizer has the latest copy of the CRL data structure, the S3 ETag value is used to determine if the object has changed. The preprocessed CRL object’s ETag value is stored as a Lambda global variable, so its value is retained between invocations in the same runtime environment. When API Gateway invokes the Lambda authorizer, the function checks for existing global preprocessed CRL data structure and ETag variables. The process will only retrieve a read-optimized CRL when the ETag is absent, or its value differs from the ETag of the preprocessed CRL object in S3.

Figure 2 demonstrates this process flow.

Figure 2: Sample implementation flow for the Lambda authorizer component

Figure 2: Sample implementation flow for the Lambda authorizer component

In summary, you will have a Lambda container with a persistent in-memory lookup data structure for your CRL by doing the following:

  • Asynchronously start your preprocessing workflow by using the S3 PutObject event so you can generate and store your preprocessed CRL data structure in a separate S3 object.
  • Read the preprocessed CRL from S3 and its ETag value and store both values in global variables.
  • Compare the value of the ETag stored in your global variables to the current ETag value of the preprocessed CRL S3 object, to reduce unnecessary downloads if the current ETag value of your S3 object is the same as the previous value.
  • We recommend that you avoid using built-in API Gateway Lambda authorizer result caching, because the status of your certificate might change, and your authorization decision would rest on out-of-date verification results.
  • Consider setting a reserved concurrency for your CRL verification function so that API Gateway can invoke your function even if the overall capacity for your account in your AWS Region is exhausted.

The sample implementation flow diagram in Figure 3 demonstrates the overall architecture of the solution.

Figure 3: Sample implementation flow for the overall CRL verification architecture

Figure 3: Sample implementation flow for the overall CRL verification architecture

The workflow for the solution overall is as follows:

  1. An administrator publishes a CRL and its signing CA’s certificate to their non-public S3 bucket, which is accessible by the Lambda authorizer and preprocessor roles.
  2. An S3 event invokes the Lambda preprocessor to run upon CRL upload. The function retrieves the CRL from S3, validates its signature against the issuing certificate, and parses the CRL.
  3. The preprocessor Lambda stores the results in an S3 bucket with a name in the form <crlname>.cache.json.
  4. A TLS client requests an mTLS connection and supplies its certificate.
  5. API Gateway completes mTLS negotiation and invokes the Lambda authorizer.
  6. The Lambda authorizer function parses the client’s mTLS certificate, retrieves the cached CRL object, and searches the object for the serial number of the client’s certificate.
  7. The authorizer function returns a deny policy if the certificate is revoked or in error.
  8. API Gateway, if authorized, proceeds with the integrated function or denies the client’s request.

Conclusion

In this post, I presented a design for validating your API Gateway mutual TLS client certificates against a CRL, with support for extra-large certificate revocation files. This approach will help you align with the best security practices for validating client certificates and use advanced S3 access and Lambda caching techniques to minimize time and latency for validation.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS Security, Identity, and Compliance re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Arthur Mnev

Arthur is a Senior Specialist Security Architect for AWS Industries. He spends his day working with customers and designing innovative approaches to help customers move forward with their initiatives, improve their security posture, and reduce security risks in their cloud journeys. Outside of work, Arthur enjoys being a father, skiing, scuba diving, and Krav Maga.

Rafael Cassolato de Meneses

Rafael Cassolato de Meneses

Rafael Cassolato is a Solutions Architect with 20+ years in IT, holding bachelor’s and master’s degrees in Computer Science and 10 AWS certifications. Specializing in migration and modernization, Rafael helps strategic AWS customers achieve their business goals and solve technical challenges by leveraging AWS’s cloud platform.

Decrypting Zabbix TLS with Wireshark

Post Syndicated from Markku Leiniö original https://blog.zabbix.com/decrypting-zabbix-tls-with-wireshark/26832/

One of the built-in security features in Zabbix is TLS (Transport Layer Security) support for external connections. This means that when your distributed Zabbix proxies or Zabbix agents connect to the Zabbix server (or vice versa), TLS can be used to encrypt all the connections. When the connections are encrypted, third parties cannot read the Zabbix components’ communication, even though they would be able to catch the network traffic in some way.

In specific cases you may still want to inspect the encrypted traffic, for example to troubleshoot some problems with Zabbix agents or proxies. I already wrote a post about troubleshooting Zabbix agent with Wireshark, but the TLS encryption prevents anyone seeing the actual contents of the packets.

Since the traffic is encrypted in the Zabbix components (the server, agents and proxies), there still is a way for you, the Zabbix administrator, to intervene with the encryption so that you can get hold of the unencrypted traffic as well. In this post I will explain the process.

First, let’s demonstrate the TLS encryption between a Zabbix agent and a Zabbix server. I have configured the agent (Zabbix Agent 2 actually) with these lines:

Hostname=Zabbix70-agent
ServerActive=zabbixtest.lein.io
TLSConnect=psk
TLSPSKIdentity=agent-ident
TLSPSKFile=/etc/zabbix/psk

In this example I’m using TLS with pre-shared key (PSK), and the key itself is saved in /etc/zabbix/psk. My favorite way of generating a PSK is using OpenSSL:

markku@agent:~$ openssl rand -hex 32
afa34bf1104a1457e11e7d3a9b1ff7f5fb4f494c92ca1a8a9c5e1437f8897416
markku@agent:~$

The same key must also be configured on the Zabbix server frontend, see the Zabbix documentation for the PSK configuration details:

After the configurations I captured the Zabbix traffic for some time on the Zabbix server (using sudo tcpdump port 10051 -v -w zabbix70-tls-agent.pcap), stopped the capture, copied the capture file to my workstation, and opened it with Wireshark.

The capture file can be downloaded here:

Note: I recommend using Wireshark version 4.1.0 or later when analyzing captures containing Zabbix traffic because the built-in Zabbix protocol support was only added to Wireshark in version 4.1.0.

The packet list looks like this:

As we can see in the Protocol column, there are no Zabbix packets recognized in this capture, there are only TCP and TLS packets (the TCP-marked packets being the “empty” packets for negotiating the actual connectivity).

A side detail: Even though the traffic is encrypted, you can still see the configured Zabbix TLS PSK identity (“agent-ident” in my configuration above) in plain text inside the TLS Client Hello packets, if you ever need to check that in the traffic.

Now that we confirmed that TLS encryption is used and we cannot see the Zabbix traffic contents in the capture, let’s prepare the Zabbix server for the TLS decryption.

As I hinted in the beginning, since we have the TLS connection endpoints under our management, we can do tricks on the hosts to get the encryption keys. TLS negotiates the encryption keys dynamically for each connection, but there is a way to save the keys to a file so that we can later decrypt the captured traffic. (Note: I’m not a protocol-level TLS expert, so please forgive me any possible technical inaccuracies in the detailed explanations. I’ll just call “TLS keys” whatever is needed to get the encryption/decryption done.)

Peter Wu (who, in contrast to me, is a protocol-level TLS expert, and also one of the Wireshark core developers) has kindly published code for a helper library that makes it possible for us to save the TLS session keys on the TLS endpoint. In this demo I will save the keys on the Zabbix server, but the same could be done on the agents/proxies instead if needed.

First I’ll see the TLS library that my Debian-based Zabbix server is using:

markku@zabbixserver:~$ ldd /usr/sbin/zabbix_server | grep ssl
        libssl.so.3 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.3 (0x00007f62ee47a000)
markku@zabbixserver:~$ dpkg -l libssl* | grep ^ii
ii  libssl3:amd64  3.0.9-1   amd64  Secure Sockets Layer toolkit - shared libraries
markku@zabbixserver:~$

To get and compile the helper library I’ll need to install some utilities:

markku@zabbixserver:~$ sudo apt install git gcc make libssl-dev
...
markku@zabbixserver:~$ dpkg -l libssl* | grep ^ii
ii  libssl-dev:amd64 3.0.9-1 amd64 Secure Sockets Layer toolkit - development files
ii  libssl3:amd64    3.0.9-1 amd64 Secure Sockets Layer toolkit - shared libraries
markku@zabbixserver:~$

I’ll the clone the Peter’s wireshark-notes repo to the server:

markku@zabbixserver:~$ git clone --depth=1 https://git.lekensteyn.nl/peter/wireshark-notes
Cloning into 'wireshark-notes'...
...
markku@zabbixserver:~$ cd wireshark-notes/src
markku@zabbixserver:~/wireshark-notes/src$ ls -l
total 28
-rw-r--r-- 1 markku markku   534 Oct  7 15:39 Makefile
-rw-r--r-- 1 markku markku 11392 Oct  7 15:39 sslkeylog.c
-rw-r--r-- 1 markku markku  7278 Oct  7 15:39 sslkeylog.py
-rwxr-xr-x 1 markku markku  2325 Oct  7 15:39 sslkeylog.sh
markku@zabbixserver:~/wireshark-notes/src$

Now I can compile the library and make it available on the server:

markku@zabbixserver:~/wireshark-notes/src$ make
cc   sslkeylog.c -shared -o libsslkeylog.so -fPIC -ldl
markku@zabbixserver:~/wireshark-notes/src$ sudo install libsslkeylog.so /usr/local/lib
markku@zabbixserver:~/wireshark-notes/src$ ls -l /usr/local/lib/libsslkeylog.so
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 17336 Oct  7 15:40 /usr/local/lib/libsslkeylog.so
markku@zabbixserver:~/wireshark-notes/src$ cd
markku@zabbixserver:~$

To use the helper library, a couple of environment variables need to be set. For Zabbix server the easy way is to edit the systemd configuration for zabbix-server service:

markku@zabbixserver:~$ sudo systemctl edit zabbix-server

In the editor that opens I’ll add these in the configuration:

[Service]
Environment=LD_PRELOAD=/usr/local/lib/libsslkeylog.so
Environment=SSLKEYLOGFILE=/tmp/tls.keys

The variables are kind of self-explanatory: Whenever Zabbix server service is started, the libsslkeylog.so library is loaded first, and the SSLKEYLOGFILE variable sets the location of the file where the keys will be saved.

Now the word of warning: The libsslkeylog.so library, when loaded by a process that uses TLS communication, will save the encryption/decryption keys of all the TLS sessions of the process to the configured file. This means that whoever gets that file and the saved TLS communication will be able to see the decrypted contents of the packets, defeating the whole idea of the TLS encryption. You really don’t want to do this TLS key saving for any longer periods of time. Be sure to remove the configurations (and restart the service) after you have inspected whatever you were inspecting in your system. Or, don’t do any of this at all.

After saving the configuration the Zabbix server needs to be restarted:

markku@zabbixserver:~$ sudo systemctl restart zabbix-server
markku@zabbixserver:~$

The TLS keys have now started being saved in the configured file:

markku@zabbixserver:~$ ls -l /tmp/tls.keys
-rw-rw-r-- 1 zabbix zabbix 10157 Oct  7 15:45 tls.keys
markku@zabbixserver:~$

At this point the Zabbix agent is still communicating actively with the Zabbix server, so I’ll take a new capture with tcpdump (sudo tcpdump port 10051 -v -w zabbix70-tls-agent-2.pcap).

After a short while I’ll stop the capture, and copy the capture file and the TLS key file on my workstation.

Now it’s a good time to disable the TLS key saving as well (besides containing sensitive data, the key file will also grow with each new TLS session so it can quickly get very large), so I’ll edit the Zabbix service configuration, remove the configured lines and restart the service:

markku@zabbixserver:~$ sudo systemctl edit zabbix-server
markku@zabbixserver:~$ sudo systemctl restart zabbix-server
markku@zabbixserver:~$

When opening the new capture file in Wireshark there is no immediate change in the packet list: the TLS packets are still shown encrypted. Wireshark needs to be specifically configured to read the TLS keys from the separate file.

In Wireshark, I’ll go to Edit – Preferences – Protocols – TLS:

There is the “(Pre)-Master-Secret log filename” field, I’ll use Browse button to select the copied tls.keys file, and save the configuration with OK.

At this point Wireshark reloads the capture file and the Zabbix agent TLS sessions will be decrypted:

Using the “zabbix” display filter will show just the Zabbix protocol packets:

When selecting a Zabbix protocol packet and looking at the packet details, in the lower right pane there are now three tabs: Frame (the encrypted TLS data), Decrypted TLS, and Uncompressed data.

This is because in this example the Zabbix agent 2 also compresses the traffic, and the compressed traffic is then encrypted when sending out to the network. Wireshark can interpret all this because of its built-in knowledge about TLS encryption and the Zabbix protocol structure, as well as the user-supplied TLS decryption keys.

We are now able to analyze the Zabbix agent communication with Wireshark even though the traffic was TLS-encrypted when we captured it.

One more trick about the TLS keys in Wireshark: It is also possible to save the keys inside the capture file when analyzing the traffic, instead of having the keys in a separate file (tls.keys in this example). I’ll go in Edit menu and select Inject TLS Secrets, and then save the capture file in pcapng format. Now the previously loaded keys are embedded in the capture file, and I can clear the “(Pre)-Master-Secret log filename” field in the TLS settings (as the filename setting is not useful in any later Wireshark analysis). The same can also be done in the command line by using editcap --inject-secrets (editcap is part of Wireshark install, see the manual page of editcap for more details).

Here is the second capture file of this demo, with the embedded TLS keys:

Finally some closing comments:

  • As demonstrated, when you have administrator/root-level access to the TLS session endpoint (Zabbix server in this example), there can be a possibility to save and decrypt the TLS sessions using external tooling. After all, TLS encryption is based on the negotiation between the TLS-connected endpoints, so if you are the TLS connection endpoint, you have ways to access the plaintext data. If you don’t have sufficient access to the TLS session endpoint, there is no way you can get the decryption keys mid-path.
  • Act responsibly when saving the TLS session keys for any traffic, on Zabbix server or otherwise. The encryption is there for a purpose, and saving the TLS keys always carries the risk that someone else gets access to data they wouldn’t have access to otherwise.
  • Do not save the TLS session keys with the capture file, unless you are dealing with a test/demo environment, like I had here.
  • When troubleshooting Zabbix connections, TLS decryption with Wireshark is not the only way. You should also consider if just increasing the logging level in the Zabbix components brings you enough information to solve your case, or maybe in some specific case you can just disable TLS encryption for an agent for a moment to not have to deal with the decryption at all. But again, usually the encryption is there for a purpose, so you need to evaluate your own situation.

The post Decrypting Zabbix TLS with Wireshark appeared first on Zabbix Blog.

Messaging Service Wiretap Discovered through Expired TLS Cert

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2023/10/messaging-service-wiretap-discovered-through-expired-tls-cert.html

Fascinating story of a covert wiretap that was discovered because of an expired TLS certificate:

The suspected man-in-the-middle attack was identified when the administrator of jabber.ru, the largest Russian XMPP service, received a notification that one of the servers’ certificates had expired.

However, jabber.ru found no expired certificates on the server, ­ as explained in a blog post by ValdikSS, a pseudonymous anti-censorship researcher based in Russia who collaborated on the investigation.

The expired certificate was instead discovered on a single port being used by the service to establish an encrypted Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection with users. Before it had expired, it would have allowed someone to decrypt the traffic being exchanged over the service.

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections

Post Syndicated from Suleman Ahmad original http://blog.cloudflare.com/connection-coalescing-with-origin-frames-fewer-dns-queries-fewer-connections/

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections

This blog reports and summarizes the contents of a Cloudflare research paper which appeared at the ACM Internet Measurement Conference, that measures and prototypes connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames.

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections

Some readers might be surprised to hear that a single visit to a web page can cause a browser to make tens, sometimes even hundreds, of web connections. Take this very blog as an example. If it is your first visit to the Cloudflare blog, or it has been a while since your last visit, your browser will make multiple connections to render the page. The browser will make DNS queries to find IP addresses corresponding to blog.cloudflare.com and then subsequent requests to retrieve any necessary subresources on the web page needed to successfully render the complete page. How many? Looking below, at the time of writing, there are 32 different hostnames used to load the Cloudflare Blog. That means 32 DNS queries and at least 32 TCP (or QUIC) connections, unless the client is able to reuse (or coalesce) some of those connections.

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections

Each new web connection not only introduces additional load on a server's processing capabilities – potentially leading to scalability challenges during peak usage hours – but also exposes client metadata to the network, such as the plaintext hostnames being accessed by an individual. Such meta information can potentially reveal a user’s online activities and browsing behaviors to on-path network adversaries and eavesdroppers!

In this blog we’re going to take a closer look at “connection coalescing”. Since our initial look at IP-based coalescing in 2021, we have done further large-scale measurements and modeling across the Internet, to understand and predict if and where coalescing would work best. Since IP coalescing is difficult to manage at large scale, last year we implemented and experimented with a promising standard called the HTTP/2 ORIGIN Frame extension that we leveraged to coalesce connections to our edge without worrying about managing IP addresses.

All told, there are opportunities being missed by many large providers. We hope that this blog (and our publication at ACM IMC 2022 with full details) offers a first step that helps servers and clients take advantage of the ORIGIN Frame standard.

Setting the stage

At a high level, as a user navigates the web, the browser renders web pages by retrieving dependent subresources to construct the complete web page. This process bears a striking resemblance to the way physical products are assembled in a factory. In this sense, a modern web page can be considered like an assembly plant. It relies on a ‘supply chain’ of resources that are needed to produce the final product.

An assembly plant in the physical world can place a single order for different parts and get a single shipment from the supplier (similar to the kitting process for maximizing value and minimizing response time); no matter the manufacturer of those parts or where they are made — one ‘connection’ to the supplier is all that is needed. Any single truck from a supplier to an assembly plant can be filled with parts from multiple manufacturers.

The design of the web causes browsers to typically do the opposite in nature. To retrieve the images, JavaScript, and other resources on a web page (the parts), web clients (assembly plants) have to make at least one connection to every hostname (the manufacturers) defined in the HTML that is returned by the server (the supplier). It makes no difference if the connections to those hostnames go to the same server or not, for example they could go to a reverse proxy like Cloudflare. For each manufacturer a ‘new’ truck would be needed to transfer the materials to the assembly plant from the same supplier, or more formally, a new connection would need to be made to request a subresource from a hostname on the same web page.

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections
Without connection coalescing

The number of connections used to load a web page can be surprisingly high. It is also common for the subresources to need yet other sub-subresources, and so new connections emerge as a result of earlier ones. Remember, too, that HTTP connections to hostnames are often preceded by DNS queries! Connection coalescing allows us to use fewer connections, or ‘reuse’ the same set of trucks to carry parts from multiple manufacturers from a single supplier.

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections
With connection coalescing 

Connection coalescing in principle

Connection coalescing was introduced in HTTP/2, and carried over into HTTP/3. We’ve blogged about connection coalescing previously (for a detailed primer we encourage going over that blog). While the idea is simple, implementing it can present a number of engineering challenges. For example, recall from above that there are 32 hostnames (at the time of writing) to load the web page you are reading right now. Among the 32 hostnames are 16 unique domains (defined as “Effective TLD+1”). Can we create fewer connections or ‘coalesce’ existing connections for each unique domain? The answer is ‘Yes, but it depends’.

The exact number of connections to load the blog page is not at all obvious, and hard to know. There may be 32 hostnames attached to 16 domains but, counter-intuitively, this does not mean the answer to “how many unique connections?” is 16. The true answer could be as few as one connection if all the hostnames are reachable at a single server; or as many as 32 independent connections if a different and distinct server is needed to access each individual hostname.

Connection reuse comes in many forms, so it’s important to define “connection coalescing” in the HTTP space. For example, the reuse of an existing TCP or TLS connection to a hostname to make multiple requests for subresources from that same hostname is connection reuse, but not coalescing.

Coalescing occurs when an existing TLS channel for some hostname can be repurposed or used for connecting to a different hostname. For example, upon visiting blog.cloudflare.com, the HTML points to subresources at cdnjs.cloudflare.com. To reuse the same TLS connection for the subresources, it is necessary for both hostnames to appear together in the TLS certificate's “Server Alternative Name (SAN)” list, but this step alone is not sufficient to convince browsers to coalesce. After all, the cdnjs.cloudflare.com service may or may not be reachable at the same server as blog.cloudflare.com, despite being on the same certificate. So how can the browser know? Coalescing only works if servers set up the right conditions, but clients have to decide whether to coalesce or not – thus, browsers require a signal to coalesce beyond the SANs list on the certificate. Revisiting our analogy, the assembly plant may order a part from a manufacturer directly, not knowing that the supplier already has the same part in its warehouse.

There are two explicit signals a browser can use to decide whether connections can be coalesced: one is IP-based, the other ORIGIN Frame-based. The former requires the server operators to tightly bind DNS records to the HTTP resources available on the server. This is difficult to manage and deploy, and actually creates a risky dependency, because you have to place all the resources behind a specific set or a single IP address. The way IP addresses influence coalescing decisions varies among browsers, with some choosing to be more conservative and others more permissive. Alternatively, the HTTP ORIGIN Frame is an easier signal for the servers to orchestrate; it’s also flexible and has graceful failure with no interruption to service (for a specification compliant implementation).

A foundational difference between both these coalescing signals is: IP-based coalescing signals are implicit, even accidental, and force clients to infer coalescing possibilities that may exist, or not. None of this is surprising since IP addresses are designed to have no real relationship with names! In contrast, ORIGIN Frame is an explicit signal from servers to clients that coalescing is available no matter what DNS says for any particular hostname.

We have experimented with IP-based coalescing previously; for the purpose of this blog we will take a deeper look at ORIGIN Frame-based coalescing.

What is the ORIGIN Frame standard?

The ORIGIN Frame is an extension to the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 specification, a special Frame sent on stream 0 or the control stream of the connection respectively. The Frame allows the servers to send an ‘origin-set’ to the clients on an existing established TLS connection, which includes hostnames that it is authorized for and will not incur any HTTP 421 errors. Hostnames in the origin-set MUST also appear in the certificate SAN list for the server, even if those hostnames are announced on different IP addresses via DNS.

Specifically, two different steps are required:

  1. Web servers must send a list enumerating the Origin Set (the hostnames that a given connection might be used for) in the ORIGIN Frame extension.
  2. The TLS certificate returned by the web server must cover the additional hostnames being returned in the ORIGIN Frame in the DNS names SAN entries.

At a high-level ORIGIN Frames are a supplement to the TLS certificate that operators can attach to say, “Psst! Hey, client, here are the names in the SANs that are available on this connection — you can coalesce!” Since the ORIGIN Frame is not part of the certificate itself, its contents can be made to change independently. No new certificate is required. There is also no dependency on IP addresses. For a coalesceable hostname, existing TCP/QUIC+TLS connections can be reused without requiring new connections or DNS queries.

Many websites today rely on content which is served by CDNs, like Cloudflare CDN service. The practice of using external CDN services offers websites the advantages of speed, reliability, and reduces the load of content served by their origin servers. When both the website, and the resources are served by the same CDN, despite being different hostnames, owned by different entities, it opens up some very interesting opportunities for CDN operators to allow connections to be reused and coalesced since they can control both the certificate management and connection requests for sending ORIGIN frames on behalf of the real origin server.

Unfortunately, there has been no way to turn the possibilities enabled by ORIGIN Frame into practice. To the best of our knowledge, until today, there has been no server implementation that supports ORIGIN Frames. Among browsers, only Firefox supports ORIGIN Frames. Since IP coalescing is challenging and ORIGIN Frame has no deployed support, is the engineering time and energy to better support coalescing worth the investment? We decided to find out with a large-scale Internet-wide measurement to understand the opportunities and predict the possibilities, and then implemented the ORIGIN Frame to experiment on production traffic.

Experiment #1: What is the scale of required changes?

In February 2021, we collected data for 500K of the most popular websites on the Internet, using a modified Web Page Test on 100 virtual machines. An automated Chrome (v88) browser instance was launched for every visit to a web page to eliminate caching effects (because we wanted to understand coalescing, not caching). On successful completion of each session, Chrome developer tools were used to retrieve and write the page load data as an HTTP Archive format (HAR) file with a full timeline of events, as well as additional information about certificates and their validation. Additionally, we parsed the certificate chains for the root web page and new TLS connections triggered by subresource requests to (i) identify certificate issuers for the hostnames, (ii) inspect the presence of the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension, and (iii) validate that DNS names resolve to the IP address used. Further details about our methodology and results can be found in the technical paper.

The first step was to understand what resources are requested by web pages to successfully render the page contents, and where these resources were present on the Internet. Connection coalescing becomes possible when subresource domains are ideally co-located. We approximated the location of a domain by finding its corresponding autonomous system (AS). For example, the domain attached to cdnjs is reachable via AS 13335 in the BGP routing table, and that AS number belongs to Cloudflare. The figure below describes the percentage of web pages and the number of unique ASes needed to fully load a web page.

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections

Around 14% of the web pages need two ASes to fully load i.e. pages that have a dependency on one additional AS for subresources. More than 50% of the web pages need to contact no more than six ASes to obtain all the necessary subresources. This finding as shown in the plot above implies that a relatively small number of operators serve the sub-resource content necessary for a majority (~50%) of the websites, and any usage of ORIGIN Frames would need only a few changes to have its intended impact. The potential for connection coalescing can therefore be optimistically approximated to the number of unique ASes needed to retrieve all subresources in a web page. In practice however, this may be superseded by operational factors such as SLAs or helped by flexible mappings between sockets, names, and IP addresses which we worked on previously at Cloudflare.

We then tried to understand the impact of coalescing on connection metrics. The measured and ideal number of DNS queries and TLS connections needed to load a web page are summarized by their CDFs in the figure below.

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections

Through modeling and extensive analysis, we identify that connection coalescing through ORIGIN Frames could reduce the number of DNS and TLS connections made by browsers by over 60% at the median. We performed this modeling by identifying the number of times the clients requested DNS records, and combined them with the ideal ORIGIN Frames to serve.

Many multi-origin servers such as those operated by CDNs tend to reuse certificates and serve the same certificate with multiple DNS SAN entries. This allows the operators to manage fewer certificates through their creation and renewal cycles. While theoretically one can have millions of names in the certificate, creating such certificates is unreasonable and a challenge to manage effectively. By continuing to rely on existing certificates, our modeling measurements bring to light the volume of changes required to enable perfect coalescing, while presenting information about the scale of changes needed, as highlighted in the figure below.

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections

We identify that over 60% of the certificates served by websites do not need any modifications and could benefit from ORIGIN Frames, while with no more than 10 additions to the DNS SAN names in certificates we’re able to successfully coalesce connections to over 92% of the websites in our measurement. The most effective changes could be made by CDN providers by adding three or four of their most popular requested hostnames into each certificate.

Experiment #2: ORIGIN Frames in action

In order to validate our modeling expectations, we then took a more active approach in early 2022. Our next experiment focused on 5,000 websites that make extensive use of cdnjs.cloudflare.com as a subresource. By modifying our experimental TLS termination endpoint we deployed HTTP/2 ORIGIN Frame support as defined in the RFC standard. This involved changing the internal fork of net and http dependency modules of Golang which we have open sourced (see here, and here).

During the experiments, connecting to a website in the experiment set would return cdnjs.cloudflare.com in the ORIGIN frame, while the control set returned an arbitrary (unused) hostname. All existing edge certificates for the 5000 websites were also modified. For the experimental group, the corresponding certificates were renewed with cdnjs.cloudflare.com added to the SAN. To ensure integrity between control and experimental sets, control group domains certificates were also renewed with a valid and identical size third party domain used by none of the control domains. This is done to ensure that the relative size changes to the certificates is kept constant avoiding potential biases due to different certificate sizes. Our results were striking!

Connection coalescing with ORIGIN Frames: fewer DNS queries, fewer connections

Sampling 1% of the requests we received from Firefox to the websites in the experiment, we identified over 50% reduction in new TLS connections per second indicating a lesser number of cryptographic verification operations done by both the client and reduced server compute overheads. As expected there were no differences in the control set indicating the effectiveness of connection re-use as seen by the CDN or server operators.

Discussion and insights

While our modeling measurements indicated that we could anticipate some performance improvements, in practice it was not significantly better suggesting that ‘no-worse’ is the appropriate mental model regarding performance. The subtle interplay between resource object sizes, competing connections, and congestion control is subject to network conditions. Bottleneck-share capacity, for example, diminishes as fewer connections compete for bottleneck resources on network links. It would be interesting to revisit these measurements as more operators deploy support on their servers for ORIGIN Frames.

Apart from performance, one major benefit of ORIGIN frames is in terms of privacy. How? Well, each coalesced connection hides client metadata that is otherwise leaked from non-coalesced connections. Certain resources on a web page are loaded depending on how one is interacting with the website. This means for every new connection for retrieving some resource from the server, TLS plaintext metadata like SNI (in the absence of Encrypted Client Hello) and at least one plaintext DNS query, if transmitted over UDP or TCP on port 53, is exposed to the network. Coalescing connections helps remove the need for browsers to open new TLS connections, and the need to do extra DNS queries. This prevents metadata leakage from anyone listening on the network. ORIGIN Frames help minimize those signals from the network path, improving privacy by reducing the amount of cleartext information leaked on path to network eavesdroppers.

While the browsers benefit from reduced cryptographic computations needed to verify multiple certificates, a major advantage comes from the fact that it opens up very interesting future opportunities for resource scheduling at the endpoints (the browsers, and the origin servers) such as prioritization, or recent proposals like HTTP early hints to provide clients experiences where connections are not overloaded or competing for those resources. When coupled with CERTIFICATE Frames IETF draft, we can further eliminate the need for manual certificate modifications as a server can prove its authority of hostnames after connection establishment without any additional SAN entries on the website’s TLS certificate.

Conclusion and call to action

In summary, the current Internet ecosystem has a lot of opportunities for connection coalescing with only a few changes to certificates and their server infrastructure. Servers can significantly reduce the number of TLS handshakes by roughly 50%, while reducing the number of render blocking DNS queries by over 60%. Clients additionally reap these benefits in privacy by reducing cleartext DNS exposure to network on-lookers.

To help make this a reality we are currently planning to add support for both HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 ORIGIN Frames for our customers. We also encourage other operators that manage third party resources to adopt support of ORIGIN Frame to improve the Internet ecosystem.
Our paper submission was accepted to the ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2022 and is available for download. If you’d like to work on projects like this, where you get to see the rubber meet the road for new standards, visit our careers page!

Introducing per hostname TLS settings — security fit to your needs

Post Syndicated from Dina Kozlov original http://blog.cloudflare.com/introducing-per-hostname-tls-settings/

Introducing per hostname TLS settings — security fit to your needs

Introducing per hostname TLS settings — security fit to your needs

One of the goals of Cloudflare is to give our customers the necessary knobs to enable security in a way that fits their needs. In the realm of SSL/TLS, we offer two key controls: setting the minimum TLS version, and restricting the list of supported cipher suites. Previously, these settings applied to the entire domain, resulting in an “all or nothing” effect. While having uniform settings across the entire domain is ideal for some users, it sometimes lacks the necessary granularity for those with diverse requirements across their subdomains.

It is for that reason that we’re excited to announce that as of today, customers will be able to set their TLS settings on a per-hostname basis.

The trade-off with using modern protocols

In an ideal world, every domain could be updated to use the most secure and modern protocols without any setbacks. Unfortunately, that's not the case. New standards and protocols require adoption in order to be effective. TLS 1.3 was standardized by the IETF in April 2018. It removed the vulnerable cryptographic algorithms that TLS 1.2 supported and provided a performance boost by requiring only one roundtrip, as opposed to two. For a user to benefit from TLS 1.3, they need their browser or device to support the new TLS version. For modern browsers and devices, this isn’t a problem – these operating systems are built to dynamically update to support new protocols. But legacy clients and devices were, obviously, not built with the same mindset. Before 2015, new protocols and standards were developed over decades, not months or years, so the clients were shipped out with support for one standard — the one that was used at the time.

If we look at Cloudflare Radar, we can see that about 62.9% of traffic uses TLS 1.3. That’s quite significant for a protocol that was only standardized 5 years ago. But that also means that a significant portion of the Internet continues to use TLS 1.2 or lower.

The same trade-off applies for encryption algorithms. ECDSA was standardized in 2005, about 20 years after RSA. It offers a higher level of security than RSA and uses shorter key lengths, which adds a performance boost for every request. To use ECDSA, a domain owner needs to obtain and serve an ECDSA certificate and the connecting client needs to support cipher suites that use elliptical curve cryptography (ECC). While most publicly trusted certificate authorities now support ECDSA-based certificates, the slow rate of adoption has led many legacy systems to only support RSA, which means that restricting applications to only support ECC-based algorithms could prevent access from those that use older clients and devices.

Balancing the trade-offs

When it comes to security and accessibility, it’s important to find the right middle ground for your business.

To maintain brand, most companies deploy all of their assets under one domain. It’s common for the root domain (e.g. example.com) to be used as a marketing website to provide information about the company, its mission, and the products and services it offers. Then, under the same domain, you might have your company blog (e.g. blog.example.com), your management portal (e.g. dash.example.com), and your API gateway (e.g. api.example.com).

The marketing website and the blog are similar in that they’re static sites that don’t collect information from the accessing users. On the other hand, the management portal and API gateway collect and present sensitive data that needs to be protected.

When you’re thinking about which settings to deploy, you want to consider the data that’s exchanged and the user base. The marketing website and blog should be accessible to all users. You can set them up to support modern protocols for the clients that support them, but you don’t necessarily want to restrict access for users that are accessing these pages from old devices.

The management portal and API gateway should be set up in a manner that provides the best protection for the data exchanged. That means dropping support for less secure standards with known vulnerabilities and requiring new, secure protocols to be used.

To be able to achieve this setup, you need to be able to configure settings for every subdomain within your domain individually.

Per hostname TLS settings – now available!

Customers that use Cloudflare’s Advanced Certificate Manager can configure TLS settings on individual hostnames within a domain. Customers can use this to enable HTTP/2, or to configure the minimum TLS version and the supported ciphers suites on a particular hostname. Any settings that are applied on a specific hostname will supersede the zone level setting. The new capability also allows you to have different settings on a hostname and its wildcard record; which means you can configure example.com to use one setting, and *.example.com to use another.

Let’s say that you want the default min TLS version for your domain to be TLS 1.2, but for your dashboard and API subdomains, you want to set the minimum TLS version to be TLS 1.3. In the Cloudflare dashboard, you can set the zone level minimum TLS version to 1.2 as shown below. Then, to make the minimum TLS version for the dashboard and API subdomains TLS 1.3, make a call to the per-hostname TLS settings API endpoint with the specific hostname and setting.

Introducing per hostname TLS settings — security fit to your needs

This is all available, starting today, through the API endpoint! And if you’d like to learn more about how to use our per-hostname TLS settings, please jump on over to our developer documentation.

Bring your own CA for client certificate validation with API Shield

Post Syndicated from Dina Kozlov original http://blog.cloudflare.com/bring-your-own-ca-for-client-certificate-validation-with-api-shield/

Bring your own CA for client certificate validation with API Shield

Bring your own CA for client certificate validation with API Shield

APIs account for more than half of the total traffic of the Internet. They are the building blocks of many modern web applications. As API usage grows, so does the number of API attacks. And so now, more than ever, it’s important to keep these API endpoints secure. Cloudflare’s API Shield solution offers a comprehensive suite of products to safeguard your API endpoints and now we’re excited to give our customers one more tool to keep their endpoints safe. We’re excited to announce that customers can now bring their own Certificate Authority (CA) to use for mutual TLS client authentication. This gives customers more security, while allowing them to maintain control around their Mutual TLS configuration.

The power of Mutual TLS (mTLS)

Traditionally, when we refer to TLS certificates, we talk about the publicly trusted certificates that are presented by servers to prove their identity to the connecting client. With Mutual TLS, both the client and the server present a certificate to establish a two-way channel of trust. Doing this allows the server to check who the connecting client is and whether or not they’re allowed to make a request. The certificate presented by the client – the client certificate – doesn’t need to come from a publicly trusted CA. In fact, it usually comes from a private or self-signed CA. That’s because the only party that needs to be able to trust it is the connecting server. As long as the connecting server has the client certificate and can check its validity, it doesn’t need to be public.

Securing API endpoints with Mutual TLS

Mutual TLS plays a crucial role in protecting API endpoints. When it comes to safeguarding these endpoints, it's important to have a security model in place that only allows authorized clients to make requests and keeps everyone else out.

That’s why when we launched API Shield in 2020 – a product that’s centered around securing API endpoints – we included mutual TLS client certificate validation as a part of the offering. We knew that mTLS was the best way for our customers to identify and authorize their connecting clients.

When we launched mutual TLS for API Shield, we gave each of our customers a dedicated self-signed CA that they could use to issue client certificates. Once the certificates are installed on devices and mTLS is set up, administrators can enforce that connections can only be made if they present a client certificate issued from that self-signed CA.

This feature has been paramount in securing thousands of endpoints, but it does require our customer to install new client certificates on their devices, which isn’t always possible. Some customers have been using mutual TLS for years with their own CA, which means that the client certificates are already in the wild. Unless the application owner has direct control over the clients, it’s usually arduous, if not impossible, to replace the client certificates with ones issued from Cloudflare’s CA. Other customers may be required to use a CA issued from an approved third party in order to meet regulatory requirements.

To help all of our customers keep their endpoints secure, we’re extending API Shield’s mTLS capability to allow customers to bring their own CA.

Bring your own CA for client certificate validation with API Shield

Get started today

To simplify the management of private PKI at Cloudflare, we created one account level endpoint that enables customers to upload self-signed CAs to use across different Cloudflare products. Today, this endpoint can be used for API shield CAs and for Gateway CAs that are used for traffic inspection.

If you’re an Enterprise customer, you can upload up to five CAs to your account. Once you’ve uploaded the CA, you can use the API Shield hostname association API to associate the CA with the mTLS enabled hostnames. That will tell Cloudflare to start validating the client certificate against the uploaded CA for requests that come in on that hostname. Before you enforce the client certificate validation, you can create a Firewall rule that logs an event when a valid or invalid certificate is served. That will help you determine if you’ve set things up correctly before you enforce the client certificate validation and drop unauthorized requests.

To learn more about how you can use this, refer to our developer documentation.

If you’re interested in using mutual TLS to secure your corporate network, talk to an account representative about using our Access product to do so.

Faster AWS cloud connections with TLS 1.3

Post Syndicated from Kate Rodgers original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/faster-aws-cloud-connections-with-tls-1-3/

At Amazon Web Services (AWS), we strive to continuously improve customer experience by delivering a cloud computing environment that supports the most modern security technologies. To improve the overall performance of your connections, we have already started to enable TLS version 1.3 globally across our AWS service API endpoints, and will complete this process by December 31, 2023. By using TLS 1.3, you can decrease your connection time by removing one network round trip for every connection request, and can benefit from some of the most modern and secure cryptographic cipher suites available today.

If you are using current software tools (2014 or later) including our AWS SDKs or AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI), you will automatically receive the benefits of TLS 1.3 with no action required on your part. This is because AWS services will negotiate the highest TLS protocol version that your client software supports. If you want to continue using TLS 1.2, you will still have full control through your client configurations. AWS will retain support for TLS 1.2, in addition to TLS 1.3, into the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, here’s the latest information on the on-going deprecation of TLS 1.0/1.1.

If you have any questions, start a new thread on AWS re:Post, or contact AWS Support or your technical account manager. If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

Want more AWS Security how-to content, news, and feature announcements? Follow us on Twitter.

Kate Rodgers

Kate Rodgers

Kate is a Senior Technical Program Manager in AWS Security with over 10 years of experience in industry as an engineer and program manager. Today she works with AWS services, infrastructure, and administrative teams to drive innovative solutions that improve the AWS security posture.

James McDuffie

James McDuffie

James is a Senior Technical Account Manager. He has over 20 years of experience in software development, with previous roles in Software and Hardware Security Architecture in Industrial IoT. He is an active member of the AWS Security community, and he works closely with our customers to help them solve complex security challenges at scale.

mTLS client certificate revocation vulnerability with TLS Session Resumption

Post Syndicated from Rushil Mehra original https://blog.cloudflare.com/mtls-client-certificate-revocation-vulnerability-with-tls-session-resumption/

mTLS client certificate revocation vulnerability with TLS Session Resumption

mTLS client certificate revocation vulnerability with TLS Session Resumption

On December 16, 2022, Cloudflare discovered a bug where, in limited circumstances, some users with revoked certificates may not have been blocked by Cloudflare firewall settings. Specifically, Cloudflare’s Firewall Rules solution did not block some users with revoked certificates from resuming a session via mutual transport layer security (mTLS), even if the customer had configured Firewall Rules to do so. This bug has been mitigated, and we have no evidence of this being exploited. We notified any customers that may have been impacted in an abundance of caution, so they can check their own logs to determine if an mTLS protected resource was accessed by entities holding a revoked certificate.

What happened?

One of Cloudflare Firewall Rules’ features, introduced in March 2021, lets customers revoke or block a client certificate, preventing it from being used to authenticate and establish a session. For example, a customer may use Firewall Rules to protect a service by requiring clients to provide a client certificate through the mTLS authentication protocol. Customers could also revoke or disable a client certificate, after which it would no longer be able to be used to authenticate a party initiating an encrypted session via mTLS.

When Cloudflare receives traffic from an end user, a service at the edge is responsible for terminating the incoming TLS connection. From there, this service is a reverse proxy, and it is responsible for acting as a bridge between the end user and various upstreams. Upstreams might include other services within Cloudflare such as Workers or Caching, or may travel through Cloudflare to an external server such as an origin hosting content. Sometimes, you may want to restrict access to an endpoint, ensuring that only authorized actors can access it. Using client certificates is a common way of authenticating users. This is referred to as mutual TLS, because both the server and client provide a certificate. When mTLS is enabled for a specific hostname, this service at the edge is responsible for parsing the incoming client certificate and converting that into metadata that is attached to HTTP requests that are forwarded to upstreams. The upstreams can process this metadata and make the decision whether the client is authorized or not.

mTLS client certificate revocation vulnerability with TLS Session Resumption

Customers can use the Cloudflare dashboard to revoke existing client certificates. Instead of immediately failing handshakes involving revoked client certificates, revocation is optionally enforced via Firewall Rules, which take effect at the HTTP request level. This leaves the decision to enforce revocation with the customer.

So how exactly does this service determine whether a client certificate is revoked?

When we see a client certificate presented as part of the TLS handshake, we store the entire certificate chain on the TLS connection. This means that for every HTTP request that is sent on the connection, the client certificate chain is available to the application. When we receive a request, we look at the following fields related to a client certificate chain:

  1. Leaf certificate Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
  2. Leaf certificate Serial Number (SN)
  3. Issuer certificate SKI
  4. Issuer certificate SN

Some of these values are used for upstream processing, but the issuer SKI and leaf certificate SN are used to query our internal data stores for revocation status. The data store indexes on an issuer SKI, and stores a collection of revoked leaf certificate serial numbers. If we find the leaf certificate in this collection, we set the relevant metadata for consumption in Firewall Rules.

But what does this have to do with TLS session resumption?

To explain this, let’s first discuss how session resumption works. At a high level, session resumption grants the ability for clients and servers to expedite the handshake process, saving both time and resources. The idea is that if a client and server successfully handshake, then future handshakes are more or less redundant, assuming nothing about the handshake needs to change at a fundamental level (e.g. cipher suite or TLS version).

Traditionally, there are two mechanisms for session resumption – session IDs and session tickets. In both cases, the TLS server will handle encrypting the context of the session, which is basically a snapshot of the acquired TLS state that is built up during the handshake process. Session IDs work in a stateful fashion, meaning that the server is responsible for saving this state, somewhere, and keying against the session ID. When a client provides a session ID in the client hello, the server checks to see if it has a corresponding session cached. If it does, then the handshake process is expedited and the cached session is restored. In contrast, session tickets work in a stateless fashion, meaning that the server has no need to store the encrypted session context. Instead, the server sends the client the encrypted session context (AKA a session ticket). In future handshakes, the client can send the session ticket in the client hello, which the server can decrypt in order to restore the session and expedite the handshake.

Recall that when a client presents a certificate, we store the certificate chain on the TLS connection. It was discovered that when sessions were resumed, the code to store the client certificate chain in application data did not run. As a result, we were left with an empty certificate chain, meaning we were unable to check the revocation status and pass this information to firewall rules for further processing.

To illustrate this, let’s use an example where mTLS is used for api.example.com. Firewall Rules are configured to block revoked certificates, and all certificates are revoked. We can reconstruct the client certificate checking behavior using a two-step process. First we use OpenSSL’s s_client to perform a handshake using the revoked certificate (recall that revocation has nothing to do with the success of the handshake – it only affects HTTP requests on the connection), and dump the session’s context into a “session.txt” file. We then issue an HTTP request on the connection, which fails with a 403 status code response because the certificate is revoked.

❯ echo -e "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:api.example.com\r\n\r\n" | openssl s_client -connect api.example.com:443 -cert cert2.pem -key key2.pem -ign_eof  -sess_out session.txt | grep 'HTTP/1.1'
depth=2 C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root
verify return:1
depth=1 C=US, O=Cloudflare, Inc., CN=Cloudflare Inc ECC CA-3
verify return:1
depth=0 C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco, O=Cloudflare, Inc., CN=sni.cloudflaressl.com
verify return:1
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
^C⏎

Now, if we reuse “session.txt” to perform session resumption and then issue an identical HTTP request, the request succeeds. This shouldn’t happen. We should fail both requests because they both use the same revoked client certificate.

❯ echo -e "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:api.example.com\r\n\r\n" | openssl s_client -connect api.example.com:443 -cert cert2.pem -key key2.pem -ign_eof -sess_in session.txt | grep 'HTTP/1.1'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

How we addressed the problem

Upon realizing that session resumption led to the inability to properly check revocation status, our first reaction was to disable session resumption for all mTLS connections. This blocked the vulnerability immediately.

The next step was to figure out how to safely re-enable resumption for mTLS. To do so, we need to remove the requirement of depending on data stored within the TLS connection state. Instead, we can use an API call that will grant us access to the leaf certificate in both session resumption and non session resumption cases. Two pieces of information are necessary: the leaf certificate serial number and the issuer SKI. The issuer SKI is actually included in the leaf certificate, also known as the Authority Key Identifier (AKI). Similar to how one would obtain the SKI for a certificate, X509_get0_subject_key_id, we can use X509_get0_authority_key_id to get the AKI.

Detailed timeline

All timestamps are in UTC

In March 2021 we introduced a new feature in Firewall Rules that allows customers to block traffic from revoked mTLS certificates.

2022-12-16 21:53 – Cloudflare discovers that the vulnerability resulted from a bug whereby certificate revocation status was not checked for session resumptions. Cloudflare begins working on a fix to disable session resumption for all mTLS connections to the edge.
2022-12-17 02:20 – Cloudflare validates the fix and starts to roll out a fix globally.
2022-12-17 21:07 – Rollout is complete, mitigating the vulnerability.
2023-01-12 16:40 – Cloudflare starts to roll out a fix that supports both session resumption and revocation.
2023-01-18 14:07 – Rollout is complete.

In conclusion: once Cloudflare identified the vulnerability, a remediation was put into place quickly. A fix that correctly supports session resumption and revocation has been fully rolled out as of 2023-01-18. After reviewing the logs, Cloudflare has not seen any evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited in the wild.

Automate the deployment of an NGINX web service using Amazon ECS with TLS offload in CloudHSM

Post Syndicated from Nikolas Nikravesh original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/automate-the-deployment-of-an-nginx-web-service-using-amazon-ecs-with-tls-offload-in-cloudhsm/

Customers who require private keys for their TLS certificates to be stored in FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certified hardware security modules (HSMs) can use AWS CloudHSM to store their keys for websites hosted in the cloud. In this blog post, we will show you how to automate the deployment of a web application using NGINX in AWS Fargate, with full integration with CloudHSM. You will also use AWS CodeDeploy to manage the deployment of changes to your Amazon Elastic Container Service (Amazon ECS) service.

CloudHSM offers FIPS 140-2 Level 3 HSMs that you can integrate with NGINX or Apache HTTP Server through the OpenSSL Dynamic Engine. The CloudHSM Client SDK 5 includes the OpenSSL Dynamic Engine to allow your web server to use a private key stored in the HSM with TLS versions 1.2 and 1.3 to support applications that are required to use FIPS 140-2 Level 3 validated HSMs.

CloudHSM uses the private key in the HSM as part of the server verification step of the TLS handshake that occurs every time that a new HTTPS connection is established between the client and server. Using the exchanged symmetric key, OpenSSL software performs the key exchange and bulk encryption. For more information about this process and how CloudHSM fits in, see How SSL/TLS offload with AWS CloudHSM works.

Solution overview

This blog post uses the AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) to deploy the solution infrastructure. The AWS CDK allows you to define your cloud application resources using familiar programming languages.

Figure 1 shows an overview of the overall architecture deployed in this blog. This solution contains three CDK stacks: The TlsOffloadContainerBuildStack CDK stack deploys the CodeCommit, CodeBuild, and AmazonECR resources. The TlsOffloadEcsServiceStack CDK stack deploys the ECS Fargate service along with the required VPC resources. The TlsOffloadPipelineStack CDK stack deploys the CodePipeline resources to automate deployments of changes to the service configuration.

Figure 1: Overall architecture

Figure 1: Overall architecture

At a high level, here’s how the solution in Figure 1 works:

  1. Clients make an HTTPS request to the public IP address exposed by Network Load Balancer to connect to the web server and establish a secure connection that uses TLS.
  2. Network Load Balancer routes the request to one of the ECS hosts running in private virtual private cloud (VPC) subnets, which are connected to the CloudHSM cluster.
  3. The NGINX web server that is running on ECS containers performs a TLS handshake by using the private key stored in the HSM to establish a secure connection with the requestor.

Note: Although we don’t focus on perimeter protection in this post, AWS has a number of services that help provide layered perimeter protection for your internet-facing applications, such as AWS Shield and AWS WAF.

Figure 2 shows an overview of the automation infrastructure that is deployed by the TlsOffloadContainerBuildStack and TlsOffloadPipelineStack CDK stacks.

Figure 2: Deployment pipeline

Figure 2: Deployment pipeline

At a high level, here’s how the solution in Figure 2 works:

  1. A developer makes changes to the service configuration and commits the changes to the AWS CodeCommit repository.
  2. AWS CodePipeline detects the changes and invokes AWS CodeBuild to build a new version of the Docker image that is used in Amazon ECS.
  3. CodeBuild builds a new Docker image and publishes it to the Amazon Elastic Container Registry (Amazon ECR) repository.
  4. AWS CodeDeploy creates a new revision of the ECS task definition for the Amazon ECS service and initiates a deployment of the new service.

Required services

To build this architecture in your account, you need to use a role within your account that can configure the following services and features:

Prerequisites

To follow this walkthrough, you need to have the following components in place:

Step 1: Store secrets in Secrets Manager

As with other container projects, you need to decide what to build statically into the container (for example, libraries, code, or packages) and what to set as runtime parameters, to be pulled from a parameter store. In this walkthrough, we use Secrets Manager to store sensitive parameters and use the integration of Amazon ECS with Secrets Manager to securely retrieve them when the container is launched.

Important: You need to store the following information in Secrets Manager as plaintext, not as key/value pairs.

To create a new secret

  1. Open the Secrets Manager console and choose Store a new secret.
  2. On the Choose secret type page, do the following:
    1. For Secret type, choose Other type of secret.
    2. In Key/value pairs, choose Plaintext and enter your secret just as you would need it in your application.

The following is a list of the required secrets for this solution and how they look in the Secrets Manager console.

  • Your cluster-issuing certificate – this is the certificate that corresponds to the private key that you used to sign the cluster’s certificate signing request. In this example, the name of the secret for the certificate is tls/clustercert.
    Figure 3: Store the cluster certificate

    Figure 3: Store the cluster certificate

  • The web server certificate – In this example, the name of the secret for the web server certificate is tls/servercert. It will look similar to the following:
    Figure 4: Store the web server certificate

    Figure 4: Store the web server certificate

  • The fake PEM file for the private key stored in the HSM that you generated in the Prerequisites section. In this example, the name of the secret for the fake PEM file is tls/fakepem.
    Figure 5: Store the fake PEM

    Figure 5: Store the fake PEM

  • The HSM pin used to authenticate with the HSMs in your cluster. In this example, the name of the secret for the HSM pin is tls/pin.
    Figure 6: Store the HSM pin

    Figure 6: Store the HSM pin

After you’ve stored your secrets, you should see output similar to the following:

Figure 7: List of required secrets

Figure 7: List of required secrets

Step 2: Download and configure the CDK app

This post uses the AWS CDK to deploy the solution infrastructure. In this section, you will download the CDK app and configure it.

To download and configure the CDK app

  1. In your CDK environment that you created in the Prerequisites section, check out the source code from the aws-cloudhsm-tls-offload-blog GitHub repository.
  2. Edit the app_config.json file and update the <placeholder values> with your target configuration:
    {
        "applicationAccount": "<AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>",
        "applicationRegion": "<REGION>",
        "networkConfig": {
            "vpcId": "<VPC_ID>",
            "publicSubnets": ["<PUBLIC_SUBNET_1>", "<PUBLIC_SUBNET_2>", ...],
            "privateSubnets": ["<PRIVATE_SUBNET_1>", "<PRIVATE_SUBNET_2>", ...]
        },
        "secrets": {
            "cloudHsmPin": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:<REGION>:<AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>:secret:<SECRET_ID>",
            "fakePem": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:<REGION>:<AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>:secret:<SECRET_ID>",
            "serverCert": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:<REGION>:<AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>:secret:<SECRET_ID>",
            "clusterCert": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:<REGION>:<AWS_ACCOUNT_ID>:secret:<SECRET_ID>"
        },
        "cloudhsm": {
            "clusterId": "<CLUSTER_ID>",
            "clusterSecurityGroup": "<CLUSTER_SECURITY_GROUP>"
        }
    }

  3. Run the following command to build the CDK stacks from the root of the project directory.
    npm run build

  4. To view the stacks that are available to deploy, run the following command from the root of the project directory.
    cdk ls

    You should see the following stacks available to deploy:

    • TlsOffloadContainerBuildStack — Deploys the CodeCommit, CodeBuild, and ECR repository that builds the ECS container image.
    • TlsOffloadEcsServiceStack — Deploys the ECS Fargate service along with the required VPC resources.
    • TlsOffloadPipelineStack — Deploys the CodePipeline that automates the deployment of updates to the service.

Step 3: Deploy the container build stack

In this step, you will deploy the container build stack, and then create a build and verify that the image was built successfully.

To deploy the container build stack

Deploy the TlsOffloadContainerBuildStack stack that we described in Figure 2 to your AWS account. In your CDK environment, run the following command:

cdk deploy TlsOffloadContainerBuildStack

The command line interface (CLI) will prompt you to approve the changes. After you approve them, you will see the following resources deployed to your newly created CodeCommit repository.

  • Dockerfile — This file provides a containerized environment for each of the Fargate containers to run. It downloads and installs necessary dependencies to run the NGINX web server with CloudHSM.
  • nginx.conf — This file provides NGINX with the configuration settings to run an HTTPS web server with CloudHSM configured as the SSL engine that performs the TLS handshake. The following nginx.conf values have already been configured in the file; if you want to make changes, update the file before deployment:
    • ssl_engine is set to cloudhsm
    • the environment variable is env CLOUDHSM_PIN
    • error_log is set to stderr so that the Fargate container can capture the logs in CloudWatch
    • the server section is set up to listen on port 443
    • ssl_ciphers are configured for a server with an RSA private key
  • run.sh — This script configures the CloudHSM OpenSSL Dynamic Engine on the Fargate task before the NGINX server is started.
  • nginx.service — This file specifies the configuration settings that systemd uses to run the NGINX service. Included in this file is a reference to the file that contains the environment variables for the NGINX service. This provides the HSM pin to the OpenSSL Engine.
  • index.html — This file is a sample HTML file that is displayed when you navigate to the HTTPS endpoint of the load balancer in your browser.
  • dhparam.pem — This file provides sample Diffie-Hellman parameters for demonstration purposes, but AWS recommends that you generate your own. You can generate your own Diffie-Hellman parameters by running the following command with the OpenSSL CLI. These parameters are not required for TLS but are recommended to provide perfect forward secrecy in your encrypted messages.
    openssl dhparam -out ./dhparam.pem 2048

Your repository should look like the following:

Figure 8: CodeCommit repository

Figure 8: CodeCommit repository

Before you deploy the Amazon ECS service, you need to build your first Docker image to populate the ECR repository. To successfully deploy the service, you need to have at least one image already present in the repository.

To create a build and verify the image was built successfully

  1. Open the AWS CodeBuild console.
  2. Find the CodeBuild project that was created by the CDK deployment and select it.
  3. Choose Start Build to initiate a new build.
  4. Wait for the build to complete successfully, and then open the Amazon ECR console.
  5. Select the repository that the CDK deployment created.

You should now see an image in your repository, similar to the following:

Figure 9: ECR repository

Figure 9: ECR repository

Step 4: Deploy the Amazon ECS service

Now that you have successfully built an ECR image, you can deploy the Amazon ECS service. This step deploys the following resources to your account:

  • VPC endpoints for the required AWS services that your ECS task needs to communicate with, including the following:
    • Amazon ECR
    • Secrets Manager
    • CloudWatch
    • CloudHSM
  • Network Load Balancer, which load balances HTTPS traffic to your ECS tasks.
  • A CloudWatch Logs log group to host the logs for the ECS tasks.
  • An ECS cluster with ECS tasks using your previously built Docker image that hosts the NGINX service.

To deploy the Amazon ECS service with the CDK

  • In your CDK environment, run the following command:
    cdk deploy TlsOffloadEcsServiceStack

The CLI will prompt you to approve the changes. After you approve them, you will see these resources deploy to your account.

Checkpoint

At this point, you should have a working service. To confirm that you do, in your browser, navigate using HTTPS to the public address associated with the Network Load Balancer. While not covered in this blog, you can additionally configure DNS routing using Amazon Route53 to setup a custom domain name for your web service. You should see a screen similar to the following.

Figure 10: The sample website

Figure 10: The sample website

Step 5: Use CodePipeline to automate the deployment of changes to the web server

Now that you have deployed a preliminary version of the application, you can take a few steps to automate further releases of the web server. As you maintain this application in production, you might need to update one or more of the following items:

  • Your website HTML source and other required libraries (for example, CSS or JavaScript)
  • Your Docker environment, such as the OpenSSL libraries, operating system and CloudHSM packages, and NGINX version.
  • Re-deploy the service after rotating your web server private key and certificate in Secrets Manager

Next, you will set up a CodePipeline project that orchestrates the end-to-end deployment of a change to the application—from an update to the code in our CodeCommit repo to the deployment of updated container images and the redirection of user traffic by the load balancer to the updated application.

This step deploys to your account a deployment pipeline that connects your CodeCommit, CodeBuild, and Amazon ECS services.

Deploy the CodePipeline stack with CDK

In your CDK environment, run the following command:

cdk deploy TlsOffloadPipelineStack

The CLI will prompt you to approve the changes. After you approve them, you will see the resources deploy to your account.

Start a deployment

To verify that your automation is working correctly, start a new deployment in your CodePipeline by making a change to your source repository. If everything works, the CodeBuild project will build the latest version of the Dockerfile located in your CodeCommit repository and push it to Amazon ECR. Then, the CodeDeploy application will create a new version of the ECS task definition and deploy new tasks while spinning down the existing tasks.

View your website

Now that the deployment is complete, you should again be able to view your website in your browser by navigating to the website for your application. If you made changes to the source code, such as changes to your index.html file, you should see these changes now.

Verify that the web server is properly configured by checking that the website’s certificate matches the one that you created in the Prerequisites section. Figure 11 shows an example of a certificate.

Figure 11: Certificate for the application

Figure 11: Certificate for the application

To verify that your NGINX service is using your CloudHSM cluster to offload the TLS handshake, you can view the CloudHSM client logs for this application in CloudWatch in the log group that you specified when you configured the ECS task definition.

To view your CloudHSM client logs in CloudWatch

  1. Open the CloudWatch console.
  2. In the navigation pane, select Log Groups.
  3. Select the log group that was created for you by the CDK deployment.
  4. Select a log stream entry. Each log stream corresponds to an ECS instance that is running the NGINX web server.
  5. You should see the client logs for this instance, which will look similar to the following:
    Figure 12: Fargate task logs

    Figure 12: Fargate task logs

You can also verify your HSM connectivity by viewing your HSM audit logs.

To view your HSM audit logs

  1. Open the CloudWatch console.
  2. In the navigation pane, select Log Groups.
  3. Select the log group corresponding to your CloudHSM cluster. The log group has the following format: /aws/cloudhsm/<cluster-id>.
  4. You can see entries similar to the following, which indicates that the NGINX application is connecting and logging in to the HSM to perform cryptographic operations.
    Time: 02/04/23 17:45:40.333033, usecs:1675532740333033
    Version No : 1.0
    Sequence No : 0x2
    Reboot counter : 0x8
    Opcode : CN_LOGIN (0xd)
    Command Type(hex) : CN_MGMT_CMD (0x0)
    User id : 3
    Session Handle : 0x15010002
    Response : 0x0:HSM Return: SUCCESS
    Log type : USER_AUTH_LOG (2)
    User Name : crypto_user
    User Type : CN_CRYPTO_USER (1) 

Conclusion

In this post, you learned how to set up a NGINX web server on Fargate in a secure, private subnet that offloads the TLS termination to a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 HSM environment that uses the CloudHSM OpenSSL Dynamic Engine. You also learned how to set up a deployment pipeline to automate the Fargate deployments when updates are made.

You can expand this solution to fit your individual use case. For example, you can use the NGINX web server as a reverse proxy for additional servers in your internal network, and set up mutual TLS between these internal servers.

Further reading

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, start a new thread on the AWS CloudHSM re:Post or contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Alket Memushaj

Alket Memushaj

Alket Memushaj is a Principal Solutions Architect in the Market Development team for Capital Markets at AWS. In his role, Alket helps customers transform their business with the power of the AWS Cloud. His main focus is on helping customers deploy data and analytics, risk management, and electronic trading platforms in AWS. Alket previously led engineering teams at Morgan Stanley and consulted for global financial services at VMware.

Nikolas Nikravesh

Nikolas Nikravesh

Nikolas is a Software Development Engineer at AWS CloudHSM. He works with the SDK team to develop standards compliant SDKs and integrations to enable AWS customers to develop secure applications with CloudHSM.

Brad Woodward

Brad Woodward

Brad is a Senior Customer Delivery Architect with AWS Professional Services. Brad has presented at RSA and DefCon Skytalks, been an instructor at BlackHat and BlackHat Europe, presented tools at BlackHat Arsenal, and is the maintainer of several open source tools and platforms.

Out now! Auto-renew TLS certifications with DCV Delegation

Post Syndicated from Dina Kozlov original https://blog.cloudflare.com/introducing-dcv-delegation/

Out now! Auto-renew TLS certifications with DCV Delegation

Out now! Auto-renew TLS certifications with DCV Delegation

To get a TLS certificate issued, the requesting party must prove that they own the domain through a process called Domain Control Validation (DCV). As industry wide standards have evolved to enhance security measures, this process has become manual for Cloudflare customers that manage their DNS externally. Today, we’re excited to announce DCV Delegation — a feature that gives all customers the ability offload the DCV process to Cloudflare, so that all certificates can be auto-renewed without the management overhead.

Security is of utmost importance when it comes to managing web traffic, and one of the most critical aspects of security is ensuring that your application always has a TLS certificate that’s valid and up-to-date. Renewing TLS certificates can be an arduous and time-consuming task, especially as the recommended certificate lifecycle continues to gradually decrease, causing certificates to be renewed more frequently. Failure to get a certificate renewed can result in downtime or insecure connection which can lead to revenue decrease, mis-trust with your customers, and a management nightmare for your Ops team.

Every time a certificate is renewed with a Certificate Authority (CA), the certificate needs to pass a check called Domain Control Validation (DCV). This is a process that a CA goes through to verify that the party requesting the certificate does in fact own or control ownership over the domain for which the certificate is being requested. One of the benefits of using Cloudflare as your Authoritative DNS provider is that we can always prove ownership of your domain and therefore auto-renew your certificates. However, a big chunk of our customers manage their DNS externally. Before today, certificate renewals required these customers to make manual changes every time the certificate came up for renewal. Now, with DCV Delegation – you can let Cloudflare do all the heavy lifting.

DCV primer

Before we dive into how DCV Delegation works, let’s talk about it. DCV is the process of verifying that the party requesting a certificate owns or controls the domain for which they are requesting a certificate.

Out now! Auto-renew TLS certifications with DCV Delegation

When a subscriber requests a certificate from a CA, the CA returns validation tokens that the domain owner needs to place. The token can be an HTTP file that the domain owner needs to serve from a specific endpoint or it can be a DNS TXT record that they can place at their Authoritative DNS provider. Once the tokens are placed, ownership has been proved, and the CA can proceed with the certificate issuance.

Better security practices for certificate issuance

Certificate issuance is a serious process. Any shortcomings can lead to a malicious actor issuing a certificate for a domain they do not own. What this means is that the actor could serve the certificate from a spoofed domain that looks exactly like yours and hijack and decrypt the incoming traffic. Because of this, over the last few years, changes have been put in place to ensure higher security standards for certificate issuances.

Shorter certificate lifetimes

The first change is the move to shorter lived certificates. Before 2011, a certificate could be valid for up to 96 months (about eight years). Over the last few years, the accepted validity period has been significantly shortened. In 2012, certificate validity went down to 60 months (5 years), in 2015 the lifespan was shortened to 39 months (about 3 years), in 2018 to 24 months (2 years), and in 2020, the lifetime was dropped to 13 months. Following the trend, we’re going to continue to see certificate lifetimes decrease even further to 3 month certificates as the standard. We’re already seeing this in action with Certificate Authorities like Let’s Encrypt and Google Trust Services offering a maximum validity period of 90 days (3 months). Shorter-lived certificates are aimed to reduce the compromise window in a situation where a malicious party has gained control over a TLS certificate or private key. The shorter the lifetime, the less time the bad actor can make use of the compromised material. At Cloudflare, we even give customers the ability to issue 2 week certificates to reduce the impact window even further.

While this provides a better security posture, it does require more overhead management for the domain owner, as they’ll now be responsible for completing the DCV process every time the certificate is up for renewal, which can be every 90 days. In the past, CAs would allow the re-use of validation tokens, meaning even if the certificate was renewed more frequently, the validation tokens could be re-used so that the domain owner wouldn’t need to complete DCV again. Now, more and more CAs are requiring unique tokens to be placed for every renewal, meaning shorter certificate lifetimes now result in additional management overhead.

Wildcard certificates now require DNS-based DCV

Aside from certificate lifetimes, the process required to get a certificate issued has developed stricter requirements over the last few years. The Certificate Authority/Browser Forum (CA/B Forum), the governing body that sets the rules and standards for certificates, has enforced or stricter requirements around certificate issuance to ensure that certificates are issued in a secure manner that prevents a malicious actor from obtaining certificates for domains they do not own.

In May 2021, the CA/B Forum voted to require DNS based validation for any certificate with a wildcard certificate on it. Meaning, that if you would like to get a TLS certificate that covers example.com and *.example.com, you can no longer use HTTP based validation, but instead, you will need to add TXT validation tokens to your DNS provider to get that certificate issued. This is because a wildcard certificate covers a large portion of the domain’s namespace. If a malicious actor receives a certificate for a wildcard hostname, they now have control over all of the subdomains under the domain. Since HTTP validation only proves ownership of a hostname and not the whole domain, it’s better to use DNS based validation for a certificate with broader coverage.

All of these changes are great from a security standpoint – we should be adopting these processes! However, this also requires domain owners to adapt to the changes. Failure to do so can lead to a certificate renewal failure and downtime for your application. If you’re managing more than 10 domains, these new processes become a management nightmare fairly quickly.

At Cloudflare, we’re here to help. We don’t think that security should come at the cost of reliability or the time that your team spends managing new standards and requirements. Instead, we want to make it as easy as possible for you to have the best security posture for your certificates, without the management overhead.

How Cloudflare helps customers auto-renew certificates

Out now! Auto-renew TLS certifications with DCV Delegation

For years, Cloudflare has been managing TLS certificates for 10s of millions of domains. One of the reasons customers choose to manage their TLS certificates with Cloudflare is that we keep up with all the changes in standards, so you don’t have to.

One of the superpowers of having Cloudflare as your Authoritative DNS provider is that Cloudflare can add necessary DNS records on your behalf to ensure successful certificate issuances. If you’re using Cloudflare for your DNS, you probably haven’t thought about certificate renewals, because you never had to. We do all the work for you.

When the CA/B Forum announced that wildcard certificates would now require TXT based validation to be used, customers that use our Authoritative DNS didn’t even notice any difference – we continued to do the auto-renewals for them, without any additional work on their part.

While this provides a reliability and management boost to some customers, it still leaves out a large portion of our customer base — customers who use Cloudflare for certificate issuance with an external DNS provider.

There are two groups of customers that were impacted by the wildcard DCV change: customers with domains that host DNS externally – we call these “partial” zones – and SaaS providers that use Cloudflare’s SSL for SaaS product to provide wildcard certificates for their customers’ domains.

Customers with “partial” domains that use wildcard certificates on Cloudflare are now required to fetch the TXT DCV tokens every time the certificate is up for renewal and manually place those tokens at their DNS provider. With Cloudflare deprecating DigiCert as a Certificate Authority, certificates will now have a lifetime of 90 days, meaning this manual process will need to occur every 90 days for any certificate with a wildcard hostname.

Customers that use our SSL for SaaS product can request that Cloudflare issues a certificate for their customer’s domain – called a custom hostname. SaaS providers on the Enterprise plan have the ability to extend this support to wildcard custom hostnames, meaning we’ll issue a certificate for the domain (example.com) and for a wildcard (*.example.com). The issue with that is that SaaS providers will now be required to fetch the TXT DCV tokens, return them to their customers so that they can place them at their DNS provider, and do this process every 90 days. Supporting this requires a big change to our SaaS provider’s management system.

At Cloudflare, we want to help every customer choose security, reliability, and ease of use — all three! And that’s where DCV Delegation comes in.

Enter DCV Delegation: certificate auto-renewal for every Cloudflare customer

DCV Delegation is a new feature that allows customers who manage their DNS externally to delegate the DCV process to Cloudflare. DCV Delegation requires customers to place a one-time record that allows Cloudflare to auto-renew all future certificate orders, so that there’s no manual intervention from the customer at the time of the renewal.

How does it work?

Customers will now be able to place a CNAME record at their Authoritative DNS provider at their acme-challenge endpoint – where the DCV records are currently placed – to point to a domain on Cloudflare.

This record will have the the following syntax:

_acme-challenge.<domain.TLD> CNAME <domain.TLD>.<UUID>.dcv.cloudflare.com

Let’s say I own example.com and need to get a certificate issued for it that covers the apex and wildcard record. I would place the following record at my DNS provider: _acme-challenge.example.com CNAME example.com.<UUID>.dcv.cloudflare.com. Then, Cloudflare would place the two TXT DNS records required to issue the certificate at  example.com.<UUID>.dcv.cloudflare.com.

As long as the partial zone or custom hostname remains Active on Cloudflare, Cloudflare will add the DCV tokens on every renewal. All you have to do is keep the CNAME record in place.

If you’re a “partial” zone customer or an SSL for SaaS customer, you will now see this card in the dashboard with more information on how to use DCV Delegation, or you can read our documentation to learn more.

DCV Delegation for Partial Zones:

Out now! Auto-renew TLS certifications with DCV Delegation

DCV Delegation for Custom Hostnames:

Out now! Auto-renew TLS certifications with DCV Delegation

The UUID in the CNAME target is a unique identifier. Each partial domain will have its own UUID that corresponds to all of the DCV delegation records created under that domain. Similarly, each SaaS zone will have one UUID that all custom hostnames under that domain will use. Keep in mind that if the same domain is moved to another account, the UUID value will change and the corresponding DCV delegation records will need to be updated.

If you’re using Cloudflare as your Authoritative DNS provider, you don’t need to worry about this! We already add the DCV tokens on your behalf to ensure successful certificate renewals.

What’s next?

Right now, DCV Delegation only allows delegation to one provider. That means that if you’re using multiple CDN providers or you’re using Cloudflare to manage your certificates but you’re also issuing certificates for the same hostname for your origin server then DCV Delegation won’t work for you. This is because once that CNAME record is pointed to Cloudflare, only Cloudflare will be able to add DCV tokens at that endpoint, blocking you or an external CDN provider from doing the same.

However, an RFC draft is in progress that will allow each provider to have a separate “acme-challenge” endpoint, based on the ACME account used to issue the certs. Once this becomes standardized and CAs and CDNs support it, customers will be able to use multiple providers for DCV delegation.

In conclusion, DCV delegation is a powerful feature that simplifies the process of managing certificate renewals for all Cloudflare customers. It eliminates the headache of managing certificate renewals, ensures that certificates are always up-to-date, and most importantly, ensures that your web traffic is always secure. Try DCV delegation today and see the difference it can make for your web traffic!

Mutual TLS now available for Workers

Post Syndicated from Tanushree Sharma original https://blog.cloudflare.com/mtls-workers/

Mutual TLS now available for Workers

Mutual TLS now available for Workers

In today’s digital world, security is a top priority for businesses. Whether you’re a Fortune 500 company or a startup just taking off, it’s essential to implement security measures in order to protect sensitive information. Security starts inside an organization; it starts with having Zero Trust principles that protect access to resources.

Mutual TLS (mTLS) is useful in a Zero Trust world to secure a wide range of network services and applications: APIs, web applications, microservices, databases and IoT devices. Cloudflare has products that enforce mTLS: API Shield uses it to secure API endpoints and Cloudflare Access uses it to secure applications. Now, with mTLS support for Workers you can use Workers to authenticate to services secured by mTLS directly. mTLS for Workers is now generally available for all Workers customers!

A recap on how TLS works

Before diving into mTLS, let’s first understand what TLS (Transport Layer Security) is. Any website that uses HTTPS, like the one you’re reading this blog on, uses TLS encryption. TLS is used to create private communications on the Internet – it gives users assurance that the website you’re connecting to is legitimate and any information passed to it is encrypted.

TLS is enforced through a TLS handshake where the client and server exchange messages in order to create a secure connection. The handshake consists of several steps outlined below:

Mutual TLS now available for Workers

The client and server exchange cryptographic keys, the client authenticates the server’s identity and the client and server generate a secret key that’s used to create an encrypted connection.

For most connections over the public Internet TLS is sufficient. If you have a website, for example a landing page, storefront or documentation, you want any user to be able to navigate to it – validating the identity of the client isn’t necessary. But, if you have services that run on a corporate network or private/sensitive applications you may want access to be locked down to only authorized clients.

Enter mTLS

With mTLS, both the client and server present a digital certificate during the TLS handshake to mutually verify each other’s credentials and prove identities. mTLS adds additional steps to the TLS handshake in order to authenticate the client as well as the server.

In comparison to TLS, with mTLS the server also sends a ‘Certificate Request’ message that contains a list of parties that it trusts and it tells the client to respond with its certificate. The mTLS authentication process is outlined below:

Mutual TLS now available for Workers

mTLS is typically used when a managed list of clients (eg. users, devices) need access to a server. It uses cryptographically signed certificates for authentication, which are harder to spoof than passwords or tokens. Some common use cases include: communications between APIs or microservices, database connections from authorized hosts, and machine-to-machine IoT connections.

Introducing mTLS on Workers

With mTLS support on Workers, your Workers can now communicate with resources that enforce an mTLS connection. mTLS through Workers can be configured in just a few easy steps:

1. Upload a client certificate and private key obtained from your service that enforces mTLS using wrangler

wrangler mtls-certificate upload --cert cert.pem --key key.pem --name my-client-cert

2. Add a mtls_certificates binding in your project’s wrangler.toml file. The CERTIFICATE_ID is returned after your certificate is uploaded in step 1

mtls_certificates = [
 { binding = "MY_CERT", certificate_id = "<CERTIFICATE_ID>" }
]

3. Add the mTLS binding to any fetch() requests. This will present the client certificate when establishing the TLS connection.

index.js

export default {
   async fetch(request, environment) {
       return await environment.MY_CERT.fetch("https://example-secure-origin.com")
   }

}

To get per-request granularity, you can configure multiple mTLS certificates if you’re connecting to multiple hosts within the same Worker. There’s a limit of 1,000 certificates that can be uploaded per account. Contact your account team or reach out through the Cloudflare Developer Discord if you need more certificates.

Try it yourself

It’s that easy! For more information and to try it yourself, refer to our developer documentation – client authentication with mTLS.

We love to see what you’re developing on Workers. Join our Discord community and show us what you’re building!

Three ways to boost your email security and brand reputation with AWS

Post Syndicated from Michael Davie original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/three-ways-to-boost-your-email-security-and-brand-reputation-with-aws/

If you own a domain that you use for email, you want to maintain the reputation and goodwill of your domain’s brand. Several industry-standard mechanisms can help prevent your domain from being used as part of a phishing attack. In this post, we’ll show you how to deploy three of these mechanisms, which visually authenticate emails sent from your domain to users and verify that emails are encrypted in transit. It can take as little as 15 minutes to deploy these mechanisms on Amazon Web Services (AWS), and the result can help to provide immediate and long-term improvements to your organization’s email security.

Phishing through email remains one of the most common ways that bad actors try to compromise computer systems. Incidents of phishing and related crimes far outnumber the incidents of other categories of internet crime, according to the most recent FBI Internet Crime Report. Phishing has consistently led to large annual financial losses in the US and globally.

Overview of BIMI, MTA-STS, and TLS reporting

An earlier post has covered how you can use Amazon Simple Email Service (Amazon SES) to send emails that align with best practices, including the IETF internet standards: Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC). This post will show you how to build on this foundation and configure your domains to align with additional email security standards, including the following:

  • Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI) – This standard allows you to associate a logo with your email domain, which some email clients will display to users in their inbox. Visit the BIMI Group’s Where is my BIMI Logo Displayed? webpage to see how logos are displayed in the user interfaces of BIMI-supporting mailbox providers; Figure 1 shows a mock-up of a typical layout that contains a logo.
  • Mail Transfer Agent Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) – This standard helps ensure that email servers always use TLS encryption and certificate-based authentication when they send messages to your domain, to protect the confidentiality and integrity of email in transit.
  • SMTP TLS reporting – This reporting allows you to receive reports and monitor your domain’s TLS security posture, identify problems, and learn about attacks that might be occurring.
Figure 1: A mock-up of how BIMI enables branded logos to be displayed in email user interfaces

Figure 1: A mock-up of how BIMI enables branded logos to be displayed in email user interfaces

These three standards require your Domain Name System (DNS) to publish specific records, for example by using Amazon Route 53, that point to web pages that have additional information. You can host this information without having to maintain a web server by storing it in Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) and delivering it through Amazon CloudFront, secured with a certificate provisioned from AWS Certificate Manager (ACM).

Note: This AWS solution works for DKIM, BIMI, and DMARC, regardless of what you use to serve the actual email for your domains, which services you use to send email, and where you host DNS. For purposes of clarity, this post assumes that you are using Route 53 for DNS. If you use a different DNS hosting provider, you will manually configure DNS records in your existing hosting provider.

Solution architecture

The architecture for this solution is depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2: The architecture diagram showing how the solution components interact

Figure 2: The architecture diagram showing how the solution components interact

The interaction points are as follows:

  1. The web content is stored in an S3 bucket, and CloudFront has access to this bucket through an origin access identity, a mechanism of AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM).
  2. As described in more detail in the BIMI section of this blog post, the Verified Mark Certificate is obtained from a BIMI-qualified certificate authority and stored in the S3 bucket.
  3. When an external email system receives a message claiming to be from your domain, it looks up BIMI records for your domain in DNS. As depicted in the diagram, a DNS request is sent to Route 53.
  4. To retrieve the BIMI logo image and Verified Mark Certificate, the external email system will make HTTPS requests to a URL published in the BIMI DNS record. In this solution, the URL points to the CloudFront distribution, which has a TLS certificate provisioned with ACM.

A few important warnings

Email is a complex system of interoperating technologies. It is also brittle: a typo or a missing DNS record can make the difference between whether an email is delivered or not. Pay close attention to your email server and the users of your email systems when implementing the solution in this blog post. The main indicator that something is wrong is the absence of email. Instead of seeing an error in your email server’s log, users will tell you that they’re expecting to receive an email from somewhere and it’s not arriving. Or they will tell you that they sent an email, and their recipient can’t find it.

The DNS uses a lot of caching and time-out values to improve its efficiency. That makes DNS records slow and a little unpredictable as they propagate across the internet. So keep in mind that as you monitor your systems, it can be hours or even more than a day before the DNS record changes have an effect that you can detect.

This solution uses AWS Cloud Development Kit (CDK) custom resources, which are supported by AWS Lambda functions that will be created as part of the deployment. These functions are configured to use CDK-selected runtimes, which will eventually pass out of support and require you to update them.

Prerequisites

You will need permission in an AWS account to create and configure the following resources:

  • An Amazon S3 bucket to store the files and access logs
  • A CloudFront distribution to publicly deliver the files from the S3 bucket
  • A TLS certificate in ACM
  • An origin access identity in IAM that CloudFront will use to access files in Amazon S3
  • Lambda functions, IAM roles, and IAM policies created by CDK custom resources

You might also want to enable these optional services:

  • Amazon Route 53 for setting the necessary DNS records. If your domain is hosted by another DNS provider, you will set these DNS records manually.
  • Amazon SES or an Amazon WorkMail organization with a single mailbox. You can configure either service with a subdomain (for example, [email protected]) such that the existing domain is not disrupted, or you can create new email addresses by using your existing email mailbox provider.

BIMI has some additional requirements:

  • BIMI requires an email domain to have implemented a strong DMARC policy so that recipients can be confident in the authenticity of the branded logos. Your email domain must have a DMARC policy of p=quarantine or p=reject. Additionally, the domain’s policy cannot have sp=none or pct<100.

    Note: Do not adjust the DMARC policy of your domain without careful testing, because this can disrupt mail delivery.

  • You must have your brand’s logo in Scaled Vector Graphics (SVG) format that conforms to the BIMI standard. For more information, see Creating BIMI SVG Logo Files on the BIMI Group website.
  • Purchase a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC) issued by a third-party certificate authority. This certificate attests that the logo, organization, and domain are associated with each other, based on a legal trademark registration. Many email hosting providers require this additional certificate before they will show your branded logo to their users. Others do not currently support BIMI, and others might have alternative mechanisms to determine whether to show your logo. For more information about purchasing a Verified Mark Certificate, see the BIMI Group website.

    Note: If you are not ready to purchase a VMC, you can deploy this solution and validate that BIMI is correctly configured for your domain, but your branded logo will not display to recipients at major email providers.

What gets deployed in this solution?

This solution deploys the DNS records and supporting files that are required to implement BIMI, MTA-STS, and SMTP TLS reporting for an email domain. We’ll look at the deployment in more detail in the following sections.

BIMI

BIMI is described by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as follows:

Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI) permits Domain Owners to coordinate with Mail User Agents (MUAs) to display brand-specific Indicators next to properly authenticated messages. There are two aspects of BIMI coordination: a scalable mechanism for Domain Owners to publish their desired Indicators, and a mechanism for Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) to verify the authenticity of the Indicator. This document specifies how Domain Owners communicate their desired Indicators through the BIMI Assertion Record in DNS and how that record is to be interpreted by MTAs and MUAs. MUAs and mail-receiving organizations are free to define their own policies for making use of BIMI data and for Indicator display as they see fit.

If your organization has a trademark-protected logo, you can set up BIMI to have that logo displayed to recipients in their email inboxes. This can have a positive impact on your brand and indicates to end users that your email is more trustworthy. The BIMI Group shows examples of how brand logos are displayed in user inboxes, as well as a list of known email service providers that support the display of BIMI logos.

As a domain owner, you can implement BIMI by publishing the relevant DNS records and hosting the relevant files. To have your logo displayed by most email hosting providers, you will need to purchase a Verified Mark Certificate from a BIMI-qualified certificate authority.

This solution will deploy a valid BIMI record in Route 53 (or tell you what to publish in the DNS if you’re not using Route 53) and will store your provided SVG logo and Verified Mark Certificate files in Amazon S3, to be delivered through CloudFront with a valid TLS certificate from ACM.

To support BIMI, the solution makes the following changes to your resources:

  1. A DNS record of type TXT is published at the following host:
    default._bimi.<your-domain>. The value of this record is: v=BIMI1; l=<url-of-your-logo> a=<url-of-verified-mark-certificate>. The value of <your-domain> refers to the domain that is used in the From header of messages that your organization sends.
  2. The logo and optional Verified Mark Certificate are hosted publicly at the HTTPS locations defined by <url-of-your-logo> and <url-of-verified-mark-certificate>, respectively.

MTA-STS

MTA-STS is described by the IETF in RFC 8461 as follows:

SMTP (Simple Mail Transport Protocol) MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) is a mechanism enabling mail service providers to declare their ability to receive Transport Layer Security (TLS) secure SMTP connections and to specify whether sending SMTP servers should refuse to deliver to MX hosts that do not offer TLS with a trusted server certificate.

Put simply, MTA-STS helps ensure that email servers always use encryption and certificate-based authentication when sending email to your domains, so that message integrity and confidentiality are preserved while in transit across the internet. MTA-STS also helps to ensure that messages are only sent to authorized servers.

This solution will deploy a valid MTA-STS policy record in Route 53 (or tell you what value to publish in the DNS if you’re not using Route 53) and will create an MTA-STS policy document to be hosted on S3 and delivered through CloudFront with a valid TLS certificate from ACM.

To support MTA-STS, the solution makes the following changes to your resources:

  1. A DNS record of type TXT is published at the following host: _mta-sts.<your-domain>. The value of this record is: v=STSv1; id=<unique value used for cache invalidation>.
  2. The MTA-STS policy document is hosted at and obtained from the following location: https://mta-sts.<your-domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
  3. The value of <your-domain> in both cases is the domain that is used for routing inbound mail to your organization and is typically the same domain that is used in the From header of messages that your organization sends externally. Depending on the complexity of your organization, you might receive inbound mail for multiple domains, and you might choose to publish MTA-STS policies for each domain.

Is it ever bad to encrypt everything?

In the example MTA-STS policy file provided in the GitHub repository and explained later in this post, the MTA-STS policy mode is set to testing. This means that your email server is advertising its willingness to negotiate encrypted email connections, but it does not require TLS. Servers that want to send mail to you are allowed to connect and deliver mail even if there are problems in the TLS connection, as long as you’re in testing mode. You should expect reports when servers try to connect through TLS to your mail server and fail to do so.

Be fully prepared before you change the MTA-STS policy to enforce. After this policy is set to enforce, servers that follow the MTA-STS policy and that experience an enforceable TLS-related error when they try to connect to your mail server will not deliver mail to your mail server. This is a difficult situation to detect. You will simply stop receiving email from servers that comply with the policy. You might receive reports from them indicating what errors they encountered, but it is not guaranteed. Be sure that the email address you provide in SMTP TLS reporting (in the following section) is functional and monitored by people who can take action to fix issues. If you miss TLS failure reports, you probably won’t receive email. If the TLS certificate that you use on your email server expires, and your MTA-STS policy is set to enforce, this will become an urgent issue and will disrupt the flow of email until it is fixed.

SMTP TLS reporting

SMTP TLS reporting is described by the IETF in RFC 8460 as follows:

A number of protocols exist for establishing encrypted channels between SMTP Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs), including STARTTLS, DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA, and MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS). These protocols can fail due to misconfiguration or active attack, leading to undelivered messages or delivery over unencrypted or unauthenticated channels. This document describes a reporting mechanism and format by which sending systems can share statistics and specific information about potential failures with recipient domains. Recipient domains can then use this information to both detect potential attacks and diagnose unintentional misconfigurations.

As you gain the security benefits of MTA-STS, SMTP TLS reporting will allow you to receive reports from other internet email providers. These reports contain information that is valuable when monitoring your TLS security posture, identifying problems, and learning about attacks that might be occurring.

This solution will deploy a valid SMTP TLS reporting record on Route 53 (or provide you with the value to publish in the DNS if you are not using Route 53).

To support SMTP TLS reporting, the solution makes the following changes to your resources:

  1. A DNS record of type TXT is published at the following host: _smtp._tls.<your-domain>. The value of this record is: v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:<report-receiver-email-address>
  2. The value of <report-receiver-email-address> might be an address in your domain or in a third-party provider. Automated systems that process these reports must be capable of processing GZIP compressed files and parsing JSON.

Deploy the solution with the AWS CDK

In this section, you’ll learn how to deploy the solution to create the previously described AWS resources in your account.

  1. Clone the following GitHub repository:

    git clone https://github.com/aws-samples/serverless-mail
    cd serverless-mail/email-security-records

  2. Edit CONFIG.py to reflect your desired settings, as follows:
    1. If no Verified Mark Certificate is provided, set VMC_FILENAME = None.
    2. If your DNS zone is not hosted on Route 53, or if you do not want this app to manage Route 53 DNS records, set ROUTE_53_HOSTED = False. In this case, you will need to set TLS_CERTIFICATE_ARN to the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of a certificate hosted on ACM in us-east-1. This certificate is used by CloudFront and must support two subdomains: mta-sts and your configured BIMI_ASSET_SUBDOMAIN.
  3. Finalize the preparation, as follows:
    1. Place your BIMI logo and Verified Mark Certificate files in the assets folder.
    2. Create an MTA-STS policy file at assets/.well-known/mta-sts.txt to reflect your mail exchange (MX) servers and policy requirements. An example file is provided at assets/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.example
  4. Deploy the solution, as follows:
    1. Open a terminal in the email-security-records folder.
    2. (Recommended) Create and activate a virtual environment by running the following commands.
      python3 -m venv .venv
      source .venv/bin/activate
    3. Install the Python requirements in your environment with the following command.
      pip install -r requirements.txt
    4. Assume a role in the target account that has the permissions outlined in the Prerequisites section of this post.

      Using AWS CDK version 2.17.0 or later, deploy the bootstrap in the target account by running the following command. To learn more, see Bootstrapping in the AWS CDK Developer Guide.
      cdk bootstrap

    5. Run the following command to synthesize the CloudFormation template. Review the output of this command to verify what will be deployed.
      cdk synth
    6. Run the following command to deploy the CloudFormation template. You will be prompted to accept the IAM changes that will be applied to your account.
      cdk deploy

      Note: If you use Route53, these records are created and activated in your DNS zones as soon as the CDK finishes deploying. As the records propagate through the DNS, they will gradually start affecting the email in the affected domains.

    7. If you’re not using Route53 and instead are using a third-party DNS provider, create the CNAME and TXT records as indicated. In this case, your email is not affected by this solution until you create the records in DNS.

Testing and troubleshooting

After you have deployed the CDK solution, you can test it to confirm that the DNS records and web resources are published correctly.

BIMI

  1. Query the BIMI DNS TXT record for your domain by using the dig or nslookup command in your terminal.

    dig +short TXT default._bimi.<your-domain.example>

    Verify the response. For example:

    "v=BIMI1; l=https://bimi-assets.<your-domain.example>/logo.svg"

  2. In your web browser, open the URL from that response (for example, https://bimi-assets.<your-domain.example>/logo.svg) to verify that the logo is available and that the HTTPS certificate is valid.
  3. The BIMI group provides a tool to validate your BIMI configuration. This tool will also validate your VMC if you have purchased one.

MTA-STS

  1. Query the MTA-STS DNS TXT record for your domain.

    dig +short TXT _mta-sts.<your-domain.example>

    The value of this record is as follows:

    v=STSv1; id=<unique value used for cache invalidation>

  2. You can load the MTA-STS policy document using your web browser. For example, https://mta-sts.<your-domain.example>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
  3. You can also use third party tools to examine your MTA-STS configuration, such as MX Toolbox.

TLS reporting

  1. Query the TLS reporting DNS TXT record for your domain.

    dig +short TXT _smtp._tls.<your-domain.example>

    Verify the response. For example:

    "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:<your email address>"

  2. You can also use third party tools to examine your TLS reporting configuration, such as Easy DMARC.

Depending on which domains you communicate with on the internet, you will begin to see TLS reports arriving at the email address that you have defined in the TLS reporting DNS record. We recommend that you closely examine the TLS reports, and use automated analytical techniques over an extended period of time before changing the default testing value of your domain’s MTA-STS policy. Not every email provider will send TLS reports, but examining the reports in aggregate will give you a good perspective for making changes to your MTA-STS policy.

Cleanup

To remove the resources created by this solution:

  1. Open a terminal in the cdk-email-security-records folder.
  2. Assume a role in the target account with permission to delete resources.
  3. Run cdk destroy.

Note: The asset and log buckets are automatically emptied and deleted by the cdk destroy command.

Conclusion

When external systems send email to or receive email from your domains they will now query your new DNS records and will look up your domain’s BIMI, MTA-STS, and TLS reporting information from your new CloudFront distribution. By adopting the email domain security mechanisms outlined in this post, you can improve the overall security posture of your email environment, as well as the perception of your brand.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Michael Davie

Michael Davie

Michael is a Senior Industry Specialist with AWS Security Assurance. He works with our customers, their regulators, and AWS teams to help raise the bar on secure cloud adoption and usage. Michael has over 20 years of experience working in the defence, intelligence, and technology sectors in Canada and is a licensed professional engineer.

Jesse Thompson

Jesse Thompson

Jesse is an Email Deliverability Manager with the Amazon Simple Email Service team. His background is in enterprise IT development and operations, with a focus on email abuse mitigation and encouragement of authenticity practices with open standard protocols. Jesse’s favorite activity outside of technology is recreational curling.

A new, configurable and scalable version of Geo Key Manager, now available in Closed Beta

Post Syndicated from Dina Kozlov original https://blog.cloudflare.com/configurable-and-scalable-geo-key-manager-closed-beta/

A new, configurable and scalable version of Geo Key Manager, now available in Closed Beta

A new, configurable and scalable version of Geo Key Manager, now available in Closed Beta

Today, traffic on the Internet stays encrypted through the use of public and private keys that encrypt the data as it’s being transmitted. Cloudflare helps secure millions of websites by managing the encryption keys that keep this data protected. To provide lightning fast services, Cloudflare stores these keys on our fleet of data centers that spans more than 150 countries. However, some compliance regulations require that private keys are only stored in specific geographic locations.

In 2017, we introduced Geo Key Manager, a product that allows customers to store and manage the encryption keys for their domains in different geographic locations so that compliance regulations are met and that data remains secure. We launched the product a few months before General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) went into effect and built it to support three regions: the US, the European Union (EU), and a set of our top tier data centers that employ the highest security measures. Since then, GDPR-like laws have quickly expanded and now, more than 15 countries have comparable data protection laws or regulations that include restrictions on data transfer across and/or data localization within a certain boundary.

At Cloudflare, we like to be prepared for the future. We want to give our customers tools that allow them to maintain compliance in this ever-changing environment. That’s why we’re excited to announce a new version of Geo Key Manager — one that allows customers to define boundaries by country, ”only store my private keys in India”, by a region ”only store my private keys in the European Union”, or by a standard, such as “only store my private keys in FIPS compliant data centers” — now available in Closed Beta, sign up here!

Learnings from Geo Key Manager v1

Geo Key Manager has been around for a few years now, and we’ve used this time to gather feedback from our customers. As the demand for a more flexible system grew, we decided to go back to the drawing board and create a new version of Geo Key Manager that would better meet our customers’ needs.

We initially launched Geo Key Manager with support for US, EU, and Highest Security Data centers. Those regions were sufficient at the time, but customers wrestling with data localization obligations in other jurisdictions need more flexibility when it comes to selecting countries and regions. Some customers want to be able to set restrictions to maintain their private keys in one country, some want the keys stored everywhere except in certain countries, and some may want to mix and match rules and say “store them in X and Y, but not in Z”. What we learned from our customers is that they need flexibility, something that will allow them to keep up with the ever-changing rules and policies — and that’s what we set out to build out.

The next issue we faced was scalability.  When we built the initial regions, we included a hard-coded list of data centers that met our criteria for the US, EU, “high security” data center regions.  However, this list was static because the underlying cryptography did not support dynamic changes to our list of data centers. In order to distribute private keys to new data centers that met our criteria, we would have had to completely overhaul the system. In addition to that, our network significantly expands every year, with more than 100 new data centers since the initial launch. That means that any new potential locations that could be used to store private keys are currently not in use, degrading the performance and reliability of customers using this feature.

With our current scale, automation and expansion is a must-have. Our new system needs to dynamically scale every time we onboard or remove a data center from our Network, without any human intervention or large overhaul.

Finally, one of our biggest learnings was that customers make mistakes, such as defining a region that’s so small that availability becomes a concern. Our job is to prevent our customers from making changes that we know will negatively impact them.

Define your own geo-restrictions with the new version of Geo Key Manager

A new, configurable and scalable version of Geo Key Manager, now available in Closed Beta

Cloudflare has significantly grown in the last few years and so has our international customer base. Customers need to keep their traffic regionalized. This region can be as broad as a continent — Asia, for example. Or, it can be a specific country, like Japan.

From our conversations with our customers, we’ve heard that they want to be able to define these regions themselves. This is why today we’re excited to announce that customers will be able to use Geo Key Manager to create what we call “policies”.

A policy can be a single country, defined by two-letter (ISO 3166) country code. It can be a region, such as “EU” for the European Union or Oceania. It can be a mix and match of the two, “country:US or region: EU”.

Our new policy based Geo Key Manager allows you to create allowlist or blocklists of countries and supported regions, giving you control over the boundary in which your private key will be stored. If you’d like to store your private keys globally and omit a few countries, you can do that.

If you would like to store your private keys in the EU and US, you would make the following API call:

curl -X POST "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/zone_id/custom_certificates" \
     -H "X-Auth-Email: [email protected]" \
     -H "X-Auth-Key: auth-key" \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     --data '{"certificate":"certificate","private_key":"private_key","policy":"(country: US) or (region: EU)", "type": "sni_custom"}'

If you would like to store your private keys in the EU, but not in France, here is how you can define that:

curl -X POST "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/zone_id/custom_certificates" \
     -H "X-Auth-Email: [email protected]" \
     -H "X-Auth-Key: auth-key" \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     --data '{"certificate":"certificate","private_key":"private_key","policy": "region: EU and (not country: FR)", "type": "sni_custom"}'

Geo Key Manager can now support more than 30 countries and regions. But that’s not all! The superpower of our Geo Key Manager technology is that it doesn’t actually have to be “geo” based, but instead, it’s attribute based. In the future, we’ll have a policy that will allow our customers to define where their private keys are stored based on a compliance standard like FedRAMP or ISO 27001.

Reliability, resiliency, and redundancy

By giving our customers the remote control for Geo Key Manager, we want to make sure that customers understand the impact of their changes on both redundancy and latency.

On the redundancy side, one of our biggest concerns is allowing customers to choose a region small enough that if a data center is removed for maintenance, for example, then availability is drastically impacted. To protect our customers, we’ve added redundancy restrictions. These prevent our customers from setting regions with too few data centers, ensuring that all the data centers within a policy can offer high availability and redundancy.

Not just that, but in the last few years, we’ve significantly improved the underlying networking that powers Geo Key Manager. For more information on how we did that, keep an eye out for a technical deep dive inside Geo Key Manager.

Performance matters

A new, configurable and scalable version of Geo Key Manager, now available in Closed Beta

With the original regions (US, EU, and Highest Security Data Centers), we learned customers may overlook possible latency impacts that occur when defining the key manager to a certain region. Imagine your keys are stored in the US. For your Asia-based customers, there’s going to be some latency impact for the requests that go around the world. Now, with customers being able to define more granular regions, we want to make sure that before customers make that change, they see the impact of it.

If you’re an E-Commerce platform then performance is always top-of-mind. One thing that we’re working on right now is performance metrics for Geo Key Manager policies both from a regional point of view — “what’s the latency impact for Asia based customers?” and from a global point of view — “for anyone in the world, what is the average impact of this policy?”.

By seeing the latency impact, if you see that the impact is unacceptable, you may want to create a separate domain for your service that’s specific to the region that it’s serving.

Closed Beta, now available!

Interested in trying out the latest version of Geo Key Manager? Fill out this form.

Coming soon!

Geo Key Manager is only available via API at the moment. But, we are working on creating an easy-to-use UI for it, so that customers can easily manage their policies and regions. In addition, we’ll surface performance measurements and warnings when we see any degraded impact in terms of performance or redundancy to ensure that customers are mindful when setting policies.

We’re also excited to extend our Geo Key Manager product beyond custom uploaded certificates. In the future, certificates issued through Advanced Certificate Manager or SSL for SaaS will be allowed to add policy based restrictions for the key storage.

Finally, we’re looking to add more default regions to make the selection process simple for our customers. If you have any regions that you’d like us to support, or just general feedback or feature requests related to Geo Key Manager, make a note of it on the form. We love hearing from our customers!

Bringing authentication and identification to Workers through Mutual TLS

Post Syndicated from Dina Kozlov original https://blog.cloudflare.com/mutual-tls-for-workers/

Bringing authentication and identification to Workers through Mutual TLS

Bringing authentication and identification to Workers through Mutual TLS

We’re excited to announce that Workers will soon be able to send outbound requests through a mutually authenticated channel via mutual TLS authentication!

When making outbound requests from a Worker, TLS is always used on the server side, so that the client can validate that the information is being sent to the right destination. But in the same way, the server may want to authenticate the client to ensure that the request is coming from an authorized client. This two-way street of authentication is called Mutual TLS. In this blog, we’re going to talk through the importance of mutual TLS authentication, what it means to use mutual TLS within Workers, and how in a few months you’ll be able to use it to send information through an authenticated channel — adding a layer of security to your application!

mTLS between Cloudflare and an Origin

Mutual TLS authentication works by having a server validate the client certificate against a CA. If the validation passes then the server knows that it’s the right client and will let the request go through. If the validation fails or if a client certificate is not presented then the server can choose to drop the request.

Today, customers use mTLS to secure connections between Cloudflare and an origin — this is done through a product called Authenticated Origin Pull. Once a customer enables it, Cloudflare starts serving a client certificate on all outgoing requests. This is either a Cloudflare managed client certificate or it can be one uploaded by the customer. When enabled, Cloudflare will present this certificate when connecting to an origin. The origin should then check the client certificate to see if it’s the one that it expects to see. If it is then the request will go through. If it’s the wrong client certificate or is not included then the origin can choose to drop the request.

Doing this brings a big security boost because it allows the origin to only accept traffic from Cloudflare and drop any unexpected external traffic.

Digging up problems with dogfooding

Today, many Cloudflare services are built on Cloudflare Workers — it’s the secret sauce we use to continuously ship fast, reliable products to our customers. Internally, we might have one Cloudflare account that runs multiple services, with each service deployed on an individual Worker.

Whenever one service needs to talk to another, the fetch() function is used to request or send information. This can be object data that we send to upstream providers, it can be a read or write to a database, or service to service communication. In most regards, the information that’s going to the origin is sensitive and requires a layer of authentication. Without proper authentication, any client would be able to access the data, removing a layer of security.

Implementing service to service authentication

Today, there are a few ways that you can set up service to service authentication, if you’re building on Workers.

One way to set up service authentication is to use Authenticated Origin Pull. Authenticated Origin Pull allows customers to implement mutual TLS between Cloudflare and an origin by attaching a client certificate and private key to a domain or hostname, so that all outbound requests include a client certificate. The origin can then check this certificate to see whether the request came from Cloudflare. If there’s a valid certificate, then the origin can let the request through and if there’s an invalid certificate or no certificate then the origin can choose to drop the request. However, Authenticated Origin Pull has its limitations and isn’t ideal for some use-cases.

The first limitation is that an Authenticated Origin Pull certificate is tied to a publicly hosted hostname or domain. Some services that are built on Workers don’t necessarily need to be exposed to the public Internet. Therefore, tying it to a domain doesn’t really make sense.

The next limitation is that if you have multiple Workers services that are each writing to the same database, you may want to be able to distinguish them. What if at some point, you need to take the “write” power away from the Worker? Or, what if only Workers A and B are allowed to make writes but Worker C should only make “read” requests?

Today, if you use Authenticated Origin Pulls with Cloudflare’s client certificate then all requests will be accepted as valid. This is because for all outbound requests, we attach the same client certificate. So even though you’re restricting your traffic to “Cloudflare-Only”, there’s no Worker-level granularity.

Now, there’s another solution that you can use. You can make use of Access and set up Token Authentication by using a pre-shared key and configuring your Worker to allow or deny access based on the pre-shared key, presented in the header. While this does allow you to lock down authentication on a per-Worker or per-service basis, the feedback that we’ve gotten from our internal teams who have implemented this is that it’s 1) cumbersome to manage and 2) requires the two service to speak over HTTP, and 3) doesn’t expose the client’s identity. And so, with these limitations in mind, we’re excited to bring mutual TLS authentication to Workers — an easy, scalable way to manage authentication and identity for anyone building on Workers.

Coming soon: Mutual TLS for Workers

We’re excited to announce that in the next few months, we’re going to be bringing mutual TLS support to Workers. Customers will be able to upload client certificates to Cloudflare and attach them in the fetch() requests within a Worker. That way, you can have per-Worker or even per-request level of granularity when it comes to authentication and identification.

When sending out the subrequest, Cloudflare will present the client certificate and the receiving server will be able to check:

1) Is this client presenting a valid certificate?
2) Within Cloudflare, what service or Worker is this request coming from?

This is one of our most highly requested features, both from customers and from internal teams, and we’re excited to launch it and make it a no-brainer for any developer to use Cloudflare as their platform for anything they want to build!

An Untrustworthy TLS Certificate in Browsers

Post Syndicated from Bruce Schneier original https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/11/an-untrustworthy-tls-certificate-in-browsers.html

The major browsers natively trust a whole bunch of certificate authorities, and some of them are really sketchy:

Google’s Chrome, Apple’s Safari, nonprofit Firefox and others allow the company, TrustCor Systems, to act as what’s known as a root certificate authority, a powerful spot in the internet’s infrastructure that guarantees websites are not fake, guiding users to them seamlessly.

The company’s Panamanian registration records show that it has the identical slate of officers, agents and partners as a spyware maker identified this year as an affiliate of Arizona-based Packet Forensics, which public contracting records and company documents show has sold communication interception services to U.S. government agencies for more than a decade.

[…]

In the earlier spyware matter, researchers Joel Reardon of the University of Calgary and Serge Egelman of the University of California at Berkeley found that a Panamanian company, Measurement Systems, had been paying developers to include code in a variety of innocuous apps to record and transmit users’ phone numbers, email addresses and exact locations. They estimated that those apps were downloaded more than 60 million times, including 10 million downloads of Muslim prayer apps.

Measurement Systems’ website was registered by Vostrom Holdings, according to historic domain name records. Vostrom filed papers in 2007 to do business as Packet Forensics, according to Virginia state records. Measurement Systems was registered in Virginia by Saulino, according to another state filing.

More details by Reardon.

Cory Doctorow does a great job explaining the context and the general security issues.

EDITED TO ADD (11/10): Slashdot thread.

How to evaluate and use ECDSA certificates in AWS Certificate Manager

Post Syndicated from Zachary Miller original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-evaluate-and-use-ecdsa-certificates-in-aws-certificate-manager/

AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) is a managed service that enables you to provision, manage, and deploy public and private SSL/TLS certificates that you can use to securely encrypt network traffic. You can now use ACM to request Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) certificates and associate the certificates with AWS services like Application Load Balancer (ALB) or Amazon CloudFront. As a result, you get the benefit of managed renewal, where ACM can automatically renew ECDSA certificates before they expire. Previously, you could only request certificates with an RSA 2048 key algorithm from ACM. ECDSA certificates could be imported to ACM, but imported certificates cannot use managed renewal.

You can request both ECDSA P-256 and P-384 certificates from ACM. If you do not request an ECDSA certificate, ACM will issue an RSA 2048 certificate by default.

In this blog post, we will briefly examine the differences between RSA and ECDSA certificates, discuss some important considerations when evaluating which certificate type to use, and walk through how you can request an ECDSA certificate and associate it with an application load balancer in AWS.

Cryptographic certificates overview

TLS certificates are used to secure network communications and establish the identity of websites over the internet, as well as the identity of resources on private networks. Public certificates that you request through ACM are obtained from Amazon Trust Services, which is an Amazon managed public certificate authority (CA).

Private certificates are issued through certificate authorities, which you can create and manage by using AWS Private Certificate Authority (AWS Private CA).

Both public and private certificates can help customers identify resources on networks and secure communication between these resources. Public certificates identify resources on the public internet, whereas private certificates do the same for private networks. One key difference is that applications and browsers trust public certificates by default, but an administrator must explicitly configure applications and devices to trust private certificates.

RSA and ECDSA primer

RSA and ECDSA are two widely used public-key cryptographic algorithms—algorithms that use two different keys to encrypt and decrypt data. In the case of TLS, a public key is used to encrypt data, and a private key is used to decrypt data. Public key (or asymmetric key) algorithms are not as computationally efficient as symmetric key algorithms like AES. For this reason, public key algorithms like RSA and ECDSA are primarily used to exchange secrets between two parties initiating a TLS connection. These secrets are then used by both parties to decipher the same symmetric key that actually encrypts the data in transit.

RSA stands for Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman: the researchers who first publicly described this algorithm in 1977. The basic functionality of RSA relies on the idea that large prime numbers are very difficult to efficiently factor. ECDSA, or Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, is based on certain unique mathematical properties of elliptic curves that make them very useful for cryptographic operations. The cryptographic utility of ECDSA comes from a concept called the discrete logarithm problem.

Considerations when choosing between RSA and ECDSA

What are the important differences between RSA and ECDSA certificates? When should you choose ECDSA certificates to encrypt network traffic? In this section, we’ll examine the security and performance considerations that help to determine whether ECDSA or RSA certificates are the best choice for your workload.

Security

In cryptography, security is measured as the computational work it takes to exhaust all possible values of a symmetric key in an ideal cipher. An ideal cipher is a theoretical algorithm that has no weaknesses, so you must try every possible key to discover which is the correct key. This is similar to the idea of “brute forcing” a password: trying every possible character combination to find the correct password.

Let’s imagine you have a 112-bit key ideal cipher, which means it would take 2112 tries to exhaust the key space—we would say this cipher has a 112-bit security strength. However, it is important to realize that security strength and key length are not always equal—meaning that an encryption key with a length of 112 bits will not always have a 112-bit security strength.

ECDSA provides higher security strength for lower computational cost. ECDSA P-256, for example, provides 128-bit security strength and is equivalent to an RSA 3072 key. Meanwhile, ECDSA P-384 provides 192-bit security strength, equivalent to the key associated with an RSA 7680 certificate. In other words, an ECDSA P-384 key would require 2192 tries to exhaust the key space.

The following table provides an in-depth comparison of the different security strengths for RSA key lengths and ECDSA curve types. Note that only RSA 2048 and ECDSA P-256 and P-384 are currently issued by ACM. However, ACM does support the import and usage of the other certificate types listed in the table. For more information, see Importing certificates into AWS Certificate Manager.

Security strength RSA key length ECDSA curve type
80-bit 1024 160
112-bit 2048 224
128-bit 3072 256
192-bit 7680 384
256-bit 15360 512

Performance

ECDSA provides a higher security strength (for a given key length) than RSA but does not add performance overhead. For example, ECDSA P-256 is as performant as RSA 2048 while providing security strength that is comparable to RSA 3072.

ECDSA certificates also have up to a 50% smaller certificate size when compared to RSA certificates, and are therefore more suitable to protect data-in-transit over low bandwidth or for applications with limited memory and storage, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices.

Take a look at the following certificate examples; you can see the size difference between RSA and ECDSA certificates.

RSA 2048: ECDSA P-256 (EC_prime256v1):
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

Consider a small IoT sensor device that tracks temperature in an office building. This device typically has very low storage capacity and compute power, so the smaller ECDSA certificate will be easier to process and store. In the case of an IoT device, you might not be able to store the entire RSA certificate chain on the device due to memory limitations and the larger size of RSA certificates. This can make it more difficult to validate the chain of trust for that certificate.

Using ECDSA, customers can take advantage of the smaller size of the certificates (and the certificate trust chain) and store the entire chain of trust on the IoT device itself, enabling the IoT device to more easily validate the certificate.

When should I use ECDSA certificates from ACM?

In general, you should consider using ECDSA certificates wherever possible, because they provide stronger security (for a given key length) compared to RSA, without impacting performance. You can also choose to issue ECDSA certificates from ACM to implement 128-bit or 192-bit TLS security, where previously you could request up to 112-bit security from ACM by using RSA 2048 certificates.

ECDSA certificates are strongly recommended for applications that need to securely send data over low-bandwidth connections, or when you are using IoT devices that might not have much memory or computational power to store and process the larger certificate sizes that RSA offers.

If your application is not ECDSA compatible, you will need to continue using RSA certificates. RSA 2048 remains the default certificate type issued by ACM, in order to prevent compatibility issues with legacy applications or with applications that do not support ECDSA certificate types. We will provide links to check if your application is compatible with ECDSA certificate types in the next section of this blog.

Getting started with ECDSA certificates

Modern browsers and operating systems are ECDSA compatible. That said, some custom applications might not be ECDSA compatible. You can check whether your calling application is ECDSA compatible by accessing the following links from your application:

ECDSA P-256

ECDSA P-384

When you access one of these links, you should see a message stating “Expected Status: good”. This indicates that the application is ECDSA compatible. See Figure 1 for an example of a successful result.

Figure 1: ECDSA application compatibility example

Figure 1: ECDSA application compatibility example

When you terminate your TLS traffic with ALB, you can work around compatibility concerns by binding both ECDSA and RSA certificates for a given domain. ALB will prioritize and present the ECDSA certificate when the calling application is ECDSA compatible and will use the RSA certificate if the calling application is not ECDSA compatible. We’ll walk through this configuration in the demonstration portion of this post.

How to request an ECDSA certificate from ACM

You can use the ACM console, APIs, or AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) to issue public or private ECDSA P-256 and P-384 TLS certificates. When you request certificates by using the API or AWS CLI, you can use the request-certificate API action with either EC_prime256v1 or EC_secp384r1 as the key-algorithm parameter to request a P-256 or P-384 ECDSA certificate, respectively.

Certificates have a defined validity period, and ACM will attempt to renew certificates that were issued by ACM and that are in use before they expire. ACM will also attempt to automatically bind the renewed certificates with an integrated service. ACM issued private ECDSA certificates can also be exported and used on other workloads to terminate TLS traffic.

Associate an ECDSA certificate with an Application Load Balancer for TLS

To demonstrate how to request and use ECDSA certificates from ACM, let’s examine a common use case: requesting a public certificate from ACM and associating it with an ALB. This walkthrough will also include requesting an RSA 2048 certificate and associating it with the same ALB, to facilitate TLS connections for applications that do not support ECDSA. ALB will prioritize and present the ECDSA certificate when the calling application is ECDSA compatible, and will use the RSA certificate if the calling application is not ECDSA compatible.

This procedure has the following prerequisites:

  • An AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user or role that has the appropriate permissions to request certificates from ACM and create an ALB
  • A public domain that you own
  • A public subnet, or IAM permissions to create one

To request an ECDSA certificate from ACM

  1. Navigate to the ACM console and choose Request a certificate.
  2. Choose Request a public certificate, and then choose Next.
  3. For Fully qualified domain name, enter your domain name.
  4. Choose DNS validation. DNS validation is recommended wherever possible, because it enables automatic renewal of ACM issued certificates with no action required by the domain owner. If you use Amazon Route 53, you can use ACM to directly update your DNS records. DNS-validated certificates will be renewed by ACM as long as the certificate is in use and the DNS record is in place.
    Figure 2: Requesting a public ECDSA certificate

    Figure 2: Requesting a public ECDSA certificate

  5. In the Key algorithm options section, select your preferred algorithm based on your security requirements:
    • ECDSA P-256 — Equivalent in security strength to RSA 3072
    • ECDSA P-384 — Equivalent in security strength to RSA 7680
    Figure 3: Key algorithms

    Figure 3: Key algorithms

  6. (Optional) Add tags to help you identify and manage your certificate. You can find more information on using tags in Tagging AWS resources in the AWS General Reference.
  7. Choose Request to request the public certificate.

    The certificate will now be in the Pending Validation state until the domain can be validated, either through DNS or email validation, depending on your selection in the previous steps. For information on how to validate ownership of the domain name or names, see Validating domain ownership in the AWS Certificate Manager User Guide.

  8. Take note of the certificate ARN; you will need this later to identify the certificate.

To request an RSA 2048 certificate from ACM

  1. To request a public RSA 2048 certificate, use the same steps noted in the preceding section, but select RSA 2048 in the Key algorithm options section.
  2. Make sure that both certificates you request have the same fully qualified domain name.

    For more information on requesting public certificates from ACM, see Requesting a public certificate.

To create a new Application Load Balancer and associate a default certificate

  1. Navigate to the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) console. In the left navigation pane, under Load Balancing, choose Load Balancers.
  2. Choose Create Load Balancer.

    For this post, we will use an Application Load Balancer. You can view more details on each type of Load Balancer, and see a feature-to-feature breakdown, on the Elastic Load Balancing features page.

  3. For the Application Load Balancer type, choose Create.
  4. Enter a name for your load balancer.
  5. Select the scheme and IP address type of the application load balancer. For this post, we will choose Internet-facing for the scheme and use the IPv4 address type.
    Figure 4: Create an application load balancer

    Figure 4: Create an application load balancer

  6. In the Network mapping section of this page, you will need to select a VPC and at least two Availability Zones and one public subnet per zone. If you do not already have a public subnet in two Availability Zones, see these instructions for creating a public subnet.
    Figure 5: Network mapping for ALB

    Figure 5: Network mapping for ALB

  7. Next, you need to create a secure listener. Under Listeners and routing, choose the HTTPS protocol (Port 443) in the drop-down list.
  8. Under Default action, choose Forward. For Target Group, select a target group for the ALB to send traffic to.
  9. Under Secure listener settings, you will associate the RSA 2048 certificate with the new Application Load Balancer.

    Choose the appropriate security policy for your organization—you can compare policies on this page.

  10. Under Default SSL/TLS certificate, verify that From ACM is selected, and then in the drop-down list, select the RSA certificate you requested earlier.

    Note: We are using the RSA certificate as the default so that the ALB will use this certificate if the connecting client does not support ECDSA or the Server Name Indication (SNI) protocol. This is to maximize availability and compatibility with legacy applications.

    Figure 6: Secure listener settings

    Figure 6: Secure listener settings

  11. (Optional) Add tags to the Application Load Balancer.
  12. Review your selections, and then choose Create load balancer.
    Figure 7: Review and create load balancer

    Figure 7: Review and create load balancer

To associate the ECDSA certificate with the Application Load Balancer

  1. In the EC2 console, select the new ALB you just created, and choose the Listeners tab.
  2. In the SSL Certificate column, you should see the default certificate you added when you created the ALB. Choose View/edit certificates to see the full list of certificates associated with this ALB.
    Figure 8: ALB listeners

    Figure 8: ALB listeners

  3. Under Listener certificates for SNI, choose Add certificate.
    Figure 9: Listener certificates for SNI

    Figure 9: Listener certificates for SNI

  4. Under ACM and IAM certificates, select the ECDSA certificate you requested earlier.

    Note: You can use the certificate ARN to identify the appropriate certificate.

  5. Choose Include as pending below to add the ECDSA certificate to the listener.
    Figure 10: Adding the ECDSA certificate to the load balancer listener

    Figure 10: Adding the ECDSA certificate to the load balancer listener

  6. Under Listener certificates for SNI, confirm that the ECDSA certificate is listed as pending, and choose Add pending certificates.
    Figure 11: Confirm addition of pending certificates

    Figure 11: Confirm addition of pending certificates

Great! We’ve used ACM to request a public ECDSA certificate and a public RSA 2048 certificate. Next, we associated both of these certificates with an Application Load Balancer to facilitate TLS communications between the load balancer and client devices.

If clients support the SNI protocol, the ALB uses a smart certificate selection algorithm. The load balancer will select the best certificate that the client can support from the certificate list. Certificate selection is based on the following criteria, in the following order:

  • Public key algorithm (prefer ECDSA over RSA)
  • Hashing algorithm (prefer SHA over MD5)
  • Key length (prefer the longest key)
  • Validity period

In the earlier example, this means if clients support SNI and ECDSA, the ECDSA certificate will be prioritized and presented to the client. If the client does not support SNI or ECDSA, the RSA certificate will be used to maximize compatibility with legacy applications.

Conclusion

In this blog post, we discussed the basic differences between RSA and ECDSA certificates, when you might choose ECDSA over RSA, and how you can use AWS Certificate Manager to request public or private ECDSA certificates. We also covered how to request a public ECDSA certificate from ACM and associate it with an Application Load Balancer. Finally, we showed you how to request an RSA 2048 certificate and associate it with the same load balancer to facilitate TLS for applications that do not support ECDSA certificates.

To learn more about using ACM to issue ECDSA certificates, see our YouTube video: AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) – How to evaluate and use ECDSA certificates. You can also refer to the AWS Certificate Manager documentation for more details, and then get started issuing ECDSA certificates with AWS Certificate Manager.

 
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Zach Miller

Zach Miller

Zach is a Senior Security Specialist Solutions Architect at AWS. His background is in data protection and security architecture, focused on a variety of security domains, including cryptography, secrets management, and data classification. Today, he is focused on helping enterprise AWS customers adopt and operationalize AWS security services to increase security effectiveness and reduce risk.

Chandan Kundapur

Chandan Kundapur

Chandan is a Senior Technical Product Manager on the AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) team. With over 15 years of cybersecurity experience, he has a passion for driving PKI product strategy.

Total TLS: one-click TLS for every hostname you have

Post Syndicated from Dina Kozlov original https://blog.cloudflare.com/total-tls-one-click-tls-for-every-hostname/

Total TLS: one-click TLS for every hostname you have

Total TLS: one-click TLS for every hostname you have

Today, we’re excited to announce Total TLS — a one-click feature that will issue individual TLS certificates for every subdomain in our customer’s domains.

By default, all Cloudflare customers get a free, TLS certificate that covers the apex and wildcard (example.com, *.example.com) of their domain. Now, with Total TLS, customers can get additional coverage for all of their subdomains with just one-click! Once enabled, customers will no longer have to worry about insecure connection errors to subdomains not covered by their default TLS certificate because Total TLS will keep all the traffic bound to the subdomains encrypted.

A primer on Cloudflare’s TLS certificate offerings

Universal SSL — the “easy” option

In 2014, we announced Universal SSL — a free TLS certificate for every Cloudflare customer. Universal SSL was built to be a simple “one-size-fits-all” solution. For customers that use Cloudflare as their authoritative DNS provider, this certificate covers the apex and a wildcard e.g. example.com and *.example.com. While a Universal SSL certificate provides sufficient coverage for most, some customers have deeper subdomains like a.b.example.com for which they’d like TLS coverage. For those customers, we built Advanced Certificate Manager — a customizable platform for certificate issuance that allows customers to issue certificates with the hostnames of their choice.

Advanced certificates — the “customizable” option

For customers that want flexibility and choice, we build Advanced certificates which are available as a part of Advanced Certificate Manager. With Advanced certificates, customers can specify the exact hostnames that will be included on the certificate.

That means that if my Universal SSL certificate is insufficient, I can use the Advanced certificates UI or API to request a certificate that covers “a.b.example.com” and “a.b.c.example.com”. Today, we allow customers to place up to 50 hostnames on an Advanced certificate. The only caveat — customers have to tell us which hostnames to protect.

This may seem trivial, but some of our customers have thousands of subdomains that they want to keep protected. We have customers with subdomains that range from a.b.example.com to a.b.c.d.e.f.example.com and for those to be covered, customers have to use the Advanced certificates API to tell us the hostname that they’d like us to protect. A process like this is error-prone, not easy to scale, and has been rejected as a solution by some of our largest customers.

Instead, customers want Cloudflare to issue the certificates for them. If Cloudflare is the DNS provider then Cloudflare should know what subdomains need protection. Ideally, Cloudflare would issue a TLS certificate for every subdomain that’s proxying its traffic through the Cloudflare Network… and that’s where Total TLS comes in.

Enter Total TLS: easy, customizable, and scalable

Total TLS is a one-click button that signals Cloudflare to automatically issue TLS certificates for every proxied DNS record in your domain. Once enabled, Cloudflare will issue individual certificates for every proxied hostname. This way, you can add as many DNS records and subdomains as you need to, without worrying about whether they’ll be covered by a TLS certificate.

If you have a DNS record for a.b.example.com, we’ll issue a TLS certificate with the hostname a.b.example.com. If you have a wildcard record for *.a.b.example.com then we’ll issue a TLS certificate for “*.a.b.example.com”. Here’s an example of what this will look like in the Edge Certificates table of the dashboard:

Total TLS: one-click TLS for every hostname you have

Available now

Total TLS is now available to use as a part of Advanced Certificate Manager for domains that use Cloudflare as an Authoritative DNS provider. One of the superpowers of having Cloudflare as your DNS provider is that we’ll always add the proper Domain Control Validation (DCV) records on your behalf to ensure successful certificate issuance and renewal.

Enabling Total TLS is easy — you can do it through the Cloudflare dashboard or via API. In the SSL/TLS tab of the Cloudflare dashboard, navigate to Total TLS. There, choose the issuing CA — Let’s Encrypt, Google Trust Services, or No Preference, if you’d like Cloudflare to select the CA on your behalf then click on the toggle to enable the feature.

Total TLS: one-click TLS for every hostname you have

But that’s not all…

One pain point that we wanted to address for all customers was visibility. From looking at support tickets and talking to customers, one of the things that we realized was that customers don’t always know whether their domain is covered by a TLS certificate —  a simple oversight that can result in downtime or errors.

To prevent this from happening, we are now going to warn every customer if we see that the proxied DNS record that they’re creating, viewing, or editing doesn’t have a TLS certificate covering it. This way, our customers can get a TLS certificate issued before the hostname becomes publicly available, preventing visitors from encountering this error:

Total TLS: one-click TLS for every hostname you have

Join the mission

At Cloudflare, we love building products that help secure all Internet properties. Interested in achieving this mission with us? Join the team!

Amazon introduces dynamic intermediate certificate authorities

Post Syndicated from Adina Lozada original https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/amazon-introduces-dynamic-intermediate-certificate-authorities/

AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) is a managed service that lets you provision, manage, and deploy public and private Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) certificates for use with Amazon Web Services (AWS) and your internal connected resources. Starting October 11, 2022, at 9:00 AM Pacific Time, public certificates obtained through ACM will be issued from one of the multiple intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) that Amazon manages. In this blog post, we share important details about this change and how you can prepare.

What is changing and why?

Public certificates that you request through ACM are obtained from Amazon Trust Services, which is a public certificate authority (CA) that Amazon manages. Like other public CAs, Amazon Trust Services CAs have a structured trust hierarchy. The public certificate issued to you, also known as the leaf certificate, can chain to one or more intermediate CAs and then to the Amazon Trust Services root CA. The Amazon Trust Services root CA is trusted by default by most and operating systems. This is why Amazon can issue public certificates that are trusted by these systems.

Starting October 11, 2022 at 9:00 AM Pacific Time, public certificates obtained through ACM will be issued from one of the multiple intermediate CAs that Amazon manages. These intermediate CAs chain to an existing Amazon Trust Services root CA. With this change, leaf certificates issued to you will be signed by different intermediate CAs. Before this change, Amazon maintained a limited number of intermediate CAs and issued and renewed certificates from the same intermediate CAs.

Amazon is making this change to create a more resilient and agile certificate infrastructure that will help us respond more quickly to future requirements. This change also presents an opportunity to correct a known issue related to delayed revocation of a subordinate CA and help minimize the scope of impact for new risks that might emerge in the future.

What can I do to prepare?

Most customers won’t experience an impact from this change. Browsers and most applications will continue to work just as they do now, because these services trust the Amazon Trust Services root CA and not a specific intermediate CA. If you’re using one of the standard operating systems and web browsers that are listed in the next section of this post, you don’t need to take any action.

If you use intermediate CA information through certificate pinning, you will need to make changes and pin to an Amazon Trust Services root CA instead of an intermediate CA or leaf certificate. Certificate pinning is a process in which your application that initiates the TLS connection only trusts a specific public certificate through one or more certificate variables that you define. If the pinned certificate is replaced, your application won’t initiate the connection. AWS recommends that you don’t use certificate pinning because it introduces an availability risk. However, if your use case requires certificate pinning, AWS recommends that you pin to an Amazon Trust Services root CA instead of an intermediate CA or leaf certificate. When you pin to an Amazon Trust Services root CA, you should pin to all of the root CAs shown in the following table.

Amazon Trust Services root CA certificates

Distinguished name SHA-256 hash of subject public key information Test URL
CN=Amazon Root CA
1,O=Amazon,C=US
fbe3018031f9586bcbf41727e417b7d1c45c2f47f93be372a17b96b50757d5a2 Test URL
CN=Amazon Root CA
2,O=Amazon,C=US
7f4296fc5b6a4e3b35d3c369623e364ab1af381d8fa7121533c9d6c633ea2461 Test URL
CN=Amazon Root CA
3,O=Amazon,C=US
36abc32656acfc645c61b71613c4bf21c787f5cabbee48348d58597803d7abc9 Test URL
CN=Amazon Root CA
4,O=Amazon,C=US
f7ecded5c66047d28ed6466b543c40e0743abe81d109254dcf845d4c2c7853c5 Test URL

To test that your trust store contains the Amazon Trust Services root CA, see the preceding table, which lists the Amazon Trust Services root CA certificates, and choose each test URL in the table. If the test URL works, you should see a message that says Expected Status: Good, along with the certificate chain. If the test URL doesn’t work, you will receive an error message that indicates the connection has failed.

What should I do if the Amazon Trust Services CAs are not in my trust store?

If your application is using a custom trust store, you must add the Amazon Trust Services root CAs to your application’s trust store. The instructions for doing this vary based on the application or service. Refer to the documentation for the application or service that you’re using.

If your tests of any of the test URLs failed, you must update your trust store. The simplest way to update your trust store is to upgrade the operating system or browser that you’re using.

The following operating systems use the Amazon Trust Services CAs:

  • Amazon Linux (all versions)
  • Microsoft Windows versions, with updates installed, from January 2005, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and newer versions
  • Mac OS X 10.4 with Java for Mac OS X 10.4 Release 5, Mac OS X 10.5, and newer versions
  • Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (March 2007 release), Linux 6, and Linux 7 and CentOS 5, CentOS 6, and CentOS 7
  • Ubuntu 8.10
  • Debian 5.0
  • Java 1.4.2_12, Java 5 update 2, and all newer versions, including Java 6, Java 7, and Java 8

Modern browsers trust Amazon Trust Services CAs. To update the certificate bundle in your browser, update your browser. For instructions on how to update your browser, see the update page for your browser:

Where can I get help?

If you have questions, contact AWS Support or your technical account manager (TAM), or start a new thread on the AWS re:Post ACM Forum. If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.

Want more AWS Security news? Follow us on Twitter.

Adina Lozada

Adina Lozada

Adina is a Principal Technical Program Manager on the Amazon Certificate Manager (ACM) team with over 18 years of professional experience as a multi-disciplined, security careerist in both public and private sector. She works with AWS services to help make complex, cross-functional program delivery faster for our customers.

Chandan Kundapur

Chandan Kundapur

Chandan is a, Sr. Technical Product Manager on the Amazon Certificate Manager (ACM) team. With over 15 years of cyber security experience, he has a passion for driving our product strategy to help AWS customers identify and secure their resources and endpoints with public and private certificates.

Experiment with post-quantum cryptography today

Post Syndicated from Bas Westerbaan original https://blog.cloudflare.com/experiment-with-pq/

Experiment with post-quantum cryptography today

Experiment with post-quantum cryptography today

Practically all data sent over the Internet today is at risk in the future if a sufficiently large and stable quantum computer is created. Anyone who captures data now could decrypt it.

Luckily, there is a solution: we can switch to so-called post-quantum (PQ) cryptography, which is designed to be secure against attacks of quantum computers. After a six-year worldwide selection process, in July 2022, NIST announced they will standardize Kyber, a post-quantum key agreement scheme. The standard will be ready in 2024, but we want to help drive the adoption of post-quantum cryptography.

Today we have added support for the X25519Kyber512Draft00 and X25519Kyber768Draft00 hybrid post-quantum key agreements to a number of test domains, including pq.cloudflareresearch.com.

Do you want to experiment with post-quantum on your test website for free? Mail [email protected] to enroll your test website, but read the fine-print below.

What does it mean to enable post-quantum on your website?

If you enroll your website to the post-quantum beta, we will add support for these two extra key agreements alongside the existing classical encryption schemes such as X25519. If your browser doesn’t support these post-quantum key agreements (and none at the time of writing do), then your browser will continue working with a classically secure, but not quantum-resistant, connection.

Then how to test it?

We have open-sourced a fork of BoringSSL and Go that has support for these post-quantum key agreements. With those and an enrolled test domain, you can check how your application performs with post-quantum key exchanges. We are working on support for more libraries and languages.

What to look for?

Kyber and classical key agreements such as X25519 have different performance characteristics: Kyber requires less computation, but has bigger keys and requires a bit more RAM to compute. It could very well make the connection faster if used on its own.

We are not using Kyber on its own though, but are using hybrids. That means we are doing both an X25519 and Kyber key agreement such that the connection is still classically secure if either is broken. That also means that connections will be a bit slower. In our experiments, the difference is very small, but it’s best to check for yourself.

The fine-print

Cloudflare’s post-quantum cryptography support is a beta service for experimental use only. Enabling post-quantum on your website will subject the website to Cloudflare’s Beta Services terms and will impact other Cloudflare services on the website as described below.

No stability or support guarantees

Over the coming months, both Kyber and the way it’s integrated into TLS will change for several reasons, including:

  1. Kyber will see small, but backward-incompatible changes in the coming months.
  2. We want to be compatible with other early adopters and will change our integration accordingly.
  3. As, together with the cryptography community, we find issues, we will add workarounds in our integration.

We will update our forks accordingly, but cannot guarantee any long-term stability or continued support. PQ support may become unavailable at any moment. We will post updates on pq.cloudflareresearch.com.

Features in enrolled domains

For the moment, we are running enrolled zones on a slightly different infrastructure for which not all features, notably QUIC, are available.

With that out of the way, it’s…

Demo time!

BoringSSL

With the following commands build our fork of BoringSSL and create a TLS connection with pq.cloudflareresearch.com using the compiled bssl tool. Note that we do not enable the post-quantum key agreements by default, so you have to pass the -curves flag.

$ git clone https://github.com/cloudflare/boringssl-pq
[snip]
$ cd boringssl-pq && mkdir build && cd build && cmake .. -Gninja && ninja 
[snip]
$ ./tool/bssl client -connect pq.cloudflareresearch.com -server-name pq.cloudflareresearch.com -curves Xyber512D00
	Connecting to [2606:4700:7::a29f:8a55]:443
Connected.
  Version: TLSv1.3
  Resumed session: no
  Cipher: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  ECDHE curve: X25519Kyber512Draft00
  Signature algorithm: ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
  Secure renegotiation: yes
  Extended master secret: yes
  Next protocol negotiated: 
  ALPN protocol: 
  OCSP staple: no
  SCT list: no
  Early data: no
  Encrypted ClientHello: no
  Cert subject: CN = *.pq.cloudflareresearch.com
  Cert issuer: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = E1

Go

Our Go fork doesn’t enable the post-quantum key agreement by default. The following simple Go program enables PQ by default for the http package and GETs pq.cloudflareresearch.com.

​​package main

import (
  "crypto/tls"
  "fmt"
  "net/http"
)

func main() {
  http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{
    CurvePreferences: []tls.CurveID{tls.X25519Kyber512Draft00, tls.X25519},
    CFEventHandler: func(ev tls.CFEvent) {
      switch e := ev.(type) {
      case tls.CFEventTLS13HRR:
        fmt.Printf("HelloRetryRequest\n")
      case tls.CFEventTLS13NegotiatedKEX:
        switch e.KEX {
        case tls.X25519Kyber512Draft00:
          fmt.Printf("Used X25519Kyber512Draft00\n")
        default:
          fmt.Printf("Used %d\n", e.KEX)
        }
      }
    },
  }

  if _, err := http.Get("https://pq.cloudflareresearch.com"); err != nil {
    fmt.Println(err)
  }
}

To run we need to compile our Go fork:

$ git clone https://github.com/cloudflare/go
[snip]
$ cd go/src && ./all.bash
[snip]
$ ../bin/go run path/to/example.go
Used X25519Kyber512Draft00

On the wire

So what does this look like on the wire? With Wireshark we can capture the packet flow. First a non-post quantum HTTP/2 connection with X25519:

Experiment with post-quantum cryptography today

This is a normal TLS 1.3 handshake: the client sends a ClientHello with an X25519 keyshare, which fits in a single packet. In return, the server sends its own 32 byte X25519 keyshare. It also sends various other messages, such as the certificate chain, which requires two packets in total.

Let’s check out Kyber:

Experiment with post-quantum cryptography today

As you can see the ClientHello is a bit bigger, but still fits within a single packet. The response takes three packets now, instead of two, because of the larger server keyshare.

Under the hood

Want to add client support yourself? We are using a hybrid of X25519 and Kyber version 3.02. We are writing out the details of the latter in version 00 of this CRFG IETF draft, hence the name. We are using TLS group identifiers 0xfe30 and 0xfe31 for X25519Kyber512Draft00 and X25519Kyber768Draft00 respectively.

There are some differences between our Go and BoringSSL forks that are interesting to compare.

  • Our Go fork uses our fast AVX2 optimized implementation of Kyber from CIRCL. In contrast, our BoringSSL fork uses the simpler portable reference implementation. Without the AVX2 optimisations it’s easier to evaluate. The downside is that it’s slower. Don’t be mistaken: it is still very fast, but you can check yourself.
  • Our Go fork only sends one keyshare. If the server doesn’t support it, it will respond with a HelloRetryRequest message and the client will fallback to one the server does support. This adds a roundtrip.
    Our BoringSSL fork, on the other hand, will send two keyshares: the post-quantum hybrid and a classical one (if a classical key agreement is still enabled). If the server doesn’t recognize the first, it will be able to use the second. In this way we avoid a roundtrip if the server does not support the post-quantum key agreement.

Looking ahead

The quantum future is here. In the coming years the Internet will move to post-quantum cryptography. Today we are offering our customers the tools to get a headstart and test post-quantum key agreements. We love to hear your feedback: e-mail it to [email protected].

This is just a small, but important first step. We will continue our efforts to move towards a secure and private quantum-secure Internet. Much more to come — watch this space.